Arctic NegativeImpact DefenseArctic war is unlikelyBeckhusen 12 (Beckhusen, Robert. "Russia and Canada Gear Up for Arctic Non-War | Danger Room | WIRED." Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital, 07 Aug. 2012. Web. 23 July 2014. . Robert Beckhusen is a contributor at wired.com Fred).

But a war is exceedingly unlikely because Russia would lose. For one, the United States has an overwhelming and decisive advantage in submarines. U.S. subs are more advanced, there are more of them, and their crews are better trained. Its unlikely Arctic nations would also begin killing each other over low-key and remote territorial disputes.

Artic Conflict wont happen Admiral Stavridis 13(Admiral James Stavridis, retired US navy admiral, High North or High Tension? online:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/high_north_or_high_tension_arctic_competition)Good humor aside, the general's point is reasonably well taken. The likelihood of a conventional offensive military operation in the Arctic is very low, despite some commentators' overheated rhetoric. While there are many diplomatic and ecological challenges, the odds are good that the international community will eventually find its way to a true zone of cooperation around the Arctic Circle and manage to avoid turning the region -- the last frontier on Earth -- into a zone of needless conflict. Russia conflict wont escalate, Russia will cooperate with US in the artic Admiral Stavridis 13(Admiral James Stavridis, retired US navy admiral, High North or High Tension? online:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/high_north_or_high_tension_arctic_competition) Third, we need to work as closely as we can with Russia in the Arctic. Although we will inevitably have disagreements over other topics, it is possible the High North could be a zone of cooperation with the Russian Federation. We have shown the ability to work together in Afghanistan, on counternarcotics and counterterrorism, in combating piracy, and in strategic arms control and reductions. We should do what we can -- working with NATO allies -- to make it so.

Russias economy is resilient- foreign reserves provide a backstop to oil price declineAdomanis 13 (Mark, Forbes contributor, specializes in Russian economics, Why Russias economy isnt going to collapse, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-to-collapse/)

Hating Russias economy is a full-time job for many people. Owen Matthews in Newsweek is perhaps the most colorful of the bunch, but the difference between Matthews and other Western journalists is primarily one of degree not of kind. Ive been following Russia very closely for about a decade now, and Ive simply lost count of the number of analyses Ive read arguing that the end is nigh and that the economys final implosion is mere months away. These articles vary greatly in quality, but the basic indictment of Russias economy consists of a number of actually quite reasonable observations on the countrys corruption, red tape, and over-reliance on natural resources. However, after getting decimated during the worse days of the financial crisis, Russias economy has been plugging along with steady and unremarkable growth in the 3-4% range, hardly world beating but actually faster than almost every country in the EU. As more time has passed and Russias economy has defied predictions by continuing to not collapse, Ive become increasingly convinced that its economic stability has been somewhat underrated and that, despite its many faults, its basic economic model is quite likely to endure through the short and medium terms. I certainly dont think that Russia is going to become some sort of economic hegemon, but it seems far more likely than not that it will evolve gradually, and not through some titanic rupture or revolutionary upheaval. But my hunches and inclinations arent very good evidence, so I thought I would put a few charts together which show why I think that Russias economy is basically going to stay stable over the next several years and that its a huge mistake to predict a cataclysm which will sweep away the dread Putin. 1.The price of Brent crude has stayed remarkably robust despite chronic economic weakness in the developed world. I suppose its possible that the EU will never emerge from its current doldrums, but I think that the developed world will eventually get out of its funk and start to grow again. When it does that growth will likely drive the price of oil even higher, or at least prevent it from going much lower. 2. Russia still has very large foreign reserves, some of the largest in the entire world. Although you often hear, as in Matthews piece, that the Russians used to be responsible with their oil money, now theyre become totally reckless and irresponsible, Russia still has very large foreign reserves that amount to almost 25% of its GDP. Note the similarity between the oil price graph and Russias foreign reserves, their shapes are almost identical. While the utility of foreign reserves can often be overstated, they can be very handy in averting economic catastrophes, and, as you might expect, the Russians drew heavily on their foreign reserves during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis. I think that the reserves provide a cushion that will help to shield Russia from a future shock, such as a rapid and massive decline in the price of oil. Of course theres still the chance that Russia will suffer a slow and gradual decline in competitiveness, but what Im pushing back against is not that argument but the argument that the whole house of cards is going to collapse in the next couple of years. 3. The Russian government still runs a budget surplus, and its spending as a percentage of GDP is not very high. From January-October 2012 Russia ran a budget surplus of about 1.4%, smaller than the 2011 figure (3.2%) but a surplus nonetheless. Russias total level of government spending (about 32% of GDP) hardly seems outrageous or unsustainable. Additionally, despite a lot of loose and foolish talk from the Russian defense ministry about it looming re-armament campaign, Russias budget spending is more weighted towards the social sphere than the military industrial complex. Courtesy of the Gaidar institute, heres a graph showing where Russias consolidated government spending was directed in the first ten months of 2012: The Gaidar institute is hardly a Kremlin outfit, indeed the overall tone of the report to which I linked is actually quite gloomy* and critical of the authorities, and considering its track record I dont think that it would have spun the numbers in a more pro-Putin direction. When analyzing any countrys budget posture you need to focus on where the money is actually being spent. While theres been an awful lot of talk about comprehensively re-arming the Russian military, the actual level of spending remains relatively small and well within the countrys ability to pay. The purse-strings are clearly somewhat looser than they used to be, but a quick glance at Russias budget certainly doesnt give the impression of a totally reckless and debauched approach. 4. Russian unemployment is at or near a post-Soviet record low. Russias labor market isnt exactly a model for anyone else, but its arguably more robust now than its ever been before. I think that this will act as a sort of stabilizing influence in its own right, but, more importantly, it might allow the government to feel comfortable enough to do some tinkering and implement a few moderate reforms. Basically, the government is more likely to undertake some modest liberalization if the labor market is healthy and its confident that people will be able to find jobs than if the unemployment rate is already trending upwards (unemployment is obviously highly politically sensitive in performance legitimacy regimes like Russias).

Several Barriers make Russia economic collapse inevitable Forbes 13(Kenneth Rapoza, analyst for Brazil, Russia, and China, Russias Three Biggest Problems online:http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/01/24/russias-three-biggest-problems/ Russia is not going to be the next big thing, Frances Hudson, Global Thematic Strategist at Standard Life Investments in Edinburgh, said in an interview with Forbes. There is a corporate governance issue and an over-reliance on oil and gas at a time when they may lose their pricing power in Europe once U.S. starts exporting natural gas.Russia will lose out to strong competition in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector and elsewhere. 2. Weak Institutions Russias institutional environment ranking 133 out of 144 countries in the World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Index 20122013, the development of the countrys institutions represents one of its key challenges. Many of the inefficiencies in the government apparatus can be attributed to high levels of corruption. Russia is characterized by much higher levels of corruption than other countries with similar levels of development. While Russia is the sixth largest economy worldwide in GDP, corruption levels are higher than in countries such as Togo or Uganda, according to Transparency International. Some argue that corruption has become engrained in the countrys system of wealth creation and distribution. In this perspective, corruption may be seen by some as a necessary evil to maintain stability and control over productive processes in the economy. 3. Social Cohesion Trust within society and towards institutions and decision-makers is a key indicator of a societys ability to fully develop its productive potential. On all of these fronts, there are signs Russia faces significant uncertainties. The number of professionals seeking to leave Russia exceeds 50% in certain segments. This not only reduces the creative potential to support economic development in the country, but accentuates capital flight and reduces domestic consumption. The same conditions also affect the countrys ability to attract foreign talent, which could play an additional role in the next stage of developing the Russian economy. The situation has grown so acute that some participants in this project expressed despair at the fact that Russia has, alongside its better-known role as energy exporter, become a full-blown exporter of financial and human capital.(A rise in) wealth has been accompanied in recent years by a rise in diverse forms of popular discontent, including frustrations with the delivery of public services, perceived impediments to pursuing professional aspirations and restraints on political freedoms. The quality of its domestic institutions and the dynamics of social cohesion have created barriers in the quest to fully develop the countrys physical and human resources. This combination could be a key impediment to Russias future economic development given that these resources are the countrys most important assets.Gazprom wont cooperate with the USMazneva 14(Elena Mazneva, analyst at Bloomberg.com Apr 4, 2014Gazprom Stops Courting U.S. Investors After Crimea Crisis online:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/gazprom-stops-courting-u-s-investors-after-crimea-crisis.html)Russias largest company OAO Gazprom will stop marketing to U.S. and European investors after the Crimea crisis and work to increase bond and shareholders from the Middle East, Latin America and Asia, especially China. Senior managers at Russias gas-export monopoly, which has a market value of $90 billion and $37 billion of outstanding bonds, told investor relations staff to find more shareholders in Asia and other emerging markets after completing investor meetings in New York and London in early March, two people with knowledge of the matter said, asking not to be named because the policy is private. The shift shows how the worst crisis in Russian relations with the U.S. and Europe since the Cold War is feeding into financial and economic relationships. China was the only country not to vote against Russias action in Ukraine at the United Nations Security Council and President Vladimir Putin travels to Beijing in May hoping to sign a 30-year gas-supply deal.Russia is grateful to the people of China for their position on Crimea and Ukraine, Putin said March 18. Eastern partners are more constructive, wiser and pragmatic than Western, Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukaev said a week later, adding that Russia should sign new contracts and agreements in Asia.Western sanctions may bring Russia and China closer together, wrote the Russian Embassy in Beijing on its official Sina Weibo account on March 25. Gazprom Chief Executive Officer Alexey Miller together with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich plans to visit China next week, people with knowledge of the matter said. Among a range of issues, greatest prominence will be given to a 30-year natural gas supply contract, one of the people said without elaborating. Gazprom executives also plan to visit the Boao Forum next week, considered an Asian alternative for the World Economic Forum in Davos. Not only Miller and Dvorkovich, but also Gazprombank head Andrey Akimov and Gazprom Neft (SIBN) CEO Alexander Dyukov are scheduled to participate, according to its website.US Heg will always be high, will continue to lead global growthFareed Zakaria 8, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 182-3) When trying to explain how America will fare in the new world, I sometimes say, "Look around." The future is already here. Over the last twenty years, globalization has been gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology has been leveling the playing field, capital has been free to move across the world. And America has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds of billions of dollars in investment a rarity for a country with much capital of its own. Its companies have entered new countries and industries with great success and used new technologies and processes, all to keep boosting their bottom lines. Despite two decades of a very expensive dollar, American exports have held ground. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over 3 percent for twenty-five years, significantly higher than in Europe. (Japan's averaged 2.3 percent over the same period.) Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, again a full percentage point higher than the European average. The United States is currently ranked as the most competitive economy in the world by the World Economic Forum. These rankings have been produced every year since 1979, and the U.S. position has been fairly constant, slipping sometimes in recent years to small northern European countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Finland (whose collective population is twenty million, less than that of the state of Texas). America's superior growth trajectory might be petering out, and perhaps its growth will be more "normal" for an advanced industrial country for the next few years. But the general pointthat America is a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous sizestill holds. Look at the industries of the future. Nanotechnologyapplied science dealing with the control of matter at the atomic or molecular scaleis considered likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over the next fifty years. At some point in the future, or so I'm told, households will construct products out of raw materials, and businesses will simply create the formulas that turn atoms into goods. Whether this is hype or prescience, what is worth noticing is that by every conceivable measure, the United States dominates the field. It has more dedicated nanocenters than the next three nations (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) combined, and many of its new centers focus on narrow subjects with a high potential for practical, marketable applications such as the Emory-Georgia Tech Nanotechnology Center for Personalized and Predictive Oncology. At market exchange rates, government nanotech funding in the United States is almost double that of its closest competitor, Japan. And while China, Japan, and Germany contribute a fair share of journal articles on nanoscale science and engineering topics, the United States has issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting America's unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products. The firm Lux, led by Dr. Michael Holman, constructed a matrix to assess countries' overall nanotech competitiveness. Their analysis looked not just at nanotechnology activity but also at the ability to "generate growth from scientific innovation."12 It found that certain countries that spend much on research can't turn their science into business. These "Ivory Tower" nations have impressive research funding, journal articles, and even patents, but somehow don't manage to translate this into commercial goods and ideas. China, France, and even Britain fall into this category. A full 85 percent of venture capital investments in nanotechnology went to U.S. companies. Biotechnologya broad category that describes the use of biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and industrial productsis already a multibillion-dollar industry. It, too, is dominated by the United States. More than $3.3 billion in venture financing went to U.S. biotech companies in 2005, while European companies received just half that amount. Follow-on equity offerings (that is, post-IPO) in the United States were more than seven times those in Europe. And while European IPOs attracted more cash in 2005, IPO activity is highly volatilein 2004, U.S. IPO values were more than four times Europe's. As with nanotechnology, American companies excel at turning ideas into marketable and lucrative products. U.S. biotech revenues approached $50 billion in 2005, five times greater than those in Europe and representing 76 percent of global revenues.* Manufacturing has, of course, been leaving the United States, shifting to the developing world and turning America into a service economy. This scares many Americans and Europeans, who wonder what their countries will make if everything is "made in China." But Asian manufacturing must be viewed in the context of a global economy in which countries like China have become an important part of the supply chainbut still just a part.

SolvencyScientific diplomacy does not solveDickson 10 (David. Director of SciDev.net. Science in diplomacy: On tap but not on top. June 28, 2010.http://scidevnet.wor...onference-2010 FRED).

Theres a general consensusin both the scientific and political worldsthat the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations,is a desirable objective. There is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can or indeed should be extended to embrace broader goals and objectives,in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international level.Science, despite its international characteristics,is no substitute for effective diplomacy.Any more than diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science.These seem to have been the broad conclusionsto emergefroma three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised bythe British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world.The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of public diplomacy, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as soft power (the carrot rather than the stick approach, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of innovation diplomacy, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UKs Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of thehighly damaging plant disease stem rusthad been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canadas International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor perhaps predictably was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europes framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention wasthe current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAMEin Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a beacon of hope for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed,there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another.Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly,those who hold science in esteem as apractice committed topromoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science whether nuclear physics or genetic technology have also led to new types of weaponry.Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities. Science for diplomacy therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives and benefit fromdiplomatic agreements butcannot provide the solutions to either.On tap but not on top seems as relevant in international settings as it does in purely national ones. With all the caution that even this formulation still requires.

Alt cause; they cant solve climate change which is the root cause of military challenges in the ArcticHeininen 13 (Heininen, Lassi. "Valdai. . Discussion Club. ." Climate Change in the Arctic: Geopolitical and Security Implications. N.p., 24 Sept. 2013. Web. 23 July 2014. . University Lecturer and Professor at Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland. Among his other academic positions are Adjunct Professor at Frost Center for Canadian Studies, Trent University, Canada; Adjunct Professor at Faculty of Geography, University of Oulu, Finland; and Visiting Professor at University of Akureyri, Iceland. He is also the chairman of the International Steering Committee for the Northern Research Forum. Fred).

Climate change entails not only socio-economic but also military challenges to the Arctic region, thus might lead towards the remilitarization of the region. The increasing competition for trade routes, maritime zones and natural resources has already led and continues to lead to a military build-up of particular coastal states and intensification of NATO military activities in the region. In contrast with the Cold war era, the current military efforts aim at protection of economic interests of the Arctic states and assertion of their national sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade routes rather than global confrontation between two superpowers or military blocs. To give some examples of military buildups in the region, for instance, Canada plans to create a 5000-strong ranger unit in its North. The U.S. and Canada are modernizing the NORAD system. Besides, the U.S. is strengthening its Alaska Command and even plans to deploy an ABM system in the Arctic region (either land-based in Northern Norway and/or sea-based if ice retreating to continue). Norway is engaged in a quite impressive program to modernize its coastal guard (including five new frigates acquisition). Russia has resumed it strategic aviation flights over the Northern Atlantic, develops its Northern Fleet (including its nuclear component) and plans to create special Arctic troops to control its Arctic Ocean coastline. Moreover, according to the so-called Stoltenberg Report of 2009, the five Nordic nations (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) decided to create joint military units as well as air monitoring system and SAR infrastructures which are specially designed for the Arctic. They also plan to create a space group of three satellites to enhance the above structures capabilities in communications and navigation. These developments affect the international security regime in the region in a very negative way. Many experts believe that a special arms control regime for the Arctic should be negotiated and legal mechanisms to solve climate change-related conflicts should be developed. The proposals to develop a system of confidence- and security-building measures in the region are made by the international expert community as well.

An Arctic treaty inevitably fails too many disputes Watson 9 (Watson, Molly. "AN ARCTIC TREATY: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION." AN ARCTIC TREATY: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE POLAR REGION (n.d.): n. pag. Www.mainelaw.com. 2009. Web. 23 July 2014. . Springfield, Massachusetts Area | Public Relations and Communications Current Consultant at EverestPR, Consultant at Ritz Communications Past Communications Consultant at Westfield State University, Public Relations Consultant at Noble Hospital, Vice President at GCI Group, Fred).

With regard to claims of territorial sovereignty, an Arctic treaty might approach the issue in one of three ways: (1) divide the Arctic among the States based on some formula agreed upon by the States; (2) direct that the territorial division will be determined under UNCLOS procedure; or (3) like the Antarctic Treaty, freeze all State territorial claims. The first option for dividing the Arctic is improbable, as the current dispute exists for the very reason that the States cannot agree. The next option is also unlikely so long as the United States refuses to ratify the UNCLOS treaty. The United States is not apt to agree to an Arctic treaty that resolves the dispute through the UNCLOS process if it remains unable to participate within its framework. However, were the United States to ratify UNCLOS, such an approach may prove effective. Within this option, an Arctic treaty could indicate that UNCLOS is to govern the States sovereignty claims while other provisions of the treaty could address the concerns unique to the Arctic not covered by UNCLOS. States, such as Russia, who have already begun working under the laws of UNCLOS, would likely favor this approach, as they will be able to continue in the UNCLOS process of submitting claims to the CLCS. By establishing UNCLOS as the governing law, the Arctic States will be bound by the determinations made by the CLCS, and left without alternatives under, for example, customary law. However, even were the United States to ratify UNCLOS, this approach is potentially problematic because the CLCS has no actual authority to settle disputes or enforce its recommendations. Thus, should more than one State claim the same territory, as will inevitably occur, it is unclear how the Commission will proceed.165 Claims made by one State are subject to counter-claims by other States, and while the CLCSs recommendations are binding, the body has no power to enforce them.166

Case TurnsNote If you dont want to run the Russia SOI DA, the link/internal link cards can independently serve as case turns to the 1ACArtic exploration causes ocean acidification, destroys indigenous communities food source and no more McDonalds filet-o-fish Leonard 13( George Leonard, director of strategic initiatives at Ocean Sonservancy. Ocean Acidification: A Pain in the Arctic, online: http://blog.oceanconservancy.org/2013/05/17/ocean-acidification-a-pain-in-the-arctic/)Even though oil companies have greatly improved practices in the Arctic, three decades of drilling along Alaska's North Slope have produced a steady accumulation of harmful environmental and social effects that will probably grow as exploration expands, a panel of experts has concluded. Some of the problems could last for centuries, the experts said in a report yesterday, both because environmental damage does not heal easily in the area's harsh climate and because it is uneconomical to remove structures or restore damaged areas once drilling is over. The report, produced by the National Research Council, was immediately hailed by opponents of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which lies east of established oil fields and is the only part of America's only stretch of Arctic coastline that for now is off limits to drilling. Advocates of drilling called it biased. Administration officials said improved techniques would lessen the environmental impact of future drilling. The council, the research arm of the National Academies, an independent advisory body on science, produced the report at the request of Republican lawmakers supporting oil drilling in the Arctic refuge. (The report can be found on the Web at nas.edu.) No matter where you live, if you go outside and start walking north, at some point youll reach the Arctic Ocean. A vast expanse at the northern reaches of the planet, the Arctic Ocean supports a dizzying array of ocean wildldife, including the charismatic and much threatened polar bear. Most readers of The Blog Aquatic know that summer sea ice has been rapidly melting, caused by human-induced climate change from our ever rising global carbon emissions. Indeed, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere just broke a new record high. But more poorly understood is that carbon dioxide is beginning to undermine the Arctic ocean itself through a process called ocean acidification. No less than 10 key scientific findings can be found in a just-released assessment of ocean acidification undertaken by an international group of independent scientists. Their assessment will be presented to the Arctic Council Ministers in Kiruna, Sweden this week. Called the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the scientists spent the last three years detailing the effects of ocean acidification on the Arctic, and exploring the consequences for the four million people living there. The assessment concludes that the Arctic is particularly sensitive to ocean acidification, in part because the especially cold Arctic water absorbs more carbon dioxide than warmer waters to the south. In addition, the regions ocean food web is also unusually vulnerable because it consists of only a few keys species that are themselves vulnerable to changing ocean chemistry. Most troubling, ocean acidification poses real threats to local indigenous peoples who depend on Arctic resources for sustenance, for their livelihoods, and for their culture. These new insights into ocean acidification in the Arctic foreshadow similar processes underway in waters south of the Arctic Ocean in the Bering Sea. In these sub-Arctic waters where future Filet-o-Fish sandwiches and California rolls prosper, ocean acidification also is a direct threat to Alaskas fishing industry. Alaskas signature catch of cod, salmon, and crab is enjoyed by seafood consumers across the U.S. and around the world. And with over $1.6 billion in revenue in 2010 and 53,000 jobs at stake Alaska is rightly worried about how acidification could impact their industry. A new study published by NOAA Fisheries scientist Dr. Chris Long has documented how more acidic waters decimate juvenile red king crabs and tanner crabs, an economically important fishery in Alaska. Along with the AMAP report, Dr. Longs research is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how ocean acidification may disrupt northern marine food webs, including for economically important species and those of cultural significance.Hegemony fails-U.S power projection promotes geopolitical conflict Christopher Layne 2, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami, 2002[U.S. RESPONSES TO THE LOOKING GLASS: Offshore Balancing Revisited, Washington Quarterly, Spring, p. Lexis]In concrete terms today, Western Europe, China, Russia, and Japan are aligned with the United States to deal with the common threat of terrorism. Because the coalition partners have differing interests, the coalition may fragment if the United States acts unilaterally to expand the war on terrorism. Even if the coalition should hold together until the war on terrorism is terminated, the conflicting geopolitical interests that divide the United States and its partners will then surely resurface because coalitions and alliances are never more than marriages of convenience. Western Europe again will seek to counterbalance U.S. "hyperpower." The Europeans, Russia, and China will oppose U.S. missile defense deployment. Russia will be suspicious of NATO expansion into the Baltic States and the projection of U.S. power into Central Asia. China will continue to pursue its great-power emergence and will contest the United States for supremacy in East Asia. The war on terrorism, in other words, is merely an interlude in international politics, not the harbinger of everlasting global harmony based on acceptance of U.S. primacy. Although U.S. policymakers have convinced themselves that the United States is a benign hegemon, no such animal exists in international politics. A hegemon is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful. The United States is not immune to the kind of geopolitical blowback experienced by previous hegemonic aspirants. Thus, in a self-help world the United States must perform the strategic equivalent of threading a needle. It cannot abrogate its freedom to act unilaterally to defend its interests, but Washington needs simultaneously to find a grand strategy that reduces fears of U.S. preponderant power, thereby reducing incentives to engage in counterhegemonic balancing directed at the United States. A good starting point is the war on terrorism itself.US hegemony leads to a constant cycle of never ender war in an attempt to create a stable international systemChristopher Layne 98, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1998[World Policy Journal, Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century? vol. 15 iss. 2, Summer, proquest]Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance expands America 's frontiers of insecurity. The posited connection between security and economic interdependence requires the United States to impose order on, and control over, the international system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic responsibilities to maintain the security of its already established interests. As the political scientist Robert H. Johnson observes, this process becomes self-sustain- ing because each time the United States pushes its security interests outward, threats to the new security frontier will be apprehended: "Uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new uncertainty and further self-extension." 16 Core and periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core remains constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. One does not overstate in arguing that this expansion is potentially limitless. Former na- tional security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently has suggested, for example, that NATO expansion is just the first step toward creating an American-dominated "Trans Eurasian Security System" {TESS}, that ulti- mately will embrace Russia, China, Japan, India, and other countries-- a security struc- ture "that would span the entire {Eurasian} continent." 17 There is a suggestive parallel between late Victorian Britain and the United States today. The late- nineteenth-cenury British statesman Lord Rosebery, clearly recognized that economic interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening, rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 18 Of course, it is an exaggeration to sug-gest that the strategy of preponderance will involve the United States in 40 wars simultaneously. It is not, however, an exag- geration to note that the need to defend America 's perceived interest in maintaining a security framework in which economic interdependence can flourish has become the primary post-Cold War rationale for expanding its security commitments in East Asia and in Europe. To preserve a security framework favorable to interdependence, the United States does not, in fact, intervene everywhere; however, the logic underlying the strategy of preponderance can be used to justify U.S. intervention anywhere.

No impact to loss of heg-multiple factors prevent another great power war Gopal Balarishnan 3, New Left Review Author, 2003 [Algorithms of War, New Left Review 23, Sept-Oct, http://www.newleftreview.net/NLR25701.]But this very freedom from external balance-of-power constraints contains the danger of a wilful exaggeration of threats and a casual underestimation of obstacles. The discipline that a nuclear-armed Soviet Union once imposed on Americas rulers has evaporated. The rhetoric of the Republican Administration is an ominous anticipation of what might happen in the event of a world economic downturn. Yet even an escalation of hostilities between the US and China or Russia, or Europe or Japan, would be unlikely to reverse one of the central sociological trends of the post Second World War era: the decline of mass militarism in Western Europe and Japan after forty years of heavy casualty warfare, a process that eventually reached the US during the high point of its Indochinese operations. The enormous conscript citizen armies of the Great Power nation-state were either destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the War or discredited in the last decades of colonialism. The raising of overarching nuclear umbrellas, the advent of consumerism, the cultural neutralization of nationalist pathos in public life, the final collapse of rural social strata from which both officers and soldiers were recruited and the break-up of traditional gender roles sealed the fate of an older Great Power politics. The only military interventions now capable of soliciting domestic acclamation are those that demand no heavy sacrifices of the home front. It is now well understood, as ballooning American deficits testify, that under no circumstances can the social segment extending from the wealthy to the super-rich be asked to bear the costs of empire.

Russia SOI DA1NCUS is lagging heavily behind in the Arctic raceAP 14 (Associated Press. "U.S. Lags behind Arctic Nations in Race to Stake Claims to Untapped Resources." PBS. PBS, 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 23 July 2014. . Fred).

WASHINGTON The U.S. is racing to keep pace with stepped-up activity in the once sleepy Arctic frontier, but it is far from being in the lead. Nations across the world are hurrying to stake claims to the Arctics resources, which might be home to 13 percent of the worlds undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas. There are emerging fisheries and hidden minerals. Cruise liners filled with tourists are sailing the Arctics frigid waters in increasing numbers. Cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route, one of two shortcuts across the top of the Earth in summer, is on the rise. The U.S., which takes over the two-year rotating chairmanship of the eight-nation Arctic Council in 2015, has not ignored the Arctic, but critics say the U.S. is lagging behind the other seven: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada and Denmark, through the semiautonomous territory of Greenland. On par with the other Arctic nations, we are behind behind in our thinking, behind in our vision, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, said. We lack basic infrastructure, basic funding commitments to be prepared for the level of activity expected in the Arctic. At a meeting before Thanksgiving with Secretary of State John Kerry, Murkowski suggested he name a U.S. ambassador or envoy to the Arctic someone who could coordinate work on the Arctic being done by more than 20 federal agencies and take the lead on increasing U.S. activities in the region. Murkowski is trying to get Americans to stop thinking that the Arctic is just Alaskas problem. People in Iowa and New Hampshire need to view the U.S. as an Arctic nation. Otherwise when you talk about funding, youre never going to get there, Murkowski said. She added that even non-Arctic nations are deeply engaged: India and China are investing in icebreakers. The U.S. has three aging icebreakers. The melting Arctic also is creating a new front of U.S. security concerns. Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin said expanding Russias military presence in the Arctic was a top priority for his nations armed forces. Russia this year began rehabilitating a Soviet-era base at the New Siberian Islands and has pledged to restore a number of Arctic military air bases that fell into neglect after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin said he doesnt envision a conflict between Russia and the United States, both of which have called for keeping the Arctic a peaceful zone. But he added, Experts know quite well that it takes U.S. missiles 15 to 16 minutes to reach Moscow from the Barents Sea, which is a part of the Arctic Ocean near Russias shore. While the threat of militarization remains, the battle right now is on the economic level as countries vie for oil, gas and other minerals, including rare earth metals used to make high-tech products like cellphones. There also are disputes bubbling up with environmental groups that oppose energy exploration in the region; Russia arrested 30 crew members of a Greenpeace ship in September after a protest in the Arctic. China signed a free trade agreement with tiny Iceland this year, a signal that the Asian powerhouse is keenly interested in the Arctics resources. And Russia is hoping that the Northern Sea Route, where traffic jumped to 71 vessels this year from four in 2010, someday could be a transpolar route that could rival the Suez Canal. In the U.S., the Obama administration is consulting with governmental, business, industry and environmental officials, as well as the state of Alaska, to develop a plan to implement the U.S. strategy for the Arctic that President Barack Obama unveiled seven months ago. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel rolled out the Pentagons Arctic blueprint last month, joining the Coast Guard and other government agencies that have outlined their plans for the region. There are no cost or budget estimates yet, but the Navy is laying out what the U.S. needs to increase communications, harden ships and negotiate international agreements so nations will be able to track traffic in the Arctic and conduct search and rescue operations. Critics, however, say the U.S. needs to back the strategy papers with more precise plans plus funding. With the country still paying for two wars, the idea of spending money in an area considered a low security threat makes the Arctic an even tougher sell. The problem with all of these strategies is that they are absolutely silent on budget issues, said Heather Conley, an expert on the Arctic at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. How do we meet these new challenges? Well, were going to have to put more resources to them. Its dark. Its cold. Theres terrible weather. We need to enhance our own satellite communications and awareness in the area as ships and commercial activity increases in the Arctic. The U.S. needs helicopters, runways, port facilities and roads in the Arctic, she said not to mention better accommodations in small coastal towns that have a shortage of beds and would be ill-equipped to handle an influx of tourists from a disabled cruise ship. With few assets, the U.S. might be forced to borrow from the private sector. When Shell drilled two summers ago in the Chukchi Sea and the Beaufort Sea, they had 33 vessels and the Coast Guard had one national security cutter, Conley said. Were not prepared. It may be another 10 years. The Arctic is not going to wait, and the increased commercial and human activity is already there. Other Arctic states are preparing more robustly, and we are choosing not to.

Its a zero sum game Russia is willing to resort to force if someone challenges their authority in the ArcticOSullivan 14 (Sullivan. "Opinion: Arctic Development Could Ignite Next Great-Game Competition." Breaking Energy. N.p., 28 Apr. 2014. Web. 23 July 2014. . Conor O'Sullivan is a writer at breakingenergy.com Fred).

The flag planting by a Russian submarine in August 2007 underneath the Arctic seabed symbolized Russias intentions to use Arctic exploration as a means of securing its desired imperial status pursuing a zero-sum game. The Kremlin plans to establish a new international order in which it becomes a regional hegemon. It is my opinion that Russia intends to end its role as an isolated entity in international affairs, becoming closely integrated with the global economy and dictating policy. Russian officials view the Arctic as securing its energy security ambitions for the next century. Dwindling Russian gas and energy reserves, in the underdeveloped Siberian fields, and over-reliance on European imports of its natural gas has led to a push towards the Arctic. Russias jurisdictional claim over the Arctic seabed will challenge the existing international law criteria, the UNCLOS, which specifies jurisdictional authority over international waters. Arctic stakeholders must be wary of Russian intentions over Arctic development, considering the nationalistic rhetoric of the current government in power. Russias nationalized energy companies maintain an influence in formulating Arctic Policy and influencing the Russian government to their advantage. Russia will also use its energy security policy in the Arctic to become a naval superpower as new shipping lanes for trade and energy production will run along its extensive northern coastline. Russias actions in Crimea and the Ukraine emphasize their willingness to revert to military action over issues of territorial sovereignty and that the U.S. requires an assertive foreign policy with Russia. Ensuing competition over Arctic energy resources and shipping lanes will increase geopolitical competition among the Great Powers. The Bering Sea provides the U.S. with access to Arctic shipping lanes and can act as a strategic counterbalance to Russia. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13% and 30% of the worlds undiscovered oil and natural gas respectively lies under the Arctic seabed. I believe that Arctic Council members, the Nordic States and Canada, will align with the U.S. to impose strict restrictions over extraction and production in the Arctic Ocean.US-Russian relations are key to solve nuclear terrorism and global stabilityGraham 8 (Thomas Graham, Thomas Graham joined the Carnegie Endowment as a senior associate in September 1998. His areas of interest include Russian domestic politics - especially leadership issues, center-regional relations, and big business government ties - and U.S.-Russian relations Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and a B.A. in Russian studies from Yale University, US-Russia Relations: Facing Reality Pragmatically, center for strategic and international studies, July 2008, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf Fred).

In this uncertain world, the United States and Russia are not strategic rivals, and neither poses a strategic threat to the other (despite some overwrought Russian rhetoric to the contrary), in contrast to the situation during the Cold War. Rather, they share a set of common strategic challenges. Russia, by virtue of its geographic location, and the United States, by virtue of its global role, must build new relationships with a Europe that is expanding and deepening; they both must find a way to cope with the growing instability in the Middle East. the challenge to energy security that implies, and, at least for Russia, the threat that that instability will infect Russias southern reaches: and they both must manage relations with a rising China. In addition, both countries must deal with the dark side of globalization, and both have a keen interest in the role and effectiveness of the institutions of global governance, such as the United Nations and the G-8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Common challenges, however, are not the same as common interests. And there are deep differences in the way the United States and Russia think of global order (consider, for example. the role of democracy or the United Nations). But the question each country needs to ask is how important the other is to its achieving its own strategic goals. For example: . Given their standing as the worlds two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia are each indispensable to dealing with the problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear terrorism, and strategic stability. . The United States, as the worlds largest energy consumer, and Russia, as the largest producer of hydrocarbons, are essential to any discussion of energy security and energys future. . Global economic dynamics and transfers of wealth will require bringing Russia, along with China, India, and others, into a more central role in managing the global economy, a service long performed by Europe and the United States. . In East Asia. to create a favorable new equilibrium, Russia has an interest in a strong powerthat is, the United Statesacting as a moderating influence on China, and the United States has no interest in a weakening Russian presence in Siberia and the Russian Far East. regions rich in the natural resources that fuel modem economies. . In the Middle East, both the United States and Russia have levers that could help promote stability, if the two countries were working in concert, or fuel conflict, if they were not.

2NC ExtensionsUniquenessUQ: Russia has significant interest in the Arctic right nowPadrtova 7/20 (Padrtova, Barbora. "Russian Approach Towards the Arctic Region." Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs Analysis RSS. N.p., 20 July 2014. Web. 23 July 2014. . Mgr. Barbora Padrtov holds a Master degree in Security and Strategic Studies from the Faculty of Social Studies of the Masaryk University in Brno. In 2009 she graduated in International Relations and European Studies from the Metropolitan University in Prague. She also studied International Relations and Political Science at the Universiteit Twente in Netherlands. In 2011 she worked at the Political Section of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Washington, D.C. Currently she is a project manager in CENAA. In her research she focuses on Russian security and foreign policy, US-Russia relations, NATO-Russia relations, post-Soviet region, and the Arctic region. Fred).

The Arctic is clearly vital to Russias relevance in world affairs. Natural resources are one of the major forces driving Russian policy as they are viewed as a basis for the economic development and determine its geopolitical influence. Moreover, the Arctic has always played a significant role from the perspective of Russian Navy. Russia is the only country in the world with a nuclear icebreaker fleet. On the geopolitical level, the most important for Moscow is maintaining of nuclear deterrence by securing the open access of submarines to worlds seas. As the forecast promises an ice-free Arctic by 2040, Russia has a well-developed commercial and transport infrastructure to take advantage of opportunities offered by the retreating icecap. The importance of the Arctic to Russia on the one hand, and growing international interest on the other, has fueled Russias determination to make its role as a central Arctic nation eminently clear by political, economic, and military means. As part of its effort to create a comprehensive presence in the Arctic, Russia has been steadily expanding its military component there since 2007. Any foreign interest in the area, government, commercial or environmental, is seen as hostile intent. Naturally, Russian national interests will be challenged by other Arctic states all NATO members who can theoretically speak with one voice against Russia. Thus the Arctic region is likely to become a region of geo-political competition.

Link/Internal LinkRussia holds significant interests in the Arctic and is wary of other foreignersMikkola & Kapyla 13 (Mikkola, Juha Kpyl & Harri.The Global Arctic: The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union(n.d.): n. pag. Aug. 2013. Web. 22 July 2014. .Juha Kapyla is researcher the Finnish institute of international affairs. Harri Mikkola is a researcher the Finnish institute of international affairs. Fred).

Russia is the most important player in the Arctic, with significant economic, security and governance interests in the region. This is primarily because of natural resources. Over 20% of undiscovered global hydrocarbon reserves are located in the Arctic area and most of them in the Russian Arctic.4 These natu- ral resources are vital to Russian national security and economy; oil and gas alone account for roughly 20-25% of Russian GDP.5 Russias domestic social programmes, infrastructure investments, and mili- tary modernization are all critically dependent on revenues from natural resource export. Similarly, hydrocarbons provide important leverage for Russian foreign influence. This is especially the case with energy-dependent Europe, where a third of the natural gas consumed is imported from Rus- sia. The Arctic plays an increasing role in this equa- tion as a strategically vital resource base for Russia. So far, the Russian Arctic has been responsible for about 10-15% of Russian GDP and 25% of its foreign exports and there are systematic efforts to increase these figures. Russias increasing northward focus is also due to the fact that Russias mature hydrocarbon sources in Western Siberia are slowly drying up. Recent hydrocarbon activities in the Russian Arctic have taken place primarily through onshore projects in key locations such as the Yamal Peninsula and in nascent offshore projects on the Arctic sea bed in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas. These offshore projects have often taken the form of joint ventures between Russian and international energy corpora- tions. This signals Russias need to seek investments and technological know-how through international cooperation. However, key offshore projects such as the Shtokhman gas field and Prirazlomnoye oil field have turned out to be extremely challenging and have been suffering from continuous delays and shuffling of foreign partners up until today. Russia has also set its sights on resource bases outside its territorial borders and submitted a claim for the extension of its continental shelf to the UN Com- mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) process as early as 2001. In order to access, exploit and deliver Arctic natu- ral resources to global markets, Russia also aims to develop critical infrastructure in the Northern Sea Route (NSR), including ports, search-and-rescue (SAR) centres, route administration, ice-breaking capability, and oil spill response capabilities. In addition, non-maritime parts of the Arctic trans- port system pipelines, aviation routes, railways, and roads and the overall socio-economic con- ditions of the region require development and modernization. Russia also has security interests in the Arctic. Russia seeks to project its sovereign authority in its wide Arctic region through improved border control (FSB), to provide safety and security espe- cially in the NSR, and to maintain credible forces to secure critical infrastructures. Russia also seeks to maintain, develop and project a credible military force primarily naval, aerial and missile assets in the region in order to be able to react in various politico-military scenarios, as well as to deter the expansion of unwanted foreign military presence into the (Russian) Arctic.

Further US involvement risks Russian retaliation, actions to gain influence in the Arctic could be detrimentalAron 13(Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author, most recently, of Roads to the Temple: Truth, Memory, Ideas, and Ideals in the Making of the Russian Revolution, The Putin Doctrine: Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, foreign affairs published by council of foreign relations, March 8, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine Fred).

Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum -- from pro-Western liberals to leftists and nationalists. It rests on three geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower, a great power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon -- the political, military, and economic leader -- of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. It has proven remarkably resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. After his election as president in 2000, Putin added to this agenda an overarching goal: the recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991. Although he has never spelled it out formally, Putin has pursued this objective with such determination, coherence, and consistency that it merits being called the Putin Doctrine. Domestically, the doctrine has guided the regime to reclaim the commanding heights of the economy (first and foremost, the oil and natural gas industries) and reassert its control over national politics, the judicial system, and the national television networks, from which an overwhelming majority of Russians get their news. In foreign and security policy, the doctrine has amounted to a reinterpretation of Russia's geostrategic triad, making its implementation and maintenance considerably more assertive than originally intended. Although U.S. President Barack Obama has signaled lately that he will attempt to revive the "reset" with Russia, Washington's best option may well be a strategic pause: a much-scaled-down mode of interaction that reflects the growing disparity in values and objectives between the two countries yet preserves frank dialogue and even cooperation in a few select areas. THE PUTIN DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE

Russia fears US encroachment in the Arctic its expansion is a security threatOBrien 9 (O'Brien, Gregory. "How to Read the Arctic: Structural Theory and the Balance of Arctic Powers." Academia.edu. N.p., Spring 2009. Web. 23 July 2014. . RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Fred).

In response to this threatening 'non-presence' of the United States, and the growing multipolarity of the global structure, Russia appears to be pursuing a path towards establishing a new balance that would favour its Arctic power and interests. On this point, Karen Ruth Adams argued in 2003 that US encroachment on the interests of nuclear powers, including Russia, would propel the development of a new balance 'just around the corner.'235 Russian Chief of Staff Lurii Baluevskii has been more direct; stating that US commitment to its hegemony "expanding its economic, political, and military presence in Russia's traditional zones of influence" is the country's top national security threat.236 As a consequence, it is difficult to isolate the regional security dilemma and polarity trends in the Arctic from the larger international environment. For example, Hubert et al. note that events such as the Russian Georgian war could easily have led to 'chilled' relations among Arctic Council states as a result of many of these states also being members of NATO.237 Secondly, Huebert argues that because both the US and Russia are Arctic Great Powers, any drive to increase power capabilities is likely to have an effect on the Arctic balance, and hence, is an Arctic security issue.238 Thus, the Arctic security dilemma is in many ways inexorably linked to outcomes within the international structure. From this vantage, the ability of Russia, or any comparable Great Power, to conduct itself in the Arctic isolated from the global environment is unlikely. The value of the region is too great, relative gains are too important, and Great Powers will strive to attain a more favourable balance where their power is most fungible.

The zero sum game is unavoidable 3 warrantsBukkvoll 14 (Bukkvoll, Tor. "Prospects for Peace and Cooperation in the Arctic." Arctic.ru. N.p., 2011. Web. 23 July 2014. . Tor BUKKVOLL is Head of the Russia Project at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment Fred).

It is of course true that many Arctic states are concerned with their economic and security interests in the region and the danger of a regional conflict. This is in part reflected in practically all Arctic states increased military presence in the area. At times we see heated rhetoric and mutual accusations of militarization. This is rooted in three main causes: a zero-sum game over access to natural resources; an insufficient level of trust among Arctic states; and the fact that the Arctic has been and will remain a militarily sensitive area, especially for Russia. In addition, climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap are likely to substantially increase commercial activity in the region. This may lead to conflicts that are not yet apparent. Speaking about oil and gas deposits, this zero-sum game is unavoidable. Politics cannot increase the volume of available hydrocarbon deposits. Delimitation agreements seem to be the only way of defusing conflicts. The 2011 agreement between Norway and Russia on a close to fifty-fifty division of the Barents Sea shelf among the two countries is a case in point. It is, however, important to note here that far from all hydrocarbon deposits are potential sources of political conflict. In fact, many and probably most deposits are located in undisputed areas. In addition, the possibilities for cooperation on infrastructure, technology development, etc., in connection with oil and gas exploration and development activities, might also make this issue less zero-sum.

Arctic Council CP1NCNote: One probably notes that its the counterplan links to the DA since US will participate in these arctic meetings. You need to make the distinction that the arctic council will pacify Russia and allow for cooperation between the arctic nations and the US. That way the disadvantage is a net benefit to the counterplan. Counterplan Text: The Arctic Council should The Arctic Council solves for miscommunication and tensions in the ArcticStavridis 13 (Stavridis, James. "High North or High Tension?" Foreign Policy. N.p., 21 Oct. 2013. Web. 23 July 2014. . Former supreme commander of NATO. He is now the Dean of Tuft's University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Fred).

Second, we need to double down on international cooperation via the Arctic Council. Currently a small-scale international organization, it must be nurtured and resourced. Ratification of the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty, a perennial topic in American foreign policy, would also increase U.S. influence in the Arctic. For the United States, working closely with Canada in particular and our NATO partners in the Arctic generally makes good sense and would reduce costs to individual nations. We should use the Arctic Council to ensure that each nation's military movements, intentions, and patterns of operation are fully understood -- thus reducing the prospect of inadvertent tension. There are also important so-called "Track II" projects, like the rapidly growing annual conference sponsored by ArcticCircle.org, a loose confederation of experts in the region who met in Iceland last week. Third, we need to work as closely as we can with Russia in the Arctic. Although we will inevitably have disagreements over other topics, it is possible the High North could be a zone of cooperation with the Russian Federation. We have shown the ability to work together in Afghanistan, on counternarcotics and counterterrorism, in combating piracy, and in strategic arms control and reductions. We should do what we can -- working with NATO allies -- to make it so.

2NC ExtensionsSolvencyThe Arctic Council can do mappingCAFF 14 (CAFF. "Arctic Council to Produce Harmonized Map Covering Region Read More: Http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/arctic-council-to-produce-harmonized-map-covering-region/." Climate.issd.org. N.p., 18 July 2014. Web. 24 July 2014. . Fred).

18 June: The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Arctic Council's biodiversity working group, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to guide national mapping organizations in the Arctic in producing a harmonized map covering the entire Arctic region, with data on, inter alia, climate and biodiversity. The aim of the Arctic Spatial Data Infrastructure (Arctic SDI) is to help harmonize, combine and integrate diverse data sets.A wide range of data with a spatial component has been generated in the Arctic. However, the management of such data has mainly been national or issue-specific and, thus, many of the existing datasets are distributed among many organizations. Thus, the Arctic SDI will also contribute to improved sharing and analysis across the Arctic, and will be critical in helping to understand the impacts of climate change on nature, biodiversity management, and the adaptability and sustainable use of all living resources in the Arctic. Spatial data can be used in the Arctic as a tool for integrated planning. Arctic SDI users include: the Arctic Council Working Groups; scientific groups engaged in Arctic research; governmental authorities involved in decision regarding the Arctic; and the broader public, including the private sector, NGOs and media. The national mapping organizations participating in the project are from the US, Canada, the Russian Federation, Denmark and the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. CCAF consists of national representatives assigned by each of the eight Arctic Council Member States, representatives of Indigenous Peoples' organizations that are Permanent Participants to the Council, and Arctic Council observer countries and organizations.Arctic Council guidelines solve for oil environmental damageArctic Council 9 (The Arctic Council Was Established In 1996 And Succeeded The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy., It Is A High-Level Intergovernmental Forum That Provides A Mechanism To Address The Common Concerns, And Challenges Faced By The Arctic Governments And The Indigenous Peoples Of The Arctic., and The Members Of The Arctic Council Are Canada, Denmark (Including The Faroe Islands And Greenland),. ARCTIC COUNCIL (n.d.): n. pag. Www.govmin.gl. 29 Apr. 2009. Web. 24 July 2014. . Its the Arctic Council. Fred).

Clean-up Assessment Technique (SCAT) Manual (2004), the Arctic Guide for Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (2008), the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004), the assessment, Oil and Gas Activities in the ArcticEffects and Potential Effects (OGA, 2009). 1.2 Goals Purpose of the Guidelines These Guidelines are intended to be of use to the Arctic nations for offshore oil and gas activities during planning, exploration, development, production and decommissioning Recommendations on the transportation of oil and gas are found in the OGA, 2008. The Guidelines should be used to help secure common policy and practices. The target group for the Guidelines is thus primarily the authorities, but the Guidelines may also be of help to the industry when planning for oil and gas activities and to the public in understanding environmental concerns and practices of Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. While recognizing the non- binding nature of these Guidelines, they are intended to encourage the highest standards currently available. They are not intended to prevent States from setting equivalent or stricter standards, where appropriate. Policy development should take into account the domestic situation with respect to political, economic, legal, and administrative conditions. Consideration should be given to macro- economic effects, regional effects, and potential environmental impacts. Such consideration should result in a staged opening plan, and ensure protection of areas of special environmental concern. While these guidelines do not address socio-economic aspects in any detail, nor do they set standards for assessment of potential socio-economic effects of offshore oil and gas activities, these are nonetheless important to consider and integrate into the planning and conduct of exploration and development. The Guidelines are intended to define a set of recommended practices and outline strategic actions for consideration by those responsible for regulation of offshore oil and gas activities (including transportation and related onshore activities) in the Arctic (see Figure 1 and Annex A). It is hoped that regulators will identify the key aspects related to protection of human health and safety and protection of the environment for the management of offshore activities, while at the same time remaining sufficiently flexible in the application of these management regimes to permit alternative regulatory approaches. It should be recognized that the eight Arctic nations have different systems with different emphases on the division of responsibility between the operator and the regulator. The goal is to assist regulators in developing standards, which are applied and enforced consistently for all offshore Arctic oil and gas operators. Sensible regulation will vary to some degree based upon local circumstances. Thus, it is expected that, based on the outcome of environmental impact assessment procedures, regulators will establish policies such that offshore oil and gas activities are conducted so as to provide for human health and safety and protection of the environment.

Arctic Council is uniquely key to solve the dispute in the ArcticStein and Axworthy 11 (Stein and Axworthy, Janice and Thomas. "The Arctic Council Is the Best Way for Canada to Resolve Its Territorial Disputes." The Globe and Mail. N.p., 25 Jan. 2011. Web. 24 July 2014. . Janice Gross Stein is director of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and Thomas S. Axworthy is president and CEO of the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and a senior distinguished fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs. Fred).

For example, the Canada-Russia dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge will take 10 to 20 years if left to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. What is needed is an Arctic-specific institution where these issues can be resolved. Luckily, one exists. The Arctic Council, comprised of the eight Nordic countries in the region, is an effective, high-level venue for discussing substantial concerns, such as the environment and native rights. However, when it was created in 1996 after a long diplomatic campaign by Canada, peace and security issues were left out of its mandate at American insistence. But 2011 is not 1996 and, as world interest on the Arctic swells, peace and security need to be on the agenda to ensure the Arctic Council remains relevant. The survey clearly demonstrates interest in peace and security in the Arctic. On the issue of an Arctic nuclear-weapons free zone (such as Antarctica), six of the nine constituencies surveyed were very supportive of this idea (82 per cent in Norway, 78 per cent of Southern Canada, 77 per cent of Finland, 76 per cent of Northern Canada, 75 per cent of Iceland, and 74 per cent of Denmark). Not surprisingly, American and Russian respondents were the least enthusiastic, with 56 per cent and 47 per cent supporting a nuclear-free Arctic, respectively. The Arctic Council would be a fitting venue to discuss peace and security, not only because it includes the world's two largest nuclear superpowers, but also because it includes as Permanent Participants the indigenous peoples who call this territory their homeland. Even in Russia, there is an appetite for discussing these issues at the council, with 81 per cent of Russians agreeing that military security should be discussed and 85 per cent agreeing that the Arctic Council should cover peace-building issues. Upon becoming chair of the Arctic Council in 2013, Canada will have a rare opportunity to put peace and security back on the agenda.

Arctic Council can get cooperationYoung 2K Oran R. Young, Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College August 2000The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing Opportunities* http://www.arcticparl.org/files/static/conf4_sac.pdfThe Arctic Council has an opportunity to move to the cutting edge in devising cooperative arrangements well-suited to the increasingly complex international/transnational landscape of the 21st century. But it cannot capitalize on this opportunity unless those steeped in traditional diplomatic practices exhibit the self-confidence needed to experiment with innovative procedures designed to open up the council to new players and to legitimize its claim to function as the voice of the Arctic.

Environmental Justice KNote, you have to either insert the exploration or development link dont read just Bryant and Rodriguez aloneJustice must be our overriding imperative-All communities are interconnected, beyond just constructed boundaries. Damage in one sows seeds of destruction in another. In return, we reap wars, environmental destruction, and inevitable extinction. Intellectual and political expediency is flypaper to progress. Making energy justice our intellectual strategy is key to incorporating these communities into decision making while laying the foundation for a sustainable politics Bryant 95 (Bunyan Bryant, Professor in the School of Natural Resources and Environment, and an adjunct professor in the Center for Afro-American and African Studies at the University of Michigan, 1995, Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions, p. 209-212)Although the post-World War II economy was designed when environmental consideration was not a problem, today this is no longer the case; we must be concerned enough about environmental protection to make it a part of our economic design. Today, temporal and spatial relations of pollution have drastically changed within the last 100 years or so. A hundred years ago we polluted a small spatial area and it took the earth a short time to heal itself. Today we pollute large areas of the earth as evidenced by the international problems of acid rain, the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, nuclear meltdowns, and the difficulties in the safe storage of spent fuels from nuclear power plants. Perhaps we have embarked upon an era of pollution so toxic and persistent that it will take the earth in some areas thousands of years to heal itself. To curtail environmental pollutants, we must build new institutions to prevent widespread destruction from pollutants that know no geopolitical boundaries. We need to do this because pollutants are not respectful of international boundaries; it does little good if one country practices sound environmental protection while its neighbors fail to do so. Countries of the world are intricately linked together in ways not clear 50 years ago; they find themselves victims of environmental destruction even though the causes of that destruction originated in another part of the world. Acid rain, global warming, depletion of the ozone layer, nuclear accidents like the one at Chernobyl, make all countries vulnerable to environmental destruction. The cooperative relations forged after World War II are now obsolete. New cooperative relations need to be agreed upon cooperative relations that show that pollution prevention and species preservation are inseparably linked to economic development and survival of planet earth. Economic development is linked to pollution prevention even though the market fails to include the true cost of pollution in its pricing of products and services; it fails to place a value on the destruction of plant and animal species. To date, most industrialized nations, the high polluters, have had an incentive to pollute because they did not incur the cost of producing goods and services in a nonpolluting manner. The world will have to pay for the true cost of production and to practice prudent stewardship of our natural resources if we are to sustain ourselves on this planet. We cannot expect Third World countries to participate in debt-for-nature swaps as a means for saving the rainforest or as a means for the reduction of greenhouse gases, while a considerable amount of such gases come from industrial nations and from fossil fuel consumption. Like disease, population growth is politically, economically, and structurally determined. Due to inadequate income maintenance programs and social security, families in developing countries are more apt to have large families not only to ensure the survival of children within the first five years, but to work the fields and care for the elderly. As development increases, so do education, health, and birth control. In his chapter, Buttel states that ecological development and substantial debt forgiveness would be more significant in alleviating Third World environmental degradation (or population problems) than ratification of any UNCED biodiversity or forest conventions. Because population control programs fail to address the structural characteristics of poverty, such programs for developing countries have been for the most part dismal failures. Growth and development along ecological lines have a better chance of controlling population growth in developing countries than the best population control programs to date. Although population control is important, we often focus a considerable amount of our attention on population problems of developing countries. Yet there are more people per square mile in Western Europe than in most developing countries. During his/her lifetime an American child causes 35 times the environmental damage of an Indian child and 280 times that of a Haitian child (Boggs, 1993: 1). The addiction to consumerism of highly industrialized countries has to be seen as a major culprit, and thus must be balanced against the benefits of population control in Third World countries. Worldwide environmental protection is only one part of the complex problems we face today. We cannot ignore world poverty; it is intricately linked to environmental protection. If this is the case, then how do we deal with world poverty? How do we bring about lasting peace in the world? Clearly we can no longer afford a South Africa as it was once organized, or ethnic cleansing by Serbian nationalists. These types of conflicts bankrupt us morally and destroy our connectedness with one another as a world community. Yet, we may be headed on a course where the politically induced famine, poverty, and chaos of Somalia today will become commonplace and world peace more difficult, particularly if the European Common Market, Japan, and the United States trade primarily among themselves, leaving Third World countries to fend for themselves. Growing poverty will lead only to more world disequilibrium to wars and famine as countries become more aggressive and cross international borders for resources to ward off widespread hunger and rampant unemployment. To tackle these problems requires a quantum leap in global cooperation and commitment of the highest magnitude; it requires development of an international tax, levied through the United nations or some other international body, so that the world community can become more involved in helping to deal with issues of environmental protection, poverty, and peace. Since the market system has been bold and flexible enough to meet changing conditions, so too must public institutions. They must, indeed, be able to respond to the rapid changes that reverberate throughout the world. If they fail to change, then we will surely meet the fate of the dinosaur. The Soviet Union gave up a system that was unworkable in exchange for another one. Although it has not been easy, individual countries of the former Soviet Union have the potential of reemerging looking very different and stronger. Or they could emerge looking very different and weaker. They could become societies that are both socially and environmentally destructive or they can become societies where people have decent jobs, places to live, educational opportunities for all citizens, and sustainable social structures that are safe and nurturing. Although North Americans are experiencing economic and social discomforts, we too will have to change, or we may find ourselves engulfed by political and economic forces beyond our control. In 1994, the out-sweeping of Democrats from national offices may be symptomatic of deeper and more fundamental problems. If the mean-spirited behavior that characterized the 1994 election is carried over into the governance of the country, this may only fan the flames of discontent. We may be embarking upon a long struggle over ideology, culture, and the very heart and soul of the country. But despite all the political turmoil, we must take risks and try out new ideas ideas never dreamed of before and ideas we thought were impossible to implement. To implement these ideas we must overcome institutional inertia in order to enhance intentional change. We need to give up tradition and business as usual. To view the future as a challenge and as an opportunity to make the world a better place, we must be willing to take political and economic risks. The question is not growth, but what kind of growth, and where it will take place. For example, we can maintain current levels of productivity or become even more productive if we farm organically. Because of ideological conflicts, it is hard for us to view the Cuban experience with an unjaundiced eye; but we ask you to place political differences aside and pay attention to the lyrics of organic farming and not to the music of Communism. In other words, we must get beyond political differences and ideological conflicts; we must find success stories of healing the planet no matter where they exist be they in Communist or non-Communist countries, developed or underdeveloped countries. We must ascertain what lessons can be learned from them, and examine how they would benefit the world community. In most instances, we will have to chart a new course. Continued use of certain technologies and chemicals that are incompatible with the ecosystem will take us down the road of no return. We are already witnessing the catastrophic destruction of our environment and disproportionate impacts of environmental insults on communities of color and low-income groups. If such destruction continues, it will undoubtedly deal harmful blows to our social, economic, and political institutions. As a nation, we find ourselves in a house divided, where the cleavages between the races are in fact getting worse. We find ourselves in a house divided where the gap between the rich and the poor has increased. We find ourselves in a house divided where the gap between the young and the old has widened. During the 1980s, there were few visions of healing the country. In the 1990s, despite the catastrophic economic and environmental results of the 1980s, and despite the conservative takeover of both houses of Congress, we must look for glimmers of hope. We must stand by what we think is right and defend our position with passion. And at times we need to slow down and reflect and do a lot of soul searching in order to redirect ourselves, if need be. We must chart out a new course of defining who we are as a people, by redefining our relationship with government, with nature, with one another, and where we want to be as a nation. We need to find a way of expressing this definition of ourselves to one another. Undeniably we are a nation of different ethnic groups