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SECTION 12

People v. Tampus

FACTS:

At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976,

Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at

Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature

and to fetch water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in

the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet

and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him.

Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After

emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to

a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard:

"Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away.

In his written report submitted on the same day when the

tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to

his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado

when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his

back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim

on the chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison

guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their

extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they

assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the

insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila

guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio

of appellant raises the following issues:

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in

violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now

Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)

2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant

Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had

presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel

de oficio called upon Tampus to testify

3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public

trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at

the state penitentiary

HELD:

1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was

inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when,

after coming out of the scene of the crime, they

surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered,

and they revealed to him that they had committed an act

of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without

any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the

same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.

Not only that. The two accused, by means of that

statement given freely on the spur of the moment without

any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain

silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was

confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty

and testimony in court.

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel

de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and

Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to

be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during

custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into

account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of

guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond

reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had

executed an extrajudicial confession.

The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the

accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his

counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not

claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then

he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was

actually excluded from the place where the trial was held

or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the

trial in the national penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the

convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid

Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is

not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction

(U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as

shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio

exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence

to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The

court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude

from the trial every person except the officers of the court

and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly

barred from admission under the Bill of Rights.

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the

accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to

remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary"

extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation

by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in

propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the

interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and

inform the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence.

The fundamental rights of such unfortunate disadvantaged

persons as the accused should all the more be clearly

protected and observed. At the very least, such alleged

waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the

penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality.

Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also

well taken. After the prosecutor had presented the State's

evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel

de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became

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the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling) to

apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to

remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right

not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any

confession or incriminatory statement obtained in

violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in

evidence."

Gamboa vs. Cruz162 SCRA 642, June 27, 1988

Facts:

On July 19, 1979, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning,

petitioner

Christopher Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy, without w

arrant of arrest, by Patrolman ArturoPalencia. On July 20,

1979, during the line up of five (5) detainees including

petitioner Gamboa who was identified by complainant

Erlinda B. Bernal as one of the companionsin the

commission of the crime of robbery. On July 23, 1979, an

information for robberywas filed against him. On August

22, 1979, he was arraigned.On August 13, 1980, petitioner

filed a Motion to Acquit predicated on the groundthat the

conduct of the line- up, without notice to, and in the

absence of, his counselviolated his constitutional rights to

counsel and to due process.On October 23, 1980, the

lower court denied the Motion to Acquit, hence,

theinstant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional rights to

counsel and to due processwere violated during the

conduct of police line- up.Held:Police line- up was not part

of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not

yetentitled at such stage to counsel. When the process ha

d not yet shifted from theinvestigatory to the accusatory

as when police investigation does

not elicit a confessionthe accused may not yet avail of the

services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the courseof his

identification in the police line- up had not yet been held

to answer for a criminaloffense, he was, therefore, not

deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because

theaccusatory process had not yet set in. The police could

not have violated petitioner’s rightto counsel and due

process as the confrontation between the State and him

had not begun.The right to counsel attaches upon the start

of an investigation. At such point or stage, the person

being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid

the

pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admission

s or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing

interrogation, for the commission of an offense.On the

right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was

not, in any way,deprived of the substantive and

constitutional right, as he was duly represented by

amember of the Bar. He was accorded all the

opportunities to be heard and to presentevidence to

substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and

instead opted to file aMotion to Acquit after the

prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors

is theabsolute lack of opportunity to be heard.The petition

is dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued is

lifted

Gamboa vs cruz

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a

warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including

petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a

companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the

conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence

of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel

and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing

was set, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and

due process violated

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial

inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such

stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a

criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an

urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or

confessions or even plain information which may appear

innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he

should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he

waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing

and in the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any

way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right,

as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded

all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence

to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and

instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the

prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors

is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard

Escobedo v. Illinois

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked

to speak with his lawyer while in police custody but before

being formally charged and was denied.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak

with an attorney, and not advising them of their right to

remain silent after they have been arrested and before

they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody

as a suspect in the murder of his brother-in-law, the

petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney

arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner

did and was not allowed to speak to his client as the

officers said they had not completed questioning. The

petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent

before the interrogation. He was convicted of murder and

the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then

granted certiorari.

Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and

interrogated by police without their request to see an

attorney being honored, nor being advised of their right to

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remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance

of counsel under the Sixth Amendment?

Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioner’s conviction and remand

the case.

The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective

assistance of counsel. Here, because the police

investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather

than a less specific investigation, refusing to allow an

accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this Sixth

Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made

must thus not be admitted into evidence.

A law enforcement system that relies too much on the

confession is more subject to abuses than one that

depends on evidence obtained through skillful

investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.

Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on grounds

that this result will place obstacles in the way of legitimate

methods of criminal law enforcement. Also, he thought

Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) demanded a different

result.

Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to assistance

of counsel should not arise until indictment or

arraignment, and that this contrary result would cause

problems for fair administration of criminal justice.

Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this result

would make statements made to police inadmissible

without the accused waiving their right to counsel. He

believed this would effectively render the “voluntariness”

test of the Fourteenth Amendment useless, and make law

enforcement more difficult.

Discussion. This case caused a lot of confusion for scholars,

as some believed it had widespread application, and

others thought it only applied to the specific facts here.

There is a great deal of language within it that is very

hostile to confessions, but at other points it says that

“proper investigative efforts are appropriate.” It mentions

that a subject asserting their rights should not be

something the system is afraid of, but that it would render

interrogation much less effective. This case is really best

understood as the precursor to the warnings that would

arise from

Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964

Historical Background

Between 1961 and 1969, the Supreme Court handed down

a series of rulings that extended constitutional standards

of due process to all States, and forced the American

criminal justice system to apply stricter standards

regarding the rights of the accused. Beginning with Mapp,

1961 (search and seizure restrictions), andGideon, 1963

(the right to legal counsel), the Court began to eliminate

State court and police practices that it viewed as violations

of the due process guarantees in the Constitution. By the

end of the 1960s, the Court had established a "minimum

standard of fairness" which all courts whether federal or

State, would be required to meet. The case

of Escobedo v. Illinois provided another landmark in the

evolution of the Court's standard.

Circumstances of the Case

Danny Escobedo was taken into custody by Chicago police

at 2:30 A.M. on January 20 in connection with the shooting

of one of his relatives the night before. After a one-hour

interrogation, and without an attorney to represent him,

Escobedo was released, having made no self-incriminating

statements. When police later arrested Benedict

DiGerlando, a friend of Escobedo, DiGerlando told police

that Escobedo had fired the fatal shots, and Escobedo was

arrested once again. Police told him that, "although not

formally charged, he was in custody and couldn't walk out

the door."

Escobedo's lawyer arrived shortly after his client had been

taken into custody the second time. The attorney was

repeatedly denied permission to talk to Escobedo, who

was interrogated all night, from nine o'clock at night until

five o'clock in the morning. Escobedo asked to speak with

his lawyer "repeatedly," but the police kept telling him

that his lawyer did not want to see him. Throughout the

interrogation, the suspect was kept standing, hands cuffed

behind his back. He was told that DiGerlando had accused

him of the murder. Allowed to confront his accuser,

Escobedo told DiGerlando, "I didn't kill Manuel, you did it."

Becoming more emotional, Escobedo made statements

concerning his connection with the crime which were later

used to convict him of murder in an Illinois court.

Constitutional Issues

The case centered on the 5th Amendment protection

against self-incrimination and the 6th Amendment right to

legal counsel. At what point must an accused person be

afforded counsel in a State prosecution? Was a confession

gained without the aid of legal counsel admissible in a

State court? Should Escobedo be given a second trial? Did

the police act properly or were their actions a violation of

Escobedo's rights against self-incrimination? Did the State

Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment have a

bearing on this case?

Arguments

For Escobedo: Denying Escobedo the right to consult with

an attorney was a clear violation of his right to due

process. His confession had been coerced and was thus

inadmissible. His conviction was faulty, and the resulting

verdict should be overturned. Escobedo should have a

new trial.

For Illinois: The criminal procedures used in the courts of

the State of Illinois rest upon the sovereignty of that State,

and are part of the powers reserved to Illinois by the 10th

Amendment. The authority to specify the criminal

procedures to be used in State courts is clearly not vested

in the Supreme Court. A decision in favor of Escobedo

would therefore violate the basic plan of federalism.

Decision and Rationale

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By a 5–4 margin, the Court deemed Escobedo's confession

inadmissible, overturned his conviction, and ordered that

he be given another trial. Speaking for the majority, Justice

Arthur Goldberg wrote: "When [Escobedo] requested and

was denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the

investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of

'an unsolved crime.'…*Escobedo+ had become the

accused…." As such, he was entitled to counsel. Goldberg

also declared that, since Escobedo was "undoubtedly

unaware that under Illinois law an admission of 'mere

complicity' in the murder plot was legally as damaging as

an admission of firing the fatal shots…*t+he 'guiding hand

of counsel' was essential to advise [him] of his rights in

this…situation."

Reflecting on past cases, Goldberg wrote: "This Court has

also recognized that 'history amply shows that confessions

have often been extorted to save law enforcement

officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and

independent evidence.'…No system worth preserving

should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to

consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and

exercise, these rights."

Goldberg then moved on to write a carefully generalized

statement of what would become "the Escobedo Rule"—

an application of the "exclusionary rule" that bars from

court evidence gained from a confession made without an

attorney present. The Court's ruling in this case, however,

was somewhat limited. It applied only to cases where

certain specific conditions were present. First, a police

investigation must have proceeded beyond the point of "a

general inquiry into an unsolved crime," and must have

"begun to focus on a particular suspect…."

Secondly, the suspect had to have "been taken into police

custody" and been subject to "a process of interrogations

that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements…."

Third, the suspect must have "requested and been denied

an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, " while the

police must "not have effectively warned him of his

absolute constitutional right to remain silent…." Provided

that all of the above conditions existed, the Court would

find that "the accused has been denied the 'Assistance of

Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment as 'made

obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth

Amendment,'…and *as such+ no statement elicited by the

police during the interrogation may be used against him at

a criminal trial."

"Escobedo Rule" holds that individuals have the right to

an attorney when an investigation goes beyond a general

inquiry and focuses on a particular suspect. This principle

states that a statement by a targeted suspect who is in

police custody is not admissible at trial. However, if the

police warns the suspect of the right to remain silent and

gives an opportunity for the targeted suspect to consult

with retained counsel, the statement is admissible

Miranda v. Arizona

Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating

evidence during police interrogations without prior

notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution (the “Constitution”).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to

inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional

rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest.

Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (”Supreme

Court”) consolidated four separate cases with issues

regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during

police interrogations.

The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (”Mr. Miranda”), was

arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an

immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr.

Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two

hours of investigation. The signed statement included a

statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.

The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (”Mr. Vignera”),

was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to

the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was

held in detention for eight hours before he made an

admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no

evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment

constitutional rights.

The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (”Mr.

Westover”), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover

was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and

then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (”FBI”)

agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr.

Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of

his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.

The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (”Mr. Stewart”),

was arrested, along with members of his family (although

there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family)

for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that

Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine

interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.

Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the

arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment

constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they

interrogate the defendants?

Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals

of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically:

their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything

they say could be used against them in court; their right to

counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to

represent them if necessary. Without this notification,

anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will

not be admissible in court.

Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (”J. Clark”) argued that the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is

not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a

new rule as the majority finds here.

The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (”J.

Harlan”) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should

apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment

rule against self-incrimination was never intended to

forbid any and all pressures against self-incrimination.

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Justice Byron White (”J. White”) argued that there is no

historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of

the Constitution to include the rights that the majority

extends in their decision. The majority is making new law

with their holding.

Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual

chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney,

any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has

the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the

government will not be allowed to argue for an exception

to the notification rule.

Miranda vs Arizona

Facts of Miranda v. Arizona:

On March 2, 1963, Patricia McGee (not her real name) was

kidnapped and raped while walking home after work

in Phoenix, Arizona . She accused Ernesto Miranda of the

crime after picking him out of a lineup. He was arrested

and taken to an interrogation room where after three

hours he signed a written confession to the crimes. The

paper on which he wrote his confession stated that the

information was given voluntarily and that he understood

his rights. However, no specific rights were listed on the

paper.

Miranda was found guilty in an Arizona court based largely

on the written confession. He was sentenced to 20 to 30

years for both crimes to be served concurrently. However,

his attorney felt that his confession should not be

admissible due to the fact that he was not warned of his

right to have an attorney represent him or that his

statement could be used against him. Therefore, he

appealed the case for Miranda. The Arizona State Supreme

Court did not agree that the confession had been coerced,

and therefore upheld the conviction. From there, his

attorneys, with the assistance of the American Civil

Liberties Union , appealed to the US Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Decision:

The Supreme Court actually decided four different cases

that all had similar circumstances when they ruled on

Miranda. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the court ended

up siding with Miranda with a 5-4 vote. At first, the

attorneys for Miranda attempted to argue that his rights

had been violated as he had not been given an attorney

during the confession, citing theSixth Amendment.

However, the Court focused on the rights guaranteed by

the Fifth Amendment including that of protection

against self-incrimination . The Majority Opinion written

by Warren stated that "without proper safeguards the

process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected

or accused of crime contains inherently compelling

pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to

resist and to compel him to speak where he would

otherwise do so freely." Miranda was not released from

prison, however, because he had also been convicted of

robbery which was not affected by the decision. He was

retried for the crimes of rape and kidnapping without the

written evidence and found guilty a second time.

Significance of Miranda v. Arizona:

The Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio was quite

controversial. Opponents argued that advising criminals of

their rights would hamper police investigations and cause

more criminals to walk free. In fact, Congress passed a law

in 1968 that provided the ability for courts to examine

confessions on a case-by-case basis to decide whether

they should be allowed. The main result of Miranda v.

Arizona was the creation of the "Miranda Rights." These

were listed in the Majority Opinion: "[A suspect] must be

warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to

remain silent, that anything he says can be used against

him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence

of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney

one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if

he so desires."

Interesting Facts:

Ernesto Miranda was released from prison after

serving only eight years of his sentence.

Miranda was convicted a second time based on

the testimony of his common law wife to whom

he confessed the crimes. He had told her that he

would be willing to marry Patricia McGee if she

would drop the charges against him.

Miranda would later sell autographed cards

bearing the "Miranda Rights" for $1.50 each.

Miranda was killed of a knife would after a bar

fight. The person who was arrested for his

murder was read the "Miranda Rights."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife,

Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and

appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last

time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found

sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat.

Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the

instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases

reported in Lucena City. During their conversation,

appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what

actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he

and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the

motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra.

Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a

certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With

the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP

immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway

robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he

invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant

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for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter

that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also

in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena

City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside

the police station, he admitted that he did not inform

appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and

to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the

supposed confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted

appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant,

given before a police investigator upon invitation and

without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence

against him.

HELD: No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an

uncounselled confession or admission and whatever

information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as

inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No.

7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting

the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a

pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include

the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is

investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected

to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the

"inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated

by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in

any significant manner. The rules on custodial

investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation

ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and

begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken

into custody, and the police carries out a process of

interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating

statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose,

as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty

to explain those rights to the accused but also that there

must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to

and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere

perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the

accused would thus not suffice.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence,

a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following

requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made

with the assistance of competent and independent

counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in

writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to

counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and

intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with

the assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution,

whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,

shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession

contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the

assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence,

regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had

been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution

shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at

the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his

participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict

him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of

appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to

counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is

investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected

to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere

invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist

on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a

condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative

and prosecutory powers of government."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

May the confession of an accused, given before a police

investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of

counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?

Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido,

were charged with the crime of highway robbery with

murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of

Gumaca, Quezon Province, under an information[1]

dated

February 8, 1989, which reads as follows:

“That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along

the Maharlika Highway at Barangay Tinandog, Municipality

of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

accused, conspiring and confederating together and

mutually helping each other, armed with bladed and

pointed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of force,

violence, threats and intimidation, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry

away from one Freddie Saavedra, a Honda TMX

motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW 9961

valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)

Philippine currency, belonging to the said Freddie

Saavedra, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the

aforesaid amount; and that on the occasion of said

robbery and by reason thereof, the said accused, with

intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery,

and taking advantage of their superior strength and in

pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,

unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with

the said weapon said Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting

upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different

parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.”

On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the

charge.

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The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as

follows:

On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock p.m., tricycle

driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our

Lady of Angels Academy in Atimonan, Quezon, where the

latter is a third year high school student, to inform her that

he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was

the last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When

the latter failed to return that evening, Delfa, as early as

4:30 o’clock a.m. of December 6, 1988 inquired on his

whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of

such inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the

lifeless body of her husband was discovered on the

diversion road at Barangay Malinao in

Atimonan. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said place

and found him sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab

wounds in different parts of his body.

Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned

sidecar of a tricycle was sighted at Barangay Malinao,

Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos

Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered

a blue sidecar which they brought back with them to their

headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano

Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in

connection with the instant case and with respect to two

other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their

conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account

of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated

that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the

loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of

Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the

motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit,

Muntinlupa for a sum of P4,000.00. With the help of

appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately

dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

After admitting that it was purchased from both the

accused and upon failure to present any document

evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily

surrendered it to the police who turned it over, together

with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station for

safekeeping.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he

invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant

for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter

that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also

in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena

City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside

the police station, he admitted that he did not inform

appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and

to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the

supposed confession to writing.[2]

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no

participation in the offense charged and contended that

his only involvement in the matter was the referral of

accused Amido to Teves. He recounted that sometime in

December 1988, Amido sought him at his house and told

him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being

offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was indeed

registered under Amido’s name, he accompanied the

latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle and they

approached Antonio Carandang. The latter, thereafter,

brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and Danilo Teves

with whom the sale was finally consummated. He

allegedly received P150.00 as his commission.

Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that

although a tricycle driver by occupation, he was at

Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some

seven kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the

renovation of his mother’s house. He narrated that the

victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have

participated in the gruesome death of the latter.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted

appellant, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations,

this Court finds Herson Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Murder and

hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of

RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify

the family of the deceased in the amount of Thirty

Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby

ACQUITTED of the charges against him and the Provincial

Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail, Lucena City, is hereby

ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito

Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for some other

lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.”[3]

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of

the prosecution to positively identify him as the culprit of

the crime and to present clear and convincing

circumstantial evidence that would overcome his

innocence.

In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed

decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on the ground

that his constitutional rights were violated.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an

uncounselled confession or admission and whatever

information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as

inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Article III,

Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution

provides:

“x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right to be

informed of his right to remain silent and to have

competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,

he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be

waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x x x x x x

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(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of

this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against

him.”

Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438),[4]

approved on May

15, 1992, reenforced the constitutional mandate

protecting the rights of persons under custodial

investigation, a pertinent provision[5]

of which reads:

“As used in this Act, ‘custodial investigation’ shall include

the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is

investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected

to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the

‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.”

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated

by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in

any significant manner. The rules on custodial

investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation

ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and

begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken

into custody, and the police carries out a process of

interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating

statements that the rule begins to operate.[6]

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose,

as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty

to explain those rights to the accused but also that there

must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to

and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere

perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the

accused would thus not suffice.[7]

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence,

a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following

requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made

with the assistance of competent and independent

counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in

writing.[8]

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to

counsel, it must, however, be “voluntary, knowing and

intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with

the assistance of counsel.”[9]

To reiterate, in People v.

Javar,[10]

it was ruled therein that any statement obtained

in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or

inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in

evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth,

if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it

becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the

absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily

given.

The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was

assisted by counsel when he made such waiver, a finding

evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on cross-

examination, thus:

“Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the

Headquarters, did you tell him that he is one of the

suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in

Atimonan on December 5, 1988?

A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case

which was investigated at Lucena Police Station. There

were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson

Tan.

Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also

took Herson Tan to your custody in connection with

another case that happened in Lucena?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as

suspect in both cases because Herson was previously

incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a

certain case, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your

headquarters, is that what happened in this case?

A Yes, sir.

Q And it just happened that without applying third

degree to him he gave you that information?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to

counsel before you propounded questions to him?

A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.

Q Before propounding question or information you

sought to elicit from him, did you inform him of his

constitutional right not to testify against himself because

he is a suspect in these two (2) cases?

A No, sir, because we were just

conversing.[11]

(Underscoring supplied)

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when

appellant was invited for questioning at the police

headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in

the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of

said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,

particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are

impregnable from the moment he is investigated in

connection with an offense he is suspected to have

committed, even if the same be initiated by mere

invitation. “This Court values liberty and will always insist

on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a

condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative

and prosecutory powers of government.”[12]

What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is

inadequate to warrant a conviction. Considering the

circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant’s

investigation which fell short of compliance with

constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the

appellant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON TAN y

VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his

immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered,

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unless there is any other lawful cause for continued

detention. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while

inside a motor vehicle in the national highway at

Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of

Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y

Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away,

through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to

P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by

and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko

Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all

amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April

1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong,

Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,

Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed

Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the

course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed

Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an information was

filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan

charging them with robbery with homicide (as per

16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information

dated 20 May 1993 was filed against Feliciano

and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery

(as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano

pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had

escaped the Maharlika Rehabilitation and

Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where

he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded

arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial, the

Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch

25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as

principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery

with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua

and to indemnify the offended party (the heirs of

Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the

offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing

funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also

found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an

indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as

the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion

temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term

and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00,

representing the value of the P700.00 cash,

stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon

the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist

watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial

court convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn

statement which he repudiated during the trial. Feliciano

appealed.

Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to

Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel.

Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a

competent and independent counsel when he was

questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1

Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started

questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993

regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver

Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had

not been apprised of his right to counsel. Feliciano

had been subjected to custodial investigation without a

counsel; inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez investigated

Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the killing of

jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did

not provide the kind of counselling required by the

Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the

consequences of his action — that the sworn statement

can be used against him and that it is possible that he

could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty.

Chavez’s independence as counsel is suspect — he is

regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as

counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the

services of counsel. He even received money from the

police as payment for his services.