CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS for January 14, 2014

Cases #1-4 assigned to Joylyn Tria 18, 20, 22 & 23 Rowena Gallego 90, 91, 92 & 93 Alpha Bonifacio Not yet passed as of consolidation time (January 14, 2014, 8:38 am)

-John Doe Warrant- Pagandaman vs. Casar Facts: On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left atleast five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified — and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative … (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases." No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748. On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru … (his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest” against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) John Does. An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a” thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for “lack of basis”, hence the present petition.

The petitioners further assert that: (a) the respondent Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; (b) failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest; (c) on August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day"; (d) there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator."; (e) conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges"... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..."who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same; and (f) issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. Issue: WON the warrant issued against fifty (50) “john Does” unconstitutional and void? Ruling: Yes. Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject”. Cleary violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subject be voided. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to costs. RD: Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the

procedure mandated by the Rule actually consists of two phases or stages. The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase. This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest: “Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- xxx xxx xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a warrant of arrest.” The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation.

-Invitations- Babst et. al., vs. National Intelligence Board “A MERE INVITATION TO ATTEND A HEARING WHICH A PERSON MAY REFUSE IS NOT ILLEGAL, HOWEVER, AN INVITATION WHICH HAS AN APPEARANCE OF COERCION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIBLE” Facts: This petition was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB) Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. Since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. The invitations were contained in letters sent by the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and were of the following tenor: Madam: “Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee. “Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Very truly yours, (SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA Brig. General, AFP (Ret.) Chairman

Petitioners argued that the respondents do not have the authority to conduct the proceeding above-described which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on freedom of expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media. Petitioners further claim that such proceedings are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment for lawful publications and that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed the Constitution. Finally they claim that such coercive invitations constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Respondents countered by claiming that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners. They claimed that what were sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners. The dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange of ideas. Respondents contended that the that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Finally, they argued that the petition filed is moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated. Issue: WON the issuance of letters of invitations and the subsequent interrogations that are conducted thereafter are valid under the Constitution? Ruling: No. Invitation with coercion is constitutionally objectionable. Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a

strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that “failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.” Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. Dispositive: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

People vs. Sequino

Facts: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda’s bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank, located three kilometers from the hacienda, to withdraw P50,557.17 to pay for the wages of the hacienda workers. The bank’s cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the bank’s motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a money bag which he hung over his left shoulder. As the three were in sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, and nearing the hacienda, the accused, armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered them to stop. Godinez recognized the armed men because Nenito Melvida and Emerlindo Sequiño used to work in the hacienda while Vicente Tumangan’s parents were Godinez’s neighbors. Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the accused, he and Godinez heard a gunshot. Godinez noticed that Broniola had fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with gun in hand, approached Godinex, took the money from the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-accused. With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving Broniola behind. Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the house of the Broniolas’ which was near the crime scene, and informed Broniola’s wife of the incident. SPO Elpidio Luna received a report from another policeman about a robbery at Sitio Antipolo. Luna went to the crime scene and found a piece of paper utilized as toilet paper with a stool on it. The paper was a bio-date sheet with the name “Melvida, Nenito” and the entry for the father’s name filled with Elpidio Melvida. One bystander volunteered to take Luna to Elpidio Melvida’s house and was not able to find. Elpidio told Luna that Nonito is not in his house so he

took him to the house of Nenito and found him playing cards, he asked Nenito to go with him – at first he hesitated but he was persuaded and went with SPO Luna. In the course of Luna’s investigation, Melvida admitted that he kept “his share the loot” in his house. Melvida then was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he delivered to the policemen and he also admitted that admitted that his (Melvida’s) companions during the robbery were Vicente Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequiño, who were staying in the house of Juanito Hones in Daanlungsod, Medellin, Cebu. Immediately, Mondigo and policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequiño on the porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. When asked if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then brought Tumangan and Sequiño to the police station. Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the Municipal mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of the holdupppers. Parafin tests were conducted and test yield negative for Tumangan and Melvida but as to Sequino, the result was positive. The RTC rendered judgment declaring Tumangan, Melvida and Sequino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON voluntary going with the policeman upon such officer’s invitation constituted an arrest? Ruling: Yes. Regardless of Luna’s claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making an arrest. Meldiva’s voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter’s invitation was a submission to Luna’s custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City of 24 February 1994 in Criminal Case No. CBU-22486 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the following modifications, viz., the award of P10,000.00 each to Eugenio Godinez and Jimmy Serafin are deleted,

while that for Presentacion vda de Broniola shall only be considered as moral damages, and that the accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the Hacienda Jose Ancajas of Medellin, Cebu, the sum of Fifty Thousand Five Hundred and Seventy-Seven Pesos and Seventeen Centavos (P50,577.17), with interest thereon at the legal rate reckoned from 24 April 1991 and until it shall have been fully paid. Costs against the accused-appellants.

People vs. Del Rosario Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about 1½ meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996. On the way to the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, del Rosario was at the back of the school, handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he

might attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only subscribed on 22 May 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on 16 May 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred. He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. While del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large. Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court found del Rosario guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: WON Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was “invited” for questioning at the house of the barangay captain? Ruling: Yes. From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already undereffective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an

unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 to include "the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that - x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. Herein, Del Rosario was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

PEOPLE vs. PASUDAG Facts--The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty and accessories of the law. SPO2 Pepito Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it. SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. The latter dispatched team to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven (7) marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police Astrero, that he owned the marijuana plants. SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report which accused Pasudag signed. He kept the six marijuana plants inside the cabinet in the office of the Chief of Police and brought the tallest plant to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The examination was positive for marijuana. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into consideration his educational attainment (he reached only grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable penalty. Hence, this appeal.

Issue I. Whether or not marijuana is admissible as evidence. NO! II. Whether or not the confiscation report was not an extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of his counsel. YES! Held/Ruling We find the appeal meritorious. I. As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. In People vs. Valdez the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the requisite judicial warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search of accused's backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants. "Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce." "The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights." We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific

instances are searches allowed without warrants." "The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions." With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The accused-appellant was not inform of his constitutional rights. II. After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report, which was part of the investigation. Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report. In both, the interrogation and the signing of the confiscation receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the only civilian present in the Office of the Chief of Police. We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden. "The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. In light of the foregoing, we uphold the constitutional right of accused-appellant to a presumption of innocence. The prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime charged for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of Corrections is hereby directed to forthwith release

accused-appellant unless he is held for another case, and to inform the Court of the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from notice.

PEOPLE vs. ZUELA Facts--The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendaño and John Abendaño, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with the Regional Trial Court an information charging accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte with "robbery with triple homicide". On June 1, 1985 Maximo Velarde was arrested at Magallanes, Sorsogon, while accused Nelson Garcia and Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on June 4, 1985 and June 9, 1985, respectively. All three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of their counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued. The evidence established the following facts: The three accused allegedly robbed Maria Abendano and killed her, her son and her driver during a delivery of the palay she buys and sells. Romualda, Maria’s sister whose store was beside Maria’s, was the witness in this case. Romualda stated that she saw the three accused board the jeepney of Maria during a delivery. Gerardo, to whom the palay was going to be delivered, saw Maximo inside the jeepney during the delivery of the palay to his ricemill. The following morning, the bodies of Maria, her son and her driver were found in rigor mortis condition at New Poblacion, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. According to Romualda, the 3 accused conceived the planto hold-up Maria while drinking in front of Romualda’s store because Maximo needed money to go to Manila. Maximo was supposed to board the jeep while the two

others would wait somewhere else to board the jeepney and hold-up Maria. The crime happened. Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was committed with the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the municipal jail. On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo. Though no warrant of arrest had been issued, Maximo was immediately brought to the Camaligan police station where he was investigated and asked to give a written statement in the presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City. On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a warrant. They underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be found in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. On the last page of each accused's confession appeared a statement, in their own handwriting, to the effect that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one coerced or promised them anything to admit responsibility for the crime. The three signed their individual statements in front of Judge Valencia Bagalacsa. She followed the same procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the voluntariness of the confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to leave her and the accused inside the chamber. Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she had them sign their individual extrajudicial statements. The three accused interposed common defenses: denial and they were tortured and forced to make a confession. Tito and Nelson also claimed that they were not assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken. Maximo claimed that he went with Lt. Idian because he was told that his parents wanted to see him because his brother died. He was shown a picture of the cadaver. Along the way, he felt a hard object hit his head and he passed out. When he regained consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing a gun, Lt. Idian told him that he could choose either to die or to sign the statement

they prepared because his brother had wronged them. He was warned not to tell anyone that he was mauled. Two days later, in front of Lt. Idian, Atty. Ocampo and Pat. Refe, Atty. Ocampo read a prepared statement. He refused to sign. He overheard that he was going to be made to sign in front of Atty. Ocampo. According to Maximo, he was kicked in the stomach and a gun was poked at him. He signed the statement out of fear. He was also made to sign another statement in front of Judge Valencia Bagalacsa. Fromthe time he was arrested, he was never released. Nelson Garcia denied knowledge of the crime and claimed that he was mauled by Lt. Idian when his group went to Garcia’s house to invite him to the station. He was mauled again at the station and to prevent injury, he just signed the prepared statement. He also claimed that he was neither informed of the contents nor assisted by counsel. He was asked to copy in his own handwriting the prepared statement. He was never released from custody from the time he was arrested. Tito also claimed that he was arrested and was mauled in order to make him sign the prepared statement. He also claimed that he was neither informed of the contents nor assisted by counsel. Issue Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, in light of the fact that the crime took place in 1985. Held/Ruling The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides: Art. IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means, which vitiates the free will, shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced

admissions or confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel." There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is inadmissible in evidence. "An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence." The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson were likewise inadmissible in evidence because they were executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact that the reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area, the Court could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given place is not a valid reason for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled confessions. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa. With regard to Maximo, he repeated the statements to Romualda who related these in court. That is admissible. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's fate but also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the latter has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay, is not applicable here. What is involved here is an admission, not a confession. Wharton distinguished these terms as follows: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct

or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness Romualda on accused-appellant Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by presenting evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to test Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as credible, stands unscathed. Other note: Crime changed from "robbery with triple homicide" to “robbery with homicide”. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court. The Court renders judgment finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y Morandarte, Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of them to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil indemnity of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendaño and John Abendaño and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, Jr. In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-appellants solidarily to pay the additional amounts of forty three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of damages to the heirs of Maria Abendaño, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages to the heirs of each of the three (3) victims.

PEOPLE vs. ABE VALDEZ Facts--For automatic review is the decision by the Regional Trial Court which found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp. Appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force testified that he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police, then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same. Said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis and it had a positive indication for marijuana. Accused-appellant testified that he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he

admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought him to the police station. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. The trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants. "WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused. Issue Whether or not that the admission of the appellant-accused that the plants were his was made under custodial investigation. Yes! Therefore, admission is inadmissible as evidence because it was made without a counsel. Held/Ruling In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation: "It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel." Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had

narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation. The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellant’s failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted. The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..." In trying to elicit information from appellant, the

police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants. Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZ 341 SCRA 645 (2000) Facts On appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, convicting appellant and his co-accused of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Early in the morning, at the Far East Bank and Trust Company, a messenger discovered the lifeless body of Matias, inside the bank premises. SPO3 Mendoza and two other officers of the Western Police District arrived after receiving a report on the incident. They interviewed the bank janitor and the other security guard. Jamoralin and four other WPD policemen conducted a follow-up investigation and learned that there was an on-going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and that appellant and his co-accused had access to the bank after office hours. On the third floor, they saw the co-accused, Rodriguez, packing his personal belongings. SPO3 Jamoralin and the other police officers saw a pair of worn-out “maong” pants on appellant’s bed, which had reddish stains on the right leg. The police also saw reddish stains on accused’s shirt. Rodriguez explained that he had a wound on his neck but police found no wound. The police then arrested Rodriguez and appellant and brought them to the police station for interrogation. The police took the maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the Chemistry Section of National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he and appellant together with three other men, killed Matias. Rodriguez was assisted by Atty. Procopio Lao III, of the Public Attorney’s Office. Appellant and Rodriguez were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Appellant and Rodriguez plead not guilty. Both Rodriguez and appellant admitted that they were provincemates and co-workers in the construction site. They slept inside the building on the night before the incident but denied any participation in killing. They claimed that they learned of the killing when they saw many people milling around the area. Rodriguez claimed that he was mauled by policemen to confess to the crime. Appellant, on his part, testified that the policemen merely placed him outside the room where Rodriguez was being

interrogated, and that the police did not take any statement from him. Appellant also denied owning the maong pants which the police said were taken from his bed. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant and Rodriguez guilty of murder, instead of robbery with homicide. Only appellant pursued his appeal. Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons. Issue Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also against appellant. No! Held/Ruling We find that Rodriguez’s confession is constitutionally flawed so that it could not be used as evidence against them at all. The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the police. The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police investigators called him and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession. Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the police station, they were already under custodial investigation. In the case of People v. Bolanos, we held that an accused who is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under custodial investigation, and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution.

The rights of persons under custodial investigation is enshrined in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which provides: Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. xxx Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by the police, they were already the suspects in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias, and should have been afforded the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the right to counsel. The records do not show that Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest, were informed of the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided with competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession. In People v. De la Cruz, 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we declared as inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of accused where the interrogation started at 9:00 A.M. and his lawyer arrived only at 11:00 A.M.. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police for about four days without the assistance of counsel. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the “evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.” These constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. As to appellant, the trial court convicted him on the basis of two pieces of circumstantial evidence which show conspiracy: (1) the extrajudicial confession of accused implicating him as one of the perpetrators and (2) the fact that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant was found positive of type O blood. The former being inadmissible and the latter being of no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison, there remains nothing to support appellant’s conviction. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, even granting arguendo that the extrajudicial confession of accused was admissible, Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that such confession is only admissible against the confessant. In order to be admissible against his co-accused, Section 30 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court require there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In this case, however, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]n appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” As we have elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

#14. People vs. Muleta Facts: (version of the prosecution)… On April 15, 1993, Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental Mindoro went to manila to find work. Once in Manila, she resided in Tondo where her uncle and sister lived. Shortly thereafter, she landed a job as a saleslady at the Ali Mall in Cubao. On April 29, 2013, Charito left Tondo and moved to Valenzuela. However, when she returned to Tondo to pick up her remaining baggage, it was the last time she was seen alive. On April 30, 1993, Charito’s lifeless body was found naked in Bulacan, tied to a post with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands tied with a bra. She bore 5 stab wounds. NBI Agent Ely Tolentino took over the case. Based on his investigation:

the appellant Domingo Muleta (uncle of the victim and brother of victim’s mother Milagros Delgado), left his workplace (Loadstar Shipping Lines located at Pier 16 Tondo) around 9:30 pm and reported 8 pm the next day;

that when appellant was requested to go to NBI Manila, he readily obliged;

that during the custodial investigation, where he was assisted with a counsel Atty. Deborah Daquis, he admitted having raped and killed Charito;

that another eyewitness Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of Charito, appellant became hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering: “patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na”. Delgado saw appellant drink ‘Chlorux’ after which he fell to the ground and was rushed to Hospital.

(version of the defense)… Accused, who presented himself as witness, denied having committed the crime. He was unscrupulously picked by NBI and forced to admit the crime. That on April 30, he left his house 5:30pm and went to the house where Charito lived. He learned from his sister that Charito transferred to another house and was then missing. He reported the matter to authorities. Accused was tortured and was forced to sign a document which he was not able to read and he was not accompanied by a lawyer. (case)… Accused appeals the decision of RTC Bulacan finding him guilty of complex crime of rape with homicide.

Issue: WON the accused extra judicial confession was inadmissible? Ruling: Appeal is meritorious. Confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in the court of law. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial investigation:

to remain silent; to have independent and competent counsel

preferable of their own choice; to be provided with counsel if they are unable to

secure one; to be assisted by such counsel during the

investigation; to have such counsel present when they decide to

waive these rights; and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact

that anything they say can be used against them in court.

Flagrantly violated in this case were the appellant’s right to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as this right to have said counsel present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation. One final note. In acquitting the appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not commit the offense charged. The prosecution failed to present credible and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is the extrajudicial confession of the appellant. But the Constitution is clear – a confession obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of the circumstantial evidence lose their significance.

#15. People vs. Tan Facts: On December 15, 1988, about 7 pm, tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at our Lady of Angels Academy to inform her that he will drive both accused Lito Amido and accused-appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time Freddie was seen alive. When he failed to return that evening, Delfa inquired on his whereabouts. A certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her husband was discovered on the diversion road at Atimonan. They found him sprawled on the ground with 14 stab wounds in his body. Lt. Carlos Santos proceeded to the crime scene and found a blue sidecar. Subsequently, the appellant was invited in connection with the instant case and with respect to 2 robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what really actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Lt. Carlos, on cross examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant of arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in the 2 robbery cases. In the belief that they were only conversing inside the police station, he admitted he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did her reduce the supposed confession in writing. Appellant alleged that he had no participation in the offense charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of accused Amido. Amido present the defense of alibi. Appellant was found guilty. Meanwhile, Amido was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite the failure of the prosecution to positively identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing circumstantial evidence that would overcome his innocence. Issue: WON the uncounselled confession or admission of the accused violates his Constitutional right? Ruling: The appealed decision is set aside and appellant is acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated. Art. III, Sec. 12 (1)-(3): Sec. 12(1) – Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be

informed of his rights and to have competent and independent counsel preferable of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These righrs cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Sec. 12(3) – any confession obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him. Custodial investigation – involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. RA7438 (protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation) – as used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of the law. …What remains of the evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellant’s investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the appellant.

#16. People vs. Obrero Facts: (version of the prosecution)… In the morning August 11, 1989, the accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero was asked to deliver dressed chicken to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Sta. Cruz, Manila. About 10:20am, Jimmy came back and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000. Pat. Ines testified that after receiving a report of killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that she received a call from Emma informing her that her house had been robbed and her 2 maids killed. Pat. Ines identified 2 sworn statements, one of which was executed by Helen Moral, a househelp of Emma. In her statement, upon arriving in the house that day, she and her employer’s nephew found the bodies of the victims sprawled in the floor. She told Pat. Ines that the accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place. On the other hand, Anita De Los Reyes, testified that she saw Jimmy and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin Building on C.M. Recto, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Pat. Ines testified that they received an information that accused-appellant was in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place and were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to Manila. Accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita. Pat. Ines testified that accused-appellant gave a confession in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De Los Reyes, in which he admitted the killing. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit stating the circumstances of the accused-appellant’s arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. (version of the defense)… Defense presented, Jimmy as its sole witness. He denied participation in the commission of the crime. According to him, on August 11, 1989, about 9:00am, he delivered dressed chickens to Emma’s residence. He came back from his errand around 10:20am and remitted the amount of P2,000. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known Atty. De Los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read. (case)… RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Hence, this instant appeal.

Issue: WON the confession of the accused-appellant is inadmissible as evidence? Ruling: The confession of the accused-appellant is inadmissible because of the fact that he was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounselled statement is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. It is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings:

1. he must be informed of his rights to remain silent; 2. he must be warned that anything he says can and

will be used against him; and 3. he must be told that he has the right to counsel,

and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De Los Reyes to establish the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when the accused-appellant executed his extrajudicial confession. However, there was only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accussed-appellant without any effort to find him out from whether he wanted to have a counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint for him. The Court finds this simply ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that the accused-appellant was specifically asked questions considering that he only finished grade 4 of elementary school. Moreoever, Art. III, Sec.12(1), requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Atty. De Los Reyes, though considered competent, cannot be considered independent since he was the station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted the accused-appellant. …we cannot thus affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant because of procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. …”it may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it is better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person”.

#17. People vs. Duero Facts: (version of the prosecution)… Late evening of March 2,1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Remeo Punzalan together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan were conducting a surveillance mission at Victory Liner Terminal (San Fernando, Pampanga) based on information of persons who may be engaging in trafficking dangerous drugs. Around 9:30pm, they noticed a person (Medel Tangliban), carrying a travelling bag and acting suspiciously. They requested him to open his red travelling bag but he refused. Later on, he acceded after the policemen identified themselves. The policemen found marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. When asked, Tangliban revealed his name and was waiting a ride to deliver said drugs to Olongapo city. He was taken to the police headquarters for further investigation. The gathered evidence was taken to PCCL at Camp Olivas and was found to be marijuana when examined. (version of the defense)… The accused (Tangliban) declared that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm and he is engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds. He goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and buy C-ration from one Nena Ballon. On March 2, 1982, the accused never left his residence. On March 3, he went to Subic to collect a balance of 100pesos from a customer and to buy C-rations from Nena at 6:00pm. He stayed until 8:00pm at Nena’s house because he had a drinking spree with her son. He tried to catch a ride at 8:00pm but he failed and was only able to take one at 9:00pm. As he was tipsy, he didn’t notice he rode a Victory Liner Bus bound to Pampanga. As soon as he arrived at Pampanga, he crossed the street hoping to catch a bus going back to Manila. Pat. Punzalan approached him and asked for a residence certificate. But as he took out his wallet, Punzalan took it and got the money inside amounting to 545pesos. He was taken to municipal building for verification as he may be a NPA. At the municipal building, he was told to take out everything from his pocket as the prisoners in jail might get them. He took out a 50pesos bill and was taken, telling him it would be returned but it was never returned. Once inside the jail, somebody told him he was being charged with possession of marijuana and if he would be willing to bailed out, somebody is willing to help him. He was visited with his wife but he told her not to complain anymore as it would be useless. (case)…

Accused was found guilty by RTC Pampanga, guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant, through counsel Atty. Enrique Chan, raised a lone assignment of error – the court erred in convicting the accused due to insufficient and doubtful evidence. However, before the Court had the chance to act on the appeal, counsel de oficio died. Thereafter, the court appointed Atty. Katz Tiera who was required to file her appellant’s brief. Issues:

1. WON the evidence seized was a product of unlawful search w/o warrant?

2. WON the evidence is admissible when it was never authenticated?

3. WON the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of defendant?

Ruling: 1. This contention is devoid of merit.

Sec. 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court – Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 – a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante. The warrantless search is consequently valid.

Aminnudin Ruling – there was no urgency, the policemen had 2 days to secure a warrant. They could have persuaded the judge that there was probable cause based from the information they had. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the head PC lieutenant had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary”.

In contrast, the present case presented urgency. There was an informer who pointed the accused. The police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a warrant. We cannot therefore apply the Aminnudin ruling.

2. The evidence was sufficient. The marijuana package examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from the accused.

3. Appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before the lower court.

“…we discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue.” This Court had ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge. In People vs. Tolentino ruling – the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of the officials acts relative to inadmissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights. What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana but his actual session.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION A. Source, Definition, Scope &

Procedure #18 – People vs. Ordono, et al. (334 SCRA 673) G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC. Both accused, Ordono and Medina were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and imposing upon each of them 2 separate death penalties. Records show that both accused were invited by the police as suspects for the death of Shirley, and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then to directly link them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. Days passed, the two suspects returned to the police station one after another and acknowledged that they committed the crime. Acting on their admission, both

accused were apprised of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their assurance that they had understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing, however, the investigators could not find the services of a lawyer to assist both accused, because there were no practicing lawyers in that remote town. Be that as it may, their statements were taken in the presence of Medina’s wife and mother, the Parish Priest, Mun. Mayor, Chief of Police and other police officers to witness the giving of their voluntary statements for the commission of the crime. At the end of their narration, they were asked to affixed their signature, however, Ordono only affixed his thumbmark as he did not know how to write. Thereafter, both were detained at the police station. They were visited and interviewed by a radio announcer, Roland Almoite, which was duly tape-recorded, and again, both accused admitted their complicity in the crime. A couple of days later, the police brought the two accused to PAO for assistance and counseling. They were also apprised of their constitutional rights and the consequences of their confessions, through Atty. Corpuz, leading them to defer the affixing of their signatures. After a week or so, the two went back again to Atty. Corpuz to informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures, and once again, Atty. Corpuz apprised them of their rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally accompanied them to Judge Baustista, who also apprised them of their rights, and to subscribe before him in the presence of MTC staffs who witnessed the signing. During the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. On trial, both insisted their innocence and testified their own alibis, and that they were forced by the police officers to admit the commission of the crime. The Trial Court adjudged both accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the present petition filed by both accused, assailing their conviction on the ground of constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of both accused under custodial investigation is admissible in evidence.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that custodial investigation began when both accused voluntarily went to the police station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing both accused of their rights, the police sought to provide them with counsel, however, none could be furnished due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers and the remoteness of the town. The presence of the parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor as well as the relatives of the accused did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation. RA 7438 explicitly states that before they can appear, 2 conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and (b) a valid waiver must be executed. Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the presence of Parish Priest, Mun. Mayor and their relatives could not stand, even with the apparent consent of the accused, as waiver in order to be valid must be made in writing. Consequently, any admission obtained from the tow accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. NOTE: The petition is affirmed with modification for damages. Although the extrajudicial confessions of both accused are held to be inadmissible in evidence, the Supreme Court relied its affirmation on the testimony of Almoite, who conducted an interview with both accused and voluntarily admitted their complicity in the crime. B. Rights Involved and Consequences of

Violation

#20 People vs. Mojello G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004 FACTS: On automatic review is the decision of the RTC, finding Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Rogelio Rayco, the victim’s uncle, saw Mojello with the victim, walking together some 30 mtrs. towards the direction of Sitio Kota. The following day, the victim’s body was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Mojello was arrested while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. He admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed, and was assisted by Atty. Giduquio during his custodial

interrogation. His confessions was also witnessed by Brgy. Captains Batobalanos and Landao, who testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to Mojello who later on voluntarily signed it. His extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Jaca. The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty as charged. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence. RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that the extrajudicial confession complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, it is valid and therefore, admissible in evidence. The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The records of the case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution, in relation to RA No. 7438, Sec. 2, where the investigator explained to the appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect. The trial court also observed that the appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Giduquio, and that it was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Jaca, who declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore NOT “fruit of poisonous tree” since the tree itself is not poisonous. NOTE: The petition is affirmed with modification, he was found guilty of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE with award for damages, instead of rape with homicide because the cause of death of the victim has not been substantially proved.

#22 People vs. Figueroa (335 SCRA 299) G.R. No. 134056, July 6, 2000 FACTS: Figueroa was arrested by the NBI operatives through a buy-bust operation. It was established that an informant called the NBI agents that Figueroa (OBET) was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. They instructed their informant to establish contact with Obet for a buy-bust operation, which the informant succeeded. They proceeded to the rendezvous area after preparing the buy-bust money. When the NBI saw the informant hand-over the money to Obet, Obet while counting it, fired his .45 caliber 2x towards the direction of Palencia while hurrying towards the house. Obet then hostage her mistress and her 2 children for the next 3 hours until Major Reyes arrives, to whom Obet had surrendered. The NBI agents brought Obet to the NBI headquarters for interrogation regarding the source of his shabu. He eventually volunteered pointing Betty as his source of shabu. A follow-up operation was made at the Betty’s house. Thereafter, they seized items examined to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride without search warrant. An information was filed before the RTC for violation of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by RA No. 7659. When arraigned, Obet and Betty pleaded not guilty. On trial, the NBI agents testified that they were not armed with a search warrant when they conducted a search at Betty’s house, but maintained that it was a consented search. They also testified that they did not see the actual crystallization processes. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting Betty for the prosecution’s failure to adduce evidence that she, in conspiracy with Obet manufactured shabu without the requisite authority. However, Obet was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and ordered his immediate transfer to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa. Unsatisfied with the verdict, Obet appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not he was deprived of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation. RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that when Obet was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust operation. In short, he was held n custody as a consequence of a failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and established conspiracy in the illegal trade of

shabu. Allegedly, he admitted that the source was Betty. On the basis of that admission, the NBI agents, together with Obet, proceeded to the residence of Betty. Needless to state, Obet, cannot be investigated for anything in relation to shabu while under custody without informing him of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in the presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12, (1), Article III of the Constitution. It has been held that this rights attach from the moment the investigation starts. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons, even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given. NOTE: The Supreme Court held that the buy-bust operation was a failure because no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was found in Obet’s person and residence. No evidence was adduced to show that Obet handed shabu over to the informant. Yet, he was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in custody, does not, initially, appear very clear on the record. ACQUITTED

#23 Gumabon, et al. vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons (37 SCRA 429) G.R. No. L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971 FACTS: The case before the Supreme Court is for Habeas Corpus, the writ of great liberty which was relied upon by the petitioners for their release from imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes, invoking the case of People vs. Hernandez, a doctrine negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them, was not handed down until their convictions had become final. Petitioners pleaded guilty for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping, and was made to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since then, each of them was imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions for more than 13 years. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information

against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. Such ruling was also affirmed in the case of People vs. Lava, where the petitioners in that case has already served more than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal. These two cases prompted the petitioners to file the Petition for Habeas Corpus, that they be afforded the same treatment as the petitioners in the above-entitled case. They precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. In their petition, they stated that they were convicted by the CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the Court, in conscience, allow the petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor? They also stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection people similarly situated were not similarly deal with. What is required under the Constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorder the same treatment both in the privileges conferred an the liabilities imposed. ISSUE: (No issue regarding custodial investigation) Whether or not equal protection may be afforded to the petitioners RULING: YES. The Supreme Court, noting its recent decision, reiterates:”Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.” The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration after the 12-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.

The petition for habeas corpus is granted, and ordered that petitioners be set at liberty.

Case: People vs. Caguioa Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales which was assigned to Branch VIII, presided by respondent Judge. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written statement of the accused Paquito Yupo and his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. After this witness had Identified the statement of the accused and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation. Respondent Judge sustained the objection of the defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could not be waived. Upon his refuse to reconsider such ruling, this petition was filed. Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of right to counsel Held: It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely and voluntarily. The questioning was rather perfunctory. An even more telling circumstance against such alleged waiver being given credence was that private respondent, a native of Samar, then nineteen years old, was interrogated extensively in Tagalog, no showing having been made that his acquaintance with the language was such that he could fully understand the import of what was asked him. On the specific question of whether or not the right to counsel during custodial interrogation interrogation may be waived, the Court rules that there is no bar to such a waiver if made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. The landmark opinion of Miranda v. Arizona, 13 decided in 1966, as noted above, the source of this constitutional provision, emphasized that statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used

against him and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

Case: People vs. Galit Facts: Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of the rights of the accused Held: We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny.

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

Case: People vs. Continente Facts: Appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Informations in connection with the shooting incident which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas. With counsels present, the appellants executed extrajudicial confessions admitting to the crime. Then the trial court found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the cries of murder and frustrated murder. They question the validity and admissibility of their confessions alleging that CIS officers threatened them to admit the contents of the sworn statements. Appellants also contend that they were not properly informed of their custodial rights under the constitution as to enable them to make a valid waiver. Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of their rights Held: Yes. It must be noted that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an explanation as to the nature of the investigation that is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants in the ambush on April 21,

1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that the appellants may choose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the appellants may be used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they contain an advice that the appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico their intentions to give their statements even in the absence of counsel. Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico requested for the legal services of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half an hour before the investigation started. Nevertheless, the appellant (Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even in the absence of counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signed41 the "Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the same as counsel of the appellant. There is also no basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that he was tortured into giving a confession and was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the same before the administering officer.

Case: People vs. Bacor Facts: Julian Albores was resting at the living room of his house with his son Dionisio and the latter's common-law wife Delia. Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire followed by Delia's exclamation that Dionisio had fallen down on the floor. Immediately, thereafter, Julian brought his wounded son to the hospital for treatment but just a few minutes after arrival there, his son died. Appellant went to the Sinacaban Police Station and told that he was the one responsible for the killing of Dionisio Albores. Appellant said what prompted him to surrender was due to his guilty conscience. Consequently, appellant was brought to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). In the presence of Atty Anggot, appellant was asked by the policemen if he had a lawyer and appellant replied that he had none and said that he would avail the service of PAO. Then, Atty. Anggot requested the policemen to leave her and appellant alone inside the office. She then inquired if appellant was not intimidated, coerced or forced and whether appellant was promised any reward. She also informed appellant of constitutional rights. After being informed of such facts,

appellant still declared that he was going to confess because he had committed a crime. During the taking of appellant's confession, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot, SPO3 Ydulzura likewise reminded appellant in the Visayan dialect of constitutional rights. Despite such reminder, appellant still agreed and accepted the appointment of PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot as his lawyer to assist him during the taking of his affidavit of confession. Before signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to appellant the contents thereof and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and to counsel of his own choice. She also informed appellant about the consequences of his affidavit and that it may be used as evidence against him. She also asked him whether he understood the contents of the affidavit. Subsequently, appellant was asked if the statements in the affidavit are true and correct and he declared that the statements therein are true and correct and that he was willing to sign the affidavit on his own free will. Appellant now questions the admissibility of the confession. Issue: WON there was a valid waiver of right Held: Accused-appellant's confession leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness and spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the crime because he "could no longer bear a guilty conscience." In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession (Exh. B) was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced or threatened to make the confession. 6 Indeed the details contained in his confession could have been known to accused-appellant alone. The records shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorney's Office (PAO): second, SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accused-appellant's confession; and lastly, by the branch clerk of the court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to give statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to the accused-appellant's contention, there is no need for a separate and express written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily

executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively waived his right to remain silent. Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before the branch clerk of court who, before administering the oath to accused-appellant, read the affidavit of confession to him and informed him of his rights and the consequences of his confession. Accused-appellant stood pat on his decision to tell it all.

PEOPLE vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR. FACTS: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. (SR) was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. (JR). Being a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house. He owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in the area. SR, accompanied by JR and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. JR asked Reynaldo to come to the former’s house to discuss an important matter. His brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. JR proposed that they rob and kill his father SR. They went to SR’s house. JR knocked on the door, asking SR to let them in. When SR opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked SR down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo, and JR and Eddie ransacked Bernardo’s aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the three of them left. JR, Reynaldo and Eddie were arrested by the police. The Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, but they signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring them to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to Atty. Jocom. Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional rights. He explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits. RTC found Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty of the crime of parricide. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON an extrajudicial confession made without a counsel, signed in the presence of a counsel in a later day, is admissible as evidence. RULING: SC ruled that Bernardo Quiadato Jr. must be acquitted. The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. The manner by which the affidavits were obtained by Mara render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel – that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel – is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day.

PEOPLE vs. RAMIL SAMOLDE and ARMANDO ANDRES, accused. RAMIL SAMOLDE, accused-appellant. FACTS: While Ramil Samolde was walking towards the market, Feliciano Nepomuceno pointed a gun at him and called him a thief. Samolde parried the gun and stabbed Nepomuceno. When the gun fell to the ground, Samolde picked it up and shot Nepomuceno. He then went to his brother’s house, and was later on arrested. He claimed that he was beaten up by the police in jail, and that the police wanted to know who helped him kill Nepomuceno. He gave a statement implicating Armando Andres. Samolde claimed that although he was provided a lawyer, the latter was not really present during his investigation.

During his detention, he was not allowed to be seen, lest visitors notice his swollen face. In his extrajudicial confession, Samolde was informed of his constitutional rights. It was stated that his lawyer, Atty. Emiliano Benito was present when he affixed his signature on the said extrajudicial confession. As regards his counsel, Somalde stated that, contrary to what was stated in his extrajudicial confession, his lawyer did not really assist him. He was not informed of his constitutional rights when he executed his extrajudicial confession, and he did so only after he had been subjected to some brutality by the police. Andres claimed that he was in Ilocos Sur when the event happened. He learned that he was implicated in the killing of Nepomuceno only when the police came to arrest him. Andres also claimed he was beaten up by a policeman; that the sworn statement he gave had been prepared by the police; that he was not given any opportunity to read it before he signed it; and that he did so because he was subjected to torture and intimidation by the police. During cross-examination, Sgt. De Leon claimed that he and his group arrested Samolde. He denied having used violence against Samolde and Andres. It was admitted that no counsel assisted Andres when he was interrogated. RTC found both accused guilty of the crime of murder. Only Samolde appealed. ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession of Samolde is admissible in evidence. RULING: The extrajudicial confession of Samolde is not admissible in evidence. He was not informed of his constitutional rights before his statement was taken. Samolde was not properly apprised of his constitutional rights. Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution provides the rights of a suspect in a custodial investigation: “(1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.” Samolde was given no more than an obligatory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than an insincere compliance with the constitutional requirements. Such

manner was "merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect." However, apart from the testimony of Ricardo Nepomuceno and the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant, there is sufficient evidence in the records showing Samolde’s guilt. Samolde confessed in open court that he had killed Nepomuceno. It is this admission of Samolde which should be considered. SC, affirmed.

PEOPLE vs. ARMANDO GALLARDO, ALFREDO COLUMNA and JESSIE MICATE, accused-appellants. FACTS: Before the RTC, accused-appellants were found guilty of murder for the killing of Edmundo Orizal. Gallardo and Micate were identified as suspects. Gallardo and Columna were investigated by SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Micate, killed Orizal. During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered the oath on the jurat of the statements. Accused-appellants signed their statements admitting the killing of Orizal. According to accused-appellants, they planned and executed the killing of Orizal. – A certain Pat. Molina, Gallardo and Columna, together with Micate and Hidalgo, met at the house of Columna. Pat. Molina conveyed to the group the desire of Cong. Tuzon that Orizal be killed because the latter was planning to ambush him and grab his land. Orizal was a strong campaigner and a bodyguard of retired Gen. Olivas, who was running for mayor against the congressman’s re-electionist wife. Pat. Molina told the group that if they accepted the job and succeeded in their mission, Cong. Tuzon would work for their acquittal in all their criminal cases, and would give cash rewards. Accused-appellants accepted the job. Accused-appellants filed with the RTC a demurrer to evidence, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish that the signed statements of the accused were procured in violation of Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. RTC denied the demurrer and stated that the court would want to know controverting evidence that the defense may give to intelligently decide the issues of the case. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in admitting their extra-judicial confessions in evidence against them. RULING: No. The extra-judicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. Although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused themselves, the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. SC held that, "to be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." Under rules laid by the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) The confession must be voluntary; (2) The confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) The confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were complied with. SC, affirmed.

People vs. Canoy 328 scra 385 Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused Heracleo Manriquez (hereafter HERACLEO) and Gregorio Canoy (hereafter GREGORIO) guilty of two counts of murder for stabbing to death Ernesto Gabuyan (hereafter GABUYAN) and Ferdinand Duay (hereafter DUAY) on 12 January 1990. GREGORIO maintains that the oral admission and extra-judicial confession he gave before the police authorities

cannot be used as evidence against him because his waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during custodial interrogation cannot be characterized as one made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently since: (1) the sworn statement was written in English and there was no proof that the preliminary questions and answers therein were translated, much less a translation after every question and answer in his alleged waiver, into the Visayan-Cebuano dialect, a language spoken and understood by him; (2) there was no proof that he, then only 18 years old and a 4th grader, clearly understood the import and consequences of the waiver which was "couched in broad and general terms"; (3) the sworn statement related only to his alleged disinterest to be represented by a counsel but it did not signify an agreement to make a confession of the crime with which he was charged; (4) he executed the sworn statement not knowing that an extra-judicial confession was attached thereto and; (5) the presence of his mother during the signing of the waiver did not guarantee that the same was done voluntarily and intelligently. Issue: The validity of the so-called waiver and extra-judicial confession executed by GREGORIO. Held: No meaningful information as to his rights under custodial interrogation was conveyed to GREGORIO. He was not asked if he wanted to avail of his rights and was not told that if he has no lawyer of his own choice he could avail of one to be appointed for him. Furthermore, the waiver states that he does not want the assistance of counsel and it is not shown that he agreed to be assisted by Atty. Tanjili. The testimony of Atty. Tanjili also eloquently reveals his cavalier attitude and the insufficiency of the assistance given. His explanation to GREGORIO on his constitutional rights during custodial interrogation and of the effects of the waiver thereof is unsatisfactory. Although the waiver of GREGORIO was intrinsically flawed and, therefore, null and void, and although the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, it did not absolve GREGORIO from any criminal responsibility. The evidence on record satisfies us with moral certainty that he and his co-accused conspired together to kill DUAY and GABUYAN and that GREGORIO was not a mere witness to the acts of the others; he himself materially contributed to the pursuit of the conspiracy. Miso The accused-appellant is GREGORIO CANOY is guilty in each case beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of murder.

PEOPLE V. SAPAL 328 scra 417 Irregularities in arrest Conviction based on proof beyond reasonable doubt Facts: Accused-appellant was arrested based on a warrant issued against him after he failed to attend his arraignment. He contends that certain irregularities attended his arrest, and that the prosecution failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Admittedly, accused is deemed to have waived his right to question the irregularities attending his arrest for his failure to raise the same at the opportune time, i.e., before he entered his plea. Nonetheless, the peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the case, e.g., the police authorities’ failure to comply with the clear directive of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Barrios, the undue delay in preparing the documents relating to the arrest of accused and his wife and in delivering them to the proper authorities for inquest, and the failure of the law enforcers to provide accused with a counsel during the custodial investigation, effectively destroy the presumption of regularity in the performance by Gomez and his colleagues of their duties. Such being the case, the presumption of regularity cannot be made the sole basis of the conviction of accused. It is well-settled that “where the circumstances shown to exist yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.”

People vs. Jara 144 scra 517 Facts: The three appellants - Bernades, Vergara amd Jara were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for Robbery with Homicide. In the companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while the two other appellants received sentences ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment. This court's task is made difficult by the fact that the crimes were specially ruthless and barbarous in their commission. No less than the counsel for the appellants states that the people of Puerto Princesa are no strangers to crime and that the frequency of criminal acts in their city has somehow benumbed the sensibilities of its citizens. Yet, the discovery on June 9, 1978 of the brutally and badly bashed corpses of two well-known and loved women of their community was still shocking to their senses. The police officers who investigated the crime and secured the confessions seemed so certain that indeed the three appellants are the malefactors. The confessions are convincing in their details. The trial court noted that "both victims were assaulted and killed with the might and fury of one really who had harbored so long a grudge and hate" and only Felicisimo Jara had that kind of ill-will against his estranged wife and her female companion. Moreover, Jara, a recidivist for the crime of homicide, was characterized as an experienced killer. There must be many residents of Puerto Princesa who are thus, convinced about the correct solution of the crime. And perhaps, the appellants could have been the killers All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the defense, the court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the same There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel. According to the records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of their right to counsel. Issue: whether or not the waiver was valid: Held: No. Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, made a "Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo". The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police

investigators either automatically type it together with the cour "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stated style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted. However, as to the accused Jara, the requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in this case. The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused Jara beyond reasonable doubt. Mere denials of the accused as to his participation jarajarain the crime are only self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his active participation in the crime Wherefore, In Crim. Case No. 2564, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are acquitted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is convicted of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. In Crim. Case No. 2565, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are likewise acquitted of the crime of Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Jara is convicted of the crime of Parricide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Considering, however, that the accused Jara is now over 70 years of age, the penalty of death is lowered to reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Nicandro 141 SCRA 289 Facts: After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias ‘Nel’. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills Thereupon, the appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette. Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed the appellant, was frisked and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills, and from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed of his rights and to warnings. Held:Yes. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be informed” of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. In other words, the right of a person under interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been “informed” of his rights. Now, since the right “to be informed” implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will

necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered. Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights. The fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the duties of an interrogating officer.- As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.

Gamboa v Cruz Facts: Petitioner alleged that he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.

Issue: WON a police line-up is covered by the Right to Counsel of accused? Ruling: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

People vs Pavillare Facts: On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was apprehended in connection with the kidnapping of another Indian national. While under police custody the appellant was required to stand in a police line-up where he was supposedly identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors. Five separate charges arising from five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of whom were Indian nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he was identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors because the Indians needed a "scapegoat" for the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian nationals then pending. Issue: WON the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel? Ruling: The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel.

People vs Jara Facts: Accued Jara was convicted with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, were apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine

Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators. They also positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession made by the two witnesses are admissible? Ruling: An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed. The confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that his admissions are involuntary or untrue. The trial court, in this case, was not convinced that the extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily. Constitution, in expressly adopting the so-called Miranda rule, has reversed the presumption. The prosecution must now prove that an extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given, instead of relying on a presumption and requiring the accused to offset it. There would have been no need to amend the centuries-old provisions of the Bill of Rights and to expressly add the interdiction that "no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere.

PeoplevsDomantay

The body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's body bore several stab wounds. The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. Police officers of the Malasiqui Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. A Medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that the child's hymen had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo filed a criminal complaint against accused-appellant of rape with homicide. At the trial, SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been brought to the Malasiqui police station. Before he commenced his questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his

constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangasinense. According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing the victim. On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's confession reduced in writing. Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection of the defense. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that: THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station, he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, § 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation. But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree.

PeoplevsDecierdo

A Criminal case in the Municipal Court of Tambulig against one Felipe Cedilla for preliminary investigation. On the same date, Judge Gualberto Bacarro, Sr. of the Tambulig Municipal Court issued a warrant of arrest against Cedilla. Finding a prima facie case against Cedilla, the Judge issued an order forwarding the case to the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for trial. Cedilla was duly arraigned, after which the government presented its evidence. Meanwhile, Chief of Police of Tambulig, on the strength of a statement given by Adelita Decierdo, pointing to Pedro Decierdo, Adelita's husband, and Regino Duhay lungsod as Montillano's killers, filed a complaint against Decierdo and Duhay lungsod. Judge Bacarro, who conducted the preliminary examination, issued a warrant for the arrest of both Decierdo and Duhay Lungsod.

Decierdo was apprehended in his residence at Matingon, about 30 kilometers from Tambulig, On May 23 or 24, 1973, Patrolman Alfredo Bopadora of the Tambulig police was brought to the Tambulig municipal building where he supposedly executed a written confession admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano. He likewise allegedly fingered Duhay lungsod as the mastermind. It was a confession Decierdo was supposed to have reiterated before Baldomero Fernandez, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, who investigated the Criminal case The Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Fiscal filed an Information against Decierdo and Duhay Lungsod for murder. Fiscal Fernandez, in view of the alleged confession in question, moved to dismiss the Criminal case. Acting on such motion to dismiss, the Honorable Asaali Isnani, presiding Judge of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance, issued, on the same date, an order dismissing death shortly thereafter, the murder case against Felipe Cedilla. Both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod entered pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, the case was set for trial. Judge Isnani issued an order acquitting Duhay lungsod for lack of evidence and convicted Decierdo. The case is now before the SC for automatic review. There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an uncounselled confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution applies. In the case at bar, Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed Exhibits "A"-"A-25", his supposed confession. Judge Bacarro himself so admitted. That fact alone (absence of counsel) nullifies the confession. Hence, the evidence cannot therefore be countenanced. III. Rights and Remedies

Case # 49 Remedies Case * 75 Definition of Bail MIRANDA vs TULIAO G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006 FACTS: Respondents SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez were charged for murder before the RTC of Santiago City for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao who were found burnt in Ramon, Isabela.

Trial for the murder case was transferred to RTC of Manila where all of the accused were eventually convicted as charged. But such decision of the lower court was reversed on automatic review by the Supreme Court and acquitted the accused. However, one of the accused who was then at large during the course of the trial was apprehended. SPO2 Rodel Maderal executed a sworn statement and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Herein respondent Virgilio Tuliao thereafter filed a case of muder against Boyet dele Cruz and Amado Doe while Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. But such was denied by Judge Timaluan on the ground that, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The new Presiding Judge took over the case and issued three subsequent orders and joint orders such as cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio; and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration with a prayer for the inhibition of Judge Anghad filed by the State Prosecutor and respondent Tuliao. As a result of those orders and joint orders, Tuliao filed petions for madamus certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for a TRO sought to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify said orders Orders and Joint Orders. However, despite the granting of said motions, the respondent judge proceeded by issuing a joint order dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. The SC took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not, an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

RULING: NO. Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. [t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" Case # 50

TALAG vs REYES A.M. No. RTJ-04-1852. June 3, 2004 FACTS: Peitioner Wilfredo Talag along with two other were accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa. However, only the respondent was subsequently charged for the crime. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of

the complaint against him for utter lack of merit. On even date, he filed an Omnibus Motion before the trial court: (1) to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to recall the same if already issued; and (2) to remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion for reconsideration. On May 31, 2002, complainant filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing Accused’s Omnibus Motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or to remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest without first resolving the said motions. Complainant immediately filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals challenging the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the said warrant. Two days after the complainant filed for motion for respondent Judge’s inhibition, the judge issued the assailed warrant of arrest against the complainant. Meanwhile, the complainant filed a Notice of Change of Address. As a result, two notice of arraignment were not received by the complainant as it was sent to his former address. Thus, the judge issued a bench warrant of arrest against the accused for failing to attend his arraignment. Subsequently, complainant filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The judge granted the motion to recall warrant of arrest and lifted the bench warrant but denied the motion for reconsideration. The complainant consequently filed for verified complaint against the respondent allegedly for partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression. Among the allegations was the issuance of the bench warrant by the judge because of the failure of the complainant to attend his arraignment due to lack of notice. Which the judge refuted and comments that since the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction of the person of the complainant, after the Court of Appeals denied complainant’s petition and lifted the 60-day TRO, has to order the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant. The Court Administrator recommends for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the he issuance of warrant of arrest procedurally correct. RULING: YES. The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally sound but it was even required considering that

respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of complainant. The issuance of the alias warrant was issued after the expiration of the 60-day TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. With the lifting of the restraining order, no legal obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest warrant and thus set in motion the stalled prosecutorial process by acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused. As to the issue of the failure of the complainant to attend his arraignment attributed to the failure to receive two Produce Order issued by the judge, the notice of change of address pertains to the address of the counsel, therefore the court assumed that court processes could be sent to complainant’s “old” and “unchanged” residence. Accordingly, the two notices were sent to complainant’s bondsman. In accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, his bondsman must produce him before the court on the given date and failing to do so; the bond was forfeited as it was. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to adopt the recommendation of the Court Administrator, and accordingly, DISMISS the instant complaint for lack of merit. Case # 51

DE JOYA vs MARQUEZ G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006 FACTS: A complaint of syndicated Estafa was filed against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan by Manuel Dy Awiten for allegedly inducing the latter to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State Resources Development Management Corporation, but when the latter’s investments fell due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or that the account was closed. The complainant includes the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State Resources Development Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya being one of the incorporators of said corporation The respondent judge issued the questioned warrant of arrest on the basis of the report sent by the state prosecutor findings of probable cause and after examination of the document.

Evidences showed that private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. Hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner could obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. RULING: NO. there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.

Luna vs Plaza (In the matter of the application for a

writ of habeas corpus, Simon Luna vs Plaza) Facts: Respondent Judge Plaza ordered a warrant of arrest without bail for the provisional release of accused, herein petitioner, Luna for the crime of murder. Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of questions and answers taken by taken by Investigator Patosa and subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before Judge Plaza that the questions were propounded by Investigator Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. The affiants further declared before respondent Judge that their answers were true, and were freely and voluntarily made, that they fully understood the questions and answers, and that they were willing to sign their respective affidavits. The affiants signed their respective affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who also signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath.

Petitioner filed a waiver for his right to preliminary investigation and he was charged thereafter with murder. Petitioner then filed for the writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention was illegal and the warrant of arrest was illegally issued because the questions propounded by respondent judge were not “searching questions”. Issue: WON the warrant of arrest was validly issued WON petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated for a defective preliminary investigation WON the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy Held: Yes, the warrant of arrest was validly issued. The Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Judiciary Act of 1848, as amended by RA 3828, requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The purpose of this is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. In the case at bar, while it is true that the respondent Municipal Judge did not himself personally cause to be reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers the examination of witnesses presented before him by the person who filed the criminal complaint, respondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses under oath and that the questions asked by the Judge and the answers of the witnesses were reflected in writings which were actually subscribed and sworned to before him. No, there was no violation of accused’s right to procedural due process. Preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary investigation and applied for bail before respondent Municipal Judge. This conduct of petitioner constitutes as an implied admission on his part that there was a probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him and that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the

preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. No, the writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy of petitioner, but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides "SECTION. 4 When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge .. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process .. or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library All the conditions set forth to deny the writ, are present in the instant case. It is shown that petitioner is detained and is in the custody of the respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest, and the order of respondent Judge, to confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is not disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment, although petitioner did question the validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which claim We have found to be untenable. Consequently, the trial Judge did not commit an error in denying the writ of habeas corpus prayed for. At any rate, the remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.

Alimpoos vs CA Facts: Accused Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest for the prosecution of robber with less serious physical injuries. The place allegedly robbed belonged to petitioner spouses Alimpoos. The accused and his wife instituted the habeas corpus case before the trial court contending that the warrant was illegally issued. The petitioner spouses and the witnesses were named as defendants in the habeas corpus case. In an amended complaint, the two arresting policemen, the Chief of Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as co-defendants. Spouses Alimpoos and the petitioner witnesses contended that they had nothing to do with the Accused’s detention and arrest. The Municipal Judge, the Chief of Police, and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba alleged that the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Herein

respondent trial judge issued an order declaring the detention of the Accused illegal, granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus and enjoining the prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case. Issue: WON the habeas corpus case is defective WON the order to enjoing the prosecution of the accused in another criminal case is valid HELD: Yes, the habeas corpus proceeding is defective. A Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. While the issuance of the writ is to all intents and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. It is an inquisition by the government, at the suggestion and instance of an individual, most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. It may be analogized to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the status of a person. The person restrained is the central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. As it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be entered against anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the technical sense. The Accused, therefore, should have limited his complaint against the Chief of Police of Bayugan, the person having him in alleged illegal custody. Moreover, habeas corpus was not a proper remedy for the accused. The remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for reinvestigation of the case. It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available. No, the order containing a provision enjoining the prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case is erroneous. If the Accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its prosecution, but to have the preliminary investigation conducted.

Parada vs Veneracion Facts: Parada is the accused in a case for 4 counts of estafa, duly bonded with EASCO. He notified the court and the manager of the bonding company of his change of address. However, the notice of hearing was sent to petitioner’s former address. For failure to appear, respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein accused-complainant, ordering the confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted. Respondent Judge likewise assigned a counsel de officio, Atty. Jesse Tiburan of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) as counsel for the accused. Furthermore, a warrant of arrest with no bail was issued. Thereafter, a decision was rendered convicting herein accused-appellant of the crime and the decision was promulgated despite his absence. Accused-complainant was arrested and brought to the Makati City Jail. Accused-complainant filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, Certiorari and Annulment of Judgment with prayer for immediate relief with the Court of Appeals. Issue: WON the warrant of arrest issued with no bail is valid? Held: No. Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. In the case at bar, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of hearing was sent to the former address of Parada’s counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his change of address. the warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge is a downright violation of Parada’s constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be noted that the crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a bailable offense.

Secretary of national Defense vs Manalo Facts: Respondent Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo recounted being forcibly taken from their home in Bulacan by armed men wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots. They were handcuffed, forced to face the ground, kicked and brought into a white L300 van. In their 18 months of captivity, they learned some of the names of their abductors. They were blindfolded and tortured in the place where they were brought. They were forced to eat spoiled or left over food by their interrogators and are questioned if they were members of the NPA. One night, Raymond tried to escape and after walking through a forested area, he talked to some women he saw who told him he was at Fort Magsaysay. Upon reaching the highway, he was spotted by some soldiers who chased and caught up with him. He was again tortured until his back bled. For some weeks, they would be tortured, and their wounds would be healed. When the wounds healed the torture would resume particularly when respondents’ guards were drunk. They were detained in Fort Magsaysay for three and a half weeks. One day, they met with Gen. Palparan who told them that they would be given another chance if they told their parents to stop joining rallies, the court hearing and CHR. The respondents agreed as they felt that they could not do otherwise.As they were also afraid, their parents acceded. Thereafter, they were brought to Camp Tecson, where they learned that they were in the detachment of the Rangers. There, they cleaned in the morning and put to chains at night. They also met Sherlyn Cadapan there who confided to them that they she has been subjected to severe torture and raped. At times, they were tortured and threatened that if they escaped, their families would be killed. Respondents were then again transferred to the 24th infantry battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were made to clean, cook and help in raising livestock and occasionally tortured. From Limay, they were transferred to Zambales were they witnessed several people being killed, including an aeta. The bodies are burned then buried. They were brought to Pangasinan to help raise poultry for Donald Caigas and were paid 200php or 400php. They were no longer put in chains but were instructed to use the names Rommel and Rod. There, they started to plan their escape. They earned some money until they had saved 1400php between them. One night, Caigas and his cohorts had a drinking sessions. When none of their guards were awake and took notice, they proceeded towards the highway and boarded a bus bound for Manila. Dr Molino corroborated the accounts of respondents saying that the two had scars consistent with physical injuries inflicted upon them. He conducted the medical examination on the respondents’ two days after their escape. They filed originally filed for a Petition for

Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs. While the petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect. The Manalo siblings filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. Issue: WON the writ of amparo can be issued Held: Yes. Respondents were abducted from their house in Bulacan until they escaped. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. Respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Velasco v CA Facts: Larkins was arrested for violation of B.P. 22 on September 1993 by virtue of a warrant. On November 1994 Alinea executed an affidavit before the NBI accusing Larkins for the crime of rape. Then authorities of NBI arrested Larkins on the basis of the said complaint. 2 days later Larkins filed for bail however, he was not released by NBI on the ground that a complaint of rape was filed against him. Subsequently Alinea executed a formal complaint of rape against Larkins. Accused common law wife filed for habeas corpus which was approved by the CA, hence, this petition for review. Issue: WON illegal arrest of Larkins was cured by the subsequent filing of an information against him. Held: Even if the arrest of the person is illegal it can be subsequently cured based on supervening circumstances such as the issuance of judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing of the complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.

Ilagan v Enrile Facts: Ilagan was arrested based on the mission order issued by then Defense Minister Enrile. Ilagan’s lawyer was also arrested, hence, habeas corpus was filed. Enrile contented that they can’t avail habeas corpus for that time it was suspended. A hearing was conducted and the court issued the release of Ilagan which was opposed by Enrile on the ground that warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion was already filed against Ilagan. Petitioner also claimed that respondent can’t avail habeas corpus for it’s unconstitutional being violative of search and seizure. Issue: WON habeas corpus Is the proper remedy for petitioner’s release. Held: The court held that Ilagan should have filed motion to quash the warrant of arrest, or filed for preliminary investigation and not habeas corpus. It is also the duty of the trial court to determine if Sec 5 of Rule 113 was properly applied. Moreover, since warrant of arrest was availed of and rebellion was filed in court, render the case moot and academic.

Moncupa v Enrile Facts: Efren moncupa and 8 other persons were arrested on the basis that he was a National Democratic Front member and a Presidential commitment order was issued against him. An investigation was conducted and he was excluded in the subversive case and only illegal possession of firearms was filed against him. Moncupa then was temporarily released by the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the president under some conditions or restraint. Moncupa filed for habeas corpus and the respondent opposed it on the ground that it’s already moot and academic for Moncupa was already released. Issue: WON the filing of habeas corpus is moot and academic for Moncupa was already released. Held: A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

Navla v Pardico Facts: Bong Lapore and Benhur Pardico was envited by Asian Land for questioning for someone saw them stole the lamps and electric wires in Grand Royale Subdivision. Thereafter, Lolita, Bong’ mother and Ben’s wife went to the office of Asian Land and ask for the release of Bong and Ben. Bong was released but Ben was left behind for further questioning. On the next day, Asian Land claimed that they already released Ben but Lolita could not find her husband. Hence, Petition for writ of amparo was filed which was granted by the trial court and opposed by the petitioner claiming that writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Issue: WON Ben’s dissappearance is within the ambit of writ of amparo. Held: A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation.

Rubrico vs Arroyo Facts: On April 3, 2007, Lourdes Rubrico while attending Lenten pabasa was abducted by armed men belonging to 301st Air intelligence and Security Squadron based in Fernando Airbase Lipa City. Lourdes was brought and detained at the Airbase without charges. She was interrogated conducted my hooded individuals which amounts to verbal abuses and mental harassment. Lourdes was eventually released but only after she signed a statement that she would be military assets. After being release, the harassment continued in form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different place by motorcycling men wearing bonnet. Lourdes filed a complaint with the office of the ombudsman, a complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave

misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan but nothing was happened. She also reported the harassment incident but nothing happened. Human Rights group of Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case. On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman. Issue: WON the CA commited reversible error in dismissing their petition and dropping President GMA as party respondent. WON the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition. Held: NO. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or

domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.

YANO vs SANCHEZ Facts: Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, September 18, 2006, Nicolas’ “wives” Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers’ uniforms passing by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded on September 19, 2006 to the Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp Detachment of the 71stInfantry

Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army’s 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no avail. respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006, whom Josephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after respondents had shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed them that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1, 2006, this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army’s 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on December 21, 2006 before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed the same to the Ombudsman for appropriate action. In the amended petition dated January 14, 2008, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In their Return, the military officers mainly denied having custody of the victims and posited that the respondents herein failed to substantiate their claim. In a Decision dated 17 September 2008, the CA absolved the impleaded military officers on the ground that the petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any direct or indirect link between the individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the grant of the provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victims. Held: No. The interim or provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence. These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order

the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.

Razon vs Tagistis Facts: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis’ return. On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo against several generals. On the same day CA issued the writ of amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008. n March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an “enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ. HELD: No. The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

PEOPLE VS ALOJADO Facts: On October 11, 1994, Julette Peñaranda and Gerra Rustia went to Amsic Elementary School where they were Grade III pupils. During the recess at around 10:00 a.m., both girls went to the house of Julette to get a dress which Julette intended to show to her teacher. On their way back to school, appellant talked to them, showed them a picture of a woman and asked them if they knew the woman in the picture. Julette told appellant that she did not know the woman. Appellant told them to help him look for the woman. The two girls accompanied appellant who was then riding a green bicycle. The three of them rode towards Amsic. In view of an obstruction on the

road, appellant told the girls to go down and walk as they made a turn towards Plaridel. Thereafter, the two girls rode the bicycle again. This time it was Julette who stayed at the back while Gerra was placed at the front of the bicycle. Both girls was brought to a grassy place and was raped. Alojado was convicted of statutory rape. Issue: Whether or not irregularity of arrest is deemed waive. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court said “ Appellant (Alojado) also maintains that he was illegally arrested. This argument, however, comes too late in the day, because appellant failed to allege it PRIOR TO HIS ARRAIGNEMENT. In People vs. Salvatierra, the Court emphasized that an objection to the legality of an arrest MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT BEFORE THE ACCUSED ENTERS HIS PLEA. Appellant is stopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea , otherwise the objection is deemed waive. Consequently, any defect concerning the arrest of the appellant was CURED by his COLUNTARY, submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as shown when entered his plea during his arraignment, and when he actively participated in the trial thereafter.

People vs. Rondero Facts: On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister’s whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was about 5 m. away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 m. away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. Maximo told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter’s own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided

to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene’s lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts[5] under Mylene’s buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood.[6] After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene’s body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.[7] Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant. Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. Ruling: Anent accused-appellant’s third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on Maximo’s suspicion that he was involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March 26, 1994. Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings. Cited case in Esquillo vs. People, J. Bersamin Dissenting The petitioner’s failure to assail the invalidity of her arrest prior to her arraignment, and her objecting to the

inadmissibility of the evidence for the first time only on appeal on the ground that the search was illegal for being done despite her not committing any unlawful act to give a justification for the search did not amount to a waiver of her objection to the admissibility of the evidence against her. The failure to object to the irregularity of an arrest prior to the arraignment does not involve a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence. It only amounts to a submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court said so in several decisions, including People v. Lapitaje,[5] viz: A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[6]

People vs. Rancho Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the PDEA, the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway

and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. Ruling: The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.

In RE: Umil vs. Ramos Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was

positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately

prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

Bagcal vs Villaraza The case was about the petition asking for the issuance of Habeas Corpus alleging that he was illegally detained. Facts: Bagcal was arrested on Feb. 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest was without warrant. He has been detained at camp Aguilar. On August 6, 1982, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an information for murder against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro presided by respondent Judge Rolando R. Villaraza. The information was accompanied by the affidavits of several persons. They were not subscribed before Judge Villaraza who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them searching questions. The information has no certification by the City Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary investigation. Indeed, if the City Fiscal had conducted a preliminary investigation, the information should have been filed in the Court of First Instance which had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. It is obvious that the information was filed with Judge Villaraza so that he would conduct a preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of arrest. Issue: whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his immediate release from detention. Held: The circumstances attending the issuance of the warrant of arrest have been invoked in the petition for habeas corpus. And it is the warrant of arrest that has been invoked in the return of the writ to justify petitioner's detention and it is also the basis for the decision of Judge Rosete on denying the petition. Petitioner claims, and Judge Rosete agrees, that respondent Judge Villaraza should not have issued a

warrant of arrest without a preliminary examination of the witnesses for the prosecution. However, Judge Rosete held, and We agree, that although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was denied.

Brown vs Illinois Facts: Petitioner, who had been arrested without probable cause and without a warrant, and under circumstances indicating that the arrest was investigatory, made two in-custody inculpatory statements after he had been given the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. Thereafter indicted for murder, petitioner filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements. The motion was overruled and the statements were used in the trial, which resulted in petitioner's conviction. The State Supreme Court, though recognizing the unlawfulness of petitioner's arrest, held that the statements were admissible on the ground that the giving of the Miranda warnings served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and petitioner's act in making the statements was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 486. Issue: WON the Illinois Supreme Court err in finding that the statements made by Brown, although after an illegal arrest, were properly admitted by the trial court. Held: The Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the exclusionary rule is used to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, it serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth, being directed at all unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as fruits. Thus, even if the statements in this case were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remains. Wong Sun requires not merely that a statement meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but

that it be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint" in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.

Sayo vs Chief of Police Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them information with the proper courts justice. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, Held: Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused. When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108. In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the

city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration. A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when

the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.

Case: FELICIANO vs PASICOLAN (1961) Doctrine Under the Constitution, "all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong." The words "all persons" used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense,". However, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security "required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law." The petitioner, without surrendering himself, filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail. Bail was DENIED.

Case: VILLASEÑOR vs ABAÑO (1967) Doctrine The judge, in increasing the bail of the petitioner charged with Direct Assault Upon and Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder (a capital offense), included a condition that the property bond must be posted ONLY by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein. The petitioner argued that the condition collides with Section 9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides that each surety must be a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines. The respondent judge reasoned that it is hard to send notices to people outside the province: there is no way of knowing whether the notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond; and that sending telegrams to people outside the province is too costly. The posture taken by the judge does not offend the good sense of justice. The respondent judge only wanted to make sure that when the proper time comes for the court to order

the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no undue delay will be incurred. The Court also enumerated certain guidelines in bail fixing:

1. Ability of the accused to give bail; 2. Nature of the offense; 3. Penalty for the offense charged; 4. Character and reputation of the accused; 5. Health of the accused; 6. Character and strength of the evidence; 7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial; 8. Forfeiture of other bonds; 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice

when arrested; and 10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at

trial in other cases. However, the Court said that the principal factor to be considered is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment. Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.

Case: DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ Doctrine Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of

Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

Case: CORTES vs CATRAL Doctrine In the case, the respondent judge is being accused of gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to certain cases wherein bail is allegedly not to be granted. Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction. Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the case presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Consequently, when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with murder, without having conducted

any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, it may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. (Sorry medyo mahaba. Multiple cases kasi yung accusations against the judge and each case is different. I just summed up yung discussion sa bail.)

Pp. vs. manallo

( definition) That on the 30th day of March 1992, at more or less 11:00 o’clock A.M. at Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay, the accused with lewd design, armed with a knife, by means of violence and intimidation, poked the victim Rosaldiza Nabor Y Nebres with said knife and when the victim resisted, slapped her rendering her unconscious, and while in that stae (sic) accused have carnal knowledge with Rosaldiza N. Nabor, to the latter’s damage and prejudice. No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing thereof.[12] Upon the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00.[13] On the same day, Alex posted a property bond which was immediately approved by the court.[14] Alex was forthwith released from detention. RTC: convicted the accused for the crime of rape: by reason of his ;flight from the scene of the crime, his having jumped bail, and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of his guilt.

Ruling : A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.[46] The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his gross ignorance of the law. As a consequence, the appellant jumped bail and managed to elude arrest for six years, to the prejudice of the administration of justice. Refer to sec. 5

Pp. vs. nitcha (definition) Jose Belmonte, Agustin Sibayan, and Joselito Sibayan collectively pointed an accusing finger at accused-appellant whom they witnessed firing his .38 caliber firearm towards the direction of May Villa Rica Sibayan who was then negotiating an earthen dike about three to four meters from the position of accused-appellant. In parrying the inculpatory thrusts of the prosecution, accused-appellant ventured to develop the theory that it was not he but one of the companions of Jojo Belmonte who pulled and fired the gun. According to accused-appellant, the bullet missed the head of his brother who was then astride Jojo Belmonte while the latter and accused-appellant's brother was engaged in a scuffle, and that unfortunately, the bullet hit the head of May Villa Rica Sibayan. Rule:The subsistence of a bail bond is also no legal obstacle to accused-appellant's immediate incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion perpetua following the principle enunciated in People vs. Fortes (223 SCRA 619 [1993]) this: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of a s amended, that: . . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion id limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . . The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that: Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Pp. vs. donato ( nature) private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for bail, 9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong. Rule : We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which

provides thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute. the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. Note: under the new law rebellion and coup d' eta are punishable by reclusion perpetua

Lavides vs. ca ( nature) Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received

reports of petitioner’s activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged. Rule: In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.[8] It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the

trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan Facts Petitioner is one of the accused (For the crime of plunder) together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and several others. The Sandiganbayan deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately. The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. Issue WON petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted Ruling The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The Court’s pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to

quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances.

Teehankee v. Director of Prisons Facts Teehankee was apprehended by Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the US army. She was specifically charged with (a) "active collaboration with the Japanese," and (b) "previous association with the enemy. She was then delivered to the Commonwealth Government for custody. No information was filed against her in the People’s Court for about a year and she applied for bail which was denied. She appealed to the SC assailing the People’s Court’s order on the ground that she was not given a hearing. SC granted her appeal and a hearing was set. The Solicitor General recommended a bail of PhP50, 000php but the People’s Court did not rule on the application for bail and merely concluded that the amount of bail really shows that the charge against her is serious. Teehankee appealed to the SC again and prayed for it to direct the People’s Court to render a judgment on her application for bail. SC granted but the People’s Court instead of complying, set a third hearing where the Judge asked the same questions tending to compel the prosecutor to produce evidence and when the Special Prosecutor refused to adduce evidence stating that it would imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the Judge had the prosecutor arrested for contempt of court. The prosecutor was released through habeas corpus. Teehankee again asked the SC to decide on her application for bail and the SC again directed the People’s Court to render a decision but in the resolution the SC declared that if the People’s Court does not feel justified in the Special Prosecutor’s attitude of not opposing the petition for bail by the petitioner and

the Sol Gen files a statement that doing so would imperil the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the People’s Court may not inquire further into the prosecution’s evidence and the prosecutor may not be held guilty in contempt of court for refusing to answer the PC’s question and that the hearing should be made in the presence of the petitioner or with due notice to her. The People’s Court however, instituted a fourth hearing, this time, when the prosecutor refused to adduce evidence, the Judge called the prosecutor into a private conference where he allegedly acquired strong evidence of Teehankee’s guilt. The People’s Court thereafter rendered a decision based on the evidence acquired in the private conference denying the petition for bail. Teehankee again filed a petition in the SC alleging that the People’s Court’s order was issued with grave abuse of discretion and prayed for her provisional release under bail as may be fixed by the SC. Issue WON the People’s Court may compel the prosecution to adduce evidence in the petitioner’s application for bail. Ruling No. The SC clarified that the Constitutional provision gives all persons the right to bail except those charged with a capital offense or when evidence of guilt is strong. This is because of the presumption of innocence. If the presumption of innocence is available to a person already charged or accused more so for a person who was merely arrested or detained. The Constitution does not qualify because to limit it to those charged would be a curtailment of individual freedom. The right to bail is therefore available to Teehankee especially because she has not been charged of any offense yet. The SC then proceeded to rule that the People’s Court has the discretion after due notice and hearing to allow political prisoners to be released on bail even before presentation of the information unless it sees strong evidence for the commission of a capital offense. But this judicial discretion to grant bail must be within reasonable bounds guided by the Constitution, statutes, rules of court, and principles of equity and justice. The Sol Gen is empowered to oppose the application for bail and to adduce evidence based on the State’s interest. If it refuses to do so, then the People’s Court must rule on what it was presented and in the absence of strong evidence of guilt, the People’s Court must grant the bail. Hence, the People’s Court cannot coerce the prosecution if it does not oppose the application for bail of the petitioner and refuses to adduce evidence because it might imperil the success of the prosecution and

jeopardize public interest. The People’s Court must therefore grant the petition for bail.

People v. San diego Facts The information charged the defendants, Mario Henson et. al, as principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited for contempt. Issue WON the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. Ruling Yes. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. The orders complained herein, having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void. The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the

prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong.

Ocampo v. Bernabe Facts The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Armed Forces of the United States and confined in Muntinlupa Prison and was turned over to the Commonwealth of the Phils. and later on filed with the Peoples Court his application for bail. The special prosecutor stated that petitioner with having pointed out Placido Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. No evidence, however, was presented by the special prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to recite the contents of an affidavit which has no referrence to count No. 4, and to state further that he had 27 more affidavits. Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is not an evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which has not been subjected to the test of cross-examination. He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges preferred against him and stated that said charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad. He presented two affidavits, one of Leoncia Nario and the other of Eugenio Trinidad, mother and uncle, respectively, of Placido Trinidad, wherein it is stated that Placido Trinidad was killed by the Japanese because of his having attempted to wrest a revolver from a foreman in charge of a detail at work under orders of the Japanese and that petitioner had nothing to do with such killing. The People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe and others issued an order denying the application for bail. Issue WON no proof was presented by the Special Prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. Ruling No proof was presented to show that evidence of guilt is strong. We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of

whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. The People’s Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail applied for.

SIAZON VS JUDGE G.R. Nos. L-34156 to L-34158. October 29, 1971 FACTS: The accused and before the commencement of the trial, the applications for bail, dated February 8 and July 2, 1971, were heard. After hearing both parties and with the announcement made by the Fiscal that he has between 40 and 50 witnesses to present, the Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications for bail. On this game occasion the Court also considered the motion filed by the prosecution to discharge the defendant Angelico Najar. Without any objection on the part of the defense, said motion to discharge was granted and accused Najar was discharged to become state witness. As the trial progressed, the defense on August 2, 1971 filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the order given in open Court ordering a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications for bail, to which the prosecution also filed its opposition. After hearing the arguments of both parties and realizing that it should give paramount importance to the constitutional provision regarding the right to bail, specially before conviction, and considering the announcement of the prosecution that it has about 50 witnesses to present, and considering further that this Court has also to travel to other provinces to try other cases, the Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that the applications for bail be first heard to which the prosecution gave its assent.

ISSUE: Whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail is still summary in nature as it was under the old rule. RULING: As a general proposition, all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in the very nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Neither under the old nor under the new Rules is there any specific provision defining what kind of hearing it should be, but in the two cases decided by this Court it was stated that the hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. "By ‘summary hearing,’ this Court added, "we mean such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purposes of the hearing." We fail to find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge. The prosecution had three months since the hearing started until the questioned order was issued and had called 27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient corroborative basis for the testimony of its principal witness, Angelico Najar. The plea that this witness will reveal the names of persons who have some knowledge of circumstances which tend to connect the two accused with the crimes and who presumably will also be called to testify, and whose willingness to do so may thereby be adversely influenced by such revelation, does not appear to be convincing, since the record of the cases below already contains the testimony which Najar gave at the preliminary investigation, aside from his three sworn statements consisting of 16 pages typed single-space in

question and answer form. The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of evidence and the order of presentation of the witnesses, while not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be equated with the purpose of the hearing, which is to determine whether the accused falls within the exception to the general rule that he is constitutionally entitled to bail before conviction. To allow the prosecution to conduct the hearing as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits would defeat the purpose of the proceeding.

MAMOLO VS NARISMA A.M. No. MTJ-96-1072. January 31, 1996 FACTS: A criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio Balagot and Ariel Acha before the MCTC of Bansalan-Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, for the murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant. After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the requisite preliminary examination he issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent Judge recommended no bail since murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to the PC Provincial Command in Cotabato. Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For Admission to Bail and set the same for hearing on 25 May 1994. At the scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the court that Balagot was ill and asked the court to dispense with the submission of his petition and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the hospital. ISSUE: Whether or not the procedures on the application of bail are complied with. RULING: The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application for admission to bail should provide the basis for judges to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a hearing on Balagot’s petition for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition. A review of the hearing reveals that only the amount of bail

was discussed after an impasse on the plea regarding the confinement of the accused. Nowhere in the transcript of the hearing do we find questions propounded by respondent Judge verifying the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. In justifying his grant of bail respondent claims that he afforded the prosecution the chance to present evidence but the latter submitted the resolution of the petition to the sound discretion of the court without presenting additional evidence. The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse respondent’s disregard of his peremptory duty. It is worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing in the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution prefaced its submission with a statement of its “serious vehement objection to the petition for bail.” Such manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition. The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic, fundamental procedure cannot be lightly overlooked. As correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law since it resulted in depriving the prosecution the time-tested and enduring procedural due process. It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For the role of judges in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping abreast with the law and court rulings will enhance the faith of our people in the administration of justice since litigants will be confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

PEOPLE VS TUPPAL G.R. Nos. 137982-85. January 13, 2003 FACTS: On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old child, Efren, attended the wedding of Florfina’s younger sister, Loida Atuan. At about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfina’s 26-year-old brother, left the wedding reception. They had barely traveled some 300 meters away and were in front of the house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by appellant and his four companions, now the co-accused, namely: Danilo, Pedro, Ben and Marcelo, all surnamed

Tuppal. After Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfina’s handbag containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot Florfina with a short firearm, hitting her in the abdomen. Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from further harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him on the spot. Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to be dead and fell to the ground. The ploy worked because she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, “Let us go, she is already dead.” In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio Solito and his son Efren scampered towards the house of Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both father and son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun jammed and did not fire. After the malefactors fled, Florfina was brought to the Isabela Provincial Hospital where Dr. Leonides Melendres administered emergency treatment. At the trial, Dr. Melendres testified that Florfina sustained three gunshot wounds, two of which could have been fatal had there been no medical treatment. Dr. Antonio Salvador, who autopsied the cadaver of Bartolo Atuan, Jr., recovered a metallic slug from the victim’s heart. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling during the bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was weak, it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the trial. RULING: The findings of the trial court during the bail hearing were but a preliminary appraisal of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether appellant is entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial. The said findings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence. It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused.