Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1983

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Oct 1983

1/48

ritish Light HelicopterOperations during theFalklandIslands ampaign


2/48

OCTOBER 1983 VOLUME 29 NUMBER 10rigadier General Robert F. MolinelliArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the Army

Major General Bobby J. MaddoxCommander Brigadier General Charles E. TeeterDeputy CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama

2 British Light Helicopter Operations During theFalkland Islands Campaign, LTC David W.A. Swan8 Shaping the AirLandEcheloned Battlefield with ArmyAviation, MAJ Charles B. Cook15 Views From Readers16 The Ice Storm Cometh20 Aviation Personnel Notes: How to Lose Your AviationCareer Incentive Pay Without Even Trying22 Flight Simulation-The Alternative, MAJ Ralph P. Aaron30 DES Report To The Field: AR 951, Change 132 Maintenance Test Flight Evaluation, LTC Harry J.McGinness and CW3 Ralph V. Winfrey33 Hangar Talk: FM 1301 Aeromedical Training for FlightPersonnel, CW3 Gary R. Weiland34 PEARL'S36 Aviation Safety and the NCO, SFC William C. Hawkins39 Remembrance and Reality-The OH58 Story, LTCDonald E.S. Merritt

Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: National AirspaceSystem Plan (NASP) Update on Air Route Traffic Control Centers, Mr. Kenneth S. ArnoldBack Cover: How To Get The Aviation DigestCover: British Gazelle with the flag of Great Br itain asbackground. An Infantry battalion commander saidit all about the helicopter forces in the Falkland conflict, helicopters were the life blood of the campaign." Story begins on page 2. Illustration by FredMartin.

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama

page 8

page 22MAINTENANCETEST FLIGHTEVALUATION

page 32

Richard K. TierneyEditor Honorable John O. Marsh Secretary of the Army

The mission of the U.S . rmy viation Digest (USPS 75-350 is to provideinformation of an operational. functional nature concerning safety and aircraftaccident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. research and development,aviation medicine and other related data.

This publication has been approved by The Adjutant General HeadquartersDepartment of the Army. 10 September 1982. in accordance with Army Regulation310-1.The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly

un1er the supervision of the Commanding General. U.S. Army Aviation Center.Views expressed herein are not necessari y those of the Departmentof the Armynor the U.S Army Aviation Center. Photos are US . Army unless otherwise specified . Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unlessotherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digestand to the author unless otherwise indicated .

Articles. photos. and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Directcommunication is authorized to Editor.U.S . rmy viation Digest P O. Drawer P.Fort Rucker . AL 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution systemas outlined in AR 310-1 Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDR. AGPublications Center. 2800 Eastern Boulevard. Baltimore. MD 21220. For anychange in distribution requirements. initiate a revised DA Form 12-5.National Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpoint distributk'l also shouldsubmit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should submit requests throughtheir state adjutant general.

Those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of theDigest can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S.Government Printing Office. Washington . DC 20402. Annual subscription ratesare $26 .00 domestic ar.d $32 .50 overseas .


3/48

T IS ISSUE contains a variety of ex-cellent, interesting articles which you'll findto your liking.We can benefit from readi ng the BritishLight Helicopter Operations During theFalkland Islands Campaign, the lead articlewritten by LTC David W.A. Swan. The BritishLIaison Officer to Ft. Rucker describes theorganization, tactics and logistics employedin their helicopter operations. In addition,this factual account of lessons learnedreveals the performance of weapons andequipment never before used in combat andthe great flexibility gained by the Britishthrough extensive use of helicopters. I urgeyou to read this crisp account to see how wecan improve our combat readiness, gainingby the British experience.Shaping the AirLand-Echeloned Battlefield With Army Aviation conceptualizesthe key roles of the hel icopter in a variety oftactical situations. Major Charles Cook seesaviation as a ground system of the land Armythat exploits the vertical aspects of the battlefield. He visualizes helicopter operationsand force structures in the main, deep andrear areas and is convinced that the armythat capitalizes most ful ly on the helicopter'scountless possiblities will win decisively.Major Ralph Aaron provides a roundup ofnear term flight, weapons and combat mission simulators. The alternative allows usto offset some flying hour and ammunitioncosts and provides for an ability to train themost critical maneuvers and operationsrepetitively; meanwhile, we save our fleetwear and tear, ready for any contingency.

OCTOBER 1983

I acknowledge the fine article by SFCWilliam Hawkins; Aviat ion Safety and theNCO addresses our NCOs, the backboneof the Army. SGT Hawkins encouragesmai ntenance NCOs to better managesoldiers by their own positive attitudes, jobknowledge and personal actions. The personal touch down the line can directly impact on flying safety.

Before you fly again, be sure to read TheIce Storm Cometh in this issue. Althoughsome readers (geographically) are not aslikely to encounter icing conditions asothers, weather is frequently fickle and whenun-expected, this phenomenon can beperilous if you're not prepared to deal with it.

Major General Bobby J MaddoxCommander, U S Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL


4/48

2

British Light HelicopterOperations during thealklandIslands ampaignPART I : The Deployment

Lieutenant Colonel David W.A. Swan AACBritish Liaison OfficerUS Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucke r AL

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


5/48

Ot is now 6 months since theUnited Kingdom regained theFalkland Islands and SouthGeorgia from Argentina whichhad illegally invaded nd occupiedthe territory. The campaign attracted the attention of the wholeworld and it has since been the subject of debate nd comment as nations have tried to glean as much information as they could on thelessons learned from the activities of

OCTOBER 1983

the opposing forces, their tacticsnd the performance of theirweapons nd equipment. Much of

the we ponry h d not beenpreviously used in a comb tsituation.Many newspaper and magazinearticles, even books, appeared onthe shelves of bookstores soon afterthe campaign was over, trying toanalyse the results of the battles.Some were well informed, and some

Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island

not. However, one common threadappeared in all of them and that wasthe acknowledgment that withoutfit, well-trained troops and the x-tensive us ofhelicopters the campaign would have posed evengreater difficulties than those whichactually faced commanders andtroops on the ground. The badweather, the poor terrain which virtually denied the use of all exceptspeci lised forms of groundtransportation, nd the movementof the mass of logistic supplies tosupport the advancing units wouldhave added to the length of the campaign had it not been for the contributions made by the helicopterforce. As one infantry battalioncommander stated, helicopterswere the life blood of thecampaign.Notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of helicoptersduring the campaign, very little hasactually appeared in writing describing their use, the problems theyfaced and the lessons the Army AirCorps AAC) learned or relearnedduring those hectic 2 months. Thisarticle attempts to redress thatbalance and I propose to go intosome depth on the organisation,tactics and logistic aspects of thehelicopter operations and recountsome of the incidents that tookplace.

3


6/48

I must, of course, say streng)1taway that I was notinvolved in the but in myDosatlcm as British Liaison Officerat the U.S. AviationFt. I received adeal of information on the nr"o:rpC'C'of the sourcesformation are many and

an active in the crunp.algnwho visited Ft. Rucker in1983 to a series of excellentbnetll lgs and intothe canlpalgn.

rganisationBefore I describe the r ~ ~ a n i t s a t i o nof the aviation unitsin r l ... Ar . t ' ncode name for the r n 1 l 1 t ~ : n UI need to outferences in the overall concept ofhelilCO )ter support in the British Services as compared with U.S.Aviation. The British Army has itsC l1r.nnrt provideda fullin U.S. terms,officer and enliste:d ctrll t lU"P,we::tnrLIl the AAC cat,ballge

uniform. The aircraft it arescout and antitank TheAAC is org;ani.sed

4

FalklandsCam

Inis for the nr


7/48

The organisation of the Cdo BdeAir Sqn during Operation Corporate is shown at figure 1. Thesquadron was limited to about twothirds of its normal strength by theamount of shipping space available.It consisted of a squadron headquarters which forms part of HQ 3Cdo Bde, three flights each of threeGazelle light observation helicoptersand one flight of six Scout that isthe Westland Scout not to be confused with the generic term of scoutused in U.S. Army Aviation) antitank/utility helicopters. Eachflight is capable of deployingseparately. Also placed under command of the Cdo Bde Air Sqn, forthe initial deployment, was adetachment of three Scouthelicopters from 656 Sqn AAC,with the rest of the squadronfollowing later.656 Sqn AAC was organised asshown in figure 2 and this is thestandard organisation of an independent AAC squadron. It consists of a small headquarters whichincludes a liaison officer detachedto brigade headquarters, a headquarters section, two flights each ofsix helicopters and a REME LAD.One flight consists of Gazellehelicopters and the other of Scoutantitank helicopters. The detachment of three Scout helicopterswhich had gone ahead with the CdoBde Air Sqn returned under command of its parent squadron when656 Sqn AAC disembarked in theFalklands.

Each squadron was reinforced byan AMG from 70 Aircraft Workshops REME which provided thenecessary 2nd Line AVIM) supportto the units. Eventually the twoAMGs were combined and set up abase workshop facility at thebeachhead at San Carlos.The support helicopters were provided by the detachments fromsquadrons of the Fleet Air Arm andthe RAF. These included Wessex,Sea King and Chinook helicopters.In all, almost 200 helicopters ofseven different types, including theAAC and Cdo Bde Air Sqn aircraft,were deployed for OperationCorporate.

EquipmentThe two types of aircraft used byboth the Cdo Bde Air Sqn and 656Sqn AAC were the Gazelle and theScout.The Gazelle is our reconnaissance

and observation helicopter, orscout. Manufactured in UK underlicence from Aerospatiale, France,

AAC Gazelle AH1

FIGURE : 656 Squadron Army ir Corps organisation

OCTOBER 1983

it is a fast, agile aircraft with a goodperformance but although it isnominally a five-seater its foldingback seat is very cramped. Certainmodifications were carried out tothe Gazelle helicopters for Operation Corporate but, in the shorttime available to mount the operation, it was not possible to fit all ofthe Gazelle with all the proposedmodifications, which included thefollowing: Flotat ion gear. Radar altimeter. I band transponder for operation with ships . Identification friend or foeIFF). MATRA SNEB 68 mmrocket system. SFENA stability augmentationsystem SAS). Blade folding capability. Increasing the Maximum AllUp Weight AUW) allowance to1,800 kilograms 3,970 lbs).The Westland Scout has been inservice with the AAC since the early 1960s as our light utility aircraft.Subsequently it was fitted with

SS 11 antitank guided missiles anda roof mounted sight for antiarmour operations in Germany. I tis now being replaced by Lynxequipped with TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireguided) missiles, but a consciousdecision was made not to deployLynx to the Falklands as, frrstly, theaircraft is fairly new into serviceand, secondly, it would have reduced our anti armour contributionto NATO in Germany. In fact, notwithstanding the size of the forcedeployed under Operation Corporate, our overall contribution toNATO was unaffected.The Scout is a simple, rugged,reliable helicopter with a good sizedcabin for carrying stores orcasualties and a useful payloadunder operational conditions ofabout 1,000 pounds. However, being old technology, it has a thirstyengine and at or near maximumAUW it has very limited endurance.

5


8/48

AAC Scout fitted with SS11 missilesand roofmounted sight

Modifications proposed for theScout were similar to those for theGazelle with the exception of theSAS, but again it was not possibleto complete them all. Its operationalmaximum AUW allowance was alsoincreased by a further 200 pounds.Needless to say there was tremendous cooperation between the services and industry to try and complete the preparations in time. Thefitting of the SNEB rockets to theGazelle was a classic example. Therewas no previous design for thismodification, but it took just overa week from the time the decisionwas taken to arm the aircraft todelivery of the first completed kits.This involved consultations withMATRA, the manufacturers inFrance, delivery of the parts to UK,modifications to the aircraft byWestland Helicopters Ltd., test flying and test firing and finallyclearance for shipboard operations.As a corollary to that story, the CdoBde Air Sqn, having received thekits, sent a message requesting theassistance of an expert to help withthe installation. The prompt replywas once you have fitted and firedthe rockets you are the experts "

In addition to the aircraftmodifications, other role equipmentwas also taken. This included SS-llmissiles, waist mounted 7.62 mmmachine guns for the Scout, Infrared Counter Measures shields forboth types of aircraft, a limitednumber of 1st generation night vi

6

FalklandsCampaignsion goggles, floor armour, stretchers for both internal and external,and camouflage covers. Aircraftspares were scaled for 30 days usageat intensive flying rates with anidentical pack held at 24 hoursreadiness in UK. Battle casualtyreplacement (BCR) aircraft andcrews were nominated and held atreadiness in UK.Command and ControlThroughout the campaign thetwo brigades carried out the missiontasking of their own aircraft. HQLFFI, once it was established, contained a Supporting Arms Coordination Cell (SACC) in which wasincluded a staff officer for lighthelicopters (S02 Lt Hels) and thesupport helicopter tasking cell. Thetasks of the S02 Lt Hels were asfollows: Advice to the commander onlight helicopter operations. Coordination of lighthelicopter mission requests fromwithin HQ LFFI and Force Troopsin accordance with laid down operational priorities. Monitoring the usage and lossrate of light helicopters and callingforward BCRs as required. Assistance in the managementof forward airspace. Assistance to the supporthelicopter tasking organisation.The SACC was responsible forthe coordination of forwardairspace and a deconfliction heightof 50 feet above ground level wasestablished, fixed wing above andhelicopters below. All Air Defencesystems were to be weapons tightfor helicopters, due to the lack ofa potent enemy helicopter threat,but weapons free for fixed wing.Two Gazelle were provided on adaily basis from the two brigades insupport of HQ LFFI and ForceTroops. Although these aircraftwere vital, particularly to the commander and his staff for visits for-

ward to the brigades, the systembecame increasingly difficult tooperate as the two aviationsquadrons moved farther forwardwith the advancing troops and transit time increased. Further complications arose over tasking theseaircraft due to the problems of nothaving a dedicated light helicopterradio net at HQ LFFI and static interference on the radios, for example HF at night. In retrospect itwould probably have been better tohave had a self-contained flight ofthree Gazelle permanently attachedto HQ LFFI for their own use.

CommunicationsI mentioned in the previousparagraph the lack of a dedicatedlight helicopter radio net at HQLFFI. This was a disadvantage inmany ways and was caused by ashortage of radio facilities in thecramped Amphibious OperationsRoom of MS earless where HQLFFI was installed. The two aviation squadrons did operate theirown VHF (FM) radio nets withintheir brigades and sometimes HQLFFI was able to join these netswhereupon light helicopter missiontasking became much easier. UHFwas used but inhibited by thelimited frequency range available inthe older radios fitted to our aircraft. These radios are currently being replaced and the new radios willovercome this difficulty.Aircrew cockpit workload, whenairborne, was high when taking into account IFF code changing, encoding and decoding transmissionsand authentication, while flying ata very low level in a combat environment. The acquisition of upto-date communications information for helicopter crews proved extremely difficult and was to causeconsiderable problems when conducting missions. t was a fast moving battle; codes and frequencieschanged rapidly as did unit and ship

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


9/48

locations. The crews therefore kepttheir radio transmissions to theminimum and gained much of theirinformation by landing at forwardunit headquarters for up-to-datebriefings and carrying the information back to higher headquarters.The use of report lines ndnicknames over the radio was considerably quicker and more effectivethan working with complex codingsystems when airborne.It is therefore reasonable toassume that aircrew workload couldhave been considerably reduced had

there been some form of automaticdata storage and retrieval system installed in the aircraft, linked to asimilar ground based system.

Preparation and TrainingIt is obvious that there was littletime to carry out a great deal ofpreparation and training for Operation Corporate becauseof the speedwith which the campaign was mounted.In fact the installation of many ofthe aircraft modifications was continued during the long sea voyagesouth and the 2-week pause atAscension Island.The Cdo Bde Air Sqn, because ofits role with 3 Cdo Bde, was trainedfor shipboard operations and ofcourse the brigade as a whole istrained for amphibious assaultswhich was why it was selected to

OCTOBER 1983

spearhead the operation. On theother hand the normal role for 656Sqn AAC did not require it to trainfor shipboard or amphibious operations nor were its aircraft equippedfor this purpose. Therefore a considerable effort was required tomodify aircraft and train the crews.656 Sqn AAC was not normallypart of 5 Bde and was thereforeoperating with a new formation.Fortunately it was possible to allow5 Bde a brief 2 week workup periodbefore it embarked and 656 SqnAAC took full advantage of this opportunity to become familiar withthe brigade s standard operatingprocedures and to get to know theunits with which they would beoperating as well as conducting itsown training.The forecast problems of vehiclemovement over the uninvitingFalklands terrain and limitations onshipping space resulted in a totalban on all except essential vehiclessuch as radio and command postvehicles. The Officer Commanding656 Sqn AAC was therefore leftwith a surplus of drivers. Thinkingin terms of local defence he usedthese drivers, together with thesquadron storemen, cooks and paystaff, to form a defence platoon.They trained as such during theworkup period and during the seavoyage nd by the time thesquadron arrived in the Falklands

LEFT: Royal Navy Sea King MK 5BELOW: RAF Chinook HC MK 1

he had an effective unit. The platoon was divided into three sectionsfor the local defence of the squadron headquarters and the two flightsand gave much needed security tothe unit.Night operations were being anticipated and there was obviouslygoing to be a requirement for nightvision goggles. Unfortunately onlya very limited number wereavailable, some going to the supporthelicopters and the remainder to theaviation squadrons. Even then therewere insufficient to fully equip onesquadron. Such as were availablewere divided between both squadrons, but only the Cdo Bde Air Sqnwas able to train with them duringthe voyage south, so that by thetime they arrived in the operationalarea at last some of the squadron screws had reached an acceptablelevel of proficiency.In addition to the pure aviationpreparations and training, there wasa considerable effort to improve individual skills, such as small armsshooting, first aid and, of course,a heavy emphasis on physicalfitness. This latter aspect was toprove essential and contributedgreatly toward the successful outcome of the campaign.

Next monthPart : The Battle

7


10/48

~ D u r u [ { D n r n aDuknIT ILrurncQ]o E ~ D u i l r n c r l J]3 ruaa ili n il crl

with Army Aviation

T HE HISTORY of land warfare has demonstratedfrequently and clearly the rapid manner in whichtechnological breakthroughs can afford distincttactical advantages to those nations capable of ex-ploiting such developments. Those armies blessed withthe acquisition of new dimensional weapons and innovative leaders with the necessary tactics to employthem have traditionally achieved rapid, sometimesstunning successes. Although appropriate countermeasures were invariably devised, the time available

8

Theltellcopter .. pia . a vital role .In.shaping today s .vertical dimensionof land warfare andIs essential to adecisive victory

Major Charles B Cook

today to react to such technical and tactical surprisesin the event of war no longer exists for all practicalpurposes. In the future, those armies that neglect totake advantage of potential technical or tacticalbreakthroughs, or the support programs designed todevelop them, risk putting themselves into the unenviable position of not being able to protect their nation s vital interests if suddenly called upon to do so.The modem armies of the world today are facedwith an extremely vexing dilemma-having re-

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


11/48

quirements for new weapons of constantly increasingcombat power (and resultant breakthrough potential)yet having to make increasingly difficult choices as totheir affordability. The emergence of the helicopter hasnot simplified this dilemma. Indeed, it has introduceda new dimension to the battlefield as complex andcostly as any newly introduced weapon system of thepast, to include mechanization and NBC (nuclear,biological, chemical) weapons. Most modern land armies are now rapidly moving to adopt in some fashionthe relatively new air assault concept and to better exploit the vertical aspects of the battlefield. A costlynew factor, yet because of the implications involved,current Air Land-Echeloned operational concepts asespoused by the United States and the Soviet Unionare heavily incorporating the use of the helicopter. Itcould probably even be argued that these evolving concepts, which emphasize retention of the initiative,agility and the tempo of combined arms operationsthroughout the depth of a greatly expanded battlefield,are only made possible through the use of thehelicopter. Because of its mobility and firepower, thehelicopter tends to keep the maneuver concept a moreviable capability on today's firepower intensive, antitank oriented battlefields.Currently both superpowers' operational conceptsbasically share the same ideas in spite of the defensiveoffensive/east-west orientations and military jargoninvolved. Combined arms operations, rapidity ofmaneuver, retention of the initiative and depth ofoperations characterize both of their capabilities andintentions. Similarly, over time, both the United Statesand the USSR have seemed to move toward commonphilosophies concerning the exploitation of this newvertical dimension of land warfare. Perhaps key to thiscommon philosophy is the concept that although anaviation system, the helicopter functions best as aground system and an integral component of their landarmies-as a combined arms entity perhaps best calledArmy Aviation.As a mutually employed, operationally subordinate

component of the land army ground force, ArmyAviation units offer a considerable number of optionswith which to exploit flexi ly the vertical aspects ofthe battlefield. The Army Aviation concept also tendsto provide solutions to the nagging problems whichhave existed concerning how to interface properly thecombat power available from one's land and ir forces.In addition to its capability of moving with groundforce units and an independence from large, fixedoperational and support bases, the helicopter has

OCTOBER 983

shown itself to be capable of being employed in rolesand missions unique to its environment on the battlefield. Accordingly, this new layer of the battlefield is having an immediate impact on currentoperational art and tactical theories. Traditional concepts of land warfare are being modified or replacedand new ones introduced in order to adapt to thepresence of this new weapon system. As a major factor of this new vertical dimension to land warfare, thehelicopter will exert a considerable influence on theshape of any future AirLand-Echeloned Battlefield.t will directly influence the manner in which battlesare fought and will playa major role in their outcome.

As today's operational concepts have evolved on eitherside of the Iron Curtain, land warfare operationsfeaturing this third dimension and a fourth one, time,have been classified into three general battle areas-amain battle area (MBA), a deep battle area (DBA) anda corresponding rear battle area (RBA). Since thehelicopter now plays such a key role within the operational theories and force structures pertaining to tactical operations in these areas, it is useful to pause andreview how this new weapon system will tend to shapesuch battle areas in the future.Main Battle reaAs the name implies, the main battle historically hasbeen where the main clash between two opposingforces initially occurs (figure 1 . It will continue to bethe point of main effort for the identifiable future andnormally will be a region of strategic/tactical interestalong a line of contact between two opposing forces.As land armies commit their forces into increasinglymore complex, integrated and deadly battles, the MBAwill be marked by intense efforts to manipulate andcontrol operations conducted within it. Once committed to such a battle, any combatant has only oneintention-to win decisively. In order to accomplishthis, requisite combat power advantages must berapidly achieved and sustained. Surprise, speed,momentum, protection of one's force, combined armsoperations and the ability to be responsive to changesin the direction of the battle, regardless of terrain orweather, are key tasks. The ability to seize and retainthe initiative while using the above principles to rapidlyoutmaneuver and overpower an opponent will ensuredecisive victories. Within the MBA or covering forcearea either side of the line of contact, use of thehelicopter in support of these principles serves as a newmeans with which to influence the outcome of battlesfought in this area. Its unique capabilities are rapidly

9


12/48

Armored TaskForceBreakthrough DefenseCounterattack

Aviation TaskForceSupportingAttack seize key terrain antitank/helo/ ADA recon and secty recon and security

enemy suppression-antihelo-antitank reinforce strong points;contain shoulders ofbreakthroughs

recon in force/feint secur ity SEAD / EW delay/defend- antipersonnel-antiair defense occupy blocking positions attack withsupporting combat

arms attachmentselectronic warfare mines/smoke/EW C31/

arty adjustment C3 engineer support

. JVvv vVvV -J medevac

v0VVVVVU special operations-Rangers

-Special Forces-Search and Rescue

emergency logistics search and rescue

Mechanized Task ForceSupporting Attack

ruse/feint arty adjustment admin/log/medevac electronic warfare C31

task organized into the combined arms forcesoperating in the MBA and enhance their overallcapability to conduct combat operations.In the offense, the helicopter will provide advancewarning and security through its reconnaissance role.In its armed role, it will provide immediate, mobile,diversified firepower. As an integrated component oftask organized, combined arms motorized/armoredforces, armed helicopters lend unique support to eithermain or supporting attacks, raids, feints or ruses.Those countries with the more sophisticated, albeitmore expensive, mUltipurpose attack helicopters willprofit the most from their varied ordnance loadscapable of being employed-antipersonnel, antitankor antiaircraft. These same multipurpose systems arealso the most survivable and have the greatest allweather capabilities.The seizure of key terrain or movement of reinforcements to hold the shoulders of penetrations or

1

the conduct of mop-up operations will be requirementscapable of being met by assault helicopters. Fastermoving, wider ranging aviation task forces will belogistically supported by dedicated transporthelicopters. Emergency logistical requirements in support of ground forces will be met by use ofassault/transport helicopters as an alternative mission.Within this key main battle area, other traditionalcombat requirements such as command and control,timely and accurate adjustment of artillery fires, andemergency medevacs will continue to be enhanced withuse of the helicopter. ew roles such as electronic warfare support will augment traditional intelligence efforts to see the battlefield and allow commanders tocontrol and manipulate the electronic combat poweravailable to them. Smoke and obscurant generation,minelaying and the employment of air assault antitank/air defense teams will protect the flanks of attacking forces. Helicopters in their various roles will

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/48

Shaping the AirLand-Echeloned Battlefield

allow Army Aviation units to serve as decisively in thefuture as have Artillery, Armor or Infantry units inthe past as attacking forces generate the combat powernecessary to defeat their opponents in the MBA.Similarly, the defense of the main battle area willbe characterized by the integrated use of Army Aviation units within the organization of the overalldefense. Defensive schemes will continue to make maximum use of the terrain, time and troops available butface greatly increased pressures due to the significantlyexpanded nature of modern battlefields. Adequateplans for the defense of the MBA will depend heavilyupon the helicopter's mobility and reaction capabilityin the execution of its many potential roles and missions. An effective, modern combined arms defensewould prove to be difficult, if not impossible, withoutArmy Aviation units available as part of the troop list.Not capable of being counted on as a forcemultiplier if both sides have the freedom to employequal numbers and types of helicopters, the helicopterdue to its mobility is capable of providing the reaction capability necessary to begin off-setting the attacker's initial advantage in choosing where, when andhow to strike. Its firepower will be one of the firstmeans available to the defender with which to strikeback selectively t vulnerable gaps and flanks of attacking forces. As in the offense, operating in its vertical component of the battlefield, it offers thedefender a new prospect or method of wresting the initiative away from an opponent and stopping an attack.Capable of being used offensively in the defense,Army Aviation's ability to move troops and equipment, provide firepower, support engineer and electronic warfare (EW) operations, expedite reconnaissance efforts and provide a means of mobile communications, command and control offers considerable leverage to the defending commander.In the main battle area, the helicopter will prove tohave a profound effect on how w ll defensive or offensive operations are conducted by modern combinedarms forces. This system, operating n its environmentwithin the MBA, offers considerable flexibility andweight to any proposed course of action. It also posesconsiderably greater complexities when such proposals

OCTOBER 983

are wargamed against similarly equipped opponents.Prudent commanders and staffs will look for innovative means to organize Army Aviation's strengthsinto their operational plans for seizing and maintaining control of all three dimensions of the MBA.

Deep Battle reaThe greatly expanded nature of today's battlefields,as promulgated by current Air Land-Echelonedtheories, results in numerous opportunities for ArmyAviation forces to play decisive roles throughout acommander's area of influence. Major clashes betweenopposing land armies will no longer be restricted tothose battles fought along the forward line of troops(figure 2). The capability of defeating an opponentthroughout an area of operations such that neithercounterattack nor coordinated defense is possible hasalways been a major objective of any tactical commander tasked with the mission of rapidly defeatingan opponent. The ability to conduct significant,simultaneous combat operations in an enemy'svulnerable rear areas greatly expands the battlefieldand can prompt the quick collapse of an opponent'swill to resist even if his main defenses are still relativelyintact. Helicopters have now developed to the pointin terms of survivability that they offer considerablebreakthrough potential in allowing the conduct of suchDBA operation beyond the MBA.Helicopter supported operations will impose tremendous pressures on any defensive plan's capability tosurvive simultaneous assaults along the MBA and into rear areas. Retention of the initiative, surprise andbetter use of the terrain are powerful factors withwhich to ensure operations of much greater tempo intoday's firepower heavy, antitank system dominatedbattlefields. Army Aviation forces have the abilityeither to move with tank heavy formations, protectingand reinforcing their successes in a combined armsdeep battle operation, or to move directly into rearareas and conduct autonomous air assault combinedarms operations themselves. Operating with or withoutparadrop delivered reinforcements and supportingweapon systems, these autonomous deep operations


14/48

antihelo\I . ~, ,

electronic warfare suppression of enemy

air defense joint airattack/antiarmor special operations air assault/airmobileoperations support airborneoperations SAR medevac antitank

mines W

~ - ,,\,. '", I, ~ IJl 1 PLOrG f ~ J v L

pursuit/exploitation/maneuver groupsupport

recon/security

Resel VesD

mayor may not be organized to link up with similarhelicopter supported, deep-striking armor operationsdepending on the situation and the mission of the otherground forces involved.Offensive efforts within the MBA will be tremendously enhanced by deep battle operations whetherthey are conducted in direct support of MBA objectives or as they are conducted in the rear areas of anopponent. Either tactic greatly disrupts the overalldefensive posture of the enemy. Destroyed or delayedcounterattacks, jammed and confused command, control, communications and intelligence 3I), destroyedor damaged special weapon sites, air defense sites andother logistical or tactical support bases are significantfactors which tend to produce the sudden collapse ofan opponent. The capability of the helicopter to support such attack-in-depth operations is probably itsgreatest contribution to modern warfare.Notwithstanding its obvious utility in low intensityconflicts, the helicopter s potential contribution inshaping the outcome of future mid to high intensitybattlefields is even more important. The prospect of

12

1 \ L\ \\ \\ \Threat of an ailassault

interdiction support

having to allocate limited defensive assets to stop mainand supporting attacks with large follow-on reservesupport and simultaneously defending against battalion to division size units in vulnerable rear areas iscause for deep concern. Unfortunately, this prospectis not a probability but a guaranteed eventuality dueto the proliferation of modern, designed-for-combathelicopter systems and Army Aviation equippedforces.

Rear Battle AreaArmor-attack helicopter heavy forces rapidly conducting envelopments into vulnerable rear areas or air-mobile air assault forces moving around, over or evenunderneath carefully prepared and positioned defensesestablished to defeat the main attack should adequatelypoint to the problem of RBA defense (figure 3). Fortunately for th8 defense, one of the primary reasonsfor causing such concern also presents an adequatesolution of the problem. Having equal mobility,



15/48

eloint Air ttackTeam elAAT)

---)\ ...)L )

Air ssaultlAirmobUe

l )C )l )( )1-,(. , 0QJ ~L , ...-- ~ - . . . ....,CSI/recon-antihelo/AC

counter-JAAT-antihelo- antiaircraft

firepower and capable of providing the C3I necessaryto detect, react to and initiate preplanned counterattacks against such offensive tactics, helicopter equipped forces may be committed against such deep battle operations much sooner than conventional groundsystem counterattacks. Army Aviation task forcesworking with preplanned, task organized air and landforces have the capability to begin counterattackoperations while enemy deep battle efforts are still inprogress or preferably attempt to preempt them priorto their execution. Without such assets of equalmobility, equal or greater firepower and preplannedC3I measures, attempts to contain offensive operationsusing currently evolving deep battle tactics which linkhelicopters with armor and/or airborne forces, or into groups of task organized air assault units, couldprove to be futile using traditional weapons and tactics. The helicopter s constantly increasing survivabilityand adverse weather capability and firepowercombined with its inherent ability to react rapidly fromkey tactical locations and to fly on a management-byexception basis in spite of incredibly complicated

OCTOBER 983

- fire support-troopmovement

airspace management problems proves it to be acritically important weapon for the defense. Withoutits support as an immediately available combined armssystem, would-be attempts to defeat larger attackingforces using the same helicopter systems previouslydiscussed would result in fighting frpm a position ofunacceptable risk and great jeopardy. Overpoweringsynergistic forces can be brought to bear on opponentslacking in similar capabilities or tactics with very unfortunate consequences. Thus, the rear area battle properly prepared for, while simultaneously conductingoperations in the MBA and the opponent s own rearareas, will prove to be an extremely challenging andmandatory scenario for professional military plannersin the future.

ConclusionAs battlefields continue to grow more complex overtime, this new look at the vertical dimension of landwarfare continues to reveal new ideas to be exploited.

3


16/48

Shaping the Airland-Echeloned Battlefield

Attempts to gain relative advantages over one s opponent will continue to be reflected in a search forequilibrium within this new layer of the battlefield.Land armies will find it increasingly important, evenmandatory, to control this new development in warfare and deny it to their opponents. The exploitationof such under-exploited areas as air-to-air weapons,tactical air-to-surface missiles, and sophisticated,emerging C31 and EW management systems will proveto be vital. Army Aviation forces will reinforce tactical land army air defense/suppression of enemy airdefense (SEAD) measures in addition to augmentingoverall Air Force strategic and theater roles of airsuperiority and SEAD. The evolving use of remotelypiloted vehicles and airborne warning and controlsystem type assets combined with a constantly expanding automated C31 capability points towardcontinually changing tactics in the near to mid termas measures are sought to best employ Army Aviation s continuously developing capabilities into combined arms force structures. These new technologicaldevelopments are particularly well suited for adoptionto fast moving Army Aviation equipped forces.Another point that bears retrospection is how thedevelopment of doctrinal, training and logistical basestends to lag during the rush to acquire and employ newcombat power producing systems and forces such asthe Army Aviation concept. Losing a battle or war dueto a faulty operational concept is no different thanhaving an audacious breakthrough (with forces intactin the face of a retreating, collapsing enemy) falterbecause of insufficient logistical support. Both instances are distinct points in any campaign wheremomentum and initiative are capable of being lost-only to be regained at great cost. f the full benefitsare to be derived from newly conceived fast movingtooth heavy combat forces such as the tank-attackhelicopter operational maneuver group or airmobileair assault task force, dedicated equally fast movinglogistical tails will be required. Large logisticalhelicopters and low flying tactical air transport craftwill meet such requirements if employed primarily inthis role. To use such assets routinely in support ofMBA units with already established, dedicated supplylines will be far less profitable. Commanders and staffs

at all levels of the land army are now charged with

4

planning strategies and tactics which must take intoaccount not only a significantly expanded manner ofexecution but also significantly expanded logistical andtraining requirements.Army Aviation will have a significant influence onhow wars will be fought through the rest of this century and the beginning of the next. This new templatelaid across the battlefield will allow old techniques towork even better, but more importantly it is a newsystem which can now be employed in new ways. Asa new tool, the principles of war may be used tomanipulate the shape of future battlefields assignificantly as have the machinegun and tank in thepast.The measures and countermeasures introduced tothe art of war because of the helicopter and this ArmyAviation entity have been subject to great debate andanalysis. The primary conclusion to be drawn fromthe introduction of the helicopter and its performanceto date, from the last days of World War II to the conflicts in the Falklands and the Bekaa Valley, is thatit is here to stay. Those responsible for making waror keeping the peace are now responsible for incorporating this new weapon into an already complexcombined arms force structure. To fail to take maximum advantage of its potential will be to offer an opponent the first method with which to begin thedismantlement of one s own defenses. The future isobvious for those who have accepted this new conceptof Army Aviation. For those who have not acceptedthe idea or have just begun to experiment with the idea,one must only consider the possiblities with it, or moreimportantly, the alternatives without it.

ABOUT TH AUTHORMajor Charles B Cook Aviation is currently serving as arotary wing aircraft techintell offi er with the Defense Intelligence Agency. He received a B S from the University ofAlabama and is a graduate of the U S Army Command andGeneral Staff College. He has authored several previouslypublished articles concerning the employment and develop-ment of rotary wing aircraft to include a thesis assessing theSoviet combat helicopter threat. MAJ Cook has served in avariety of command and staff positions in previous opera-tional assignments.



17/48

VIEWS ROM RE DERSEditor:I would like to express my appreciation for the outstanding article WhyMe? - The Threat Officer on threatpublished in the April 1983 U S ArmyA viation Digest This article clearly illustrates the criticality of Army aviatorsbeing properly trained for effective mission operations in the threaten vironment.I am surprised, though, that amember of the Army Aviation Centerwould prepare such an informative article without providing' the rest of thestory. Allow me to provide some additional information.The Army Aviation Center is theTRADOC proponent for a group ofequipment systems and philosophiescalled aircraft survivability equipment(ASE). The philosophies include nap-ofthe-earth flight, lusterless paint schemesto blend in with the operationalbackground, and hardening of aircraftcomponents to allow continued safeoperation after sustaining damage fromthreat systems. Equipment systems include threat radar detectors, jammersand other countermeasure devices.These philosophies and equipmentsystems have been and are beingdeveloped for incorporation on currentand future field Army aircraft toenhance their ability to survive missionoperations in the threat environment.ASE systems are deployed to applicablepriority aviation units after they havebeen thoroughly tested to assure theireffectiveness.

The current edition of FM 1-101,Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasur es

and Survivability," provides some information on how to operate the ASEsystems to enhance mISSIOnsurvivability. This manual is currentlybeing revised by the Aviation Center toincorporate additional threat operationsand ASE system operatio nal informa-

tion. Additionally, the Aviation Centeris developing ASE system operationa ltraining courses to be included in the applicable aviator training programs.

The tactical radar threat generator(TRTG) AN/TPQ T4 has beendeveloped as a device for trainingaviators with in-flight operational use ofthe ANIAPR-39 series Radar WarningReceiver Systems. A limited quantity ofTRTGs is in the field with actions inprocess to procure additional systems.Additional training devices, identifiedas being required to support the aboveindicated ASE system operationalcourses, will be developed and fieldedat the earliest possible time.I hope the above information will bepassed on to your readers to show thatthe Army is serious about providingaviators with the capability to survivemission operations in the intense threatenvironment. All of these philosophies,equipment and training devices areuseless, however, without actual fieldunit training on how to effectivelyoperate the aircraft and its installed mission equipment (to include ASE) tocomplete required missions in a threatenvironment.

l .W. DeanLogistics Management SpecialistAircraft Survivability EquipmentProject Manager's Office

Editor:f it is possible I would like to havea transcript of an article that appearedin A viation Digest sometime in the first

half of 1970. It was entitled Stay Clearof Hue. I was one of those involvedin the action about which the article waswritten, and I would deeply appreciatethis transcript.

Henry SteffesLynnwood, W A

Editor:After reading your article' The FirstBook of Rucker I was honestlyshocked Since joinin g Army Aviation7 years ago I have enjoyed reading yourmagazine each month. It is sad to seeit go along with the countless otherpublications of this day that poke-fun at GOD, the BIBLE andChristiansI would just like to go on record assaying that I see no reason for suchnonsense, and I hope that in the future

articles like this will not find their placein A viation DigestSGT Lindal R. Cossey568th Trans Co.Ft. Wainwright, AK

Neither the original skit nor theadaptation was intended to poke fun atGod, the Bible or Christians. Ourapologies to anyone who felt the formatwas offensive.

Articles from the Aviation Digest requested in these letters have been mailed. Readers can obtain copies of materialprinted in any issue by writing to: Editor U S rmy Aviation Digest P.O. Drawer P Ft. Rucker AL 36362

OCTOBER 983 5


18/48

6 u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


19/48

he ice stormc o m e t h E ~u s RMY S fETY CENTERI NDIAN SUMMER-crispleaves underfoot, the smell ofwoodsmoke in the air, andsounds of Saturday afternoonfootball games-winter is stilllong way off. But not in someparts of the world, for some ofyou winter is here, right now,with all of its problems anddangers to aircraft and theircrews.This article is not intended totell you everything you alwayswanted to know but were afraidto ask about winter flying . t israther a reminder that winter ishere and no matter how muchexperience you have, a review ofcold weather operations is inorder efore you encounter theadditional hazards of winterweather conditions.Aviators are warned thatAircraft will not be flown intoknown or forecast severe icingcondit ions. Army Regulation95-1, Army Aviation GeneralProvisions and Plight Regulations, further states that I f aflight is to be made into knownor forecast moderate icing conditions, the aircraft must be equipped with adequate deicing oranti-icing equipment. Theregulation does not prohibit flying when light icing is a possibility. Unless local supplementsto the AR restrict such flights,the pilot must make the decision.The importance of the missionmust be weighed against thepossibility of worsening weatherand accumulating ice. Aforemost consideration in thisjudgment call is the safety of theaircraft and the crew.

OCTOBER 1983

Rapidly changing weather isthe greatest hazard to coldweather flying, not only for thebeginner but for the experiencedpilot as well. In one case, a Hueypilot encountered unforecast icing less than Y2-mile from theend of the runway. Within 30seconds ice had obscured windshield visibility except for two6-inch squares in the lower leftand right corners. This pilot'sdecision to turn back immediately may have saved the aircraftand the crew.Icing is most common whenthe temperature is between32P/0C and -4P/-20C andvisible moisture such as clouds,drizzle, rain or wet snow is present. Icing is rarely experiencedin those areas which maintaintemperatures of -20C or below.Weather conditions that normally cause icing to occur are asfollows: Stratiform clouds indicatestable air in which minute waterdroplets and/or ice crystals aresuspended. Water droplets maybecome supercooled at or belowfreezing and still be in a liquidstate. Supercooled droplets freezeon contact with air and formlayers of ice. The suspended icecrystals are not hazardous toflight because they will notadhere to the aircraft. Icing in cumuli form cloudswith high moisture content canoccur rapidly. Unstable air withcurrents may carry large supercooled droplets which spreadbefore freezing, causing rapid accumulation of ice. Icing in mountainous terrain

occurs mainly when moist air islifted over high peaks. Iceproducing areas are usually onthe windward side of peaks toabout 4,000 feet above the peak,and possibly higher when the airis unstable. Icing in frontal inversionsalso can be rapid. Temperaturesare normally colder at higheraltitudes; but when air from awarm front rises above colderair, freezing rain may occur.Rain falling from the upper(warmer) layer into a colder layeris cooled to below freezing, butremains a liquid. The liquidfreezes upon contact with the aircraft, and accumulation may bevery rapid (figure 1 .

W RM AIR

, . \ \\. \

II 'dd 'FIGURE t.-Rain freezes upon contact.

7


20/48

The first sign that your aircrafthas entered icing conditions willbe ice on the windscreen. Butlike all rules, this one has exceptions. An anonymous pilot's account in Flight Comment theCanadian Armed Forces flightsafety magazine, emphasizes howunexpected icing can endangerhelicopters and their crews.

18

Sure s odd to get fogwhen it s this cold I thinkto myself. Feeling our wayalong the road that hasbeen cleverly disguised asan enormous snowdrift, Isuddenly get the feeling thatthe collective (up-downlever for you starchwingtypes) setting s unusuallyhigh for the speed and aircraft weight. A quick glancedown at the instrumentstells me that my TOT salso very high. What theI had been watchingfor any indication of ice accumulation on the windscreen and antennas- butnothing. When in doubtland as soon as possible, Ithink. With a thump we'redown (it's a good thingthere s a high transientunintentional TOT permitted). During shutdownthings start to vibrate quitebadly with chunks of iceflying off the main rotor asit coasts down. When themain rotor finally stopped Icouldn t believe my eyes.Ice covered the entire rotorsystem-heaviest towardsthe tips and taperingtowards the hub-a crustyice in excess of \I2-inchthick at places. The tailrotor was even worseagain tapering from the tipsbut in places well overI-inch thick. How stupidcould I be to fly under suchconditions? It was ignorance. Ignorance of itemsof information that should

have been basic to thet rade-and yet were not.Why not?Even in the worst icing conditions, the side windows normallywill not ice over and can providesome visibility. Thanks to this

phenomenon, the pilot of aC-I2A was able to land hiscrippled aircraft in fog, althoughhis windscreen was completelyiced over.

When icing is encountered,normally descent to an altitudeclear of the clouds s advised.However, in freezing rain, it isvital to know the altitude of theinversion layer and the freezinglevel. The best solution may beto climb through the inversionlayer to warmer air above.Rotor blade icing begins nearthe blade root. This ice buildupcan cause loss of lift, thus requiring an adjustment of powerto maintain lift, which will increase the engine operatingtemperature.Asymmetrical shedding occurswhen one rotor blade sheds iceresulting in an out of balancecondition. Severe vibrations mayoccur as a result of main rotorasymmetrical ice shedding. f icing conditions are encounteredwhile in flight, erratic controlmovements should not be madein an attempt to remove ice accumulations from the main rotorblades. Shaking the cyclic couldplace undue stress on the rotorsystem and lead to even greaterimbalance. Ice shedding can alsocause foreign object damagefrom ice ingested into the engine.f icing s moderate to heavy,land as soon as possible. f you

cannot land, fly the aircraft to awarmer flight level. Safeautorotational rotor speeds maybe lost if ice s allowed to formon the rotor blades. (Check FM1-230 for additional clarificationof structural icing.)

Ground personnel should remain well clear of helicopters

during landing and shutdownafter flight in icing conditions.Crew and passengers should remain aboard until the rotorblades have stopped. Pieces ofice shed by the main rotor whilepassing through translational liftduring approach to land, as wellas at .touchdown, have beenfound as far away as 300 feetfrom the aircraft.Ice accumulation increasesstalling speed of fixed-wing aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports thatwind tunnel tests have shownthat ice, frost, or snow accumulation on the leading edgeand upper surface of a wing,having a thickness and surfaceroughness similar to medium orcoarse sandpaper, can reducewing lift by as much as 30 percent and increase drag by 40 percent. Tests made in Sweden withsmall aircraft show that aI-millimeter layer of hoarfrost ona wing may result in a 50 percentreduction in maximum lift. Evenmosquitos deposited along awing's leading edge during summer operations have considerableeffect on the stalling speed ofsome modern aircraft.Accumulations of snow, frost,slush and ice while an aircraft son the ground will adversely affect general aircraft performance,climb performance and stallspeeds to a dangerous degree.Pilots of iced aircraft have foundthat following take-off, once theyrose above ground effect, theycould no longer sustain flight ormaneuver the aircraft withoutlosing control and stalling. Contamination of aircraft components by ice, frost, or snowalways has some effect, however,the fine line between a successfultake-off or loss of control andstall s sometimes difficult todetermine. Consequently, accumulations of snow, frost andice must be removed from aircraft before take-off.



21/48

The crash of Air Florida'sFlight 90 into the 14th StreetBridge over the Potomac River inJanuary of 98 provides a vividreminder of what ice accumulation on the ground can do to anaircraft. Seventy-eight peopledied, 74 on the Boeing 737 and 4others whose vehicles were on thebridge when the plane struck.The National TransportationSafety Board's (NTSB) conclusion as to the most probablecause of the crash was theflight crew's failure to use engineanti-ice during ground operationsand take-off, their decision totake off with snow ice on theairfoil surfaces of the aircraft,and the captain's failure to rejectthe take-off during the earlystages when his attention wascalled to anomalous engine instrument reading. Contributingfactors included prolongedground delays, known inherentpitch-up characteristics of theBoeing 737 when the leadingedge is contaminated with evensmall amounts of snow and ice,and the limited experience of theflight crew in jet transport winteroperations. According to theFAA, icing accidents are relatively few but the fatality rate ishigh. Victims are often pilotswho are operating in unfamiliarweather conditions for whichthey have no practical training.Ice and snow on runways aredangerous for fixed-wing operations. Snow is particularly slippery where temperatures are nearfreezing. Wet snow or thick slushon runways offers little frictionand there is a constant danger ofsliding or loss of braking action.Only slight brake pressure shouldbe applied to maintain directionalcontrol. Avoid taxiing throughpuddles or deep snow. Slush ormoisture can collect in the wheelassembly and cause the brakes tofreeze.Before taking off in rotarywing aircraft, skids should be

OCTOBER 983

FM 1-202,FM 31-70,FM 31-71,FM 90-6,TC 21-3,

Environmental FlightBasic Cold Weather ManualNorthern OperationsMountain OperationsSoldier's Handbook for Individual Operations and Survival in Cold Weather AreasAFM 64-5, Survival (This publication is available from the U.S.Air Force Distribution Center, Baltimore, Maryland21220)

Operator's Manual and any supplemental local directivesFIGURE 2.-Publications covering cold weather flight operations.

checked to be sure they are freefrom obstruction and have notfrozen to the surface. Helicoptersproduce the greatest amount ofrotor wash when hovering,therefore, hovering where there issnow should be avoided. Whenthere are no obstacles, a maximum performance take-offshould be made. f it is necessaryto clear an obstacle, make a nearvertical ascent.Unless proper landing procedures are used helicopters canbe engulfed in a snow cloud,particularly in powdered snowconditions. The aircraft must beflown in front of the snow clouduntil it makes contact with theground. Loss of outside visualreferences in helicopters canresult in undetected drift, treestrikes, or inadvertent groundcontact.The whiteout phenomenon isnot encountered as often byfixed-wing aircraft as by rotarywing aircraft but it can occur,particularly when aircraft areoperating in loose snow. As air isdrawn in by the propeller, loosesnow is lifted and blown rearward over the fuselage creatingwhiteout.Whiteout is not a phenomenonpeculiar to the novice aviator-high time, proficient aviatorswho have long experience in flying in snow conditions can stillfall victim to this hazard.A review of winter flying procedures will better prepare you todeal with cold weather problems.The publications listed in figure 2

will refresh your memory orbring you up-to-date on changes.There could be something thatwill save your aircraft o r evenyour life. Of course, you willalso need to know thecapabilities of both your aircraftand your crew. This information,along with the weather conditionsat your point of departure, enroute, and at destination, is vitalto your go, no go, decision asmission pressures build up. Onecivilian pilot penetrated a drizzling overcast with known icingconditions in an aircraft whichwas not equipped with deicinggear. His error in judgmentalmost cost him the lives of hiswife and children. He expressedthe lesson learned this way, Apilot's judgment is reliable onlyi you weigh all known risks of aproposed flight against the actualthreat to human welfare or sur-vival i the flight is not made.That's not a bad rule of thumbfor any aviator.

REFERENCESAirman's Roulette, Nov-Dec982 and Ground Icing, Jan-Feb1983 FAA General Aviation News.

AR 95-1, Army Aviation GeneralProvisions and Flight RegulationsFM 1-202, Environmental FlightFrozen Tips, No.2, 1983, FlightCommentRoed, Aage, Chief Technical Advisor, Swedish Board of AccidentInvestigation, Aircraft Deicing,Oct 1982, Flight Safety DigestThe Hazards of Winter Flying,Oct 1982, Flying Safety

9


22/48

VI TIONPERSONNEL NOT S

How to Lose Your Aviation Career IncentivePay without even trying

BEFORE YOU READ this article, I want youto resolve to yourself that you are willing to take thetime to correct any deficiencies in your records whichmay cause you to be over or under paid Now that Ihave your attention, you need to do two things:

Get a copy of your latest Leave and EarningsStatement (LES).

Get a copy of your most recent Officer RecordBrief (ORB).

f you don't have one, see your military personneloffice. Now that you have these two items, sit downand prepare to inspect them carefully.

Figures 1 and 2 are reproductions of these important documents with areas that you need to key onto prevent pay problems. The problem which causesyour incentive pay difficulties is encountered when theAviation Service Entry Date (ASED) and Total FederalOfficer Service (TFOS) date do not match on the LESand the ORB. These two items are both used to compute your eligibility for incentive pay and gatestatus.

Check blocks 45 and 46 of your LES with the appropriate blocks of the Aviator Gunnery Qualifica-

20

tions selection on the ORB. Are these two items synchronized? f not, it's time to send out the Maydaycall and proceed with the following emergencyprocedures: Contact your local finance and accounting office.

Contact your local military personnel office. f you cannot get the problem resolved locally,

write to: Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPCOPA-V 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.This step can be taken to resolve ny Aviation CareerIncentive Pay data problem, but any request must beaccompanied by appropriate documentation to justifythe change.

Recently, here at MILPERCEN, we have been b l ~to resolve more than 225 mismatches of ASED andTFOS. This is an ongoing effort which requires ex-tensive research of each case, to pinpoint the exactproblem. There are still an estimated 400 cases yet tobe resolved. Don't be one of those 400 who suddenlyfind their flight pay reduced or cut off because of anadministrative error. Check your LES and ORB to ensure all the data is valid. The guide to changing anyelement of the ORB is DA Pam 600-8.


23/48

TOFDC (Total OperationalFlying Duty Credit . Thecumulative number ofmonths an aviator is assigned to operational (not proficiency or nonoperational) flying duty pOSitions.

FIGURE 1Leave andEarningsStatement

JUMPS-ARMY LEAVE AND EARNINGS STATEMENT COPY 2 PFII ' ~ . ' ~ . ' ~ ~ ~ ~ T ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ = ~ ~ _ o - - - D S. SOC. II C. NO I INETPAYDUE . ~ . .,. -. :_ = ' ~ ~ ' - ~ - O - ~ - - ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ - I

I

. 0 1_.U . NlTIAftN 4

I . . . I _

I

'--- .r r - . ' . UOC I.... r- r :'-j,\ T '"......T r= 1J I , f T ' I ' T ) ' ' ' ' U G 7 . F o t _ o f t l t ' ' t o m t . _ I ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ & C . .\SED (Aviation Service Entry Date). The TFOS (Total Federal Officer Service). Alldate an officer is first qualified, Le., on officer service computed from date ofvalid orders, for aviation service. Once original appointment as a warrant or com-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h e d j S E D is not normally m7fticer

I. 1'1 I OFACER RECORD BRIEF IDA Pom - 1 /'''ON " .. , , ,n 0'" .. nON,,,,,,,,,,,,,7 .. ,-,,, ., . I --'1 :::-1 ;z:r ~ : : . - : Date of Physi~ 1 ~ S ~ t ~ C o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . t ~ : g ~ n ~ ~ ~= Qualified for Aviation - ' ~ ~Service ... I / 2 = Medically Disqual ified ~ I ~ I I ~ I I ' ~ ~ ~ q ~ ~ " ~ " " ~ ~ H ~ " " ~ " . ~ " U ~ " ' :.. - - ~ .= Non-Medically ':':::';:' .Disqualified , ~ : ~ ' ..... . 4=Aviator-Not in Aviation . .u '".''".ou.'' . .,o.. "'''0 .. ........ "'0 '0. .

Service :..t1 ... I I ,'. j ..... Aircraft Qualification Code - ~ 1 : ; : ~ ~ + . ~ ~ .. : j : 4 : ; ; ; ; : ~ = : : : ; ~ I : ; ; ; : : : . ,,,+OH= . ~ = . p q : o o ~ + = = I : : : : : :..=. :;::: = = + '=====11 = Qualified Aviator 2 = Unit Trained Instructor Pilot3 = School TrainedInstructor Pilot

OCTOBER 1983

FIGURE 2OfficerRecordBrief

21


24/48

\111 t fS

AH l FS \111 60A fS

I F i l n ~ J u u~ n [ [ ] ooilmunrIThe Alternative

The U S Army and particularly Ft Rucker considersthe use of simulators to enhance the

development of helicopter training programs s

22

a major breakthrough Simulator trainingsaves lives and it is cost effective



25/48

IIDEPARTMENT OF Defense policy is tomaintain or increase combat readiness to the extentpossible through the use of simulation, miniaturization and substitution. Currently, the U.S. Army training strategy for aircrews includes a simulator programwith expenditures exceeding 600 million dollars.The cost of training and maintaining proficient aircrews is expensive in terms of dollars and trainingresources. Today, attack helicopter pilot gunnerytables have been established by affordability ratherthan by required proficiency. Also, many importanttasks can t be safely taught in the actual aircraft. Theability to react properly to emergencies, such as lossof components, determines aircrew chances of survivability. Obviously, this type of emergency procedurecan t be practiced in an expensive aircraft. Reactingto foreign object damage caused by Threat air defenseweaponry is perhaps inevitable during war but is notpossible to train for with an actual helicopter orairplane. Common sense demands that alternativetraining methods be used.

OCTOBER 983

Major Ralph P AaronDirectorate of Training and DoctrineNew Systems Training Office

U S Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

The flight simulator FS) program is managed at theU.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, by theDirectorate of Training and Doctrine, New SystemsTraining Office, Training Devices Branch. The Training Devices Branch was established on 1 October 1981with the mission of functioning as the user s representative. Specifically, Training Devices Branch officerstranscribe need statements into requirementdocuments, write acceptance test plans, write (or assistwith writing) specifications prior to contract andmonitor programs from the need statement throughoutthe life cycle of the system. Action officers, or systemsmanagers, are assigned to major systems. For example, the AH-1 Cobra systems manager is responsiblefor all training devices associated with that system.This includes the AH-1 flight and weapons simulatorand several part task trainers.The Army flight simulator program began withTraining Device Requirement 0027, approved on 10July 1967, by a letter from Headquarters, U.S. ArmyCombat Developments Command. The firstsimulators were delivered to Ft. Rucker in 1971. Thefour-cockpit systems replicated the UH-1H Huey configuration. Cost avoidance and enhanced training inthese simulators resulted in an additional purchase of21, four-cockpit UH-1H synthetic flight trainingsystems (SFTS) from the Singer-Link Company. TheUH-1 SFTS are all alive, well and still in use-havingaccumulated more than 811,000 flight hours (as of 25July 1983) at Ft. Rucker alone.The next generation of SFTS procured was theCH-47C Chinook prototype SFTS. t was followed bythe AH-1 TOW Cobra prototype flight simulator andthe UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter simulator. A prototype AH-64A Apache combat mission simulator(CMS) is on the horizon and a training device requirement for a scout attack team trainer has been preparedby the Aviation Center and forwarded to the U.S.Army Training Support Center for staffing.

3


26/48

CH-47 Flight SimulatorCH-47FS)

he prototype Chinook CH-47FS was delivered toFt. Rucker on 15 December 1976. The CH-47FS consists of one cockpit which includes both student stations and an instructor station as well as a motionsystem, a computer system and a camera model boardvisual system. The device may be used for instrumentflight rules lFR) or visual flight rules VFR) environments. The motion system is 6 degrees offreedom; that is, the aircraft attitude changes in allthree axes and the aircraft translational movement inall three dimensions is represented in the aircraft. Avideo camera and model board are used to provide avisual representation to the pilot through televisionreceivers mounted in the windows of the cockpit. Thiswas the first device to incorporate a visual system.Singer-Link was awarded a contract in June 1979for three production model C CH-47FSs. All three

FIGURE : BOIP for CH47FS.

devices have been fielded. They, along with the prototype, employ a camera model board visual system.A contract will be awarded in the first quarter offiscal year FY) 1984 to modify all fielded CH-47FSsfrom C model to the D model configuration. This willinclude conversion of the camera model board visualto a computer generated imagery visual system.Two additional CH-47FSs, D models, were contracted for in July 1983 The basis of issue plan BOIP)is at figure 1This device is an excellent training vehicle for bothtransition and continuation training. Practically all aircrew training manual tasks may be practiced in thisdevice. Some examples are ground taxi, takeoff, hovering, standard autorotation, landing, terrain flight, confined area and pinnacle landings, and slingloadoperations. ..,.

UNIT LOCATION READY FOR TRAININGPrototype-1 Ft. Rucker, AL Aug 77 C Model C I I ~ . 7 .2 Ft. Campbell, KY 2 May 82 C Model Ps3 Ft. Hood, TX 3 Aug 83 C Model ( o(,.{:4 Coleman Bks 3 Dec 82 C Model iJJltUSAREUR)5 Ft. Lewis, WA Apr 86 0 Model6 Korea Sep 86 D Model

24


27/48

AU I Flight and WeaponsSimulator FWS)

The prototype AH IQ Cobra flight simulator wasdelivered to the Aviation Center on 22 January 1979.A contract was awarded to Singer-Link on 30December 1982 to upgrade the device to the AH ISModernized Cobra configuration. It is currently usedby the Attack Branch for the aircraft qualificationcourse. It is also used by the Active Army, the Reserve,

AH IFS cockpit.

FIGURE : BOIP for AH1FWS.READYUNIT LOCATION FOR TRAINING

1 Ft. Hood, TX May 842 Hanau, FRG Aug 84PrototypeModified Ft. Rucker, AL Dec 843 Ft. Campbell KY Mar 854 Illesheim FRG Jun 855 Ft. Lewis, WA Sep 856 Ft. Rucker, AL Nov 867 Indiantown Gap, PA Feb 878 Phoenix, AZ May 87

Devices 6 7 and 8 have not been contracted for at this time.

OCTOBER 1983

the National Guard and Allied Nations includingIsrael. This device will be out of service in March 1984,refurbished and ready for training in December 1984.A contract was awarded to the Singer-Link Companyon 15 April 1981 to build five AH IFWS in theAH IS Modernized Cobra configuration. TheAH IFWS is designed to train normal operating procedures, emergency procedures and gunnery techniques. The trainer consists of two separate cockpitsrepresenting the pilot and gunner station, with eachcockpit mounted on its own 6 degree of freedom mo-tion system. The entire complex is controlledby five PDP 11/45 computers. Eachcockpit is an authentic replica of the actualaircraft from the trainee station forward.The trainer includes a visual system that provides day and night cues to the pilots as well asweapons effects. The visual system employs aclosed circuit laser camera/television systemwith a three-dimensional terrain model. Twoidentical 64-foot long by 24-foot high modelsrepresent a part of the Ft. Rucker training area

about 11 by 4 nautical miles in area. A laserprobe, synchronized with cockpit maneuvers, generates the visual image seen by the pilot on a front andside window, and by the gunner on a front window.The two identical terrain boards provide the capabilityof flying separate training missions for the pilot andgunner simultaneously, or the two cockpits can belinked electronically for crew training.This device is capable of being used for a myriadof individual and crew training tasks. All weapons willbe simulated including the 20 mm, the TOW tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missile andthe 10-pound high explosive folding fin aerial rocket.The AH IFWS has 26 Threats of which any 1 maybe programed to be active at any time. Each Threatpossesses the capabili ty to engage the crew with eitherelectronic warfare or weapons, to be scored HIT orMISS, and some will display a muzzle flash. The deviceis a good trainer for night vision goggles and nuclear,biological and chemical tasks. The BOIP is at figure 2.This is the first device fielded that will allow crewsto train in a simulated combat environment.

25


28/48

UH-60A Flight SimulatorUH-60FS)

A contract was awarded to the Singer-Link Company on 3 August 976 to build a prototype BlackHawk UH-60FS. The trainer was delivered to Ft.Rucker in June 1980. The prototype consists of twoseparate cockpits with independent motion systems.UH-60A FS cockpit.

26

One cockpit has a four-window digital image generation visual system while the other cockpit has a threewindow, camera-model system visual. This device isused for the aviator qualification course. Each studentreceives 6 hours flight time in the UH-60FS from a

UNITPrototype123456789

101112131415

total program of 5 flight hours.A development acceptance inprocess review was conducted inMay 983 at Ft. Rucker. The decision was made to go into production for 5 UH-60FSs. All production devices will use computergenerated imagery. The HOIP is atfigure 3.The UH-60FS is an excellent aidin conducting transition and continuation training. The device willbe used for normal and emergencyprocedures in both VFR and IFRenvironments. zG .

FIGURE 3: BOIP or UH60FS.READYLOCATION FOR TRAINING

Ft. Rucker, AL Apr 81Ft. Campbell, KY Apr 86Ft. Campbell, KY Jul 86Hanau, FRG Oct 87Iliesheim, FRG Jan 87Ft. Lewis, WA Apr 87Ft. Bragg, NC Jul 87Ft. Hood, TX Oct 88Korea Jan 88Germany Apr 88Korea Jul 88Ft. Ord, CA Oct 89Hawaii Jan 89Ft. Riley, KS Apr 89Ft. Bliss, TX Jul 89Indiantown Gap NG) Oct 90



29/48

AH 64A Combat MissionSimulator

In July 982 the Army awarded a contract to theSinger-Link Company for a prototype ApacheAH-64A CMS. This will be the first synthetic trainerwith full sensor integration capabilities applied to atotal crew training concept. The prototype will consist of two separate cockpits, one for the pilot and theother for the copilot gunner. The two cockpits allowthe pilots to train separately or as a crew.Each cockpit will have an onboard instructor station. Training functions for each cockpit will be controlled from the instructor's station in either an independent or integrated mode.The simulator will include a visual system tosimulate the out-the-window scene as well as a varietyof sensor displays. The sensor systems that will besimulated are the forward looking infrared radar vi-sionics associated with the pilot's night vision sensorsystem and the gunner's Target Acquisition Designation System, as well as the daylight TV system, directview optics and the Integrated Helmet and DisplaySighting System.The visual requirements for this device exceed thecurrent state-of-the art of visual technology. Becauseindustry wasn't capable of providing the needed visualcapability at the time the user needed to begin training, an interim combat mission simulator (ICMS) isbeing developed as an alternative for the near term.This interim device will totally comply with the user'srequirements in all areas except visual and sensorsimulation. A simultaneous Visual System ComponentDevelopment Program (VSCDP) was initiated in May1981. Once this visual system is developed it will beincorporated into the CMS.On 7 December 1981, the Assistant Secretary of theArmy for Research, Development and Acquisition approved the fielding of a two-station ICMS at Ft.Rucker no later than 1 August 985 through an accelerated competitive process. As a result of this 2-yearproduction acceleration, prototype technology will befielded. A preplanned product improvement programwill be implemented in conjunction with the VSCDPin the FY 988 timeframe. The tentative BOIP is atfigure 4.

OCTOBER 1983

As the early Vietnam era gunship evolved into the"space age weapons platform of the Apache, so hasthe philosophy governing the training of attack air-

Artist concept ofexternal viewof AH64Ae S cockpitrnodule.

crews. We can no longer afford to fly the actual aircraft or fire its weapon systems in training on a sustained basis. This is especially true for the AH-64 when1 flight hour costs the American taxpayer roughly$3,000 and one HELLFIRE missile fired downrangecosts in excess of $40,000 Also, cost considerationsaside, existing ranges and maneuver areas are tot llyinadequate to support realistic combat skills trainingfor AH-64 aircrews. These are the issues which drivethe criticality surrounding the accelerated procurementof the combat mission simulator and herald the factthat until the fielding of the CMS, Apache aircrewswill be less than adequately trained to perform theirmissions.

FIGURE : Tentative BOIP for AH64CMS.UNIT LOCATION READY FOR TRAININGICMS Ft. Rucker AL Aug 85

1 Ft. Hood TX Aug 862 USAREUR Nov 863 Ft. Campbell KY May 874 USAREUR Feb 87

27


30/48


31/48


32/48


33/48


34/48


35/48

Hangar Talk" a quiz containing questions based onpublicationsapplicable toAnnyAviation.The answel5are atthe bottom of the page. If you did not do well, perhaps youshould -get out the publication and look it over.

FM 1 301Aeromedical Training for Flight Personnel

CW Gary o WeilandDepartment of Combined Arms Training

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL

1. What is the most plentiful gas in the earth'satmosphere?a. Hydrogen c. Oxygenb. Nitrogen d. Argon

2. An average adult human body contains aboutpints of blood.a. Six c. Tenb. Eight d. Twelve

(I) ES-6 ElEd 01E-8 ElEd 6

q) Z) E8 L ElEd 8

OCTOBER 1983

Z-9 alnfiu LZ) -S ElEd 9S) ql-v ElEd S

3. One of the symptoms of hyperventilation iscyanosis (blueness of the skin).a. True b. False

4. List the following modes of flight in order ofleast to most fatiguing.a. Night vision gogglesb. Instrumentc. Chemical MOPP 4 protectiond. Day, nap-of-the-earth

5. The force acting on an object moving in a circular pattern, which holds the object on itscircular path, is centrifugal force.a. True b. False

6. Carbon dioxide (C 02 , as a fire extinguishingagent, is nontoxic.a. True b. False

7. Some symptoms of are cool skinwith profuse perspiration and a rapid pulserate.a. Heat exhaustion c. Hypothermiab. Heatstroke

8. An individual will rarely notice noise-inducedhearing loss until extensive hearing loss hasoccurred.a. True b. False

9. The site at which the optic nerve enters the eyeis void of photosensitive cells and causes a nightblind spot in the visual field.a. True b. False

10. What is the mostdisorientation?a. Corio is illusionb. Leans

Z alqEl E 'p 'q ...EZ Z ElEd osOI-Z Nd Z

common form of spatialc. Autokinesisd. Flicker vertigo

SH MSNV

33


36/48

PEARL SPersonal Equipment nd Rescue/survival Lowdovvn

Cathy Fancher photo by Reflections StudioUSAF TO 00-5-1USAF Technical Order TO) 00-5-1 has recentlybeen distributed. The TO is only a 6-page document,but since it deals with the Air Force technical ordersystem, it would be a good one to have around.Inertia Reel Assembly

The inertia reel assembly, national stock numberNSN) 1680-00-775-4182, is a multiple application itemused on UH-l AH-l OH-58 and CH-54 aircraft. Inthe past, it was managed as a nonrepairable item anddisposed of at unit level. As a result of a recent U.S.Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel ReadinessCommand value engineering proposal, it was recommended and approved that the supply, maintenanceand recover ability code be changed to require turn-inof this item for repair at depot level. t was determinedthat this repair program was cost effective and wouldresult in supply availability at a lower overall cost,resulting in increased readiness of this vital ALSE.When the inertia reel requires removal, the unserviceable reel should be returned to Sharpe ArmyDepot, Lathrop, CA 95330, RIC AQ5, W62G2T.TSARCOM Supply Letter Number 3383, dated 7December 1982, covers this same subject.Question and AnswerDear PEARL I am perplexed and hope you can

4

help us aviation life support equipment users with apredicament w are facing. Can you tell me the proper maintenance procedures and repair tolerances of heCWU-27 P aircrew personnel flight coverall?We are always glad to help and because we have hadso many questions pertaining to maintenance andrepair of aircrew personnel clothing, it seems users andin some cases commanders are not fully aware of therepair tolerances of this critical clothing: FIRST-TM 10-8400-201-23, TB 10-8400-252-23

and also FM 10-16, FM 10-30 and USAF TO14P3-1-112 will provide information on this subject;so become familiar with these references.

SECOND-The updated version of TM10-8400-201-23 will clearly state garment shall be condemned when it no longer presents an acceptablemilitary appearance from the standpoint of structuralintegrity to coincide with USAF TO.

THIRD-Repair of Nomex flying coveralls shallbe restricted to open seams, holes or tears, not in excess of 4 inches and replacement of hook/pile slidefasteners. Small holes or tears not in excess of Y inchmay be mended and/or darned on a sewing machine.To repair holes larger than Y inch, but less than 4inches, use patches. Patches shall be Nomex fabric,NSN 83 5 -00-406-7499, color, sage green.) But be sureto follow proper sewing procedures and use the proper Nomex thread . NOTE: TM 10-8400-201-23 is being updated to reflect proper information the same asUSAF TO 14P3-1-112, since we are a user of the AirForce item of clothing. POC for additional information is Jim Angelos, AUTOVON 693-3112.Parts Listing for Headset, NSN 5965-00-755-4656 P /N10557This is the gray headset used by ground crew personnel on the flight line and ramp area. They are normally not authorized the SPH-4 helmet. This headsetprovides noise protection as well as a communicat ioncapability. t is also used by aircrews in some fixedwing aircraft when the SPH-4 is not required. AirForce Technical Order 12R2-2AIC-222 coversmaintenance and parts information on this headset.This headset should not be disposed of when it



37/48

becomes unserviceable. Recommend that i t be turnedin for repair, using the AFTO as authorization. Savings will be about 65.00 on each headset repaired.SPH-4 Helmet Microphone BoomThe SPH-4 helmet microphone boom rotation problem can be solved. Natick Laboratories (NLABS) hascome up with a value engineering proposal to adherethe microphone boom slotted washer to the inside ofthe helmet shell if the microphone boom rotates toofreely. The following procedure was found to workquite well.

1. Abrade one surface of the slotted washer and thecorresponding surface of helmet shell with 80 gritsandpaper.2. Clean both areas using a cloth with denaturedalcohol; allow to dry.3. Apply a thin coating of 3M EC-1357 orequivalent adhesive to both surfaces; allow to dry 3to 5 minutes. Adhesive should have set and helmetready for use within 2 hours. The 3M EC-1357adhesive should be available in 5 ounce tubes throughyour local 3M distributor.4. Reassemble microphone boom hardware snugly.NOTE: Should more information be desired, point ofcontact at NLABS is the project engineer for theSPH-4 helmet, Mr. Bruce Buckland, AUTOVON256-5580 or Commercial (617) 651-5580.

SP -4 Helmet Retention Assembly SizingRegular size retention assemblies are out of stock.The extra large (XL) retention assembly, NSN8415-01-056-0699 is available in quantity; as an interimsolution to the out of stock regular size, the followingalterations may be used as needed.With the retention assembly removed from theSPH-4 flyer's helmet, use the following procedures toaccomplish the alterations: Unfasten buckle from the nape strap. Apply a chalk mark 2 inches on both sides of thecenter seam on the top and bottom binding (figure 1). Carefully remove stitching from the top and bottom binding, taking care not to cut or damage eitherthe binding or the fabric (figure 1). With the binding loose from the retentionassembly, cut the lower binding (opposite end fromtop binding seam). On the upper binding removestitching up to the point of overlap. Peel back the bind-

I 2 -+- 2 1-+1 te I t., ~ i ~ i S

illckl. outI i

.

1 sew new seam 1/4 from old seam2 cut both extensionsat the old seam3 pull extension rightside out

4 sew bindingback into place5 blacken out allsize marking

wa:::;)CJiL

NWa:::;)CJiL

ing, exposing the outer edges of material (figure 2). Remove the edge stitching from the top and bottom of fabric 2 inches on each side of center seam,turn each edge of material inside out after edge stitching has been removed (figure 2). Using FED-VT-295, type I, class I, subclass A,size E, olive drab, nylon thread, seven to nine stitchesper inch, sew new seam on each layer of materialinch in from existing seam, cut fabric at old seam andturn each layer right side out (figure 3). Using original stitch pattern, resew upper andlower edge of fabric. Resew binding to material overlapping asrequired. Reinstall nape strap through buckle. Mark out NSN and XL with black laundrymarker.Altered XL retention assembly will now fit regularsize SPH-4 flyer's helmet. Alteration procedure is usedto eliminate excessive bunching of material under napestrap.

f additional information is desired, your point ofcontact at TSAR COM is Mr. Jim Angelos, DRSTSMCAPL, AUTOVON 693-3112 or Commercial (314)263 3112/3114.

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear write PEARL DARCOM ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St. Louis MO 63