Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1974

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1974

1/52


2/52

UNITED

COMMANDING GENERALU.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER

MG William J. Maddox Jr .

DEPUTY COMMANDING GINERALU.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER

BG Jam M. Leslie

5

EDITOR, U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGESTRichard K. Tiorney

ABOUT THE COVERThis issue accents the thraat to U. S.airmobile operations. On the coverthe film depicts enemy air defenseweapons and the helicopter is anArmy AH-1 HueyCobra which repre-sents airmobile tactics. The cover

was prepared by M. Dorough

44

RMY VI TION1GESSEPTEMBER 1974 VOLUME 20 NUMBThe Threat To United States Airmobile Operations, Randolph Britt DACMilitary Intelligence And Enemy Air Defense, BG Harry H. Hiestand Air Defense COL James A. KilgoreWhen Helicopters Are Airborne,

Lieutenant General of Artillery V. GatsolayevPipelineArmy Aviation Hall Of Fame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Major Reorganization Implemented At Fort Rucker . Aeromaintenance-Who Shot The Troubleshooter?, CW4 Frank W. KerviViews From Readers . Instrument Corner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .For Fools And Second lieutenants, COL F. Max McCullar . . . . . . . . . .All About FOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tips For Aviation Safety Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Part Time Or Full Time? MAJ William G. Daly Jr. . . . Safe And Orderly Flight, CW4 Richard D. HavenstritePearl s . . Write To Right . . USAASO Sez

The .1 on of tho U S. ARMY AVIATION DIGBT I. to provide InforMation of on opetlon.1 or fundlon.1 n. tur . concerning o y .nd . ircr. ft .celd.nt ,rev.ntlon, tr .lnl nten.nce, op.r. t lon. , re.o.rch . nd develop.ent, .vl . t lon lelne . nd other I.tod d . t The DIGEST I ofReI.1 Depart .ent of the Ar .y perlodlc.1 publl.hed .onthly unthe .upervl.lon of the Co ndlng G.neral, U S Ar .y Avl.tlon C.nter. View. expre herein are not nece lly tho.e of the Dep.r t .en t of the Ar .y or the U.S. ArAviation Center. Photo. are U S. Ar .y unle.. otherwl.e .peclfled. M.terl.1 reprinted provided credit I. given to the DIGEST and to the .uthor, unle otherwindicated .Article., photo., . nd I te .s of Inter on Ar .y avl.tlon . r e Invited. Dlred com.unltlon I. authorized to: Idltor, U S Ar .y Aviation Dlg.st, Fort Rucker, AL 36360.U.e of fund. for printing of thl. publlc.tlon h be.n approved by The Adjutant Geral, H.adqu.r ters Depart .ent of the Ar.y , 8 April 1974, In .ccord.nce with AR 310Active Army units r .celve distribution und.r the pinpoint dl.trlbutlon sy.tem a . oIIn.d In AR 310-1. Compl.te DA For . 12.5 .nd nd dlr .dly to CO AG Publication. Ct . r 2800 I ern Boul.v.rd, 8altlmor., MD 21220. For any chang. In distribution req ulm.nts, Initiate revised DA FOrM 12-5.N.tlonal Guard and Army Reserv. units under pinpoint distribution .1.0 should .ubDA Form 125. Other National Gu.rd unit. should submit request. through their . tadiutant general.Those not eligible for ofReI.1 dl.trlbutlon or who desire per.onal copies of the DIGEcan order the m.g.zlne f ro . the Superintendent of Docu.ent. , U.S. Govern.ent PrintOIIce, W hlngton, D C 20402. Annu.lsub.crlptlon r . t e 13.40 dome.tlc and 16ov . . . . . . . Single copl e 1.20.


3/52


4/52

/If 1iftll] llfelhellteliNEnem y II; efellle

Brigadier General Harry H HiestandCommander U S Army Intelligence Center and School

Fort Huachuca AZ

. . . We can get the intelligence information theproblem is dissemination in time for missionplann ing to counter enemy air defense sys -tems he author discusses the new tacticalimagery interpretation facilities and processing

laboratories as important solution steps

T o ENSURE THAT a viableprogram is adopted to counterenemy air defense systems, the coordinated efforts of the U. S ArmyTraining and Doctrine CommandTRADOC) schools, the U. SArmy Aviation Systems CommandAVSCOM) and the U. S AirForce USAF) are required. Theintelligence community has a number of on-going programs whichemphasize the importance of collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence information in aprompt manner. Additional training on this overall subject may berequired both at the Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL, and at theIntelligence School at Ft. Hu-achuca, AZ.For the past 3 years training onthe enemy air defense threat hasbeen conducted for personnel attending the Aviation Combat Surveillance Qualification Course atthe U S Army Intelligence Center

and School. These personnel, as2

well as the airborne sensor specialists, also receive training on theradar homing and warning receivers. Subject matter is constantlybeing updated as information becomes available Of new equipmenti introduced.The massive introduction of thehelicopter added a new dimensionto the battlefield by giving theground force commander an organic capability for vertical envelopment of enemy forces. This

was demonstrated successfully in

the Republic of Vietnam, thoughour earlier modes of air operationsproved inadequate when moresophisticated antiaircraft weaponswere introduced by the communisforces. Changes from heretoforesuccessful tactics were again required when the unprecedented airdefense array supplied by theSoviet Union to the Arab forcesconfronted the previously unchallenged Israeli Air Force with extremely serious problems. In apossible future conflict, we canexpect to encounter more advancedantiaircraft systems in large numbers, our potential enemies havingrecognized our capabilities and developed a formidable array of airdefense weapons as countermeasures [see When Helicopters AreAirborne, page 8].My approach to the problem ofproviding Army aviation with in-telligence required to counter enemy air defense systems is to determine what information is needed

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


5/52

how to acquire it and how to disseminate it. Probably the most important element of informationneeded is the precise location,quantity and details of enemy airdefense weapons systems. To acquire such information the Armyhas several general categories ofinformation collectors; these areround and aerial visual observation, surveillance ystems, radiationemitter location systems, prisonersof war and to, perhaps a lesserdegree, intelligence agents.Technical intelligence sourcesprovide the answers to essentialof information concerningenemy s surface-to-air weapons.However, despite our capability toan enemy has andhere he has it, the informationis adequatelycorrelated and dissem

In short, information colis of little value unless ais provided to make thatavailable on an imthose who need it.

The Army aviator and the aviaion operations officer need thisthey try to deermine how best to reach a targetin enemy airspace . Where doHowthe aviation people use thisnformation in their planning? Do

eded? Detailed mission planningoes not take place where the inand there does notan adequate means to

viation mission planning. Perhapssystem will solveearly disseminationinformation.

The major problem, as I see it, isabundance of in-and then to

1974

disseminate this information to theusing aviation elements in a timelyand efficient manner. The problemof coordinating the collected information with penetration aidsand suppression systems is no smalltask and must be a joint effortamong ground forces, Army aviation elements, USAF and all intelligence agencies. Both intelligence and aviation units must beforced to habitually transmit thisinformation to higher, lower andadjacent units by the fastest meansavailable.Currently, we do not have ameans to process air defense dataother than the normal intelligencecycle and collection plan. Our interface with the Air Force has beenoriented primarily toward obtainingair combat power on an enemytarget or pecific information onenemy activitie well forward ofthe forward edge of the battle areaFEBA) . Because until recentlywe have not had need for AirForce intelligence concerning enemy antiaircraft distributions, enemy early warning radars andground control interception andtarget acquisition radars, we havenot established a mechanism orchannel for obtaining this information.Flight crews on aerial reconnaissance/ surveillance or logisticalsupport missions are an excellentsource of information concerningenemy air defense when they aremotivated to report all that theysee. Aids available to them includehigh-power radar jammer , decoyaircraft or remotely piloted vehicles , chaff dispensers, fuze jammers, radar homing and warningreceivers, and infrared IR) suppressor kit and/ or detection systems.

The OV 1 D Mohawk surveil-

*lance system is currently theprincipal Army airborne collectionasset. This aircraft with the improved side-looking airborne radarSLAR), IR and photographicsystems has the capability to detect,locate and to some degree identifyenemy activity or equipment. Whilethe SLAR system can be effectivelyemployed in a standoff mode, outof reach of the enemy airdefen e threat, effective employ

ment of IR and photographic systems requires penetration of enemyairspace. The Mohawk s ability topenetrate and survive is subject tothe same considerations and limitations of other aircraft-the location, makeup and density of theenemy air defense systems, coupledwith our ability to neutralize ordestroy them.A further limitation of the Mohawk surveillance system, timeliness of information, is being overcome by development of two datatransmission systems: the Army InFlight Data Transmission SystemAIDATS) and the Interim DataTransmi sion System for Europe.

The AIDATS will provide nearrealtime transmission for SLARand IR imagery, through an airborne relay if required, to a surfacerecording terminal at the user locations. The data transmissionsystem for Europe recently proposed by the Army IntelligenceCenter and School is a modificationand improvement of the now outdated SLAR data transmissionsystem. The data transmission system for Europe will provide aninterim capability for transmissionof SLAR imagery pending full development of the AIDATS.While correlating the mass ofinformation acquired, consideration must be given to terrain in

Continued on page 6


6/52


7/52

The author tells of Air Defense equipment, such as NikeHercules at left capabilities and rules of engagement forthe benefit of flight crewmen. Aviation personnel may gaininsight into tactical airspace utilization, restrictions andcontrol c ircumstances and there are thoughts to consider

HE AIRSPACE ABOVE thecombat zone is used by allby all combat branchesIt often appearseach feels it ha exclusivethe use of the air in theits mission. It

be difficult to refute that, at a given time, must havea portion of the airspace andproblem is encountered anytime

or more try to use the samethe same time.Airspace became a problem durWorld War I when the U. S.air supfor U. S. forces in the Meuse

and II new concepts forof air into the landscheme were developed.II there was aawareness of a need fore control of aviation. Initially,support was dedicated to infor direct support;, this system proved unduring the battle of

arrangements necessaryair assets recounter major concenenemy threats. But a quickradically changed our controlandbrought immediate and

superiority wasthe enemy permitting

ied bombers some degree ofand our fighter sweeps

mount up to 2,000 sorties a day.Our forces have always sought

managed to obtain air supeand it has been more than

1974

during nap-of-the-earth NOE) operations

has been faced with a sophisticatedair attack.N ow, the Army aviator readingthis article may start to wonder,Then what's the point? Whyshould I need to know about airdefense? He may remember thehelicopter in Korea and most assuredly remembers the Army avi

ator's contributions in the Republicof Vietnam. It's well known thatthe helicopter performed yeomanservice in Vietnam. The Armyaviator proved his courage andflying skill many times over. Thehelicopter pilot established himselfas an indispensable member of acombined arms team which rangedfrom the foot soldier on the groundto the men in blue.But the skies over South Vietnam were friendly skies. In thatwar we again enjoyed the luxuryof complete air superiority. It maywell have been the last such war.A comparison of U. S. Air Forceassets against those of other countries with which we might engagein future conflict portends thattotal U. S. air superiority is probably a thing of the past.So let's turn the Vietnam experience around to conform to what wemight logically expect in somefuture war. Those jets over ourarea of operation may bear othermarkings. Instead of the friendlyF-4 we could see the not-so-friendlyMIG . It's there in numbers and it'sflown by a fellow who harbors anintense hate for helicopters, especially those with U. S. markings.A natural bully, he attacks ourformations with abandon. Our derring-do notwithstanding, we're notup to a dogfight with him. Do wehave a problem? Indeed we do

Enter the .air defense artilleryman. You might remember, he wasthe guy you saw in Vietnam whowore the crossed cannons with themissile in the middle, who performed a variety of tasks-advisedthe ARVN (Army, Republic ofVietnam) soldier on infantry tactic , flew airplanes and helicopters,furnished convoy protection andperimeter defense with his Duster-almost everything but the onething he's primarily trained to do:shoot down enemy aircraft. Yes,the air defense artilleryman soldiered well in Vietnam. He gainedcombat experience and he did a lotto promote short tour equity amongthe branches; but his primary skillwas not needed-all the aircraftoverhead were ours.

Well, what can the Air DefenseArtillery (ADA) guy do in thisnew environment where the jetsoverhead present more than justa backwash problem to the Armyaviator? First, he has some potentweapon which tend to even theodds a bit, particularly when ourAir Force jets are in short supply.The Nike Hercules is a longrange missile system that can engage high speed aircraft with eithera conventional or nuclear warheadout to about 140 kilometers inrange and up to about 100,000 feetin altitude. t achieves its greatestlethality at the higher altitudes andis most often employed far abovethe normal operating level of Armyaircraft. Nike Hercules units usually are assigned to theater air defense organizations and positionedin the rear area.The cornerstone of air defensein support of the Army in the field

is the Hawk missile system. Its


8/52

combat proven effectiveness againstthe high speed, low altitude threat,along with its capability to rapidlydisplace by echelon while providingcontinuous protection for theground forces, makes it well suitedfor employment within the corpsand division areas. Current air defense doctrine places a Hawk battalion with each committed division.Highly mobile Chaparral missileand Vulcan gun systems provideshort range or close-in defense ofthe corps and division commanders'priority assets against low altitudeair attack. These systems furnishbackup protection for units andinstallations against enemy aircraftwhich may get through the longerrange defense provided by the radar directed Hercules and Hawksystems.Redeye teams assigned to maneuver and cannon artillery unitsprovide an additional means offorward area air defense againstaircraft attacking at low altitudes.Redeye gives battalion and company sized units their own dedicated air defense weapon.In employing these weaponssystems the air defense artillerymanadheres to the basic principles ofmass, mix, mobility and integration.In short, this means that he uses avariety of weapons in sufficientnumbers to protect priority assetswell; he ties them together in acoordinated defense; and he movesthese weapons as necessary to support the maneuver plan and to

The Vulcan guns furnish backup for ground units against aircraft that may get by the

Hercules and Hawk

We could see the not toofriendly Mig 2 above orthe SU-7 right. Both are verycapable in ground attack

missionscounter attempts at air defense suppression.So the ADA has some potentweapons and knows how to usethem. But how does this help theArmy aviator do his job? One ofthe more important lessons learnedfrom the most recent Mid-East wars that ground based air defensesystems, when employed in accordance with sound doctrine, can- by themselves-achieve dominance over local airspace, even inthe face of a superior enemy airforce. Army air defense chargesthe air attacker a high price ofadmission a price he may not bewilling to pay) but its value cannotbe measured in terms of enemyaircraft kills alone. Its mere pres-

ence often will force an aircrafto resort to ineffective attack techniques or to completely abort itmission. Low altitude air defenssystems tend to force the attacketo higher altitudes, leaving y the Army aviator-the airspacyou need to do your job.Given the fact that Army aviation will find it extremely difficuto work wit out air defense artilery when confronted with a superior enemy air force, it followthat the aviator must know how twork wit the air defense artilleryman to accomplish his mission witminimum risk from ADA fires. Oncannot just turn ADA off anaviation on at will; they musfunction together in the sam

volume of airspace. Unfortunatelythose ADA systems mentioneearlier can shoot down ours as weas theirs if proper coordination i


9/52

not effected. The key to success isa common understanding of bothaVlatlOn and ADA operationsamong all those involved.For ADA the primary problemis, of course, aircraft identification.

A policy of shoot 'em down andsort 'em out on the ground isobviously not acceptable. Air defense rules and procedures areestablished to permit rapid andaccurate identification of friendlyand enemy aircraft; but, if they areto be effective and accidents are tobe avoided, the cooperation of theArmy aviator is required.t may seem to you that this airdefense fella speaks in a strange

tongue when talking weapons control and coordination; he may babble such phrases as weapons freeweapons tight and weapons hold(see box). Actually, it's not all thatcomplicated. Let's take a quicklook at some of the control measures used for the various ADAweapons systems.We'll bypass Nike Herculessince, as mentioned earlier, it isusually deployed in rear areas andnormally engages aircraft abovethe operating level of Army aviation. With Hawk, it's a differentstory. Since it is deployed in theforward area and can engage aircraft from treetop level up to about45,000 feet, the Homing All theWay Killer is in our ballpark.

The ADA lieutenant who is controlling the fires of the Hawk battery or platoon seldom sees theaircraft he is engaging. He makeshis identification based on what hesees on a radar scope. More oftenthan not during combat he will beoperating under decentralized control, which means that he canengage aircraft meeting hostilecriteria established by higher airdefense authority (the theater AirForce commander in most cases).

Hawk missile - cornerstoneof a ir defense for the soldiersin the f ield against the high

speed, low altitude threat

SEPTEMBER 1974

1111 111111111 11111111

Weapons Control StatusWeapons free: Fire at any aircraft not identified as friendly. Aircraft ofunknown or doubtful identification may be engaged.Weapons tight: Fire only at aircraft positively identified as hostile inaccordance with hostile criteria. Criteria is normally visual identification as enemy by configuration or markings or any aircraft attacking friendly elements .)Weapons hold: Do not fire the right of self-defense is never denied).This status is normally time, area or unit limited and may be furtherlimited as to class of aircraft protected e.g., Redeye Weapons Hold,1600-1630, Area PB, Helicopters).

He will normally be given a combination of factors to be consideredbefore declaring an aircraft hostile.Such items as speed, heading, location, alti tude and IFF (identification, friend or foe) may be used.The latter almost always will beincluded, therefore, it is very important for his own safety that theArmy aviator know IFF proceduresand abide by them.The Hawk system is used primarily to engage high speed, fixedwing aircraft-not helicopters.Army aircraft and Hawk can workwell together as long as the pilotknows the rules under which Hawkis operating, avoids its hostile criteria and religiously adhere toprescribed IFF modes and codes.With short range weapons(Chaparral, Vulcan and Redeye)identification procedures are simpler in theory, yet more difficult inpractice. Here the ultimate decisionof whether to engage an aircraftnormally rests with the enlistedman in charge of the individualweapon and he relies primarily onvisual identification. He may beprovided early warning and tenta-

tive identification from outsidesources, such as the Hawk radarsand the forward area alertingradars of the Chaparral/Vulcanbattalion, but his end game identification is by eyeball.As with Hawk, rules and procedures for engagement of aircraftwill be established by higher airdefense authority. The weaponscontrol status indicates the degreeof fire control imposed on the airdefense weapon.Aha, you say, keep 'em all onweapons hold or weapons tight;that's safest for me. Not necessarily, my friend. Remember, theenemy has air superiority. ThoseMIGs are seeking you out on theground and in the air. Also, remember the enemy has a few helicopters of his own which may bebringing in troops to do a job on

your helipad. And remember yourold ADA partner. Weapons free ishighly favorable for air defenseeffectiveness. The Chaparral, Vulcan or Redeye gunner has just afew seconds from the time he first

Continued on page


10/52

8

WhenHelicoptersAre Airborne

This is a reprinted translation of anarticle that appeared in the Russianperiodical MILITARY HERALD. It reflectsa Russian general officers evaluation ofthe U. S. Army s NOE helicopter airmo-bile threat. It also covers thoughts con-cerning air defense tactics to offset

this threatReprinted from MILITARY HERALD, No . 11 , 1973

V GatsolayevLieutenant General of rtillery

UNTIL RECENTLY helicopters played a secondary roleon the battlefield. They were employed for providing various typesof support for the Ground Forces.However the situation at the present time, as borne out by the foreign press, is quite different. Theneed for effective air operations indestroying mobile and small target ,particularly tanks, has revived interest in helicopters. t turns outthat they possess a number of important advantages over aircraft,since they do not require costly

airfields and they are able to changetheir flight altitude and speed veryquickly and extensively. Moreovertheir high cargo carrying capabilityenables them to transport varioustypes of guns , instruments and firecontrol equpiment.These and other factors serve todefine the future for helicopters,which at the present time are serving as a powerful means for destroying various ground targets.

Helicopters at the present timeconstitute an absolute majority ofall of the piloted aviation vehiclesbeing employed for military purposes. Using data obtained fromthe foreign press, let us examineorne of their tactical-technicalcharacteristics.

The flight range for helicoptersis 500-1,500 kilometers. In addition to maneuvering successfullyabove a battlefield and furnishingfire support for ground subunits,they can also conduct reconnaissance of an enemy s forces andcommunications, ferry in airborne

U. S ARMY AVIATION D I G E ~ J .


11/52

troops and diversionary-reconnaissance groups and carry out strikesagainst various targets in the immediate rear and [also those] located at a great depth from thefront line. In particular they areable to attack tactical airfieldscommand posts troops on themarch crossings bases and warehouses.

The flight speed of helicoptersmay change drastically from zeroto 300 kilometers per hour andmore. f in this sense we view ahelicopter as a target for antiaircraft gunners then its low speedcompared to that of an aircraft isconsidered to be a shortcomingsince it will remain longer in thezone of fire of air defense weaponsthan for example a fighterbomber. In addition the accuracyof the antiaircraft gunners will increase under such conditions. Withregard to the effective carrying outof combat and particularly gunnerytasks these vehicles also possesscertain positive qualities: comparatively low speeds the abilityto hover while aiming and firing atsmall mobile targets etc.An important combat characteristic of helicopters is their rate ofclimb 8 18 meters per second.This means that within a matterof just several seconds a helicoptercan surprise an enemy by suddenlytaking off from a shelter and risingto an altitude that will enable it toobserve the battlefield select atarget destroy it and thereafter depart the area of shelling.

The practical ceiling of helicopters is 3 000-5 000 meters. Buttheir miIximum altitudes as borneout by the foreign press are rarelyused since their flight safety isrelated more to low altitudes wherethey are more difficult to detectby means of radar. Helicopters areable to approach the line at whichthey are to carry out a gunnerytask in a secretive manner takingadvantage of the folds in the terrain.SEPTEMBER 1974

Various types of armament areinstalled aboard a helicopter. Forexample gunnery support helicopters may carry cannons and machineguns antitank guided and freeflight missiles grenade throwersand also means for guiding theirweapons. In this sense helicoptersdiffer very little from modern tactical fighter aircraft and similar tothe latter they have at their disposal modern navigational equipment and instruments which ensureautomatic piloting at low altitudesand also communication and reconnaissance equipment. On sometypes of helicopters the cabins forthe pilots are protected by armor.

At the present time there is stillinsufficient experience available onthe combat employment of helicopters. Thus the foreign authorsmaintain that it is difficult to reliably predict the various types ofoperations that they will carry outin battle. But nevertheless the foreign press is devoting a great dealof attention to questions concernedwith the use of helicopters particularly for fire support purposes.

In examining the tactics of helicopter subunits the foreign militarypress emphasizes that on each occasion they will perform on thebasis of their onboard equipmentthat is taking into account theirrange of effective fire and the nature of the assigned task. In thisregard two methods are availablefor carrying out strikes againstground targets. The first methodinvolves having the helicoptersconduct their firing while locatedabove the territory occupied bytheir own forces that is while behind their own leading edge. Inthe case of the second method theywill advance past the front lineand operate over the territory oc-

9


12/52

uringone attack small groupof helicopters can knock out

tank element

cupied by the enemy battle formations.The latter method involves considerably more danger for the helicopters, since they must overcomethe zone of fire of air defenseweapons. Thus, when planning anoperation in which helicopters arerequired to penetrate a territory occupied by the enemy for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance,ferrying in airborne forces or diversionary-reconnaissance groupsor carrying out strikes against targets in the enemy s rear, full consideration must be given to thenature of the PVO [air defense]forces and the opportunities available for neutralizing them. Certainly, the foreign authors maintainthat when deciding upon the flightsectors for helicopter subunits apreference should be shown forthose sectors in which the PVOforces are weak and where conditions favor concealed flight operations at a low altitude.

What actions will be carried outby helicopters located above the1

territory occupied by their ownforces? The foreign military specialists -believe that under suchconditions the firing will be conducted against various targets andparticularly against the enemy tanksattacking along the leading edgeof defense. Towards this end thehelicopters will approach the lineof contact between their own forcesand the enemy and remained concealed behind natural or speciallyinstalled screens. t the moment ofthe attack, the crews, acting upona signal issued by the combinedarms commander, will go aloft intheir helicopters, approach theplanned firing lines at a low altitude, occupy an advantageous position for firing and carry out theirstrike. t is obvious that the line forthe timely landing of the helicopters

(starting line) will be located at adistance from the leading edgesuch that losses caused by the artillery fire of the attacking enemy willbe minimal and the firing line willbe located where there are fewerantiaircraft weapons and where,prior to ascending for the purposeof firing, the helicopters will beable to conceal themselves behindlocal objects and conduct observation of the enemy actions.

Certainly, the foreign press hasstated that the tactics of suchmobile subunits as helicopter elements must be distinguished byspecial flexibility. For example, inorder to force an enemy into dispersing the fire from his antiaircraft weapons, the helicopters mayappear on a mass basis from variousdirections and carry out strikesboth along the front and on theflanks. Nor can one exclude thepossibility of a large number ofhelicopters being employed in theform of small groups.

In examining the possible actionsthat can be carried out by helicopters, the authors of the articleswhich appeared in the foreign military journals devoted a greatamount of attention to their use incombating leading detachments andenemy advance guards. They maintain that fire support helicoptersubunits can prevent the latter fromcarrying out their assigned tasksand in this manner they can sharplyreduce the tempo of the offensive.This is particularly important during those instances when it is impossible to delay the advance of astrong enemy forward detachmentthrough maneuvers being carriedout by ground subunits.

Naturally, the point is emphasized in the articles that fire supporthelicopters must carry out a strikeagainst a forward detachment priorto the latter being able to carry outits assigned task. In order to accomplish this, the direction of[helicopter] movement should bereconnoitered in advance After

U. S RMY VI TION DIGEST


13/52

having selected an area in whichmaneuvering will be very difficultand also the organization of aneffective air defense and deployment of tanks and other vehicles,a surprise strike should be carriedout against the forward detachment.

t is by no means easy to repelsuch an airborne attack since helicopters can operate, as mentionedabove, at low altitudes down to10 meters) and they are located inthe zone of fire of antiaircraft gunners for 25-35 seconds in all, thatis for as long as is necessary toguide an antitank guided missile toits target. During this period of timethe air defense subunit must detectthe helicopter, turn its gun launcher) in the direction of the target,lock onto it and remain preparedto fire as many projectiles as possible. Hence, every attempt mustbe made to reduce the amount oftime required to detect the targetand to make the required preparations for firing. In order to accomplish this, improvements mustbe realized in the system employedby platoons and batteries for re-SEPTEMBER 1974

connoitering an airborne enemy. Inaddition to a reconnaissance scoutat a battery or platoon commandpost, all personnel must concernthemselves with visually searchingfor the helicopters. Upon occupyinga gun launch) position, each guncrew must determine the sectorsof observation, particularly in thedirection of the front and flanks,where for the launch range ofantitank guided missiles there arenatural screens of the type usuallyemployed by helicopters for concealment purposes.

The operators of radar sets, uponproceeding to reconnoiter the airborne targets, must first of all studywell the locations and the natureof the signals being received fromlocal objects, such that at anymoment they will be able to distinguish their blips from those representing the airborne target flyingat a low altitude. Naturally theofficers, sergeants and soldiers mustknow the silhouettes of the firesupport helicopters and possess theskill required to identify them in arapid manner. Thus during specialized training exercises and drills

unners must master the artof destroying targets just

meters above the ground

the soldiers must be taught the rulesfor visual observation and theymust be trained to detect and identify airborne targets.The air defense methods to beemployed against helicopters willdepend upon the nature 1>f theactions carried out by the latter,the number of antiaircraft subunits

and also upon their fire potential.In view of the fact that thehelicopters will rarely be used atmiddle altitudes, the antiaircraftgunners must master the art ofdestroying targets flying at altitudesof just several meters above theground. Here a considerableamount of importance is attachedto anticipating the course to befollowed by the helicopters andthe targets of their strikes. f it isdetermined that the deployment ofthe antiaircraft subunits is not inkeeping with the interests of airdefense, then the deploymentshould be changed to ensure thatthe helicopters will appear within .the range of effective fire of thePYO weapons.Here a very important role willbe played by antiaircraft ambushes,wherein a portion of the guns andlaunchers will be carefully concealed in the immediate vicinity ofthe anticipated helicopter course.Naturally one acquires the abilityto predict the development ofevents only by persistently studyingthe tactics of helicopter subunits.A very complicated task is thatof combating helicopters which arefiring antitank guided missiles whilelocated above their own territory.In order to reduce to the maximcnpossible degree the time whichelapses between detecting an airborne target and opening fire

11


14/52

against it, it is recommended that,once a position has been occupied,each gun or launcher be assigneda principal axis for firing in a manner such that it will divide theobservation sector into two equalparts and pass through the pointof probable appearance of the helicopter. After receiving his task thegun commander must determine theazimuth, the angle of sight of thispoint and the corresponding settingsfor the sight. In such a case thenatural screens that could be usedby the helicopters for concealmentpurposes, will be kept under constant observation.

During an attack against anenemy's leading edge of defense theconstant support antiaircraft subunits must follow directly after thebattle line of tanks and remainready to immediately open fireagainst the helicopters and their

commanders must be familiar withthe direction of constant observation, that is, that local object wherethe airborne enemy may possiblyappear.When planning a change of position for antiaircraft subunits whichusually fire from stationary positions, one should bear in mind thatthey should be brought up in amanner such that, during the periodof artillery preparation, theychange their positions and remainas close as possible to the linefrom which the helicopters aremost apt to open fire with antitankguided missiles. Certainly, the

routes for such movements and thegun positions must be locatedbeyond the zone of fire of theenemy's direct firing weapons. Inorder to ensure that the degree ofreadiness of the antiaircraft subunits is not lowered too drastically,the movement to the new positionsshould in some cases be carried outon a gun-to-gun basis.When organizing an air defensesystem for motorized rifle, tank andartillery subunits, it should beborne in mind that a small groupof helicopters is capable, duringjust one attack, of knocking a tankelement out of action and even aforward detachment. Thus, in theinterest of protecting the latter,one should assign highly mobileantiaircraft subunits that are capable of firing at airborne targetswhile moving or during very briefhalts. In the process the antiaircraft units should ideally be distributed in a manner such that aportion of them are located at thehead and the remaining portion inthe middle of the column.The distances between the antiaircraft units and other vehiclesmust not be less than 50 meters.This ensures freedom of action forthe antiaircraft personnel when

ire support helicopters cansharply reduce the tempo ofenemy advance detachments

firing at low-flying targets. Theright to open fire against the helicopters belongs to the commanderof a unit. Thus he is responsible forthe timely detection and identification of the airborne enemy. In thisregard he must assign the marchtask in an efficient manner and indicate the sector for observationand firing relative to the column'smovement (to the right, to the left,forward, backwards). In this manner he will be able to organizecorrectly a search for the targetsand display initiative during a complicated situation.

When protected forces are required to transit narrow areasalong a route (bridges, defiles,crossings, etc. , all units must re-main in readiness to immediatelyopen fire in their sectors and theircommanders must maintain constant observation of the airspace.

If airborne targets are detected(helicopters), the antiaircraft gunners will fire at their maximum possible tempo. Interludes in the firingwill be tolerated only in those instances where the gunners have losttheir targets and such interludeswill then be used for introducingfiring corrections.The same holds true for themissile personnel. During the period that a helicopter is searchingfor its target on a battlefield andaiming its antitank guided missiles,the missile personnel will be ableto launch from one to severalmissiles. When the probability ofdestruction of a helicopter with just

one missile is low, the subunits,depending upon the situation, maysimultaneously launch several missiles without waiting upon the results of the first launches. This isparticularly important in those instances where the airborne targetsare operating at low altitudes anda complicated radio jamming situation has developed. Where favorable firing conditions are availableand also in those instances where aneed exists for simultaneously shell-


15/52

ing several helicopters, each targetshould be destroyed using one missile.t should be borne in mind that

helicopters can operate simultaneously with tactical aviation andcarry out strikes on the slyagainst troops and antiaircraft subunits, immobilized by firing at aircraft. Thus during all battlesagainst tactical aviation, one mustalways anticipate the possibility ofhaving to transfer the fire of aportion of the units (guns) againsthelicopters. This task should beassigned to the best trained crews.A brief signal ( above the firsthelicopter ) should be establishedfor shifting fire. In response to thissignal the designated units (guns)will commence independently tocarry out the combat task. Theshifting of fire from aircraft to helicopters up until the end of thefiring (with the exception of casesinvolving self-defense) is hardly advisable.Tank antiaircraft machinegunsand also rifle wea pons can be employed effectively against helicopters. Certainly, it will be difficultfor the crews of tanks that are constantly engaged in battle againstground forces to detect a helicopterin a timely manner and yet theyare obligated to maintain aerialobservation.The waging of battle against anairborne enemy requires that theantiaircraft gunners display a highdegree of combat expertise and the

ability to employ their weaponsSEPTEMBER 1974

with the maximum degree of effectiveness. The knowledge and skillsrequired for combating helicoptersare usually acquired during thecourse of exercises, drills and firingpractice. Thus conditions must becreated during these exercises anddrills that will enable the personnelto master the means and methodsto be employed when firing againstsuch targets. Firing against helicopters must occupy an importantplace among the combat and training gunnery tasks usually carriedout by antiaircraft gunners, tankpersonnel and motorized riflemen.

The personnel must be taught tofire against such targets both whilestationary and while moving andthey must devote particular attention to questions concerned withtarget detection and identification,target acquisition, rotating a gun(unit) 90 and 360 degrees, loading, locking-on the target and commencement, conduct and termination of firing. Particular importanceis attached to evaluating the speedand accuracy with which these operations are carried out and ensuring that a reduction occurs in theamount of time required to do so.The effectiveness of firing shouldbe evaluated not on the basis ofgrouping the traces to the target,but rather according to the numberof direct hits, that is, a positivegrade is assigned only i bulletholes are observed.Naturally, in order to work outquestions concerned with firing athelicopters and carrying out field

firing against them, an appropriatetraining equipment base must becreated. The units have accumulated a considerable amount ofexperience in this regard. At someantiaircraft polygons, in the regionsof moving target gunnery rangesfor ground targets, some rathersimple devices have been preparedfor raising targets which, in termsof their configurations and dimensions, correspond with the silhouettes of helicopters. The firing atsuch targets is not as simple as itmight seem at first glance. Theprincipal difficulty is that very littletime is available for carrying outthe gunnery task-only as muchas would be available in actualbattle. Only well trained subunitscan successfully overcome this difficulty. Obviously, firing againsthelicopters will in the future become a component part of a multitheme gunnery task. Hence, inorder to achieve success during suchfiring, the personnel of antiaircraftsubunits must master all firingmethods, to include those usedagainst both aircraft and helicopters. In order to accomplish this,the exercises and drills should involve the participation not only ofenemy fighter-bombers but alsohelicopters.

The problem of combating helicopters has many facets and problems that are still awaiting solutions. It is to be hoped that thediscussion raised on these pageswill be continued in subsequentissues of the journal.

13


16/52


17/52

he did not like nap-of-the-earth stories.Almost 400 readers wrote in the comments columnthat they like the DIGEST just as it is (sweet music toour ears) while six said they did not. Some describedthe DIGEST'S coverage as being too broad, but otherendorsed its variety. Some want the magazine tobe less technical while an equal number want it moretechnical. A similar 50-50 type breakout has occurredin all of our past surveys. Even though we can'tplease all of the people all of the time, we can try.The mission of the DIGEST is to provide informationon safety, training, maintenance, operations, researchand development, aviation medicine and related subjects to ALL personnel associated with Army aviation. This spectrum includes for instance: Infantry;the Transportation Corps; Army Reserve units-inshort, anyone who is interested in us we have aninterest in them.By the comments it's obvious that many readerswant more DIGEST. Some suggest that articles belonger and others want the magazine to increase itsnumber of pages. One reader wants us to increasethe number of issues we print each year (we nowprint one issue each month). The biggest gripe isthat not enough copies can be obtained. We haveeven received complaints that the magazine is alwayslate. (The magazine is on pinpoint distribution. Theinside front cover of the DIGEST each month tells youhow to obtain the magazine.)So many readers suggested possible articles thatwe can't list or even summarize them all. But, thelist includes suggestions such as articles on theNational Guard and Reserves, aviators, emergencyprocedures, aviation in the nuclear environment,visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules(IFR), fuel conservation, an article directed towardenlisted men and how they can get into the flyingwarrant officer program, civilian aircraft, articles ofinterest to the U. S. Marines, congressional legislation,and aircraft capabilities and limitations.Some wanted to recall Charlie and Danny andto put Frozzleforth back on active duty. Otherswant more flying experience articles such as theDIGEST'S new instigated Flying hru The OnlyWay To Grow feature.One reader thinks we run too many Fort Ruckerarticles and another doesn't like survival stories.Pearl got a lot of mail, some good and some bad.The survey proves that the DIGEST now is playinga new and important role in this period of restrictedflying. Many aviators are assigned to nonflying

duties; to the National Guard and Reserves.These form a large contingent who depend on theDIGEST to help keep abreast of the latest in aviation.Also, reaffirmed is the fact that the magazine is readextensively by nonrated ground forces personnel tolearn what aviation can do for them.A survey does not provide all of the answersconcerning our readers' wants and needs. The onlyway we can really know what you want is when youtell us. Our survey is not over, however. Our maindata input is still to come-the letters you sendwhich give specific explanations of how you feel areour most valuable guides. f you have any constructive suggestion please write: Editor, u. S. ARMYAVIATION DIGEST, P. O. Drawer P, Fort Rucker, AL36360; or call AUTOVON 558-6680/3619. We'realways happy to hear from you

I feel the DIGEST is:Helpful 1 116Interesting 754Ugh 30I prefer articles on:

Same More FewerAvionics 728 236 192rmament 620 230 290

ATC 464 688 94Inst. Flyi ng 338 894 62Humor 660 230 92Maintenance 536 622 98Medical 640 294 170Research 458 652 138Developments 478 716 78Safety 464 752 52Tactics 594 398 216History 562 342 10Training 892 516 128Combat Exp. 560 274 358Weather 478 524 84ccidents 528 708 66

Flying Exp. 530 506 138


18/52

T ~ R E A Tontinuetl from page

the MILITARY HERALD Theauthor, a Soviet general, is quotedin part as follows:When organizing an air defense system for motorizedrifle, tank and artillery subunits, it should be borne inmind that a small group ofhelicopters is capable ofknocking a tank element outof action Thus, one shouldassign highly mobile antiaircraft subunits that are capableof firing at airborne targetswhile moving or during verybrief halts . . . Firing againsthelicopters must occupy animportant place among thecombat and training gunnerytasks usually carried out byantiaircraft gunners, tank personnel and motorized riflemen.In providing the necessary airdefense for its field forces , theSoviet Union has developed a modern and extensive arsenal of airdefense weapons systems consistingof tactical aircraft, missiles, antiaircraft artillery and vehiclemounted machineguns. Furthermore, the Soviets make maximumuse of individual and crew servedweapons in an air defense role.These weapons systems, augmentedby a wide assortment of electronicwarfare equipment, could have asignificant impact on U. S Armyairmobile operations.The principal aircraft which maycurrently be encountered are theMig-21 Fishbed 1) and the SU-7Fitter 2). The Fishbed is an allweather, single seat jet fighter ca-

5: SU-11 Flagon6: SA-2 Guideline7: SA-3Goa8: SA-4Ganef


19/52

pable of speeds in excess of Mach2 and a combat radius of 550kilometers. Armament includescannon, rockets and the ATOLLair-to-air missile similar to the U.S. Sidewinder. The Fitter is also asingle seat jet fighter, but is somewhat slower and has a shorter combat radius than the Fishbed. Armament includes rockets, cannonand bombs. There is a variable .geometry version of the Fitter withimproved takeoff performance andrange.Later model fighter aircraft include the Mig-25 Foxbat (3), theMig-23 Flogger (4) and the SQ llFlagon (5). Foxbat, which hasreportedly been seen in Egypt, iscapable of speeds of more thanMach 3 and has a combat radiusof more than 1,100 kilometers.Both the Flagon and the variablegeometry Flogger are capable ofspeeds in the Mach 2.3 range andcombat radii of around 700 to900 kilometers, respectively. Manyof the older aircraft such as theMig-17 and the Mig-19 remain inservice and may be encountered.

Rapidly assuming predominancein the Soviet air defense arsenalare surface-to-air misslles withoverlapping high, medium and lowaltitude coverage and the abilityto move with ground forces for airdefense. 1bese misslles include thehigh altitude SA-2 Guideline andthe low altitude SA-3 Goa, bothknown from the Vietnam war; the 11medium and high altitude SA-4Ganef, the highly moblle SA-6Gainful and the SA-7 Grall, handheld like the American Redeye andreported.to be mounted on vehiclesas well.

The M.2 Guideline (6), standard in the Soviet Army and

9: SA- Gainful10: SA7 Grail11: 5 60 mill imeter gun


20/52

18

throughout the Warsaw Pact andSoviet-backed countries, is the firstof the transportable surface-to-airmissile systems. Mounted on a ZIL157 semitrailer transporter-erector,it is land mobile. t is employedwith a track-white-scan radar. thas radio command guidance.Guideline s mobility and low altitude capability are limited.The SA-3 Goa (7) which followed the Guideline is thought tohave been intended for much thesame operational role as the U. SHawk short range defense againstlow flying targets. Goa is a small,two-stage solid propellant surfaceto-air missile and is canied in pairson the ZIL 157 truck. Both theGoa and Guideline were extensively deployed in Egypt.The next of the surface-to-air

missiles to appear was the mediumand high altitude SA-4 Ganef (8).First seen in 1964, it is transportedin pairs on an armored trackedvehicle which also serves as thelauncher. The system is thus highlymobile and can be brought intoaction rapidly. Ganef has a rangecapability comparable to the SA -2.A relatively recent addition tothe Soviet air defense arsenal isthe SA-6 Gainful (9). First appearing in the Moscow Novemberparade in 1967, the SA-6 was anunknown quantity at the outbreakof the 1973 Middle East conflictwhere it reportedly proved extremely effective against Israeliaircraft. The highly mobile Gainfulsurface-to-air missile s role is lowaltitude defense. This weapon,along with the SA-7, has greatly

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


21/52

improved Soviet low altitude missile capability.The newest addition to theSoviet air defense missile systemis the SA-7 Grail (10), a low altitude surface-to-air missile whictwas introduced into Warsaw Pactarmed forces about 6 years ago andwas encountered in combat duringthe North Vietnamese 1972 springoffensive. The SA-7 is a heat-seeking missile similar to the U SRedeye. t can either be fired byone man or mounted on vehicles.The SA-7 has been used againstboth U. S aircraft in SoutheastAsia and Israeli aircraft in theMiddle East.

Although as already mentionedsurface-to-air missiles are rapidlyassuming the dominant role in theair defense system of the Soviet16

SEPTEMBER 1974

ground forces, they have Dot displaced conventional antiaircraftweapons. Antiaircraft guns currently available for use by WarsawPact ground forces for air defenserange in caliber from 14.5 to 100millimeters, although the older 37,85 and 100 millimeter guns arebelieved to have been largelyphased out of active service.A significant antiaircraft gun ofthe Soviet ground forces is the57 millimeter S-60 (11), a postWorld War II development. It isa recoil operated, towed weaponwhich has replaced the earlier 37millimeter models in most WarsawPact units. The S-60 employs bothoncarriage and otfcarriage fire control. I t has a tactical antiaircraftrange of 6,000 meters and a cyclicrate of fire of 105 to 120 roundsper minute Another 57 millimeterantiaircraft gun, the twin self-propelled ZSU-57-2 (12), made itsappearance in the late fifties and isstiD found in antiaircraft units oftank regiments in most WarsawPact countries. The ZSU-57-2mounts two 57 millimeter guns ona modified T -54 tank chassis. Theseguns are ballistically similar to theS-60 gun; however, an opticalmechanical computing sight s theonly fire control method availablefor the ZSU-57-2. The system hasa tactical antiaircraft range of4,000 meters.The Soviet light towed antiaircraft gun ZU-23 (13), which ap-12: ZSU 2313: SU 2314: ZSU 23 415: ZPU 416: PC mounting 12.7 mm

M38 4617: PC mounting 14.5 mm KPVT18: T 55 tank mounting 12.7 mmmachinegun19: T 62 tank mounting 12.7 mmmachinegun20: 7.62 mm AKM a.sault r i f le

19


22/52

peared in the early 1960s, is replacing the older quad 14.5millimeter antiaircraft heavy machinegun ZPU-4 in many WarsawPact armies. The ZU-23 consistsof twin 23 millimeter guns mountedon a towed two-wheel carriage. tcan fire 800 to 1,000 rounds pertube per minute to an antiaircraftrange of 2,500 meters.A self-propelled system mounting four 23 mUlimeter guns, andfeaturing a completely integratedfire control system, was introducedby the Soviets in 1965 and is nowfound in several Warsaw Pactarmies. The ZSU-23-4 (14) ismounted on a light tracked chassis.Its onboard radar is believed tohave both target acquisition andtarget tracking capabUities. Employed along with the SA-6 GainfulmissUe in the October 1973 MiddleEast war, the ZSU-23-4 reportedlyscored great success against Israeliaircraft, especially when the aircraftmaneuvered to evade the SA-6.One other antiaircraft weaponsystem still used widely within theWarsaw Pact and which is particu-2

2 : RPK squad automatic weapon

larty well suited for defense againstlow flying aircraft is the Soviet 14.5mUlimeter heavy machinegun ZPU-4 (15). This weapon system consists of four 14.5 millimeter rnachineguns mounted on a four-wheeltowed carriage. It has a cyclic rateof fire of 600 rounds per minuteper gun and a tactical antiaircraftrange of 1,400 meters.Vehicle-mounted machinegunsalso present a hazard to airmobUeoperations. The 12.7 millimetermachinegun is widely used onarmored personnel carriers (16),as is the 14.5 mUlimeter (17).These weapons have tactical antiaircraft ranges of 1,000 and 1,400meters, respectively, and rates offire per barrel of 600 rounds perminute. Other armored vehiclesmounting machineguns which maybe encountered include the T-55(18) and the T-62 (19) mediumtanks.The Soviets supplement their airdefense systems with various infantry weapons such as the 7.62mUlimeter AKM assault rifle (20)and the RPK squad automatic

weapon (21). Soviet infantrymenare trained to engage all enemyaircraft, particularly helicopters.This special training is further emphasized by the same Soviet generalofficer quoted previously. Tankantiaircraft machineguns and alsorifle weapons can be employed effectively against helicopters. . .As stated previously, the air defense weapons systems are augmented with a wide assortment ofelectronic warfare equipment andthe Soviets can be expected to makeextensive use of this equipment todisrupt communications and navigation radars necessary for effectiveairmobile operations.

In summary, the Warsaw Pactthreat to airmobile operations extends across a broad spectrum ofweapons, ranging from small armsto antiaircraft artillery, and fromsurface-to-air missiles to tacticalaircraft. This combination of systems provides the Warsaw Pactground forces with a continuousand quick reaction air defense capability to counter airmobile operations.U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


23/52

Last month the DIGEST carriedan article on the dedication ofthe U. S. Army Aviation Hall ofFame and we named the firstseven inductees. We promisedfollowup articles telling you a lit-tle more about each. This is thefirst featuring Igor I. Sikorsky

ARMY AVIATION H LL OF FAMEI GOR I. SIKORSKY s interestin rotary wing flight first manifested itself in 1909 when he produced two unsuccessful experimental helicopters in Russia. Hisvisionary efforts are the foundationof the tecbnology that is basic tomodern helicopters worldwide. Inconstructing the VS-300 30 yearslater, Mr. Sikorsky solved theproblem of antitorque control anddeveloped a successful rotor headwhich incorporated features thatenabled the pilot to control motionin all directions. These cyclic andcollective pitch control featuresare incorporated in virtually allhelicopters today. Sikorsky designed UH-19 and CH-34 helicopters have seen extensive Armyservice in a variety of missions.SEPTEMBER 1974

They provided the Army one ofits earliest capabilities to exploitairmobility with utility and cargohelicopters. The UH-19 was thefirst cargo helicopter in the Annyinventory to see combat during theKorean War. The CH-34 was thefirst helicopter approved for Annyuse as a presidential executivetransport vehicle. t was followedin this role by the Sikorsky VCH-3.Development of and use by theArmy of Sikorsky CH-37 mediumcargo and CH-54 heavy lift helicopters are further tributes to theengineering genius for which he isrenowned. This aviation pioneer,the father of today s Anny helicopter fleet, retired from activeengineering work in 1957. Mr.Sikorsky died in 1972.

This is one of the last pictures ofMr. Sikorsky. It was taken shortlybefore his 83rd birthday 25 May1972 in his office at the StratfordeN plant

2


24/52

Redeye missile gives batta-lion and company sized unitstheir own air defense weaponto counter low level attacks

haparral s an infrared heatseeking surface to air missilefor use in forward areas

against air attack

sees an aircraft until the aircraftreleases its ordnance and is out ofhis range. By easing his identification problem, we allow him moretime to place fire on the target,thereby increasing his chances ofdowning the aircraft. In some situations, therefore, it may be st-it may be safest-for you the Armyaviator when ADA is on a weaponsfree status. You may prefer to staydown and hidden while ADA clearsthe skies for you.Aviation and ADA can worktogether to the mutual advantageof both. For example, suppose acomposite Chaparral and Vulcanbattery has been assigned the mission of protecting a division airfield,a critical and vulnerable asset. Inthis situation it may be best toestablish a restricted area with safepassage corridors in and out. ADAcould fire on any aircraft attemptingto penetrate the restricted areaalong any route outside the estab-

lished corridors. Within these corridors we have weapons tight(Positive ID s hostile would apply.) Thus, your chances of survival against enemy air attack areenhanced with little or no interference with your operations.Some additional food for thoughtwhile we're on the subject of weapons control and aircraft identification - flying nap-of-the-earth

(NOE) may not be the safest inall situations. By popping up onthe ADA gunner, particularly in aweapons free environment, you increase the risk of misidentification.When operating behind our lines itjust could be safer for you to fly afew feet higher, giving the ADAgunner more time to eyeball youon the way in.To effectively coexist with shortrange air defense, the aviator needsto stay abreast of the rules and procedures under which these weaponsare operating. In particular, heshould be aware of any weaponsfree and restricted areas.I think you begin to see that agreat deal of coordination is re

quired between aviation and ADAif both are to perform effectivelyin the forward combat area. Theorganization to facilitate this closecoordination does exist within thedivision. Representatives from theaviation, Chaparral/Vulcan andHawk battalions sit side-by-side inthe airspace control element(ACE) of the division tactical operations center. Don t get the ideathat the ACE is going to exerciseminute-to-minute control over allusers of the airspace. t neither hasthat capability nor the requirementto do so. t can and does performbulk management of the airspacethrough planning and implementation of procedures which best servethe needs of both aviation andADA. This is accomplished withinthe framework of the overall rulesand procedures set down by higherair defense authority and in con-sonance with any guidance from


25/52

Hawk (Homing All the Way Killer), above, is lethal from treetop levelto 45,000 feet against aircraft or missiles. Nike Hercules, right,engages high speed aircraft to 140 kilometers and up to about

100,000 feetthe division commander and 03.Since the Army owns most ofthe helicopters employed in theforward area, the Air Force commander will normally look to theArmy for advice on rules and procedures for ADA engagement ofhelicopters and may allow theground commander considerablelatitude in the implementation ofhis directives. Generally speaking,the ground commander can makethe rules for engagement for ADAmore restrictive but not more lenient. Don't think that just becausethe Air Force has overall responsibility for air defense and airspacecontrol there is a big blue-suitersomewhere in the sky who isgoing to dictate your every action.Knowing the basics of how ADAoperates you, the Army aviator,can make recommendations as thetactical situation develops forchanges in procedures to allow youto perform your mission most effectively under the protection ofADA.

The presence of the Hawk battalion within the division area provides the necessary coordinationlink with the Air Force on airdefense and airspace control measures. The Hawk battalion opera-SEPTEMBER 1974

tions center maintains communications with its parent group which,in tum, maintains an element withan Air Force control facility. Aconcept being developed by the U.S Army Air Defense School at Ft.Bliss, TX, provides for the collocation of an element of the division'sflight control center with the Hawkbattalion operations center. Thispermits the use of Hawk radars inairspace management and furtherstrengthens the ties between aviation and ADA.Even in peacetime, in some partsof the world an awareness of airdefense control measures is essential to the Army aviator's safety.You may have heard or read aboutthe U. S helicopter recently shotdown by the South Koreans whenit allegedly overflew the presidentialresidence of Chung Hee Park a

restricted area. Why, when itclearly bore U. S markings? Without knowledge of the details of theparticular case, it would be difficultto say; but recall, according to airdefense rules and procedures, nyaircraft within a restricted areawould be considered hostile to theair defense gunner no further attempt at identification required.It pays to learn and to stayinformed on air defense rules ofengagement. Here, we've onlytouched on a few possible air defense control measures. To knowthe procedures in your commandget out the SOP governing airdefense and read it thoroughly.Only with your complete understanding of these procedures canArmy aviation and air defense artillery work together effectively as ateam.

Colonel Kilgore earned his aviator swings in 1956 and has served in fly-ing assignments in the UnitedStates, Vietnam and Europe. He hascommanded Air Defense Artilleryunits both at battery and battalion

level in the U S and Korea

23


26/52

Maior ReorganizationT FT. RUCKER s request,the Department of the Army,on 14 May 1974, approved a majorreorganization of the U S ArmyAviation Center/School organization. Because Ft. Rucker is asmall post with all of its elementsultimately striving for a single purpose, i.e., the creation of aviationdoctrine and trained personnel forthe rest of the Army, its organizationallines have been redrawn. Asa result, those who provide the

training and doctrine and thosewho support them now very muchare on the same team. We now areknown simply as the U. S ArmyAviation Center.Not only is a unity of effortattained, manpower and equipmentresources are conserved. This cameabout through integration of theformer Center and School staffs.

24

With the focus of all AviationCenter personnel sharpened underthe new integrated staff structure,there now occurs increased cooperation, less need for interofficewritten communication and increased managerial flexibility. Staffgroups are freed from the burdenof the myriad coordination inherentin the former dual structured environment. The changes are comingin two phases.Phase I of the reorganizationprimarily concerned director/supervisor levels of the various staffs;this was planned as a transitionalvehicle. t was implemented assoon as approval was received. Affected staff elements were realignedas intact modules, where possible,under operational control of thegaining elements. Figure 1 revealsthe former dual structure while

One of the principles of warsupposes a unity of effortfinancial stringencies theevery command. Accordingthe artificial walls that hava greater unity

figure 2 points out the new alignment of elements Phase I created.Major organizational changes inthe restructured Aviation Centerare: Manpower Management Division, Office of Management andBudget COMB was combined withForce Development Division, Di-



27/52


28/52


29/52

W O

T HE TROUBLESHOOTER isdead. Oh, who shot thetroubleshooter? Surprising words?We think not when we view the excessive number of expensive partsturned in as "defective," "inoperative," "broken," etc.; yet whenplaced on a test bench or inspectedcorrectly they are classified as serviceable. The art of "troubleshooting" seems to have been replacedby the wasteful practice of "partschanging. "Consider one unit's answer to ahigh-frequency vibration on aUH-1 Huey. Its personnel trackedthe tail rotor then changed thehub and blade assemby because the"hi-freq" was still present. This action did not correct the fault so thenext step was to change the 90 degree gear box, the 42 degree boxand the shafting between the twoitems. This didn't help smooth outthe vibration either. Someone(probably with a little troubleshooting tendency) finally recommended a look at the driveshafting,and 10 and behold, number twosection plainly showed a wallowing motion in a dynamic state(drive shaft cover removed) and adial indicator check after shutdownrevealed excessive runout.One small inexpensive piece ofshafting was replaced and the aircraft was operationally ready (OR)SEPTEMBER 1974

Shot TheTroubleshooterCW4 Frank W. Kervin

once more after 2 days of combinednot operationally ready maintenance and not operationally readysupply time.What You say troubleshootingsolved the problem after all? To adegree, we agree with your claim.But what happened to all those assemblies and parts that wereswapped prior to finding the causeof the hi-freq? Everyone wastagged "Unserviceable" and turnedin to supply channels. Over $4,000of serviceable parts with considerable time remaining went down thedrain. Ironically, this same unitcontinually screams bloody murder

about "lack of supply support"every time their OR rate falls below normal.Consider the time wasted swapping out components; it probablyamounted to enough man-hours to

complete a normal periodic inspection.Now to get to the heart of thematter of troubleshooting versusparts-changing. It is true in thiscase that the "troubleshooting"chart for the Huey does not concern itself with bent driveshaftingcausing hi-freq vibration-but thetest on high frequency vibrations,TM 55-1520-210-20, page 8-5 and8-6, points out driveshafting as thethird item to investigate as the possible cause of a hi-freq. Commonsense should dictate it as the nextitem to check following tail rotortrack. Why? Because tail rotortrack and driveshaft inspection requires no disassembly.Think about this case for a fewminutes. How many other incidentscome to mind where the most timeconsuming operations were accomplished irst and the simple "coupleof minutes" tasks were done assort of an afterthought when all elsehad failed? Webster defines troubleshooter as locating and eliminating the cause of trouble in theoperation of something." There isno Webster definition for partschanging so we'll substitute his definitions for "lost" which reads, inpart, "having wandered from theway bewildered and perplexed,not spent profitably or usefully;wasted." Doesn't the foregoing definition fit parts-changing ratherwell?So, let us reverse the status quo,resurrect troubleshooting as an art,a way of life, and parts-changingwill cease to exist and will neverneed an official definition.CW4 Kervin is chief of the General Sub

j ~ c t ~ Section Maintenance TrainingDIVISion Department of cademic Training at the U. S. rmy viation Center

27


30/52

VR

JEWSROME DERS

Sir:For a book I am writing on thehistory of Field Artillery Liaison A viation in World War II, I would like tohear from anyone who was a part of orhas some knowledge of this operation.This includes pilots, instructors, observers, ground crewmen or anyone onlyindirectly connected but interested.

Sir:

Jerry Eyler271 Garden Grove LaneEI Cajon, CA 92020

Would you please straighten me outon the following. Some personnel saythat the radios in the UH ID/H aircraft should not be turned on until theloadmeter drops below a certain level.Since there is nothing in the operator shandbook about this, or at least that Ican find, I am inclined to believe thatthis is more opinion than fact based onsome old procedure.Please enlighten us on this maybe

we need a change in the checklist. Ordo we? CW4 Archie A Harrello Trp 3rd Sqdn 8th CavAPO New York 09185 The U. S Army Electronics Command, Ft. Monmouth, NJ, and the U. SArmy Aviation Systems Command, St.Louis, MO, advised that no damageoccurs to radios or other componentswhen radios are turned on in accordancewith the procedures in the UB1 Operator s Manual.

Sir:Frequently inquiries are made to theReserve Components Liaison Officer andthe Adjutant General Records HoldingCustodian, U. S Army Aviation Center(USAAVNC) at Ft. Rucker, AL, forcopies of aviator originaL rating ordersThe most frequent requests come fromcommanders of Reserve Componentaviation units.

Many former active Army aviatorswish to join either National Guard orArmy Reserve aviation units. Duringin-processing of these individuals, anadministrative requirement of the FlightEvaluation Board is to review the flightrecords of the aviators: One of themore important documents is the original aviator rating order.When separated from the Army, theindividual s military personnel record(201 file) is forwarded to the U. SArmy Reserve Components Personneland Administration Center (USARCPAC) at St. Louis, MO, where it remains until requested by the individual snew military unit. Because many individuals do not keep extra personalcopies of documents such as their aviator original rating orders, it is necessary for the individual s new militaryunit to try to secure copies of the orderfrom USAAVNC.Commanders in the field cannot beexpec;:ted to be knowledgeable of the

Informatio for USARCPAC Reference Aviation OrdersSpec Order. Shipped by Date Shipped 80x of Tota. Acce on No.for yr No. 80xe.

1964 USAAVNC 18 Jan 68 6 of 7 68-A-13331965 USAAVNC 18 Jul69 2 of 4 69-A-1251966 USAAVNC 28 Jan 70 3 of 6 70-A-10591967 USAAVNC 18 Mar 7 2 thru 4 of 12 71-A-12161968 USAAVNC 3 Jan 72 14 thru 16 of 16 72-A-6711969 USAAVNC Jan-Oct Feb 73 9 thru 10 of 22 73-A-5571969 AG Nov-Dec Feb 73 2 thru 7 of 22 73-A-5571970 AG 3 Jan 74 10 thru 25 of 28 Pending

28 U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


31/52

Adjutant General Records Holdingpolicies and procedures at USAAVNCand USARCPAC. As a consequence,considerable time is lost and researchingefforts are duplicated because inquiriesare made with insufficient backgroundinformation or the inquiry is made tothe wrong records holding agency.Information required to initiate asearch to locate an aviator s originalrating orders includes: Special Ordernumber, issuing HQ and date issued.This information may be found in theindividual s DA Form 66 (block 15)or DA Form 66B (block 45). Withoutaccurate information, the Records Custodian must extensively research his filesto locate the desired orders.The USAAVNC Records Holdingarea retains these Special Orders for 3full years after the cutoff date, which

is always 31 December of the year inwhich the order was published. Example: SO 100, HQ, USAAVNS,dated 21 September 1968. This SOremained in the active functional filesin USAAVNC AG Academic Recordsuntil 31 December 1968. t was thentransferred to USAAVNC AG RecordsHolding area for 3 full years. This SO,along with all other 1968 Special Orders, was shipped to the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) (Military Records Section) on 31 January1972. These records were then retiredindefinitely in the NPRC Records Holding area.To obtain copies of aviator originalrating orders issued by the AdjutantGeneral, USAAVNC, subsequent to 1January 1971, address inquiries to:Commanding GeneralU. S Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ-PA-AGAFort Rucker, AL 36360To obtain copies of aviator originalrating orders issued prior to 1 January1971, address inquiries to:CommanderU. S Army Reserve ComponentsPersonnel and AdministrationCenterATTN: AGUZ-ED-SS9700 Page BoulevardSt. Louis, MO 63132To expedite the location of desiredSpecial Orders requested of USARCPAC, aviation commanders should submit information shown on the chartfor the year the order was issued. Complete shipping records are maintainedfor each year to include: date of shipment, shipment number, bill of ladingnumber, number of containers shippedand contents within each container.I believe this information will be

SEPTEMBER 1974

welcomed by the thousands of aviatorsand numerous aviation commanderswho will in the future want to obtainthe original aviator rating orders.

Sir:

LTC Richard W LewisReserve Component Liaison OfficerU. S Army Aviation CenterFt. Rucker, AL 36360

In order to share my suggestion withthe rest of the aviators in the Army, Ifelt AVIAn ON DIGEST might be interested in my suggestion for a combataviator s device.This suggestion has been submittedtwice, and 4 years ago received veryhigh compliments up to the last evaluator (a colonel who was probably nonrated). This time after waiting 2 years(the required waiting period) I haveresubmitted the suggestion in a differentmanner. It has been bounced around fora year and from last report on its finalroute toward possible approval.I just felt that you would like topossibly review this suggestion.

CPT David M Watters19th Replacement DetachmentFt. Bragg, NC 28307SUGGESTIONThe current awarding of a device forexperience and valor against an armedforce is unjustly leaving out a number

of individuals. These individuals on adaily basis have had more contact withthe enemy, been under fire more andhave been directly involved with combatoperations more than any other soldier.I am speaking of the Vietnam veteranaviator and his crew. I feel that somedevice should distinguish this individualas a combat experienced aviator or air-c:rewman. I am, therefore, submittingmy recommendation for a combataviator s device and a combat aircrew-man s device. The awarding of these twoawards could be done by the number ofcombat assault hours flown as aircraftcommander or CA time logged as anaircrewman (crewchief or doorgunner).I feel that there should be recognitionwhere it is due. The responsibility of anair mission commander in a Cav troopor the lead on an airmobile assault isone that warrants reward equal to theCIB and CMB. This award would beawarded to warrant officers as well ascommissioned and all enlisted. The an-tiquated idea that only the infantrysoldier should be distinguished has longbeen thrown out the window, with theevolution of the helicopter. If leader-ship is a question, then just talk to anyteam lead, aircraft commander, or airmission commander. It is my hope thatthrough this award a put aside hero ofVietnam be brought to light, THE U S.ARMY AVIATOR

Q AR 95-1 paragraph 4-2? states that for approach minimums,helicopter pilots are authOrized to reduce all published visibilityor RVR by as much as 50 percent, but never less than 1 4 mile orRVR 1,600 feet. This reduction seems logical for nonprecisionapproaches, s i n ~ the missed approach I?oint is at the runway orairport, and a helicopter may be In a pOSition to land and a fixedwing may not. However, on precision approaches all aircraftexecute the missed approach at the same point. Why is there adifference in visibili ty requirements for fixed wing and helicopterswhen executing precision approaches? .A. The decision to allow helicopters a 50 percent visibility reduction for procedures other than uCopter Only" is based on operational capabilities. Primarily, these capabilities are reduceda.pproach speeds and cockpit visibility which allow the pilot moretime to react, at the DH or MDA to the visual cues available. The50 percent reduction rule eases the restriction -to operations during reduced weather conditions and provides an increased alternate airport selection basis which helps offset the limited rangeof the helicopter.

29


32/52

For ools ane

COL McCullar a dual rated seniorArmy aviator is a logistician andserved as assistant chief nd execu-tive officer Procurement DivisionOffice o the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Logistics Washington DC for 4years. He has also served as directoro the Department o MaintenanceTraining Army Aviation Center Ft.Rucker; aviation officer Eighth U SArmy; commander 165th AviationGroup and deputy brigade com-

mander 1 t Aviation Brigade Republic of Vietnam. During the Vietnamassignments he was head of theUSARV aviation safety inspectionteams COL McCullar has been theDepartment of the Army aviationsafety officer and commander o theU S Army Agency for AviationSafety at Ft. Rucker for the past 2V2years. He retired 31 August aftermore than years of service.



33/52


34/52


35/52


36/52

-< a ~ ~ ~ US VSTed ontosPublica tio nsandGraphicsD iv is io n U S rmyAgency for viationSafe ty

lla boutfodEWINDIV IDUALShave chanceduponahibernat in gbea r,but it 'sagoodbet thatany whohavewere careful not todisturbthebeast.Andforagoodreason. Expertstell usthata bruin aro usedfromitswinter napdoesn'tlooktookindlyuponitsuninvitedguest. Asamatte r offact, itbecomesquite nasty-fast. And it 's somewhat the samewith FOD . Undisturb ed, causativ eagents remaindormant.Butpro dthemin toactionandbeforeyouknowi t ZAP-thedamageis done. Sincetheseagentsareplentiful,our bestprotectionaga inst FODliesin keeping themresting secure lyawayfromequipment that canst irthemintoaction. Unfo rtunate ly,we haven 'talwaysbeensuccessfu l in do ingthis.AnFOD stu dyshows thatduringCY 1967 23percentofallT53 enginefailu res res ulted fromFOD ,andth atapproximate ly half ofall A rmyaviationgasturbineenginesremovedtodepotshowed evidenceofFOD.Inaddit ion,airframeFOD causednumerousmishapsthatresultedininjuriesandair craft losses .Inoneinstance, aponch o linerblewoutof thecargocompartmentof anOH-6andwrappedaro undthetailrotor,caus ingit tofail. Theaccid entthatresu lted34

destroyed theai rc ra ft. Another OH-6wasdestroyedafter amosquitonetblewout ofthehelicopterandbecameentangledinth etailro to r.Athirdair craftspunduringautorota ti on,crashedandburn edafteracrew chie f'sja cket blewout ofthe aircraft intoth etail ro tor.Duringthe last6monthsofCY1969,morethan2 200 T53 enginessustainedsome deg reeof FOD .Of these, approx imately500hadtobereturnedtodepot foroverhaulat anestimatedcostof 685,000.InCY 1973, Armyair cr aft were involve d in ato talof 33 FOD-induced mishaps ,for amishap rateof171 per100,000flyinghours. Althoughdamagecosts exceeded 380,000, no injuries ordestroyedaircraft re sulted.A tfirstglance , we maybetemptedtoacceptthis rate as onewe mustlivewiththatanysignificantimprovem ent is virtuallyunlikelytobeattained.This ju st is n't so Ach eck ofthese33mishapsshowsth atallbu tfive could have positivelybeenprevented .Andit is likelythat evensomeofthesefive might possibly havebeen averted.Inoneinstan ce, amechanicbroke aportio n ofhispliers whiletighteningacannonplugona UHl. AI-

U S ARMYAV IATIONDIGEST


37/52


38/52


39/52


40/52

t ~ ~U S V S tips forvi tion s fety officers

OU HAVE JUST left the company commander soffice. His introductory briefing was thoroughand to the point. He is a busy man in this organization,with many aircraft, hundreds of personnel and a veryimportant mission. Although you fully expected somesort of additional duty, he really floored you with thesafety officer job.

Where do you begin? What does the commanderexpect of you in this assignment? How do youestablish a safety program or check the currentprogram for effectiveness? The commander knowsyou are not a graduate of the Army Aviation SafetyCourse. He has really put you in a tight spot. Has he?Not really, when you sit down and think about thejob and how it might be accomplished. The followingtips should aid anyone who feels he is in a similartight spot.

ANALYSIS First, determine the commander s per-sonal philosophy about aviation safety. Staying withinthe guidelines of this philosophy, one of your firsttasks will be to evaluate the unit and analyze itsproblems, including recommendations for solvingwhat problems you may find. To perform this analysis,you will need to gather information and use someaccident prevention tools.Your first step should be to perform an aviationaccident prevention survey. A survey is the same asan informal inspection of the unit s operation andfacilities, as well as an examination of its policies.

Your tool here is the Guide to Aviation ResourcesManagement for Aircraft Mishap Prevention, pre-pared by and available from the U. S Army Agencyfor Aviation Safety USAAAVS) . You should beable to answer many of the questions in this bookletin a positive manner. However, you will be unableto answer some of the questions. List the unansweredquestions as potential problem areas, then gather theunit inspection records in all fields-maintenanceinspection records, Command Maintenance Manage-ment Inspection CMMI) records and InspectorGeneral IG) records. Each contains indicators ofpast problem areas.38

By listing these areas and adding them to theresults of your survey, you come up with still moreproblem areas that must be resolved. History recordswill reveal some of the past problems of the unit,particularly accident experience.Then look at the unit mission accomplishmenrecord. Has the unit consistently accomplished itsmission without difficulty, or has it at times beenunable to perform the full mission due to lack ofaircraft or damaged aircraft?Evaluate unit discipline. Discipline includes theflying habits of the aviators. Are they professional atall times? Are the enlisted men well motivated? Doesthe unit have problems with morale? All of thesehave an adverse effect on safety attitudes. When youhave completed your analysis of unit problems, yournext task is to determine how best to attack theproblems.

EDUCATION One of the first problem areas youwill likely encounter is in the unit education program.The people involved in this program must beknowledgeable in several areas if the program is tobe effective. Your first step is to build a positiveattitude toward aviation mishap prevention through-out the unit. You can do this through monthly avi-ators meetings and through personal contact withother aviators, the commander, instructor pilots andenlisted personnel. You must instill in these indi-viduals a pride in workmanship. This can be achievedby various incentive awards-letters of appreciation,simple praise and an occasional pat on the back forwork well done.

You must continue to communicate. With whom?You must be free to talk to the maintenance officer,the operations officer, the commander and enlistedmen throughout the unit. You must move outside theunit and talk with the safety officers of adjacent units,

~ ~ ; t b- ;ila ~ ; / t i ; ~ ~ ; ; ; i t - ; d ~ ~ . ~ ~toward accident preventionthrough the unit , J

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


41/52

higherheadquar te rsandsubord ina teunits .Thecommunicationschaininaccidentpreventionmustneverbeperm ittedtobreak .

Oneofthemostdifficultareasinwhich youmustcommunica te and educate s hazard identification.Many people walk by known hazards every dayw ithout seeing them. As theold saying goes, Youcan'tseetheforestforthetrees.

H azardsmaybe n the form offoreignobjectsinrevetment areas , on airfields , in shop areas, orpetro leum ,oil, lubricants (POL) areas.Thesimpleuse of handtools can be extremely hazardous ifpropertechniquesareno tfollowed.Thisbecomesaneducation problem for the aviation safety officer.

Youmustbep reparedtogive specific classes onhazard identification andelim inationorcontrol.Allhazardsmustbeeliminatedorcontrolledifthem ishapprevention program s to be effective. f a hazardcannotbeelim inated ,itmustbecontrolled.

Perhapsoneofyourmostdifficultstudentswillbethe unitcommander , whomay notbe receptive to

SEPTEMBER 1974

Theavia tion safetyoffieristhecommanders rightarminmattersper ta in ing t acc iden tpreven tion .Thestrengthorweakness ofthatarm isde ter -mindedbytheASOsperformance

positivecontrols .Hemaynothavetherighta ttitudetowardam ishappreventionprogram ,simplybecausehe believes t s interfering with his ability toaccomplishthemission. fyouareagoodsalesman,youcancorrec tthissituationbypointingoutthataneffective preventionp rogram improvesmission pe rformancebecauseitconservesresources,makingthemavailableformissionaccomplishment.Youmayalsohaveproblemsbetweenopera tional

andmaintenancepersonnel. Quite often they are at odds in theirattempts tosatisfy thecommander.

BUILDING A PROGRAM Having analyzed thecurrentaviation m ishap prevention program of theunitandembarkeduponamajoreducationprogram ,youmustnowbuildaneffectivepreventionprogram ,with certa in goals in mind. The prog ram must beorien tedtowardmissionaccomplishment,notmissioninterference.

Youmustknowthedeficiencies of theunit.Youmaybeconcernedwith such things as the 11-poin tprogram , listed in 1st Avia tion B rigade Regula tion

39


42/52


43/52


44/52

8/12/201

Documents

Army Aviation Digest - Sep 1974