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D E V E L O P M E N T P O L IC Y

w i l l n o t d o t o p i c k o u t o n e s o c i a l a r e a o r a n o t h e r ,

p l o t s o c i a l i n d i c a t o r s f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a r e a a n d

c r a m i t i n t o a n i n c o n g r u o u s s y s te m o f s o c i a l i n -

d i c a t o r s .

W h a t i s n e e d e d i s t h e d e s i g n o f a r a t i o n a l w a y o f

l i f e , a m o d e l f o r t h i s a n d a r a t i o n a l b u d g e t s h o w -

i n g t i m e s c h e d u l e s a n d u t i l it y v a lu e s . I t w i l l c e r -

t a i n l y n o t b e a m a t t e r o f s i m p l y e x t r a p o l a t i n g t h e

p r e v i o u s c o n s u m p t i o n o f t im e a n d u t i l it y v a l u e s .

A r a t i o n a l c o n s u m p t i o n s c h e m e w i l l h a v e t o b e

o u t l i n e d , t o b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a m o d e l a n d t o b e

i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e s o c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o -

c e s s f o r p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e r a t i o n -

a l l y d e t e r m i n e d m a t e r i a l n o r m s f o r t h e c o n s u m p -

t i o n o f g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s w i l l h a v e t o b e j u s t i f ie d

b y r e f e r e n c e t o s e v e r a l c r i t e r i a : t h e c o n s u m e r s '

p r e f e r e n c e s , s c i e n t i f i c a l l y j u s t i fi a b l e c o n s u m p t i o n

n o r m s , a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l e v e l o f p r o d u c -

t i v e f o r c e s ( n a t i o n a l o r w o r l d w i d e ? ) a n d a r g u -

m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e v a l u e o f h u m a n l iv e s . T h e

S e c o n d a n d T h i r d W o r l d h a v e f u r n i s h e d e x a m p l e s

o f p o s s i b l e d e s i g n s f o r s u c h b u d g e t s . W e s h o u l d

l e a r n f r o m t h e m . O v e r i m p o r t a n t a r e a s w e l o n g

a g o c e a s e d t o p l a y t h e r u l e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e -

c e p t o r .

I N S T I T U T I O N S

M arket ing and is t ribu t ion S t ra teg ies

for Internat iona l O rgan izat ion s

b y J o h n C . P a t t is o n a n d J o h n A . Q u e l c h , O n t a r i o *

R e c e n t ly in te rn a t io n a l o r g a n iz a t io n s a s e .g . th e In te r n a t io n a l M o n e ta r y F u n d o r th e G A T T h a v e

in c r e a s in g ly b e e n c r i t i c i z e d p a r t i c u la r l y b y d e v e lo p in g c o u n t r i e s . E v e n th e c r e a t io n o f a k in d o f s u p e r -

U N C T A D is u n d e r d isc u s s io n . O th e r In st itu tio n s a r e a ls o s u b je c te d to in c r e a s in g p r e s s u r e to J u s t if y th e

In v e s tm e n ts o f th e i r s p o n s o rs in te r m s o f th e p r o d u c t w h ic h th e y a r e o ffe rin g, W h a t a b o u t a d e q u a te

s t r a te g ie s fo r th e in te r n a t io n a l o r g a n iz a t io n s ?

u r i n g t h e p a s t t h r e e d e c a d e s t h e r e h a s b e e n

a c o n t i n u o u s e x p a n s i o n i n t h e n u m b e r , s i z e

a n d r o l e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e p r o -

l i f e r a t i o n i s s u c h t h a t i t i s a p r o b l e m f o r g o v e r n -

m e n t s a n d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s t o a r -

r a n g e f o r s e v e r a l h u n d r e d f u n c t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l

c o m m i s s i o n s , b o a r d s , c o m m i t t e e s a n d s e c r e t a r i a t s

t o w o r k t o g e t h e r e f f e c t i v e l y . W i t h i n t h e l a s t f e w

y e a r s , t h e r e h a s b e e n i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n w i t h

o p e r a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y a n d c o s t e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f

i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a s w e l l a s w i d e s p r e a d

c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s a n d a l l e g e d i n e f f e c -

t i v e n e s s . D u e t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g s c r u t i n y b y l e g i s -

The Un lv e rs l t y o f Wes t e rn Ont a r io , Sc hoo l o f Bus ines s Ad-

m in i s t ra t i on .

138

l a t u r e s t h e r e i s i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e f o r e a c h b o d y

t o j u s t i f y t h e i n v e s t m e n t s o f i t s n a t i o n a l s p o n s o r s

i n t e r m s o f t h e p r o d u c t w h i c h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n

o f fe r s . T h e U n i t e d N a t io n s , th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a -

b o u r O r g a n i z a t i o n ( I L O ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r T r a n s -

p o r t A s s o c i a t i o n ( I A T A ) , O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r E c o -

n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t ( O E C D ) a r e

o n l y a f e w e x a m p l e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h p a r t i c -

u l a r l y d e e p l y - r o o t e d p r o b l e m s w h i c h h a v e b e e n

e x t e n s i v e l y c r i ti c i z e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s .

C r i t i z i s m f r o m t h e c l i e n t e l e i s e x t e n s i v e , b u t b e -

c a u s e o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p r o d u c t , i s b o u n d t o b e

p r e s e n t i n s o m e q u a n t i t ie s . I n 1 97 4 , R i c h a r d G a r d -

n e r w r o t e i n Foreign ffairs ( p a g e 5 57 ) t h a t N o -

b o d y n o w t a k e s a m a j o r i s su e to E C O S O C , U N C -

INTERECONOM ICS, M ay/Jun e 1979

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INST ITUT IONS

TAD, GATT, IMF or OECD wi th much hop e fo r a

cons t ruct ive resu l t . The Economis t (January 12,

1976, page 815 ra ised the quest ion, Do we ne ed

an IMF? Char les Kind leb erger in Po w e r a n d

M o n e y (Macm i l lan , 1970 , page 12) no ted tha t The

e co n o m is t i s in c l in e d t o . . . su g g e s t th a t i n te r -

na t iona l o rgan iza t ions a re ra ther l ike ch i ld ren 's

par t ies w i th p r izes fo r everyone, no mat te r who

wins the game. 1 Conf l ic ts w i th na t iona l go vern-

ments o f ten occur , fo r example , the OECD sup-

por ted by the US and the UK has been c r i t ica l o f

Germ an m acroec onom ic po l ic ies . By and large,

however , such cr i t ic isms a re in inverse p ropor t ion

to the s ize o f the coun t ry (and hence in the share

o f the o rgan iza t ion 's budget ) .

Concern w i th f inanc ing these o rgan isa t ions has

r isen a t a rap id pace in the 1970 's . The re luctance

o f t h e U S C o n g re ss in 1 9 7 8 t o sh o w e n th u s ia sm

for the fo re ign a id b i l l is a case in po in t . About

one th i rd o f the amount o f the admin is t ra t ion 's

o r ig ina l request was fo r the Wor ld Bank and o ther

mu l t i la te ra l a id agenc ies. The concern was ba-

s ica l ly whether US in te rests a re served e f fec t ive ly

by in te rna t iona l a id agen c ies us ing US funds. In

Bri ta in, a study in a 1976 issue of the L loyds Bank

Rev iew by J . D iamond and J . Dods wor th s ta ted

tha t In 16 ou t o f 18 o rgan iza t ions, the USA under-

pays re la t ive to i ts share o f na tu ra l income . Ac-

cord ing to th is s tudy, the UK had a tendency to

overpay in a la rge number o f these bod ies. These

ca lcu la t ions a re v i r tua l ly mean ing less i f in te r -

na t iona l o rgan iza t ions a re v iewed as se l l ing a

product o r even p rov id ing a pub l ic good . The

nat iona l con t r ibu t ions represen t ne i ther p r ices fo r

serv ices nor a we l l - thought -ou t system o f in te r -

na t iona l taxa t ion . Nonethe less, the po in t is tha t

the UK fe l t tha t i t was overpay ing re la t ive to o ther

coun t r ies .

R e a s o n s f o r t h e G r o w t h

One o f the consequences of the p ro l i fe ra t ion o f

o rgan iza t ions is the

increased

l i ke l ihood o f com-

pet i t ion for members, resources, and re lat ive

prominence.

The t ime has

c o m e

fo r in te rna t iona l

o rgan iza t ions to move more c lear ly and con-

s t ruct ive ly to deve lop a mix o f se rv ices des igned

to sa t is fy the needs o f the i r customers, ra ther than

the pre ferences of the i r secre ta r ia ts o r subse ts o f

the membersh ip . Such a p rocess imp l ies , in es-

sence, tha t each body shou ld fo rmu la te a mar-

ke t ing s t ra tegy o f wh ich one e lement is a com-

prehens ive communica t ions p lan .

Be fo re embark ing on a d iscuss ion o f the e lements

o f a marke t ing s t ra tegy, a shor t d ig ress ion in to

t F u rt h e r r e f e re n c e s m a y b e f o u n d I n J o h n P a t t i e o n a n d M .

F r a t i a n n i , I n te r na t i ona l I ns t i t u t i ons and I n te r na t i ona l P r og -

r es s , i n : T he N ew Ec onomi c s o f t he Les s D ev e l oped C oun t r i es ,

N ak e K a m r a n y , ed . Bou l de r , C o l o r ad o : We s tv i ew P r es s , 1978),

pp. 319-346.

I N T E R E C O N O M I C S , M a y / J u n e 1 9 7 9

the reasons fo r the g rowth o f in te rna t iona l o rga-

n iza t ions is in o rder . The number o f o rgan iza t ions

has expanded in harmony w i th the number o f in -

dependent sovere ign s ta tes and the end o f exp l ic i t

co lon ia l ism. T ied in w i th th is , many o f the o lder -

estab l ished bod ies have expanded the i r member-

sh ips in response to the g rowing number o f

na t ion s ta tes. S imu l taneous ly , there has occur red

a dec l ine in the in te rna t iona l dominance o f some

major powers such as the US, a r ise in o thers

such as Japan and Germany, and a recogn i t ion o f

an ob l iga t ion on the par t o f the ma jo r powers to

o f fe r the remain ing s ta tes a renas in wh ich to ex-

p ress the i r v iews and ostens ib ly par t ic ipa te in

dec is ion-making . As a resu l t o f these t rends, the

ro le o f many bod ies has sh i f ted f rom an emphasis

on po l icy and dec is ion-making to one o f p romot -

in g co mmu n ica t io n s .

I t is usefu l to note the changing shares of the

majo r coun t r ies in the indust r ia l ized wor ld . The

US has fa llen f rom 59 .0 % o f OECD GNP in 1953

(a year wh ich does n o t d is to r t the immed ia te post -

war reconst ruct ion phase) to 39 .4% in 1976 .

Japan rose f rom 3 .1 to 13 .0%, wh i le Germany

wen t f rom 5 .6 to 10 .5 %. The GNP o f the s i x or ig -

ina l mem bers o f the European Com mu ni ty rose

f rom 18 .8 to 26 .3 %. 2 The n ine mem ber European

Com mun i ty has a marke t share o f abou t 33 % o f

OECD G NP and is moving towa rds the US share .

Whi le i t cou ld be sa id tha t the US was a t one t ime

a su f f ic ien t ly la rge par t o f the indust r ia l ized

wor ld ' s economy to p rov ide leadersh ip in in te r -

nat ional affa irs, the redu ct ion in i ts m ark et

share reduced bo th it s incen t ive and it s ab i l i t y to

prov ide po l icy coord ina t ion serv ices 3.

The abd ica t ion o f over t leadersh ip on the par t o f

the ind iv idua l ma jo r powers has necess i ta ted a

dramat ic increase in the number o f t ransna t iona l

in te r re la t ionsh ips, par t icu la r ly w i th regard to in -

fo rmat ion f lows. In an e f fo r t to reduce r isk and

uncer ta in ty in po l icy-making , na t ions were eager

to jo in o r es tab l ish bod ies invo lved in p rov id ing

e f f ic ienc ies in the genera t ion and d issemina t ion o f

in fo rmat ion on an in te rna t iona l sca le .

The number o f issues fo r wh ich in te rna t iona l in -

fo rmat ion f lows and coopera t ive dec is ion-making

are impor tan t is g rowing . There has long been a

recogn i t ion tha t na t iona l ju r isd ic t ions a re too

sma l l t o su cce ss fu l l y a d d re ss ma n y e c o n o m i c

i ssues. Bu t the deve lopment o f new

techno log ies,

fo r example in the a reas o f communica t ions and

seabed exp lo ra t ion , necess i ta te tha t e i ther an

= F o r s o m e s t a t ls t lc s , s e e M i c h e l e F r a t i a n n l a n d J o h n P a t -

t i e o n , T h e E c o n o m i c s o f I n t e r n a t io n a l O r g a n i z a t io n s , a p a p e r

p r es en ted a t t he 1975 annua l me e t i ng o f t he Pu b l i c C ho i c e Soc i e t y ,

r ev i s ed 1978 , m l meo .

3 F o r e ma thema t i c a l and t heo r e t i c a l j us t i f i c a t i on o f t h i s po i n t , s ee

F r a t i a n n l a n d P a t t l s o n , i bi d.

39

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INSTITUTIONS

es t ab l i shed o r a new body add ress t he t r ans -

na t i ona l im p l i ca t i ons o f such advances . A no t he r

reason f o r t he i nc rease i n t he num ber o f o rgan i -

za t i ons i s f o rum shop p ing wh ere gove rnm en t s

sea rch ou t the o rgan iza t i on m os t l i ke l y to p rom o t e

a f avou rab le ou t com e. Th i s has c rea t ed a m arke t

f o r se r v i ces wh ich we re p rov ided by ex i s t i ng bod -

ies by t he c rea t i on o f new o rgan iza t i ons , com -

mi t tees and so for th .

M ar ke t i ng C oncept s

The las t f ac t o r m en t ioned above i s one o f t he

m a jo r r easons why ex i s t ing b od ies m us t em bark

upon se r ious m arke t i ng cam pa igns . The re la t i ve

ease and l ow cos t w i t h wh ich a new in t e rna t i ona l

o rgan iza t i on o r se r v i ce can be es t ab l i shed poses

a threat to es tab l ished bod ies , i f no t to the i r ex is t - '

ence a t leas t to the i r re la t ive impor tance ( i f t he

cos ts o f re tent ion are less than the cos ts and the

i l l -w i l l o f the i r e l im inat ion) . The cos ts o f swi t ch ing

a se r v i ce f r om one body t o ano t he r a re a l so l ow .

Thus , to main ta in the i r ex is tence and impor tance,

t he i n t e rna t i ona l o rgan iza t i on m us t em brace t he

m arke t i ng concep t , m ean ing t ha t i t m us t con -

s tant ly be respons ive to the evo lv ing needs o f i t s

cus t om ers .

Fo rum shopp ing m ay be a con t r i bu t i ng f ac t o r t o

t he g row ing num ber o f o rgan iza t i ons bu t i t i s no t

necessar i ly undes i rab le as is o f ten asser ted. I f a

coun t r y w ishes t o ach ieve a po l i c y ob jec t i ve

aga ins t t he w ishes o f a sec re t a r i a t o r a subse t o f

an organ iza t ion 's membersh ip , i t may t ry to sh i f t

t he l ocus o f dec i s ion -m ak ing t o a new o r ex i s ti ng

body . Th i s ad jus t m en t does , howeve r , r equ i r e an

im por t an t g roup ing o f coun t r i es t o concu r i n t he

t r ans i t i on . Th i s p rocess need no t be coun t e r -

p roduc t i ve i f a s ign i f i can t ag reem en t can be

reached in t he new body . Th i s i s l i ke l y whe re t he

o r ig ina l f o rum was com pr i sed o f a l a rge num ber

o f m em bers o f d i f f e ren t i deo log ies and where a

h igh pe rcen t age o f m em bers ' consen t i s r equ i r ed

f o r po l i c y dec i s ions . M any gove rnm en t s a re d i s -

cover ing that the most e f fec t ive t ypes o f bod ies in

wh ich t o pa r t i c i pa t e a re t hose w i t h a sho r t e r

char ter , l im i ted to members w i th s im i la r charac-

ter is t ics and w i th a spec i f ic se t o f goa ls . Th is

t rend is re la ted to the inc reas ing d i f f i cu l t y wh ich

in ternat iona l o rgan iza t ions have in fo rmula t ing

and im p lem en t ing dec i s ions as t he i r m em bersh ip

inc reases . Thus , due to low ent ry bar r ie rs , major

powers have f ound i t t o t he i r bene f i t t o wo rk

w i t h in bod ies wh ich a re m ore m anageab le and

which, by v i r tue o f the i r smal le r s izes fac i l i t a te the

dec i s ion -m ak ing o r com m un ica t i ons p rocesses .

When cons ide r ing t he s i ze o f an i n t e rna t i ona l

o rgan iza t i on , no t e t ha t t he Group o f F i ve com -

p r i ses 76% o f t he OE CD a rea . Fo r m any eco -

nom ic ques t i ons t o go f u r t he r down t he l i s t t o t he

Group o f Seven, Group o f Ten and so for th , re -

su l t s in m inor add i t ions to the GNPs invo lved (as

a p roxy f o r t he bene f i t o f t he coope ra t i on ) ye t

g rea t l y com p l i ca t es t he po l i t i c s , econom ics and

organ iza t ion (e .g . , s imul taneous t rans la t ion) o f the

group.

The re la t i ve i n f l uence o f an o rgan iza t i on and t hus

i ts abi l i ty to maintain i ts members ' loyal ty is a

func t ion o f i t s ab i l i t y to serve the po l icy goa ls o f

t he m em bersh ip . I n t e rna t i ona l o rgan iza t i ons a re

t he i n t e rna t i ona l equ iva len t o f bus iness t r ade as -

soc ia t i ons and depend f o r t he i r success on t he

deg ree o f r esou rces and com m i t m en t p rov ided by

the me mbe r c oun t r ies 4. As such, i t is pa r t icu lar ly

im por t an t t ha t t he execu t i ve o f an i n t e rna t i ona l

o rgan iza t i on and m a jo r pa r t s o f t he sec re t a r i a t be

aware o f t he po l i c y ob jec t i ves and bene f i t s sough t

f rom the organ iza t ion by ind iv idua l members . In

ve ry l a rge o rgan iza t i ons such as t he UN o r t he

OE CD, t he ex t en t o f t h i s awareness i s p rob le -

mat ic . Th is is par t icu lar ly t rue because each

m em ber na t i on has m any i n t e res t s and d i f f e ren t

min is t r ies w i l l usua l ly have d i f fe rent goa ls . A

coun t r y l i ke a m a jo r com pany m ay we l l j o i n 30 o r

40 grou ps to a ssure cove rage o f i ts many in ter -

es ts . I f an organ iza t ion is unab le e i ther to ident i f y

t he po l i c y needs o f i t s sponso r o r se r ve t he va r i -

ous po l icy des i res , i t reduces i t s ab i l i t y to main-

t a in t he suppo r t o f t hese m em bers e i t he r i n t e rm s

of budget or ro les .

4 T he ana l ogy t o t r ade as s oc i a t i ons i s a us e fu l one . T he ana l y s i s

o f t r ade as s oc i a t i ons c a r r i ed ou t by S t i g l e r c ou l d j us t as p r o f i t ab l y

be done fo r c o un t r i es j o i n i ng i nte rna t iona l o r gan i z a t i ons . See

G e o r g e S t i g l e r , F re e R id e r s a n d C o l l e c t iv e A c t io n : A n A p -

pend i x t o T heor i es o f Ec onom i c R egu l a t i on , Be l l J ou r na l o f Ec o -

nomi c s and M anage men t Sc i enc e , Vo l . 5 , N o . 2 ( Au tumn 1974) , pp .

359-365.

V E

K O N J U N K T U R

V O N M O R G N

h e s h o r t r e p o r t o n d o m e s t i c a n d w o r l d b u s i n e s s t r e n d s a n d r a w m a t e r i a l m a r k e t s

p u b l i s h e d e v e r y f o r t n i g h t b y H W W A - I n s t l t u t f L ir W i F t s c h a f t s f o r s c h u n g - H a m b u r g

ISSN 0023-3439

R L A G W E L T A R C H I V G M B H H A M B U R G

14

I N T E R E C O N O M I C S , M a y / J u n e 1 9 7 9

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INSTITUTIONS

As the number o f o rgan iza t ions increases, the

poss ib i l i t y o f dup l ica t ion o f se rv ices and , there -

fo re , o f head- to -head com pet i t ion fo r resourc es

among groups w i th over lapp ing mandates in -

creases. From the s tandpo in t o f the sponsor ing

na t ion , there is some ra t iona le fo r dup l ica t ion . The

uncer ta in t ies o f in fo rmat ion may be reduced i f

more than one independent body genera tes the

same in fo rmat ion . In add i t ion , dup l ica t ion may be

regarded as a means o f res t r ic t ing the po ten t ia l

power and independence o f an o rgan iza t ion , o r

subse ts o f i t s membersh ip .

The r isk o f compet i t ion and dup l ica t ion suggests

tha t the body shou ld a im e i ther to de l ive r a

un iqu e se t o f se rv ices o r to de l ive r a se t o f

serv ices in a un ique ly e f fec t ive manner such tha t

imi ta t ion by e i ther a new group o r an ex is t ing

body a t tempt ing to expand i ts mandate w i l l be

d i f f icu l t . The best source o f se l f -p ro tect ion is a

c lear unders tand ing o f the needs o f ac tua l and

poten t ia l member coun t r ies , and the deve lopment

o f a serv ice mix wh ich e f fec t ive ly addresses these

needs. However , as the mem bersh ip expand s, i t

becomes more d i f f icu l t to de l ive r th is serv ice mix

w i thou t compromis ing the in te rests o f some

members.

Di f ferences between Internat ional Organizat ions

and Private usiness

In the deve lopment o f a marke t ing s t ra tegy an

organ iza t ion must rea l ize the ex is tence o f s ign i f i -

can t d i f ference s between i tse lf and a pr ivate

bus iness. Un l ike most p r iva te en te rp r ises, an in te r -

na t iona l o rgan iza t ion is o r ig ina l ly c rea ted by it s

customers and as a resu l t has an immed ia te mar-

ke t fo r i t s p roduct . Thus, the o rgan iza t ion has a

customer base to sa t is fy immed ia te ly upon i t s in -

cep t ion . To susta in i t se l f the o rgan iza t ion must

con t inue to cons ider i t s mandate care fu l ly . The

body must be ab le to fo resee the chang ing needs

o f i t s members and adapt i t s po l ic ies and p r io r i -

t ies to sat isfy these needs, or e lse decl ine in im-

por tance . Bu t as in the bus iness con text a l te r ing

po l ic ies to meet the chang ing needs o f some cus-

tomers r isks a l iena t ing o thers to whom the cur ren t

strate gy appeals. Som e United N at ions ' act iv i t ies

and ca l ls fo r a New In te rna t iona l Economic Order

are examples.

A second s ign i f ican t d i f fe rence be tween a non-

pro f i t ins t i tu t ion such as an in te rna t iona l o rgan i -

za t ion and a bus iness f i rm is the lack o f a mone-

ta ry yardst ick . A bus iness can assess the degree

to wh ich i t is meet ing ex is t ing customer needs

and crea t ing new custom ers by the yardst ick o f

p ro f i t s o r sa les as we l l as a wea l th o f account ing

data. In the case of an in ternat ional organizat ion,

there is no imm ediate measure. R ather, i t must t ry

INTERECONOMICS May/June 1979

to measure i t s impor tance compared w i th the

compet i t ion to de te rmine i f i t is se rv ing customer

needs. I t can be a rgued tha t dec l ines in membe r-

sh ip and membersh ip suppor t can be used as a

measure , bu t th is is usua l ly in f luenced by longer

te rm facto rs tha t a re no t d i rec t ly re la ted to shor te r

term, ef fect iveness. Also, such a m easu re is not of

much he lp s ince i t p rov ides no advance warn ing

o f p rob lems.

Both o f these fac to rs must be borne in mind by

the o rgan iza t ion when i t a t tempts to app ly the

marke t ing techn iques d iscussed be low. There a re

th ree bas ic marke t ing concepts tha t a re ava i lab le

to the execu t ives o f in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions to

fac i l i ta te the ma in tenance o f membersh ip and

re la t ive p rominence . Through segmentation the

actua l and po ten t ia l customers o f the o rgan iza t ion

may be c lus te red accord ing to s ize , geograph ica l

loca t ion , po l i t ica l system, the re la t ive impor tance

a t tached to d i f fe ren t bene f i t s assoc ia ted w i th

membersh ip , o r o ther var iab les such as economic

openness and in te rdependence . The segmenta t ion

process a t tempts to iden t i f y the common charac-

te r is t ics o f the members and th rough th is ap-

p roach , ind ica tes wh ich needs the body m ust

serve to fu l f i l l the needs of i ts members. Conf l icts

seem very l ike ly to ex is t among the marke t seg-

ments, so i t wi l l not be possib le to target at

severa l segments s imu l taneous ly .

Differentiation

refers to d if ferences in the pack-

ages of benef i ts of fered. When specify ing the

organ iza t ion 's mandate and des ign ing the serv ice

mix i t is essen t ia l to know what bene f i t s a re o f -

fe red by o ther , po ten t ia l ly comp et ing bod ies. I t

shou ld be no ted tha t the serv ices o f fe red a re im-

p l ied o r exp l ic i t ly s ta ted in i t s mandate and i t may

be d i f f icu l t fo r an estab l ished body to change

these serv ices. D i f fe ren t ia t ion does no t neces-

sar i ly have to be in the form of d i f ferent services.

Many in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions dea l w i th s imi la r

agr icu ltura l issues, as an example. In th is case

d i f fe ren t ia t ion must be based upon super io r qua l -

i t y o f se rv ices o r upon an increased serv ice to a

na t iona l sponsor o r g roup o f sponsors . D i f fe ren-

t ia t ion by p rov id ing be t te r se rv ice to a par t icu la r

c l ien te le is one way fo r them to deve lop the i r

marke ts where the bas ic p rognos is is no t favor -

able.

When bo th segmenta t ion and d i f fe ren t ia t ion ana l -

ys is have been comple ted , i t w i l l be poss ib le fo r

execu t ives o f in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions to deve l -

op a positioning st ra tegy. Pos i t ion ing invo lves

bo th the spec i f ica t ion o f a ta rge t segment o f

po ten t ia l customers and the de f in i t ion o f a d i f -

fe ren t ia ted serv ice m ix wh ich addresse s the needs

o f th is segment . Th is must be cons is ten t w i th the

mandate o r i t can change the mandate . Aga in ,

141

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though, an o rgan iza t ion is no t f ree to move in to

areas to wh ich i t has no mandate , i t must work

with in i ts l imits to develop a program, that wi l l

sat isfy i ts in i t ia l sponsors and, perhaps, at a la ter

s tage , p oss ib ly sa t is fy the needs o f o ther po ten t ia l

members.

A marke t pos i t ion ing s t ra tegy is par t icu la r ly im-

por tan t fo r in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions because

once the p roduct is purchased by one se t o f

c l ien ts i t may be d i f f icu l t o r imposs ib le to se l l to

someone e lse . The OECD secre ta r ia t may want to

add East Germany, fo r example , as a ma jo r eco-

n o mic f o rce in Eu ro p e , h o w e ve r f o r o th e r me m-

b e rs w i t h a p re d o min a n t l y ca p i t a l i s t e co n o my th is

migh t p rove unacceptab le . S imi la r ly OPEC migh t

n o t w a n t t o in c lu d e C a n a d a o r t h e U K a s me mb e rs

even though they a re pe t ro leum expor t ing coun-

t r ies . A pos i t ion ing s t ra tegy w i l l , the re fo re , evo lve

f rom answer ing the fundamenta l quest ion , by

wh ich the manda te is de f ined , W hat bus iness a re

w e in ? .

I d e n ti fi c a ti o n o f o n s u m e r N e e d s

a n d h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

Th e sp o n so r in g me mb e r co u n t r ie s a re g e n e ra l l y

regarded as the customers o f in te rna t iona l o rgan-

iza t ions. These customers may be examined on an

ind iv idua l bas is o r in te rms o f g roup ings re levan t

to a spec i f ic o rgan iza t ion o r common to severa l

o r a l l in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions. In a b roader

sense , however , the u l t imate consumers a re the

nat ional publ ics in f luenced by i ts act iv i t ies. I t

migh t be a rgued, there fo re , tha t the o rgan iza t ion

shou ld be cogn izan t o f the needs and sen t iments

o f these u l t imate consumers and , indeed, act ive ly

promote i t se l f to these consumers to ra ise pub l ic

awareness and favorab le a t t i tudes regard ing i t s

con t inued ex is tence and in f luence . I t is poss ib le ,

fo r example , to env isage the Un i ted Nat ions

f in a n c in g a co mm u n ica t io n s ca m p a ig n d i re c te d a t

tax-pay ing c i t izens o f Weste rn democrac ies. The

Eu ro p e a n C o mmu n i t y h a s re g u la r l y co mmiss io n e d

pub l ic op in ion po l ls in member coun t r ies . How-

ever , the po l i t ica l leadersh ips o f the sponsor ing

na t ions may regard such e f fo r ts as a t tempts to

compromise the i r con t ro l o f the act iv i t ies o f the

organ iza t ion . In add i t ion , sponsor ing na t ions gen-

era l ly w ish to c la im respons ib i l i t y and cred i t fo r

act ions o r even ts wh ich a re , in fac t , a t t r ibu tab le

to the in te rmed ia t ion o f the body. Th is approach

both depends upon and re in fo rces the ma in te -

nance o f an image o f ine f fec t iveness among the

vo t ing pub l ic .

R e ce n t co n f ro n ta t io n s b e tw e en t h e U S C o n g re ss

and the Admin is t ra t ion and be tween the US

Government and in te rna t iona l bod ies have oc-

cur red par t ly because o f a lack o f apprec ia t ion o f

142

US consu me r needs and sen t iments by these

bodies. However, g iven the mult i la tera l nature of

these o rgan iza t ions i t is v i r tua l ly imposs ib le tha t

such conf l icts do not ar ise. I t is easy to under-

s tand oppos i t ion to Wor ld Bank lend ing to V ie t

Nam f rom a US po in t o f v iew, bu t more d i f f icu l t

f rom the v iewpo in t o f the ma jo r i t y o f Wor ld Bank

cont r ibu to rs . I t is a lso na tu ra l fo r Congress to

want to rece ive cred i t and in f luence na t iona l

po l ic ies w i th a id money. I t is p rec ise ly because o f

the la t te r p rob lem tha t near ly one th i rd o f wor ld

a id is channe l led th rough mu l t i la te ra l agenc ies,

com,pared with 1 0% in the mid-1960's. US op-

pos i t ion to h igh sa la r ies and benef i ts is more d i f -

f icu l t to fau l t , as most na t iona l members o f the

majo r in te rna t iona l o rgan iza t ions have fa r lower

domest ic pay sca les, and o f ten h igher taxa t ion

than e i ther sen io r US government sa la r ies o r the

sa la r ies a t the lead ing o rgan iza t ions.

Confus ion about the na tu re o f the u l t imate con-

sumer o f the serv ices o f in te rna t iona l o rgan iza-

t ions was recen t ly d isp layed in a Wor ld Bank

repor t on aud i t resu l ts o f p ro ject per fo rmance.

The Bank s ta ted Annual Review o f Pro ject Per-

formance Audit Results, Wor ld Bank, February

1978, p . i ii ) because . . . con f iden t ia l i t y cann ot be

co mp ro mise d w i t h o u t co mp ro mis in g t h e in te g r i t y

of the reviews, specif ic pro ject names, as

well

as

names o f coun t r ies , have been de le ted f rom th is

pub l ished summary. However , the Bank went on

to no te

. . . the Bank is accountab le to i t s shareho lders -

i t s member governments . . . I t is the shareho lders ,

there fo re , who rece ive the Pro ject Per fo rmance

Aud i t Repor ts on the resu l ts o f the ind iv idua l

opera t ions.

Apparen t ly , the taxpayers and c i t izens who a re

the u l t imate shareho lders a re no t en t i t led to know

how the i r money is spen t .

Represen ta t ion a lso a f fo rds member coun t r ies a

h igh ly des i red fo rm o f pa t ronage in te rms o f ap-

po in tments , t rave l and so fo r th . These a re o f ten

h igh ly v is ib le a t the na t iona l po l i t ica l leve l, bu t no t

a l l members use the oppor tun i t ies wh ich a re o f -

fe red . The re la t ive a t t rac t iveness o f an o rgan i -

za t ion may depend, in par t , upon the degree to

wh ich the dec is ion-makers be l ieve tha t the i r per -

sona l p re fe rences may be maximized . In dea l ing

wi th economic po l icy , there is a c lear p re fe rence

revea led toward s a t tend ing m eet ings o f the OECD

ra ther than , fo r example , the IMF. To some exten t ,

th is is a p re fe rence fo r one loca t ion over ano ther .

H is to r ica l ly , the ma jo r o rgan iza t ions have been

located in at t ract ive ci t ies such as Paris, Geneva,

and Rome, ra ther than c i t ies w i th be t te r com -

mun ica t ions fac i l i t ies bu t perhaps less ambiance .

The loca t ion o f the IMF in Wash ing ton is a resu l t

INTERECONOMICS May/June 1979

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INSTITUTIONS

o f l e g a l s t i p u l a t i o n s i n t h e A r t i c l e s o f A g r e e m e n t .

W h i l e s u p e r f i c i a l , i n t e r m s o f t h e b a s i c o p e r a t i o n s

o f t h e s e b o d i e s , t h e s e a r e m a r k e t i n g c o n s i d e r -

a t i o n s w h i c h a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d n o t i g n o r e .

Three imensions

I n m a n y r e s p e c t s a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n

m u s t m a r k e t i t s p r o d u c t s i n t h e s a m e w a y a s a n

i n d u s t r y s e l l s a m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t , r a t h e r

t h a n a s a r e t a i l m a r k e t i n g e x e r c i s e . I n t h e i n d u s -

t r i a l p u r c h a s i n g s i t u a t i o n , i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y t o

i d e n t i f y t h e k e y d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a n d t h e i r r e l a t io n -

s h i p t o k e y p o l i c y m a k e r s . T h e s e p e o p l e a r e l i k e l y

t o b e s e n i o r e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t ic a l t e c h n i c i a n s

r a t h e r t h a n t h e m o s t s e n i o r c i v i l s e r v a n t s a n d t h e

C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s . T h e r e a r e t h e n t h r e e d i m e n -

s i o n s t o t h e m a r k e t i n g - p u r c h a s i n g d e c i s i o n . F i r s t ,

w h a t c a n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ( s e l l e r ) d o

f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ( p u r c h a s e r ) ? S e c o n d , w h a t

c a n t h e s e l l e r d o f o r t h e e m p l o y e e h i m s e l f ? T h i r d ,

h o w d o t h e d e c i s i o n s a n d t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e

b o d y a f f e c t t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e ? W i l l t h e

o r g a n i z a t i o n c r i t i c i z e p o l i c i e s t h e e m p l o y e e p r o -

m o t e s ? W i l l i t o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s t o u n d e r -

m i n e h i s p o l i c y s u g g e s t i o n s ? W i l l t h e w o r k o f th e

o r g a n i z a t i o n r e f l e c t p o o r l y u p o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t

a n d h e n c e i t s r o l e i n t h e i r j o i n t a c t i v i t i e s ? T h e

p u r c h a s i n g d e c i s i o n i s o n e w h e r e b o t h s e l l e r a n d

p u r c h a s e r m u s t h a v e a n a c t i v e r o l e o n a n o n g o i n g

b a s i s f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f b o t h . F o r e x a m p l e , f r o m

t i m e t o t i m e , e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s r e q u i r e d f o r L a t i n

A m e r i c a h a v e b e e n m o r e e a s i l y i m p l e m e n t e d

t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r m e d i a t io n o f t h e I M F t h a n t h e y

c o u l d h a v e b e e n i f p r o m o t e d b y t h e U S G o v e r n -

m e n t w h i c h h a d a m a j o r i n t e r e s t i n t h e s e c o u n -

t r ie s . S i m i l a r ly , U S i n t e r e s t s w e r e w e l l l o o k e d a f te r

i n a r e c e n t I M F l o a n t o E g y p t . T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n -

m e n t h a s p r e s s e d t h e I M F i n t h e p a s t to f i n a n c e

b u f f e r s t o c ks , m a i n l y t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h

F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g A f r i c a n a s s o c i a t e s a n d o t h e r

d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . F r a n c e w o u l d r e c e i v e a

l a r g e b e n e f i t r e l a t i v e t o i t s s h a r e o f t h e c o s t s .

T o s e r v e t h e g e n e r a l n e e d s o f t h e s p o n s o r s a s

o u t l i n e d a b o v e , t w o d i f fe r e n t t y p e s o f w o r l d o r g a n i -

z a t i o n s h a v e e v o l v e d o v e r t i m e s T h e f i r s t o f t h e s e

a r e f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c servi e o r g a n i z a t i o n s

e s t a b l i s h e d t o a c c o m p l i s h c l e a r l y d e f i n e d t a s k s .

T h e s e c o n d t y p e , t h e g e n e r a l

forum

o r g a n i z a t i o n

i s a l a r g e m u l t i - p u r p o s e g r o u p w i t h a b r o a d

m e m b e r s h i p r a n g e .

F u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f ic b o d i e s a r e t h o u g h t t o b e

m o r e e f f e c t i v e t h a n m u l t i - p u r p o s e o n e s . H o w e v e r ,

t h i s j u d g e m e n t s h o u l d b e t e m p e r e d w i t h t h e r e a l i -

z a t i o n t h a t t w o t y p e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s d o n o t

s I n t he s ens e o f Cox and J ac obs on . See Rober t W. C o x and

H . K . J a c o b s o n , The Ana t omy o f In f l uenc e New Hav en : Ya le

Un ivers ity P ress, 1973), pp. 5, 6.

n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e t h e s a m e t y p e s o f g o a l s . S p e c i f i c

g r o u p s a t t e m p t t o s o l v e p r o b l e m s a n d t o d e v e l o p ,

f o r m o r i m p l e m e n t p o l i c y i n s p e c i f i c a r e a s , a n d

t h e r e s u l t s a r e r e a d i l y s e e n . M u l t i - p u r p o s e o r g a n i -

z a t i o n s t e n d t o s e r v e a s f o r u m s f o r t h e e x c h a n g e

o f i n f o r m a t i o n , f o r t h e t e s t i n g o f n e w i d e a s , a n d

a s a r e n a s i n w h i c h t o e x p r e s s c o n c e r n . A l t h o u g h

r e s u l t s a r e h a r d e r to m e a s u r e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f

s u c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d .

A p o s i t i o n i n g s t r a t e g y w i l l o r d i n a r i l y n e c e s s i t a t e

t h a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f i r s t d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r i t

v i e w s i t s m i s s i o n a s t h a t o f a f o r u m o r s e r v i c e

o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e f l e x i b i l i t y of e x i s t i n g g r o u p s w i t h

r e g a r d t o t h i s d e c i s i o n i s l i m i t e d b y i t s h i s t o r i c a l

d e v e l o p m e n t a n d b y t h e p e r c e p t i o n s a n d p r e f -

e r e n c e s o f m e m b e r a n d n o n - m e m b e r n a t i o n s

a l i k e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e i s s o m e e v i d e n c e t h a t

b o d i e s e v o l v e fr o m p o l i c y - m a k i n g o r s e r v i c e o r -

g a n i z a t i o n s t o o r g a n i z a t i o n s s e r v i n g p r i m a r i l y a

f o r u m f u n c t i o n . T h e a b i l i t y t o a d o p t a s p e c i f i c

p o s i t i o n i n g s t r a t e g y , i s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t d e t e r -

m i n e d b y t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a g e o r , in m a r k e t i n g

t e r m s , i t s s t a g e i n t h e p r o d u c t l i f e c y c l e . A r e l a -

t i v e ly y o u n g b o d y w i t h o u t a h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d o f

p e r f o r m a n c e w i l l m o r e e a s i l y a d a p t t o n e w f u n c -

t i o n s t h a n o n e w i t h a t r a d i t i o n o f s e r v i c e i n a

g i v e n a r e a .

T h e p o s i t i o n i n g s t r a t e g y o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n m u s t

n e x t b e m o r e c l o s e l y d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e

n e e d s o f i t s t a r g e t c u s t o m e r s . T h i s p r o c e s s m a y

b e c o m p l i c a t e d b y v a r i a ti o n s a m o n g m e m b e r s i n

t e r m s o f t h e i r n e e d s o r t h e r e l a t i v e e m p h a s i s

p l a c e d u p o n t h e m . T h e n e e d s o f a n i n d i v i d u a l

m e m b e r c o u n t r y m a y a l s o b e e x p e c t e d t o v a r y

w i t h t i m e a s p o l i c i e s a n d p e r s o n n e l c h a n g e , s u g -

g e s t i n g t h a t t h e b o d y m u s t c o n s t a n t l y r e a s s e s s

t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f i t s m i s s i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f s h i f t s i n

t h e b e n e f i t s s o u g h t b y m e m b e r s . F i n a l ly , a n o r g a n i -

z a t i o n s e e k i n g t o e x p a n d i t s m e m b e r s h i p m u s t

a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e n e e d s o f p o t e n t i a l t a r g e t c u s -

t o m e r s a n d t h e i r c o m p a t a b i l it y w i t h t h e b e n e f i t s

s o u g h t b y e x i s t i n g c u s t o m e r s i n s h a p i n g i t s p o s i -

t i o n i n g s t r a t e g y . F o r e x a m p l e , a R e p o r t o f t h e

T r i l a t e r a l C o m m i s s i o n h a s r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t I r a n ,

B r a z i l a n d M e x i c o s h o u l d b e i n v i te d t o jo i n t h e

O E C D 6. F r o m a m a r k e t i n g v i e w p o i n t , t h i s m o v e

m i g h t r e d u c e t h e v a l u e o f t h e O E C D t o m a n y , b u t

n o t a l l , e x i s t i n g m e m b e r s .

evelopment of Ma rket ing Strategy

O n c e t h e b a s i c p o s i t i o n i n g s t r a t e g y i s e s t a b l i s h e d ,

t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e m a r k e t i n g s t r a t e g y m u s t b e

c l o s e l y d e f i n e d . T h e f o u r e l e m e n t s m o s t f r e q u e n t l y

a d d r e s s e d a r e p r o d u c t p o l i c y , p r i c i n g p o l i c y , d i s -

t r i b u t i o n p o l i c y , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n p o l i c y .

C . F re d B e r g s t e n e t a l . , T h e R e f o rm . of I n t e rn a t i o n a l

I ns t i tu t i ons New York : The T r i l a t e ra l Com mis s ion , 1976) , p . 25.

INTERECONOM ICS, May /June 1979 14 3

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I N S T I T U T I O N S

The product is essen t ia l ly the mix o f se rv ices

def ined by the posit ion ing strategy. In addit ion,

the actua l members o f the o rgan iza t ion may be

v iewed as an e lement in d i f fe ren t ia t ing the p rod-

uct o f fe r ing , par t icu la r ly i f the body is in te rested

in a t t rac t ing new member coun t r ies . Actua l and

poten t ia l members genera l ly ho ld membersh ips in

severa l ra ther than one g roup each p rov id ing

co mp le me n ta ry b e n e f i t s t o t h e me mb e rs . Th e d e -

s ign o f the o rgan iza t ion s p roduc t m ust take ac -

coun t o f th is rea l i ty - the mix o f se rv ices wh ich

wou ld be appropr ia te i f a coun t ry cou ld on ly be a

member o f one body wou ld l ike ly be much less

spec ia l ized than i f the same count ry cou ld be long

to severa l concurren t ly .

The p r ice pa id by a coun t ry fo r membersh ip var ies

f rom one o rgan iza t ion to ano ther, bu t w i ll inc lude

a con t r ibu t ion towards the opera t ing expenses,

funds wh ich the o rgan iza t ion may t ransfe r to o ther

coun t r ies in the deve lop ing wor ld , the imp l ica t ions

o f membersh ip fo r the a t t i tudes o f o ther coun t r ies

and fo r membersh ip o f o ther o rgan iza t ions. Other

non-moneta ry membersh ip fees a re a lso invo lved .

The ob l iga t ions o f membersh ip represen t a sub-

s tan t ia l por t ion o f the imp l ic i t p r ice tag . The GATT

membersh ip fee , fo r example , inc ludes an ob l iga-

t ion to a f fo rd t rade concess ions to the con t ract ing

p a r t ie s . OEC D o r IMF me mb e rsh ip p re su p p o se s

an accep tance o f the ob l iga t ion to re f lec t in te r -

na t iona l p r io r i t ies in domest ic po l ic ies .

The p r ice tag o f membersh ip is no t on ly a funct ion

o f the serv ices de l ive red bu t a lso o f the number

o f members. Because the va lue o f membersh ip

does no t bear a l inear re la t ionsh ip to the number

of members, payof fs may have to be d ivided

among more members in a la rger c lub . Conse-

quent ly , the p r ice tag may be lower . One e lement

o f the serv ices is the re la t ive in f luence wh ich the

member has w i th in the o rgan iza t ion . We igh ted

vo t ing , such as tha t used by the IM F, genera l ly

at tempts to re late costs to re lat ive benef i ts, and

makes such bod ies more a t t rac t ive to the i r la rger

and more economica l ly impor tan t customers.

D is t r ibu t ion po l icy invo lves the de l ive ry o f the

serv ice mix to members. The loca t ion o f the head-

qua rters and branch of f ices, and the f requ enc y

and dura t ion o f meet ings bear upon the re la t ive

a t t rac t iveness in te rms o f bo th costs and the

appea l to po l icymakers in member coun t r ies . I f

several bodies are located in the same city, in for-

mat ion f lows be tween the o rgan iza t ions a re fac i l -

i ta ted. Thus, the IMF establ ished a branch of f ice

in Geneva to be t te r regu la te i t s re la t ions w i th

o ther UN bod ies. In add i t ion , the cost o f coverage

of severa l o rgan iza t ions to the member coun t ry is

reduced i f they a re loca ted in the same c i ty ; such

economies a re o f par t icu la r re levance to deve lop-

144

ing coun t r ies w i th rest r ic ted fo re ign cur rency to

a l loca te to in te rna t iona l invo lvement .

C o mmu n ica t io n s p o l i cy co ve rs t h e d isse min a t io n

o f in fo rmat ion and persuas ive communica t ions to

actua l and po ten t ia l m embers o r to o ther pub l ics

such as vo te rs in member coun t r ies . Some organ i -

za t ions, par t icu la r ly many serv ice o r ien ted bod ies,

a re in te rested on ly in in te rna l communica t ions

among members and a im to reta in a low prof i le in

the in ternat ional arena. They have l i t t le use for an

e x te rn a l ly d i re c te d c o mm u n ica t io n s p o l i cy a ime d

at genera t ing new members o r pub l ic suppor t .

Indeed, ra ther than marke t ing the o rgan iza t ion ,

there may be more in te rest in demarket ing that is

us ing communica t ions to de-emphasize e i ther

cer ta in act iv i t ies o f the o rgan iza t ion o r perhaps

the degree o f dec is ion making , au thor i ty o r po l icy

adv ice occur r ing w i th in the o rgan iza t ion in o rder

to reduce the i r nega t ive exposure to some mem-

ber coun t r ies . Re tu rn ing to the congress iona l -

adm in is t ra tion-Wo r ld Ban k p rob lem, dem arke t ing

cer ta in Wor ld Bank funct ions in the US cou ld be

advantageous.

onclusions

The deve lopment , adop t ion and imp lem enta t ion o f

marke t ing s t ra teg ies fo r in te rna t iona l o rgan i -

za t ions o f fe rs many advantages to na t iona l gov-

e rnments and to the o rgan iza t ions themse lves.

F i rs t, the com pet i t ion wh ich w i l l be encourage d

among these bod ies w i l l tend to p romote the sys-

temat ic ends o f the in te rna t iona l economy by

creat ing incent ives to f i l l needed ro les in the in ter-

na t iona l po l i t ica l and economic f ramework. Cur-

rent ly, many secretar iats of in ternat ional organi-

za t ions have too g rea t a f reedom to fo l low the i r

in ternal goals which of ten leads to dupl icat ion of

serv ices, s ince en t ry costs to an estab l ished

organ iza t ion a re low. Second, marke t ing s t ra teg ies

wi l l l ike ly improve the image o f in te rna t iona l

o rgan iza t ions he ld by the i r own employees. Th is

would do much to ra ise the low level of morale in

these bod ies and to improve the recru i t ing o f

good execu t ives and techn ic ians upon whom , the

respons ib i l i t y fo r the fu tu re o f much in te rna t iona l

coo pera t ion wi l l u l t imate ly fa l l. F inal ly, a prop er

marke t ing s t ra tegy is l ike ly to lead to increased

acceptance o f the act iv i t ies o f the body no t on ly

by member na t ions bu t by c i t izens o f these coun-

t r ies . Curren t ly , pub l ic a t t i tudes towards in te r -

na t iona l o rgan iza t ions a re l ike ly fa r more host i le

than those o f the c iv i l se rvan ts and government

members who serv ice these bod ies on beha l f o f

the i r member s ta tes. The bus iness communi ty in

par t icu la r , is one segment o f the u l t imate marke t

where coopera t ion and compl iance a re necessary ,

espec ia l ly fo r mu l t ina t iona l compan ies, bu t where

the cur ren t accep tance is incred ib ly low.

INTERECONOM ICS M ay/Ju ne 1979

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