Army Headquarters Vietnam Lessons Learned 23 June 1969

8/3/2019 Army Headquarters Vietnam Lessons Learned 23 June 1969

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UNCLASSIFIEDAD NUMBER

AD502598CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidentialLIMITATION CHANGES

TO:Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 11 May1969. Other requests shal l be referred toOffice of the Adjutant General,Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYDoDD 5200.10, 31 May 1981; OAG D/A ltr, 29Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


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SECURITYMARKINGThe classified or limited status of this report appliesto each page, unless otherwise marked.Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18 ,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN AN Y MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

)pVJ'ICE O-F IHAUJL)I AN T (.TENERALW ASHIN~t ON. D)C. Z0310

JIkl.ln 0) ) ,IR 01' 11 69204h 23 June 196')

SL'J EkI': OperIaL 1,kt1a Re po It - k~hl,,!earnt lleadquarteis, United ,,t t,,0A7rm9yietn, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (0i)SEE l)IRISt IBITLON

1. Subject report is torwhrded lo r review an d evaluat ion in accordancewith paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective act ions shouldbe reported to ACSFOR O" lIT, Operational Reports Branch. within 90 daysot receipt of covering letter.2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriatubenefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations andmay be adapted fo r use in developing training material.BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF Tre ARMY:

I mnci C, A,. STANFIELas Colonel, ACCI)1SI BUTION: Acting The Adjutant GeneralCommanding Generals

US Continental Army ConmandUS Army Combat Developments Command

Commandant sUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army Adjutant General SchoolUS Army Air Defense School.US Army Armor SchooltISArmy Aviation SchoolUS Army Chaplain SchoolUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Field Artillery School Regraded unclassifid when selratedUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Transportation School from classified Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL


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CONFIDENTIAL1) STR1I HITION (Cont d)

US Army nLeo Il igence SchoolUS Army Medical Field Service SchoolItS Army TM ilitary Police SchoolUS Army Missile and luoikillous SlihuolUS, Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolI1S Ai my Security Agency SchoolUS Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal SchoollUS Army Special Warfare School

Copies furnished:Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs oi StaffChief of EngineersCommanding Generals

US Army Materiel CommandUS Army Vietnam

CommandantsArmed Forces Staff CollegeIndustrial College of the Armed ForcesThe National War CollegeDefense Documentation Center

Commanding OfficersUS Army Limited War LaboratoryUS Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

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CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

H4EADQUAITERS. UNITIEO TATEIIe ARMY VIETNAMAPO SAN FRANCISCO 06375

AVHGC-DST i1 May 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States ArmyVietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSTOR-65

(R1)(U)

THRU: Commander in ChiefUnited States Army, PacificATTN: GPOP-DTAPO 96558

TO: " Assistant Chief of Staff for Force DevelopmentDepartment of the ArmyWashington, D. C. 20310

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.a. (U) COMMAND.(1) Corumanders,CG, USARV1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69 GEN Creighton W. AbramsDCG, USARVI Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69 LTG Frank T. MildrenCG, Engine er Troops, Vietnam (Provisional)

I Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69 MG David S. Parker

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DO D DIR 5200.10FOor VT CONFIDENTIAL

IV I ZOqh'


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AV HGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States ArmyVietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65

(R 1)(U)CG , US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam

1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69 BG E. P. Yates(2) Distinguished Visitor Summary: During the reporting period, 55

parties of distinguished visitors visited this headquarters,SIGNIFICANT VISITORS TO USARV

PERIOD: 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969NAME/DATE POSIT IONCh (MG) Francis L. Sampson Chief of Chaplains, DA4 - 14 February 1969BRIG Charles F. Flint, ODE Engineer-in-Chief, Australian5 - 8 February 1969 ArmyBG Russell K. Pierce, Jr . Commander, Air Weather8 February 1969 Service, MACGEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr. CINCUSARPAC8 - 16 February 1969LTG John D. Lavelle, USAF Dir, DCPG, OSD11 February 1969MG John M. McNabb, USAF CG, Technical Training Command1i February 1969Mr. Leonard Sullivan (GS18E) Dep Dir of Research & EngineeringIZ February 1969 for SEA Matters, DODDr. Nils F. Wikner (GSl8E) MACV Science Advisor12 February 1969BG Burnside E. Huffman, Jr . CG, II FFORCEV Arty17 February 1969

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AV HGC- I)SI'SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-6T(RI) (U)

MG Charles T. Horner, Jr. CG, 2d Logistical Command20 - 23 February 1969BG Robert D. Terry CG, USASTRATFCOM-Pacifi,20 - 27 February 1969 ACofS, C-E, USARPACMrs. Jo y Berlemann (GS16E) Mrs. United States Savings22 February 1969 BondsRADM J. N. Shaffer, USN DCS fo r M ilitary ABsistance,23 February 1969 Logistics & Administration,

PACOM

MG Hal D. McCown COMUSMACTHAI and Ch,25 February 1969 JUSMAG, ThailandLTG Lawrence Craigie, USAF (Ret) Dir of Military Requirements,I March 196-) Lockheed CorporationM r. Yoshio Okawara Asst Dir General, American6 March 1969 Affairs Bureau, Japanese

Foreign MinistryMr. Coleman P. Cook (GS16) Spec Asst fo r Planning, OASA6 - 13 March 1969 (I&L)

M r. Wayne A. Smith (GS16) ODCSLOG, DAo - 13 March 1969BG Fred Kornet, Jr. Dir of Ammo, ODCSLOG, DA1) - 11 March 1969MG Delk M, Oden CG, US Army Aviation Center,9 - 16 March 1969 Ft Rucker, AlabamaMG Raymond C. Conroy MACV J4 (Designate)10 March 1969

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A VHGC- DSTSUBJECT. Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending 30 Apri l 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R 1)(U)

LTG Serm Na Nakorn Assistant Chief of Staff,12 - 13 March 1969 Operations, Royal Thai ArmyBG Morton M. Jones USA Vice Director, DCP'312 - 13 March 1969Mr. David R. Israel (GSI8) Dep Dir for Engineering, DCPG12 - 13 March 1969Dr. Benjamin Balser (GS16E) Professor of Psychiatry,12 - 17 March 1969 ColumbiaMG Ben Sternberg ACofS, G3, USARPAC13 - 15 March 1969LTG William F. Cassidy Chief of Engineers, US Army18 - 26 March 1969MG Robert A. Hay, OBE, MBE COMAFV19 March 1969M r. Robert G. Rothwell (GS16) Associate Director, Defense20 March 1969 Division, USGAO, Washington DCBG Frank K. Everest , Jr., USAF Asst Dir, Operational Test &22 March 1969 Evaluation, Office Director of

Defense Research and EngineeringCINCPAC Joint TransportationBoard (Party of 6)23 - 25 March 1969MG Ward S. Ryan Chief, KMAG24 March 1969BG William E. Potts MACV 32 (Designate)Z4 March 1969

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AVHGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of lt.adcpi, rtrs, United States ArinyVietnam fo r Perimld l Midin,t) April 1969, RC S CSF'I0 -6b(RI) (U)

BG Charles W, Ryder, Jr. ACofS, G1 , USARPAC25 - 31 March 1969BG D. A. Raymond Director of Construction26 March 1969 Operations, OASD (I&L)BG William A. Hamrick Chief, Medical Service CorpsZ - 11 April 1969HON Phillip R. Lynch M. P., Australian Minister of3 April 1969 the ArmyMr. B. White ls t Secretaryto the Australian3 April 1969 Minister of the ArmyMG Shelton E. Lollia CG, USATACOM5 - 10 April 1969MG John W. Kaine CG, 77th ARCOM5 - 13 April 1969MG Michael B. Kauffman CG, 124th ARCOM5 - 13 April 1969MG Noble F. Schlatter CG, 86th ARCOM5 - 13 April 1969MG Herman H. Hankins CG, 95th Div (Tng)5 - 13 April 1969BG William H. Booth CG, 81st ARCOM5 - 13 April 1969BG Edward Bautz, Jr. ACofS for Operations, J311 April 1969 (Designate), H1 1 MACVBG Thomas J. Camp, Jr. Dir of Organization, Unit12 April 1969 Training & Readiness, OACSI,)Il

DA


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CONFIDENTIALAVItGC- l)STSUBJECF: Operational Report of Headquarterts, United States Army

Vietnam fo r Period Ending 30 April 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R1)(U)

CO L (P) Thornas F. McCurd ACofS, G2, USARPAC13 - 19 April 1969MG Autrey J. Maroun Ch, M ilitary Plans Office,14 April 1969 SEATOMG Karl W. Gustafson TPMG, DA16 - 21 April 1969LT G W illiam B. Rosson Spec Asst to COMUSMACV19 April 1969Mr. LaVern J. Duffy (GS1BE) Member of the Permanent Sub-21 April 1969 committee on Investigation,

Senate Committee on GovernmentOperations

Mr. Carmine Bellino (GS18E) Member of the Permanent Sub-21 April 1969 committee on Investigation,

Senate Committee on GovernmentOperations

MG Joseph R. Russ DCG, I FFORCEV24 April 1969

GE N Andrew J. Goodpaster DEPCOMUSMACV25 April 1969MG William A. Enemark TIG, DA25 - 30 April 1969

b. (C) PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.(1) Military Personnel Management.(a) (C) Strength Ceiling. As predicted in paragraph lb(l)(a), Head-

quarters USARV ORLL dated 13 February 1969, the Army chargeable

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UdNFIDENTIALAV11GC-I)STSUBJECT: Opcratiijnal Report of lleadqua ittrs, United S)tates Arnny

Vietnam for Period Krnding 30 April 1969, RCS CSlFOR- 65(RI)(U)

strength in RVN (operating + patients i IDY in-.country) reached it s peakon 3 February 1969. On that date it was 365, 933 or 2371 beneath the D)O1)Program 0 imposed strength ceiling. It rose no higher because of carefulmanagement actions taken to control it. These actions included super-vision of accurate, up-to-date strength reporting an d selective pre-DERO(S;departure of a group of February rotatees.

(b) (C) -Infantry Shortage. Infantry casualties increased greatly aisthe result of the enemy's post-Tet offensive which began 23 February. Therate of replacet-ient input over this period and into April was inadequate inMOS IIB/C/H to compensate fo r the losses sustained. Therefore, OPO,DA was contacted and requested to provide all possible early assistance.OPO agreed to adjust AIT flow and add 300-500 airborne personnel to RVNinput, however, it is anticipated this action will no t affect the infantrystrength until late May an d June. In the interim 1400 infantrymen assignedto 1st Logistical Command and the two engineer brigades in December 1968have been levied fo r reassignment to the combat units. Six hundred of thesehad moved to combat units by the end of Ap ril. The se actions should per-m it th e infantry strength to recover by June, providing there is no sub-stantial rise in casualty rates in the interim.

(2) (U) Civilian Personnel Management.

(a) (U) Limitations on the Number of Civilian Employees which m aybe Utilized by USARV. USARPAC message 10264, 19 March 1969,imposed an employment limitation on this command of 35, 804 US citizenand Vietnamese employees paid from appropriated funds effective 31 May1969 This message included instructions that CONUS recruitment forUS citizen employees would continue, but accessions resulting from suchrecruitment would be offset by vacancies to meet th e restrictions imposed.At time of receipt of these instructions, it was determined that theestimated strength of US citizen employees as of 31 May 1969 would be749 employees. Therefore, the employment limitation fo r Vietnameseemployees effective 31 May 1969 would be 35, 055. The on-boardVietnamese employee strength at time of receipt of these instructions was37, 340 employees; 2, 285 employees in excess of the 31 May 1969 limitation.Included in the instructions received were provisions to honor firm

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CONFIDENTIALAVHGC-DI)ST"SUBJECT: Operational Reoort of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam fo r P,:riud Ending 30 April 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R I) (U)

commitmeents of employin- -nt and to attempt attainment of th e new manninglevel by attrition and not L-, reduction in force actions. It was estimatedat this time that 1, 305 Vietnamese citizens had been given firm commit-mentn of employment. SubsequentlyS he command was authorized to fillexisting vacancies in the Kit Crson Scout program which amounted to some637 additional manpower requirements. Command messages were dispatchedto USARV organizations limiting hiring of new employees to those prospec-tive employees "with firm commitments of employment and Chieu. Hoireturnees to to utilized in the Kit Carson Scout program.

(b) (U) Conduct of First DA-Sponsored Personnel Management Exec-utives Conference (PME) in Vietnam. In accordance with USARPAC letter,GPPE-CC, 3 December 1968, subject: Request fo r Approval to ConductExecutive Training, a PM E was conducted in Vietnam during the period6 - 14 February 1969. The conference staff consisted of representativesfrom USARV, USNAVFORV and 7th Air Force. Forty-two confereesattended th e conference. Representatives were present from USARV,USNAVFORV, 7th A ir Force, RVNAF, Government of Vietnam, an d USAID.Nine guest speakers appeared before the PME group; the appearance of theUS Ambassador added a great deal of prestige to the conference. Thefollowing objectives were established for each participant at the start ofthe conference:

1 Broaden his perspective of managing people.

2 increase his awareness of his personal behavior in relation to othe:'s.3_ Sharpen his insights into group or organization"t behavior.4 Increase his appreciation of contemporary urgai. ation and the

environment in which executives work.The conferees indicated orally an d by written comments that the conferencewas highly success, .I. Other indicators of success included an invitationfrom the Civil Service Directorate, GVN, to stage PM E exclusively fortheir personnel, and the National Defense College officials in th e grouprequested assistance in conducting PM E fo r their faculty.

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A VI HG.G- I)STUtBJE-I(C. Operational Report ot lleadquarte'rs, .riilt-(d States Arwy

Vittnan tor Period Enoding W( April 1')C', l(CS CSFO'(R-01(I1 l)I((1.)

(3) (U) Moralt, and Pvrconal Scrvicc~i.(U ) Chaplain Activities There was a I4 perctnt in( rease in the

number oft perstinnel receiv ing L-tI t rad t e r guidance instruction frromn theprvvious quarter. Attendance at religious services remained relativlyconstant dt.sp te the inm reasta d activity (of tactical units during the pust-Tet ftensive. The numbtv r of opp,rtunities for worship increased 3. ?'percent ov,,,r the previous quarter. Contributiions by Chaplain's Funds tVietnamese religious /charit able causes during th e 3d Quarter -Y69totaled $70. 088.42.

(4) (W.1) Medical Service and Medical Supplies.(a) (U) Stratification Report. In February, the first Stratification

Report of (lass VIII i tems for the 32d Medical Depot was accomplished.The report enabled the medical depot to accomplish interdepot stockleveling and identify command excesses. The excesses beyond theauthorized retention level were offered to RVNAF and USAID medicaldepots to satisfy any valid requirements they might have. During thisreporting period $95, 000 worth of excess medical materiel was transferr,to RVNAI- and $3, 000 to USAID. Excesses not required by RVNAF an dUSAID were shipped to the US Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands. InMarch, $160. 970.00 worth of excess materiel was returned to Okinawa.

(b) WI) C-ommand Medical Stockage List. In order to reduce th e numb., rof line items of medical materiel stocked in th e medical supply system inUSARV, and to better control medical materiel, a progriam was initiated inFebruary to develop a Command Medical Stockage List (CMSL). The CMSLwill consist of those standard and non-standard medical items professionallydetermined to be essential for the accomplishment of the medical missionin this command. In conjunction with th e CMSL, a Therapeutic Formularyis being prepared for distribution to all medical units within the command.The formulary lists each pharmaceutical authorized for stockage bytherapeutic grouping and restriction code. The professional consultantshave identified those items which are authorized fo r hospital use only andthose which m ay be issued fo r general use. The CMSL and TherapeuticFormulary Program will result in:

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AVI I(C- flSTSuLJBJ:C v: Operational Report of' leadquartert , United States Arynly

Vietnain for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RC S CS'OR-6 '(R 1) (U)

I Better control of medical m ateriel.

2 Reduction of depot inve-,tories.3 Reduction (it storage requirements.4 Improved inventory management.

5 Conservation of supply dollars.6 Increased supply responsiveness.(c) (U) Area Dermatology Service. During this reporting period the

dermatology service was reorganized to provide group level care ratherthan care liim-ited to one hospital area. The dermatologist now travelswithin the medical group, holding clinics at all major group hospitals andat major divisional units within groups. This effectively brings specializedskin care to al l hospitals an d divisions rather than requiring transport oflarge numbers of troops and patients to the dermatologist . At the sametime, th e teaching accomplished during these visits improves the unit'sand th e hospital 's capability to handle these problems within their ownresources. Further expansion of this program is anticipated.

(d) (U ) Medical Communication Channel. A technica! communicationchannel between hospital medical services an d divisional medical unitswas established on 1 March 1969 under the operational title of MEDCON.In order to establish professional dialogue between these two levels ofmedical care, mutual liaison visits were encouraged on a regular basisbetween physicians operating at each level. Chiefs of Medicine an dDivision Surgeons will coordinate these professional activities which aredesigned to enhance appreciation of problems in each sphere or activityand to develop together the solution to these problems. The MEDCONliaison visit represented a new philosophy of field medicine. It affordedthe opportunity for physician-to-physician discussion through a newtechnical channel paralleling channels of patient care/evacuation andafforded to personnel at al l levels the opportunity to broaden their under-standing of the total care of the military patient.

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CONFIDENTIALAVtIGC- 1STSU Ili , CF: ()peratijonal I1(tport ot lreadquarters, United tt-cs Arrny

Vietnam fo r Period E~nIding "W)April 1969, RC S CSFOIR-6(T(I I) (U )

(e) (U) I{VNA " Physicians 1T ainini . An in-country training tjr,ograziifo r RVNAF m ilitary physicians in US m ilitary medical facilities started15 March 1969. Twenty VN licensed m ilitary physicians were selectedfo r a six-month program under a closely monitored preceptor. Eachtrainee was assigned to another US physician wh o served as the trainee'simmediate preceptor. The trainve was required to work side by sid' withand maintain the sarne hours as his US physician preceptor.

(f) (U) Medical Su p )jy and Medical Services, MUST Hospital. InJanuary, the fifth US Army MUST hospital (i. e., 2d Surgical Hospital,Lai Khe) became operational. Although several MUST medical peculiaritems requisitioned fo r the Zd Surgical Hospital were no t received fromCONUS, the hospital was able to utilize organic TOE medical equipmentto satisfy their immediate requirements. Improved repair parts supplysupport resulted in a decrease in the command 's MUST Utility Packsdeadline rate from 27 percent in Tanuary to 17 percent in March.

c. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.(1) (U) The Monthly Intelligence Review (MIR) continued to provide tr,

intelligence community with a detailed review of countrywide enemyactivity an d associated items of special interest. The average length ofthis periodical was 45 pages.

(2) (U) A weekly Intelligence Conference was held each Friday at 13 3}hours. The agenda of th e conference included summaries of the significarioperations, enemy activity, an d enemy order of battle updating. WeeklyIntelligence Conference Notes were provideci to all attendees includingrepresentatives from th e local intelligence community and from th e generalan d special staffs of Headquarters USARV. "

(3) (U) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Branchprovided material to support a review of all-source intelligence which waspresented to the Command Group and designated USARV staff membersdaily. In addition, CASI Branch presented an all-source briefing eachSaturday to the Commanding General, 1s t Logistical Command, Commanding

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CONFIDENTIALAV tiGC- DS["SUBJ ECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Armlly

Vietnam fo r Period Ending 30 April 1i69, RCS CS-'GR-6tr(RI)(U)

General, lo t Signal Brigade, and designated members of the U)SARV andsubordinate staffs. Special briefings for the Deputy Commanding General,USARV, the Chief of Staff, and other memilbers of the -JSARV staff were.conducted as required.

(4) (G) During the period 15 January - 19 March 1969, an evaluationof centralized OV- 1 Mohawk assets in a direct support employment con-cept was conducted. As a part of the test a consolidation of the Mohawkaircraft , personnel, an d equipment of the tw o Aerial Surveillance andTarget Acquisition (ASTA) Platoons of the le t Infantry Division arid IstCavalry Division (AM) was made at Vung Tau airfield with the 73dSurveillance Airplane Company (SAC). Direct sole-user telephone circuitswere installed between the 73d SAC an d th e 1s t Infantry, 1st Cavalry (AM)an d 25th Infantry Divisions. SLAR an d IR ground sensor terminals wereplaced in operation at the three supported divisions. A report on theevaluation is being prepared by II FFORCEV.

(5) (C) Significant changes in operating procedures for the KAC-QNumberal Code were initiated in mid-March 1969.

(a) Operational Security (OPSEC) analysis was used to pinpointthose areas where the enemy was alerted to planned operations. Tw oinsecure areas which were identified involved the passing of future artil lerytargets and the submission of unit locations in periodic SITREPS usingeither clear text t ransmissions or base point systems such as the point-of-origin.

(b) PW interrogation reports also identified these means of passingtargeting data and unit locations as weak areas which were exploited byVC/NVA forces to avoid target areas an d contact with US forces.

(c) The use of KAC-Q with the Autokey method of encryption providedexcellent security fo r numerical data. However, units found th e Autokeyprocedures difficult to follow under conditions of poor visibility or whileriding in moving vehicles.

(d) The Commanding General, United States Army Security Agencyrecently approved the use of a modified straight line encryption procedurefo r KAC-Q.

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CONFIDENTIALA VIIGC - DS)TS L FIO rtCT ,-. rt t0i Headquarters, 11"Ji,, ,;th's Artily

Niltntalm I,)t' Pe1Viod Ending 30 April 1(4,09 R(1- (. SI.()lt-,(R I (;)

(e) Th e new 1)101t-dkdortIC were tested in th e Ist Inftanttry Il)vis lnbeginning in mid-Markh Initial results indicated that there was a significant reduction in the amount of konmmunicat ions intelligente niad vavailable to enemny forces, and that the new procedures were much ca amrto follow than the old Auttoky.y stittIT.

(f) Instructions tin us e of th e modified straight line sysitern wereissued throughout Vie-tnam fo r use by all Army units.

(6) (U) The third quarterly issue :f Combat Intelligence l~essons(CIL) was publisht.d en 1 April 1969. The continued increase in demandfo r the publication rt-qulreid an itn( lease in the distribution.

(7) (U) On 17 Ma rch 1969, th e DCG was briefed on the proposedreorganization of military intelligence detachments (MID) supporting thefield forces/corps, divisions and separate brigades/armored cavalryregiment in Vietnam. The reorganization was approved and the MIDMTOE package was delivered to GI fo r processing prior to forwardirgto DA fo r approval

(8) (C) On 26 April 196(, all major tactical unit commanders weresent a survey questionnaire on the tactical operational value of the (A,(SLAR) and OV-C (IRi Mohawk. The survey addressed th e immediateoperational value and reliability of the intelligence information collectedby those two systeniss. The responses to th e survey will be collated,analyzed an d presented to the DCG, USARV on 25 May 1969.

d. (C) PLANS, OPERATIONS AN D TRAINING.(1) (C) Movement of th e 1s t Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear

Elements from An Khe to Bien Hoa.(a) Between 28 October and 10 November 1968, COMUSMACV

redeployed the tactical elements of th e 1s t Cavalry Division (Airmobileifrom operations in I CTZ to III CTZ. It appeared the move would bh oneof a rather permanent nature due to th e buildup of enemy forces in III C. /and th e considerable deescalation of the enemy's operations in I CTZ..

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AVHGC-L)ST CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States ArmyVietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R1)(U)

(b) On Z6 December, MG Forsythe, Commanding Genersi of the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile) stated that a move of his rear elements fromAn Khe to somewhere in II Corps was urgently needed. It was estimatedthat 750 men were lost each day to the forward elements due to the over-extended LOC which required R&R, DEROS, Leave, and in/out processingpersonnel to travel between the let Cavalry Division (Airmobile) POE-POD at Cam Ranh Bay, the base camp at An Khe, and the Division'sforward elements in III CTZ.

(c) P survey was conducted by USARV G3 in February 1969 whichdetermined that the Bien Hoa Army Base (BHAB) was best suited fo r theIst Cavalry Division (Airmobile) base camp. The decision was based onthe following rationale:

i BHAB was constructed to accomodate a force in excess of 7, 500men. while only 3, 500 were permanently assigned.2 BHAB already contained some ls t Cavalry DISCOM, Supply and

Service Medical and Engineer elements.3 BHAB is contiguous to the Bien Hoa aerial port.(d) COMUSMACV gave tentative approval of the move provided thedefense of An Khe would not be impaired after the ls t Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) Rear was re-deployed south. To preclude a defense gap atAn Khe. a 184 man Vietnamese mercenary security force was formed,and USARV authorized a provisional Security Detachment to augmentand direct the Vietnamese unit. These forces were assigned the missionof replacing the lo t Cavalry Division (Airmobile) elements defending the"Green Line" perimeter of Camp Radcliff, An Khe effective I April 1969.COMUSMACV gave final approval to the move on 17 March 1969.

(e) The movement of men and equipment commenced on 1 April 1969by air and sea. Currently the operation is 75 percent complete with anestimated completion date of 5 May 1969.

(2) (C ) The Deployment of the M551 Sheridan. In January 1969, 60M551 Sheridans were deployed to Vietnam. The 3d Squadron, 4th

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CONFIDENTIALA V HGC,- DS)I'SUBJFCT-' Opt. rational tuport ol l i teadqurter, , UnI} e(d ,state.s Artiy

Vietnam for Pc rind E;nding 10April 1909, R ;S (ISF'O -65(RI)(U)

Cav&lry. 25th Infantry Division, and the I st Squadron, I 1th Armor,.dCav&lry Regiment each were issued 27 vehicles. Six Sheridans wereretained as maintenanct, floats. Crew training, organizational mainte -nance, Direct Support and General Support training were provided on sitt-by a 26 man New E(quipment Training Team sent to USARV from CONIUSThe first troop cont"xited to t onhat wa.' ,"o'up B, 1/4 Cavalry )it8 February. The Artiy C:oncept 'lIeain iii Victnam began a 90 day ,!p.ra-tional evaluation of the Sheridan on 8 February. Should the evaluationbe favorable, an additional 252 Sheridans will be issued to th e ArmoredCavalry units in Vietnam in FY70. As of 27 March, th e two Sheridanequipped cavalry squadrons had participated in 454 missions, 12. 6percent of which resulted in contact with the enemy.

(3) (C) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force RTAYF. During theperiod 22 . July - 5 August 1968, the 1st Increment (one Infantry Brigade.plus division command, combat support, an d combat service supportelements) of th e RTAVF deployed to Vietnam. During August - Septermn,:1968, the Queen's Cobra Regiment returned to Thailand. The 2(iIncrement, RTAVF, deployed to Vietnam during January - February l)?W1completing deployment on 14 February 1969, an d bringing th e PTAVF t'iits full authorized strength of 11 , 266 (including a 5 percent overstrength).The RTAVF was under the operational control of the Commanding Genera,II FFORCEV. Administrative and logistical support was provided byUSA R V.

(4) (U) Government Owned Contractor Operated Equipment (GOCC)TDA. TD A documentation of GOCO equipment furnished to contractorshas been completed for FY69 contracts with some exceptions. Theexceptions were those contracts which expire in FY69 and are not curreni.\planned fo r extension. Pacific Architects and Engineers R&U contra trequirements fo r FY70 are presently being prepared. The latter M- -Ais scheduled fo r submission du ing June 1969.

(5) (U) TD A Augmentation to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regimentwas submitted in March. The augmentation fo r the four separate infantrybrigades will be submitted during May 1969. The seven division augmen-tation TD A will be submitted by September 1969. These TD A containtabular authority fo r minimum essential equipment fo r base camp opera-tiorns no t provided fo r in presently existing TOE/MTOE.

15CONFIDENTIAL


21/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHG- I)STSUBJEcr: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnamn for Pieriod Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOCR-65(RI) (U)

(6) (U) Headquarters USARV MTDA. D)A approved the HeadquartersUSARV MTDA on 27 November 1968. The approved printed document wasreceived from USARPAC on 1 February 1969. An updated HeadquartersUSARV MTDA is currently being finalized for submission in early May1469.

(7) (U) Reorganization of the 1st Logistical Command. In accordanctwith guidance received from DA, a closed loop package of TDA/MTDAreorganizing Headquarters 1st Logistical Command and the Qui Nhon,Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands was prepared and is beingfinalized for submission in early May 1969. The package submissionimplements USARPAC Manpower Utilizatioii Surveys, Program 6 Civiliani-zation and current local national augmentation of TOE units.

(8) (U) DA Directed Standardization Program.(a) The Phase II Standardization Program for designated USARVcombat, combat support and combat service support units was submitted,

approved by DA, and implemented by General Orders.(b) MTOE for Phase III Standardization Program for USARV COSTAR

units have been submitted to DA. DA approval and implementation isexpected at an early date.(9) (U ) Reorganization of the Americal and 101st Airborne Divisions.(a) Reorganization of the Amezical Division which began with Phase I

in December 1968 was nearly completed during the quarter. Phase II, theactual reorganization, began on 15 February and ended in March. PhaseIII, the final review and adjustment phase, will be completed in May. Tudate, no significant difficulties were encountered.

(b) The conversion of the 101st Airborne Division to an AirmobileDivision was completed in March with the deployment of the remainingelements of the 2/17 Air Cavalry Squadron.

16

CONFIDENTIAL


22/47


23/47

AVHGC- DS TSLIJ.I;CT: Operational Report of 1teadqu,irterm, Uniit ed Stlate, ArmnyVietnam fo r Period Endilig 10 April 196), RCS'CSYFOR-)(R 1)(U)

(c) A request fo r airmrobile do)zekrs fo r al l infantry division c omrbatengineer battalions and separate brigade cotnbat engineer companies Thevdozer can be airlifted into fire support bases to assist in preparing forti-fications.

(d) DA approved a requirement fo r .145 belly armor mnodification kitsfor the MlI3A1 APC. These kits will conmence arriving in June - Julyand a continuous review of mine incident rates will be made to insurepriority of issue.

(e) As a result of a conference at USARPAC in February 1969), anorganizational concept for th e A ir Cushion Vehicle unit was developed.The unit will be organized along the lines of an Armored Cavalry Troopwith one platoon OPCON to XXIV Corps and the Troop (-) OPCON to the9th Infantry Division.

(f) DA approval fo r 1435 Accurized M14 rifles with LWL/ART scopesto fulfill total USARV requirements fo r sniper weapons. The introductionof these weapons beginning August - September 1969, should significantlyimprove sniper operations in RVN.

(13) (U) ENSURE Requests . The following is a summary of ENSURErequests submitted during the period i February - 30 April 1969.

(a) Travel Lift fo r ACV's - Pending DA validation.(b) Director Finding (D/F) Equipment, Tower Mounted fo r Air Traffic

Control - Pending DA validation.(c) Hover Position Indicator fo r CH-54 - Pending DA validation.(d) Parsons Model 77-1A Trenchliner - Approved.(c) Ripper Attachment fo r Caterpillar D9G Tractor - Pending DA

validation.(f) Landing Zone Directors Signal System - Pending DA validation.

18


24/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHG(C -1)51'SU BJEICTl Ope ratijonal R eport of Hleadqua iter s linited States ArmnyVietnam [or Period Fnding- W( April R9 CS (FO

(R 1) (U)(g) Underwate r Swnuncnr De-tector - Pe-nding D)A validatiomn.(h) Airrnobile D~ozer - Pending DJA validation.(i) D9 G T racto rs with Romie Pl ow Kits P ending DJA valIidlation.(j) Improved Illum ination Ammrunit ion -Pending DA validation.(k) Tactical Automnatic Dial Telephone Switching Equipmnent -Pending

DA validation.(1) Airborne Radar Warning System (ENSURE 138. Add-on) -PendingDA validation.e. (C) LOGISTICS.(1) (C) Ammunition Suppiy(a) Eight ammunition items were under Available Supply R'ate (ASR !

Allocation management at the end of April as compared to twtlve at theend of January. Items under ASP /Allocation management at the close ofthe period were.

*Ctg, 40mm, HE **Ctg, 105mmr, HE*Gren, Hd, Off **Ctg, 4.2Z', HE*Sig, Ilium, Gd. WSP **Proj, 155mm, HE

**Ctg. 81mm, HE **Proj. 8'1, HE*Items under DA ASR management.**Items under MACV allocation management.

(b) As a result of enemy action directed at the Qui Nhon AmmunitionDepot on three occasions during the quarter, portions of that depot's

19CONFIDENTIAL


25/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHG(- D)STSUBJFC' : Operational Report of livadquarters, l'nited States Army

Vietnam fo r Period lding W0 April 199, l(S CSI'O1(-65(RI1)(U)

missions were transferrred to the Cani Ranh Bay Animunitiun I)epot. Thet ransferred missions i' "l-ded storage of 8, 000 short tons (ST) of ll-LeQuiNhon Ammunition Dep, stockage objective and 6, 000 ST of the Da NangSupport Commazud stockage obj,-c'tive. Th, latter tonnage was stored atQui Nhon due to insufficient capacity in the l)a Nang Support Command.

(c) Phase II of the USARV Class V Retrograde Program was completedin February, During that month, 13, 562 ST of ammunition were retro-graded, including 2, 528 ST t ransferred to ARVN.

(d) During th e period of increased enemy activity in I-February andMarch, the concept of Rolling Ammunition Supply Points (RASP) wasdeveloped and implemented. This concept involved preloading stake andplatform trailers with fast moving Class V items on the complete roundconcept and positioning them in locations where the ammrnnition wouldbe readily accessible to temporarily isolated friendly units.

(2) (U ) Services Activities.(a) Cargo discharged an d handled in RVN ports (ST):

Discharged Handled

January 521,046 735,700

Febru, ;} 420.255 621,858March 503, 862 723, 869(b) SeaLand Container Service:

Dry Vans Reefer Vans Total

January 1,079 201 1,2.80February 1,561 375 1,918March 1,013 238 1,251

20CONFIDENTIAL


26/47

CONFIDENTIALAVI{GC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report ot lleadquarterb, United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1169, RGS CSF'OR-b65(R1)(U)

(c6 Motor Transport Tonnage (S I')Port & Beach Local Line Total

'January 335,5b4 257 464 125,443 718,461Februar, 302, 046 325, 050 125, 112 752, 208March 311,682 277,691 133, 510 722, q03(d) Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Service from Okinawa: (Semitrailers

an d Vans)

January 279February 383March 624(e) Rail Tonnage (ST):January 17,992. 1February 15,637.8March 16,238,2(f) Air Passenger Movements (Out of Country):

Actually PercentProgrammed Allocated Moved Used

January 31,744 27,207 26, 820 98.6February 26, 174 25, 378 24, 167 95.2March 33,254 29,113 28,157 96.7

21

CONFIDENTIAL


27/47

CONFIDENTIALAVEGC> I)STSUB ECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Arrny

Vietnam for Period Ending 10 April 1469, RC S CSF'ov-65(FMW(}J

(g) Intra-!VN Cargo/Passenger Movernents: Passengers

January 50, 519 175, 686February 47, 560 158, 187March 45, 186 172,430(h) Emergency Airlift Shipments:

Tactical Emergency CombatEmergency Resupply Essential

January 0 0 24February 0 6 -55March 2 3 51(3) (U) Graves Registration Operations. Summary of mortuary

operations is as follows:(a) Remains processed:

USA Mortuary, TS N USA Mortuary, DNG TotalJanuary 620 330 950February 620 523 1143March 869 820 1689(b) Personal Property Division Status:

Cases on hand 31 Dec 68 383

22

CONFIDENTIAL


28/47

AVIIG(- IDSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vie.tnam fo r Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R I) (U)

Cases received 1 Ja n - 31 M ar 69 2633Cases shipped I Ja n - 31 M ar 69 2399Cases on hand 11 M ar t0) 617(4) (U) Class III Suppl and Distribution.(a) Consumption of bulk petroleum by US Forces, FWMAF, and

RVNAF in 11 , III and IV CTZ and Army in I CTZ during the quarter wasas follows:

January 2, 869, 700 bblFebruary 2, 756, 600 bblMarch 2, 714, 900 bbl(b) Headquarters USARV assumed the responsibility fo r procurement

inspection of petroleum products procured in RVN effective 1 January 1969.(c) Headquarters USARV initiated action to improve accountability

procedures fo r petroleum received from com m ercial suppliers.. Lessonslearned from th e recent GAO investigation in Thailan d, ostbeneficial in improving an d policing the systemnirRN.

f. (U) COMMAND MANAGEMENT. None.g. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) During the period, 273 complaints an d 2,026 requests fo r assistancewere processed. Of the 273 complaints. 76 were justified, This representsa substantial decrease in complaints an d requests fo r assistance comparedwith th e previous period. Increased emphasis by commanders on the"troops' open door policy", coupled with the policy of encouraging troops toinitially present their problems within command channels as outlined inUSARV Fact Sheet 2-69 accounted in most part fo r the decrease of requestsfo r assistance and complaints. There was no indication of problem areaswhich could result in conditions detrimental to th e efficiency or reputationof the command.

23


29/47

A VtII (iC,- L)STI

SUBJECTL Opert ional Retport of Headquarters, United States ArmyVietnanr fo r lc riiod lEnding W0 April 19t09 RC((.i CS FOV-6(RI )(U)

(2) Headquarters USARV conducted Annual (General Inspections of 43USARV organizations (town to battalion level during this period. Areasmost often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: inadequate mainte-nance management operations, specifically in th e areas of the Army Equip-ment Records System (TAERS) and maintenance of prescribed load lists(PLL) of repair parts; failure of commanders to authenticate requisitionsassigned 05 and highr issue priority designators; and failure to turn inexcess repair parts or to requisition parts authorized fo r stockage onprescribed load lists.h. (U) COMMAND INFORMATION. None.

(U) fIVIL AFFAIRS.(1) Designation of ACofS, G5. On I April 1969 USARV Headquarters

ACofS CORDS was redesignated ACofS, G5.(2) Deployment of Civil Affairs Platoons. On 26 February 1969 MACV

reassessed the allocation of civil affairs platoons and instructed USARV toextend the period of attachment of th e three platoons from th e Zd CACompany to th e Z9th CA Company for an additional 90 days fo r refugeework in I CTZ. The period was extended to 31 May 1969.

(3) Transfer of Staff Responsibility fo r PSYOP. Primary staff respon-sibility fo r Psychological Cperations at Headquarters USARV was trans-ferred from ACofS. G3 to ACofS, G5, effective 1 March 1969. Thisimplemented DA DCSPER Board Recommendation 40 by combining thesim ilar politico-m ilitary functions of influencing people through a combi-nation of social, economic, physical an d psychological actions.

(4) Transfer of Staff Responsibility fo r Solatium. Primary staffresponsibility fo r Solatium at Headquarters USARV was t ransferred fromth e Staff Judge Advocate to ACofS, G5, effective 1 April 1969. This betteraligned staff responsibility with staff functions, since solatium plays asignificant role in the community relations of US Army elements in RV Nand is supervised by unit G5/S5's .

24


30/47

CONFIDENTIALA V D- F

d' FII T OperatIon1AI 1{t-,ort k) IoI v dqtill trti, Illitt d Staties ArmyVietnam tor IIPeriod Fltd ig 30 April 1 49. RCS CSFOR -(,5(tP I ((U)

i;)Prep~tiat ton ot Civil Aflarbir IP1,10 CA FEstimatc., Handbookanid Art a Study fo r specific areas of Southedast Asia were prepared an dtorwarded to USARPAC ai, required by operating instructions from thatheadquarters. This in luded an annual update of earlier plans plus acomple te rewriting of these document s in a new format provided byUSARPAC.

(6) Management Improvement of the Kit Carson Scout Program. Thehighly successful KCS program expanded at a rate of approximately 120KCS's per month. USARV plans for management of this program wasdeveloped in four phases.Phase I Initial establishment of the KCS program, AIK funded,

organized and controlled at unit level.Phase 1I Introduction of formal management, O&MA funded,with centralized direction and detailed reporting.Phase III Advanced planning, programming support, deter-mining future requirements, analyzing reports,

exchanging ideas and lessons learned.Phase IV Expansion of the program, standardization, planningfor transfer of KCS's to ARVN.

During this quarter th, major accomplishments in the KCS program were:(a) Review of current KCS personnel requirements for USARV units.(b) Reall,)..ation of KCS spaces to meet present needs, within MACVceiling of 2200 space,.(c) Initiation of staff visits to units eniploying KCS's.(d) Development of projected KCS requirements for FY70.(e) Realignment of funding of the KCS program from O&MA to AIK

account s .

25CONFIDENTIAL


31/47

CONFIDENIIALS U JBF .C[' k.qpaiz.r , I , , dkiqda, t ' , I rIvitrd 'it% tvea Ar my

"Vi.'tAl.lA In ' it.| ). dn i() Apl lp (. ,I) (W) (Rc FOR-65( ' I )

j (U ) COMMAND) HIISTORY N,)nv.k, (C) AVIATION.(I) Airfield Operation. Tht. Iniit Aii )purations (iroup (.)JAOG)

membership has expanded to include al l military servit es and AirAmerica. At a JAOG meeting hosted by the 84th Air Division on7 April 1969, it was agreed that tlive working groups would be establishedwith minimum membership being two representatives (a primary and analternate) from each mernber oi th t JAGG The working groups included:Airfield Facilities; Artillery Warlkllg; Air rraffii Control; Notice toAirmen (NOIAMS); and Educatioui. A briefing team from th e educationworking group is currently givinig bi iefings on RVN air operations toselected staffs and schools in CONUS.

(2) Aircraft Logictics.(a) The program fo r conversion of 95 UH-IH (-)'s from the T53-LII

engine to the T53-L13 engine is 70 percent complete. Estimatedcompletion date is May 1969.

(b) The engine conversion program for CH-47B aircraft was completedin March when T55-L7C engines were installed in the remaining 15aircraft equipped with the TSS-L7/L7B engines.

(c) USARV Regulation 95-27, Conspicuity Markings for Army Aircraft,was implemented. The regulation directed specific uniform paint markingson upper surfaces of Army aircraft to enhance safety of flight and facilitatethe locating of downed aircraft. All helicopters with a tw o blade mainrotor system had the top of one blade painted white, creating a strobeeffect when the aircraft is viewed from a higher altitude in flight.Helicopters with rfmain rotor systems in excess of two blades had the topsurface of each blade tip riaiked in white. The to p surface of synchronizedelevators and horizontal stabilizei s were painted with international orange.Fixed wing aircraft hd stardard white and international orange markingson the upper aurface of ving dod horiizontal stabilizer assemblies.

2.6

CONFIDENTIAL


32/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHGC - )!STS113JIEF.C Operationcil Report of Headquartera. United States Army

Vietnam for Pteriod Ending W) April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(. 1)(U)

d& A requirement was established for skid shoes on those OH-6Ahelicopters used fo r standardization and proficiency training. Severalskid shoe designs were pruduced by the I st Transportation Battalion

1F'AMF) and tested by the OH-6A Training Team at Vung Tau. Theselected design was coordinated with the 1,OH Project Manager's Office,and an authorization to produce 120 sets of stainless steel, three quarterlength skid shoes was issued to the Ist Transportation Battalion (FAMF).Estimated completion date of this project is 30 August 1969.

(31 Avionics.

(a) OV-I Evaluation and Support. An evaluation of consolidatedOV- I assets in support of US divisions in RVN was completed during thequarter. Emphasis on electronic support to th e Infra Red (IR) and SideLooking Aerial Radar (SLAR) Ground Station Terminals (GST) resultedin improved performance and utilization in GST operations. Theevaluation report is being prepared by Headquarters II FFORCEV andACTIV.

(b) Air Traffic Control Equipment. Five AN/TSQ-71 Ground ControlApproach (GCA) radar systems were received and issued to using units,bringing th e inventory of GCA systems in-country to 29 systems. Theprogrammed installation of 20 Air Traffic Control Centrals, AN/FSQ-75was completed during this quarter.

(c) Command Control Consoles. The planned total of eighty-threeAN/ASC-IS consoles were received and issued to using units. The 34thGeneral Support Group is refurbishing th e AN/ARC-1Z2 non-secureconsoles fo r issue to ARVN forces.

(d) Standard Lightweight Avionics Eeuipment (SLAE). The NewEquipment Introductory Team (NEIT) fo r SLAE conducted training atVung Tau. Deployment plans and mission support plans were completed.Estimated delivery date of SLAE equipped OH-6 aircraft has been changedto June 1969.

27

CONFIDENTIAL


33/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHGC- DS TSUBJECT, Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam fo r Period Ending 30 April 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R 1)(U)

(e) Emergency Radio Set, AN URC-68 (ENSURE 147). An urgentrequirement exists in RVN fo r an emergency radio set, USARV indicatedthe AN/URC-68 as acceptable with a limited FM homing capability. Amission support plan was forwarded to FCOM, and USARV Circular 750-4,"Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment Radio Set AN/URC-68" wasrevised. The estimated delivery schedule begins with 100 radios in May,increasing to 500 radios per month by July.

(f) OH.-6A Command Console. The 1s t Infantry Division an d 25thInfantry Division fabricated command consoles fo r the OH-6A usingAN/PRC-25 and PRC-77 FM radios. A console design was forwarded toECOM with a request fo r parts to locally fabricate forty-two consoles.

(4) Aircraft Armament .(a) Throughout the quarter, the USARV aircraft armament inventory

continued to be managed under Closed Loop Support (CLS) procedures.All armament programs m et their objectives, except retrograde of theM-3 an d M-16 systems was slightly behind the programmed schedule.The March 1969 inventory of XM-18EI gu n pods reflected sufficientdeliveries to support the required BO I of 1.55 per AH-1G. A fewdiscrepancies existed between inventories turned in by units and theinventory records maintained at USARV. These discrepancies are beingworked out with timely and accurate armament loss reports by units an dclose liaison between USARV Armament Branch and Units.

(b) The XM-8 (40rmm grenade launcher fo r the OH-6A) arrived inApril 1969 fo r a 90 da y evaluation. This evaluation will be monitored byACTIV and if th e evaluation warrants further procurement a basis ofissue will be established.

(c) The conversion of the AH-IG armament subsystem from the TAT102 to th e XM-28 was begun on 7 April. Performed by a contract teamfrom Lockheed, this conversion fo r ninety-six subsystems will requireapproximately 24 weeks to complete.

(d) The World Wide Aviation Closed Loop Support Conference inMarch 1969 disclosed the slippage of the XM-35 armament subsystem

28CONFIDENTIAL


34/47

CONFIDENTIALAVIIGC-DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report (if Headquarters , United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(RI) (U)

(20rnm, 6 barrel gun fo r the All-IG) from an in-country date of July 1969until September 1(40).

(e) The fabrication and issue of one hundred aircraft jettisonableflare racks was completed during this reporting period. The rackscarry twenty-four M-24 flares outside th e aircraft, an d ca n be easilyjettisoned in an emergency.

(5) Aviation Training.(a) The AH-IG Training Team continued operations during the

reporting period with 68 aviators completing transition training. Eighteenaviators were qualified as Standardization Instructor Pilots (SIP) andInstructor Pilots (IP) during non-school training time. The AH-IGTraining Team was relocated to Vung Tau on 5 March 1969 and the studentcapacity was increased to 24 students per clams on 30 March 1969. Thismove was required to obtain sufficient billeting, maintenance and trainingspace to support th e increased student capacity.

(b) The OH-6A Training Team transitioned 75 aviators in th e CH-6Ahelicopter during 31 January - 30 April 1969. Twenty-one StandardizationInstructor Pilots and Instructor Pilots were qualified during non-schooltraining time.

(c) The OH-58 NEIT arrived in RV N an d conducted briefings on th eOH-58 helicopter at various locations throughout USARV during 21 - 30April 1969.

1. (U ) ENGINEER.

from Phu Hicp to Dong DEuong to accomplish LO G construction in vicinityof Dalat.

(2) Construction.

29

CONFIDENTIAL


35/47

CONFIDENTIALAVHGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters , United States Army

Vietnari fo r P'eriod Finding W0 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R 1)U)

(a) During March 1969, th e Construction Division assumed theresponsibility fo r fiscal management of th e MCA program in RVN. Thisfunction ha d previously been the responsibility of th e Director ofConstruction, MACV. Assumption of this function will permit th eDivision to more effectively manage the entire MCA program.

(b) On 15 March 1969, MACV tasked the Construction Division todevelop priority lists fo r Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract construc-tion in II, III, and IV Corps by I April 1969. CG , I FFORCEV, as ZoneCoordinator, developed an d integrated th e II Corps list to include AirForce an d Navy projects as per MACV direction. The lists fo r III andIV Corps consisted of Army projects only for subsequent integration byMACV. Additionally, MACV advised that al l future lists would be tri-service integrated by Zone Coordinators . The priority list fo r I Corpswas prepared as a tri-service list by th e III Marine Amphibious Force inclose cooperation with Army, Navy and A ir Force members of the DaNang Area Base Development Board, As finally developed, th e prioritylists for III an d IV Corps consisted of seven groups. One list includedwaterfront construction fo r th e entire area. The others consisted of onelist each fo r hoiizontal an d vertical construction in the three primarycontractor mobilization locations: Saigon and vicinity; the Delta, toinclude Vung Tau; an d Long Binh, to include Bien Hoa.

(3) Mapping and Intelligence.(a) The First Order Traverse was still observed in the Delta, The

Vietnamese National Geographic Survey (NGS) has completed all observa-tions between Saigon to Can Tho following an inland route, an d is nowconducting a reconnaissance from Sa Dec to Rach Gia and Chau Duc,Results of the NGS survey are no t ye t available fo r accuracy determina-tion. The US portion of th e survey, which travels along th e easterncoast and then moves inland to Can "ho, is no w being observed. Nearlyall stations had angles measured, bu t no distance observations were madedue to microwave interference with the Tt.lurometers and the limitedrange of the Geodimeter now available. Steps are being taken to obtaina Geodimeter with extended range, and al l towers were left up for use by

30

CONFIDENTIAL


36/47

CONFIDENTIALAV 1 C - I)STSUBJFKCT' Operatijonal Reeport ot II ,a(lq1uartrs, United States Army

Vietnam fo r Period Ending W0 April 1969, RC S CSFOR-65(R I)(U)

the distance- measuring teams, It is estimated that the survey effort willmove to th e I and 11 CTZ area by the end of May to resume that portion ofth e t raverse.

(b) Aerial photography was directed toward support of the LOGprogram and practically no urban photography was flown. About two-thirds of th e LOC requests were fulfilled, although the remaining roadswill probably be th e most difficult. At present, th e only cities which willbe flown in the near future are Pleiku, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. Theaircraft will be responsive to an y tactical reque,,ts, however. Theweather pattern should allow an increasing number of flights in the I andII CTZ during May, June, an d July, while the Delta regions will not beavailable for photograph during this period due to clouds.

(c) Terrain Scale Studies (TSS) and Hamlet Studies were producedfo r th e Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, at th e rate of one TSSper month and one hamlet study per quarter.

(d) Base planning maps at a scale of 1:2400 an d 1:4800 were completedduring the reporting period for seven areas requested by th e XXIV CorpsEngineer an d provided to UJSAECAV. USAECAV requested similarcoverage of Camp Enari, an d photographs were taken for this project.

(4) Supp=_. During the reporting period, a total of 319 pieces ofcommercial construction equipment were received in RV N under M ilitaryConstruction Army - Lines of Communication (MCA-LOC) Program.This figure represents 49 percent of th e total i tems purchased. A reviewof forecasted arrivals of MCA-LOG equipment indicates that th e remainderwill arrive in RVN NLT August 1969.

m, (C) COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.(1) (C) Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM).

No additional secure voice switchboards (SECORD's) were activated duringthe quarterly period ending 30 April 1969. Installation was completedon th e three SECORD's remaining to be activated (Nha Trang, Pleiku, an d

31

CONFIDENTIAL


37/47

CONFIDENTIALAV HG(C- I)STSUBJ'FCT: Op[eraittirnal ,'j tt UIn.iterd Stated Arm

Vietnaw t,)r i',r ,, I. nriir, Atpri l 1146). R(CS CSlOR-65{R 1)(W)

Qui Nhon). All sub.k rkbetr teim winals .. ih..t three SI:CORD's wereinstalled. H")owever, they cannt,t be a(-tlvatt(d until Hutficient personnelare avaitable fo r operation and. maairmtt'iiince. As () I o April 1969, a totalof 151 wide-band and 16 narrw- band subscribt r. (of al l services) wereactivated. Of these subscriber ternminals, IJSARV has maintenance respon-sibility fo r 108 wide-band and 10 narrow-band terminals.

(2) (U) Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). Expansion of th eUSARV AUTODIN (including Army operated MACV and DCS facil 'ties)continued with the activation of eight terminnalH at six Commcenters duringth e quarter ending 30 April 1969. Included was the replacement of opera-tional transportablea by fixed facilities. The expansion dut.ing thisquarter increased the total number of terminals operated by USARV to41. These terminals-provided AUTODIN support to 3Z Commcentera/facilities. Four Commcenters included in the USARV C-E LO Number I(AUTODIN Teletype Networks RVN) dated 31 December 1968, still requirean AUTODIN capability. Replacement of many of the active terminals by24 digital subscriber terminal equipments (DSTE) is scheduled as a partof the continuing program to expand an d improve AUTODIN within thecommand.

(3) (U ) Southeast Asia Automatic Teeh hone System Status. At thebeginning of the quarterly reporting period (I February 1969) only oneTandem Switching Center (TSC) had been activated in the Southeast AsiaAutomatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS). This TSC was activated atBang Pla in Thailand in December 1968. On .,'ebruary 1969, the TSCat Can Tho was successfullv activated and provided direct distance dial(DDD) service throughout RV N an d Thailand to subscribers of Binh ThuyAB , Can Tho, Dong Tam, Soc I rang, And Vinh Long dial telephoneexchanges (DTE). On 29 March 1969. the TSC at Korat in Thailand wasactivated and provides DD D service to subscribers of five exchanges inNorthern Thailand. On 12 April 1969, th e second TS C in RVN wasactivated at Da Nang. This TSC serves subscribers of Chu Lai, DaNang AF, Da Nang East (Navy), Da Nang Red Beach, and Phu Bai DTE's.

(4) (U) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Supportof 1at Cavalry Division A'irobile). On 9 F,-ebruary 1969, elements of the

32CONFIDENTIAL


38/47

CONFIDENTIALAV IGC,- DSTSUB.JECT. Operational Report of litadquart. rs , United States Army

Vietnam fo r Period IEnding 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R1)(U1

Ist Cavalry Division (Airinobile) made a rapid move from Phuoc Vinh,The lo t Signal Brigade was ta8Ked to provide a 14 channel system tosupport the division during and after th move. The system was activatedwithin a matter of hours, and communications service was provided tomeet th e requirement.

(5) (U ) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Supportof 173d Airborne Brigade, In March 1969, a survey of circuit routingindicated that a more direct and reliable path was required to support the173d Airborn e Brigade. This need was m et by tasking the lo t SignalBrigade to install a t roposcatter radio system from Landing Zone Englishto Phu Cat. The installed system provided better service to elementssupporting th e brigade.

(6) (C) Airborne Radio Relay Operations. The five airborre radiorelay aircraft assigned to the lo t Signal Brigade were used extensively insupport of Project Delta operations in th e XXI. Corps area of operations.Relay missions were normally flown during the hours of daylight on acontinuing basis with US and ARVN personnel operating th e radio relayequipment on each flight. A total of 249 hours of airborne radio relaywere flown in support of Project Delta from Z April 1969 to 25 April 1969.

(7) (U) Installation of Corps Area Communications System in Supportof Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. In late March 1969, th e Navy requestedsupport of Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. A portion of the supportrequested included a requirement to enter the common user telephonesystem in the Saigon area, and to establish sole user circuits into theDelta area. To meet these diverse requirements, two VHF systems wereinstalled between th e Navy command post, located on a barge, and entrypoints of the Corps Area Communications System s. This action wascompleted on 30 April 1969, shortly after th e Navy barge arrived on site.

(8) (C) Allocation/Distribution of Single Sideband Radio (SSB) Equip-m ent.

(a) The SSB equipment posture within Army units in RVN was greatlyenhanced with th e distribution of additional SSB assets. On 10 April 1969,

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CONFIDENIIALAV HGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Ileadquarters, United States Army

Vietnam 'o r Period Ending i0 April 19)69, P CS CSFOR-65(R 1) (U)

th e USARV Chief ot Staff approved the allocation and distribution of 330each AN/GRC .)42 SSB Radio Teletypewriter Sets. On 28 April additionalallocations were approved for 61 each AN/(GRC-142's. This bringsUSARV units to over 90 percent of their authorized fill.

(b) On 12 April 1969, the USARX Chief of Staff approved the allocationan d distribution of 50 each AN/GRC-106 SSB Radios.

(9) (C) Tactical Secure Voice Program. As of 30 April 1969, 95percent of all authorized tactical secure voice equipment, TSEC/KY-8,TSEC/KY--8 and TSEC/KY-38, was in-country an d distributed to USARVand MACV units. Approximately 40 percent of this equipment arrivedduring the 3d Quarter FY69. The production schedule of the TSEC/HYI,-3Regenerat ive Repeater , which will provide a retransmission capabilityfo r the tactical secure voice equipment, is proceeding satisfactorily. Thefirst thirty each HYL-3's. scheduled to arrive in late May 1969, will beused for testing and evaluation purposes prior to the total quantity beingshipped from CONUS.

n. (U) MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,an d Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL. None.b. (U) OPERATIONS. None.c. (U) TRAINING. None.d. (C) INTELLIGENCE.(I) 1C) Protection of Personnel Facilities Against Sabotage.(a) OBSERVATION: Extensive security measures are normally in

effect to protect m ateriel , equipment and supplies against sabotage attempts.

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CONFIDENTIALAVHGC-DSTSUIBJECT: Operational Report of tteadquarters, United States Army

Vietnarn for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R 1)(u)

Less detailed attention is usually given to the protection of the individualsoldier while he is in an area normally considered to be secure frominfiltration by the enemy. Recurring reports indicate that the enemy hasor intends to establish sapper -nitts on base camps among indigenousemployees,

(b) EVALUATION: Troop facilities are targets :)f terrorist activities.(c) RECOMMENDATION: That stringent measures be establibhed at

the lowest echelon to assure that troop facilities are closely inspectedfor booby traps, other explosives and incendiaries.

(Z) (C) Location of Enemy Mortar and Rocket Positions.(a) OBSERVATION: Enemy mortar and rocket fire directed againstUS fixed installations is normally conducted from sites located on or in

the immediate vicinity of prominent terrain features.(b) EVALUATION: Analysis of VC/NVA indirect firing procedures

reveals that, based upon radar sightings, shell reps, and informationprovided by ralliers and PWs, over 95 percent of all mortar and rocketattacks conducted against one USARV organization were initiated fromsites located on or no more than 300 meters from roads, road junctionsand streams. The principal reasons for this are:

1 Mathematical firing data computations are more accurate whenrendered from known locations.

-2 Safety and speedy egress from the firing site.(c) RECOMMENDATION: That counterbattery programs concentrate

on these likely sites and that countermortar radars increase targetingalong these terrain features.

(3) (C ) OB Analysis at Brigade Leve>.

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CONFIDENTIALAVHGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United Staten Army

Vietnam to r Period Ending W0April 19b9, RCS CSFOR-65(R i(U)

(a) OBSERVATION: Timely 013 analysis is needed at brigade levelto facilitate immediate reaction.

(b) EVALUATION One organization within USARV assigned two OBanalysts to t'o separate brigade headquarters. The men were experiencedanalysts with a broad knowledge of OB functions and procedures, Acapability fo r immediate readout of captured documents and agent reportswas provided the brigades an d subordinate units by these analysts.Identification of enemy units in contact was expeditiously made an d infor-mation forwarded to the division OB section fo r confirmation and furtheranalysis.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this system be adopted when brigadeshave operational headquarters located away from division intelligencedetachments which contain OB sections.

e. (U) LOGISTICS.(1) (U) Item: M551 repair parts.(a) OBSERVATION: Demand data fo r M551 Sheridan repair parts,

in some cases, do not get recorded due to expedited action aimed atremoving vehicles from deadline.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the deployment of Sheridan to SEA, severalrepair parts failures have occurred which resulted in extraordinarymeasures being taken to remove vehicles from deadline. Rep air partssuch as recoil seal follower rings, track adjuster brackets, pulleys, fanbelts, air filter elements, etc., have been requested via telephone callsan d messages to the Sheridan Project Manager. Repair parts have alsobeen "pushed" to RVN by the Project Manager to resolve known repairparts shortages. These actions, while necessary to remove vehiclesfrom deadline, have circumvented th e supply system in that demand dataoften does not get recorded at unit, suppo rt ma intenance or depot level.The net effect is that needed repair parts are no t available in th e supplypipeline in sufficient quantities to support the vehicle. The ICCV is a, ,reof this problem and is taking action to insure that the demands are recorded.

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AVHGC- DSTSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R1)(U)

(c ) RECOMMENDATIONS; That Project Manager representatives,Lichnical representatives and supply pertB nnei at unit, support mainte-nance, and depot levels insure that all requirements for repair parts,however acquired, are recorded as demands on the supply system.

(Z) (U) Item: AR 700-70, Distribution of Support Items for NewEquipment.(a) OBSERVATION: Some items of new equipment are deployed to

RVN without proper logistical support.(b) EVALUATION: AR 700-70 requires that a 90 percent range andquantity of all non-TASL support items be shipped to the gaining command

prior to the deployment of the end item. In many cases, this requirementcannot be met without delaying the deployment of the end item. When thisresults, the commodity manager (NICP) requests a waiver of the pro-vision, of AR 700-70 in order to meet the deployment schedule. Thisheadquarters has been very lenient in granting waivers primarily becausefield commanders desire the equipment as rapidly as possible. Thispractice has invariably resulted in a less than satisfactory readinessposture until the necessary logistics support becomes available. Thesame commanders who request that equipment deliveries be expeditedare the first to condemn the lack of logistical support provided for theequipment. The final result of the waiver can be a lack of confidence bythe individual soldier in the reliability of his equipment.

(c ) RECOMMENDATION: In the future, this headquarters will applya more critical review of requests for waivers of the provisions of AR700-70.

(3) (U) Item: Installation of Pipelines.(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable difficulty was experienced during

the quarter with a pipeline on Red Beach at Qui Nhon.(b) EVALUATION: Heavy seas damaged the line to the extent that itbecame necessary to abandon it and construct a new welded line inlandfrom the beach.

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AVtI.I 1C)._SSUBIJC.! ': Operattonial Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnamn t or Pe-riod En;ding WOApril 1969, (C S cSFOR-65

,Idvantagea are that 1)St fac ilit ic i, equipinient, and te hnical assistancedre made available to the vehicle crew to insure that a thorough, periodicservice is perfornmt-d The Rt&R requires a 5 - 7 day standdown. Inorder toiinsure that nninimurl downtime is experienced, it ha s been foundnecessary to perform the technical inspection at least two weeks prior toR&R in order to comrpensate fo r requisitioning lead time. Alao, based onexperience, DSU stocks of fast moving repair parts (e.g. seals, gaskets,and bearings) have been increased.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To date, the entire fleet of 175trnu/8"weapons has received on R&R and a second cycle has begun. The firsttycle of 105mm/ 155mn SP Artillery is currently in process. It is feltthat the artillery R&R Program has been a major contributing factor toUSARV's favorable operationally-ready rate fo r self-propelled artil lery.Recommend that the ip'o6ram continue without change.

(6) (U) Igrated Contract Construction Priority Lists.(al OBSERVATION: Integrated contract construction priority lists

have significant meaning if developed in relation to th e locations where thecontractor is mobilized. Inter-service coordination, as effected in th eintegrat,-d priority list developed by Commanding General, I FFORCEV,is a great improvement over past procedures and holds promise forsignificant improvement in th e apportionment of construction resourcesin the III and IV Corps areas.

(b) EVALUATION: W aterfront construction effort is very limited inRVN, thus a meaningful priority listing fo r waterfront effort can only bedeveloped on a Corps-wide basis. Other priority lists are most nmean-ingfui when prepared in relation to mobilization location and type ofeffort involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That integrated contract constructionpriority lists be prepared based on contractor mobilization locationsthroughout RV N and that priorities be divided fo r vertical and horizontalconstruction effort. That th e waterfront priority list be prepared on aCorps-, ide basis. That inter-service coordination, as effected byCommanding General, I FFORCEV, be used throughout Vietnam fo r thepreparation of these lists.

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A \'IHG C - DSTSUBJECT: Operationail Report of Headquarters, United States Army

Vietnam for Period Ending W()April 1969, RPCS CSFOR -65(R 1)(U)

(7) (U) Funding.(a) OBSERVATION: Many commanders an d staff officers lack abasic understanding of Army funding procedures.(b) EVALAlATION, Many operational support and MCA construction

staff actions would be greatly facilitated if the principala had a betterunderstanding ot O&MA, MCA, and PEMA funding procedures. Thebasic problem is that there is a lack of understanding of what th e variousfunds are for, how their assets are administered, and who administersthem. Also, many officers have no idea how the funds are interrelatedto the missions of th e command.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all branch officer career courses bemodified to include an orientation on basic funding procedures, theirpurposes, and how they work. The common,-place role that funding hasin the modern Army should be taught to every officer.FOR TH E COMMANDER:

Incl GEORGE L. MABRY, JR .Distribution List Major General, US Army

Chief of Staff

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GPOP-DT (11 M ay 69) lot Ind (U)SUBJECT. Operational Report of HQ, USARV fo r Period Ending 30 April

1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 9 JUN i.96TO : Assistant Chief of Staff fo r Force Development, Department of th e

Army, Washington, D. C. 20310This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.FOR THE COMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.t1. SHORT!CPT, AGCAswt AG

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.1 REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons learned, llq, United States Army Vietnam4. OI$CRIPTIVE NOT93 (TYPO -1 r .~1I And IRGIAJIVI, oeA@S)FNxirtences of unit .eoa~ed in countetinsurgency operations, I Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.S-U f4THORI (Fiset n 7'c, 0dd.nsia r,at ncm.mJ

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t0-ISTRIOU1ION STATEMENT

It- SJUPPLEMNTARY NOTFS 12, SPONISORING MILITARV ACTIVITY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 2031013. ABSTRACT

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DD, 'Nov'.14 73 UNCLASSIFIEDS"U rity claftification

Documents

Army Headquarters Vietnam Lessons Learned 23 June 1969