Army Aviation Digest - May 1994

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Major General Dave Robinson

Protect the ForceMost everyone I talk with wants

to protect the force. We have gottenrelatively sophisticated in assessing riskand understanding its management.Protect the force is much more than asafety slogan-it must be internalizedby each of ou r aircrews and groundsupport personnel. It is easy to becomevictim to complacency! The result isdisaster and heartache.

Not too long ago, I received aneye-opening phone call. A senior aviation officer working in the Pentagoncalled me. He was relaying the concernsof a young company-grade officer whowas about to deploy to the NationalTraining Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif. As most units do, his was leaningforward in the saddle to prepare fo rthe challenges and rigors of this intensetraining opportunity. However, thisyoung officer felt the train was movingtoo quickly; the training "Super Bowl"was approaching, and he did not feelready. He had a nervous knot in hisbelly-was it time to call time-out andrefocus?

With this information at hand, Idecided to call the young officer 's brigade commander and get his perspective. The unit is a top outfit with a solidrecord of performance. The brigadecommander appreciated the call. Afterall, I was not trying to command thebrigade but give him some informationthat he had a few players with pregamejitters. So he decided to take a step backand assess. This doesn't mean the unitwas not proficient or couldn't get thejob done.

The brigade commander gathered hischain of command and affirmed the

"crawl, walk, and run" philosophy ofour profession. In doing this, he transmitted his understanding of pregame jitters and confirmed the rotation as a"training opportunity" and not a "showand-tell" operation. The team settleddown, and its confidence increased.The brigade deployed to the NTC andhad a superb rotation-accomplishingall training objectives without anincident or accident. Now the youngcompany-grade officer mayor may nothave saved someone's life by raising hisconcerns. What is important here is thecommander's response. Once aware, heacknowledged and addressed those concerns; that is what makes the difference-that is real leadership. We gladlyaccept the challenges and hazards ofArmy aviation, but we also must besmart enough to do everything possibleto avoid risky behavior or unnecessarymistakes. When somebody calls timeout or says "I'm not ready," it is ourobligation to listen and make the rightdecision. Remember the crawl, walk,run approach-it works! We empowerou r young leaders to make l ifeand-death decisions in combat;why shouldn't we listen to them inpeacetime?

While soldiering itself is hazardous,the nature of our mission requires aviators to operate "in harm's way" on aregular basis in a notoriously unforgiving profession. Because of this,the Army aviation community hasalways had a heightened awarenessof accident prevention and forceprotection. As we travel into thetwenty-first century, protection of ourresources, people, and equipment has

u.s. Army Aviation Digest May/June 1994

never been so important. Commandersand leaders--f rom the Chief of Staff ofthe Anny down to the lowest leadershiplevels-must become personally involved.As Army aviation has grown andmatured, so has our knowledge and ability to protect ourselves from the inherent risks of our dangerous business. Inthe 1950s- when Army aviation wasstriving to find its own identi tyour accident rate was about 50 mishapsper 100,000 flight hours. This alarmingrate caused the formation of the ArmyAccident Review Board, which later became the U.S. Army Safety Center, FortRucker, Ala. Army safety has come along way since this humble beginning.Aviation safety has consistently blazedthe trail for the Army.

Today, through the hard work andgenuine concern of every soldierconcerned with Army aviation, we arecommitted to driving the Class A aviation accident rate down to less than oneaccident per 100,000 flight hours. Weare also committed to greatly reducingClass Band C mishaps. We cannotaccept human-error mishaps--becausesuch accidents sometimes result frompoor decisions. Certain mishaps canresult in lost lives and equipment.

While the numbers are gettingsmaller, we still suffer the same typesof accidents as we did four decades ago.Human error dominates as the leadingcausal factor. In 1993, there was a totalof 125 Class A through Class C accidents; of these, 67 percent were causedby human error. Human-error accidentsare described in five categories:standards failure, training failure, leader


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failure, individual failure, and supportfailure.

If standards do not exist or are notpractical, then we have a standards failure. Everything we do in the Armyshould be done to a high, yet achievable, standard. I f he standards exist, butthe individual doesn't know about themor how to achieve them, then we have atraining failure. This parallels a leadership failure in which the standards areknown but not enforced. Now, we cometo the tough part- if the standards areknown but aren't followed, we have anindividual failure. It is the most concealed form of human error because itis often executed without anyone elseknowing-unless there is a mishap. Occasionally, something happens in thesupport side of the house that is humaninduced; we must stamp these intooblivion.

Leaders must have their heads in thegame at all times--assessing potentialrisk areas and working a managementscheme. Effective leadership has theability to anticipate; we can never letour guard down. Nothing we do inpeacetime is worth the loss of one life.

Army aviation is still leading the wayin safety and accident prevention. Weare continually improving our knowledge and techniques of force protectionwith innovative programs. As you willread in Dr. Leedom's article (pages 10through 13), the Army's own aviationcrew-coordination training is now a reality. We are no longer dealing with crewcoordination that lacks objective standards--nor are we talking in terms ofhow to coordinate at 35,000 feet. Instead, we are focused on the nap-ofthe-earth environments using night-vision systems. We have integrated crewcoordination into aviation training atboth USAAVNC and in the field.Risk management is rapidly rising tothe forefront as the decision-makingprocess. Now, we clearly understandthat risk management is a leadershipfunction that requires aggressive command emphasis. Today, instruction in allleadership courses (aviation officer,warrant officer, or noncommissionedofficer) at Ft. Rucker includes howto implement the risk-managementprocess. All aviation doctrine manuals2

now include guidance on risk-management implementation. You are operating with a serious handicap if you havenot integrated risk management into theway you conduct operations.

The U.S. Army Safety Center isworking diligently with the AviationBranch to find methods to identify whoor what may cause the next accident andtake positive steps to reduce that risk.During my many visits to different aviation units over the past several years, Ilike to ask three questions: who is going to have the next accident in yourunit, what kind of accident will it be,and what are you doing about it? A common answer is, "Sir, we're not going tohave an accident." That's the unit mostlikely to have an accident. Why? Because the commander who says his unitwill not have an accident is a commander who is comfortable with his situation and has stopped looking. Whenyou get too comfortable as a commanderor leader-you get nonchalant, and yourhead is not in the game.

Data from aviation accidents is nowbeing analyzed in greater detail thanever before in an effort to provide thefield with an automated risk-management program. This not only informs themission planner of the level of risk of aselected course of action but also recommends countermeasures to eliminateor reduce the risk. Development of a"Next Accident Test" for aviators isnearing completion. When fielded, thistest will assist both the commander andthe individual by defining behaviorthat may contribute to the next accident. Our goal is to identify and changerisky behavior. We closely review accident records of those individuals whoare tentatively selected for instructorpilot qualification training. I f this initiative is successful, it will be expandedto all advanced aviation training. Ihighly encourage commanders toexecute this at the unit level.

The aviation commander clearlyunderstands that force protection is acommand function. We are veryfortunate to have realized the need fora specialized staff officer to manage theadministrative safety requirements andadvise commanders on risk-assessmentcriteria and possible courses of action.

The Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) iskey in unit safety programs. The SafetyCenter has redefined the ASO responsibilities. No longer is the ASO coursegraduate just an accident investigatorwith limited knowledge of how to manage a safety program. Our new ASOsare arriving at units with skills in accident-prevention techniques that includeessential risk-management skills, occupational health and safety knowledge,Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) compliance,and hands-on experience in hazardidentification and countermeasures.Furthermore, we are completing workon a refresher course for ASOs to keepthem up-to-date on current programs.The Aviation Branch Safety Office isrevamping Army Regulation 385-95,ArmyAviationAccident Prevention, tobetter clarify procedures for safety program management. Planned changesinclude full integration of risk management, clear delineation of safety program functions, and a restructuringof the Commander's Accident Prevention Plan to make it a truly useful tool.The goal is to provide you with a regulation that is user-friendly and works atall levels.

The present era is a challenging anddemanding era for Army aviation.Changing missions abroad, the Armydrawdown, budget constraints, and limited resources leave us no margin forerror. Critical to contingency-forcereadiness is our ability to successfullyimplement the risk-managementprocess and eliminate human-erroraccidents. Do not walk randomlyinto a situation that will control youyou decide! You decide whether you areready for a crawl, walk, or run operation-just as the young company-gradeofficer did in the beginning of thisarticle. Our ultimate test is victoryin battle; and for this to occur, wemust protect the force, remembering that soldiers are our most preciousasset-taking care of them is a solemnobligation.

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The following comments areaddressed to the article, AviationWarrant Officer Fixed-Wing CareerUpdate, page 43, January/February1994, Aviation Digest, concerningthe changes in the acquisition, assignment, and utilization of aviationwarrant officer (AWO) fixed-wingaviators.I am convinced that the U.S.Army must implement an approachto fixed-wing aviation that ensuresadequate numbers of trained, competent aviators are available to bothoperational support airlift (OSA)and special electronics missionaircraft (SEMA) assignments.The changes outlined in thearticle are certainl y first step incorrecting a problem that hasplagued Army fixed-wing careerprogression since the mid-1970sthat is, too many senior warrantofficers. However, there appear tobe inconsistencies in three specificareas of the plan.

The plan does not permit theacquisition of warrant officer Is(WOls) into fixed-wing. The Armyplan concludes that WOls are capable of competing for and completing training in advanced rotarywing aircraft-such as the AH--64,CH-47, and the UH--6O--but notfor fixed-wing aircraft. The planlimits fixed-wing training to chiefwarrant officer 2s (CW2s) who arenot qualified in an advanced aircraft.This implies that fixed-wing/

SEMA trainees will be selectedfrom a population of CW2s thatwere nonselects for competitivepositions in advanced rotary-wingaircraft. The WOl restriction seemsinconsistent because second lieutenants are routinely selected for flXedwing training; these individualsreceive the same level of trainingas WOls.

The article states that" . . . anequitable outside continentalUnited States to CONUS rotationbase for fixed-wing warrants of allranks. Some fixed-wing aviatorsmay find themselves rotating intoaerial exploitation battalions . . . .This statement suggests that the primary thrust of fixed-wing trainingis to support the OSA Command requirements. This is wrong! Thisstatement exacerbates an alreadydifficult situation in which Army intelligence trains SEMA warrant officers, gives them valuable operational skills, and then loses them toan OSA assignment. Army intelligence has a well-validated, significant requirement for competitive,capable, SEMA-qualified warrantofficers. SEMA pilots require special skills that are developed throughformal training at Fort Huachuca,Ariz., and recurrent operational assignments in intelligence battalions.Rotations between OSA and SEMAassignments are counterproductive.The article does not address thehigh attrition rate of senior fixedwing aviators. Also, no method ofslowing attrition is addressed.

I recommend the following asadditional solutions:U.S. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994

Allow WOls to compete forfixed-wing as they do fo r advanced rotary-wing aircraft. Thiswill ensure that fixed-wing hasits fair share of top performers. SEMA fued-wing aviators musthave a specific military occupational specialty (MOS) designationand be assigned only to aerial exploitation battalions and otheraerial intelligence units for theirentire careers. Establish a floor for SEMAfixed-wing promotions to CW5.This will slow the attrition rate ofexperienced WOs while the newforce structure is implemented. Thiswould ensure a safe and professional development of a new fixedwing aviator base. There is an inordinately low selection rate for CW5among fixed-wing SEMA aviators.This consistently low selection ratecannot be attributed to individualperformance alone. It appears thatthere is a difference between whatfield military intelligence (MI) commanders consider top performersand what promotion boards considertop performers.

With the Aviation RestructureInitiative, Army fixed-wing is at acritical point in its history. Stepsmust be taken to ensure that thefixed-wing force will support thetactical needs of commanders. A coherent fixed-wing policy must beset that adequately addresses theneeds of Army tactical intelligence.

LTC Michael J. GaffneyCommander. 15th Military Intelligence Battalion (AE)Fort Hood, TX 76544-5085

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American Military University isan independent university foundedin June 1991 in the Commonwealthof Virginia. The purpose of the University is to provide graduate education in military studies. TheUniversity's primary audience is theU.S. military, but anyone meetingthe admission requirements is eligible for study at AMU. As of January 1994, the university has grownto an enrollment of 300 students, afaculty of 68 (41 of whom hold thedoctorate), and an offering of morethan 100 courses.

All instruction at AMU isconducted through distance education. Direct communication between the student and professoris accomplished by telephone, correspondence, computer, or othermeans. The student is required to"meet" with the professor at leastfour times during the semester, usuall y by telephone. Professors arerequired to establish "office hours"each week to allow students the opportunity to communicate directlywith them-thus contributing toa close one-on-one mentoringapproach to the learning process.

Students are located throughoutthe United States and abroad and aregenerally not able to attend standardclassroom instruction. The university provides each student withrequired material for directed selfstudy and research; the student mayalso use local libraries and researchfacilities for supplemental material.

Each course has a specificweekly assignment and goal.Students study at their own pacebut must complete all assignedrequirements within the 15-week4

semester time period. Althougheach course contains differentrequirements, general minimumcourse requirements include1,200 to 1,500 pages of requiredreading, a research project or paper,and a proctored final examination.

The most basic definition of theword "faculty" is "teaching body."AMU expands this definition toinclude maximum personal attent ion-a one-on-one mentoring environment, and a special partnershipbetween the student and professor.The faculty at AMU is composedof professional educators, militaryhistorians, and authors. They havededicated their lives to the study andteaching of the military arts andsciences; they now offer their capabilities to students of warfare,regardless of the student's locationin the world. AMU combines itsdistinguished faculty with a broadcurriculum and high academic standards to form a unique institutionof higher learning.Students may specialize in one offour areas of study-land warfare,naval warfare, air warfare, or defense management. These areasstudy are designed to allow the student to focus academic efforts in thespecific area of interest. About 35courses are available each semesterto support the four areas of study.Eventually, course selection willcomprise the most extensive arrayof military courses availablean ywhere in the country.

As a new institution of graduateeducation, AMU is required to operate for a tw


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Enrollment Growth Winter 1993-18. Summer 1993-57. Fall 1993-156. Winter 1994-275. As of Feb 1994-311Number of Courses Offered January 1993 (Winter}-13. May 1993 (Summer}-27. September 1993 (Fall}-35. January 1994 ( W i n t e r ~ 3 5 . May 1994 (Summer}-33.Catalog Requests3,000 since October 1992.Student Profile (Winter 1994) U.S. Army 26. U.S. Navy 18. U.S. Marine Corps 38. U.S. Air Force 32. National Guard 50. Retired Military 23. Civilian 119. Foreign 5.Students in Degree Programs Land warfare-96. Naval warfare-12. Air warfare-19. Defense management-10. Undecided-174.Faculty66 members, 44 of whom holdPhDs.Most Popular Courses RC700-The Study and Use ofMilitary History. LW500-American MilitaryExperience to 1900. LW503-The A merican Revolution. LW518-History of GuerrillaWarfare. LW519-The Korean War NW514-Naval Power andStrategy. AW503-Air War in Korea.American Civil War coursesAMU announces the inauguralblock of graduatecourses concentrating on the American CivilWar. Scheduled to be offered

during fall semester, which beginsin August 1994, are- U.S. Grant: Study in Leadership(Professor Edward Coggins) Prelude to War: AntebellumAmerica (Dr. James Abrahamson) Naval History of the Civil War(Professor Robert Schneller).Five other courses that focus onthe Civil War are under development. These courses will thoroughlycover all the major campaigns andbattles of the War Between theStates and will commence in January 1995. Course materials will include the best books and videotapesavailable on the Civil War. Dr. FrankVandiver-authorofMighty Stonewall, Their Tattered Flags, andother acclaimed works on the CivilWar-is a member of the AMUAcademic Board, which will assist in the development of this10-course block.AMU also continues to offer oneof the most comprehensive rangesof graduate level courses in MilitaryStudies available anywhere. Currentcourses address- Ancient and medieval wafare. American Revolution. Boer War. World War I. World War II. Vietnam. Afghanistan. U.N. peacekeeping operations. Military law. Leadership. Military logistics.Courses cover the gamut of themilitary arts and sciences--on land,at sea, and in the air. At AMU, students study with some of the mostnoted authorities in the field--educators, authors, and civilian andmilitary leaders. The universitycatalog contains a complete list ofall AMU courses and faculty.


The Army Otter-CaribouAsssociation will have its ninthannual reunion 7-11 September inOrlando, Fla. Former Army Otter orCaribou aviation personnel shouldcontact the association at 1-800-626-8194 for membershipinformation.The association was organized in1985 and approved by the IRSas a nonprofit veteran organizationunder IRS Code 501(c)(19).

Former U.S. Air Corps cadetsand instructors who trained ortaught in the 1940s at Parks Collegeor one of its sites in Sikeston or CapeGirardeau, Mo., Jackson, Miss.,or Tuscaloosa, Ala., will havea reunion 31 September-2 October.The event will be on the Parkscampus in Cahokia, Ill., near downtown St. Louis, Mo. For moreinformation, contact Nita S. Browning, Public Relations Director, ParksCollege of St. Louis University,Cahokia, IL 62206-0r call 618-337-7575, extension 206.

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"Mission First, Safety Always"Colonel Thomas M. Hayes, Commanding12th Aviation Brigade, V Corps, U.S. Army, Europe

CW5 Gerald D. CartierBrigade Safety Officer

Captain Joseph TorrenceAssistant S3

This article was written and approved before the tragic incident over northern Iraq, in supportof Operation Provide Comfort, on 14 April 1994. It is dedicated, therefore, to those proud menand women who perished on this mission trying to help others.

"Mission First, Safety Always," in the 12th Brigade,these are the words we live by and fly by.

Over the course of 1993, the brigade flew 17,412hours without a recordable class A, B, or C flight-related mishap, fatality, or injury. These hours representthe combined effort of 242 combat-ready aviators flying 103 assigned aircraft for a forward-deployed aviation brigade.The turmoil in Europe has done little to diminish thetraining pace or the mission profile of the 12th Aviation Brigade. The brigade provides lift aviation andtarget acquisition support to the only remaining Corpsin the European theater. Few units have been so testedwith such sensitive missions and performed so professionally.MISSIONS/SUPPORT TO V CORPS

Daily missions include: command aviation and fixedwing support of Headquarters, V Corps, and its ninemajor subordinate commands; direct medium lift helicopter support to the Corps two divisions and its Corpssupport command; assault helicopter support for bothdivisions and the Corps long-range surveillance unit;and target acquisition support for the Corps artillerycommand and three Corps-level, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter battalions.SENSITIVE MISSIONS/SUPPORT TO CORPS/MACOMS

Besides normal training support provided to theCorps, the brigade has accomplished numerous sensitive missions for the Corps and major Army commands(MACOMs). In addition, we have closed two major6

Army airfields in Europe, which required re-stationing a UH--60 Black Hawk company, a CH-47 Chinookcompany, and an air traffic services (ATS) battalion.We completed the final drawdown of the Corps pre

mier aviation combat multiplier (Task Force Warrior).All tasks were completed on schedule and without incident, a testament to this organization's professionalism and safety prowess.

The combination of these events, coupled with a positive proactive safety attitude, resulted in a proven andready brigade unrivaled in accomplishment.OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Task Force 5-158, 12th Aviation Brigade, was VCorps aviation contribution to Operation Restore Hope,the United Nations relief effort in Somalia. On Christmas Day, the last elements of an advanced party consisting of 15 UH--60s, 38 vehicles and ground supportequipment, and 160 personnel deployed to Mogadishu,Somalia, via U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy and C-141Starlifter aircraft.By the end of December, a 700-man, 46-aircraft (30UH--60s and 16 CH-47s), 370-vehicle task force hadclosed on Somalia. This contingency deployment demonstrated the brigade's ability to deploy rapidly by air,rail, and sea with very little notice and all safely.

Besides the advanced party's strategic air deployment,the brigade ran three international rail head operationsfrom Germany to a port in Italy and self-deployed 31aircraft to Italy. These 31 aircraft plus 332 various vehicles and ground support equipment were loaded andtransported via ship from Italy to Somalia, all withoutincident.

As an indicator of the brigade's safety attitude, itshould be noted that the brigade safety officer w'as one



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of the first two soldiers sent to the port before any aircraft or vehicles to ensure a safe and smooth transitionduring these very dangerous operations. All personnel,aircraft, vehicles, and ground support equipment eventually were returned to Germany without the brigaderecording a single aviation-related mishap or personnel incident.OUT OF THEATER MISSIONS

During the year, 12th Aviation Brigade aviation assets found themselves heavily involved in the evacuation of three highly sensitive missions, all out of theater.The Beirut Air Bridge

The first mission entails a detachment of four UH-60 aircraft and crews with support teams. This detachment was forward deployed to the island of Cyprus insupport of the Beirut Air Bridge (BAB), to provide lifeline support and on-call emergency evacuation to theUnited States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Over thecourse of the year, some 797 accident and incident freehours were flown in support of the BAB.

The mission profile for this operation involves someof the most demanding and strenuous flight activitieswe can ask U.S. Army aviators to perform. Night vision goggles (NVG) overwater flight is the requiredmission profile. An agressive overwater training program, to include drownproofing, "dunker," helicopteremergency escape devices (HEEDs) bottle, life raft,aviation life support equipment (ALSE), and NVG decklandings on U.S. Navy ships, calls for constant vigilance and a superior. safety conciousness.

With crews rotating every 60 days, the training tempois continuous and standards are reinforced daily. Thismission continues to be accomplished professionallyand safely to this day.Operation Provide Comfort

Our second mission takes our soldiers to the verydangerous high mountains of eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, in support of Operation Provide Comfort(OPC). Six UH-60 aircraft and crews with supportteams are deployed to provide aerial support to the European Command Combined Task force in Turkey. Operating well beyond established lines of communication in a hostile environment is the hallmark of thisvital mission.

Deployed aircrews and support personnel are entitledto Imminent Danger Pay and are awarded a combatpatch upon completion of this rigorous mission. Adverse weather, to include unpredictable winds, heat, fog,and heavy snow, coupled with a high-density altitudeu.s. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994

(DA), test the abilities of our crews during every flight.Daily missions range from VIP support to air move

ment operations. Over 2,000 accident and incident freehours were logged last year in support of this very difficult and demanding mission."Safety First" is not just a catchy phrase for thesesoldiers, but a way of life. Our OPC flight crews werecredited, on three separate occasions, with the rescueof Allied je t fighter pilots who were forced to ejectover hostile territory in support of this mission. Having superbly trained, professional crews and supportpersonnel (rotated every 60 days) is critical to the continued success of operation provide comfort and cannot be underscored.Allied Command, Europe, Mobile Force (Land)

The third, and possibly the most difficult mission,because of the varied training requirements and multinational composition, is our mission to provide theAllied Command, Europe, Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L aviation component.Deploying with an international task force comprisedof North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) groundforces, this component is a ready and trained elementof the NATO contingency force . Five UH-1 crews andsupport personnel are dedicated to this demanding requirement. Arctic, overwater, and mountain training,to name a few, keep these always on-call soldiers ready,willing, and able to respond when needed.

During the past year, this unit was deployed three different times to conduct training with the AMF (L).With the ability to rapidly deploy by air, sea, and rail,this unit is one of the most capable and ready aviationassets in Europe. Previously, this important mission rotated among units in theater. Now the 12th AviationBrigade is the only unit capable of meeting the exacting demands of this mission.

Last year alone, Allied forces in Denmark, Italy, andTurkey had the chance to see how some of the U.S.Army's best trained and safety conscious soldiers provide responsive and flexible aviation support to theAMF (L) ground forces. Operating under demandingfield conditions, all missions were conducted withoutaccident or incident.

In addition, on one occasion a flight crew of ours wascredited with saving the life of a Belgian helicopterpilot and three passengers who had crashed at one ofthe AMF (L) field sites. Quick thinking on the part ofour personnel helped extricate the pilot and passengersfrom the wreckage before it was fully engulfed inflames. These accomplishments further define the excellence, dedication, and safety awareness of the aircrews within the 12th Aviation Brigade.

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OTHER SUPPORTCombat Maneuver Training Center

Besides the heavy commitment for our out-of-sector missions, the brigade is able, and more than willing, to provide support as needed and required. OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and CH-47D support for unit rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center atHohenfels and range density at Grafenwoehr are common taskings.The overall expertise with which thesemissions are carried out earns accolades from all supported units that have had the chance to work with thesecombat aviation professionals.

On a recurring basis, our CH-47 crews are on standby to provide fire bucket support to suppress range firesand, if needed, to supplement host nation forestfirefighting efforts.

Perfecting the brigade's ability to covertly insert longrange surveillance units (LRSUs) with UH-60s andCH-47s, outfitted as Fat Cows, providing fuel, has extended V Corps intelligence capability immensely. Thiscapability provides the command with a real worldcombat multiplier.Operation Provide Promise

Over the year, our fixed-wing detachment set the standard for professionalism. On a daily basis, it is calledon to fly an assortment of missions all over the European continent.

Its support to Operation Provide Promise, the UnitedNations contingent in Croatia, took it into a hostile firearea twice a week for most of the year. Landing at sitessuch as Zagreb, Croatia, and Split, BosniaHerzegovina, provided a challenge each time becauseof the difficulty associated with diplomatic clearances,less than ideal ATC facilities, and the constant threatof hostile fire.Operation Able Sentry

Early last summer a tasking to provide fixed-wingsupport for Operation Able Sentry, another United Nations peace-keeping mission located in Macedonia, wasreceived. As expected, assets from the 12th AviationBrigade answered the call.The high mountains surrounding Skopje, Macedonia,our designated airport, provided a challenge. Unpredictable weather, coupled with a massive language problem and less than desirable navigational aids, helpedshowcase our flight detachment's aviators' true professionalism.

The safety of our passengers and aircraft were always the overriding factor and primary concern on eachmission. In spite of these challenges, all missions werecompleted safely.8

Air traffic servicesProviding the best possible air traffic services (ATS)

to 14 fixed airfields in Germany, and tactical ATC support anywhere it is needed, is what our ATS battalionprides itself on. Deployments to tactical field trainingsites or real world requirements such as ATC servicesin Somalia or special ATC for visiting VIPs such as theU.S. Secretary of Defense are always impeccably orchestrated.

The overall professional attitude and ability to adaptto an ever--changing scenario has earned our controllers the respect of the entire European aviation community. With 522,774 safe movements and 14,773ground controlled approaches (GCAs) accomplishedlast year, and no controller-related incidents reported,our ATS battalion is justifiably proud.Grafenwoehr Training Area

From mid-August through mid-September, all unitstook part in a brigade-level gunnery range density atGrafenwoehr Training Area (GTA). All soldiers available qualified with their respective individual weapons. In addition, M60, M9, and M16 unit and individual competitions were held. Part of this density wasdevoted to annual door gunner qualifications for UH-1, UH-60, and CH-47 aircraft assigned to the brigade.

A gate type, GO/NO-GO, crew training system wasused to evaluate each gunner before actually going tothe aircraft for the live fire portion. At the same time,we were able to validate the door gunner tables at GTA.Because of our BAS, OPC,_and AMF (L) mission requirements, door gunnery qualification is a requisiteskill needed before assignment on one of the rotations.CONCLUSION

The 12th Aviation Brigade has distinguished itself asan outstanding aviation unit, dedicated to using safetyas a force protector and combat multiplier. Carrying ona tradition started with the formation of the unit, thebrigade has demonstrated its ability to accomplish anymission, anywhere, anytime safely.

Few units have been tested with such a diverse arrayof sensitive missions and performed as professionally.Our Mission Essential Task List is tested frequently.We prove, on a daily basis, that we can and will accomplish our mission safely.

The safety record of this brigade is testimony to thecapabilities and professionalism of each member of theunit. The 12th Aviation Brigade units exemplify excellence in U.S. Army Aviation and clearly set the standard for other units world.

"Mission First, Safety Always."u.s. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994


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Everyday scenes of Kurdish people living Inthe U.N.-deslgnated safe zone of northern Iraqand serviced by Operation Provide Comfort.(Camera Imagery by Staff SergeantsTheodore J. Konlares and Efraln Gonzalez)

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What is This Thing Called "Crew Coordination"?Dr. Dennis K. Leedom

Principal ScientistU.S. Army Research InstituteRotary-Wing Research UnitFort Rucker, AlabamaThis article provides you with some background information on the Army's current trainingprogram on crew coordination-How it was developed, how it has been shown to be effective,and whether it is the best approach.Ever since the publication of TC-210,

Aircrew Training ProgramCommander's Guide to Individual andCrew Training, March 1992, we've allknown that something called "crew coordination" is important to Army aviators. According to the Commander'sGuide, crew coordination is "a set ofprinciples, attitudes, procedures, andtechniques which transforms individuals into an effective crew."But are we just talking "motherhood"and "apple pie" when we speak of crewcoordination? Or is it something thatwill actually contribute to mission performance and flight safety? Some aviators believe that adherence to good crewcoordination principles will save theirlife someday. Other aviators remainunconvinced, seeing the current emphasis on crew coordination as just anotheradministrative burden. So, who is right?The answer depends, in large part, onhow the training is implemented.A Little History ..

In early 1990, the Army became increasingly concerned over the possibility that crew error was a significant contributor to aviation accidents. A reviewof aviation accidents from 1984 to 1989suggested that crew error was implicated in accidents that had cost theArmy 147 lives and over $292 millionin aviation resources. A year later, a review of aviation accidents occurringduring Desert Shield/Desert Storm reinforced the belief that poor crew coordination was a contributing factor tocrew error accidents. Thus motivated,the U.S. Army Aviation Center(USAAVNC) established a "tiger team"of aviation specialists and psychologists

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at Fort Rucker to develop a set of fixesfor this problem. By early 1992, a number of solutions began to emerge fromthis collaborative effort.

Recognizing the need to introduce theconcept of crew coordination in a "topdown" manner, the USAAVNC team setabout to make appropriate changes tothe Commander's Guide. Thus, theMarch 1992 revision to TC 1-210clearly emphasized the requirement forcrew coordination training in the unit'soverall training program. In addition,this same revision highlighted importantaspects of crew coordination identifiedfrom initial research conducted by theU.S. Army Research Institute (USARI),e.g., positive communication, direct assistance.

At the same time, the revised versionofTC 1-210 instituted a policy of mandated battle rostering for Army aviationunits. Battle rostering was defined as thedesignation of two or more individualaviators to perform as a crew duringboth peacetime training and wartime deployment. All FAC-1 and FAC-2 aviators were to be battle rostered. Finally,TC 1-210 specified that crew readinesswould be measured against a new set ofCrew Readiness Level (CRL) designations. The CRL-1 and CRL-2 designations track battle rostered crew trainingstatus independently of individual aviator training status.

Attention was turned next to makingappropriate revisions to the individualAircrew Training Manuals for each aircraft type. Here, specific guidance wasdeveloped on the crew coordinationactions essential to each flight task. Formany flight tasks, the task descriptionnow specifies the coordination actions

required of the pilot on the controls, andthose required of other crewmembers.A New Training Approach

As the various Aircrew TrainingManuals were being revised in 1992,the USAAVNC team realized that a newtraining system was needed to assistaviation units in transitioning their aviators to the new flight task standards.While some training materials were already available from the commercialairline industry, previous attempts toadapt these materials to Army aviationhad met with limited success. Specifically, many aviators complained that theexisting training packages for crew coordination lacked objective standardsfor measuring crew performance. In addition, it was argued that training oriented toward cockpit coordination at35,000 feet was not necessarily suitedto the Army 's night, nap of the earthenvironment.In response, USARI expanded itscrew coordination research to includethe development of a performancebased training and evaluation programfor Army aviation units. A unique feature of this training and evaluation program is that it defines crew coordination in specific, operationally relevantterms. After some amount of debate, theUSAAVNC team agreed that crew coordination would be evaluated in termsof 13 key dimensions. It is useful tothink of these dimensions, shown in thetable, as similar to the "basic qualit ies"aviators might remember from basicflight training. Each "basic quality" isnot so much important in itself as it isan important contributor to accomplishing the specific flight tasks essential for



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TableCrew Coordinat ion Evaluation DimensionsEvaluation DimensionEstablish and maintain tlight team leadership andcrew climate

Premission planning and rehearsal accomplished

Selection of appropriate decision makingtechniques

Prioritize actions and distribute workload

Management of unexpected events

Statements and directives are clear, timely,relevant , complete, and veri tied

Maintenance of mission situational awareness

Decisions and actions communicated andacknowledged

Supporting information and actions sought fromcrew

Crewmember actions mutually cross monitored

Supporting information and actions offered bycrew

Advocacy and assertion practiced

Crew-level afteraction reviews accomplished

Notes: IResearch during this entire period was supported with technical assistance from a contractor teamcomprised of Dynamics Research Corporation andANACAPA Sciences, Inc.

2For those aircraft without an associated flight simulator or combat mission simulator, demonstration flights

u.s. Army Aviation Digest May/June 1994

DescriptionPerformance anchors focus on leadership style,professional respect, the resolution ofdisagreements, and team member attitudes.Performance anchors focus on premission flightplanning, rehearsal of critical events, and in-tlight replanning and rehearsal.Performance anchors focus on informationgathering and use of team deliberation underconditions of either high or moderate/low timestress.Performance anchors focus on mission taskprioritization and cockpit workload distribution.Performance anchors focus on team preparationand composure, and on team resourcemanagement.Performance anchors focus on the adequacy,timeliness, clarity, standardization, andacknowledgement of callouts by team members.Performance anchors focus on how teammembers keep each other informed of criticalevents and factors affecting situational awareness(e.g., fatigue, anger).Performance anchors focus on manner in whichdecisions and actions are communicated,claritied, and acknowledged by team members.Performance anchors focus on solicitation ofinformation and assistance from other teammembers.Performance anchors focus on scanning for teammember errors and the use of the two-challengeruJe for overcoming cognitive inertia.Performance anchors focus on the anticipationand offering of required information andassistance to other team members.Performance anchors focus on rank/experienceintimidation and the assertiveness of junior teammembers.Performance anchors focus on the self-critiqueand improvement of team performance after eachmission.

are conducted either in-flight or in the UH-l Iroquoisinstrument trainer.

3Battle rostered crews, previously formed by theirunit, were required to have flown at least once as abattle rostered crew within 60 days preceding the test.

11


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mission effectiveness and flight safety.USARI then took these dimensions

and produced a training and evaluationprogram for Anny aviation units. Classroom instruction and small group exercises led by unit instructor pilots (IPs)and unit trainers (UTs) first provideaviators with an introduction to the importance of each dimension and the factors necessary for achieving each standard. This instruction is followed byseveral sessions in the flight simulator2in which unit IPs can demonstrate andevaluate actual behaviors in a tacticalmission setting. An essential step in thiswhole process is the video recording ofcrew behaviors during the training missions. During the mission debriefingswith the IPs, crew-members have theopportunity to observe themselves andnote their strengths and weaknesses.Throughout the entire training andevaluation process, emphasis is placedon teaching crew coordination in a context that is operationally relevant to eachindividual aviator.The Proof is in the Pudding .

During 1992 and 1993, USARI conducted two field studies to assess thevalidity and impact of the new training.Of biggest concern to the Aviation Center were the questions, "Would Annyaviators accept this new training?" and"Would the training produce measurableimprovements in mission performanceand flight safety?" The first study, conducted with UH-60 Black Hawk crewsfrom Fort Campbell, Ky., found that unitaviators and IPs enthusiastically endorsed the new training--despite thefact that some aviators had leave cancelled to take part in the test! In a second study with AH-64 Apache crews atFort Rucker, reactions were much thesame. Typical comments included:

"I'm 100 percent for this program. Itwill save lives'and aircraft. It may wellsave my life someday."

"I thought some of the material wascommon sense, but it is needed to institutionalize common practices and define techniques. It makes everybodyspeak up and fly as a crew."

"I sequence and time activities better.This.course got me out of some badhabits."

12

"This program made me think more,even with crewmembers that I haveflown with before."

But what about performance? Here,the evidence was just as strong that thenew training program had a positive effect on both mission effectiveness andflight safety. In the study with UH-60crews conducting simulated troop insertion and slingload missions, IP evaluators found tha t -

-Crews conducted better missionplanning with shorter planning and rehearsal cycles.

- Crews practiced better communication patterns in the cockpit.

- Crews managed critical flight tasksmore efficiently, using the entire crew.

- Crews exhibited significantly fewererrors of the type frequently implicatedin previous aviation accidents (e.g., violation of altitude restrictions, poor transition to instrument meteorological conditions flight, failure to detect systemmalfunctions in a timely manner, failure to maintain obstacle clearance).

-Crews navigated more accuratelywith fewer course and timing deviations.

-Crews more successfully avoideddetection and engagement by enemy airdefenses.

Comparable results were found in theUSARI study of AH-64 crews a yearlater. In this study of crews conductingsimulated attack missions, IP evaluatorsfound that-

- Crews managed cockpit workloadbetter with improved communicationpatterns.

-Crews reacted better to unexpectedevents.

-Crews navigated more accuratelywith fewer obstacle or ground strikes.

-Crews engaged more targets andachieved more successful target kills.

-Crews more successfully avoideddetection and engagement by enemy airdefenses.

Based on earlier validation findin'gsobtained in 1992, the training and evaluation program was approved by the U.S.Army Chief of Staff (CSA) forArmywide fielding. Interestingly, theCSA's approval of funding for this training came the same week that he wasasked by the President to make significant cuts in the Anny's FY93 budget.

By mid-1993, USAAVNC establisheda Crew Coordination Training Team toimplement the training at each aviationsimulation training site worldwide. Accompanying this action, each of theArmy's visual flight simulators throughout the world were outfitted with videorecording equipment to support the newtraining. By September, 1993, theUSAAVNC training team had begun the2-year installation cycle by installingthe training program at FortCampbell.Other sites are following inrapid succession. To date, theUSAAVNC team has experienced positive aviator reactions at eachlocation. They also have observed thatcrew performance consistently improves over the sequence of three training missions conducted 'in the flightsimulator.Is Battle Rostering Needed?

As USAAVNC began to field the newtraining and evaluation program, questions were raised about the continuednecessity of battle rostering. Since itspractice was mandated by TC 1-210 inMarch 1992, operational units werebeginning to complain of the significantadministrative burden imposed by thiscrew pairing requirement. In addition,some anecdotal evidence was beginningto surface that suggestedprolongedbattle rostering was inducing complacency and overconfidence in somecockpits, two contributors to aviationaccidents. So, in early 1992, USARI wasasked to investigate this issue. Specifically, USAAVNC wanted to know ifbattle rostering added any significantbenefit to crew performance beyond thatachieved with the new training andevaluation program.

To answer this question, USARI conducted another test in October and November of 1993. Using 24 battlerostered AH-64 aviators from FortRucker, crews were ~ v a l u a t e d in a series of four different attack missionsconducted in the AH-64 Combat Mission Simulator. All aviators receivedthe Army's new crew coordination training about 4 months before the test. Fortwo of these missions, the aviators flewas battle rostered crews.3 For the remaining two missions, the same avia-

U.S. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994


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tors were randomly paired so that nocrew had been previously battlerostered. Each scenario contained several challenges in the form of missionchanges, hostile air defenses and helicopter threats, deteriorating weather,and unexpected equipment malfunctions. The test was to determine if crewperformance (using the same aviators)differed significantly between the twomethods of forming crews.

In comparing the cockpit behaviors ofbattle rostered versus newly formedcrews, no statistically significant differences were found in any of the basic dimensions of crew coordination. IP ratings of both crew coordination skills andaircrew training manual task gradeswere virtually a dead heat between thetwo pairing conditions. In terms of mission performance, only one differencewas found to be statistically significant:battle rostered crews achieved about 18percent more target kills per target engagement with missiles than randomlyassigned crews. All other measures ofmission performance, including gun androcket engagements, altitude deviations,exposure to threats, detection of in-flightmalfunctions, and instrument ap-proaches differed insignificantly between the battle rostered and randomlyassigned crew pairings.

In post-test interviews with the aviators and IPs, USARI received both positive and negative comments regardingbattle rostering. On the one hand, some

aviators felt that battle rostering provides a higher level of familiarity in thecockpit. Others expressed concern thattoo much familiarity leads to overconfidence, complacency, and a reversionto nonstandard coordination techniques.To investigate this concern further,USARI compared self-ratings of performance by the aviators under each crew,pairing condition to ratings provided bythe IP evaluators. In each condition,overconfidence was expressed by virtue of the fact that self-ratings of performance were higher than the IP ratings. However, the level of overconfidence was 50 percent higher in the caseof battle rostered crews, as comparedwith randomly assigned crews. Thus, itseems that flying with a newcrewmember causes aviators to be moreobjective in their self-appraisals.

As a result of these test findings,USAAVNC formally rescinded itspolicy of mandated crew readiness levels and battle rostering in a messagedated 251200Z FEB 94. This message,in part, states that commanders may stillchoose to battle roster crews at their discretion. However, commanders are invited to take note of the recent test results and to guard against the negativehabits potentially introduced by battlerostering.A Final Word .In summary, a number of significantdevelopments have occurred in "recentyears regarding crew coordination. In


comparison to the pioneering effortstaken in the commercial airline industry, the U.S. Army is light years aheadin the degree to which crew coordination training has been institutionalized.As a result of research specifically focused on the Army's tactical flying environment, crew coordination standardshave been behaviorally defined in termsthat are relevant to the average aviator.These training standards have beenshown to positively impact both missionperformance and flight safety. And,most importantly, the training has beenaccepted and endorsed by the seniorstandardization instructor pilots and IPswithin the Army.

Perhaps the current state of affairs canbe described best with a quotation fromthe recent USAAVNC message on battlerostering:

"The Army is still conducting crewcoordination training which is separate and distinct from crew readinesslevels and battle rostering. This training program is seen as the most effective solution for improving crewcoordination. "After June 1994, Dr. Leedom will

move to the position of Chief, SoldierPerformance Division, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen ProvingGrounds, Md. Questions and commentsmay be directed to the author at (410)278-5916 or DSN 298-5916.

13


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Threat and Countermeasure Factors in Risk AssessmentCW3 Stephen L. WoodsTraining Development OfficerAircraft Survivability Training Management DivisionDirectorate of Training, Doctrine, and SimulationU.S. Army Aviation Center

Attention: Threats are the mostcapable ever.The threats of today are much

more technologically advanced thanany time in history. Armies understand the capabilities modern helicopters bring to the battlefield andhave prepared against them. Themost advanced weapon systems areavailable to any buyer. Third worldarmies are able to defend themselveswithout investing in research anddevelopment. Modern air defenseweapons are considered commodities and are purchased much likeyou or I would purchase a personalcomputer, based on capabilities andfunction. Armies cannot afford tohave attack helicopters erase theirinvestments in ground forces.Countering today's modernthreats requires risk assessment.

All weapon systems have both capabilities and associated limitations.Analyzi ng the mission area threatsreveals methods of capitalizing

[

Fort Rucker, Alabama

upon their system weaknesses andexploiting our system capabilitiesagainst them. Risk assessment involves identification of the cause ofhigh risk and leads to steps we cantake to reduce the risks. Direct combat action against an enemy will require a level of risk. Identificationof the threats causing the risks is asimportant as identifying factors suchas weather, terrain, and crew selection. When analyzing the mission,direct threats can be separated intotechnology types (or portions of theelectromagnetic spectrum) such asradar, infrared, optical/electro-optical, and laser/directed energy weapons for ease of analysis. Some threatsystems may fall into more than onetype such as a radar threat with anoptical/electro-optical backupmode.

All threats would be evaluatedbased on their ability to acquire andengage aircraft in their normal mission flight mode. Some threats mayhave a minimum effective altitude

Max All

J' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

Min Rng~ ~ n ~ A ~ I I - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ . - ~

Figure 1.

higher than the aircraft's missionflight mode. Although these threatsmay have a lower risk associatedwith them than lower altitude capable threats, care must still be takenwith these threats. Understandingthat minimum effective altitude isthat altitude in which a properlytrained crew under good firing conditions has a 50-percent probability of hit (Ph) at that altitude basedon flat terrain. Below this minimumeffective altitude, the Ph may be reduced but seldom is the threaterased. I f the threat system is at analtitude below the aircraft, the minimum effective altitude may be verynear ground level. (See figures I and2.)

General o p e r a t ~ o n a l considerations include:

Does the threat have a homeon-helicopter mode or capability?

Is the threat normally located forward of, near, or well behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT)?

Does the threat support front lineMax All

Figure 2.

14 u.s. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994


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troops, higher echelon, or does itrove in a gap filler type role?

I f the threat fixed, mobile, orself-propelled?

Once the threats are divided intoguidance types, threats can be compared to aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) effectiveness. Considerations should be given to the following:

Will warning be received fromeach radar threat?

Is chaff reflective in the radarfrequency of the threat and may it,therefore, be an effective decoy?

Which threats will the aircraft'sradar jammer provide for effectivecoverage?

Once ASE considerations havebeen taken into account, the threatscan be prioritized and risk can beassessed. Are the radar threats onthis mission high, medium, or low?What is causing the risk on thismission? This will aid you inidentifying a valid means ofreducing the risk. Risk reductionfactors include:

Night-time operation thatdegrades Optical/Electro-Opticalthreats with no night-viewingdevices.

Standoff ranges that place theaircraft close enough to shoot yetfar enough away not to get shot.

Accurate suppression of enemyair defenses to destroy degradeknown positions.

Using aircraft with the leastsusceptibility during the start of theoperation to destroy threats beforebringing up the most susceptibleaircraft. Orientation of the battle positionand route of flight to place the sunor moon behind aircraft.

Making use of overlappingcoverage of Air Force standoffjamming aircraft during theirstrikes.

Committing only the forcenecessary for the engagement thusreducing susceptibility.

Using the combined armsapproach. The use of ground forcesto designate or destroy air defenseartillery (ADA) assets. Brief groundforces to designate which ADAvehicles will be first.

Brief all aircrews on the priorityof threat vehicle engagement, ASEconfiguration settings, andvulnerabilities of their aircraft.Plan tactics and select countermeasures settings.

Once threats are prioritized byguidance type, ASE configurationsettings can be selected to optimizeprotection on this mission. The ANIAPR-39A(v)1 has both operationalflight programs (OFPs) and emitteridentification (EID) softwareversions that must be set for thetheater of operations.

The AN/APR-39(v)2 hassoftware version numbers andtheater selection settings that set theEID.

The M-130 chaff dispenserelectronic control module must beset with the program settings toreproduce the correct aircraft radarcross-section size

see, ASE systems depend on properconfiguration settings. It isimperative that your ASE beconfigured to the threats expectedto be encountered on a particularmission. Just as your IdentificationFriend or Foe (IFF) or communications radios must have validconfiguration settings, so must yourASE.Use these tools for risk analysis.

All school trained ASElElectronicWarfare Officers (ASEIEWO) aretrained to perform this risk analysis.The tools they use are the AircraftSurvivability Equipment Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures, dated15 December 1990, with change 3applied, and the Survivability RiskAnalysis worksheet. (See figure 3.)The U.S. Army Aviation Centerhas a ne w ASE configurationsetting guide available. For a copy,contact CW3 Woods, DSN 558-3917. The guide is classifiedSECRET and a written request fromyour unit's security manager isrequired.

DATE:___and the operatorcontrol unit must bese t to program.TheAN /ALQ-144A(v)1I3 must beset with the properjammer programnumber based on theaircraft and threats.

SURVIVABILITY RISK ANALYSIS

The ANIALQ-162(v)1 must havethe correct user datamodule setting.

The AN/ALQ-136(v)1I5 must havethe correct missionmode switch setting.

The ANIAPR-44(v)1/2/3/5 musthave the correctfilter connections.As you can clearly

AIRCRAFT lYPE:MISSION DAY/NIGKT


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OFP& EID?SSG Robert L. Niebrugge

Aircraft Survivability Training Management DivisionDirectorate of Training, Doctrine, and Simulation

A common problem involvingaviators and avionics personnel whoassociate with the ANIAPR-39A(V)1 Radar Signal DetectingSet (RSDS) is that they do not understand the significance of the Operational Flight Program (OFP) andEmitter Identification Data (EID)versions that are displayed on theindicator when initiating the systemself-test. There is no reference tothe different OFP/EID versions inthe technical manual (TM), nor isthe importance of the correct versions explained. The following information will provide a better understanding of the OFP/EID versions. Contact the Aircraft Survivability Equipment/Electronic Warfare Officer (ASE/EWO) for moreinformation on this subject.

What is the OFP?The OFP is that part of the ANI

APR-39A(V)1 software that con-16

U. S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama

troIs processor operations. Portionsof the OFP are classified and arestored in the removable User DataModule (UDM), also known as circuit card assembly (CCA) A 7.0therunclassified portions of the OFP arestored in CCAs A4, A5, and A6.

The OFP directs all processor activity. This includes sorting the signal environment, comparing received signal parameters to thestored EID, and generating the appropriate symbol and syntheticvoice commands.

What is the EID?The EID is that part of the ANI

APR-39A(V)1 software that holdsspecific descriptions (threat library)of known threat signals. The processor compares each incoming signalwith the EID. When a match occurs,the processor generates the appropriate threat symbol and syntheticvoice message.

The EID is classified and is storedin the UDM; therefore, the UDM isclassified. Update the EID by replacing the UDM with one havingthe desired EID.The EID version depends on thearea of operation, and the OFP depends on the Aircraft SurvivabilityEquipment (ASE) configuration.The minimum OFP version for aircraft not equipped with the ANIAVR-2 Laser Detecting Set (LDS)is 020.9. Aircraft equipped with theLDS should have an OFP of 521.1or 022.2.

The available EIDs are as follows:-017, 023-Global (being phased

out, contact the unit ASE/EWO)-018, 024--Southwest Asia (rec

ommended for continental UnitedStates and Germany units)

-025-Southcom-026---U.S. Navy boats-027-National Training Center(deployed units only)-028--Korea-029-YugoslaviaNOTE: EID 517 or 600 series,

contact the unit ASE/EWO immediately.Are OFP/EID versions correct?

I f OFP/EID versions are incorrect,contact the company ASE/EWO.The company ASE/EWO shouldcontact the brigade ASE/EWO. Thebrigade ASE/EWO will contactPM-AEC with a total number ofversions required for the brigade.

It is imperative that Avionics Radar Repairers (68R) verify the correct OFP/EID versions when testingand should also verify after replacement of CCA A4, A5, A6, or A 7.To avoid unnecessary maintenancetime and cost, do not use the National Stock Numbers (NSNs) foundin TM 11-5841-294-30Pwhen requisitioning the above mentionedCCAs.

There are many different OFPIEID versions in the supply system;therefore, if normal requisition procedures are used it is unsure whichsoftware version will be received.



19/56

OFP/EID version contact: PM-ABC, ATTN: Jim Carter, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63220; DSN693-5539, COM 314-263-5539.Verification Procedure

The following matrices reflect the available OFP/EID versions and the compatibility with other ASE:1. Using the ASE matrix, locate the letter that reflects the configuration code for the aircraft.2. Using the configuration letter, locate the applicable OFP/EID codes on the OFP/EID matrix.3. Verify correct software versions.

coNFI

G

ABC0EFG

ASE MATRIXPOSSIBLE INSTALLED EQUIPMENT

APR-44 AV3 PROD AVR2YES NO NOYES YES NOYES NO NOYES YES YESYES YES NOYES YES NOYES YES YES

OFP/EID MATRIXOFP VERSION

AAR-i7NONONONONOYESYES

020.9 521.1 (AVR2) 021.2 021.5 022.2 (AVR2)EIDVERSoN

017018023024025026027021029605606618

AACCCCCCCCCC

X=Inoompatible OFP/Em017=Global version Emo18=Gult version Em023=Global verslon+AAR-47024=Gult version+AAR-47026=80uthoom Em026=tlS,.Navy boats Em027=National Tra.lnJng Center EID028=U8. ,Army Korea Theater EID029=Yugoslavia Em606=Su1tcase Tra.1ner Em606=Su1tcase Tra.1ner+AAR47 FID618=621.1 OFP Global EID


XX0000000000

B X BB X BE F GE F GE F GE F GE F GE F GE F GE F 0E F GE X 0

020.9=Basio AVI OP'P/Em021.2=Q20.9 with AV3 oonflgura"on021.B=AAR-47 Interface added t.o 021.2022.2=AAR-47 Interface ~ leR/rIgb\ added to 021.8621.1=020.9 with AVR-2 Interface

17


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AH-64A Apache Single-Engine ConsiderationsMajor Bloo Anderson

British Liaison Officer/AH-64 Standardization PilotDirectorate of Evaluation and StandardizationU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, AlabamaThis article addresses some safety issues raised by impending changes to TC 1-214 and shouldmake AH-64 aviators more aware of single-engine considerations in day-to-day operations.Several years ago, I watched an air

craft crash as a result of a single-engine failure. In the subsequent accidentinvestigation, it was established thatboth crewmembers had later died as aresult of carrying out improper emergency procedures. The pilot on the controls had not understood his aircraft'ssingle-engine perfonnance limitations.

Crew safety is hardly the primary factor for consideration during an attackhelicopter mission; however, understanding our aircraft's single-engine capabilities and limitations, especially ina high-r isk environment, may make thedifference between success or failure.During training, it may prevent an incident from becoming an accident. In recent months, it has become apparentthere is a lack of understanding aboutwhy and how we calculate single-engine perfonnance and what we shoulddo with the resulting infonnation whileairborne.Training circular (fC) 1-214

The infonnation contained in TC 1-214, Aircrew Training Manual AttackHelicopter, AH-64, task 1004, PrepareDA Fonn 5701-R (UH-60/AH-64),Performance Planning Card (PPC), waswritten before change 21 of TM 55-

1 5 2 ~ 2 3 8 - 1 0 , the operator's manual.This change introduced the performancedata not only for 701 C-equipped AH-64 Apaches, but also a single-engine,maximum torque available chart (2.5-minute limit) for the 701-enginedApache. Along with others, task 1004will be changed to reflect the use ofthese latest charts.

At present, task 1004 states, in items9 and 35, that maximum torque (single-

18

engine) should be computed not to exceed the continuous torque limit fromfigure 7-2, pp. 7-9 of the operator'smanual, which is based upon a turbinegas temperature (TGT) limit of 867 degrees celsius. These torque values aresubsequently used to calculate maximum allowable gross weight (GWT)(single-engine) fo r the departure,cruise, and arrival conditions, whileminimum single -engine speed (henceforth referred to as Vs) is computedfrom the cruise chart. For the purposesof illustration, assume a situation giving a pressure altitude of 300 feet, whilethe free air temperature (FAT) is 30 degrees celsius. Using a representativeplanned weight of 15,500 pounds (lbs)in such a situation, we calculate a maximum available continuous, single-engine torque of 106 percent which, inturn, allows a maximum allowableGWf (single-engine)of 19,000 lbs andVs of 24 knots indicated airspeed(KIAS)/36 knots true airspeed (KTAS).(A maximum mission gross weight of17,650 lbs is assumed to be the norm.The above information, therefore, indicates that, at or below this maximumweight, the aircraft is capable of sustained flight in a single-engine configuration at Vs).

Using the same ambient conditionsand aircraft weight, but using the 2.5-minute limit chart, (based upon a TGTlimit of 917 degrees celsius) figure 7-2, pp. 7-10 of the operator's manual,we find that maximum available torquesingle-engine is 117 percent, which allows a V s of 19 KIAS/30 KTAS and amaximum allowable GWf (single-engine) of 20,500 lbs. (This last figure maybe of significance for flight with one or

more auxiliary tanks fitted and filled.)The figures obtained from the preced

ing paragraphs indicate single-enginedflight is possible at departure weight, butthe aircraft must be at or above Vs. Inother words, on departure, if an enginefails below Vs, continued takeoff willnot be possible at tha t weight, even using maximum available single-enginepower, unless the aircraft is able to accelerate above Vs. This is usuallyachieved by trading altitude for accel eration. However, in many instancesduring a takeoff, or while perfonninghover or slow-speed maneuvers, therequisite altitude and space are notavailable to do this.

This highlights the significance ofcalculating Vs. By using torque from the3D-minute limit chart, available singleengine power has been artificially limited by basing calculations upon a TGTof 867 degrees. In reality, following asingle-engine failure, power availableon the aircraft engine is limited by thehigher TGT of 917 degrees. This artificiality results in a higher derived Vs thanis actually the case. The difference maybe vitally significant to a pilot's performance planning and the way in whichhe or she handles a power failure during a mission. A lower Vs is always preferable in the event of a power loss. Forthis reason, it normally should be calculated using torque values interpolatedfrom the 2.5-minute limit chart.Jettison of wing storesYou will be aware departure perfor

mance was calculated at a specificweight and the Apache has a system thatenables jettison of wing stores. Losingan engine during a critical stage of flight



21/56

is exactly the occasion for consideringuse of this facility to reduce aircraftweight. Having planned our maximumOWf single-engine and Vs properly,we will be aware of being above or below V s if an engine fails and how muchwe may increase performance/decreaseweight by jettisoning our wing stores.

Continuing to use our conditions fromabove, in an aircraft carrying eight missiles and two empty rocket pods, usingthe jettison will lighten the aircraft byabout 1,255 1bs; thereby reducing thepower requirement at original Vs by 13percent (single-engine) and further reducing Vs itself by about 7 KTAS (using torque from the 2.5-minute limitchart). The increase in performanceavailable and decrease of performancerequired as a result of reduced OWfin the above situation is obvious andserves to illustrate why wing stores jet

t i s ~ n should always be a considerationfollowing an engine failure.

Having said this, just because wingstores are jettisoned will not, in somecritical situations, automatically permitthe aircraft to flyaway. There are manyconditions in which loss of an engine isabsolutely decisive, and no matter whata pilot does, continued flight will justnot be possible. However, being prepared; being cognizant of the planninginformation; and being situationallyaware during an engine failure will enable the professional pilot to make atimely assessment and decision that maysave the crew's lives and possibly theaircraft.

Consider now the situation of operating at the National Training Center insummer, when pressure altitude (PA) iscommonly 4,000 feet and temperaturesare 30 degrees celsius. We have a17,000-1b aircraft with 2,000 Ibs ofjettisonable wing stores. Maximumtorque, single-engine is 102 percent(2.5-minute limit).

This means that, upon departure, Vswill be 40 KIAS/56 KTAS while maximum allowable OWf (single-engine)will be 18,100 Ibs. The higher than average Vs may elicit comment from aplanning crew, but further inspectionmay reveal cautionary information.

Bearing in mind that Vs was calculated from the 2.5-minute chart, we

should be aware that, in the event of anengine failing, not only is Vs relativelyhigh, but the power required to maintain sustained flight may only be usedfor 2.5 minutes (contingency) if we wishto avoid damaging or destroying our remaining good engine.

Perhaps, under these conditions, weshould calculate our maximum allowable gross weight (single-engine) fromour 30-minute chart? Doing so revealsthat, to remain within operating limits,our continuous torque available is now92 percent, making Vs 62 KIAS/77KTAS and our maximum allowableOWf (single-engine) only 16,700 lbs.

Assume conditions as above with ouraircraft loaded to 17,000 lbs, and anengine failing during forward flight andat an airspeed above Vs. This aircraftcould fly quite safely without jettisoning wing stores but only for 2.5 minutesbecause its contingency power would berequired to remain airborne.

I f flight for longer were necessary,weight must be reduced by a minimumof 300 Ibs, reducing the power requirement sufficiently to be within continuous torque limits. Perhaps, in this case,having 2 1/2 minutes to choose time andplace, a pilot might selectively jettisonwing stores (bear in mind center ofgravity (CO), especially if auxiliarytanks are full) or could elect to jettisonall stores simultaneously.

It should now be obvious from theabove that, when preparing a PPC,maximum allowable gross weight(single-engine) should be calculated using the 30-minute limit chart. I f any calculation results in a figure of less than17,650 lbs or the actual aircraft weight,single-engine GWfs and Vs's should becalculated using both 30- and 2.5-minute limit charts to ensure crews arefully aware of their single-engine considerations.

Remembering the practice of simulated single-engine failures while hovering out of ground effect (OOE), it maybe recalled that, even under controlledconditions with the pilot expecting tolose an engine, altitude lost in achieving Vs can be considerable.

On good days, heading into wind witha relatively light aircraft, altitude lostto gain 32 KTAS may be about 100 feet


while, with an adverse wind, a heavyaircraft and a slightly slow procedure,altitude lost can be as much as 300 feet.

The lesson here is that, unless wehover in our battle positions (BPs) at300 feet, we shall invariably be requiredto do something other than a standardfly-away drill in the event of a powerfailure.Using the Apache's design features

I f continued flight is not possible following a single-engine failure, weshould be aware of the Apache's outstanding crash survivability record anduse the design features incorporated inthe aircraft that can save our lives andminimize damage to our airframe. Wingstores jettison should always be considered and drooping main rotor speed (Nr)to the low normal range may also be feasible while seeking a suitable place toland. However, the primary aim mustbe to ensure the aircraft contacts thesurface in a level attitude, thereby enabling the gear and seats to "stroke" andabsorb any excessive vertical accelerations.Knowledge of Vs, maximum allowable OWT (single-engine), and situational awareness through prior planning will ensure that, should a crew everface a low-speed or low-altitude powerproblem, the decision of what must bedone has already been planned for before the decision being required.Crew coordination and planning

Crew coordination is used in the process of planning responses to a powerfailure, not just during pre-flight, butalso during the mission itself. Takeoff,landing, and low-level and hoveringflight are all situations in which thecrewmember not on the controls(workload permitting) can assist the flying pilot in situational awareness. During takeoff, crews should be aware of"Vs" as the aircraft accelerates abovethat value. During an approach to ahover or landing, they should likewisebe aware of being "committed" to landand/or jettison stores in the event of apower failure when speed is reduced be-10wVs.

For those units equipped with 701Cengined aircraft, the situation is further

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complicated by having intermediate andmaximum power available besides thatof contingency; however, the planningprocess is the same as for 701s. Havingmore installed power available meansthe marginal conditions may be encountered less frequently; however, in lowspeed, low-altitude flight below Vs,considerations will be identical.Conclusion

In conclusion, several statements maybe made as follows:

Single-engine maximum allowablegross weight and Vs should be plannedand briefed for departure, cruise, arrival,and any intermediate conditions. (Theymay vary enormously.)

Aways calculate maximum allowableGWT (single-engine) using torque interpolated from the 3D-minute limit chart(701 or 701 C engine). I f this figure isgreater than actual or planned aircraftweight, no further GWT calculations arerequired. Whenever this calculation results in a figure less than actual or

planned aircraft weight, torque valuesshould be calculated from both the 3D-minute and 2.5-minute limit charts andGWTs calculated accordingly.

Vs should always be calculated using torque interpolated from the 2.5-minute limit chart (701 and 701 C engines); however, if GWT is a limitingfactor or if flight on one engine may berequired over any extended period; Vsshould be calculated using torque figures from both 3D-minute and 2.5-minute limit charts. This is true whenflying in an environment in which normal landing is impossible. e.g. recovering from cross-FLOT operations orflying over the sea.

The decision to jettison storesshould not be an automatic reaction toa power failure at low speed/low altitude, but its consideration should beplanned using the PPC and briefed before flight. Always be aware of powerrequirement, power available, andpower being used; e.g., maximumsingle-engine torque available (contin-

gency) 118 percent. Therefore, in level,low-speed flight, dual-engine torquevalues of less than 59 percent indicatethat your aircraft is below V s.

Aircrew coordination techniquesshould be considered to enhance acrew's awareness of V s during all takeoffs, landings, and low-speed/low-altitude maneuvering. Minimize time spent in environments in which loss of an engine is decisive.

In certain environmental conditions,depending upon an aircraft's configuration and weight, single-engine flightwill just not be possible. In such circumstances make sure, by carrying out correct planning, you are aware of it.

During low speed or hovering flight,always maintain an awareness of windstrength and direction.

Planning, briefing, and flying withsingle-engine performance awarenesswill enhance the safety of every flight,no matter how routine.

Pilots should always be aware of the Apache's outstanding crash survivability record and use thedesign features incorporated in the aircraft that can save their lives.20 u.s. ArmyAviation Digest May/June 1994


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COMMANDER'S QUARTERLY SAFETY REPORTCW3 Ronald B. Ritter Jr

Squadron Safety Officer6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry11 th Aviation Brigade

The 6th Squadron designed and implemented the use of his report as a management technique toassist and monitor an effective safety program.

As a squadron safety officer, I amoften asked how I-

Plan the safety program in amanner that focuses on the priorityissues at hand.

Ensure the many safety classesand councils are properly scheduledand conducted.

Ensure safety awards, hazardreports, safety surveys, and safetystatistics are managed effectively,while ensuring compliance with different regulations.

The only answer I have is plan,plan, and plan some more. I realize that many times "Flexibility iskey." However, the better the planis and the further out it projects, theeasier it is to be flexible whenchanges occur. Recurring safety programs and issues should be plannedabout a fiscal year in advance. Details should be finalized at least afiscal quarter out.

Many times safety managers areoverwhelmed with all the requirements they must complete. A considerable number of recurringevents and issues must be managedto ensure an effective safety program. These -recurring events andissues do not even consider that thesafety problems arise on a day-today basis. Neither coJ11manders, norsafety officers, can do it all.

These are the -reasons the 6thSquadron, 6th Cavalry, 11th Aviation Brigade, developed and imple-

mented a "Commander's QuarterlySafety Report." Four purposes ofthis quarterly report are-

Identify what we have accomplished in the previous quarter, andwhether or not we have met oursafety objectives and goals. (Thereport also identifies any hazards orshortcomings we may have, and provides a method to track those issues.)

Help us plan the future quarter.(The report activates the decisionmaking and planning thought processes. When implemented with ayear plan, it simplifies and reducesconflicts between safety events andthe unit training schedule.)

Act as a "mentoring" tool forinexperienced safety personnel. (Byencouraging them to compile safetystatistics, analyze previous quartersaccomplishments, and conductshort- and long-term planning, theyshould be operationally effectivewhen assigned at the squadron orbrigade levels.)

Provide commanders at each unitlevel with a "snapshot picture" oftheir safety programs. (This information could be useful when available during "command and staff'meetings, or any other meetingswhen safety may be discussed.)

The format we adopted is verysimple to complete when automated,and seldom takes more than 1 hourto complete (Apprendix A). The


benefits are tremendous. We taskeach troop safety officer to completeand forward the report to the squadron safety officer within 5 workingdays after the end of each fiscalquarter. I then compile all the information for the squadron commanderwithin 10 working days after the endof the fiscal quarter.

The actual content of the information we use could be varied depending on the type of unit it will serve.I f your unit wishes to implement aprogram like this, feel free to modifyit to your needs. Remember, it is amanagement tool that helps makethe safety program more productiveby focusing on the priority areasthrough effective planning.

Items 1 though 7 are self-explanatory. They help determine the training and resource requirementsneeded to maintain an effective andefficient safety program.

Items 8 and 9 are aviation andground safety statistics. This is important for trend analysis. Our general consensus was that this information was needed quarterly. Theaccident rates were computed usingthe formulas outlined in AR 385-40. Although the statistics may notbe as accurate or meaningful asthose provided by the U.S ArmySafety Center, which has the Army'sstatistical base, we found them useful for the purposes of the 6thSquadron.

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APPENDIX A - (COMMANDER'S QUARTERLY SAFETY REPORT) to ANNEX 18 -(RECURRING SAFETY REPORTS) to 6thSquadron, 6th Cavalry, Safety SOPMEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDER, 6thSquadron, 6th CavalryQUARTER/YEAR OF REPORT: 2d QTR,FY941. Safety Meetingstrraining:a. Dates and topics ofsafety meetings or train-ing conducted during the quarter:8 Jan Accident ReportinglPre-Accident Plan15 Jan Aircrew Communications/ALSE/FOD5 Feb Workload Pedormance/Ramp Parking26 Feb Hearing Conservation/FOD PreventionRisk Assessment WorksheetslHIRTA5 Mar Terrain Flight HazardslPO L Safety25 Mar POL Safety/Hazardous MaterialsField Safety/Safety Statisticsb. Dates/topics ofnext quarter safety meetings/training events:23 Apr ATC Operations/Available Resources28 May Heat Stress/Situational AwarenessHot Wax Injury PreventionlWater Safety7-9 Jun Squadron Drownproofing11 Jun Summer Flight Operations25 Jun Brigade Safety Day2. Squadron Safety Councils:a. Date of ast Aviation Safety Council: 8 Feb94b. Date of ast Aviation Safety Council: 8 Apr94c. Date of last Enlisted Safety Council: 5 Mar94d. Date ofnext Enlisted Safety Council: 21 Apr943. Hazard Inventory Logs: QTR FYa. Hazard Inventory Logs incomplete: 2 2b. Inventory Logs completed: 0 0c. Hazard Inventory Logs total: 2 2d. Identified Hazards with a RiskAssessmentCode (RAC) of1 or 294-2 IIIN POL Storage Facilities22

4. Hazard Reports (OHRs, DA Form 4755s):QTR FY

a. Total Hazard Reports: 2 6b. Date of ast Hazard Report: 15 Mar 94c. Topic of last Hazard Report: Flares fired ataircraft.5. Safety Inspections:a. Date and areas inspected during the quarter:11 Feb 94 V CORPS AORSE Inspection1-12 Mar 94 Semiannual Safety Surveyb. Scheduled dates and areas to be inspectednext quarter:19-23 Apr 946. Safety Trained Personnel:

DES Inspection

a. Number ofsafety trained officers: 6b. Number ofsafety trained NCOs: 4c. Identify u n i t ~ safety shortage, ifapplicable:Squadron is short safety NCOs with the A2identifier.7. Remarks, Comments, Safety Concerns:The Squadron received a "Commendable"

overall rating during the V CORPS AORSinspection.8. Aviation Safety Statistics:

MISHAPSCLASS FREQUENCY

A 0B 0C 0D 1E 7

CAUSESCAUSES FREQUENCYHuman Error 1Material Failure 7Environmental Factors 0

RATE*000

100697

PERCENTILE12.587.50.0

Quarterly AH-64 Flight Time Flown @:516 Hrs



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Quarterly OH-58 Flight Time Flown @:407 HrsQuarterly UH-60 Flight Time Flown @:81 HrsTotal Quarterly Flight Time Flown @:1004 HrsTotal FY Flight Time, To Date: 2,278 Hrs

CAUSESCAUSE FREQUENCY PERCENTILEHuman ErrorMaterial Failures 3 100o 0Environmental Factors 0 0Quarterly total number of lost workdaysbecause of injuries: 17

Total Quarterly Accident Costs: FY total number of lost workdays because of$2,150.00 injuries: 17Total FY Accident Costs, To Date: $3,400.00 Quarterly Total Accident Costs: $2,040.00Date of last Aviation Class A, B, or C Mishap:16 Mar 93Units Total Accident Free Flight Time:4,758 HrsNOTES:* RATE = 100,000 hours x Mishaps)/HoursFlown.@ Flight Time will be obtained from the DAForm 1352, ending the 15th of each month.9. Ground Safety Statistics:

GENERAL MISHAPS

CLASSABCD

CLASSABCD

FREQUENCY0012AMVMISHAPS

FREQUENCY0000

RATE 10092183

RATE 20000


FY Total Accident Costs, To Date: $2,540.00Date of last Ground Class A, B, or C Mishap:5 Aug 93Total Number of Accident Free Days:51 though 3 Mar 94NOTES:RATE 1 = 200,000 hours x Mishaps) /2,184manhours.RATE 2 = 1,000,000 miles x Mishaps)/milesdriven.** 3,000 miles for Troop* 15,000 miles for SquadronSummaryI have found the use of this "Commander 's QuarterlySafety Report" to be very useful for the planning andimplementation of an effective and efficient safety program. I f I have not sold you on this concept as a management tool, at least consider it.

During recent V CORPS and Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization safety inspections, the use ofthis report was noted as a "Commendable" idea andtechnique. It can help to build credibility for your safetyprogram!I would certainly appreciate hearing comments onthis report from safety officers. Feel free to contact me;my address and phone number are CW3 Ron Ritter,HHT, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, CMR 416, Box 425,APO AE 09140-5000; DSN 467-4410.

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~ A i i l . ~ I A F ~ i YCW4 Dennis E. DuraHeadquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 1/137th Aviation Battalion (AVIM)Ohio National Guard

T he battle lines are drawn. Theenemy is maneuvering for theattack. Our gunships are readyto engage and destroy the enemy'sadvancing elements. Safety is the lastthing a gunship or scout pilot shouldhave on his mind-or is it?Safety attitudes and conceptsnever should hinder the accomplishment of the mission. Theyshould enhance the chances ofsuccess. I f we ignore safety andattempt to successfully overcome theenemy, we will either lose or winat a cost that may have unpleasantresults in later battles. Flying safelyduring battle may ' sound like acontrad

Documents

Army Aviation Digest - May 1994