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June 2008 n ARMY 69

Sixty-four years after his greatestmilitary victory, Gen. Dwight D.(Ike) Eisenhower remains a popu-lar subject of biography. Two re-cent studies have portrayed theSupreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Force, as a quintessential rags-to-riches

American hero. Both biographers have

awarded Ike high marks for character but

have said little about his direct contribution

during the climactic battle on the Western

Front during World War II.

The Eisenhower who commanded the Allied

Expeditionary Force in the spring of 1944

was a far more mature battle captain than the

untested commander who led the invasion

force that landed in North Africa in Novem-

ber 1942. In the Mediterranean Theater,

British chief of the Imperial General Staff

By Col. Cole C. KingseedU.S. Army retired

Opposite, top: Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander,Allied Expeditionary Force, orders paratroopers in England justbefore they board airplanes on D-Day 1944 to begin the first as-sault in the invasion of Europe. Far left: Gen. Eisenhower’s June 6order of the day advised his troops, “We will accept nothing lessthan full victory!” Left, middle: Soldiers of the Army’s 1st Divisionleave a landing craft from the USS Samuel Chase to wadeashore at Omaha Beach on the morning of June 6.Op

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Gen. Alan Brooke attempted “to push [Ike] into the stratos-phere and rarefied atmosphere of a Supreme Commander,where he would be free to devote his time to the politicaland interallied problems, whilst we inserted … our owncommanders to deal with the military situations.” Thoughmany senior British officers remained skeptical of Ike’s op-erational ability during the campaigns in the Mediter-ranean, Eisenhower proved to be the indispensable factorin the Allied victory on D-Day.

Nowhere was Eisenhower’s evolution as a coalitioncommander more evident than in the six months thatpreceded the Allied invasion of northwest Europe.During that crucial period, Ike made a series of criti-cal decisions that greatly enhanced the chances ofsuccess for the impending invasion. These actions addressedthe full range of Joint/combined operations, including order-ing major revisions to the initial invasion plan, selecting keysubordinates and demonstrating a clear comprehension ofthe intricacies of conducting coalition warfare.

Eisenhower arrived in London on January 15, 1944, toprepare and to mount the cross-Channel invasion, code-named Operation Overlord. Having received his appoint-ment as Supreme Commander directly from PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt following the second anniversary ofthe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Ike immediately exam-ined the invasion plan and found it lacking in scope and inthe number of divisions allocated to the initial attack. To-gether with the land forces commander, British Gen.Bernard Law (Monty) Montgomery, Ike directed that addi-tional forces be assigned to the invasion force and that thegeographic scope of the invasion area be vastly expandedto include a 60-mile stretch of the Normandy coast.

The next area in which Eisenhower made significant im-pact on the invasion was in his selection of subordinates. De-termined that the solidarity of the Anglo-American coalitionremain paramount, Ike continued the structure of Alliedheadquarters that had proved successful in the Mediter-ranean where his principal air, land and sea commanderswere British officers. Each of the three subordinate servicechiefs, however, had been selected long before Eisenhower’sarrival in England. Though Montgomery was not his pri-mary choice for land forces commander, Ike deferred toPrime Minister Winston Churchill, who championedMonty’s cause. The selections of Air Chief Marshal TraffordLeigh-Mallory to command all tactical air assets assigned toOverlord and Adm. Bertram Ramsay to exercise overall con-

trol of Operation Neptune, the code name allocated to thenaval dimension of the invasion, were far less controversial.

Against then-Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley’s objections, Eisen-hower went out on a limb and resuscitated the career ofthen-Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. Bradley, destined to com-mand the American First Army on D-Day, preferred thatPatton not play a conspicuous role in the upcoming inva-sion. In both North Africa and in Sicily, Bradley had servedunder Patton. Now the tables had been turned as Eisen-hower had designated Bradley as the senior Americanground commander for D-Day. When and if Patton arrivedin theater, he would command an army under Bradley,who would move up to command an army group. Mean-while, Patton remained in limbo in Sicily because of an in-cident in which he slapped a hospitalized soldier the pre-ceding summer.

Only in early 1944 did Ike summon Patton to England. Itdid not take Patton long before he again embarrassedEisenhower and Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Mar-shall. On April 25, Patton addressed a small assembly atKnutsford, a pleasant town in northwestern England. In-stead of confining his remarks to the real purpose of theevent, Patton opined that it was “the evident destiny of theBritish and Americans, and of course the Russians, to rulethe [postwar] world.”

For Eisenhower, this was almost the final straw. Ike in-formed Marshall that he was becoming “exceedingly wearyof Patton’s habit of getting everybody into hot water throughthe immature character of his public actions and statements.”Marshall left Patton’s fate in Eisenhower’s hands but cau-tioned Ike that “the decision is exclusively yours. … Do notconsider [the] War Department position in the matter. Con-sider only Overlord … Everything else is of minor impor-tance.” Eisenhower decided to keep him on board, but notbefore he issued a sharp rebuke to Patton, who once againpromised to refrain from his outrageous behavior.

Gen. Eisenhower speaks with land forces commanderBritish Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery in March

1945 as Gen. Alan Brooke, British chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff, stands by. Gen. Brooke hoped Gen. Eisen-hower would devote his time to political problems so that

British commanders could deal with military situations.

70 ARMY n June 2008

COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former profes-sor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer andconsultant.

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Patton would serve a valuable purpose on D-Day, justnot in the manner that the flamboyant general desired. Pat-ton’s major contribution to D-Day was in command of afictitious army group presumably to land at the Pas-de-Calais. He would later command Third (U.S.) Army, butonly after the lodgment area had been firmly established.Meanwhile, Eisenhower promised Marshall that “thevolatile, offensive-minded Patton would always serve un-der the more even-handed Bradley.”

With respect to the other American commanders,Ike placed his personal stamp of approval onevery division commander and higher. Accordingto one recent biography, his “criterion was unam-biguous: No officer was selected whom he did notknow personally. … Numerous West Point classmates, alongwith veterans of the North African and Italian campaigns,were among those tapped to fill the roster of jobs.” Eisen-hower’s usual pattern was to discuss each prospective officerwith Bradley and his own chief of staff, then-Lt. Gen. WalterBedell Smith. In every case, one of the three officers knew thedesignee well. Ike then sent a written request to Marshall.This procedure produced the desired effect. Eisenhower andBradley felt comfortable with the vast majority of comman-ders with whom they had served in the Mediterranean.

In the end, Marshall did not assign Eisenhower every of-ficer he requested, but the Army Chief of Staff ensured thatIke had the tools at hand to make D-Day successful. To as-sist Eisenhower in the planning and preparation for the in-vasion, Marshall assigned a number of officers who hadserved conspicuously in the Pacific Theater, such as Maj.Gen. Charles (Pete) Corlett, to Eisenhower’s headquarters.Corlett had established his reputation by seizing KwajaleinIsland in the Marshall archipelago. Gen. Marshall offeredCorlett’s services to Eisenhower, whom he hoped wouldbenefit from Corlett’s amphibious experience.

The Army chief would be sorely disappointed. Corlettwas not a member of Eisenhower’s “Mediterraneanclique.” Ike reluctantly accepted Corlett in order not toalienate Marshall, but Eisenhower was not pleased withthe arrangement. Once in England, Corlett found himselfto be the proverbial outsider, “an interloper from the Pa-cific, a son-of-a-bitch from out of town.” He soon discov-ered that the officers surrounding Ike’s headquarters con-sidered anything that had occurred in the Pacific strictly“bush-league stuff” and that no one was interested in histhorough knowledge of amphibious methods.

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Top commanders of the Allied Expeditionary Force meet in London in early 1944 to discuss the cross-Channel invasion,code-named Operation Overlord. Left to right are: Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley (U.S. First Army), Adm. Bertram Ramsay (AlliedNaval Expeditionary Force), Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder (deputy commander), Gen. Eisenhower, Gen. Montgomery,Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory (Allied Expeditionary Air Force) and Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (chief of staff).

In July 1944, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., Lt. Gen. Bradleyand Gen. Montgomery meet to discuss the French cam-paign. Gen. Eisenhower designated Gen. Bradley as thesenior American ground commander for D-Day.

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June 2008 n ARMY 73

Nor were Bradley and Patton impressed. By Bradley’sown admission, Corlett, whom he had known from hiscadet days, was not one of his favorite officers. As for Pat-ton, Corlett was strictly “.32-caliber,” only slightly betterthan the Supreme Commander’s assessment of then-Lt.Gen. Jacob Devers, another Marshall protégé, whom Ikepersuaded his chief to send to the Mediterranean Theater toavoid Devers playing a conspicuous role in the upcominginvasion. Yet had Corlett’s recommendations concerning theinadequate ammunition allocations and the lack of amphibi-ous tractors to support the initial assault been accepted, un-doubtedly fewer American lives would have been lost.

Another area in which Ike left his imprint on the upcom-ing invasion was his utilization of air assets in support ofOverlord. Contrary to popular belief, Eisenhower did notthreaten to resign if the strategic air forces were not placedunder his immediate command for D-Day. That issue hadalready been decided during operations in the Mediter-ranean Theater. The more important issue was where thestrategic or long-range bombers ought to concentrate theirattacks preceding D-Day. Eisenhower remained insistentthat the heavy bombers ought to attack the railroad net-work in France, the low countries and western Germany(the Transport Plan). British Air Chief Marshal Arthur(Bomber) Harris and American then-Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatzpreferred continuing the aerial assault on Germany’s in-dustrial capacity (Operation Pointblank).

According to Eisenhower’s aide, Churchill had takenthe position that either the Royal Air Force (RAF)Bomber Command should be independent of theSupreme Commander’s control but work in con-junction with Ike and his forces, or only a part ofBomber Command should be under Ike’s control. Eisen-hower sought to clarify “the exact pattern of command” ofthe air resources. In the end, Ike prevailed because hewould not budge. As he reported to Marshall, Ike said that

the British were trying to make him change his mind, but“I have stuck to my guns because there is no other way inwhich this tremendous air force can help us.”

The solution was muddled but ultimately clear. Eisen-hower’s deputy commander, Air Chief Marshal ArthurTedder, would now supervise all air operations for Over-lord. Eisenhower, as “a direct agent of the Combined Chiefsof Staff [CCS] for the execution of Overlord,” and BritishAir Chief Marshal Charles Portal, chief of the Air Staff andthe CCS executive for Pointblank, were to approve the airprogram developed for Overlord. Then, the “responsibilityfor supervision of air operations out of England of all theforces engaged in the program, including U.S. Strategic andBritish Bomber Command … should pass through the

Supreme Commander.”The next dimension in which a more

mature Eisenhower emerged was hiswillingness to empower his subordi-nates. In that capacity, he lent the fullweight of his office to give Mont-gomery complete support in the lat-ter’s adverse assessment of the origi-nal assault plan. According to thatplan, the Allied assault would consistof three divisions attacking on a rela-tively narrow front. Montgomery in-

Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, withGen. Eisenhower at Allied headquarters in NorthAfrica in May 1943, recognized his talents for orga-nization early. The following November, Gen. Eisen-hower took command of the D-Day invasion.

From left, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.Patch, commander of SeventhArmy; Gen. Eisenhower; and Lt.Gen. Patton, commander of ThirdArmy, listen to Lt. Gen. Jacob L. De-vers. Gen. Devers took command ofthe Sixth Army Group in 1944.

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sisted that a five-division assault, supported by three air-borne divisions, across a much wider front was necessary.Ike not only supported Monty, he postponed the invasionuntil early June to allow extra time to assemble the addi-tional landing craft and logistical support.

The utilization of airborne resources posed a particularproblem. From the initial planning stage, Montgomery andBradley had insisted on using airborne divisions to securethe flanks of the landing force. In the American zone be-hind Utah Beach on the Cherbourg (Cotentin) Peninsula,Bradley and his senior airborne advisor, then-Brig. Gen.James Gavin, stoutly agreed to the inclusion of two air-borne divisions to block German reinforcements from dis-rupting the invasion. Over the objections of Leigh-Mallory,Ike approved the request.

On the eve of the invasion, however, Leigh-Mallory againraised the old question concerning the wisdom of airborneoperations into the Cotentin Peninsula. Leigh-Mallory wasquite sincere in protesting what he termed “the futileslaughter” of two fine divisions. A combination of unsuit-able landing grounds and expected resistance constituted anundue hazard for the airborne soldiers, who would be vul-nerable until the amphibious forces moved inland. Leigh-Mallory anticipated casualties reaching 70 percent in theglider units.

Ike consulted Bradley to refute Leigh-Mallory’s con-cerns. It was risky, of course, stated Bradley, but the Ameri-can commander insisted that the success of the Utah Beachlanding was predicated on the seizure of the exits behind itby the airborne forces—no airborne drop, no Utah Beach.That was enough for Eisenhower. If Bradley felt the air-borne divisions were crucial to Utah’s success, so be it. Re-tiring to his tent to “sweat out the decision,” Ike an-nounced the attack was to go as planned.

Two other factors characterized Ike’s maturation as acommander on the eve of the invasion: the willingness tomake critical decisions on less-than-perfect informationand the acceptance of accountability and responsibility forthe decisions that he made.

On June 1, Ike transferred Supreme Headquarters Al-lied Expeditionary Force (Advance) to SouthwickHouse, Adm. Ramsay’s headquarters north of Ports-mouth. Weather and meteorological data dictatedthat the invasion must occur between June 5–7 orthe next possible period in mid-June. In Eisenhower’s ownwords, he felt that “the only remaining great decision to befaced before D-Day was that of fixing, definitely, the dayand hour of the assault.” It was at Southwick House thatIke made the decision he was born to make.

Following a one-day postponement due to severeweather conditions in the English Channel, the senior com-manders met again to discuss the feasibility of designatingJune 6, 1944, as D-Day. Meeting on the evening of June 4,Ike polled his subordinates. Group Capt. (Dr.) John Stagg,a civilian meteorologist on loan to the RAF, predicted atemporary slackening in the inclement weather on themorning of June 6.

Then it was the commanders’ turn. Monty recom-mended proceeding with the invasion. Leigh-Mallory, whofeared excessive casualties among the airborne troops, re-mained pessimistic. Ramsay opined that if the invasionwas to go forward, an order had to be given now. Ikeweighed all the alternatives and said, “I am quite positivewe must give the order. I don’t like it, but there it is. … Idon’t see how we can do anything else.”

The Allied commanders in chief convened one last timeat 4:15 A.M. on Monday, June 5, for a final update. AgainIke polled his commanders and received an optimistic as-sessment from Stagg. The decision to designate Tuesday,June 6, as D-Day now rested on the shoulders of theSupreme Commander. After final careful considerationand deep reflection, Eisenhower announced his decision:“OK, we’ll go.” With three words, Ike launched the largestamphibious invasion in history. There could be no turningback now.

In his highly favorable treatment of his grandfather, his-torian David Eisenhower notes that “many have narratedthis decision—few have evaluated it.” Friedrich Ruge, FieldMarshal Erwin Rommel’s naval adviser that evening, laterreflected that Eisenhower had made the decision on insuffi-cient intelligence without having to clear the decision with

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Gen. Eisenhower and Lt. Gen. Bradley take abreak during a conference at Allied ExpeditionaryForce headquarters in France on July 4, 1944.

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higher headquarters. The responsibility lay solely on theshoulders of the Supreme Commander. Montgomery, nevera strong Eisenhower supporter, noted that “Eisenhowerwas in good form and made his decision quickly.”

Now that he had made the decision, Eisenhower heldhimself personally accountable for the success or failure ofthe invasion. He returned to his trailer and penned a notein his own hand. Temporarily placing the note in his tunic,he later gave it to his naval aide. The message read: “Ourlandings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain asatisfactory foothold, and I have withdrawn the troops.My decision to attack at this time and place was basedupon the best information available. The troops, the airand the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to dutycould do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it ismine alone.” Eisenhower initially dated the message July5, rather than June 5.

Before North Africa, Sicily and Italy, Eisenhower hadwritten a similar message. No attempt was made to escaperesponsibility and accountability in the event that the inva-sion failed. No greater testament to the Supreme Comman-der’s character exists than this simple message that he keptin his wallet for ready reference.

D-Day, of course, was a great success and the pinna-cle of Eisenhower’s storied career. By evening,nearly 156,000 Allied soldiers were firmly in placealong the Normandy coast. German counterattackshad failed to dislodge the assault force. To his dy-ing day, Eisenhower took greater pride in the Allied suc-cess on June 6, 1944, than he did in any single achievementduring his presidency.

Returning to Normandy on the 20th anniversary of D-Day, Eisenhower paid an emotional visit to Omaha Beach,where 2,500 Americans had fallen. Sitting on the wall ofthe American cemetery overlooking the once-bloodstainedbeach, Ike reflected upon the sacrifice of the Allied sol-diers, sailors and airmen, so many of whom had giventheir last full measure of devotion. In an effort to put theirsacrifice into perspective, Eisenhower paid them the ulti-mate tribute: “These men came here—British and our al-lies, and Americans—to storm these beaches for one pur-pose only, not to gain anything for ourselves, not to fulfillany ambitions that America had for conquest, but just topreserve freedom.”

It seemed a fitting epitaph from the commander who him-self had done so much to ensure the success of D-Day. M

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Above, on the afternoon of June 5, afterdeciding to move forward with D-Day onJune 6, Gen. Eisenhower wrote an in-case-of-failure message taking full respon-sibility. He inadvertently dated it July 5.American military leaders (right) pay theirfirst visit to the Normandy beachhead onJune 12, 1944. From left: Gen. H.H. Arnold,commanding general, Army Air Forces;Adm. Ernest J. King, commander in chief,U.S. Fleet; Gen. Eisenhower; and Gen.George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.

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