Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1968

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Dec 1968

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UNITED

DIRECTOR OF ARMY AVIATION ACSFORDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

BG Edwin L Powell Jr .

COMMANDANT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLMG Delk M. Oden

ASST COMDT U. S. ARMY AVIATION SCHOOLCOL M . H. Parson

DIGEST EDITORIAL STAFFLTC Robert E. luckenbill , ChiefRichard K. Tierney , EditorWilliam H. SmithJohn P. JonesMarion JonesLinda McGowan

GRAPHIC ART SUPPORTHarold G. LinnHarry A . PickelDorothy l . CrowleyAngela A . Akin

DIRECTOR, U. S. ARMY BOARD FOR AVIATIONACCIDENT RESEARCHCOL Russell P. Bonasso

USABAAR PUBLICATIONS AND GRAPHICS DIVPierce L. Wiggin ChiefW illiam E. CarterJack DeloneyTed KontosCharles MabiusPatsy ThompsonMary W. WindhamABOUT THE COVER

candles ignite differentto ourour loved ones, our comin arms, our faith, our hopes,r perhaps personal memories. I tthis Christmas the canthe cover will remind usf our freedom, in the same wayactor Will iam Howard didsaid the greatest gloryf a free-born people is to t ransmitf reedom to their children.thanks to CW4 J. P. Ervin forcover photograph of his daughtaken with a mirage lens.

RMY VI TION

1GESDECEMBER 1968 VOLUME 14 NUMBERARMY AVIATION, MG Willard PearsonNEW EYES FOR THE BAD NEWS BUTTERFLY

CW3 Clarence J. CarterTHE FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMED HELICOPTER FLYING2 CPT Eugene Fudge.. - .....;;;;JWHAT S ALL THIS PM JAZZ?

SFC R MullinaxAIRSPRAY TECHNIQUES FOR DUST CONTROLWHAT D JA SAY? , CW4 C R. BurroughsTELL US A WAR STORY, MACMAJ Robert E. Poston

E R ~ L ROCKET ARTI LLERYMAJ Warren E. MullenUSAASO SEZTWO MINUTES : THE MOST IMPORTANT OF YOUR LIFEMAJ Glenn f .. LeisterLET S QUIT KILLING OURSELVES, MAJ Noel Q. NicholsWHERE WOULD YOU PUT IT? CPT George D FullerCRASH SENSEAH -56A CHEYENNEFOR THE CHEYENNE, LTC Howard J. TuggeyMANHOOD VS SAFETY, Chaytor D MasonPEARL SVIEWS FROM READERSICING Inside

The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST is to provide information of an operationalor functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention training maintenanceoperations research and development aviation medicine and other related data.The DIGEST is an official Department of the Army periodical published monthly under thesupervision of the Commandant U. S. Army Aviation School. Views expressed herein are notnecessarily those of Department of the Army or the U. S. Army Aviation School. Photos areU. S. Army unless otherwise specified. Material m 'ly be reprinted provided credit is given to theDIGEST and to the author unless otherwise indicated.Articles , photos and items of interest on Army aviation are invited. Direct communication isauthorized to: Editor, U. S. Army Aviation Digest Fort Rucker, Ala. 36360.Use of funds for printing thiS publication has been approved by Headquarters Departmentof the Army , 3 November 1967 .

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution system as outlined InAR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-4 and send directly to CO AG Publications Center 2800Eastern Boulevard Baltimore Md . 21220. For any change in distribution requirements initiate arevised DA Form 124.National Guard and Army Reserve units submit requirements through their State adiutantsgeneral and U. S. Army Corps commanders respectively.For those not eligible for official distribution or who desire personal copies of the DIGEST,paid subscriptions 4.50 domestic and 5.50 overseas , are available from the Superintendent ofDocuments U. S. Government Printing Office Washington D. C. 20402.

U . S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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Its Developing PotentialArmy Aviation

Major General Willard PearsonDirector of Individual TrainingHeadquarters, Department of the Army

THE AIRMOBILITY Armyaviation provides in Vietnam isthe lif blood of combat op rations.In fact when the history of thiswar is written, it cannot h lp butbe largely a history of Armyaviation.Looking at Vi etnam, one findsArmy aviation in xtricably inter-wound into ev ry facet of groundoperations and deployed through-out the country - from the DMZto the D lta and from the EastChina Sea to the Cambodian andLaotian borders. It provides mobility needed to move troops acrossrivers, over mountains, jungles andtrackless wastelands.

Once the destination is reached ,Army aviation's helicopters providefire support, reinfor ement, resupply, evacuation, command and control, communications and intelligence information.

In deed, Army aviation providesthe ground commander with manyadvantages . One results from a decision made about 5 years agoto in tegrate Army aviators intocombat and combat support units,but at the same time have themr tain branch qualifications. Thispolicy is still in effect and providescommissioned pilots familiar withboth ground and aerial operations.Army aviators with branch ex perience are better able to respondto routine or emergency requestsof ground commanders. However,one of the Army aviator's most important assets is that he is imbuedwith an immense team spirit to getthe job done. He identifies with theground forces he is supporting and,through experience, knows theDECEMBER 968

probl ms confronting them.Tactically speaking, close air sup

port provided by sister services hasbeen supplemented with outstand-ing results by the guns of Armyhelicopters. Many a combat commander in Vietnam would agreethat Army aviation is his right armin combat and the principal meansof achievi ng victory.

The sophisticated helicopters inthe Army inventory have added anew method of outflanking the enemy. Military 1 aders throughouthi tory have att mpted to do thisthrough a variety of means : Therehave been countless forced marches.Hannibal attempted such a tacticwith elephants ; during the WarBetw en the States were greatcavalry sweeps' and, in more re-

nt times, we have seen thesetactics used with tanks and airbornetroops.Today the helicopter offers theground commander a new dimension - the vertical envelopm nt of

the enemy's flanks or rear, a tacticwhich forces him into the undesir-able situation of having to fight intwo directions at one .

Army aviation also must be consider d as th newest member ofthe combat team, which tradition-ally has be n limit d to Infantry,Artillery, Armor and Engineers.The skill, cOUTage and spirit ofteam work demonstrated by aviation has li it d th admiration andrespe t of the other members of theombat team.

G n ral Creighton W. Abrams,America n Commander in Vietnam,during the battle of Hue in Feb-

ruary 1968, re ognized Army avia-tion as a m mb r of this elite team.H e pointed out that Army aviationdid not becom a member by invitation, fiat or di rective. It earnedth badge and then was accepted.

Beyond Vietnam, in limited, con-v ntional or even nuclear war,Army aviation will be playing anequally vital role. Tactics willchange and aircraft will be modi-fied, but with its improvin doc-trine Army aviation can be effectively brought to bear on thbattlefield of the future.

As the newest member of thecombat team, aviation should feelfree to innovate and experimentwith new ideas for count rinsur-gency doctrine. Some areas inwhich this should be concentratedinc1ud gunship support, organiza-tion and distribution of aircraft,improved maintenance and betterw aponry. Army aviation is themost expensiv member of the com-bat team and improvements inthes areas would provide a greaterpayoff for the dollars invested. Inaddition, Army aviation can im-prove its net return through saferoperation. More crew members andaircraft are lost in Vietnam fromaccid nts than from hostile fire.

Every aviator who dons his wingsalso receives a heritage earned bythe courage, valor and skill ofArmy aviators through th ree wars.The wings carry the admiration,respect and affection th ese menhave earned. The ground soldierhas learned to expect a great dealof Army aviation which must, andwill, live up to th high standardsof their predecessors.

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ew yes or the

ad News utterflyThe XM 58 antiosci llation sigh t greatly increases the effec-t iveness of an already potent weapon system the M 22

THE RECENT addition of theXM-58 antioscillation sight forthe M-22 wire guided missile system gives the Army an added potential in helicopter mounted pointtarget weapons systems. This combination makes it possible to engageand destroy a target at ranges upto approximately 2.2 miles.

This method of target engagement has been employed in recentM-22 gunnery qualification classesand has increased the hit averages.In one class, a student hit 10 for10 while two others scored 8 for 10.These hits were sure kills, as the88-11B missile is a point targetweapon.

The 88-11 B is a wire guided, twostage missile. t is approximately 4feet long, weighs 64 pounds andhas a 5 to 16.5 pound shapedcharge warhead. The warhead willpenetrate up to 24 inches of armorplate at 90 impact and 9 inchesat 60 impact . The M-22 may beemployed at ranges from 500 to3,500 meters and may be firedwhile on the ground or at altitudesup to 5,000 feet and at any forwardspeed up to 300 mph. The missileattains a maximum speed of about425 mph and has a disastrous ef-fect on buildings and bunkers.

The XM-58 sight and its com-2

CW3 Clarence J. Carter

ponents will fit any of the UH-1Bh licopters from 1962 and all UH-1C models. The mount consistsof brackets and related reinforcements to provide secure, hard pointmounting for the sight assemblyground above and forward of theoperator s copilot) position in thehelicopter. The sight assemblygroup consists of the sight assembly(a two-axis gimbal system for thetelescop and ring sight, adjustable headrest assembly, transmittingsynchro) viewing devices, rate stickassembly, control box, and the lineof sight indicator transmitter. Allcontrols necessary for operation ofthe antioscillation sighting system

di rectional control, ON switch,POWER switch, two drift compensator (trim) , and the synchroCAGE switch), are located conveniently to the sight assembly. Theoutput of the transmitting synchrogeared to the azimuth yaw) gimbal provides an indication of targetlocation with respect to the longitudinal aXIS of the . subsystemweaponry on the line of sight indicator located on the panel infront of th pilot. Thus, the pilotis provided an azimuth indicationof the target and visually indicateswhen the horizontal travel limits of

the sight are about to be exceeded.Attached to the bottom of the

mount is the balanced azimuthgimbal, its housing, support armand counterweight, and the mechanical stops which limit thehorizontal trav I to 45 eith r sideof the helicopter cent r line. Theelevation gimbal is fixed to a yokeon the azimuth gimbal supportarm. Mounted on the elevationgimbal is the 6-power, 10.5-degreewide angle field of view telescope(monocular ), polaroid ring sightand two motion sensing gyroscopes.The elevation gimbal incorporatesmechanical stops to limit verticaltravel of the telescope to 15 upand down from the helicoptercenter line.

Operating independently, thetwo gyroscopes sense helicopter motion electrically, then send signalsto the control amplifier located onthe floor of the helicopter just aftof the M-22 guidance control unit.The amplifier then sends counteracting commands to the gimbalmotors, which move the sight indirect motion opposite to that ofthe helicopter. The sight, once seton a target, will stay on target during helicopter motion if the helicopter does not exceed the azimuthlimits (45 left or right) or theU S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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An Army UH l f i res a wire guided missileelevation limits 15 up or down).Also attached to the mount sthe gimbal position control. Thiscontrol s a horizontally mountedhand grip with a 360 buttonswi tch that allows the gunner tocontrol and reposition the sight inany direction at rates up to 20 persecond, depending on the amountof pressure applied to the 360switch. With this control, the gunner s able to track moving targetswith the sight stabilized. He canalso use the 6 power magnification of the sight to scan the terrainfor targets without being exposedto ground fire.

Once the target has been acquired in the telescope field ofDEEMER 968

view, the antioscillation sightingsystem will maintain this line ofsight without blurring, which isalmost impossible to pr v nt whenthe optical aid s hand held ormounted to the aircraft. To get anidea of what the 6 pow r magnification means to the gunn r, makea I-inch cross on a piec of paperand beside it make a 6-inch cross.As you can s e, th re s quite adiffercn e and this advantage greatly enhances the effectiveness of thissystem.

The SS-11 missile s guided bytwo wires that payout from bobbins built into the missile, in muchthe same manner as line from aclosed face spinning reel. These

wires rem in connected to thlaunch r until missile impact. Theyare connected to the guidewireterminals on the launcher whichrelays signals to the missile fromthe missile selector switch, missileselector box and the guidance control unit GCU). The GCU transmits signals received and activatedby the control stick operated by thegunner to control the missile inmuch the same manner as a radiocontrol model airplane.

When firing at ranges of 1 to 2miles, with the missile moving atspeeds of 300 to 425 mph, th ef-fect of ontrols movements are hardto determine, so here s anotheradvantage of magnification. The

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ad News utterflyenlargemen of the target also allows the gunner to pick the exactspot on the target he wishes to hitand the average gunner can hit a3-foot circle at 2 miles with theaid of the sight.

In making a normal firing runwith this system the M-22 shipwould start its run at 3 000 to 5 000feet above the terrain and about3 to 5 miles from the target. Theaircraft locks on the sight and whenit closes to within 3 500 meters thepilot starts a slight dive to allowthe gunner to launch the missiletoward the target. When this isaccomplished the pilot may thenlevel the aircraft climb or takeevasive action as long as he remainswithin travel limits of the sight.This method would be used if theairspace around the target areawas secure.

The gunner launches the missilewhile looking around the sightwhich he has already stabilized inline with the target. e then looksinto the sight and by use of his left

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Above: an aviator test f ir ing the M 22 missile system. Below:close up views of the sight being used by the aviator above

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rmedHelicopter Flyingaptain ugene Fudge WHAT s a really good aviatorProbably the best answerwould be thc aviator who knows

how to live in his environment.In Vietnam as in other areas ofthe world where the Army oper-ates its aircraft certain funda-mentals should be followed. Thesefundamentals may differ some-

what for desert flying as comparedto jungle fiying but basically theyare the same. Some you learnwhen you first start fiying; othersyou learn only after many hardhours in the cockpit.

One of the things you weretaught in basic flying s to make


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ome are learned in school others from experiencea high reconnaissance of an areab fore going in. High reconnais-sance provides valuable information about the enemy situation andterrain which might go unnoticedat treetop level.

Only in ra re cases is it necessaryto proceed into an area at lowlevel without making a high re-connaissance first. One reasonwould be if weath er conditions had< r eated a 300 to 400 foot ceiling.Then it would be wise r to go in attreetop level th an to present alucrative ta rget at 300 feet.

The in telligence boys work realhard at ga thering their information, but they can t always beright . Wh n th ey sa n area isfr of th e enemy thi s may be theone time they are wrong, so don td pend on it. Likewise, just be-cause you have worked an arear peat edly without encounteringresistance does not mean it willstay that way. The enemy canchange his ar ea of op ra tion justas we do . Experience has shownthat the majority of ai rc raft hitsand ca sualties occur when the aircraft fli es directly over an n myposition.

Once a target is identified whileflying guns, a firing pass should beinitiated at a distance withinrange of your weapon system. fthe weapons ar e capable of killingat a range of 2 000 meters, thenengage th e target at that distance,situation permitting. The probability of your aircraft being hitincr ases the closer you get to thetarget.

Do not fly directly behind thelead helicopter (1800 wing posi-tion ) . This will result in both shipshaving the same ground track. Byflying in an extended right or leftechelon, each ship has a separateground track and will not overflythe same area. When two ships flythe same ground track, the firstECEM ER 1968

ship al rt th hostil forces on th eground to th presence of aircraftand in cr a the ground fire hazard to the second ship or wingship.

Flying parall to terrain fea-tures is dang rous because of thelength of time your aircraft is ex-posed to enemy weapons systemsusually employed along treelines,ridgelin s, canal lines, etc. Also,flying parallel to terrain featuresestablishes a pattern. Wh en a pattern is established, the enemys jobis easier since he can predict yourflight path. t is far better to avoidsuch terrain fea tu res as much aspo sible unless the mission dictatesotherwise. Wh n flights over andaround linear terr ain featur s arenecessar y, it should be at variousangles to th em. Wh n conductingreconnaissance of a linear terrainfeature you should use an S-typepattern.

Befor becoming engaged in agiven op ration be certain youfamiliariz you rself with all avail-able in forma tion pertinent to th eint nd d operation. This must in-clude th ground tactical plan , airplan, fire support plan, and anyother plan that may be peculiarto the operation.

Everyone inside your helicopteris a very important member ofyour team and should be briefedbefore takeoff. When the missionis a ru shed one, you may have tobrief in the air. Often you willreceive. information which pertainsto your mission over the radiofrom other aircraft in the area orforc s on the ground. Make sureyour lemen s monitor proper radiofrequ ncies at all times This willease your control problem. As inany military operation, the fiveparagraph fi ld order should beused.

Never fire until you have thefri ndly forces located. Identify

the front lin es, flanks , and adjoining units. Don t r turn hostilground fire until the fri endly troopdispositions have b en po itivelyidentified.

Firing over th heads of fri ndlytroops is usually the poor st attackdirection for several reasons. Themachinegun bra s and links fallingon th troops can cause a controlprobl m for the ground commander. The falling br ass, links, andthe noise of the guns create theimpression that you have misjudgedthe distance to the target and arefiring into their position. Also byattacking over their heads, yourflight path is straight into theenemy fields of fire aimed at thefri endly troops. The enemy troopdisposition is most likely to beparallel to the fri ndlies, and byattacking over their heads you willnot take advantage of the weaponsbeaten zone. Attacks should beplanned to ma ke th long axis ofthe beaten zone of the weaponscorrespond to the long axis of th etarget.Don t waste ordnance and don texpo e yourself by engaging an unworthy ta rget. f 50 percent willneutralize or suppress a target savethe res t, because the enemy mayhav just begun to fight. Yourmiss ion is to support the groundcommander to the best of yourability. At times you will be theonly support available to a groundcommander, so make each roundcount.

Shock action and surprise aretwo of the most important charac teristics of all armed helicopteroperations. This can only be accomplished by experienced andwell trained crews without jeopardizing th e safety of all concerned.While learning to live in the. environment, remember to concentrate on accuracy and sound tactics ; speed will follow.

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What s ll This PM Jazz?It stands for preventive maintenance

but it could also stand for professional management

THE U. S. ARMY uses a mostworkabl and safety consciousaircraft maintenance system. Thebackbone of this system is PM(preventiv maintenance). To fixthe small things and inspect forincipient failures will continue toma ke a lot of sen e because of improper maintenance until an airplane is developed that can bepulled over and parked whensomething breaks.

OK , you say, if it s such a greatsystem then why doesn t it work?Well now that s a funny thingabout a system, it just doesn t workunless you work it. Let s look atthe picture from a simple viewpoint. What the system boils downto is a series of checks and re-

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SF R Mullinax

checks ba s d on , and scheduled according to, data obtained fromprevious experience. Well callthese organizational maintenanceand inspec tions. Now, when weperform one of these operations westill come up with check and recheck in t ~ t th e mechanics do thework, the in pector checks thework, and th e supervisor checks onboth and reports to the maintenanc officer any problems encountered.

Now that sounds perfect doesn tit? With all these people checkingon each other, what could possiblygo wrong? Plenty of things cango wrong, but one of the main onesis a lack of und rstanding betweenmaintenance and command, com-

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mand and operations, operationsand maintenance, or all three.

Let s look at this area and someof its problems. FM 101-20 statesthat (le t s use the UH-1 series foran example) it takes an average of5.5 hours of maintenance for eachhour of time that a UH-1 helicopter flies. This of course doesn tmean that if we fly a ship today forone hour that we will find it necessary to perform 5.5 hours of maintenance tonight, but if we fly 100hours this month, then the averagemaintenance time will be 5.5 hoursx 100 flight hours.

This means the 550 manhoursthat should be accomplished for the100 hours of flying should bebroken down something like this:U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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300:00 hours for dailies, 90:00 hours for intermediates, 160:00 hours for periodic inion.Now if you have 25 UH-1 heli

in a unit an d each of theseflies 100 hours in onenumber

maintenance hours that will befigures up to about 13,750urs. T hat s a pr tty goodmaintenance hours whentop and look at it real close.

After your close look, are yourpersonnel actuallye red in the time designated? Tod you in determining these facthe following formulas are

d for arriving at properns: To determine manhour workloadwherex = minimum maintenance manhours requiredn = number of type of aircraftinvolvedm = MH / FH ratio (manhour /flight hour)p = average monthly flying hourfactoruse formula x = nmp Example:n = 20 U -l (hypothetical)m = 6:0 MH/FH ratiop = 30 monthly flying hourfactorx = nmpx = 20 x 6.0 x 30x = 3600.0 minimum manhoursrequired per month (1st

2nd echelon) To determine maintenance manhours available wherex = maintenance man hoursavailablea = number of directmaintenance personnelb = hours per work day

c = number of work days inperiod (week, mo, qtr)d = percent of time personnelare available exc luding leave,KP, guard, illness, etc.,based on local situationand specific perioduse formula x = d (abc) Example:a = 8 personnelb = 8 hours per dayc = 20 work days per monthd = 76 time personnel areDECEMBER 1968

available fo r maintenanceduty, thereforex = d (abc)x = 76 (8 x 8 x 20)x = 973 available manhours permonth

In the sample problems, therewas a defici ncy of 627 manhoursfor the required maintenance. tmay b to your advantage to runa check on your unit. It is importan t that commanders at all echelons understan d that a certain percentage of EDPs is inevitable un derpresent stockage policies. Experienc indicates the EDP rate formost aircraft will be approximately10 percent. T h is will vary depending on thc newness an d complexityof the major item and the d is tanceof the unit from the source ofsupply.

Now how many times have youseen the operations officer or thecommanding officer give the maintenance officer a h ar d time aboutavailability of aircraft? O ne bat talion in Vietnam demanded a 90percen t availability where ap plicable publica tions state that UH -1availability should be 70 percent.

f we stop and really consider thesystem, we ll find that the aviationmaintenance program is developedto operate on a maximum TEAMeffort to provide maximum availability of safe aircraft.Yet, if commanders and op ra tions offic rs do not take the timeto understand and appreciate themaintenance officer s respons ibilityand efforts, then we are faced withan unworkable situation.So let s work the system so thesystem can work for us. Using theinspection and checks referred toearlier, with the mechanics to dothe work, the insp ctor to checkthe work, the sup rvisor to checkon both and report to the maintenance officer, and most importantperhaps the commander to assurethat every link in the chain pullsunder the same pressure smoothlyand efficiently - then any unitcan accomplish its mission satisfactorily and safely.T hat PM jazz stands for preven tive maintenance, but it alsomight stan d for professional management.

The system can work fo r you, not against you

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Techniques For ust C o n t r o l ~The U S Army Engineer Waterways ExperimentStation is testing system that may alleviatelarge part of the dust problem plaguing helicopters

A LANDING PAD suitable forhelicopter operation has beenprepared by using a helicopterairspray technique. Under a con-tract to the U. S. Army EngineerWaterways Experiment StationVicksburg Miss., AgriculturalA viation Engineering Company(AGAVENCO) has developed andflight tested the system. Thisaerial dispersal system designedfor the UH 1 Band D helicopteris capable of applying polyesterresin and other dust alleviationmaterial to unprepared groundsurfaces.Responsibility for developingdust control materials and tech-niques in support of the Army inthe field was assigned to the Waterways Experiment Station by theU. S. Army Materiel Command.

The AGAVENCO system wasbased on specifications developedby the Waterways Experiment Station who also designated theparticular dust alleviating materialsto be employed.

The objective of the concept isto quickly prepare a ground areaupon which helicopters might landor ground vehicles may operatewithout creating a dust cloud.Dust is harmful to the helicopterand engine as well as being thedirect cause o accidents due toloss of outside visual reference bythe crew. The airspray techniqueas compared with conventional andother experimental methods makesit possible to rapidly and evenlydistribute liquid dust control materials on ground surfaces withoutrequiring ground personnel or

other types of equipment.After a design development andlaboratory test program by thecontractor the spray system wasflight tested in a UH-IB helicopterat the U. S. Army Aviation TestActivity at E d w a r d ~ Air ForceBase Calif. The equipment wasquickly installed without any mod-ification to the helicopter.With the UH-IB flying at 15mph and at approximately 7 feetin altitude a 50 x 50 simulatedhelicopter landing pad was satu-rated with polyester resin in 10adjacent and overlapping flightpasses. Each pass sprayed down asheet of liquid material 5 feet wideas would be accomplished with amassively large paint gun. A latexbase water soluble dust suppres-sant mater ial 10 feet wide in two

Below: spray nozzles mounted on UH l Lower right: the system mounted in the door


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adjacent passes was also appli daround the p rimeter of the polyester landing pad to demonstrateprotectiv coverage of soil andvegetation.

The syst m was designed with adual capability. During flight t sting polyester resin and catalystwer pumped independently andsimultanequsly through mixingnozzl s to provide a quick hardening mixture. Also the systemsprayed and appli d a single dustsuppression material capable ofself-hardening and drying uponexposure to air. During the finaldemons trat ions fluid flow patternsand control were applied withininches of a visually marked testgrid and distribution of both materials on the ground was consistent.

The dust control system incorporates an on-board gasoline engine pumping unit to achieve highrates of flow with materials of highviscosity and density. The entiresyst m in addition to being easilyand rapidly installed and removeds s If-contained. I t r quires onlynominal aircraft electrical pow r to

activate control valves. Test photographs movies and landing padsamples verify that th airspraytechnique for landing site preparation s a feasible concept to accomplish the dust control mission.AGAVENCO in addition to

dust suppression systems has developed other military dispersalsystems specifically for the BellU H ~ 1 helicopter. Among those developed are boom spray systemsand rotary brush systems for defoliation and disea e vector controlboom dust dispersal systems andsmoke generation systems for obscuration purposes. The companyalso s a major supplier of aerialdispersal systems and componentsfor the commercial aerial application industry.DECEM ER 968

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What d Ja Say CW4 C. R. BurroughsR EADY TO ROLL her out forrunup, the shop supervisortold the maintenance officer. Theflight line crewmembers wentthrough their daily checksheet.Wh en refueling had completed thetopping off, the line chief climbedin and fired up the Hu ey. Pre-liminary checks indicated good.The engine man and component smen indicated no leak s. The flightline chief was watching the clockso he wouldn't go over his allow-able run time. Normal shutdownand another check for leaks wasnext before tracking. Really luck-ing out so far, the line chief re-ported, if w don't have trackingproblems.2

This was just another routinejob, thought Joe Smedlock theline chief. H e'd been doing thisabout 10 years and was glad thereweren't an y problems. Seemed likethe ringing in his ears didn't g ttoo bad if he didn't have to spendtoo much time working with aBird. J oe didn't pay too muchattention to the extra side tonenoises in his ear until a few monthsback when his little girl held hernew watch for him to listen to ittick . By golly he could see it wasrunning but he couldn't hear it.Then during a trip to the beachJoe's wife had to remind him acoup le of times that the turn signalblinker was still on and he hadn't

heard the clicking. The two in-cidents convinced Joe to go to theflight surgeon for an audio check.

The news of nearly a 50 percenthearing loss really shocked Ol e JoeH e used earplugs mo t of the time.Oh, he would jump in on a runupsometimes without the plugs, andtracked without them too. Butwhat the heck difference could thatmake ? H e'd observed flight linepersonnel from other services withthe ear defenders (muffs) on, butcouldn't scrounge any. Now re-calling what th e flight surgeon hadtold him he probably would havesaved his hearing if he had ob-tained the muffs through supplychannels. Joe just d idn't realize heU S ARMY AV IATION DIGEST


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was losing the ability to hearsounds. But now he was becomingaware of little indicators uch ashaving to ask someone to repeat aquestion; being accused of beingsnooty for not answering when hedidn't hear a greeting; th carblinker; his little girl's watch; anda lot more.

Joe decided he'd a k his maintenance officer about g tting someear defenders and bing r fittedwith earplugs for himself and hism n also. He dug out some literatur and learned som interestingthings like this d cib thing he'dheard about but didn't r ally un-derstand.

The decibel (db) is a term bor-rowed from electrical communication engineering and represents arelative quantity. When it's used toexpress nois levels a referencelevel is implied. U ually, this reference level is a sound pressure of0.0002 Dyne per square centimeterand can be referred to as 0decibels.

This starting point of the scaleof noise levels is about the level ofthe weak st sound that can beheard by a person with very goodhearing in an extremely qui t location. For example, the sound levelin a large office usually is between60 and 7 decibels. Now Joe couldunderstand what a decibel measured.

The flight surgeon explained toJoe about how the noise exposureand hearing cons rvation programoutlined in TB MED 250 (25 Jan1965) was based on data gatheredby taking noise m asurements witha meter. It was possible to pointto certain noise levels that indicatewhen it's advisable to initiate hear-ing conservation programs. Ifnoise analysis reveals levels forvarious octave bands in excess of85 to 92 decibels in the 150 to9,600 CPS range, th n ear protection must b used or there will bea loss of hearing.

J oe copied down the FSNs of theDECEM ER 968

earplugs, containers for the plugs,and the ear muffs that the flightsurgeon had in the TB that couldbe ordered through supply chan-nels. He not d that the small,medium and large of one typ plug'only had one digi t differ nc inlast four numbers, but th extrasmall and xtra large had a different numb r. Th y r e large6515-299-8288, medium 8289, small8290, extra small 6515-664-7858,extra larg 7859. The cas was6515-299-8287. There was anothertype listed plus a cotton di posabletype, but he was going to be ableto get fitted by the flight surgeonany time he needed a new pair sohe didn't worry about them.

Ordering ear muffs was goingto be another matter. There werefour types listed by different manu-facturers, so he copied all of thenumbers. They were 4240-861-3612Aural Prot ctor, Sound, High P rformance, Noise Foe, Mark II,Mine Saf ty Appliances Co.; 4240-991-1910, same nomenclature,

M258, Wilson Co.; 4240-226-6016,same nomenclature, M1200, Am rican Optical Co.; and 4240-856-6650, same nom nclature, M 19A,David Clak Co. Joe now kn w thatearplugs would help but th y wouldonly filter out about 20 p rcent ofthe nois . He could improve onthis by using both plugs and muffswhich together cut out 35 to 40decibels.

Joe realized that it was too lateto do anything to regain the hear-ing he lost. But, he reason d thateven though he had goofed, hecould se to it that his men didn't.He could get them over to theflight dispensary for audiometertests and fittings with plugs untilthe muffs were rec ived. He couldget an hour from the Ole Man'straining and put th word out. Hecould point out to the troops thatif they don't want to wind up likeOle Joe Smedlock, half deaf, th y'dbetter start doing something now.Are you a, Huh, What'd Ja'Say ?

He could ensure that his men took ear tests


16/68

Tell lJs A War Story MacArmy ~ v i t i o n could benef it from valid experiences conceptsand techniques developed by individuals and un its in thefield if they were reported th rough the proper chain ofcommand. Also a letter or note to the aviation schoo l w illget them to the proper agency for dissemination and incor-poration into the training program

THE INFANTRY company wasin trouble. Intense fire fromthe fortified treeline to their fronthad them pinn d down in the ricepaddies and op n ar a which th eywere attempting to cross. Nowsporadic fire was beginning tocome from both flanks as theenemy attempted to encircle thecompany position. What had be-gun as a fairly routine s arch anddestroy operation was fast becom-ing a fight for survival in a cleverlyset enemy trap.

14

Major Robert E. Poston

t must have seemed to the com-pany commander that everythingthat could possibly go wrong thisday had already done so. Onlymoments before when his companywas not meeting resistance he hadrequ sted that the suppo rting artil-lery battery be moved forward sothat he would not move out ofrange of its supporting fires. Nowwhen he ds perately needed firesupport th e battery was enrouteby helicopters to its new position.Although the move would be rapid

each minute could very well costthe l ves of men in his company.H thought of tactical air supportbut as he looked up ward at thelayers of low clouds above his posi-tion he knew that the aircraftcould not find nor support himunder the 200 to 300 foot brokenceiling.H e reported his perilous situationto th e battalion commander whoadvised that a platoon of aerialartillery had been dispatched tosupport the company while the

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


17/68

tube artillery was moving, and thatthe rocket armed helicopters ~ h o u lbe nearing his position. Almost instantly, the radio operator reportedthat the platoon leader of theaerial artillery had checked intothe company net. The helicopterswere approximately seven kilometers south of the company position, but were encountering zeroceilings and patchy ground fog.

s the company commanderglanced skyward to recheck theweather over his position, it seemedthat fate had indeed chosen thisday to plot against him. The ceiling was still a couple of hundredfeet, but in places light fog and theragged bottoms of clouds brushedthe treetops, making it doubtfulthat the aerial artillery could pickits way through to his position.

Enemy fire from the flanks ofthe company position was increasing and mortar rounds were beginning to fall on his position. Anassault or attempted withdrawal

The leader climbed the platoon,in trail formation, above the lowerlayer of clouds and proceeded VFRbetween layers toward the beleaguered company's position. Hequeried the company commanderabout the approximate ceiling andvisibility at his position, the magnetic azimuth and distance fromthe position of his radio set to thetreeline to be attacked, a brief verbal description of the treeline andits orientation to the surroundingterrain, and that the company beprepared immediately upon command to mark the treeline withred smoke from rifle grenades.

s the platoon homed to thecompany's FM radio, the platoonleader made a careful map studyof the terrain, elevations and obstacles around the coordinatesgiven as the company's position.He then gave his platoon the following briefing on VHF: Beginspacing yourselves in trail formation with one minute intervals be-

radio while continuing descent to300 feet. We should be in theclear at 300 feet but if not, do notdescend farther; fly heading 310for two minutes and then climbback to VFR on top.

We should be under these cloudsbefore arriving back at the radio.The target should be e ~ i l y recognized from the description given us,but if you are not sure, don't fire.Remember, the target will bemarked wi th red smoke and theforward friendly positions withyellow smoke. Plan to fire six pairsin each of four ripples. We maynot get more than one pass.

Any questions? OK, let's be onour toes. This could be ratherticklish, but it will work. FAAmight not approve of this pro-cedure but I'm sure that companydown there would.

s the platoon leader turned iI)bound toward the company's radio,he broke out of the clouds right at300 feet and requested immediate

t h r ough t h egraz ing firefrom the fortified t r ee l inewould be disas-

how many lessons have been learned and new tacticstechniques and procedures developed never to be dis-seminated farther than to a few buddies at the bar?

mark ing offriendly positions and thet a r ge t Only

trous under existing conditions. Tostay put meant almost certain encirclement. He must have fire support on the fortified treeline andhave it soon.

In desperation the companycommander grabbed the radiohandset and called the platoonleader of the aerial artillery. Heexplained the urgency of his si tua-tion and his desperate need forartillery support.

The aerial artillery platoon leader already had given much thoughtto the possibility of such situationsoccurring. He had discussed it atlength with the pilots in his platoon and decided upon variouscourses of action which he mighttake depending on the problem.Now without hesitation or delayhe proceeded to implement one ofthe plans.

DECEMBER 1968

tween aircraft. The heading fromthe radio to the target treeline is310 and the distance is approximately 400 meters.

You heard the commander'sdescription of the target. The elevation of the ground down there isapproximately 100 feet with nonein the immediate area higher than150 feet and no known obstaclesother than trees. The ceiling isapparently between 200 and 300feet so we should break out withno problem. It looks like we willbe able to maintain VFR on topor between layers at 1,200 feetuntil reaching the company's position.

We will fly outbound from theradio on a heading of 100 for oneminute while descending at 500feet per minute to 700 feet. Thenturn right to 310 back to the

seconds afterthe red smoke ignited in the tree-line, ' the first of the helicopters'rockets slammed into the target.

The company mounted an assault on the fortified treeline im-mediately after the last helicopter'sfiring pass. The enemy, surprisedand dazed from the impact of 1922.75 rockets, offered only lightresistance.

The infantry company wasthankful for the much needed support and the aerial artillery pla-toon was justly proud of a jobwell done. They reported to theirhigher headquarters that supporthad been given to the company,but not how it was accomplished.How it was accomplished was re-ported only to their buddies at thebar that night.

On another day, the pilot of an0-1 and his observer were cruising

5


18/68

along on .a daily reconnaissance oftheir area of responsibility. It wasa beautiful day with just a fewpuffy cumulus clouds a bright sunreflecting from the rice paddies andcanals below and a cool breezeblowing in from the South ChinaSea.

The observer was almost daydreaming as he thought of how wellhe knew his area of responsibility.Every canal every paddy everytreeline and every hootch werefamiliar to him. He thought ofhow he had watched daily thecountryside below turn from the

brown of the dry season to the lushgreen shades of the wet season. Hehad seen the rice planted andwatched it grow until it now stoodtall and nearly mature.

Today the rice the coconutpalms the reeds and rushes alongthe canals and all of the broad


19/68

leaf tropical plants seemed to bealive as they bent and waved inthe brisk breeze below. I t lookedas though someone had taken agiant comb and combed the entirecountryside into the direction thewind was blowing. Virtually everysprig of vegetation was bent withthe wind except about two dozenclumps of tall green reeds alongthe sides of two intersecting canals.The observer wondered momentarily why those clumps of reedsdid not bend and sway. Were theysome type of stiff reed with whichhe was not familiar?

He picked up the binoculars totake a closer look. The clumps ofreeds appeared to be the same typeas the others around them, but theywere not bending in th e wind because th ey were pulled togetherand tied at the top.

The observer called this to thepilot s attention, and they decidedto take another look from a loweraltitude. On a pass at 500 feet, itappeared to the pilot and observerthat something was hidden in eachclump of reeds, but they could nottell what it was. No personnel wereseen and no ground fire was received on the pass at 500 feet, sothey decided to make a pass atcontour altitude. This pass, onlya few feet above the reeds, revealeda carefully concealed enemy bunker, foxhole, or gun position in eachclump of reeds. I t also revealed,by the ground fire received, that atleast a portion of the positionswere occupied.

The pilot climbed the 0-1 to asafe altitude and reported to thearea commander. He repor ted thenumber and location of the positions, but he did not report howthey were discovered. How theywere discovered was reported onlyto his buddies at the bar thatevening.

Just as in the stories above, howmany lessons have been learnedand new tactics, techniques andprocedures developed never to beDECEMBER 1968

disseminated farther than to a fewbuddies at the bar? How manycostly mistakes have been repeatedand lives lost as the thousands ofArmy aviators, who were not oneof the buddies at the ba r, searchedfor effective tactics and techniqueswhich had already been employedbu not shared?

The principles of war neverchange, but the tactics, techniquesand procedures used in the conduct of war must constantly bechanged, improved and modifiedto retain optimum effectiveness.

It looked as if some-one had taken agreat comb andgroomed the entirecountryside intothe direct ion thewind was blowing

the only troublewas a couple ofdozen clumps ofreeds were notcombed A lowpass brought inter-esting results

Many factors influence the development of new t ~ t i c s and require changes or modifications ofexisting tactics. The objective, theenvironment , the enemy, and theintroduction of new weapons systems are but a few of these factors.Rar ely are tactics developed inpeacetime, and none can be judgedeffective until they have beentested and proved in battle.While the development andmodification of tactics is a continuous process, changes do not oftencome about suddenly or dramatic-

ally. Changes and improvementsare a result of the lessons learned,trials and errors, successes andfailures and experience gained byindividuals and units in all phasesof combat. Each individual andevery unit commander must ensurethat his trials, errors, experiencesand lessons learned are reported sothat others may benefit from themand develop more effective tactics,techniques and procedures.

The primary means of disseminating information is through doctrinal publications and trainingliterature. These include fieldmanuals, training circulars, training and special texts, referencenotes, Army training programsand special publications. The personnel who prepare these publications are not fountains of allknowledge; they have no crystalballs; they cannot disseminate information which is not reported.They depend on you, the individualon the scene, to provide the muchneeded information.

The U. S Army Aviation Schoolis training hundreds of new aviators each month. I f th ese aviatorsare to avoid the mistakes anderrors made by others before th em,they must be given the benefit ofprevious exper iences and trainedin the lates t and bes t possible tactics, techniques and procedures.This can be accomplished only ifthe improved methods, experiencesand lessons learned by those onthe scene are reported.

Any new concepts, ideas, or experiences should be reported ofcourse through the proper chain ofcommand. In addition, a letter ornote addressed to the Commandant, USAAVNS, Fort Rucker, Ala.36360, will get to the proper agencyfor dissemination and incorporationinto the training program.

Remember, the next time youhave any information which maybe useful to others in your profession, don t be bashful. Tell us awar story, Mac.

7


20/68


21/68

which the airmobile force com-mander may bring decisive fire-power to bear on an elusive andfast moving enemy on an ill definedbattlefield.

The airmobile divisions arecharacterized by rapid movementand overwhelming firepower. Allfire and maneuver elements areadapted to movement by air oftento locations far removed from thedivision base camp. Through airmobility the division exploits theadvantages of surprise and initia-tive; and through aerial resupply

DECEMBER 1968

Figure : M 6and displacement maintains superior firepower and maneuverabilityon the battlefield. Particularlysuited to the airmobile concept isthe artillery helicopter a fast mov-ing and hard hitting fire supportsystem capable of rapid and effec-tive employment over a large area.

The aerial rocket artillery battalion is equipped with 39 heli-copters Hueys and Cobras),three UH 1 Cs assigned to theheadquarters battery and eightUH-1Cs plus four AH-1Gs to eachof three firing batteries.

Figure 2: M 16r - ~ ~ ' I . . , . : I I I I .

Headquarters aircraft are usedin varying roles. Their primarypurpose is to support command andcontrol liaison and reconnaissancefunctions. They are also employedalthough less frequently, in battlefield surveillance reconnaissanceby fire target acquisition and sup-pressive fires in support of infantrycombat air assaults.

Headquarters aircraft are variably equipped to best support thecurrent mission. Installed weaponssystems may be M-6 four 7.62 mmM-60 machineguns on flexible ex-

19

.-.


22/68

ternal hydraulic mounts, figure 1)or M-16 (M-6 with the additionof two external pods each carryingseven 2.75 aerial rockets, figure2). Special purpose equipment isfrequently mounted. Smoke dispensing devices are installed foruse against personnel in well-protected positions such as tunnelcomplexes or caves.

The various weapon systems andspecial purpose equipment may bequickly installed or removed, andare fully adaptable to any of thebattalion aircraft.

2

Figure 3: XM 3UH-l helicopters of the firingbatteries are normally equipped

with the XM-3 rocket system.Forty-eight launching tubes areassembled into two pods mountedon external brackets on either sideof the aircraft (figure 3). Eachship, armed with 48 2.75 foldingfin aerial rockets, carries the initialstriking power of a full battalionof 105 mm howitzers.

Each firing battery is also equipped with four M-22 missile systems(figure 4). The M-22 (88 -11) installation provides fire control and

Figure 4: M 22

test equipment for six wire-guidedmissiles, suspended from mountingbrackets extended horizontally oneither side of the aircraft.

Within each battery, certain aircraft have been modified to in :corporate the M-22 guidance andtest equipment as permanent features. In these aircraft, the normally mounted XM-3 rocket system may be removed and the M-22missile system installed and testedin two or three hours, allowingflexibility in the choice of weaponsystems.

U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


23/68

Although possessing a dualweapons capability, the aerial artillery battery s most frequent mission is to provide rocket artilleryfire support to the airmobile forcecommander. To assure maximumeffectiveness, aerial rocket artillerymen are trained for quick response.Less than two minutes after a callfor fire, the ARA weapon systemsare airborne and en route to thetarget area.

One of the most distinguishingand valuable features of aerialartillery is the ability to place atremendous amount of fire on aspecific target witbout adjustment.Accurate aiming devices and welltrained crews ensure first roundfire-for-effect capability. Directobserved fire affords immediatestrike assessment. Shifting of firescan be almost instantaneous - aformidable tactic against multipleor fleeting targets.

From the 1st Cav s base camp atAn Khe, the ARA has respondedto calls for support from U. S. andallied forces stretched across thecentral highlands from the Cambodian border to the South ChinaSea. The tactical influence of itsaerial artillery extends well beyondthe division s normal tactical areaof responsibility.

Rapid response, speed of movement, extensive radius of action,large volume of fire and firstround - on - target accuracy havemade the aerial rocket artillerybattalion invaluable member ofthe fighting first team in Vietnam.

The unit did not achieve itsoutstanding effectiveness withouteffort. Certain aspects of aerialartillery operations require continuous emphasis; among them.communications, log is t ic s andflight crew training.Effective command and controlrequire continuous communicationbetween aerial rocket artillery ele-.ments at the division base campand in the airmobile task forcesareas of operation. ARA teamsDECEM ER 1968

The ARA can respond to a call in less than two minutes

may be dep loyed simultaneously inseveral locations, each exceeding aline-of -sight distance of 120 kilometers from rear area commandpost locations. Radio communications across such vast reaches ofmountainous jungle, most of whichis inaccessible to radio relay teams,require both ingenuity and technical competence to establish.Relays must be set up whereversecure terrain is available, however

poorly it may conform to equipment technical requirements. Limitations in available real estate mayrequire circuitous signal paths,necessitating additional relay pointsto maintain efficient communication links,. Where sufficient groundradio relay sites cannot be secured,airborne relay stations may beestablished . In either case, equipmen t organic to the ARA is frequently employed near the prac-

2


24/68

During sustained pperations rearming must be completed quicklytical limit of its range capability,requiring careful siting, precise adjustment and high maintenancestandards.

From alert positions at the 1stCav s base came, aerial artilleryaircraft can support c ~ r t i n smallscale, wide ranging operations.Among these are limited objectiveassault preparations, fire supportfor long range reconnaissancepatrols and ambush reaction forces,fires denying the enemy unrestricted use of key terrain and protective cover for convoy movements. For sustained operation inforward locations, however, theARA s normally located near thesupported airmobile force artillerycommand post.Co-location in forward supportareas affords several advantages,among them mutual security, close22

and direct fire support coordination and current intelligence. Thechief advantage, however, s thereduced time of movement fromalert positions to targets as theydevelop.Location m forward tacticalareas poses an immediate requirement for independent fuel and ammunition resupply. Reliance onjoint-use facilities s seldom satisfactory. During sustained operations rocket helicopters must swiftly refuel, rearm and return to thetarget area. There can be noquestion of priorities in the use ofservlcmg equipment or armingpoints. Additionally, the ARAoperations elements must exercisecontrol over expenditure and resupply rates as they are affectedby tactical actions.

In some instances the aerial ar -

tillery unit may provide a portionof its own logistic support throughsurface or air transportation offuel and rockets. In most cases,the necessary resupply s accomplished by cargo helicopters of thedivision s assault support helicopterbattalion.To achieve maximum effectiveness in aer ial rocket artillery firesupport, continuous and detailedtraining must be conducted in tactical radio communications, mapsand terrain analysis and ARAtactics and techniques.

Within the aerial rocket artilleryfire team, the functions of command and control and of firedirection usually require communication with two or more agenciessimultaneously. Among these areARA operations centers, forwardobservers, aerial observation posts,liaison officer and artillery firedirection centers. Coordination sfrequently required with other fireor maneuver elements, which mightinclude cavalry scout or weaponsaircraft, general support conventional artillery fire direction centers, forward air controllers andtroop lift aircraf t. U sing UHF,VHF and FM radios, the teamleader s often hard pressed to sortinformation and avoid confusion.

The team leader cannot alwayslisten to everyone himself. Hemust often assign certain frequencies to other pilots in the flightand specify a common channel forcommand and control. Pilots mustbe well trained in the unit SO P forcommunication checks and frequency changes. The flight leadermust be assured that he has positive control of every aircraft in theflight.

The possibility of radio failuremust be recognized. Failure toestablish a procedure for immediate transfer of control can seriouslydelay a fire mission or result infriendly casualties. Training mustensure that control of the flightwill quickly and smoothly pass toU S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


25/68

the senior aircraft commanderhaving positive contact with thefire control agency; and that noone will fire until he has receivedpositive information describing thetarget and friendly troop dispositions.

In aerial artillery operations theability to swiftly analyze map andterrain features is at a premium.Time do es not allow a casual cockpit study. Crews must quickly determine the best route to the targetarea considering weather, terrainobstacles and enemy weapons locations) ; accurately locate thetarget and evaluate those terrainfeatures which will influence tactics; and precisely navigate to thedesired attack position. Every pilotmust be highly proficient in plotting map coordinate and checkpoint data , interpreting map symbols and recognizing terr infeatures.

The range of ARA operationsrequired a large area map coverageto be carried in each aircraft. Thenecessity for great detail in terrainanalysis requires small-scale tacticalmap coverage of that same largearea. t is not unrealistic to contemplate employment over a regionrequiring 40 to 60 map sheets forcomplete coverage.

Inability to locate the correctmap at the right time can resultin unnecessary confusion and delayin fire support. Even more seriousis the possibility that a flight couldrun out of map coverage enrouteto a target beyond the normallyanticipated ranges of ARA em ployment. In solving these problems, methods have been developedfor organizing extensive area coverage into a series of compositemaps carefully indexed and storedin a cockpit-mounted container forready selection and use. To makethe system effective, aviators mustbe trained to use it correctly.

The effectiveness of aerial artillery depends largely on the methodof attack and distribution of fire.DECEM ER 1968

ARA tactics must conform to thesize, nature and orientation of thetarget. Crews are assigned a widevariety of targets, each requiringa different analysis.

The size and nature of the target dictates the size of the fireteam, which may vary from two to2 aircraft, normally not exceedingfour. A symmetrical area target

may require attacking aircraft tofire simultaneously from a lineabreast, each with a given sector,delivering the maximum volume offire in the shortest time. A narrowlinear target such as a ridge lineor stream line may require aircraftto fire from a trail formation, the

second and succeeding helicopters400 to 500 meters behind and toone side of the preceeding aircraft,each firing a given sector for optimum distribution.A point target, moving or stationary, may dictate attack by asingle aircraft firing from shortrange while covered by the remaining aircraft in position to provideimmediate covering fire. Multipletargets may require multiple directions of attack simultaneously,or sequential attack in order ofimportance.

Various methods of attack involve certain specifics amenable toSOP. These include approach and

The ARA frequently coordinates with other f ire and maneuverelements such as the troops below who are f lushing out an enemycommand post. CH 47 brings in more troops

3


26/68

Aerial Rocket Artilleryfiring formations, time to fire, number of rockets to fire, target sector,direction of the break after firingand emergency actions. Every aviator in the flight must know thevarious techniques and procedures,and must be able to perform appropriate actions at the propertime without a lot of conversationover the tactical radios.

The flight leader may expend allor a portion of his rockets againsta target on a given pass or firingrun. The number of rockets to belaunched or retained is determinedby evaluation of the target andthe probable need for subsequentattacks. A balance must be soughtbetween destructiveness of initialfires and retained capability forsustained fire against fleeting targets or targets of opportunity. Thetarget must be quickly neutralized;however, the flight leader must notallow surviving enemy to emergefrom cover and freely maneuverwhile he circles the area withempty rocket tubes.

Rocket helicopters normally carry two door gunners equipped withM-60 machineguns to provide suppressive fires against the target orsurrounding terrain during rocketfiring or surveillance passes. Effective delivery of suppressive firerequires training in several techniques: visual scanning by sectorto detect hostile counteraction,target recognition and identification, delivery of air-to-ground fireand safety procedures.

Gunners must know where andhow to fire and when to commenceor to cease their engagement. Success of a fire mission often dependslargely on the door gunners abilityto protect their aircraft duringrocket firing runs on the target.

Aerial rocket artillery fire missions may be categorized as preplanned or on call. Scheduled firessuch as air assault preparations

4

and harassment and interdiction(R I) generally allow time forextensive crew briefings, detailedcoordination with air and groundelements and consideration of alternate and emergency plans.Commanders may carefully determine who shall fire upon what andin which manner.

On-call fires from orbit or fromalert positions on the ground require immediate response; time isnot available for preflight planning.The flight leader must depend uponhis judgment and upon the priortraining of his crews. It is thereforenecessary that all rocket artillerymen continue to develop skill andjudgment through continued studyof ARA tactics and techniques.The work of tactical planning mustbe accomplished on the ground before the mission - not in the airafterward.

t has often been stated thatevery artillery aviator should remain proficient in conducting conventional artillery observed fire.This dictum most surely applies tothe aerial rocket artilleryman. Inseveral instances, ARA aviatorshave successfully adjusted and coordinated the fires of direct supportand general support conventionalartillery and rocket helicoptersagainst moving troop concentrations. On other occasions they havebeen called upon to adjust conventional artillery on targets obscured from direct observation byforward observers, or to continueadjustment for forward observercasualties. t appears likely thatARA pilots will continue to becalled upon to conduct conventional artillery fire missions, andmust therefore remain well trainedto do so.

UR 1 Band 1C helicopters werenot designed as weapons platforms,and were not intended to carry theloads habitually placed upon them

in aerial artillery batteries. Theadded weight of the XM-3 armament system (48 rockets), two machineguns and ammunition, emergency radio and signal flares, survival kits and four crewmemberswith individual weapons and protective equipment brings the aircraft very close to the maximumallowable gross weight for standardsea-level conditions of temperatureand pressure.

In the heat and humidity of theVietnamese jungle, particularly inthe higher terrain of the centralhighlands, aircraft frequently operate at surface density altitudesranging from 4,000 to 5,000 feetand occasionally higher. Underthese conditions the UR-IB can nolonger operate at the maximum design gross weight. A reduction infuel, rockets or crewmembers becomes necessary, diminishing thecombat capability of the weaponsystem.

To maintain the highest possiblecombat effectiveness, ARA aviatorsmust normally fly their ships atmaximum gross weight for existingconditions - a circumstance requiring unusually careful flighttechniques. In the fully loadedrocket helicopter every takeoff mustbe treated as a maximum performance maneuver. Introduction of theArmy s attack helicopter, the AR-1G Cobra, specifically designed foraerial weaponry, has significantlyincreased rocket helicopter speed,range and firepower. As ARA firesupport capability increases, newconcepts will be required in armament, employment, communications, logistics and tactics.Since its inception, the aerialrocket artillery battalion has beensingularly proficient in the fundamentals of artillery - to move,shoot and communicate. With continued emphasis on training andthe development of effective SOPsfor communication, logistics, andthe conduct of fire, success will beassured. .;;;iiIF



27/68

JI {~ U S S O e z' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' , , ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ' ' ~ ~ ' ' ' ' .. ,,. ,,, ,,.. , ,,.,iii ,.ii iii i .iii i i; i ;, i ,;iii ii i i.i;i i;i i,ii i ,,ii i .;;, i i; i ;,ii i i,ii i ;ii ; i iii i, i i ii i ii i ,,i.i ,,i.i i ii. i .; ii.; ""; ; i i ; i i.i iii ,,i.i ,,ii i ,,iii iii i; i ;. i i; i i. i i i;i ;; i ;,i ",;i ,,;; i ,,i, i .,,.i ,,;ii" ;ii i ;i i ;i; ,,;; i ,,i, ; ,,i.;

The U. S. Army Aeronautical Service Office discussesOverhauling GCA equipmentNew 1;500,000 Tactical Pilotage ChartsNew policy with FAA on parachute jumpsGett ing GCA operators ideas into manuals

ON navaids: Every try to uproot an AN/FPN-40? t can be quite a job if yourpersonnel have never been involved in such a project. The Army scyclic overhaul program for GCA equipment as established in SB 11-464 has causedsome heartburn not only in the uprooting of the equipment, but ininstalling the overhauled replacement sets as well. Commanders encountering difficultiesin installing or relocating GCA or other fixed base navigation aids should takeadvantage of services available under paragraph 3 of AR 95-23 which tasksUSAASO with providing worldwide engineering assistance on design and installation ofArmy ATC ground support facilities and systems.O N pilotage charts: There has been a considerable amount of static about the new1 ;500,000 Tactical Pilotage Charts (TPC) which have replacedthe good old sectional chart used for many years by Army aviators and operations types.As indicated in previous articles in the Flight Information Bulletin,the Army use of the Tactical Pilotage Chart was prescribed by DOD policy. An effort isbeing made to permit use of the regular sectional edition alongwith the TPC or to add data to the latter to meet our specific and often uniquerequiremen ts.O N parachute jumping: U. S. Armed Forces are no longer required to notify FAAprior to making parachute jumps within armed forces restrictedairspace. Previously, Part 105.23 of the Federal Aviation Regulation prohibitedparachute jumping in or into certain parts of the airspace unlessappropriate prior notice was furnished to the nearest FAA Air Traffic Control Facilityor FAA Flight Service Station. Now an amendment says Section105.23 does not apply to parachute jumping by members of an armed force within arestricted area that extends upward from the surface, when thatarea is under the control of an armed force.ON GCA manuals: Ground controlled approach (GCA) operators have long laboredwith technical manuals that did not always meet operatorneeds. USAASO wants to crank the operators ideas and needs into these manuals. Takea look at TM 11-5840-293-12 (FPN-40) and TM 11-5840-281-15 (TPN-8/18).How can they be improved? What s missing? Put your ideas down on paper andsend em to: Director, USAASO

ATTN: Fit Fac DivCameron StationAlexandria, Va. 22314Now is the time to move on this one. The -15 (TPN-8/18) is in the process ofbeing revised and the other is overdue for revision (insofar asoperators are concerned).

DECEMBER 1968 25


28/68

26

TwoMinutes:the most important of 40ur lifeHe rushed himself and exceededhis capability. Had he taken twoextra minutes one outbound andone inbound he d have donebetter (and passed the check ride)

Maior Glenn A. Leister

AT 0620 MAJOR Blastforth a senior aviatorarrived at airfield operations to accomplish hisannual instrument renewal ride. He had a fairamount of experience flying instruments in U -8 aircraft a few years ago; however he has just returnedfrom Vietnam and hasn t been able to do much instrument flying. He naturally was a bit apprehensiveabout the flight check but his fears subsided a bitwhen a rather shy young warrant officer walked upand introduced himself as the instrument flightexaminer.

During the preflight briefing the examiner asked ifthe major was familiar with DOD FLIP charts andif there were any questions.

U. S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


29/68

The major felt a slight uneasiness in his stomach,but having accomplished a recent IFR flight, hequickly replied he was prepared to file the flightplan. The weather was below VFR conditions andhe felt confident the examiner would not be giving.simulated single engine procedures or anythingunexpected.

Wh en the major completed his flight plan, theflight examiner noted that enroute VOR stationidentifiers had been entered in the TO block of the175 instead of ONLY the point of in tended landing.(FLIP Planning Data and Procedures, Sec II; PilotProcedures. ) After this and a few other minor errorswere corrected the flight plan was filed with operations. Destination weather was forecast to be 800feet overcast and one mile visibility with VOR andADF approach facilities. The alternate selected wasforecast to be 600 feet overcast and two miles visibility and was not listed as an exception under U. S.Army Alternate Airport Weather Minimums [nearth e front of the DOD Flight (Terminal) InstrumentApproach Procedures ]. The alternate airport hadcomplete ILS, ADF and VOR approach facilities.

The departure was uneventful except that Blastforth would have overshot his SID altitude restrictionbut luckily ATC cleared him to continue climbing toan assigned enroute altitude. Having obtained radarcontact after takeoff he was relieved of demonstratinghis knowledge of reporting procedures.

Upon arrival at his destination Blastforth's confidence increased. He had been previously assigned inthe area and his last instrument flight was to thesame airport. Du e to traffic conditions Blastforth wascleared to hold at the VOR station on the inboundcourse, procedure turn side, one-minute patterns,maintain 4,000 feet. Airport elevation was 305 feet.

So far so good. Blastforth finally pinned down agood inbound heading to fly and was tracking withthe VOR needle almost centered. As he was turningoutbound from th e VOR he was cleared for a VORapproach to Pittsville airport. Blastforth yanked offth e power to expedite descent and went outboundone minute. He also reported VOR outbound, whichis not required by approach control.

While outbound and descending he glanced at hisapproach procedure and after one minute began aturn to the inbound course to the VOR. Procedureturn (PT ) altitude was 2,500 feet MSL and sincehe thought he knew he was near th e inbound coursehe continued descending to 2,000 feetMSL whichwas the minimum altitude authorized inbound to thestation. The ra te of descent was 1500 feet-per minute. Things began happening fast now.

DECEM ER 968

The heading indica tor was approaching 360 degrees (inbound course ) - stop and turn, OK , now,whoops - gotta stop that descent, whoo Just a hundred feet low, now back up to 2,000 feet. Hold it,what's the matter with the VOR'? Full scale leftdeflection Better make a good size correction toget on course. Let's see, what was that minimumaltitude on final and time inbound? Oh yeah, got itnow. * # @ @ # * it Now the VOR is full scaleright deflection. Another turn.

Then the TO indicator went to FROM on theVOR. Again Blastforth yanked the power off anddropped th e gear to attempt to salvage the approach.A few more S turns and the VOR deviation needleis only five degrees off course. Thirty seconds left togo on time inbound from the VOR to the airportand it looks like Blastforth has salvaged the approachand leveled off just a hair below minimums: groundin sight but no airport or forward visibility.

At this point the examiner instructed Blastforth toinitiate the missed approach p r o c e d ~ r e Anticipatinga full stop landing, Blastforth was a bit confused,particularly since he figured 30 seconds were remaining. The examiner realized the time from theprocedu re turn point inbound was less than 45 seconds, indicating a tailwind on the approach. Therefore the time inbound on the approach would beshortened. Since the minimums were 800 feet andone mile, the field should already have been in sight,but since VOR and ADF are nonprecision approachesit is not uncommon to fail to be aligned with therunway as you should be with ILS or eCA whichare precision approaches.Blastforth fumbled for the missed approach procedure, but with some welcome copilot assistancefrom th e examiner he managed to initiate the missedapproach.

Informed that Pittsville airport was below minimums, a change enroute flight plan was filed and aclearance obtained to Podunk airport. Upon arrivalat the alternate Blastforth was relieved to find thatwinds from th e ground to his altitude were light andvariable. Wea ther was 200 feet overcast, one-halfmile visibility, with light rain and fog.

An almost identical situation occurred. The clea r-' ance for approach was given in a similar holding

position, except this was to be an ILS approach.Again Blastforth went outbound only one minute andturned inbound. The MAJOR factor that was to bea problem during this approach wasn't wind - itwas unf mili rity with the approach to Podunk airport . This time the pilot was rapidly glancing at theapproach procedure and trying to control headingand altitude, which were persistent in remaining

7


30/68

almost out of tolerances. Suddenly the glide slopecame off the peg and moved toward the doughnutcourse needle was slowly moving away from center. Blastforth was confused with an unfamiliar format on the approach procedure What was DH?MDA? HAT? Why was an A - B - C - D - E aboveeach column? By this time the ADF needle was offthe tail and both LOCALIZER and GLIDE SLOPEwere fully deflected.

At this point the examiner stated, "I've got it "and requested clearance for another approach. Heproceeded back to the outer compass locator, wentoutbound two minutes on a teardrop procedure tumand reversed course. During the two minutes inbound he intercepted, bracketed and tracked on thelocalizer, reducing heading changes down to two tothree degrees. The localizer needle was centered andas the glide slope needle moved to the cente:, thegear was extended. Very few corrections were necessary during the final approach. The approach wasexecuted with precision because he had allowed himself sufficient time to stay well ahead of the aircraftwithout rushing the sequence.. "Why not expedite the approach?" ask many

p ~ l o t s It can be done however it is an exceptionalpIlot who can make a precise approach under theadverse conditions described above.

The primary objective of an instrument flight isto. a ~ r i v e safely at destination. Blastforth thought hewas n the "ball park" on both approaches. Was he?Let's analyze the obstruction clearance criteria on

an ILS approach. This is not "protected airspace"from other aircraft, but the safety zone between youand obstructions '

This area assures terrain clearance when the aIrcraft is within the boundaries of the airspace ap-proach segment and at the published altitudes. Des- 8

cent below procedure turn altitude should never bestarted until intercepting the glide path on a fullILS approach, at the final fix inbound on a localizerapproach, or when established inbound on finalcourse in accordance with the altitude shown on thepublished VOR or ADF approach. (Blastforth wasdescending too early on the VOR approach.)Note how narrow the safety zone becomes as youapproach the airport: 500 feet either\Side of centerline and 200 feet above the terrain. A full-scale deflection on either LOC or GS could mean your flightmight terminate in a sudden stop short of the airport. A turning missed approach procedure also isnot as safe as you might think. I f you delay your turn,or fail to compensate for a tailwind on your approachtime inbound from station, you may not have obstruction clearance.

The ironic part of this story is that although thenames are fictitious, this story is repeated every dayby numerous pilots - military and civilian. Blastforthis probably an average pilot. He rushed himself andexceeded his capability. Had he taken two extraminutes - one outbound and one inbound - hecould have been much more precise (and passed hisc ~ e c k ride). With regard to overshooting altitudes,hIS crosscheck wasn't slow, he was descending orclimbing too fast - FAA reques,ts no more than 500fpm rate of climb or descent the last 1,000 feet to anassigned altitude. This is the human factor. Double

~ h e amount of tasks (or crosschecks) to accomplishn a short length of time and the outcome is doubt-

ful. The same principle applies to an approach. Thehuman reaction, for example, at 200 - one-half~ i n i m u m s if descent is 1,500 fpm, only an excep

t l ~ n a l l y good pilot will consistently stop his desceritWIthout "busting" minimums. Rates of descents andtasks in the cockpit MUST NOT EXCEED normalcrosscheck capabilities.I f cleared for a straight-in approach the controller generally must give clearance at an altitude

and heading commensurate with the inbound courseand altitude. When a pilot "mgers" a clearance he. ,SIgns a contract that he can comply. I f he's not inposition to comply, he should request a standard approach and/or radar assistance. The controller mustmaintain a two minute or a five mile horizontalseparation ' of 1,000 feet vertical separation betweenyou and other aircraft. You don't have three milesor 1,000 feet between you and obstructions - youmay have as little as 200 feet vertical or 500 feethorizontal clearance from the ground.

So what if IFR traffic is heavy? Have you expedi ted anything if you have to make a mi Sed ap-proach? It may be worth it to take the extra twominutes.



31/68

NORMAL PROCEDURE TURN AREA ALL AIRCRAFT

SECONDARY AREA

INBOUND COURSE

PROCEDURE TURN MAYBE EXTENDED TO 15 MILESBY SELECTING RADIUS POINTALONG THIS LINE.

ILS CATEGORY I FINAL APPROACH AREA

---_ I5 ~ 0 F T ~ ----40:1 SLOPE J4 0 , 0 0 0 - - - - ~ 1

- t - . . - - ISYMMETRICAL EXTENSION (IF REQ'D)

40:1 SLOPE I- -1 1 6 0 0 0 FTII

50DOFT _ I- - - - . . I - ~ ..I~ M A X . NORMAL I S T - ~ I - - - - - J~ - - - - MAX. DIST. WHEN EXTENDED 15 MI.--------- f.1

IF REQ'D.)

DECEMBER 1968 29


32/68

Let s Quit Killing urselvesI f you insist on ignoring what you ve been taught,be sure that you wear your dog tags when you re flying

W HEN DID YOU look atUSABAAR's "Weekly Summary" without seeing:

"Aircraft lost rpm on takeoff" or"high density altitude considereda f


33/68

with no difficulty. What will thedens ity altitude be la ter on in themorning? How many troops then?You picked up seven troops lasttime out of the PZ; since then youhave refueled. How many addedpounds nex t time out? You easilypicked up a load at a low altitudestrip and you are going to the topof a 3,000-foot peak. What's thedensi ty al ti tude going to be there?What if you have to terminate ata hover ?

If we start doing some betterchecking more of us will come backfrom our tour unscarred. That GoNo-go placard , if used, will preventall misery but remember it is goodfor one takeoff at a time. The factors affecting each takeoff must betaken into consider ation. You cannot get the same load out of avertical tunnel formed by a ringof 200 foot tr ees that you can liftat home base. Just because youhad the necessary get up and goat a sea level base camp doesn'tmean you'll safely make it on andoff that 3,000-foot mountaintop.

The people who make helicopters are fully aware of th eir performance limitations and our accident statistics. To help us out theyare installing a more powerful engine - added power for youroverburdened Huey. Too bad someof us are going to crash becauseof th at engine Just think howmuch more you will be able tohaul in your bird with that addedpower. Those who ta ke the attitude that the added power is toenable us to do our present jobmore efficiently will benefit, findtheir job easier and will live longer. Those who figure on throwingmore weigh t aboard because ofmore power are in for serioustrouble.

Another aspect of the problemis a lack of understanding bycommanders. Most of our groundcommanders understandably havelittle knowledge of aircraft andaviator capabilities or limitations.DECEM BER 1 968

In past years some commandersfelt Army aviators were overpaid,underworked flyboys who sometimes contributed a little s o m ~thing to th e overall accomplishment of th e mission. To our credit,those days are gone forever. Now,our company, battalion and brigad e commanders are asking for asmuch aviation support as we cangive them and demanding moreand more all the time. As a resuit aircraft and aviators aresometimes misused, abused andmisunders tood.

There is a big ta sk ahead toeducate all commanders to properly use the aircraft available tothem. One big reason for our existence , lest you forget , is to enable the ground unit to fight moreeffectively. If we are not filledwith a sense of successful missionaccomplishment when supportingthe troops we are not worth ourpay as soldiers. A major undertaking properly and safely accomplishing our mission is to ensurethat our machines are always usedcorrectly.

An inexperienced person seeinga Huey pick up eight troops at th eairport will assume th e same aircraft can take eight troops out ofa jungle landing zone and may basehis aircraft request on that. Ormaybe in the cool of the morningit took 20 ships to do a job normally assigned to 25. You knowhow many ships that man is goingto request la ter in th e day whenthe density altitude is a thousandfeet higher, the crews are tired andeverybody is in a hurry to get thejob done. Sure, he is going to askfor that same 20 ships.

Brigade aviation officers are ina good position to advise the bossand the rest of the staff on properutilization of aircraft. The brigadeAO should be able to corner theold man now and then and provide him with some pertinent facts.If everyone realizes th e designlimitations of the machines and

the factors affecting aircraft per formanc e they are more likely torequest enough a ircraft to do thejob properly rather than insist ona minimum number of ships so th elift can be accomplished withgreater speed. They certainlywould rather have an ex tra sortieor two than an overloaded aircraft crash wi th one of their infantry squads on board.

Many ground commanders havelea rned the problems that face anaviation unit, but it has taken fartoo many accidents to bring thepoint home Don't blame th e commander Look tothe aircraft commander who says, Sure I can takea couple more, climb on.

Also we need to think aboutwhat we carryon our helicopters .The normal crew for routine missions consists of th e aircraft commander, pilot, crewchief andgunner. Each has a personalweapon, ammunition and somesort of armor to sit on , wear orhide behind. Add two machinegunsand two or th ree boxes of ammofor each gun. Throw in a case ofC rations , some extra bil , hydraulicfluid, tools and manuals - you'vegot a good load even before themis sion starts.

Is it all necessary? When did youlast take a look into the heatercompartment? What did you findth ere ? How much did it weigh?Was it necessary or was it justdead weight around the neck ofaircraft performance?

Enough said? Start thinkingth en Get out your dash 10. Brushup on how to use the Go No-goplacard and tell the boss what youraircraft and you are capable ofdoing. Then when you go out todo that job stay within the limitsprescribed by the book, your bossand yourself. If you insist on violating what you've been taught andassume the attitude that a fewex tra pounds won't hurt, be sure towear your dog tags so you can beidentified.

31


34/68

WHERE WOULDYOU PUT IT?

Like a spiteful child she maydecide to quit. It could be today

Captain George D Fuller

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.


35/68

.

I , , ~ _ ,

1 ~ ~ ~

, 0 1' .. (_i ~ . # ' i c :oj f . . ; . ~ > ~ \

~ ~ - : ,

':;1':- ; ? , ~ : ) : : : ; ~ . ; ~ ':, ,-, .,- . ' : , ~ HERE WOULD YOU put it? Remember;:, ; , ~ , ~ ~ that question from your glorious days in flight.. school? It was usually asked by a devilish IP who pulled the throttle back just when you decided to

fumble with maps, light a cigarette, or pass a minuteor two in pleasant reverie enroute to the home field.-I: ./ . Actually, IPs develop a sixth sense. The techniquevaries with instructors, but it s rather like the stu-dent in a classroom who passes the time by staringat the back of a buddy's head. You concentrate onthat spot and see if he will get uncomfortable andmaybe look around. It's more subtle of course but bystudying the back of your head, the right toe of yourboot, or your left knee cap an experienced IP seem-ingly can tell exactly when your thoughts are on thenext weekend. At least mine always could. As surelyas night follows day, back comes the throttle, forcedlanding dances through your earphones and the IPchortles smugly. Caught again.


36/68

Where Would You ut It from page 33)I've heard it said by some pilots

who are no doubt inclined to bemystic that an airplane engineoperates the same way. To mostof us an engine is simply a ratheramazing o l l e t i o ~ of ingeniouslyarranged parts and pieces. But apilot who has flown one particularairplane for a long time tends tothink of that airplane as a livingbeing, complete with emotions,whims, and soul.

Put nice fresh oil in her engineand her pilot feels freer, looser.Top off her tanks after a longflight and the pilot feels theirmutual hunger satisfied. It's some-thing like the golfer who thinksof his driver as an extension of hisarms and the head of his club is ahardened fist with which he willslap a ball far down the fairway.

At any rate some pilots will tellyou an airplane knows when herpilot is trea ting her badly. She maycough gently to remind you of aneed for carb heat, or sputter inprotest at too lean a mixture orwag an accusing needle when oilor fuel pressure loss is making heruncomfortable. The point of allthis discussion is that she will tryto warn you, her master and fri end ,that if the ball game or sceneryoccupies more of your attentionthan she, your harmonious friendship is about to go down the drain.

Very infrequently are the oc-casions when she will sit down andquit, blow up or die with a sputterand these are the occasions thatdrive pilots and safety pe 'ople up thewall. Not only are the explanationsof ten dubious, but the man-machineharmon