Mohammed  Ali  Bapir  

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A critical assessment of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s

Hermeneutic Philosophy

Mohammed  Ali  Bapir  

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ABSTRACT

Hermeneutics as the art of interpreting and understanding text, speech and human

action is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy. Drawing extensively on

Gadamer’s writings on hermeneutics, this essay is an assessment of the centrality of

‘language’ and ‘understanding’ in his philosophy. Taking the very work of Gadamer

on hermeneutics as an interpretation of Continental Philosophy, metaphorcity of

language and historicity of understanding are the key elements in interpreting

meaning in a text as well as a social action. Gadamer contributed to hermeneutics by

first, providing an ontological shift, from interpretation of text to the interpretation of

social action; second, replacing the ‘hermeneutical circle’ with the ‘hermeneutical

dialectic’; and lastly, by treating hermeneutics as a science and therefore, giving his

work on ‘hermeneutic philosophy’ a universal characteristic.

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CONTENTS

Title page …………………………... 1

Abstract …………………………… 2

Page of Contents …………………… 3

Introduction ………………………... 4

Section One ……………………..…. 5

Section Two ……………………..… 12

Conclusion ………………………… 16

Bibliography ………………………. 18

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INTRODUCTION

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the social sciences is the flexibility in how

one can analyze a social event; there is always more than one way to ask a question

and more than one way to answer. To comprehend a social event, there are two

approaches that differ distinctly in their focus; one is on ‘explanation’ and the other is

on ‘understanding’. Since the nineteenth century, ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’

have been two main approaches to social explanation, the former seeks ‘cause’ and

the latter pursues ‘meaning’ (see, von Wright 1971; 2004). Hence, each tradition has

its own philosophical foundation, ontological, epistemological and methodological

considerations. ‘Explanation’, philosophically treats social sciences as a natural

model science; it is, ontologically objectivist and regards the social world as an object

separate from the observer; epistemologically positivist that the social life can be

studies as such (i.e. treating data as fact); and methodologically explanative that

explains causality (i.e. the causes) of a social event and what makes it happen.

‘Understanding’, philosophically takes social sciences as different from natural

sciences (i.e. social sciences has its won method to study the social world); it is,

ontologically constructivist, that the social world is a construct of idea and action;

epistemologically interpertivist, that the social agents contribute meaning to their

actions; and methodologically hermeneutical, that is to understand (interpret) what

does a social event mean, and what do social agents mean by their actions.

This essay is an attempt to discuss ‘understanding’ and its methodology

‘interpretation’, in relation to its philosophical foundation: hermeneutics. This,

however, is done with reference to Hans-Georg Gadamer (to correspond with the

essay question) to critically assess his hermeneutic philosophy. The essay,

nonetheless, narrows the focus on Gadamer’s conceptualizations of hermeneutic, and

thus, excludes other philosophers’ views and conceptualizations, except those who

have been Gadamer’s references in his discussion on the subject matter.

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This paper focuses primarily on deconstructing and defining hermeneutics in

terms of interpreting language and understanding. Such an interpretation of the essay

question is imperative, since it correlates hermeneutic philosophy and the explanation

in social sciences. Furthermore, the paper can also be regarded as an instance of

hermeneutics, as it relies on Gadamer’s writings, mostly Method and Truth, (1975;

1979) what he has called ‘philosophical hermeneutics’, and also the interpretation of

other scholars of Gadamer.

In this essay, I make two different but overlapping arguments. First, Gadamer’s

Hermeneutic philosophy is highly influenced by continental philosophy, and though

some scholars argue Language is central to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, this paper

argues that not only language but also understanding is essential core in his

conceptualization of hermeneutics. Second, the paper also, with reference to

historicity of understanding and metaphorcity of language, argues that Gadamer’s

attempt was not one of how understanding ‘should be’ but was rather stating what

‘happens’ when we interpret, and what ‘occurs’ when we try to understand, and

hence, giving hermeneutics a universal character.

This essay is composed of two sections. In the first section I will discuss

Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy within the context of continental philosophy, and

then turn to argue that not only language but also understanding is central to

Gadamer’s hermeneutics philosophy. In the second section, I will highlight the

universality of hermeneutics, Gadamer’s universalistic claim on the hermeneutic

problem and the art of interpretation. And finally the paper draws a conclusion.

SECTION ONE

Hermeneutics, from the Greek word hermeneia, in the fifteenth century referred to a

broad range process of interpretation, understanding and the meaning of biblical

texts. Later within the settings of modern continental philosophy, the content of the

term expanded to cover interpretation of any kind of written text and speech. In the

twentieth century, hermeneutics was used within the context of sociology to cover the

understanding and meaning of human action, social event and the interpretation of the

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social world. In this section, with reference to Gadamer, I will shed some light on the

philosophical dimension of hermeneutics. That is, taking Gadamer’s hermeneutic

philosophy within the context of continental philosophy, by illustrating Plato’s

Dialogue, Hegel’s Dialectic and Heidegger’s Context influence on Gadamer’s

Hermeneutics. Meanwhile, I make an attempt to highlight two elements in his

conceptualization on hermeneutics namely, language and understanding.

First and foremost, it is necessary to make it clear that the aim of this paper is

not to discuss Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, in relation to analytic philosophy

and continental philosophy, for this is an entirely different subject of discussion (i.e.

not analytic philosophy versus continental philosophy debate). In the outset, I

mentioned that the continental philosophers have influenced Gadamer’s work and

hence, his work is a manifestation of continental philosophy. Here, in order to back

up my claim a definition of continental philosophy is necessitated, Patrick A. Heelan,

(1991) in his work ‘Hermeneutical Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Science’

gives a satisfactory definition stating that continental philosophy views ‘science as an

institution in a cultural, historical, and hermeneutical setting’ and then identifies the

domain of continental philosophers’ discourses in ‘values, subjectivity, life worlds,

history, and society as these affect the constitution of scientific knowledge’ (emphasis

added, Heelan, 1991: 213). There is a direct correlation between Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy and the very subject matter of continental philosophy, on the

one hand, and in their attempt to constitute scientific knowledge, on the other.

Accordingly, Georgia Warnke (2002), states that Gadamer locates the ‘conditions of

understanding meaning whether textual, aesthetic, or historical, in the traditions to

which interpreters belong as in the authority of those traditions’ (emphasis added,

Warnke, 2002: 79). The historicity of human knowledge, the role of culture and

tradition, in relation to the establishment of acceptable knowledge, is the main

common features of both Gadamer’s Hermeneutic philosophy and continental

philosophy.

Paying close attention to the structure of Gadamer’s Hermeneutic philosophy, I

argue that his works (i.e. on hermeneutics) are highly influenced by Plato, Hegel and

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Heidegger. Not only does he refer to these figures in his writings on hermeneutics but

he also, interprets their views vis-a-vis knowledge and understanding, and their

method of work, in order to establish the structure of his hermeneutics.

From the start, the most influential feature characterizing Gadamer’s

Hermeneutics is Plato’s dialogue, the mode of questioning and the use of language as

a common ground to understanding, and the meaning of the concepts used in a

conversation. Accordingly, Gadamer states ‘as a student of Plato I particularly love

those scenes in which Socrates gets into a dispute with the Sophist virtuosi and drives

them to despair by his questions’ (emphasis added, Gadamer, 1966: 13). Here

Gadamer takes dialogue as the method of questioning a subject matter, for him to

question is to interpret, and therefore, to ‘understand’ the meaning of what has been

uttered about the subject matter in a conversation. Gadamer argues that ‘whoever

wants to understand must question what lies behind what is said’ (1975: 370),

expanding this notion and technique of addressing a question, from speech to text.

Thus, for Gadamer dialogue becomes one of the foundational premises on which he

builds his Hermeneutic philosophy. Correspondingly, Gadamer argues that

‘philosophical hermeneutics is more interested in the questions than the answers – or

better, that it interprets statements as answers to questions that it is its role to

understand’ (emphasis added, Gadamer, 1979b: 106).

Again, Plato is present in Gadamer’s conceptualization of language, when

Gadamer views language as the criterion to understand (i.e. language is the channel).

He quotes Plato, ‘the truthful access to beings should be sought independent of

language’ and concludes that ‘Plato conceals the true nature of language’ (Gadamer,

1979a: 408). Then, the true nature of language conceals understanding a subject

matter per-se, this will be dealt with in detail in the later part of this section.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831) is another figure whose

influence can be seen in the construction of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy.

Building on the idea of question and answer from dialogue, Gadamer looks for a style

that can manifest such a dialogue, in relation to a text within the route of history (i.e.

a conversation over a longer period of time). Thus as Richard E. Palmer, (1969) has

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rightly put, ‘Gadamer finds in Hegel’s dialectical account of experience the starting

point for his own dialectical hermeneutics’ (Palmer, 1969: 195). That is to say the

text is ‘itself the answer to a question not the question we put to it, but the question

the ‘subject’ of the text puts to it’ (ibid: 200). For instance, if a text was discussing

social justice, we need to interpret the text in such a way that we subject our selves to

the questions that social justice directs us as readers (i.e. listeners) and the text (i.e.

speaker). For Gadamer this is an attempt to understand justice within a given context,

and our interpretation builds on understanding, together with the understanding that

the text has on justice in a dialectical manner. Bildung, is the term Gadamer uses

instead of method, referring to Bildung as a movement by which something

continually differs from itself and yet in that very process becomes itself thus in his

‘thesis it is Bildung not, method, best explains the nature of Hermeneutic

understanding’ (Weinsheimer, 1991: 187).

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) influenced Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy.

Gadamer’s Bildung, from Hegel’s dialectic, suggested that the process by which

understanding develops itself is interoperation (i.e. dialogue). Similarly, Heidegger

(1962) Being and Time, puts, ‘in interpretation, understanding does not become

something different, it becomes itself’ (Heidegger, 1962: 188). Gadamer for the most

part, is an add-on to Heidegger. Concerning hermeneutics, Heidegger’s argument is

essentially that an interpretation of a text reveals something about the social

context in which it was formed, and provides the reader with a means to share the

experiences of the author. Such a reciprocity between text and context is part of what

Heidegger called the ‘hermeneutic circle’. I refer to hermeneutic circle as

Heidegger’s ‘context’, Gadamer, as one further building elements to his hermeneutic

philosophy uses context. If a metaphor could help, it is like putting the roof on the

walls; with Heidegger’s context Gadamer gives his hermeneutics a certain definition.

Gadamer’s interpretation of Heidegger is like Marx’s interpretation of Hegel’s, but in

a more constructive manner. Here is where the ontological turn of Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy can be manifested the best, and takes a certain shape, a

Gadamerian shape. This turn took place in two phases. First when Gadamer regards a

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historical text as a window through which the interpreter can see the socio-political

condition of a given past. For instance, he writes, ‘when we read Mommsen’s History

of Rome, we know who alone could have written it, and then he adds ‘we can

identify the political situation in which this historian organized the voices of the past

in a meaningful way’ (Gadamer, 1966: 6). This would suggest that text can be the

mediator between us an the past in this way, interpretation is the method by which we

understand (i.e. dialogue), and with the help of Bildung (i.e. dialectic) this ends up in

understanding that given social world, the social agents and the way they attributed

meaning to their actions; to hear ‘organized the voices’ in a meaningful way (i.e.

context). The second phase of the ontological turn is when Gadamer calls for

interpreting experiences, arguing that hermeneutics not only has to do with ‘a

theoretical attitude toward the practice of interpretation; the interpretation of texts,

but also in relation to the experiences interpreted in them and in our communicatively

unfolded orientations in the world’ (Gadamer, 1979b: 112). This is one of the

fundamental characteristics of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, and taking this

statement into consideration, one can argue, that Gadamer’s interpretations and build

on to Plato, Hegel and Heidegger on its right is a self evident example of

hermeneutics. Gadamer interpreted the texts of Plato and Hegel as example of the

past, but Heidegger was his teacher, and hence, Gadamer interpreted his experience

to understand the subject matter: hermeneutics. Further, in his work ‘Hermeneutics as

a Theoretical and Practical Task’ he clarifies and confirms that the ‘the art of

understanding is required not only with respect to text but also in ones intercourse

with ones fellow human being’ (1979b: 113). At this stage, Gadamer’s ontological

turn manifests and transforms hermeneutics from interpretation of text, to

interpretation of the social world for understanding social action.

Thus far, I have discussed the construction and characteristics of Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy, and now defining such a hermeneutics in Gadamer’s words

would make the task of discussing the position of ‘language’ and ‘understanding’ in

relation to his philosophy easier. Gadamer, in an essay entitled ‘Hermeneutics as

Practical Philosophy’ gives a rough definition stating ‘by hermeneutics is understood

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the theory or art of explication, of interpreting’ (1979b: 88). Two questions may arise

here; first, interpreting what? Second, interpreting for what? The answers are:

interpreting language, and for the sake of understanding. In the outset I argued that

not only ‘language’ but also ‘understanding’ is central to Gadamer’s

conceptualization of hermeneutics, because these two concepts are answers to two

fundamental questions on the very definition of hermeneutics.

Gunter Figal in his work ‘The Doing of the Things Itself: Gadamer’s

Hermeneutic Ontology of Language’ (2002) argues that ‘the consideration of

Language stands at the centre of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics’ (Figal,

2002: 102). Nevertheless, in my understanding, Figal is viewing only ‘language’

dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, as I stated with reference to Gadamer’s

definition both language and understanding stand at the centre of his philosophical

hermeneutics. Gadamer defines understanding as ‘sharing a common meaning’

(emphasis added, Gadamer, 1975: 432). And then about language he writes ‘being

that can be understood is language’ (emphasis added, 1975: 432). Figal’s,

interpretation to Gadamer’s definition of language is that ‘there is no understanding

without language … something is understandable in so far as it can come to language

… meaning is what word and thing have in common’ (Figal, 2002: 115). However,

with reference to Gadamer’s definition of understanding, I argue that there can be one

more interpretation to Gadamer’s conceptualization of language; I take Figal’s

argument the other way round that ‘there is no language without understanding’. As I

view, Figal has taken language as an end, while throughout, as I discussed the

construction of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, language was the mediator and

understanding was the end. Understanding is what becomes itself in Bildung,

understanding is the ‘end’ which through language realizes itself. My point is that

both understanding and language are entwined and they cannot be separated, both

encompass ‘meaning’, as Gadamer believes that in a successful interpretation the

meaning is alive and ‘exists purely for itself’ (1975: 392).

Another interpretation to Gadamer’s definition of language; ‘being that can be

understood is language’ (emphasis added, 1979a: 432), is by Joel Weinsheimer. He

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argues ‘at the very least, this means that language is the condition of understanding

anything whatever’ (Weinsheimer, 1991: 181). To draw on this interpretation,

Weinsheimer’s view would suggest, not only that we speak a language, but also there

is a language that speaks to us. A language that speaks to us in our daily

communication and social activities, and hence to understand this language we need

a hermeneutical interpretation, to ‘interpret’ the action of a social agent and to attain

the ‘meaning’ that the social agent attaches to the act. Here once again we come back

to ‘understanding’ its ontology, epistemology and methodology, that is,

constructivist, interpertivist and hermeneutical.

The following example would make understanding and hermeneutics clear

within a given social context. In Islam, performing prayer has very specific rules and

functions. It includes a series of acts by the performer: first standing in a certain

direction (Ka’aba where each and ever Muslim should direct to), then bending, then

prostrating, then siting and once more standing up and so on for two, three and four

times all while reciting some verses of Koran (the sacred text of Islam). While

performing prayer, aside from the function and recitation, no further speech, action or

even glance is allowed. For an observer unfamiliar with that social context (i.e. that

specific act), the act and the performance of prayer might seem meaningless, that is

because the observer does not understand the language that ‘speaks the to the

observer’ (i.e. performers action). But once the observer relates the act of that social

agent (performing prayer) to its given social context, with taking into consideration

the meaning that the social agent attaches to the act, then understanding occurs. In the

first instance there was a language, (a social agent performing prayer) but since there

was not understanding, the action was not meaningful, however, after understanding

meaning became present. The meaning attached to the action by the performer is,

prayer as an act of purifying and inner self-emancipation draws one closer to

goodness. This meaning however is not just injected to the act by the social actor, but

there is a history, culture and tradition in constituting that meaning. Thus, with taking

the social agent, the act and the social context, understanding will be the common

shared meaning between the observer and the observed (i.e. the language that

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communicates in the social world). Historicity of language, and perceiving meaning

in relation to social knowledge as well as universality of hermeneutics will be points

of discussion in the next section.

SECTION TWO

Gadamer has made an attempt to universalize the problem of hermeneutics, or at least

to give it a universalistic character with reference to understanding and language.

This can be seen clearly in his essays, ‘The Universality of Hermeneutic Problem

1966’ and ‘On the Scope of Hermeneutical Reflection 1967’ where Gadamer

embodies such an attempt, by highlighting the historicity of understanding and

metaphorcity of language. In this section I discuss the historical dimension of

understanding, the metaphorical character of language and the universalistic character

of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy.

Concerning the role of history in the process of understanding and constituting

knowledge, Gadamer argues that ‘knowledge of oneself can never be complete since

all knowledge of oneself produced from what is historically pre-given (1979a: 245).

In the most basic terms this would suggest that a human is a historical being,

therefore he subjects the human to the route of history. For instance, Georgia Warnke

(2002) writes ‘Gadamer locates the conditions of understanding meaning … in the

traditions to which interpreters belong and in the authority of those traditions’. This

recognizes the power of history in two major ways: first, humans cannot be detached

from history, and secondly that understandings as well as perceptions are historical.

My emphasis is on the latter, the historicity of understanding. Gadamer’s hermeneutic

was an attempt to identify how understating is subject to history and further, how

understanding adds on to history. History tells us something, and we tell something in

addition as we interpret. That is to say, on the one hand we are subordinate to what

we know and historically pre-given, and we have a chance to know what we do not

know with the help of our creativity and questioning, on the other. This also indicates

the evolutionary character of human being (i.e. understanding), for the very

dialectical nature of interpretation gives human the opportunity know what is not

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historically pre-given and ‘know what he does not know’. In Gadamer’s words in

hermeneutical experience ‘both things change, our knowledge and its object’ (1979a:

318) because of this dialectical interface, interpretation can not be regarded as solely

something we do to the text, and understanding can not be conceived merely in a

given period, both should be taken into consideration within the passage of history, as

the continuation of it. Correspondingly, Joel Weinsheimer (1991) writes:

‘understanding differentiates the horizon of the past form that of the present, and yet

in the same act joins them in such a way that they are invisibly one’ (1991: 201).

What labelled as the ‘hermeneutical circle’ is not correspondent to Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy. A circle and circulation indicate a closed end movement,

that starts from one point and ends at the same point. ‘Hermeneutical circle is a

historical one in which our understanding the effective history … influences of that

which we are trying to understand’ (Warnke, 2002: 81). One can argue that Gadamer

has created a ‘hermeneutical dialectic’, which is also historical. As discussed in

Bildung, interpretation and understanding do not circulate but rather build on each

other in a dialectical manner. Thus, the historicity of understanding indicates that

‘understanding’ is inherent in history, not only does history dominate as Figal states

‘philosophical hermeneutics is subordinate to historical consciousness (Figal, 2002:

103). But also, humans add interpretation, and in that dialectical interaction between

human consciousness and historical consciousness, understanding becomes itself; this

is what I call hermeneutical dialectic. And here, I need to quote Gadamer, stating ‘it

is imagination that is the decisive function of the scholar. Imagination naturally has a

hermeneutical function and serves the sense for what is questionable’ (Gadamer,

1966: 11).

The metaphorical character of language, as I understand it, can be regarded as

the essential component in Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy. Language is a

metaphor for something, and in both language and an object, meaning is what can be

present. Thou both meaning and language are non-objective, Gadamer made an

attempt to objectify the form or the role of language, and as far as I consider, he

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found that problematic asserting ‘we are seeking to approach the mystery of language

from the conversation that we ourselves are’ (1979a: 340).

In his essay on ‘The Universality of Hermeneutic Problem 1966’ Gadamer

highlights the role of language and writes ‘language is the fundamental mode of

operation of our being-in-the-world and the all embracing form of the constitution of

the world’ (Gadamer, 1966: 3). Further, he argues ‘is not language always the

language of the homeland the process of becoming at home in the world’ (1976: 238-

239). In these two quotations Gadamer the first presents an assertion and then directs

a question. Linguistically this indicates the centrality of metaphor in Gadamer’s

attempt to conceptualize language: in both cases Gadamer uses metaphor.

Accordingly, he argues that ‘mere seeing and mere hearing are dogmatic abstractions,

perception always includes meaning’ (emphasis added, 1979a: 82). Perception

includes meaning, that is, in Weinsheimer’s words ‘understanding turns for help to

metaphor’ (1991: 190), and thus, perception is a metaphor. Here, language plus

meaning is a metaphor that invites understanding. Gadamer has illustrated this

complex interconnectedness with a simple example of picturing, as he rightly puts,

‘the picture, represents something, which without it, would not represent itself in this

way’ (emphasis added, 1979a: 124). This is to argue, the picture is a metaphor that

represents a meaning; the picture as meaning, and this ‘hermeneutic as joins at the

same time what is and is not’ (Weinsheimer, 1991: 201). In the same fashion, I argue

that social action would be meaningless if it was not a metaphor, and it is meaningful

as metaphor, in this way metaphorcity of language is central to understanding; or in

other words, metaphor is what language and understanding have in common, whether

the language is textual, aesthetic or behavioural.

On metaphor, Jacques Derrida writes that ‘metaphor itself; it is a metaphor for

metaphor’ then he adds ‘the use of a metaphor to convey the ‘idea’ of metaphor- this

is what prohibits definition, but yet metaphorically assigns a stopping place, a limit,

and a fixed point’ (Derrida, 1974: 55). In an essay entitled ‘On the Scope and

Function of Hermeneutical Reflection 1967’ Gadamer, once more, refers to the

metaphorcity of language, he writes, ‘in language, and only in it, can we meet what

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we never ‘encounter’ in the world, because we are ourselves it’ (Gadamer, 1967: 32).

That is to say, we are the language; we are the metaphor, and hence we are the

meaning and in turn understanding. Moreover, Gadamer clarifies, that the

philosophical hermeneutics’ task is the opening up of hermeneutical dimension in its

full scope, ‘showing its fundamental significance for our entire understanding of the

world and thus for all the various forms in which this understanding manifests itself’

(Gadamer, 1967: 18). Drawing on both Gadamer and Derrida, I use the Aristotelian

logic to argue that metaphor is the final form of language, and when language is the

condition of understanding then metaphor is the final form of understanding;

meaning. By this I mean, that in a social context if we regard an action as a metaphor

then the only way by which we can understand that social action is to interpret the

social action in its given social context. Thus, social structure is a language, for all

that can be understood is language. For example, putting papers into the ballot boxes

is a metaphor for a social collective action, the meaning this metaphor presents can

only be attained as such when the act is related to its context ‘elections’. This

metaphorcity of social action can be understood with regard to the historicity of that

particular social action. That is, to understand elections we need to take into

consideration the historical dimensions of the phenomenon to see what do social

agents mean by what they do. This is a hermeneutical correlation between the ‘part’

(i.e. action) and the ‘whole’ (i.e. context) and then back to the part, to make it a

metaphor that represents meaning and enables one to understand it.

Historicity of understanding and metaphorcity of language are two

universalistic elements in hermeneutic philosophy Gadamer argues that ‘science’ is

one more factor that can make the very act of interpretation and hermeneutical

engagement universal. His essay, ‘Hermeneutic as Practical Philosophy’ argues

‘practical philosophy, then, certainly is ‘science’; a knowledge of the universal that as

such is teachable’ (Gadamer, 1979b: 93). Gadamer’s point is that science under his

definition gives, ‘a knowledge of the universal that as such is teachable’. Therefore, if

hermeneutics as such is teachable, then it is science and hence, universal. He further

argues, ‘just as in natural scientific research the experiment that could be replicated

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by any one affords the basis of verification’ in the same way ‘in the interpretation of

texts one sought to apply procedures that anyone could check’ (Gadamer, 1979b: 99).

What is worth mentioning as a concluding phrase of this section is Gadamer’s view

on his hermeneutic accordingly he writes ‘the Hermeneutics that I have characterized

as philosophic is not introduced as a new procedure od interpretation or explication.

Basically, it only describes what always happens whenever an interpretation is

convincing and successful’ (Gadamer, 1979b: 111). And thus, he concretizes his

universalistic claim about his hermeneutic philosophy.

CONCLUSION

In his essay ‘Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy’ Gadamer concludes ‘it is not at

all a matter of a doctrine about a technical skill that would state how understanding

ought to be’ (Gadamer, 1979b: 111). As stated by Gadamer himself, his hermeneutic

philosophy is an illustration of what occurs when we interpret a speech, text or social

event. It is explaining the very process of getting to a meaning and constituting

acceptable knowledge that was Gadamer’s universalistic claim. Central to that

conceptualization was language and understanding. In two different but yet

interrelated sections I have made an attempt to critically assess Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy.

In the first section, I argued that first and foremost, Gadamer’s hermeneutic

philosophy could be studied within the continental philosophy, both as an

interpretation of continental philosophers and as a continuation of that tradition. I

illustrated the cases in which Gadamer’s hermeneutics was influenced by the works

of Plato, Hegel and Heidegger. I argued that each of those philosopher’s works

compose a fundamental component of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy, that is,

Plato’s dialogue, Hegel’s dialectics and Heidegger’s context. Then, with defining

hermeneutics in Gadamer’s perception, I argued that not only language but also

‘understanding’ is central to his conceptualization of hermeneutics. Also, illustrated

that Gadamer made an ontological turn in hermeneutics, from interpreting text to

interpreting social world.

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In the second section, I discussed historicity of understanding, the

metaphorcity of language and the universality of Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy.

With reference to Gadamer’s conceptualizations, I augured that understanding is

historical, language is metaphorical and hermeneutics as the art of interpretation is

universal. And thus, reinforcing two main arguments of this essay: first, Gadamer’s

hermeneutic philosophy is highly influenced by continental philosophy, and language

and understanding are essential cores in his conceptualization of hermeneutics.

Secondly, Gadamer’s attempt was not one of how understanding ‘should be’ but was

rather stating what ‘happens’ when we interpret, and what ‘occurs’ when we try to

understand, and hence, giving hermeneutics a universal character.

Mohammed  Ali  Bapir  

  18  

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