Armor, September-October 1997

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 03794

A piece of in memoriam mail, forwarded to me the otherday, was cause to reflect for a few minutes about the lossof another ancestor warrior. I felt sad, and it was kind ofweird because I don’t know that I have ever met GeneralDelk Oden. Why would I, or should I, feel sadness abouta man whom I had probably never met, except in theparagraphs in various books?

Delk M. Oden, Major General (Retired), Honorary Colo-nel of the 35th Armored Regiment, recently passed away.General Oden was the commander of the 35th Tank Bat-talion of the 4th Armored Division during World War Two.His battalion was the sister unit to the renowned 37thTank Battalion, seeing virtually the same action throughoutthe 4AD’s triumphant sweep across Western Europe.Originally a horse cavalryman, like so many of his peers,he early saw a linear relationship between horse cavalryexperience and its doctrine and the doctrine being devel-oped for the growing armored force, “Everything we reallydid in armor, we kind of learned basically from the horse,you might say.” (Thunderbolt, Lewis “Bob,” Sorley, p.37)

The notification came to me from another, much latercommander of the 35th Tank Regiment, who learned inhis generation from some of the lessons forged in battleby General Oden. This current tanker, whose professionallife was directly touched by General Oden, asked thatsome mention be made of the passing of one of our Ar-mored Force’s truly great combat leaders. As a rule, wedon’t publish obituaries, promotion lists, gunnery results,and the like, but this request felt different to us, as it car-ried an almost imperceptible tone of urgency. You see,more and more of these great men are passing away nowas their age group passes the 80-year mark and movetoward 90. They take with them their tales of battle, perse-verance, and bravery. And they are stories worth hearing.General Oden (then a LTC), and his peers in the 4AD,received accolades later from General Bruce Clarke whenhe described, “The revolution wrought by Abrams and oth-

Stand To

ers in the field [Oden’s battalion was the next one over]when they made up what was to become the armoredforces that rolled across Europe. They had not beentaught this. They invented it.” (Sorley, p. 37)

We have also noticed an increase of autobiographicalkinds of books from people involved in the “Big One.”Some are the big-budget, Madison Avenue-promotedtexts which come with book signings and free-standing,in-store display racks. Others are much more humble, likea recent book by retired Colonel Jim Moncrief, As YouWere Soldier: Recollections of a Thirty-year Veteran.Colonel Moncrief, an ex-6th Armored Division soldier, self-published his work because he thought it so important totell his tale. Like others who are feeling their mortalitymore acutely than many of us, Colonel Moncrief feelsthat, “These stories, likewise, might be interesting to theother Old Soldiers, as well as to the friends of Old Sol-diers. And, if recorded, the tales would reflect the spiritand character, as well as the motivation, of the youngmen of the Forties, my generation.” (Moncrief, p.7) I amcertain that we can learn from their words. I am equally ascertain that we should want to learn from them.

It is a sad thing for all of us when these pioneers of ourvocation will be no longer available. It is inevitable, butsad nevertheless, to see those tankers and cavalrymen,to whom we all owe so much, fade away. With the pass-ing of each one, there is a little gap that we, who remainever vigilant in the turret, are duty-bound to step forwardand fill.

I think that when Veteran’s Day comes around in No-vember this year, I will take some extra time to think aboutmen like General Delk Oden, and I will do a little morethan that. I will call a couple of them to say, thanks. Onsecond thought, I won’t wait until November. Youshouldn’t, either.

— TAB

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-97-5

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER

ARMOR (ISSN 0004(2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer. The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

OffICial distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battaiion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series' enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information conceming the training, logistics, hiStory, and leadership of armor and arM mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

Features

7 Road March Planning In Restrictive Terrain by Captain Don L. Willadsen

10 Mortar Support In the Korean Defile by First Lieutenant Brian Pedersen

12 The Armor Battalion After Next - A Modest Proposal by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

14 Annor Combat Development 1917-1945 by Dr. Robert S. Cameron

20 Force Protection for Checkpoint Operations by First Lieutenant Patrick R. Milligan

22 Air/Ground Integration and the Combined Arms Concept by Captain Charles Dalcourt

26 The Russian T-90S: Coming Into Focus by James M. Warford

29 The Future Combat System (Part Two: Armament) by Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon

34 Training Lethal Crews by Sergeant First Class (P) Emest Roth

36 Comments South on Initial Draft of ARTEP 71-1 MTP and on Revision of FM 17-98

37 Tactical Vignette 97-1: "The Battle of Durango Valley"

38 Using Computer Wargames to Train at the CoITm Level by captain Darren P. Fitz Gerald and Captain James E. Ward

40 TWGSSlPGS: Pushing the System by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Campbell Jr. and Captain Christopher Kennedy

43 Ground Surveillance Radar Operations In Heavy Units by Captain Frank Sobchak

51 Ralph Peters' Novels: More Than Just a Quick Read by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bolger

Back The Weekly 10% Inventory System Cover by First Lieutenant James E. Warder

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 4 Commander's Hatch 6 Driver's Seat

52 Books

Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, AiTN: ATZK·TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

USPS 467-970 September-October 1997, Vol. CVI No.5

Directory - Points of Contact DSN - 464-XXXX Commercial - (502) 624-XXXX U.S. Armx Armor Center

Commanding General (ATZK-CG) ARMOR Editorial Offices MG George Harmeyer 2121

E-Mail: [email protected]

Edltor·in-Chlef LTC Terry A. Blakely E·Mail: [email protected]

2249 Deputy Commanding General BG Robert Wilson E-Mail: [email protected]

(ATZK-DCG) 7555

Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens 2249 Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) E-Mail: [email protected] COL William E. Marshall 1101

E-Mail: [email protected] Editorial Assistant Vivian Oertle 2610 Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) E-mail: [email protected] CSM David L. Lady 4952

Production Assistant E-Mail: [email protected]

Mary Hager E-Mail: [email protected]

2610 Directorate of Force Development COL John F. Kalb

(ATZK-FD) 5050

Staff Illustrator E-Mail: [email protected] Mr. Jody Harmon 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD)

COL William R. Betson 8247 E-Mail: [email protected]

U.S. Army Armor School TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) COL Robert L. West holm 4009

Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) E-Mail: tsmfx:[email protected] COL Richard P. Geier 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS)

COL David M. Cowan 7955 Armor School Sergeant Malor (ATSB-CSM) E-Mail: [email protected] (To be announced) 5405

Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) NCO Academy (ATZK-NC) COL Karl J. Gunzelman 7809 CSM Kevin P. Garvey 5150 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) COL Patrick F. Webb 1272 COL Gregory M. Eckert 7848 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Scott R. Feil 6843 LTC Randall Williams 1315 E·Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in edit gets lost or distorted.) If you have any questions concerning electronic ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or art submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. printed out double-spaced in near-Ietter-quality printer mode, along with a 31/2 or 5Y.-inch disk in MultiMate, WordStar. Microsoft Word, Word MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: A1ZK-TDM. Fort Knox, Perfect, Ami Pro. XyWrite, Microsoft Word for Windows, or ASCII KY 40121-5210. (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter and include a double-spaced printout). Tape captions to any illustrations or PAID SL'BSCRIPTIONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Rephotos submitted. port delivery problems or changes of address to Connie Bright or Dar

lene Kennedy, P.O. Box 607, Ft. Knox. KY 40121. or call (502) 942SUBMISSION POUCY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we 8624; FAX (502) 942-6219; E-Mail: [email protected]. will not print articles that have been submitted 10, and accepted for publication by. other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or changes of adArmy journal at a time. dress to Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610; commercial: (502) 624-2610. Re

quests to be added to the free distribution list should be in the form of a GRAPmCS AND PHOTOS: We can accept electronic graphics and letter to the Editor-in-Chief. photo files in most formats except Harvard Graphics. Compressed formats .jpg and .gif take up the least disk space. We prefer PC Paint ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN 464-TANK; The Armor Hotline is a 24brush (.pelt). If you use Powerpoint (.ppl), please save each illustration hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, as a separate file. Try to avoid the use of color and shading, but if you training, organizations. and equipment of the Armor Force. must use shading to illustrate your point, send us an unshaded version of the illustration along with a printout of your shaded version. (We have ISSUES IN ARMOR; Visit the ARMOR Web site at the following adfound that when we convert files to a format we can use, the shading dress: http://www.entelechy-inc.comldocslknoxdoclarmormaglindex.html.

ARMOR - September-October 1997 2

Guard Units Face a Squeeze, Too

Dear Sir:

Recently, ARMOR published an article byCaptain Michael A. Kelley, TXARNG, concern-ing the incompetence of officers in the TexasNational Guard. Captain Kelley went on tosay that armor funds for tank training shouldbe put into the active duty ranks, “WHERE ITBELONGS — WITH THE REAL TANKERS.”

As a senior NCO, I believe it is our duty toteach and train our young people, enlisted orcommissioned. If the abilities of our junior offi-cers fall short, we carry a lion’s share of thefault.

The National Guard is fortunate to have inits ranks many former active duty soldiers.They bring with them skills, knowledge, andexperience we greatly appreciate and use inthe 16 hours a month, two weeks a year thatwe have to train our soldiers. Unfortunately,on occasion we get people who hold theGuard in contempt from the onset. Theymake excuses to not attend drill, make littleattempt to prepare for classes, and are moreinterested in advancement than caring for thesoldiers for whom they are responsible. Yet,they expect to be put in command positionsbased solely on the fact they were an activeduty soldier.

As for the funds Captain Kelley suggestsshould be transferred to active duty, there isvery little in the way of funds for anything. Ofthe 118 M1 tanks at Fort Drum, New York, 80have been mothballed because there is nomoney for parts.

Consequently, all units have to share whatwe have, and take great pains to keep themmaintained and operating — in that’s all we’regoing to get.

In armories, platoon sergeants come in ontheir own time to set up training, with trainingaids they have to make or buy out of theirown pockets.

In order to provide an operational tank forthe crews to train on, one maintenance sec-tion, after waiting a year for a hydraulic tankto be repaired, took it to a civilian welder andpaid for it themselves.

Because there is only enough money forone training session per year per man, offi-cers and NCOs have to attend leadershipschools without pay in order to be able to ac-company their soldiers on their two-weektraining.

One third of our soldiers drive more than100 miles round trip to attend drill and stillhave to fight with employers to give themtime off, risking being fired.

If this is the way it is with us, it has to bethe same everywhere.

So, you see Captain Kelley, we need peo-ple like you. We need you to be part of thesolution, not part of the problem.

SFC PATRICK D. SIMS“D” 1/127th Armor

NYARNG

Book Review: Another Opinion

Dear Sir:

LTC(P) Hertling’s review of Into the Storm inthe May-June issue of ARMOR was not asinformative as it might have been. As a civil-ian with no Army experience whatever, Irarely feel qualified to comment on current af-fairs in the military profession, but as a re-searcher for another publication (MHQ: TheQuarterly Journal of Military History), the baf-flement and annoyance I felt at the reviewer’scomment that “...many will return to it as areference work” must be communicated. Thepublisher has presented the book in the for-mat of a work of fiction; General Franks’name appears in tiny print under TomClancy’s on the jacket, as if he were a con-sultant rather than the writer of much of thetext, and his career the subject of all of it.Worse, it is also completely without an index,which is unforgivable in these days of com-puter typesetting. If General Franks hopedthis book would restore his reputation with theinterested proportion of the American public,he may be disappointed, because his editorshave not done well by him.

General Franks does make it clear wherehe stands on the matter of operational doc-trine, however. At the end of the section onVII Corps operations in the Persian Gulf War,the reader will be aware as never before justhow many synonyms exist in the English lan-guage for the word “synchronization.”

JOHN FLUKERNew York, N.Y

Reactions: The May-June Issue

Dear Sir:

In his letter “Second Thoughts on NewIdeas” (May-June 1997, pp. 3, 52), MG JohnC. Faith “hopes” the Louisiana Maneuverspeople are paying attention.” The LouisianaManeuvers Task Force chartered in 1992 byGEN Gordon Sullivan and GEN Fred Franksended its work in June 1996. It had served itspurpose by imparting momentum to the con-tinuing series of experiences that will propelthe Army into information-age warfare. ArmyChief of Staff GEN Dennis Reimer released amessage in the spring of 1996 summarizingthe accomplishments of the Louisiana Ma-neuvers Task Force (1992-96).

I was delighted to read LTC Jim Walker’s“Vietnam: Tanker’s War?” (May-June, pp. 24-30). I am among the many who probably owetheir lives to the gasoline-to-diesel engineconversions he describes in “Equipment:Blessing and Nightmare.” While a platoonleader in 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (25th In-fantry Division) my M113 was twice hit byRPGs. Once on 19 Feb 68, and again (a dif-ferent vehicle) in July of ‘68. Both RPGs en-tered in the fuel storage area in the left rear.On neither occasion did my track catch fire. Ihave always suspected that my track waschosen as a target because it sported two ra-dio antennas rather than one.

I’m also pleased to see Jim Walker recallour field expedient use of spare track blocks,

steel PSP, and chain link fence to cause en-emy antitank weapons to pre-detonate beforereaching the vulnerable parts of their targets.These ingenious field modifications alsosaved lives and remain part of the lore of ar-mor. They may be useful again someday ifour soldiers should face an enemy as toughas the VC/NVA, who would fire an RPG from50 meters or less.

ROBERT FAIRCHILDCOL, ARNG (Ret.)

Hampton, Va.

Putting the New Ration HeaterIn Historical Perspective

Dear Sir:

Well, kiss my grits! “Desert Storm estab-lished the unmistakable need” for the capabil-ity to heat water and rations in and around ar-mored vehicles. Mr. Larry T. Hasty, I knownothing of your background or experience inArmor, except your winning the Isker Awards(congratulations) for work in fielding theMounted Water Ration Heater, or MWRH, butsir, I’ll wager George Washington’s cavalrywas avidly seeking a way to boil water in1776. I’ll throw in my seat at Fiddler’s Green ifGenghis Khan’s boys weren’t establishing anunmistakable need or a way to heat their riceas they rode around the Great Wall.

We used to have something called OVM(on-vehicle materiel) on tanks that included alittle pump-up Coleman stove. The intendeduse of this neat little piece of equipment wasto (you guessed it) heat water and rations. Ithink it was called a Tank Crew Stove (TCS).I will tell you that it didn’t get much use be-cause if you used it and didn’t get it reallyclean, you could flunk a Command Mainte-nance Inspection (CMI) or the Annual GeneralInspection (AGI). So what did we do from theplains of Texas to the far reaches of theworld? We built fuel-fed fires in our helmetsor C-ration cans; we drained water from ra-diators; we put rations on the transmissionsof the tanks or manifolds of the trucks. I kepttelling my stupid tanker friends that if weworked hard enough and demonstratedenough need, the Army would give us, inFY97, an MWRH.

BOB SHAMBARGERLTC, Armor/Cavalry (Ret.)

Alma, Ark.

There’s Need for Refresher CoursesTailored to Armor Enlisted

Dear Sir:

I have completed the required five hundredhours of correspondence courses to max thatarea of promotion criteria. During these longhours of study I noticed that the Armor branchof the U.S. Army doesn’t have the same ex-panse of studies as the Infantry branch.

ARMOR — September-October 1997 3

Continued on Page 50

In a previous edition of the Com-mander’s Hatch, I talked about the vi-sion for the Armored Force which im-plied that we must forge the finestmounted combat force in the world, ca-pable of winning decisively throughoutthe spectrum of combat. I firmly be-lieve that vision of the future. Toachieve it, we must have the best com-bination of soldiers, equipment, train-ing, doctrine, leadership, and organiza-tion that we can muster.

This Commander’s Hatch will ad-dress the equipment and organizationalaspects of the equation and describe thedirection we are headed over the nextdecade.

Over the past two years, we haveconducted three Armor Caucuses,where the Armor Center presented tosenior Armor leaders a proposed blue-print of where the Armor Force shouldgo and how we should get there. Manyof the resulting decisions were incorpo-rated into our Tank ModernizationStrategy that defines capabilities spe-cifically tailored for Force XXI and be-yond.

COL Dave Cowan’s recent article inthe May-June issue of ARMOR pro-vides highlights of the Tank Modern-

ization Plan. Other caucus decisionsgalvanized a scout strategy.

A key component of Senior ArmorLeader guidance is that the follow-onto Abrams will not be an evolutionaryderivative of the M1 platform. Instead,we will develop a Future Combat Sys-tem (FCS) for fielding in the 2015-2020 time frame that will provide theleap ahead capabilities required for bat-tlefield supremacy well into the 21stCentury. We are now defining a Mis-sion Need Statement for a Future Com-bat System. The following goals reflectwhat is feasible and a starting point forfocusing operational and engineeringanalysis:

• Light enough to permit at least twosystems for transport on one C17.

• Sensors and lethality to detect anddestroy any target with a near per-fect probability of hit/kill at rangesbeyond an enemy’s capability.

• A non-line-of-sight capability thatwill dramatically increase the taskforce commander’s battlespace andcombat power.

• An integrated survivability systemwill make the system nearly im-mune to enemy weapons.

• An advanced propulsion systemthat provides dash speeds in excessof 100 kph and requires signifi-cantly less fuel over time than theAbrams.

• No more than half the logisticalsupport now required to support theAbrams.

• Fully embedded training, and easeof system operation.

Senior Armor Leaders also endorsed anew scout modernization strategy thatconsists of the near-term Long RangeAdvanced Scout Surveillance System(LRAS3) and the follow-on FutureScout and Cavalry System (FSCS).

LRAS3 is a line-of-sight sensor thatwill allow real-time target detectionand identification, and target locationusing second-generation FLIR, high-definition TV, a built-in, eye-safe laserrange finder, and integrated GPS.

The Future Scout and Cavalry System(FSCS) will be the pre-eminent recon-naissance platform for Force XXI andArmy After Next operations. An ex-traordinary collaborative program be-tween the U.S. and the United King-dom is currently taking shape and willserve as a model for acquisitionstreamlining. Due to be fielded by

MG George H. Harmeyer Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

4 ARMOR — September-October 1997

Force Development —Where We Are Headed

2007, FSCS will take the place of theHMMWV with LRAS3 and the M3A3Bradley.

FSCS requirements include full digiti-zation, long-range multi-spectral sen-sors, aided target detection and identifi-cation, fusion of data from internal sen-sors and external intelligence sources,high transportability and tactical mobil-ity, survivability through signaturemanagement and modular armor, and amedium caliber self-defense gun.

The mast-mounted sensor packagewill increase survivability and recon-naissance capabilities. This system willbe tied in to the digitized commandand control system to provide com-manders and precision weapon systemswith exact enemy locations, intentions,and strength at very long ranges.

The Armor Center is also the propo-nent for battle command atbrigade and below. ForceXXI Battle Command Bri-gade and Below (FBCB2), abattle command informationsystem, completes the ArmyBattle Command System(ABCS) information flowprocess from brigade to plat-form/individual soldier, andacross all platforms withinthe brigade task force.

FBCB2 consists of a tacticalcomputer with display, infor-mation software that providesa common set of messagesand screens, interfaces withplatform sensors, and a supportingcommunication infrastructure that al-lows for on-the-move operations.FBCB2 will provide friendly and en-emy situational awareness, shortenplanning time, and allow forces to op-erate at a high tempo.

To further assist the commander incommand and control we are develop-ing two new vehicles. The first of theseis the Command and Control Vehicle(C2V), a program that resulted in re-sponse to the deficiencies the M577demonstrated during Operation DesertStorm.

The C2V is an MLRS derivativechassis that provides increased mobil-ity, and a tailorable command and con-trol mission module that provides aworking environment for the staff. Thesystem has its own 43KW primary

power unit, 40,000 BTU heating andcooling environmental control unit, andan NBC overpressure system. A 10-me-ter, telescoping mast antenna enablesthe crew to quickly increase its com-munication systems range while at thehalt. The C2V has a unique inter/intracommunications capability which al-lows staff officers to communicatedigitally or by voice from one worksta-tion to another within the same vehicleor between vehicles via a wireless localarea network, as long as vehicle sepa-ration distance does not exceed 500meters. The mission module is de-signed to be reconfigurable so thatvarious arrangements of computers andradios may be assembled for a battal-ion, brigade, or higher staff.

The second system is the Battle Com-mand Vehicle (BCV). This is intendedto be either a Bradley or Abrams Bat-

talion Task Force Commander’s vehiclewith enhanced digital communicationsand space for a staff officer/NCO.

Two BCV prototypes were evaluatedfor their conceptual usefulness duringthe recent Army warfighting exercise atthe NTC. The BCV has merit, and wewill continue to refine the concept withseveral focused experiments. Together,the C2V and BCV will provide maneu-ver commanders and their battle staffswith highly mobile, survivable plat-forms, adaptable to being configuredwith the most current state-of-the-artautomation and communications suites.

Another key part of the Armor ForceModernization Strategy is MountedWarrior. This program addresses cur-rent deficiencies with command andcontrol, chemical, clothing, and equip-ment worn by all combat vehicle crew-

men. Mounted Warrior is an integratedensemble composed of modular sub-systems. The complete ensemble willallow unrestricted movement, dexterityand tactility, provide NBC protection,and provide laser eye protection.Mounted Warrior will leverage hostplatform capabilities, such as sensors,computers, or radios, to enhance the ar-mored crewman’s performance. An af-fordable head-up display that may beused by multiple vehicles is an exam-ple of a Mounted Warrior component.

In the force design and structurearena, we are examining — togetherwith the other TRADOC centers — al-ternative organizations. Smaller, moreeffective organizations will make themounted force more deployable andmore agile. Three division alternativesare currently undergoing analysis.Briefly, the first design reduces many

organizations currentlywithin the division to arriveat a division strength ofabout 15,000. This providesa benchmark as to the effec-tiveness of new systems andoperational changes, relativeto the current division. It isalso the organization chosenfor the Division AdvancedWarfighting Experiment thisfall. The second alternativefeatures two ground bri-gades and one robust avia-tion brigade. The third op-tion is brigade-based. It hasa relatively small divisionheadquarters with three

ground brigades, an aviation brigade,and DIVARTY — all with organic CSand CSS assets. Each division alterna-tive features a scout or cavalry troop inevery ground brigade, as well as anHHC and three companies in each ma-neuver battalion. Approval of a finaldesign, which will most likely varysomewhat from the three describedabove, is expected early next year.

The introduction of these various in-itiatives into the force must be pre-ceded by the intellectual foundation indoctrine and training that gives leadersand soldiers the capability to exploitmateriel and organizations, but more ofthat in a future article. We are excitedabout the future and confident of oursuccess.

Forge the Thunderbolt!


In the force design and structurearena, we are examining — togetherwith the other TRADOC centers — al-ternative organizations. Smaller, moreeffective organizations will make themounted force more deployable andmore agile.

Armor branch, good day.

As I climb into this hatch and runthrough the before-operations checks,there is much to learn in order to be aneffective advocate for the force. FortKnox, the Armor Center, and the Ar-mored Force have changed dramaticallyin the past five years. Over the next fiveyears, we must make even more dra-matic changes in our force structure, ourunit structure, our training strategy, andour personnel management. Armor andCavalry must make the best use of thenew technologies and equipment. Asleaders, we must continue to improve sothat we will always develop the besttrained and motivated soldiers, and placethem in the best synchronized and mostcohesive units. There lies victory.

The key to my learning process is toget out and communicate with the force.You deserve information first-hand, andI need to assess your issues and chal-lenges first-hand. Ft. Hood is first, in or-der to meet with our M1A2 NET teamand the units they are training. Thesevisits will become more useful to you, asI learn more about your needs and aboutwhat the branch and the Armor Centerwill do to fix them.

I am grateful to MG Harmeyer for histrust, and to CSM Davis for his example,as I hit the start button.

It is time to review the changes in Ar-mor NCO structure proposed by the Ar-mor Center and adopted by the ArmyChief of Staff on 22 July 1997. Thesechanges were only a part of the Army-wide reduction of the NCO structurefrom its current level of 49.6% to about47.8% of the total enlisted structure.Since June, 1996, Armor has been devel-oping and staffing the best way to sup-port this goal.

Throughout the development and staff-ing process, senior sergeants were in-volved and CSM Davis took the lead indefending the critical leader and trainerpositions throughout our force. He hasbeen a worthy advocate and has advised

MG Harmeyer well as some very toughdecisions were made. We owe CSMDavis thanks for his battle on our behalf.

Armor NCO structure is currently48.4% of the total armor enlisted force.A target structure of 45.5% was the goalof the Change in NCO Structure (CIN-COS) initiative. This target would haverequired the downgrading of 1,616 NCOpositions. Armor made a thorough, bot-tom-up review of every TDA positionand every TOE function. This review in-cluded brigade, division, and corpsstaffs, and addressed the need for moreopportunities for staff experience inMOS 19D.

As individual positions were consid-ered, unit warfighting missions, branchhealth, and soldier development and mo-rale were kept in clear focus. Armor wasin a dilemma because the target figurecould not be met without downgradingsergeant positions. Of these, 3,050 areMTOE, and only 240 are TDA. To re-code all gunners and scout squad leadersto grade E4 would decrease NCO per-centage below the target, but would bedevastating to the morale and efficiencyof the force. Our leaders recognized thatother positions would have to be re-duced, and that a reasonable, good-faitheffort must be made to comply withGEN Reimer’s goal.

The price has been paid throughout theforce. The price has been paid in the fol-lowing positions: On the TOE side, byreducing the grades of the division, bat-talion, and company/troop master gun-ners; on the TDA side, by reducing thegrades of tank crew, IET tank/track com-mander/instructor, operations sergeant,and other staff positions. No reductionswere made in TOE first sergeant, pla-toon sergeant, tank commander, or gun-ner positions. No reductions were madein TDA instructor (less certain IET posi-tions), drill sergeant, recruiter, or AC/RCpositions.

There is some impact on warfighting.This impact is acceptable. Division /regi-

mental staffs with an operations SGMwill suffer only limited impact by our re-ducing the SGM master gunner positionin grade. Re-coding certain operationsstaff positions from 19K to 19D will im-prove the range of skills on staffs andimprove career progression. Reducingbattalion master gunners to SFC andcompany/troop master gunners to SSGwill decrease master gunner experiencelevels, but it should not impact on mas-ter gunner technical skills. It will alsobetter match our current training and as-signment strategy.

There is legitimate concern that SGTsgenerally do not have the maturity, expe-rience, and expertise to instruct in an in-stitution. However, SGTs will only serveas instructors of basic skills for InitialEntry Soldiers, and then only under thedirect supervision of a senior NCO.There will be no SGT instructors inNCOES/OES training.

In a future column, I’ll present chartsthat show the changes by MACOM, thechanges to Fort Knox positions, thechanges to TDA positions outside FortKnox, and the changes to TOE positions.

Our leaders have proposed a reason-able plan to reduce the NCO structurewhile protecting the keys to Armor andCavalry effectiveness: Drill sergeants,NCOES/OES instructors, and noncom-missioned leaders of tank and scout pla-toons. GEN Reimer saw the wisdom ofthe Armor proposal, and adopted it with-out modification: of the Armor enlistedforce, 48 percent will remain noncom-missioned officers. All MTOEs andTDAs are to be changed so that thesechanges will be completely documentedby FY 99. The new TDA and TOEdocuments are to be available to thefield for reporting purposes NLT June1998.

We have reached the “Roger Out” mo-ment. Let us accept, support, and carryon.

“SERGEANT, TAKE THE LEAD”


by CSM David L. Lady, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Changes Coming in Armor NCO Structure

by Captain Don L. Willadsen

“The finest theories and most minuteplans often crumble. Complex systemsfall by the wayside... Then raw truth isbefore us.”

- Major General Charles W. O’Daniel

The tactical road march is the most ap-propriate mission to conduct when a unitmust move over long distances through asecured area. Due to the complexity ofsuch a movement, particularly in thecontext of the battlefield rear areas, asuccessful road march requires meticu-lous planning. In the Republic of Korea,restrictive terrain further complicates thesituation. The purpose of this article is topresent tactics, techniques, and proce-dures (TTPs) for planning road marchesin restrictive terrain, particularly withinthe factors of METT-T, for an armor-heavy task force in the Republic of Ko-rea. The technique for presenting theseTTPs will describe how the DragonForce performs them.

Restrictive Terrain Description

Restrictive terrain presents severalunique problems for the planner, particu-larly in Korea, in which mobility is re-stricted due to a combination of steep,forested mountains and open rice pad-dies. The planner must contend with nar-

row mobility corridors, scarce or nonex-istent alternate routes, readily availableambush positions for enemy forces, lim-ited line of sight for direct command andcontrol, and disruption of FM radio com-munication. In addition to these obviousproblems which emerge with terrainanalysis, however, further factors emergewith weather integration and threat inte-gration.

Restrictive terrain, when combinedwith the effects of the weather in Korea,is particularly daunting. Precipitationvariations result in widely varying waterlevels at fords, unpredictable soil traffi-cability, and varying road conditions.Temperature variations also affect soiltrafficability. For example, the depth ofthe ford at the Sinyong-Ni River, com-monly used by 2ID units, averages lessthan one foot in winter. During the mon-soon season this year, the depth wentfrom three feet to 30 feet deep in aweek.

The planner must also contend withother variables, such as the effects of thelocal populace and the enemy. Even inpeacetime, a road march in Korea is adangerous exercise, though more so tothe local populace than to an armor-heavy force. This is due to the poor con-ditions of the roads north of Seoul, thelimited load classifications of bridges(which necessitate fords or bypasses bythe heavier vehicles in the task force),

the ever-increasing number of privatelyowned vehicles on Korean roads, andthe impatience with which some Kore-ans drive. In wartime, the enemy wouldfurther complicate the situation byblending in with the local population toconduct their rear-area raids and inter-diction missions.

Planning

A task force usually organizes intomarch units to enhance command andcontrol. In the Dragon Force, the marchis organized in one of two ways. In anadministrative march, when the battalionis not task-organized, each companymarches with its battalion-internal sup-port slice as a march unit. In a tacticalroad march, when the task force is task-organized in its habitual task organiza-tion, the SOP dictates a specific forma-tion called Attack from the March (Fig-ure 1). In either case, the planning fac-tors remain the same.

The march planner designates criticalpoints on the route, defined as points atwhich interference with the march mayoccur. In Korea, two common criticalpoints are built-up areas and bridges.Most of these points along the majorroutes are designated by standardized2ID checkpoints, and so are easily re-ferred to in our operations orders(OPORDs) and fragmentary orders(FRAGOs). Given the high threat of


Road March PlanningIn Restrictive Terrain

Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Ko-rea during a war, the planner must con-sider the naturally-occurring chokepoints on a route as critical points. Fi-nally, restrictive terrain requires the plan-ner to designate Command and Control(C2) node locations, so that the taskforce can maintain continuous FM com-munication with all of its units duringthe road march.

After identifying critical points, theplanner decides what actions to take tominimize the impact of each criticalpoint on the road march, such as estab-lishing a Traffic Control Point (TCP) atan intersection, tasking the scout platoonto conduct area reconnaissance on achoke point prior to the arrival of themarch column, or tasking a staff officerto man a C2 node to relay FM commu-nications to the TOC.

In the Dragon Force, a peacetime taskforce road march quickly exhausts thescout platoon in providing TCPs and re-quires the mortar platoon and MilitaryPolice to augment the TCP force. Thebattalion TAC (an M113A3 modified asa command and control vehicle), battal-ion XO, and battalion S3 form the C2nodes, augmented by other staff mem-bers if necessary. In wartime, the battal-ion SOP is to use an armor-heavy team

to follow the scouts on their route recon-naissance and establish required TCPs invehicle sections, with air defense supportwhere appropriate, with the secondarytask to protect any C2 node which maybe co-located with the TCP. The battal-ion XO or B Team XO, depending onwho controls the TCPs, collapses theTCPs as the task force passes.

The march planner then designates andorganizes the Reconnaissance Force,whose task is to recon the route in orderto verify travel time, determine the con-dition of the route and its underpasses,bridges, fords, etc., and locate obstaclesand enemy forces which influence theroute. The instructions to the recon forcemust be clear and precise, and the plan-ner must provide them with the re-sources, including troops, equipment,and time, to accomplish their mission.

The scout platoon conducts a doctrinalroute reconnaissance only if enemy con-tact is not likely and time allows, such asin peacetime. If enemy contact is likely,the task force conducts an Attack fromthe March, with route scouts attached toTeam D, the advance guard team, as inFigure 1.

If required, the march planner desig-nates and organizes a quartering partywhose task is to recon the area at the ter-

minus of the march and guide the mainbody into the area. He tasks the quarter-ing party with specific instructions as tothe area to be occupied (assembly area,battle position, or attack position).

The CSM leads the quartering party,which consists of one vehicle per subunitand one combat vehicle per platoon. Itmay move with Team B or separately asit marches on the route.

The march planner must consider lo-gistical issues, which for a heavy taskforce always include refueling, medicalsupport, and recovery. He must considerwhere to position medical and recoveryassets to best support the march units,while balancing flexibility to respond toemergencies. He must ensure that the co-ordinating instructions are clear and pre-cise in describing how individual vehiclecrews must respond to problems. In Ko-rea, a single broken-down vehicle canblock the entire route, because bypassesare difficult or impossible.

Each company has its Class III andmaintenance support slice for the roadmarch, with the remaining fuelers in thefield trains, and the unit maintenancecollection point (UMCP marching as thelast element in the task force. In a tacti-cal situation, the fuelers are preposi-tioned for a tactical refuel near the re-

lease point (RP), andthe UMCP marchesat the rear of thetask force.

The march plannercompletes the planin the form of amarch OPORD orFRAGO. The roadmarch table is thecommander’s toolfor graphically de-picting the roadmarch over itsplanned time period.As such, it mustcontain informationcritical to under-standing and execut-ing the road march,including speed, in-terval, unit informa-tion, pass times, andSP times. The timesat which units areexpected to hit eachcritical point, par-ticularly the refuel-ing point, are help-ful, because they al-low the staff to coor-


7.5 Km (22.5 Min [20 kmph])

4-5 Km ([40 VPK] = 500m per Co/Tm 15 Min [ 20 kmph ])

March FormationTF 2 & 2 TaskOrganization

..FLANK SCT

FLANK SCT

..

FLANK SCT

..

FLANK SCT

..

ROUTE SCT

CBT PATROLw/D TM CDRD TM FSOADV GUARD

TACMORT

C/ 2-72BREACH

RETRANS

A/ 2-9ASSAULT

TOC

B/ 2-9RESERVE

...........

D/2-72

..SFV

BY

LT

C A

NT

AL

...

Fig 1. Attack from the March

dinate sharing the march route withother units. Unfortunately, these CPtimes can be cumbersome to calculate.

In the Dragon Force, an Microsoft Ex-cel spreadsheet on a laptop computercalculates the data automatically. Theplanner inputs the march speed, vehicleinterval, unit data, critical point data, andSP times (shaded areas on the table). Thespreadsheet calculates the pass times andthe times at which the unit can expect tohit each critical point.

This allows the commander to evaluatehis options. With the addition of coordi-nating instructions, the table itself be-comes the road march OPORD orFRAGO. Figure 2 depicts an exampleroad march table, with the addition ofspecial notes and the row and columnheadings, to aid other units in recon-structing the table.

Additionally, task force SOP dictates aDriver’s Sketch Card, which each vehi-cle driver prepares under the supervisionof his vehicle commander. It contains atable with the azimuth, distance, and de-scription for each leg of the road march,a sketch detailing the physical layout ofthe route and major landmarks on theroute, and a section for the driver to cal-culate what his odometer readingsshould be at each critical point. Thedriver’s sketch card ensures that eachdriver understands the route well enoughthat he can complete the march if sepa-rated from his march unit, without hav-ing to rely on his vehicle commander,and allows the driver to assist the vehiclecommander with land navigation. A sam-ple sketch card is shown in Figure 3.

Execution

Execution of a road march in Korea isalmost always an exciting event. Traffic



FORMULAS USED:Pass Time {for cell D10} = IF (B10<>"",ROUND(C10*60/ ((1000/($B$5+6))*$B$4),0)+ROUND(C10/25,0),""CP Arrival Time {for cell G10} = IF ($B10<>"",F10+G$8/$B$4/60),"")

Figure 2. Road March Table

“Never depend completely on thestrength of the terrain and conse-quently never be enticed into passivedefense by a strong terrain.”

-General Carl von Clausewitz

Providing mortar support for an ar-mor task force on today’s fast-pacedbattlefield is a very difficult mission.The mission gets more complicatedwhen fighting in defiles1 such as in therestricted terrain of Korea. There, pro-viding mortar support requires a highdegree of coordination and a flexibletactical approach to provide effectiveresponsive or preemptive fires.

This article will explain how 2-72 Ar-mor, the Dragon Force, evaluated theunique conditions of warfare on theKorean peninsula using METT-Tanalysis and formulated a plan to betteruse the mortar platoon to support thetask force in the defile.

METT-T Analysis

Maybe the most important missionthat a tank-heavy task force could exe-cute in a war in Korea is to counterat-tack against an nKPA hasty defense.Focusing on the offense — for examplea movement to contact — will exem-plify the greatest need for flexibility intactics and the modification of doctrine.In our unit, this first offensive engage-ment is the ‘attack from the march.’The task force, presumably in its 7.5km long column,2 makes contact withthe enemy at the entrance to a defile,attacks to gain a foothold within thedefile, then fights through to exit thedefile, and either establishes a defenseor reinforces its success and maintainsits momentum.

The North Korean threat that an ar-mor task force could expect in the de-

file would consist of some of the fol-lowing forces and weapons systems:VTT-323s, T-55s, T-62s, light amphibi-ous tanks, truck-mobile infantry units,dismounted RPG and antitank weaponteams, artillery groups of various sizes,and SOF teams. An important fact toremember is that the North Koreans donot have any thermal sight capabilitiesfor their tank and antitank weapon sys-tems and precious few night-fightingsystems and observation devices.

The armor task force has six organic120mm track-mounted heavy mortarsystems, with a maximum effectiverange of about 7000m. The tracks aremanned by approximately 35 soldiers(MOS 11C). The most important plan-ning factors to consider in this area aresurvivability3 and required supply rate.4

Restrictive terrain is what makes Ko-rea such a difficult place in which tofight and, in executing tactics, is atleast as large a factor as enemy orfriendly troop dispositions. Mountain-ous terrain dominates the Korean pen-insula, with fewer and fewer trafficableroads toward the north. Mobility corri-dors are often reduced to a single-laneroad, and battlesight ranges drop to lessthan 400m for the M1A1 tank. Numer-ous rivers and streams, combined withsprawling urbanization and swamp-likerice paddies, make the terrain difficultto impassable during the rainy seasonand canalizing during most other times.The broken, mountainous topographyhelps the enemy find keyhole5 positionsto counter the superior technology ofallied weapons systems.

Evaluating time is the most difficultplanning factor for warfare in Korea.Time works against the armored taskforce attacking into the defile. Thefaster it can muster its forces andmount an attack, the less time the de-fenders have to counter the technologi-

cal advantages of the Abrams- andBradley-equipped task force. In an ar-tillery-dominated army such as thenKPA, the counter they hope to employagainst us is indirect fire. Our speed inexecution prevents them from accu-rately and effectively employing it. Theparadox here is that the longer the taskforce has to prepare for its attack, themore combined arms assets it can em-ploy, and the better coordination it canmake for the conduct of operations.Finding the best balance between prep-aration and violent execution is thetrick.

Building a Plan

Using these assessments, as well asother considerations, the Dragon Forceformulated a method for maximizingthe indirect fire support it receivesfrom its mortar platoon. The plan firsttakes into account the terrain and itsmovement constraints on the task force.With the task force in column on a sin-gle lane road, the mortar platoon mightnever be in range to provide supportingfires if it is placed too far back in theroad march order, so the mortars moveimmediately behind the lead companyof the task force. To account for themortars’ logistical requirements, themortar platoon’s Class V followsclosely behind the trail section, andprepositioned ammunition stores areused if possible. For survivability, themortars will operate in split section.Despite their separation, both sectionswill be able to quickly mass as a pla-toon on targets along the length of thedefile, due to the defile’s narrowness.Next, taking into account the enemy’slack of thermal capability, the mortarsutilize an equal number of smoke (WP)and HE in order to blind the enemy inthe defile. To increase responsiveness,all potential keyhole positions will be


Mortar Support In the Korean Defile

by First Lieutenant Brian Pedersen

templated within the defile. As the leadelements of the task force (scouts orcombat patrol) move toward these key-hole positions, the commander deter-mines whether to fire smoke, HE, orallow the tanks to clear with direct fire.The normal procedure is for the mor-tars to suppress all likely keyhole posi-tions sequentially in front of the leadtank. Using bounding sections will al-low coverage of all priority targets con-tinuously.

At the point in the entrance battle6

when the scouts or combat patrol havefound the enemy element they need todestroy in order to gain a foothold intothe defile, they send a code word callover the task force net. This code wordcall gives the composition and locationof the enemy force and is the task forcepriority target. All mortar tubes at thistime will converge on this target, sup-pressing and smoking it until it can beengaged by direct fire. If bounding to anew firing position when this call forfire comes, a section will conduct a‘hipshot’7 and converge its fires withthe stationary section onto the enemylocation.

Throughout the defile battle, the mor-tars must remain flexible, as they maybe required to provide support for thescouts, the combat patrol, the leadcompany/team of the task force, thebreach company/team, the assault com-pany/team, or the reserve com-pany/team. They might be required tosuppress dismounts, disrupt lightly ar-mored vehicle formations, smoke en-emy tanks or antitank assets, or smokesuspected enemy observation points orkeyhole positions.

Once the task force has its foothold inthe defile, the lead team continues tomove through the center of the defile.Enemy antitank ambush will be the pri-mary targets of the mortar platoon. Themortars will conduct the ‘hipshot’ andconverge platoon fires onto known en-emy positions, keyhole positions, andobservation points, attempting to blind,confuse, and destroy the enemy inplace while the breach team conductsits breach.

The final element in the attackthrough the defile is the exit battle.8

This is the point where the enemy willhave both depth and width since he isno longer in the defile, while the taskforce will have a minimum frontage.For the mortars, this is possibly themost critical point in the battle. Thelead element of the task force onceagain will determine the enemy ele-ment it must destroy in order to exit thedefile. The code word call again goesout on the task force net, where themortars immediately converge withsmoke and HE onto this enemy posi-tion. However, once the direct fireweapon systems have converged on theenemy, the mortars must shift withsmoke onto each successive enemy ele-ment in order for the maneuveringteams to bypass the fixing team (thelead element) and destroy the remain-ing enemy elements. Once all friendlyelements have exited the defile andsuppressed/destroyed all remaining op-position, the task force will set into anL-shaped ambush, in anticipation of acounterattack, and consolidate/reorgan-ize.

Summary

This scenario is just one of manyways to approach the unique problemsof fighting in the Korean defile. It rep-resents a methodology that can betaught rapidly, utilizes commonlytrained combat skills, and embracescurrent doctrine while introducingsome innovative ideas to approachcombat situations in Korea.

Notes

1In restrictive terrain, an area in which themobility corridor can be reduced to a singlelane the width of one vehicle and engagementranges are under 400m.

2Due to terrain and infrastructure constraintsin Korea, most task force-level movements willbe tactical road marches in closed column, thelength of which is 7.5 km.

3The carrier is from the M113 family of vehi-cles, lightly armored, and armed with a .50 calMG.

4The M1064A3 carrier (120mm) carries only69 rounds.

5A position in which the defender cannot beseen until after the enemy passes in front ofhim and presents his flank; usually gives de-fender only a 3-6 second window of opportu-nity to fire.

6There are three parts to the defile battle: En-trance battle, center battle, and exit battle. Theentrance begins with the task force scouts mak-ing contact at the entrance to the defile. Theywill call for indirect fire and then hand off thebattle to the combat patrol of the lead com-pany/team.

7Mortar firing technique in which a track isaligned on a direction of fire using a hand-heldcompass rather than a ground-mounted aimingcircle; advantage is a firing time standard oftwo minutes; the drawback is accuracy of initialfire for effect.

8The exit battle begins once the breach com-pany/team has cleared the obstacle for the taskforce. At this point, the lead element in the de-file calls for heavy smoke to mask its departurefrom the defile. Once he has contact with theenemy element, which he needs to destroy toclear the defile, he will call smoke and suppres-sive fires onto that position. The assault ele-ment will attempt to flank the enemy and makespace for the rest of the task force to clear thedefile and enter the fight.


“Throughout the defile battle, the mortars mustremain flexible, as they may be required to pro-vide support for the scouts, the combat patrol, thelead company/team of the task force, the breachcompany/team, the assault company/team, or thereserve company/team....”

1LT Brian A. Pedersen is a1994 Magna Cum LaudeGraduate and DistinguishedMilitary Graduate from theUniversity of Montana at Mis-soula, Montana. After gradu-ating from the Armor BasicCourse in 1995, he servedtwo years in Korea as a tankplatoon leader, XO, and mor-tar platoon leader for 2d Bat-talion, 72d Armor at CampCasey. He is currently the ex-ecutive officer for E Troop,1st Squadron, 16th Cavalryat Fort Knox.

“I have seen the future of warfare...TheArmy’s ability to use information todominate future battles will give theUnited States a new key to victory, I be-lieve, for years, if not for generations tocome.”

—Secretary of Defense William Cohen

(CSA Random Thoughts While Running, re-ceived via e-mail on 21 April 97)

The e-mail nets were alive throughoutthe Army during the Advanced Warfight-ing Experiment (AWE) conducted at theNational Training Center in March of1997. Somewhere around 21 April 1997,significantly put out on e-mail, our Chiefof Staff GEN Reimer put out a clarioncall for action and thinking on the sub-ject of the size of our battalions. In thee-mail he wrote, “We stayed away fromtinkering with the maneuver battalionson purpose because we really wanted tosee what we had first. However, nowthat we see what we’ve got (based uponthe results of the AWE author note), Ithink it’s time to take this one on in ear-nest.” (CSA Note)

The power of the new informationtechnology the Army is testing is awe-some. While it is not a panacea, thesooner we in the Army exploit this tech-nology and articulate what it is we wantthe technology to do for us, the better wewill be able to retain our fighting edgeover potential adversaries. I once heardCOL Jim McDonough, then Director ofthe School of Advanced Military Stud-ies, call this the “Billy-Jack” approach.We will demonstrate what we can do toour enemies, and they know there isnothing they can do to stop us. This isthe right attitude to take in an increas-ingly hostile world. This is asymmetricalapplication of force. Demonstration ofconventional power is a deterrent.

The purpose of this essay is to outlinea “modest proposal” for the structure ofthe tank battalion after next. I am delib-erately staking out an extreme positionin the hopes it will raise the blood pres-sure of my contemporaries and thusbring on the debate we really ought to be

having in regards to this topic. Unlesswe in the Armor Force do this, we mayfind ourselves sounding like MG JohnK. Herr, the last Chief of Cavalry, argu-ing for keeping the horse cavalry whilethe rest of the Army modernized. In1938, MG Herr said, “We must not bemisled to our own detriment to assumethat the untried machine can displace theproved and tried horse.” (Petras, p.106)Similar words are spoken about the com-puter and information systems. We can-not be left behind.

I propose that the Armor battalion bereorganized as shown in Figure 1.

The organization I propose is smaller,thus it should be more strategically mo-bile. The heart of the matter is what isNOT in the battalion.

Assuming we can achieve maintenancesituational awareness and just-in-timesupply, we can then remove the mainte-nance platoon, support platoon, medicalplatoon — essentially all of the CS andCSS functions from the battalion. Wecan have battalions without staffs. Thesole function of the battalion is to pre-pare tankers for war through training ascrews, platoons, and companies. Thebattalion commander, his X3, and CSMare the proper trainers of the battalion’stroopers. The Army selects these menbased upon their demonstrated potentialfor future service, thus we can empowerthem to train their outfits. The CS andCSS functions are captured by the use ofelectronic means and transmitted to the

proper level. We can make these net-works happen in the field and the garri-son.

I propose a battalion without a staff inthe traditional sense. Capitalizing on thestrengths of the information systems nowavailable, as well as those in the near fu-ture, we can eliminate the staff at thelevel of the fighting element. There is, ofcourse, the corresponding requirement tohave an in-place support system in garri-son and in the field to meet the battal-ion’s CS and CSS needs. We can achievethese economies through the use of in-formation systems we have on hand. TheS1/personnel function can be taken careof at the central in-processing facilitymost divisions run right now. Our auto-mated ID cards are supposed to carry in-formation on the bar code on the back. Itis time to make that work. Personneltransactions can then take place on aLAN with input from the 1SG (and theshadow staff any good 1SG will have,anyway).

The point is that the information sys-tems must be/are in place before we putthis effort into effect. A coordinatedLAN within the division or brigade cantake care of promotions, demotions, payinquiries, etc. That is what the AGs ofthe force say, so it is time to put up.

The S4 supply functions will make useof the automated property book systemwe have, with refinements. The com-pany commander would still be respon-sible for signing for his equipment and


• 35 tanks, 9 HMMWVs

• 1 LTC, 1 MAJ, 1 CSM, 3 CPT,12 LT, 3 1SGs, 11 SFC/19K40(four Master Gunners), 15SSG/19K30, 3 SSG/92A30,109 PV1-SGT/19K10/20

• Total = 164 troopers

A Company B Company C Company

BN CMDElement

Armor Battalion After Next

Figure 1

The Armor Battalion After NextA Modest Proposal

by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

the monthly inventories. I really cannotsee ever walking away from that need,even when we all look like the soldiersin Heinlein’s Starship Troopers. Thepoint is that in garrison we can take ad-vantage of automated systems in placefor the supply sergeants we will stillneed, if only for their familiarity withthe CSS system and procedures. This in-tegration can be at either brigade or divi-sion. The field system will take advan-tage of the systems for “just-in-time” lo-gistics and the information-sharing sys-tems which will track ammunition ex-penditure and fuel consumption.

The S2/S3 functions are handledthrough improved red and blue situ-ational awareness. That is easy to sayand very tough to execute, but within therealm of the possible given the power ofthe systems we have. Think about LTC“Abe” Abrams leading the 37th Tankinto Bastogne. Abe led from the frontand used his intuitive feel for battle andthe enemy to guide the actions of hisbattalion. Battalions do not have a deepfight, they form the heart of the closefight of the brigade. Battalion command-ers execute operations along with theirtroopers, and close with the enemy byfire and maneuver. This does not relievethe commander of the requirement toknow the enemy and the terrain; in fact,the increased situational awareness af-forded us via systems interface makesunderstanding the relationship of enemy,weather, terrain, capabilities, and thecommander’s estimate all the more im-portant. Reports from the NTC seemedto indicate that the real problem was toomuch information and a lack of willing-ness to trust the information on thescreen. Here then is the re-emergence ofthe art of command and battle leader-ship. The power of the information sys-tem will allow the commander to go tothe critical point because he can first“see” where the critical point is, basedon the positive knowledge of friendly lo-cations and the collation of enemy loca-

tions on his display screen, then move tothe point on the battlefield and see whatis most important. In this way finger-spitzengefuehl, coup d’oiel, call it whatyou will, is enhanced, not befuddled, bytechnology. This situation will only getbetter as the systems improve and us“old dogs” learn some new tricks. Pilotssay, “Trust the instruments.” It is timefor tankers to do likewise.

Here again are the words of our Chiefof Staff, “In my opinion, we have atleast a 30% increase in capabilitiesthrough situation awareness at the pre-sent time, and if we are able to developit to its full potential, it could be a 50%-60% increase. Given the fact that, inpower projection operations, getting ca-pabilities there quickly makes a largedifference, I think it’s time we look atthe size of these armor and mech infan-try battalions and see if we can’t down-size some of them. I know how emo-tional that is, but we have to take it on inmy opinion.” (CSA Note) This reductionin the size of the battalion also allows usto expand the number of heavy divisionswhile not exceeding the number ceiling

placed on the Army by budget con-straints.

The historians out there will quicklypoint out that the last Army to do thiswas the German Army after the invasionof Poland. The U.S. Army also did thisduring World War II, by decreasing thesize and number of the armored regi-ments of the existing armored divisionsin order to field more armored divisions.By saving 23 tanks from each battalionin the current force (five armored divi-sions each with five tank battalions), theArmy could field at least three more re-duced size armored divisions. Here aremy numbers:

23 tanks from 25 battalions = 575 tanks

575 tanks = 2300 men = roughly 16downsized battalions

The smaller battalions will enable theArmy to focus and reduce the size of thesupport battalions and other battalionswithin the division. Since we cannot pre-dict where and when the Army will beneeded in the next fight, we can retainmore, smaller armored divisions whichgive the Army more strategic flexibilityin the application of force. Our Chiefagain put this thought concisely, “In myopinion, the Army has been drifting to-ward smaller, more mobile units in thelast few years. I think most of us haverecognized the need for strategic mobil-ity, but we did not want to give up thecombat capabilities we currently pos-sessed.” (CSA, 21 April 97) We are notgiving up combat capabilities within the


Armor Battalion After NextCommand Element

• Two tanks, three HMMWVs• 1 LTC, 1 MAJ, 1 CSM, 2 SFC

(one Master Gunner), 4 19K10-20, 3 19K10/20 HMMWVdrivers

• Total = 12 troopers, 2 M1A2,3 HMMWV Figure 2

Armor Battalion After NextTank Company

• Company CommandElement– 1 CPT, 1 1LT (XO), 1 1SG, 2

SSGs, 1 SSG (92A SupplySGT), 4 19K10/20, 319K10/20 HMMWV drivers

• Tank Platoon– 3 2/1LT, 3 SFC (one Master

gunner), 3 SSGs, 27 19K10/20

• Total = 49 troopers, 11M1A2, 2 HMMWV Figure 3


This article was compiled on behalf ofthe Directorate of Force Development,and it provides an historical overview ofthe policies governing American tank de-sign in this early period. Together withtwo subsequent articles, it is intended torecognize the basic accomplishments ofcombat developments with respect to theMounted Force from their infancy inWorld War I to the sophistication repre-sented by the Future Combat System.

When America joined the Entente inApril 1917, it possessed no tanks of itsown. Indeed, the tank originated fromBritish and French efforts to end theWestern Front trench deadlock. Follow-ing a study of British and French tankuse, however, the U.S. Army establishedthe Tank Corps, within the American Ex-peditionary Forces, to organize and trainAmerican tank units.1 Headed by Colo-nel Samuel D. Rockenbach, the TankCorps combined the French emphasis onsmall light tanks to accompany advanc-ing foot soldiers with the British prefer-ence for large, heavily armed tanks tobreach enemy positions in advance of aninfantry assault. Consequently, separateAmerican light and heavy tank unitswere formed.2

To overcome the absence of Americantanks, the War Department endeavoredto produce a copy of the French RenaultFT 17 light tank, develop a new designthrough Ford Motor Company, and par-ticipate in a combined British-French-American effort to build the Mark VIIIheavy tank. None of these endeavorsproved successful. Rather than simplymass-produce a copy of the Renaulttank, the Ordnance Department modifiedthe design, although lacking tank pro-duction experience. Delays and confu-sion resulted, unrelieved by disagree-ment whether the speedometer of a tankcapable of less than ten miles per hourshould show kilometers or miles perhour. Only ten American-made Renaultswere built by war’s end.3

In an early effort to utilize the massproduction capability of the automotiveindustry, Ford Motor Company receiveda contract to mass produce a three-tonlight tank that it would design itself.Over the objection of AEF personnelwho found the vehicle unsatisfactory forcombat, the company produced only 15by war’s end.4 The Mark VIII repre-sented the first international tank design.It incorporated British and American

concepts and technology — includingthe American Liberty aircraft engine —in a design that would be assembled inFrance. Intended to spearhead a planned1919 offensive, production suffered fromthe slow rate of Liberty engine develop-ment and the priority given to aircraft forthose engines produced. The war’s endin November 1918 left the U.S. Armywith a collection of parts that upon as-sembly provided it with 100 Mark VIIItanks.5

The continuation of wartime tank pro-duction into 1919 resulted in the Army’spossession of a tank fleet expensive tomaintain and mechanically unreliable.Worse, it provided an illusion of tankstrength that impaired Congressionalwillingness to fund the development andproduction of new designs. Throughoutthe interwar era, the Army could affordonly one new model a year.6

The exclusive use of tanks in a trench-breaching role resulted in their associa-tion with the Infantry. Consequently, theNational Defense Act of 1920 that de-fined the Army of the interwar periodabolished the Tank Corps and assignedtank development responsibility to the


The M-26 tank, seen here on an M8 tank transporter, did not enter combat in the European Theater until the final days of WWII. Its armor protection,90mm gun, and modern torsion bar suspension finally put U.S. tankers on a par with their German opponents.

Armor Combat Development 1917-1945by Dr. Robert S. Cameron

Infantry. The Act precluded experimenta-tion with tank use beyond the narrowmission of assisting the advance of therifleman and seizing ground.7

Under the guidance of Rockenbach,now commanding the Infantry’s tankforce, tank development focused upon amedium tank. He sought a design capa-ble of accompanying the rifleman in allterrain, able to withstand .50 caliber ma-chine gun fire, carrying close supportfirepower, and weighing no more than15 tons in order to utilize highwaybridges. Such a balance of armor, mobil-ity, and firepower proved beyond the ca-pability of American tank technology inthe 1920s.8 Although three tanks werebuilt under Rockenbach’s supervisionbetween 1921 and 1925, all proved over20 tons.9

The difficulties of creating a satisfac-tory medium tank encouraged the Infan-try to shift its focus in 1926 to light tankdevelopment. The higher mobility andspeed of these vehicles also reflected theArmy’s preference for a war of maneu-ver over a positional conflict like theGreat War.10 In particular, the Infantrysought a tank capable of 12 miles perhour, possessing a 37mm main gun, andarmored against .30 caliber machine gunfire.11

The resulting T1 series was designed asa light, fast tank suitable for portage bytruck. The first model represented a col-laborative effort between the OrdnanceDepartment and the Society of Automo-tive Engineers. It embraced the newestadvances in automotive technology, in-cluding the link type springless suspen-sion and the use of an all-purpose chas-sis to facilitate standardization. Between1927 and 1931, Rock Island Arsenalbuilt a succession of pilot models, eachone introducing new features but ulti-mately increasing the tank’s weight toseven tons. The reliability of the series,however, demonstrated the viability ofthe tank’s operation without a carrier.12

Since their invention, tanks dependedupon railways and trucks for transporta-tion to and from the battlefield. Thespeed of a tank-laden truck column,however, barely exceeded three milesper hour and precluded rapid, mobile op-erations. A tank that could safely relyupon its own engine, both on and off thebattlefield, increased its versatility andpermitted a higher tempo of operations.Eliminating carriers from tank unitssimilarly reduced their cost and person-nel requirements.13

J. Walter Christie’s tank designs furtherreinforced the trend away from tank car-riers. During the interwar years, he builttanks capable of moving 40 miles perhour cross country, fording rivers, allow-ing rapid conversion between wheel andtrack movement, and equal speeds for-ward and backward. Although the Armynever adopted any of Christie’s designsfor standardization, it flirted with themthroughout the era and purchased severalmodels. It found them unsuited for thestresses of military usage and their de-

signer unscrupulous in his business deal-ings.14

Light tank development also benefitedfrom the creation of the American Ex-perimental Mechanized Force in 1928and the Mechanized Force in 1930. Bothforces sought to combine tanks withother arms and utilize them in a varietyof tactical roles. Neither organizationcould survive, however, in the face ofopposition from the combat and servicearms that feared the loss of personneland funding to them.

In 1931, Chief of Staff GeneralDouglas MacArthur authorized a newmechanization policy that permitted eachcombat arm to control the pace and ex-tent of its own mechanization program.Although this policy decentralizedmechanized development, it ensured thatmechanization no longer posed a re-source threat. MacArthur’s policy alsoengendered the Mechanized Cavalry totest the tank’s application to Cavalryfunctions and implement the conclusionsdrawn from the Experimental Mecha-nized Force and the Mechanized Force.15

The Cavalry mission included recon-naissance, screening, exploitation, pur-suit, and raiding operations, and it, there-fore, necessitated a more dynamic use ofthe tank than the simple close supportrole of the Infantry. Throughout the1930s, the Mechanized Cavalry’s activi-

ties resulted in the development of mo-bile combat teams of tanks, self-pro-pelled mortars, and riflemen working in-dependently toward common objectives.The mobile, dispersed nature of these ac-tions generated requirements for an ar-mored personnel carrier and self-pro-pelled artillery. A new set of tank specifi-cations also emerged that stressed mobil-ity and reliability over firepower and ar-mor.

The fresh impetus given to tank devel-opment by the Mechanized Cavalry co-incided with a general desire to jettisonthe World War I tank fleet of Mark VIIIsand Renault tanks. Such tanks did notpermit analysis of the fast moving tacticsnow advocated by the Infantry andMechanized Cavalry. Echoing the senti-ments of those personnel associated withmechanized development, one Infantrytank officer advised that the “best solu-tion for the present mechanized meansof the U.S. Army is to get the biggesttransport we have, load it all on, anddump it into the middle of the AtlanticOcean.”16

The Infantry and Mechanized Cav-alry’s combined interest in light tanks re-sulted in the T2-series that became thepattern for the later M3 and M5 LightTanks. A single chassis served botharms. The series introduced the verticalvolute suspension, necessary to handlethe 35-mile-per-hour speed. Although in-tended to utilize a Wright-built Conti-nental aircraft engine, Guiberson dieselengines equipped some models. In 1936,19 T2s were produced, to be followed by170 in 1937.17

The Cavalry version carried only a ma-chine gun as armament, but the Infantryreacted to the growing efficacy of anti-tank guns demonstrated in the SpanishCivil War by seeking heavier armamentand armor.18 The 12-ton M2A4 reflectedthese concerns, carrying a 37mm gun ina rotating turret and a maximum armorprotection of 25 millimeters.19 Complet-ing trials in September 1939, the M2A4missed the August Plattsburg maneuvers,and its armor had already been surpassedby the German PanzerKampfwagen II.

The Plattsburg maneuvers demon-strated mechanized cavalry’s ability touse its superior mobility to unbalanceand envelop a slower force. The maneu-ver’s conclusion coincided with the Ger-man invasion of Poland; both events un-derscored the importance of a powerfultank force.20 The declaration of a limitednational emergency resulted in an orderfor 329 M2A4s from American Car andFoundry Company and marked an


“One Infantry tank officeradvised that the “best solu-tion for the present mecha-nized means of the U.S.Army is to get the biggesttransport we have, load itall on, and dump it intothe middle of the AtlanticOcean....”

awareness of the importance of a tankforce to national survival.21 While Po-land’s prewar inventory included 1,000armored fighting vehicles, the U.S.Army possessed only a variegated col-lection of 450 tanks.22

The fall of France in 1940, however,stunned the War Department and pro-vided the catalyst for changes affectingthe design, production, and employmentof American tanks. In June, the War De-partment established the National Muni-tions Program to govern the mass pro-duction of war materiel.23 Charged withimplementing this program, the NationalDefense Advisory Commission sought toensure effective coordination of indus-trial capability and military need. Gen-eral Motors President William S. Knud-sen served on the Commission as the ad-visor for mechanized equipment. He rec-ommended the abandonment of Ord-nance Department plans to utilize heavyengine and locomotive plants to buildtanks, advocating instead the building ofnew arsenals for tank production that ex-ploited the labor, management, and pro-duction expertise of the automobile in-dustry. Consequently, Chrysler Corpora-tion built the first such arsenal at De-troit.24

France’s defeat also pushed the WarDepartment in July 1940 to create theArmored Force with responsibility forcreating the armored formations nowdeemed vital for modern warfare. Thenew organization absorbed the Mecha-nized Cavalry and Infantry tank force,but the former exerted a dominant influ-ence, embodied by the appointment ofthe Mechanized Cavalry commander,Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., asChief of the Armored Force.25 TheMechanized Cavalry emphasis upon mo-bility shaped the doctrine and organiza-tion of the armored formations. Despitethe European trend toward more heavilyarmed and armored vehicles, light tanksconstituted the majority of tanks in thenew armored divisions expected to per-form an exploitation role.26

Modifications to the M2A4 generatedthe M3 Light Tank. Lessons learnedfrom France’s defeat included an in-crease in frontal armor to 38 millimetersand enhanced protection of the enginecompartment against strafing. Weightrose to 13.5 tons, but the GermanPanzerKampfwagen III possessed 90millimeters of frontal armor. Neverthe-less, the pilot model completed its trialsin July 1940, and American Car andFoundry Company received a large pro-duction order.27

The fall of France also stimulated me-dium tank development, lagging since

1926. Although the M2 Medium Tankentered service in the spring of 1940, its37mm cannon and eight machine gun ar-mament was offset by a maximum armorprotection of only 25 millimeters. It alsosuffered from being underpowered andunlikely to fare well against the newermodels of German tanks.28

The emergence of the Panzer-Kampfwagen IV, carrying a 75mm gun,led Chief of Infantry Major GeneralGeorge A. Lynch to declare the M2 me-dium obsolete and recommend develop-ing a new tank carrying a turret-mounted75mm and heavier armor. Chaffee con-curred with these views and, togetherwith the Ordnance Department, deter-mined upon the creation of a new designbased upon the M2 chassis but carryingheavier armament and protection.29

The larger weapon required a new tur-ret. While its design began, an interimtank was developed that retained a37mm gun in the turret but also carried a75mm gun in its hull. Designated theM3 Medium Tank, it featured a redes-igned hull and superstructure upon anM2 chassis and utilized the latter’s me-chanical layout. In August, 1,000 of thevehicles were ordered and constructionbegan on a new arsenal to build them.30

Issued to the British through the LendLease program, the new tank enteredcombat during the Gazala tank battles ofMay 1942. These early models sufferedfrom engines that overheated after 25hours of use and the issuance of thewrong fuses for the 75mm gun. Theseproblems had been corrected before thetank entered combat with American sol-diers. Although the M3 proved popular

with the British, the 75mm gun couldnot be operated from a hull-down posi-tion, and its limited traverse precludedtracking a moving target. It proved capa-ble of penetrating the frontal armor ofmost German tanks encountered at arange of 400 yards, but newer models ofthe PanzerKampfwagen III and IV re-peatedly destroyed it at 1100 yards.31 Al-though the M3 continued in British serv-ice in the Far East throughout the war,its use in North Africa and Europe waseclipsed by the M4 Medium Tank, and itwas declared obsolete in April 1944.32

The M3 Light Tanks also suffered froma number of problems despite theirpopularity with the British. They pos-sessed a high silhouette and their angularhull and riveted armor offered poor pro-tection. Their short cruising rangeproved an embarassment in North Africaand resulted in additional fuel tanks be-ing built into the hull sides. Other princi-pal series modifications included powertraverse, periscopes for all crew mem-bers, and the use of the Guiberson dieselengine to alleviate shortages in the Con-tinental aircraft engine initially intendedfor the tank.33

Continual modifications to the M3 re-sulted in the M5 Light Tank. Maximumarmor increased to 51 millimeters, andtwo V8 Cadillac automobile engines re-placed the Continental aircraft engine.Initial Ordnance Department skepticismwith the idea ended after a prototypemodel drove from Detroit arsenal to Ab-erdeen Proving Ground without mishap.Production began in June 1942 butended in June 1944, following develop-ment of the M24 Light Tank. The M5


The M3A1 Stuart light tank, with its 37mm gun and light armor, quickly became obso-lete in the European Theater. This 1st AD example has the unique “flag” markings andyellow turret stripes peculiar to vehicles used in the North Africa invasion of 1942.

remained operational, however, until latein the war, although outclassed by allGerman tanks.34

Growing dissatisfaction with the M5’sinsufficient turret space, weak armament,and cooling system resulted in develop-ment of a replacement design designatedT7. Equipped with a 75mm gun, earlytrials proved so promising that it wasconsidered a possible replacement forthe M4 Medium Tank. The ensuingmodifications to the original design,however, resulted in an overloaded andunsatisfactory vehicle. A new light tankdesign finally emerged in April 1943 thatcorrected the worst defects of the M5.Designated the M24, it featured a 75mmaircraft cannon, an enhanced torsion barsuspension system that increased stabil-ity and flotation, wet stowage of ammu-nition, power traverse, an electrical firingmechanism, and a Hydramatic transmis-sion similar to that found in taxi cabs. Incombat, however, the large floor escapehatch proved vulnerable to mine explo-sions. The M24 marked a significant ad-vance over the M5, but few saw combatin World War II.35

The M4 Medium Tank entered produc-tion in October 1941, and during thecourse of the war over 70,000 of all con-figurations were built. This output wasachieved by distributing production be-tween 11 major firms and over 100 sub-contractors. Use of the same chassis asthe M3 further simplified construction. Avariety of models were built around dif-ferent power plants developed by theautomotive industry in an effort to opti-mize performance and reduce the highdemand for aircraft engines. Other modi-fications included armament of a 76mmgun or 105mm howitzer, the introductionof horizontal volute spring suspension,and the incorporation of wet ammunitionstowage. The last feature necessitatedover 2,500 changes to the vehicle’s lay-out.36 Later versions also carried a tele-phone for communication between thecrew and supporting infantry.37

In general, however, the M4 provedmechanically reliable, and highly mo-bile. The tank’s principal weaknesses layin an inadequate main armament and ar-mor protection. Tank crews feared thatthose M4s equipped with gasoline en-gines were firetraps following reports oftanks bursting into flames upon beinghit. Tests conducted at Fort Knox, how-ever, determined that the cause of thefires was not the gasoline, but the pene-tration of the tank by ammunition de-signed to explode inside the tank and ig-nite its combustible components.38

Questions concerning the adequacy ofthe M4’s armament began to emerge in1943 and triggered a dispute between theArmored Force, the Army GroundForces (AGF) responsible for combatdevelopments, and the Ordnance Depart-ment. The Armored Force wanted tomount a 90mm gun on the M4, but AGFopposed this idea. Its commander, Lieu-tenant General Lesley J. McNair, consid-ered this action unnecessary sinceAmerican doctrine stressed the use of

tanks for exploitation rather than de-stroying enemy armor.

He also opposed the Ordnance Depart-ment’s preference for developing an en-tirely new heavy tank, because of the de-crease in M4 production that would oc-cur while industry retooled for a newtank.39

Adverse publicity concerning theweakness of the M4 in encounters withGerman Tigers and Panthers throughout


Field Expedient “Protection”

Testing ways to improve the Sherman’s protection, units fired captured German antitankweapons against hulks. Above, a soldier examines the damage done by a 60mm shapedcharge that blew away bags of cement before perforating the transmission casting. Sparetrack sections were also employed, as seen on the Sherman below, at the 1st AD’s crossingof the Arno River in Italy during 1944.

1944 only deepened the three-way rift.The M4A3E2 represented an improvisedsolution. A 42-ton heavily armored M4,the tank was initially designed for closeinfantry support during the Normandycampaign, but the U.S. Third Army foundthem useful in leading armored columns,where their heavier armor increased theirsurvivability if attacked. Some of thesetanks carried the more powerful 76mm

gun, but overall numbersof the M4A3E2 producedamounted to only 254.40

The Ordnance Depart-ment continued to advo-cate a heavy tank, andhad already acquired de-sign experience. It haddeveloped the M6 HeavyTank following France’sdefeat. None of the 50vehicles produced enteredcombat, but the tank’sdual main armament of a3-inch gun and a 37mmgun mounted coaxially,its 25-mile-per-hourspeed, its track skirts, andballistically shaped hullhad been innovative forthe early war period. Be-ginning in 1943, the Ord-nance Department hadalso sought to improvethe M4 Medium Tank,focusing upon transmis-

sions, suspensions, larger guns, use of anautoloader, and increased armor and fire-power without sacrificing mobility. Inde-pendently, the Ordnance Departmentcontinued to develop a heavily armoredtank carrying the 90mm gun, resulting inthe T26-series of heavy tanks. The dem-onstrated inadequacy of the M4 MediumTank in combat against heavier Germanvehicles in 1944 finally provided the

stimulus for AGF, the Ordnance Depart-ment, and the Armored Force to agreeupon the production of 250 T26s.41

The 3d and 9th Armored Divisions re-ceived the first deliveries of T26s inJanuary 1945. Mixed teams of civilianand military experts provided newequipment training, and their effortsstimulated theater demands for addi-tional tanks. By May 1945, the T26 be-came standardized as the M26 and 200had been issued to combat units inEurope. By war’s end, only 20 had en-tered combat, including the capture ofthe Remagen Bridge. None saw action inthe Pacific Theater of Operations, al-though they were requested for use onOkinawa.42

By the war’s end, American tank de-velopment had drifted toward more ver-satile tank designs capable of performingmultiple tactical roles and that incorpo-rated a better balance of armor, fire-power, and mobility. Light tanks contin-ued to function in a reconnaissance role,reflecting the American preference forfully tracked vehicles over the cheaperarmored cars favored by foreign powers.The M4 Medium Tank and M26 HeavyTank, however, represented the emer-gence of the main battle tank conceptthat would shape Cold War tank designs.Production and design had matured sincethe confusion of World War I, and bene-fited from the effective utilization of the


Above, although the U.S. did not field a heavy tank in time for WWII, it developedthe 60-ton M6 early in the war. The few that were made never went into combat,the Army relying instead on mass production of the M4 Sherman.

At left, the M24 light tank did join the fight during the final months of the EuropeanTheater. Its torsion bar suspension was a big improvement over the vertical vo-lute spring system of the Stuart series, and its 75mm gun was a formidable mainarmament for a tank of its size.

automotive industry in all phases of tankdevelopment. The controversy over theM4’s replacement, however, resulted inAmerican combat troops entering com-bat with inferior equipment and under-scored the importance of coordinatingthe needs of combat forces with doctrineand technological ability.

Notes

1Robert L. Collins, “Report on the Develop-ment of the Tank Corps,” in The United StatesArmy in the World War 1917-1918, Reports ofCommander-in-Chief, A.E.F, Staff Sections andServices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department ofthe Army, Historical Division, 1948), p. 220;Dale E. Wilson, “‘Treat ’Em Rough!’ The UnitedStates Army Tank Corps in the First World War,”Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1990, Uni-versity Microfilms International Order NumberDA9107939, pp. 9, 12.

2S.D. Badsey, “The American Experience ofArmour,” in J.P. Harris and F.H. Toase (eds.),Armoured Warfare (New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1990), p. 126.

3Wilson, pp. 113-115; Robert I. Icks, “FourDecades of Mechanization: Our Record of Com-bat-Vehicle Development,” Army Ordnance,XVII, 102 (May-June 1937), pp. 333-334.

4Collins, pp. 222-223; Icks, “Four Decades ofMechanization,” p. 335.

5Collins, pp. 221-222, 224; Icks, “Four Decadesof Mechanization,” pp. 333-334.

6Badsey, p. 127.7U.S. War Department, The National Defense

Act Approved June 3, 1916 as Amended by ActApproved August 29, 1916; Act Approved July 9,1918; Act Approved February 28, 1919; Act Ap-proved July 11, 1919; Act Approved September29, 1919; Act Approved June 4, 1920 (Washing-ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920),Section 17, p. 15; Timothy K. Nenninger, “TheDevelopment of American Armor, 1917-1940,”Master’s thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968, p.62.

8Samuel D. Rockenbach, “The Tank Corps,”Lecture given to War Department General Staffmembers at Tank School, September 19, 1919, p.7, U.S. Army Military History Institute (refer-enced subsequently as MHI) Library; Samuel D.Rockenbach, “American Tanks Since the WorldWar,” 1923, pp. 3-4, MHI Library; Samuel D.Rockenbach, “Weight and Dimension of Tanks,”February 1923, MHI Library.

9Icks, “Four Decades of Mechanization,” pp.336-337.

10R.H. Allen, “A Resume of Tank Developmentin the United States,” Lecture at Army War Col-lege, October 27, 1929, pp. 2-3, MHI Archives.

11Chris Ellis and Peter Chamberlain, “LightTanks M1-M5,” in Duncan Crow (ed.), AmericanAFVs of World War II (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou-bleday and Company Inc., 1972), p. 3.

12Allen, pp. 4-5; Icks, pp. 337-338.

13General Service Schools, The Employment ofTanks in Combat (Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.: Gen-eral Service Schools Press, 1925), p. 8.

14George F. Hofmann, “A Yankee Inventor andthe Military Establishment: The Christie TankControversy,” Military Affairs, XXXIX, 1 (Febru-ary 1975), pp. 9-10.

15The Adjutant General Major General JamesF. McKinley, “War Department policies formechanization,” April 5, 1935, p. 1, MHI Ar-chives, Willis D. Crittenberger Papers.

16Notes of discussion following lecture of Ma-jor Oswald H. Saunders at the Army War Col-lege, “Status of Mechanization—1933,” Septem-ber 18, 1933, p. 24, MHI Archives, Army WarCollege Curricular Archives.

17Ellis and Chamberlain, “Light Tanks M1-M5,” p. 3.

18George A. Lynch, “Final report of MajorGeneral George A. Lynch: A summary of infan-try developments during his term of office,” April30, 1941, p. 7; report of Colonel Stephen O.Fuqua, U.S. Military Attaché, Spain, Report No.6862, July 25, 1938, “Analysis of Tank Casual-ties—Spain,” MHI Archives, Willis D. Critten-berger Papers.

19Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C.Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, United StatesArmy in World War II: The Technical Services:The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitionsfor War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chiefof Military History, Department of the Army,1955), pp. 197-198.

20Adna R. Chaffee, “The Seventh Cavalry Bri-gade in the First Army Maneuvers,” CavalryJournal, XLVIII, 6 (November-December 1939),pp. 450-461.

21Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, UnitedStates Army in World War II: The TechnicalServices: The Ordnance Department: Procure-ment and Supply (Washington, D.C.: Departmentof the Army, 1960), p. 225.

22Steven Zaloga and Victor Madej, The PolishCampaign 1939 (New York: Hippocrene Books,Inc., 1985), p. 88.

23Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Sup-ply, pp. 12-13.

24Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, “M3 Me-dium (Lee/Grant),” in Duncan Crow (ed.), Ameri-can AFVs of World War II (Garden City, NewYork: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1972), pp.38-39.

25Memorandum from The Adjutant General,AG 320.2 (7-5-40) M (Ret) M-C, “Organizationof Armored Force,” July 10, 1940, George C.Marshall Foundation, National Archives Project,Microfilm Reel 36, Item 1479.

26“War Department Armored Force Field Man-ual; Tactics and Technique; Chapter 7: The Regi-ment (Tank) Light and Medium,” July 7, 1941,MHI Archives, Willis D. Crittenberger Papers.

27George Forty, United States Tanks of WorldWar II (New York: Sterling Publishing Company,1983), p. 42.

28Army Ground Forces Board No. 2, Develop-ment of Armored Vehicles (Ft. Knox, Ky.: TheArmored School, undated), I, Tanks, pp. 94-95.

29Peter Chamberlain and Peter Ellis, “M4 Me-dium (Sherman),” in Duncan Crow (ed.), Ameri-can AFVs of World War II (Garden City, NewYork: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1972), pp.53-54.

30Chamberlain and Ellis, “M3 Medium(Lee/Grant),” pp. 41-46.

31Memorandum from Major General Ernest N.Harmon to the Commanding General, AlliedForce, “Modern Equipment for the 1st ArmoredDivision,” May 21, 1943, MHI Archives, ErnestN. Harmon Papers; George B. Jarrett, “MiddleEast 1942,” unpublished manuscript, pp. 55-56,62, 90, MHI Archives, George B. Jarrett Papers.

32Chamberlain and Ellis, “M3 Medium(Lee/Grant),” p. 51.

33Ellis and Chamberlain, “Light Tanks M1-M5,” pp. 8-12.

34Forty, United States Tanks of World War II,pp. 57-60.

35Robert J. Icks, “M24 Chaffee Light Tank,” inDuncan Crow (ed.), American AFVs of WorldWar II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Com-pany Inc., 1972), pp. 105, 108, 110-112.

36Chamberlain and Ellis, “M4 Medium (Sher-man),” pp. 53-55, 57-59.

37George Forty, M4 Sherman (New York: Ster-ling Publishing Company, 1987), p. 58.

38Report submitted by Major General Alvan C.Gillem, Jr. to the Chief of Staff, “Report of Ob-servations at European Theater of Operations andNorth African Theater of Operations,” August 1,1943, p. 8, GCM Foundation, National ArchivesProject, Xerox No. 2300; Jarrett, “Middle East1942,” p. 195.

39Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: AmericanTanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1983), pp. 25,27, 81, 86.

40Baily, pp. 116, 120.41Robert J. Icks, “The M6 Heavy and M26

Pershing,” in Duncan Crow (ed.), American AFVsof World War II (Garden City, New York: Dou-bleday and Company Inc., 1972), pp. 77-78, 80-82, 85, 89-90.

42Icks, “The M6 Heavy and M26 Pershing,” pp.92-93.


Robert S. Cameron, the Ar-mor Branch historian, earnedBA degrees in history and eco-nomics at the State Universityof New York at Binghamtonand a doctorate in history atTemple University. Formerly ahistory instructor at Temple andseveral other colleges in thePhiladelphia area, he alsoteaches history at the ArmorCenter.

Checkpoints are used to control move-ment of vehicles, personnel, or materielalong a specified route; and are classi-fied as deliberate or hasty. They helpprevent trafficking of contraband items,ensure proper use of routes by both ci-vilian and military traffic, prevent un-authorized access or infiltration of re-stricted or controlled areas by local civil-ians or military forces, maintain continu-ous monitoring of road movement, andserve as local security and observationoutposts.

This article will focus primarily on theissue of force protection — planning forand implementing force protection meas-ures for both deliberate and hasty check-points. It will also address some of thetactics, techniques, and procedures util-ized during checkpoint operations. Thearticle is based on the experiences ofApache Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st U.S.Cavalry from 1 January 1996 to 17 Oc-tober 1996 in Northeast Bosnia-Herze-govina. The soldiers of A Troop estab-lished seven deliberate checkpoints in afive month time period, all on majorroutes through the Zone of Separation.

Force Protection Planning

Force protection and checkpoint de-fense are primary concerns in a stabilityoperations environment, and are mutu-ally dependent. Force protection was aprimary concern and the buzzword ofOperation Joint Endeavor. Many specificmeasures were taken to prevent the un-necessary loss of manpower — as out-lined in the tactics, techniques, and pro-cedures implemented and utilized for ve-hicular convoys, base camp protection,and checkpoint operations. Checkpointforce protection measures (the focus ofthis article) included the use of improvedmaterials for cover and concealment ofsoldiers and checkpoint structures, obsta-cle and barrier plans, perimeter lighting,and operational procedures (to includedefense contingency plans).

Force protection planning for check-point operations requires in-depth troopleading procedures (TLPs) conducted atthe platoon level. During mission analy-sis, it is important to focus on three spe-cific areas — the Threat, the terrain, andthe supporting assets needed during

checkpoint operations. Each item influ-ences checkpoint force protection plan-ning and may influence the execution ofoperations.

In a peacekeeping or peace-enforcingenvironment, the Threat is not always avisible, recognizable, or definable force.As the bombings in Beirut and Dhahranhave both shown, invisible terrorists andfactions dressed in civilian clothing, us-ing guerrilla warfare tactics, pose a con-stant threat to our forces. During theplanning phase, leaders must identifyThreat avenues of approach (AAs) to thecheckpoint (dismounted avenues of ap-proach, possible sniper locations, andhigh speed vehicular AAs), and this vigi-lance must be continued by the soldiersmanning a checkpoint. The Threat tem-plate incorporated with the checkpointlayout will assist in identifying threatAAs. The platoon leader, or checkpointground commander, must continuallyanalyze, and if necessary, revise histhreat IPB and make corrections to hisCP defense plan. This becomes very im-portant, especially if the checkpoint islocated in a built-up area or if the activi-ties in the area surrounding the check-point become more active. An exampleof the latter was our CP A2, establishedin January 1996. By early April, “MarketArizona” began nearby with a couple ofdozen peddlers. By July, it had evolvedinto a large market with over a dozenpermanent structures and more than a

hundred merchants. The checkpoint pro-vided the blanket of security for free-market trading and enterprise for mer-chants of all ethnic backgrounds, but likeany built-up area, it was always consid-ered a potential threat platform.

The old adage, “Terrain Dictates,” isoften true in checkpoint operations. De-fense of the checkpoint and force protec-tion for your soldiers must be a primaryconcern — good IPB will assist in bothareas. Terrain will also influence or dic-tate the size of your checkpoint, opera-tional planning, the obstacle plan, andresupply operations. Deliberate check-points should not be located on restric-tive terrain, for example, low groundwith minimal fields of observation, on acurvy road, or in a built-up area. Easilydefensible terrain will support more effi-cient operations; it will support your ob-stacle and defense plan, assist in resup-ply and relief-in-place operations, andprovide the ability to establish adequateforce protection.

On the other hand, the intent of a hastycheckpoint is surprise. These locationsshould limit detection from long dis-tances. When planning a hasty check-point, leaders should analyze terrain andother restrictions as to how they will af-fect your CP. Key terrain surroundingyour checkpoint must be observable atall times and targeted with direct- andindirect-fire weapon systems.


Force Protection for Checkpoint Operationsby First Lieutenant Patrick R. Milligan

Two Bradleys guard Checkpoint Apache 2 along Route Arizona in northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Also consider how the checkpoint willreceive its supply and other support.How will supporting indirect fires beutilized? How will civilian contractorsservice the checkpoint? How will this af-fect operations, and will their presenceincrease the threat? These are commonquestions which must be addressed andanswered with solid solutions.

Resupply and refueling at your check-point must be specified with a plan. In it,you must address how your resupply ele-ment will conduct operations. Considerthe LOGPAC’s direction of travel to thecheckpoint, access points to be used,number of vehicles in the resupply ele-ment, how the checkpoint will be de-fended with additional assets on site, ar-rival and departure times, assets neededto support the LOGPACs arrival, etc.The lack of a reliable resupply or refuelplan will hinder and disrupt checkpointoperations at the most inopportunetimes, creating confusion that degradescheckpoint security and force protection.

Consider the supporting fires protectingthe checkpoint and what assets are mostappropriate — battalion or troop mor-tars, direct support 155mm, or attackhelicopters? Where is this support lo-cated, and how long does it take to de-liver fires? If fires are released, whattype of round(s) will be fired to supportthe checkpoint [the most common fireplan would utilize illumination due tothe effects of collateral damage on thecivilian populace]? What organic weap-ons do you have that can deliver fires todeadspaces surrounding the checkpoint,and what types and quantities of roundshould you have on hand? All of thesecommon and specific questions musthave answers in the checkpoint defenseplan. Plan fire support and air-groundcoordination exercises and rehearsals on

a regular basis; by doing so you will beable to accurately determine if they willbe able to support you when it counts.By the time you get fires released, the“war” may well be over, thus the re-hearsals will provide you insight to ad-just your CP defense plan as needed.Utilize organic M203 grenade launchersto cover deadspace within short range ofthe checkpoint; again, illumination willbe the most likely round utilized.

It’s also important to coordinate withsupporting civilian contractors. An exter-minator team arriving at your checkpointat 0200 in the morning will most likelycreate immediate suspicion and tensionwithin the guard force. All checkpointpersonnel must know who your contrac-tors are (access rosters do work), theirnormal arrival times, and what they do.Civilian contractors or their vehicles arean easy mode of transport for terroristsor terrorist activity. Coordinating the ar-rival of civilian contractors and keepingyour personnel informed will assist incheckpoint force protection and allowthe supporting civilian elements to dotheir jobs. Without prior coordination,access to the checkpoint should be de-nied — the OIC and NCOIC must en-force this unwaveringly.

Checkpoint layout and level of prepa-ration will be heavily dependent on the

threat, terrain, amount of traffic, and du-ration of operations. Restrictions such asroad width, vegetation, and minefieldswill often affect or dictate the size andlayout of your checkpoint. The sketchabove depicts the layout and composi-tion for a temporary checkpoint (theauthor’s platoon SOP). This CP was oc-cupied and manned for 48 hours by two12-man scout sections.

Force Protection Implementation

Force protection measures will changewith changes of mission, transition to adifferent phase of the same mission, orchanges to the threat condition (THREAT-CON). The tactical commander must beflexible enough to plan and implementupgrades or reductions in force protec-tion as needed. For example; about 180days into our deployment to Bosnia, theforce protection level was downgraded,which resulted in a change to the uni-form requirement and a change in check-point operations. We transitioned from arigid 100-percent vehicle search tactic toa more random method that facilitatedfreedom of movement through the Zoneof Separation (ZOS).

Outlined below are the materials andTTPs utilized during checkpoint opera-tions. The items are all available throughnormal Army supply channels, and willassist in establishing and operating an ef-fective and defensible checkpoint.

Barrier Materials and Employment

Hesko bastions (see photo) filled withgravel or rock, with filled sandbagsplaced on top, provide cover and con-cealment approximately 5 feet high and3 feet thick — a good base of force pro-


ConcertinaWire

Temporary Checkpoint

Warning Triangles and CP Sign; Up to 300 m forward of CFV

Speed bum

p

Concertina Wire& Barrels

M3A2CFV

SearchMan Barrier

Security

Spe

ed b

ump

GeneratorLight set

Vehicle Search Area

Speed bum

p

Barrels

M3A2CFV

QRFTeam

Concertina Wire& Barrels

M3A2CFV

BarrierSecurity

SearchMan

Warning Triangles and CP Sign; Up to 300 m forward of CFV

“Civilian contractors or their vehi-cles are an easy mode of trans-port for terrorists or terrorist activ-ity. Coordinating the arrival of civil-ian contractors and keeping yourpersonnel informed will assist incheckpoint force protection...”


The complementary manner in whichthe U.S. Army’s components functionand fight is one of the principal reasonsit is the best army in the world. Team-work, cooperation, and the effective andtimely synchronization of resources andassets creates synergistic effects thatcripple the enemy and lead to success.This interdependence is tied to the pulseof every soldier, the success of everybattle — it is the crux of our Army’scombined arms concept.

Combined arms is the synchronizedand/or simultaneous application of sev-eral arms — such as infantry, armor, ar-tillery, engineers, air defense, and avia-tion — to achieve an effect on the en-emy which is greater than if each armwas used sequentially.1 The combinedarms concept has long surpassed thedreams of its developers, but still has notfully exploited the capabilities at its core.To accomplish this, combined arms offi-cers must be experts, not only in the em-ployment of their own branch, but in thedoctrinal employment of all elements ofmaneuver and fire support.

The purpose of this article is to discussthe capabilities and uses of attack avia-tion assets, highlight challenges associ-ated with the integration of air andground forces, and provide recommenda-tions to improve future operations. Alltoo often units at the Combat TrainingCenters (CTCs) demonstrate that there isa lack of familiarization by armored/mechanized force leaders with the mis-sions and roles attack aviation assets canperform in concert with or in support ofground tactical operations.2 This articlefocuses on how U.S. Army attack avia-tion and armored/mechanized forces canintegrate to form one of the most effec-tive forces on the battlefield.

CapabilitiesArmy Aviation bridges the gap be-

tween aerial and ground combat. To the

ground commander, it offers speed, mo-bility, and flexibility in one hand and alethal mix of firepower and versatility inthe other. Army Aviation maneuvers itsaerial firepower for optimal engage-ments, concentrates and disperses forcesrapidly, and converges on objectivesfrom multiple directions to support com-bined arms operations.3 Although unableto occupy or seize terrain, attack heli-copters can deny the enemy terrain for alimited time by dominating it with directand indirect fires.4 The helicopter’s ex-clusive ability to use and interact withsurrounding terrain serves as a definingcharacteristic of the advantages it offersto the ground commander.

Unencumbered by terrain and groundobstacles, attack helicopters can coverlarge areas of ground quickly. This al-lows the maneuver force commander tosimultaneously attack threat forces — atalmost any time, under almost any con-ditions — with significantly concen-trated masses of combat power.5

When allocated by division or corps,an attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB)placed under the operational control of aground maneuver brigade provides thecommander with a highly mobile and le-thal antiarmor, antipersonnel, antimate-

riel, and air-to-air destruction capability,both during the day and at night. The le-thality of an AH-64-equipped ATKHB isextraordinary. The AH-64 Apache’sweaponry includes Hellfire antitank mis-siles, a wide array of 2.75-inch (70mm)folding fin aerial rockets (FFAR), and a30mm gun (See Figure 1). It is equippedwith a target acquisition and designationsight (TADS) which provides the crewwith day and night target acquisition bymeans of a direct view optical (DVO)telescope, a day television (DTV), and aforward looking infrared (FLIR) sensorsystem.6 These acquisition systems, op-erating individually or in combination,elevate the commander’s view of thebattlefield to the third dimension.

UsesArmy Aviation performs myriad roles

both in concert with and in support ofground forces on the battlefield. Groundmaneuver commanders must understandnot only the capabilities of aviation as-sets, but how to employ them as well. Amaneuver brigade may receive anATKHB OPCON for a specific missionor for a certain amount of time. The bat-talion, because of sustainability andother issues, is the smallest unit that is


AH-64

Armament: Effective Range Maximum Range Quantity (STD) Quantity (HVY)

Hellfire 500m - 8 km 8(+)km 8 16

2.75" Rocket 7.5km 9km 38 0

30mm (API,HEI) 3km 4km 1200 1200

Optics (TADS): Detection Recognition Identification Magnification

DTV 10(+)km 8-10km 5-7km 14.3-127X

DVO 3.5-18.2X

FLIR 10(+)km 5-6km 900m - 1.2km 1.2-39.8X

Figure 1. AH-64 weapon/optical capabilities

Air/Ground IntegrationAnd the Combined Arms Concept

by Captain Charles Dalcourt

placed OPCON to a brigade. TheATKHB executes its missions using theattack helicopter company (ATKHC) toengage and destroy enemy forces. To dothis, the ATKHB commander applies oneof the following three methods of em-ployment: continuous attack, phased at-tack, or maximum destruction.

ATKHBs are capable of conducting avariety of missions, to include reconnais-sance, counter-reconnaissance, and secu-rity missions within the unit’s capabili-ties. They conduct tactical offensive op-erations such as movements to contactand attacks to destroy, attrit, and disruptenemy forces. ATKHBs can be used tooverwatch and suppress, assist in obscur-ing, and provide security for breach op-erations; and additionally, serve as thecommander’s reserve or tactical combatforce (TCF).

An AH-64 ATKHB can be extremelyeffective when employed in a reconnais-sance role and can provide informationthat can have a significant impact on theground commander’s scheme of maneu-ver. Reconnaissance, performed beforeand during other combat operations, pro-vides combat intelligence used to con-firm or modify the commander’s conceptof the operation.7 Equipped with clearand concise guidance, a thorough under-standing of the critical tasks of the mis-sion, and a prioritized list of reconnais-sance objectives, the ATKHC can gatherdetailed information about the activitiesand resources of an enemy force. On-board equipment that enhances theATKHC’s ability to conduct reconnais-sance include the TADS and the videorecorder subsystem. The video recordersystem has the capability of recording upto 72 minutes of selected video. With theproper equipment on hand, or using theaircraft itself to play back the video, theground commander or S3 can view near-real-time video footage of enemy loca-tions and other reconnaissance objectivesbefore departing the attack position.

During a movement to contact, com-manders may employ attack helicoptersforward of ground maneuver elements toestablish contact with and destroy theenemy’s first echelon forces. Althoughusually a division cavalry mission, theATKHB can accomplish this task whenand where the situation requires or per-mits its execution. Leading combat ac-tions with attack helicopters establishesmomentum and sets a rapid tempo foroffensive operations. This action by theground commander exploits the speedand mobility of his aviation assets andallows them to set the pace of the battle,versus responding to the pace of ground-based combat. Once contact is made andthe situation developed, a battle hand-over is conducted with the ground ma-neuver force, which then assumes thefight. Attack assets may also be em-ployed during a movement to contact aspart of the covering force or advancedguard. Given this mission, attack avia-tion assets support the ground com-mander by extending the range of obser-vation (thus, increasing reaction time)forward and to the flanks of the force,provides additional combat power to de-feat an enemy force upon contact, andfacilitates the rapid, aggressive actioncharacteristic of a movement to contact.Additionally, the ATKHB may operate aspart of the main body during this opera-tion. Operating from successive forwardassembly areas, the ATKHB remainsprepared to exploit enemy weaknessesand attack counterattacking forces.

Whether close or deep, attack helicop-ters answer the call to strike. As part ofthe ground unit’s attack, be it hasty ordeliberate, the ATKHB can attack the en-emy’s flanks, diverting his attention andforcing him to fight in more than one di-rection. Coordinated properly, this in-creases the survivability of all assets in-volved and greatly enhances the paralyz-ing effect of our armor. In a deliberateattack, aviation assets can be used to de-

stroy enemy second-echelon maneuverforces, logistical assets supporting en-emy first-echelon forces, or the enemy’scounterattack force. An ATKHB is capa-ble of destroying an enemy armor/mechanized regimental-sized element.As an example, let’s look at the capabil-ity of one ATKHC during a deliberate at-tack.

Assume that the enemy has formed areserve force using a tank battalion fromthe Motorized Rifle Division’s tank regi-ment. Given a 75 percent operationalreadiness rate (6 of 8 aircraft) and astandard configuration of eight Hellfiremissiles, 38 2.75-inch FFARs, and 30-mm rounds, an AH-64-equipped ATKHCis capable of destroying an enemy tankbattalion, assessed to be approximately83 percent strength. The ATKHC departsits attack position with a total of 48Hellfire missiles. Assuming a 60 percentprobability of hit (PH), which reduces thenumber of probable hits to 29, and a 90percent probability of kill (PK), theATKHC can destroy 26 of the 31 tanksin the battalion. Using the same battle-field calculus, but modifying the con-figuration to reflect 16 Hellfire missileson each aircraft, the ATKHC can be ex-pected to destroy up to 52 point targets.

During breaching operations, the AH-64 serves as an ideal platform fromwhich attack aviation assets can assistthe ground force. Using a tailored mix ofmissiles, rockets, and 30mm ammuni-tion, the AH-64 can assist in reducingthe loss of mobility assets at the breachsite.8 Supporting the ground forcethrough all four breaching fundamentals(suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce),attack aviation assets prove to be an im-measurable asset during this type of op-eration. First, using their optics to viewthe obstacle, the aircraft can forward in-formation to validate and refine obstacleintelligence, such as the obstacle’s loca-tion and orientation, composition, andsize, to the ground force or breach force


“When allocated by division or corps, an attack helicopterbattalion (ATKHB) placed under the operational control of aground maneuver brigade provides the commander with ahighly mobile and lethal antiarmor, antipersonnel, antimate-riel, and air-to-air destruction capability, both during the dayand at night....”

commander. If a bypass is available, theycan reconnoiter the route, eliminate en-emy resistance along the route, and over-watch the movement of ground assetsalong the bypass. Second, attack aircraftcan suppress and destroy enemy forcesoverwatching the breach site. This task isaccomplished by using on-board weap-onry as well as through calls for indirectfire from the direct support artillery as-sets and the maneuver unit’s organicmortars. Third, aviation can assist in ob-scuring the breach site. Again, aviationassets supporting the breach can call for,observe, and adjust indirect fires, as wellas monitor and protect the movement ofsmoke assets at the breach site. The AH-64 is also capable of providing security,both near and far side, for the entirebreach force. Additionally, the helicop-ters can impede or destroy enemy coun-terattack forces, or forces repositioning,before they get within direct-fire rangeof the breach site. In support of the re-duction effort, the attack helicopter unitsupporting the breach cannot directly af-fect the reduction of the breach site, butassists indirectly by providing the secu-rity necessary to protect the breachforce.

To this point, we have outlined some ofthe capabilities and uses of attack avia-tion assets during the various forms oftactical offense, as well as in support ofspecific missions. The attributes of at-tack aviation mentioned are great, in andof themselves, but the full exploitation ofthese strengths rests in their integrationand synchronization with the capabilitiesof other maneuver forces. With this inmind, let’s discuss three key issues thatcan prevent the success of this merger.

Problems

One problem identified in the orches-tration of air and ground assets is the in-tegration of aviation assets into theground unit’s tactical decision-makingprocess (TDMP). It is during the plan-ning process that the commander deter-mines the best use of the additional ma-neuver assets given to him. Under-standing and considering the inherentlimitations and capabilities of attackhelicopters allows the commander tomake prudent decisions about the deci-sive point or critical time in which these

assets will be employed. This opens thedoor to the next issue; the capabilities ofthe aviation liaison officer (LNO).

The inexperience of some aviationLNOs assigned to ground units, coupledwith their inability to articulate the capa-bilities of the aviation unit they repre-sent, is another issue impeding the syn-chronization of air and ground forces.The aviation LNO is the critical link be-tween the ground commander and theaviation unit. The LNO makes recom-mendations to the ground commanderand facilitates the exchange of informa-tion critical to mission success. The pres-ence of an LNO neither negates the needfor the ground maneuver unit’s S3 to co-ordinate with his aviation counterpartnor rescinds the requirement for the S3to be familiar with the proper employ-ment of aviation assets. What the LNO’spresence should provide is a credible re-source, an experienced hand, capable ofassisting the ground maneuver com-mander in properly employing aviationassets to suit his scheme of maneuver.

A third dilemma is the employment ofaviation assets under the operationalcontrol of armor/mechanized command-ers. Due to the aforementioned prob-lems, aviation assets are very often notemployed throughout the ground unit’sscheme of maneuver. Commanders donot exploit the agility, mobility, and ver-satility of aviation assets under their con-trol. Attack assets are conceptuallybound to the traditional roles of attack-ing second echelon forces, serving as thetactical combat force, or as the groundmaneuver unit’s reserve, thus opportuni-ties to capitalize on the helicopter’sstrengths are overlooked. Too often,aviation assets are placed in this capacity(TCF or reserve) because of deficientplanning, and are required to providesupport anywhere on the battlefield with-out required planning and synchroniza-tion. Assigning an ATKHB a reservemission, without a clear task and pur-pose, results in numerous branches withno detailed planning, and the result isthat it very seldom works. More often,the quick reaction force/reserve mental-


ity results in destroyed aircraft and ahigh probability of fratricide because oftheir rapid employment into areas wherethe enemy and friendly situations are un-clear.

Recommendations

So, what steps do we take to reversethese trends? The integration of aviationassets into the tactical decision makingprocess (TDMP) is a simple problem tocorrect — do it. In the early stages of thecommand estimate process, coordinatingstaff members from both units (air andground) should meet to exchange infor-mation and discuss, by battlefield operat-ing system, the general requirements ofeach. The ground commander shouldidentify critical times and places whereattack aviation will assist his scheme ofmaneuver. After doing so, the aviationunit commander or S3, through the avia-tion LNO, confirms the aviation unit’sability to accomplish the desired task.This leads us to the next step; the inte-gration of the aviation LNO into theground planning process.

The Aviation LNO is the critical linkthat facilitates the continuous integrationof aviation assets available to the groundcommander during the planning, prepa-ration, execution, and consolidationphases of the mission. The aviation unithas the responsibility of providing acompetent LNO to the ground unit.LNOs must be knowledgeable in all as-pects of aviation employment and mustensure that the planned employment iswithin the capabilities of the unit. Thisindividual must be able to provide theground commander with:

• Recommendations on the employ-ment of the aviation unit

• Recommendations on the location oftentative support-by-fire positions, at-tack-by-fire positions, and battle po-sitions in support of the ground com-mander’s scheme of maneuver

• Facts regarding the capabilities andlimitations of the aircraft and itsweaponry, based on environmentalconditions as well as mission con-straints

• Updates regarding the aviation unit’sstatus.

Additionally, the LNO must keep hisparent unit informed, notifying them assoon as possible of changes that occur inthe ground unit’s mission or timeline.

In prescribing a solution to the lack offamiliarization in employing aviation as-sets, one may consider it a matter of pro-fessional development. Soldiers aretrained to be tactically proficient and ex-hibit an overall adeptness in the missionof their particular branch. Our branchschools/centers do a great job of trainingwarfighters to meet this requirement, butwhere do we train warfighters to fight asthey would during war? That is, wheredo the doctrinal principles learned inschool meet with the practical applica-tion needed to produce that valuable re-source called experience?

We no longer have the luxury of train-ing as a single arm because we are notgoing to fight as a single entity. Theonus for training leaders to operate withand alongside other members of thecombined arms team rests on maneuverunit commanders. Commanders shouldseek ways to cross-train personnel inspite of budget constraints. Officer pro-fessional development sessions con-ducted by members of the otherbranches, exchange programs, and ef-forts such as sending leaders to the fieldwith other arms to observe their trainingare all inexpensive methods of familiar-izing leaders with the capabilities andlimitations of other arms.

ConclusionAs we outgrow the ways in which we

have fought in the past, we must alsoembrace the need to impart in eachleader a true understanding of the com-bined arms concept. By ensuring that wepromote interdependence among com-bined arms team members, we can col-lectively reverse the trends that tend toisolate an arm, thus reducing the effectof the team. As a team we should con-duct tough, realistic training at every op-portunity. Through innovative thinkingand an aggressive approach, we can, inspite of budget constraints, familiarizeour leaders with the doctrinal employ-ment, capabilities, and limitations of fel-low team members. Combined armswarfare is the simultaneous applicationof combat, combat support, and combatservice support toward a common goal.9

There will never be a war that a singlearm can or will win alone. It is whenwe work in concert with one another —synchronizing both efforts and effects —that we are most capable of deliveringsuch a crushing blow, from which no op-ponent could recover.

Notes

1FM 100-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics.2Conversation with LTC(P) E.J. Sinclair, Jan 6,

’97.3FM 1-100, Doctrinal Principles For Army

Aviation In Combat Operations, February 1989,p. 1-18.

4FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalion, 21February 1991, p. 1-3.

5FM 1-100, p. 1-18.6TM 1-1520-238-10 (Change 2), Operator’s

Manual For Helicopter, Attack, AH-64A Apache,31 August 1994, p. 4-40.

7CPT(P) Ronald F. Lewis, “AH-64 in the Re-connaissance Role.”

8FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Op-erations, February 1991, p. 2-4.

9FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, p. 2-3.

The author would like to thank LTC(P) E.J. Sinclair, LTC Steve Moore, MAJJim Richardson, and CPT(P) Ron Lewisfor their advice in the writing of this ar-ticle.

“The integration of aviation assets into the tactical decision makingprocess (TDMP) is a simple problem to correct — do it.”


CPT Charles J. Dalcourt is agraduate of Southern University,Baton Rouge, La. His previousassignments include: AH-1 pla-toon leader, 5/17th Cav, 2ID, Ko-rea; asst. squadron S3, AH-64platoon leader, squadron S2, ATroop Commander, 1-6 Cav, Ft.Hood, Texas; and assistant bdeS3 (plans), 6th Cav Bde, Ft. Hood,Texas/Camp Humphreys, Korea.He has attended the Aviation Offi-cer Basic Course, Joint FirepowerController Course, Armor OfficerAdvanced Course, and the Cav-alry Leader’s Course. He is cur-rently enroute to an assignmentin the Aviation Brigade, 101st Air-borne Division (Air Assault).

Since the publication of the article“The Russian T-90/T-90S Tank: An OldDog with Some Dangerous New Tricks”(ARMOR, March-April 1995), some newinformation concerning this mysteriousRussian MBT has come to light. Variousopen sources have confirmed that thereare at least three different variants of theT-90. The Russians confirmed the exist-ence of an export variant in June 1996,1

and Russian promotional materials havediscussed both the T-90S (or “C” if youprefer the sometimes-used Cyrillic non-translation) and the T-90SK commandvariant. There are also occasional refer-ences to a T-90E, but these appear to beunsubstantiated. It’s possible that the T-90E designation could have been a de-liberate piece of disinformation intendedto keep the actual T-90 a secret a littlebit longer; or maybe it was an attempt toget some quick export sales of the T-72BM MBT prior to the first public ap-pearance of the T-90. Additionally, someof the information and specifications at-tributed to the T-90 differ from informa-tion now known to belong to the T-90S.Ballistic computers, day/night sight sys-tems for the tank commander, and com-munication systems are some of the ar-eas where a difference can be identifiedbetween the T-90S and a third variant ofthe T-90. Finally, the T-90S that was re-cently shown to the public for the firsttime was not fitted with thermal nightsights, although thermals are reportedlyavailable as an option if desired. As re-ported previously in ARMOR, the Rus-sians have had thermal sights availablefor their tanks since at least 1992; andthere are reports that the T-90 is fittedwith the latest Agava-2 thermal sight.So, based upon the available informa-tion, the three T-90 variants are as fol-lows: the T-90 (non-export MBT), the T-90S (export version, and the focus of thisarticle), and the T-90SK (command vari-ant).

Times have changed since the T-90/T-90S first appeared in 1993. Built uponthe poor performance of Iraqi-employedT-72s in Desert Storm, network newsfootage of turretless M-84A MBTsablaze in the former Yugoslavia, and the

misplaced bad press dumped on the T-80BV MBT for its performance inChechnya, large export orders for mod-ernized T-72s and T-80U MBTs have notmaterialized. It may have been this verylack of export business that pushed theRussians into finally showing the T-90Sto the public. Although certainly relatedto the tanks that fought those recent bat-tles, the T-90/T-90S was not directly in-volved and was spared the scrutiny andbad press. In effect, the T-90/T-90S actu-ally benefited from the war in Chechnya.

In February 1997, information was cir-culated concerning Russia’s participationin the bi-yearly IDEX international mili-tary exhibition. Originally organized andheld in Abu Dhabi in 1993, IDEX hasquickly become one of the most signifi-cant military exhibitions for groundweapons and hardware in the world.IDEX ’97 was conducted from March16-20 1997, and included over 750 con-tractors from 42 countries. The delega-tion from Russia consisted of 350 per-sonnel and about 500 exhibits; including

the T-90S. The following description ofthe T-90S is based on the most recentopen-source information, including thetank’s sales brochure distributed at IDEX’97.

The T-90S is armed with the 125mm2A46M smoothbore main gun firingHVAPFSDS, HEAT-FS, and FRAG-HEammunition. The T-90S can also fire the5km range “jam proof” 9k119 RE-FLEKS gun-launched ATGM (AT-11SNIPER). The tank’s autoloader carries22 ready-to-fire rounds of ammunition.The T-90S is fitted with an integratedfire control system that is capable of en-gaging targets day and night, from a sta-tionary or moving tank, by both the gun-ner and commander. The night sightingsystem is either passive/active IR orthermal. The question to be answeredhere is which thermal? According toJane’s Intelligence Review, it could beeither the TPN4-49-23 Buran-PA sightused on the older T-80Us, or the newerAgava-2 sight intended for newer T-80Us and the T-90. With the Agava-2,the commander is provided with a small


The Russian T-90S: Coming into Focus

by James M. Warford

• Shown for the first time on June 28,1993 at the Kubinka test center.

• Called “Supertank” with a “perfect”fire control system.

• The best Russian tank vs. the T-80/T-72B.

• 107 T-90s were produced as of Sep’95, all located in Siberia.

• 1 Battalion of T-90s fielded at pre-sent.

• 1996-1997 deployment plan is toequip an entire Military District with T-90s.

• Has many features unsurpassed inthe world.

• In the same class as the Abrams,Leopard 2, and Leclerc.

• The main vehicle of the RussianArmy up to the year 2005.

(As reported by: Izvestiya, RossiyskayaGazeta, Krasnaya Zvezda, Armeyskiy Sbornik,and Voyennyye Znaniya)

video screen which provides the sameimage as that seen by the gunner.2

The T-90S is powered by the multi-fuelV-84MS 840 hp diesel engine. Thisgives the tank a maximum road speed ofabout 60 kph and an operating range of550-650 km (the higher number with ex-ternal fuel drums). There have been re-ports that this engine (a derivative of theV-84-1 that powers the lighter T-72BM)is underpowered for the increased weightand causes the T-90S to be “somewhatmore sluggish than either the T-72BM orthe T-80U.”3

More information is required, however,since the combat weight listed for the T-90S is 46.5 tons, while other sources putthe T-90’s combat weight at 50 tons.There are reports that the Russians areworking on new, more powerful dieselengines providing up to 1,100 hp, whichmay be incorporated into the T-90/T-90Sin the future. The T-90S is capable ofdeep fording to a depth of 5 meters us-ing a snorkel, and can also be fitted withKMT-7 mine clearing equipment.

The T-90S is one of only three or fourtanks (the others being the T-90, the T-80UK/T-80UM Model 1995 MBT, andpossibly the Ukrainian T-84 Model 1995MBT) that is fitted with a “three-tiered”protection system: advanced base armorknown as “Combined” or “Sandwich”4

armor by the Russians, Kontakt-5 Explo-sive Reactive Armor (ERA), and theTshU-1-7 Shtora-1 Defensive Aids Suite(DAS). Very little information concern-ing the advanced base armor of modernSoviet/Russian tanks has been publishedto date. It is known that the T-64 series,T-72 series, and T-80 series tanks incor-porate composite/laminate armor overtheir 60-degree frontal armor arc; and re-portedly, the T-90 is no different. Ac-cording to Jane’s Intelligence Review, theT-90 consists of a modified T-72BM tur-ret and hull that incorporates a Russianversion of Chobham armor in the turret;consisting of a basic armor shell with aninsert of alternating layers of aluminumand plastics and a controlled deformationsection.5 So far, no specific additional in-formation about the T-90’s front-slope or

glacis armor configuration is available.The most likely design would be a muchimproved version of the 5-layer armorthat protected the hulls of Iraqi T-72s inDesert Storm.

Based upon the information currentlyavailable, it’s not clear if the T-90S isequipped with the same base armor asthat attributed to the T-90. Added to thisimpressive base armor is the second tierof protection, Kontakt-5 ERA. Firstidentified in 1989, and initially shown tothe public in September 1994, Kontakt-5represents a huge jump in capabilityover previously fielded HEAT warhead-defeating ERA systems. According to theRussians, Kontakt-5 has the ability tosignificantly degrade the penetratingpower of kinetic-energy APFSDS am-munition. To date, Kontakt-5 ERA isused on the T-90/T-90S, T-80U, T-80UM,T-80UM Model 1993, T-80UK/T-80UMModel 1995, T-84 Model 1995, T-80UD,and the T-72BM. Since its introduction,unclassified photographs have also ap-peared showing a T-55 MBT equippedwith this new ERA.


The third tier of protection incorpo-rated into the T-90S is the TshU-1-7Shtora-1 DAS. The Shtora-1 is an elec-tro-optical countermeasure system de-signed to reduce the probability of thetank being hit by ATGMs and laser-guided projectiles by three to five times.6

The system consists of two electro-opti-cal/IR “dazzlers,” one each mounted tothe left and right of the main gun, a setof laser warning receivers mounted onthe turret, and smoke grenade launchersusing a new type of smoke, which re-portedly has the ability to “defeat” lasersand thermal sights. The Shtora-1 can beoperated in fully automatic or semi-auto-matic modes and has the capability tooperate continuously for six hours.Against ATGM attack, the electro-optical“dazzlers” each emit an IR light that isintended to confuse the missile IR track-ing system used by the ATGM launcher;against laser-guided projectile attack, thesystem warns the crew that they are be-ing illuminated and either fires thesmoke grenades or waits for the tankcommander’s decision to fire them. Asthis article is going to press, Shtora-1 hasbeen seen fitted to the T-90/T-90S, T-80UK/T-80UM Model 1995, and T-84Model 1995.

In the March-April 1997 issue of Mili-tary Parade magazine, an article writtenby Vladimir Seryakov (the Director-General of Uralvagonzavod, the DesignBureau that builds the T-72 series andthe T-90 and T-90S) provided an almostunprecedented look at one of the latestproducts of the Russian military-indus-trial complex. Titled “T-90S Gun-MissileTank: New Generation of RussianTanks,” this article provides a very inter-esting look at how the Russians presentthe T-90S to the outside world. De-scribed as incorporating “a number ofdesign innovations and the use of state-of-the-art technologies,” the T-90S “isnot only on a par with the best foreigntanks in terms of combat and service

characteristics, but it even surpassesthem in terms of a number of vital pa-rameters.”7 What some Russians think ofthe T-90/T-90S, however, is apparentlyanother matter. Reportedly, the T-90 wasselected as the “main tank” for the Rus-sian Armed Forces in 1993 after a seriesof competitive trials with the T-80U. Itwas also declared in 1996 that the deci-sion was made to “move gradually to theT-90” as the single tank produced for theRussian Army. According to Jane’s Intel-ligence Review, the selection of the T-90over the most recent versions of the T-80U has not been unanimously sup-ported by the Russian military. Colonel-General Aleksander Galkin, the Chief ofthe Russian Ministry of Defense’s MainArmor Directorate, told an interviewer inSeptember 1996 that the T-90 decisionwas “a mistake” and that he still consid-ers the T-80U a superior tank.8

While the position occupied by the T-90 in the Russian Army may not be asfully supported as originally thought, theposition of the T-90S and its intendedrole are all too clear. Accompanied by anuncharacteristic flow of technical andsales information from Russia, the T-90Shas quickly established itself as a seriouscompetitor on the export market. Rus-sia’s success exporting its modern MBTsin recent years has been minimal at best;and the one real exception to this lack ofsuccess has come from another formerSoviet State. In July 1996, the Ukrainianand Pakistani governments announcedthe completion of a deal for the deliveryof 300 Ukrainian-produced T-80UDs toPakistan. According to a variety of opensources, the unit price for a T-80UD isreportedly $1.8 million, bringing the to-tal value of the deal to about $550 mil-lion. According to Yu. Mirgorodskiy,General Director of the Zavod ImeniMalysheva State Enterprise (tank plant),the T-80UD was selected by the Paki-stanis after a long “competitive strugglewith other vehicles. “The T-80UD is a

state-of-the-art tank which meets all re-quirements.”9 The first batch of 15 T-80UDs have been shipped and report-edly arrived in Karachi on March 23rd.While this landmark deal provides thePakistani Army with a significant tankqualitative advantage over Indian armor,it also firmly establishes the Ukraine asthe principal exporter of T-80 seriestanks. The Russians, of course, arekeenly aware of this situation and arelooking to the T-90S to achieve a newlevel of export success. The delivery of alarge number of T-90Ss by the Russiansto any one of a number of possible cus-tomers represents a very serious poten-tial threat. Based upon the appearance ofthe T-90S at IDEX ’97 and what is nowknown about the tank’s capabilities, it isunlikely that this significant new armorthreat will take long to materialize.

Notes1Rynyanov, Mikhail, “Arms Bureau: This is a

Bobcat. You can’t tell it to ‘Shoo’! Our Corre-spondent Visited Secret Firing Ranges,” Komso-molskaya Pravda, June 28, 1996.

2Zaloga, Steven, “T-90: the Standard of RussianExpediency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Febru-ary 1997, p. 62.

3Ibid., p. 64.4Seryakov, Vladimir, “T-90S Gun-missile

Tank: New Generation of Russian Tanks,” Mili-tary Parade, March-April 1997, p. 40.

5Zaloga, Steven, p. 61.6Warford, James M., “The Russian T-90/T-90S

Tank: An Old Dog with Some Dangerous NewTricks,” ARMOR, March-April 1995, p. 8.

7Seryakov, p. 41.8Zaloga, p. 61.9Chepalov, Aleksandr, “Our Tanks by Southern

Seas,” Trud-7, August 16-22, 1996, p. 11.

The two SHTORA-1electro-optical/IRtransmitters are ar-rayed on either sideof the main gun,and the receiver isin the center of theturret just above thegun mantlet.


James M. Warford was com-missioned in Armor in 1979 as aDistinguished Military Graduatefrom the University of SantaClara, Santa Clara, Calif. A fre-quent contributor to ARMOR, Mr.Warford has held Armor/Cavalryassignments ranging from tankplatoon leader to brigade S3,and has served as a tactics in-structor both at Ft. Knox, Ky. forAOAC and at Ft. Leavenworth,Kan. for CGSOC. Mr. Warford re-tired from the Army on Septem-ber 1, 1996 and was awardedthe Silver Medallion of the Orderof Saint George. He is currentlyemployed as a corporate trainerin the Kansas City area.

(This is the second in a series of threearticles exploring a conceptual futurecombat system. -Ed.)

Main Gun Armament Evolutionand Technology Assessment

This article will examine the potentialmain and secondary armament systemsfor the FCS in view of their forecastedtechnologies, their feasibility, and theirpredicted evolution:

Conventional 120/140mm GunsA major consequence of the diminished

urgency to develop novel guns in thenear foreseeable future is that conven-tional, Solid Propellant (SP) guns willremain in service for many years tocome, and their lethality will be gradu-ally enhanced. This was the predominantreason behind the selection of the 120-mm high-pressure gun for the FMBT.The typical High Velocity Armor Pierc-ing Fin Stabilized Discarding Sabot(HV-APFSDS) projectile has been suc-cessively improved over the last threedecades with suggested near-future pene-tration capability of up to 800-900+ mmof Rolled Homogenized Armor (RHA).This was primarily achieved by a pro-gressive increase of the geometrical ratio‘Length/Diameter’ (L/D) of relativelylong and slender rod penetrators andcontinuous improvements to their corre-sponding materials (Tungsten Alloys,Powder Metallurgy-PM, Depleted Ura-nium-DU, and Variable Density Penetra-tors-VDP).

Penetrators with high ‘L/D’ ratiosproved effective against RHA but theywere found considerably less effectiveagainst composite and/or complex armor.To augment its effectiveness against thelatter, the penetrator rod must have alarger diameter. Without reverting tolower and adverse ratios of ‘L/D’ (ap-proximately 20/1 for 120mm and experi-mental 140mm and still increasing), it

must ultimately result in an increase ofvolume and mass of the penetrator rodand therefore, inevitably, in a corre-sponding undesirable reduction of the ef-fective muzzle velocity. Utilization ofprogressively heavier rod penetrators todefeat contemporary and ever-improvingarmor protection required higher muzzleenergy [presently 18-20 megajoules(MJ)]. Consequently, it led to guns withever-increasing chamber pressures andlikewise, larger gun calibers (90, 105,120, 140mm, Western preference).

No future U.S. plans have been an-nounced in regards to the 140mm gun,Advanced Tank Cannon System -ATACS, subsequent to the untimely can-cellation of the ‘Block III’ Main BattleTank Program. Following a MOU pre-viously signed in 1988 with the U.S.,Giat (France), Rheinmetall (Germany),and Royal Ordnance (U.K.) are contem-plating a joint venture to develop, mar-ket, and produce a standardized 140mmsmoothbore/rifled gun and ammunition.The weapon system is designated byNATO as the Future Tank Main Arma-ment (FTMA) and is claimed to have asignificant increase in armor penetrationover the standard 120mm tank gun.

Notwithstanding the 140mm gun andammunition’s indisputable potential, thelarger gun size will command a biggerand heavier vehicle. If the requirementto reduce weight and volume is going toremain firm and strictly enforced, it ismost unlikely that the 140mm gun andheavy ammunition will find their wayinto the FCS. Furthermore, because ofthe major changes required and the highcost involved in upgunning the M1Abrams tank from 120 to 140mm (stor-age, autoloader, and turret/hull recon-figuration), it is highly doubtful whetherthe 140mm gun will ever be utilized inany future upgrade to the M1 tank series.Grounded on the author’s personal workexperience with the ill-fated ‘Block III’Tank Program, a 140mm main armamentsystem could only be successfully inte-

grated into an entirely new tank (turretand hull) that is built around the mainarmament system. It will weigh at leastas much as contemporary heavy tanks(70+ tons). The changes would also in-crease vehicle mechanical complexityand significantly reduce ammunitioncomplement. This scenario is entirelyunacceptable under the FCS’s currentprevailing philosophy. But the 140mmgun could become a valid and urgentproposition if the U.S. encounters a ma-jor threatening rival, similar to theU.S.S.R. during the cold-war era, withinthe next 10-20 years, prior to the deploy-ment of the FCS.

The following improvements are feasi-ble in the short term and make the ‘ge-neric’ 120mm M256 smoothbore gunand its derivatives (e.g. XM291) viablepropositions for the next three decadesand beyond. Extraction of more energyfrom the propellant gases by increasingthe effective length of the gun barrel upto 55 calibers long is a viable alternative,but it will not yield dramatic results. Forinstance, the 120mm L55 gun developedby Rheinmetall (Germany) for the Leop-ard 2 MBT, is 1.30 m longer(!) than itspredecessor, the standard L44 Rh120120mm smoothbore gun. The L55 gunwill provide a moderate incrementalhigher muzzle velocity, resulting in im-proved armor penetration. Notwithstand-ing its benefits, it will definitely make itmore difficult for the Leopard to maneu-ver in heavily built-up areas or cross-country terrain textured with denselygrown vegetation or other ground obsta-cles.

The XM291 gun is a spin-off of thedual-caliber approach previously adoptedby the U.S. Army. It was developed bythe Army Armament Research, Develop-ment and Engineering Center (ARDEC)in collaboration with Watervliet Arsenal,and is a combination of a common rein-forced 120/140mm high-pressure breech/chamber with a light 120mm gun tube.This newly designed “Lightweight 120mm


PART TWO: ARMAMENT

The Future Combat System (FCS):Technology Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment

by Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon

Tank Main Armament System,” couldyield comparable results to the 140mmgun at the lower performance range ofthe latter. Another improvement in gunperformance could be obtained by theuse of propellant with greater surfaceburning progressivity, which generateshigher pressure gradients to propel pro-jectiles. An additional increase in gunperformance could come from a reduc-tion in the temperature sensitivity of pro-pellants, which will allow the increase ofburning rates at lower temperatures.Maximum allowable chamber pressureat normal and high temperatures can beraised by employing higher strength im-proved steels commonly utilized in con-struction of gun barrels.

Advanced 120mm KE penetrators, Sen-sor Fused Weapons (SFW), Smart tankmunitions and Smart Top Attack Weap-ons1,2 (STAW) will soon be introducedinto the inventory. These munitions haveextended autonomous capabilities suchas independent target acquisition, identi-fication, prioritization, maneuver control,and improved lethality.

One representative candidate is the De-fense Advanced Research Projects Agency(DARPA) M872 ‘X-Rod’ Rocket-As-sisted KE (RAKE) long rod penetratorthat defeats targets with kinetic energyand could achieve a boosted ‘muzzle’velocity of 2000 m/sec. Another is theXM943, Smart Target Activated Fire andForget (STAFF) top-attack round, whichkills with a downward firing, non-axissymmetric, Explosively Formed Penetra-tor (EFP). The STAFF is designed topenetrate the thinner turret roof armorand lightly armored tank top deck. Theguided round’s sensor and explosivelyformed penetrating warhead are capableof destroying evasively maneuvering ar-mored targets that attempt to make useof terrain texture and defilade.

The M829E3 is a dramatically im-proved kinetic energy (KE) round devel-oped to defeat advanced explosive reac-tive armor. The Advanced KE CartridgeProgram is about developing a roundwith composite sabots, precursor, axialthruster assembly, and fastcore OXE-TANE/CL20 propulsion. It will have im-proved performance over the standardM829A1/A2 rounds in defeating Explo-sive Reactive Armor (ERA) and pene-trating Rolled Homogeneous Armor(RHA), and greater hit probability. Cate-gorically, these types of advanced muni-tions will further extend the useful life ofthe 120mm solid propellant gun.

These improvements, impressive asthey are, will probably not lead the wayto the FCS’s main antitank armamentdue to large caliber burden, ammunitionvulnerability, and the inherent limitedgrowth potential of solid propellants(SP). According to basic governing ther-modynamic laws, the velocity at whichchemical SP could accelerate a projectileis controlled by the velocity at which agas could physically expand. For allpractical purposes, contemporary 120-mm guns may ultimately reach a muzzlevelocity of 1800-2000+ m/sec. Future140mm guns (if fielded) may reach anextended muzzle velocity of 2100-2300+

m/sec while their effective ‘kill’ rangewill not exceed 6-7 km at best.

With industrial and logistic infrastruc-tures already in place, backed by battle-field-proven technology, conventional120mm guns will remain the ‘backbone’system in service for the next 20-30years and beyond. They will progres-sively continue to receive incrementalimprovements until replaced, while al-lowing sufficient time for a new mainarmament weapon system to mature. The120mm main armament gun system,though extremely potent in its own right,will not justify the enormous expenditurein development, production, and deploy-ment of a new tank. It will serve as thestandard gun of existing M1A1/A2s, andas an indisputable, cost-effective upgradefor tanks that are equipped with an infe-rior caliber gun (105mm). Regardless ofhow SP guns will ultimately evolve,both users and the defense research com-munity have concluded that solid propel-lants are not the most efficient mediumof conveying to a projectile the energyrequired to defeat the ever-evolvingthreat. Consequently, since the mid-80’s,there has been a significant increase inWestern R&D interest and research ef-forts aimed particularly at developingnew technologies which will substitutefor contemporary SP gun systems. Mostof these efforts (ETC, EM, high-powerlaser) are descendants of the U.S. Strate-gic Defense Initiative (SDI) space-ori-ented weapons program.

Liquid Propellant Guns

Liquid Propellant (LP) gun propulsiontechnology is another viable alternative.Unfortunately, it has recently receiveduntimely poor publicity when the U.S.Army finally decided it will not be im-plemented in the Crusader, the advancedself-propelled howitzer currently under

development for the U.S. Army. To thebest of our information, the U.S. Armyhas reluctantly given up on this promis-ing technology in Crusader. Ostensibly,it was compelled to make that decisionbecause of the detrimental impact itwould have on production and deploy-ment schedules if the Army had to waituntil LP technology matures enough towarrant its near-term implementation. LPtechnology is the outcome of extensiveR&D efforts performed in several coun-tries ever since the end of WWII.

Though LP is technologically based ona sound engineering foundation, it ispresently known to experience inherent,pre-maturation, ‘nagging’ problems suchas ignition control, excessive corrosion,combustion non-repetitiveness, sealing,exorbitant weight growth, material con-tamination, and difficulties in handlingof LP. It may be adaptable to naval ap-plications where better controlled envi-ronment, available space, larger guns,handling, storing, and operating LP ar-mament systems seem more plausible.LP guns require continuous resupply ofpropellant working liquid, which doesnot conform favorably with stringent re-quirements for reduced logistics. LP, inconjunction with 120/140mm tank gunswith regenerative, multi-stage propellantinjection systems, could reach unassistedmuzzle velocities up to 2200/2500 m/secrespectively at best. (It is about 10-15%higher than what could ultimately beachieved with conventional SP 120/140-mm guns). This only holds true if ailingproblems with “traveling charge” or“stage propellant” will be satisfactorilyresolved to match the injected “chargefront” propagation speed — through theentire injection process — with that ofthe projectile as it advances down thebarrel.

It has already been demonstrated thatby using a 30mm two-stage traveling-charge LP demonstrator gun, velocitiesas high as 3100 m/sec and beyond couldbe achieved. Trade-offs between projec-tile velocity and mass will dictate thepreferred caliber for future applications.If limited vehicle weight and ammuni-tion count are to remain the main driv-ers, the selected caliber of LP guns isprobably not going to exceed 60-80mmwith maximum muzzle velocities of upto 2500-2800 m/sec.

LP technology, though once believed tobe the prime alternative to SP, is nowa-days viewed as less attractive for groundmobile applications and thus may not


become the main armament for the FCS.Nonetheless, all this may dramaticallychange if these technical difficultieswould somehow be satisfactorily re-solved. As with the implementation ofany novel technology, LP requires cur-rently nonexistent industrial and militaryinfrastructures for production, deploy-ment, and logistics.

In spite of its temporarily recent handi-cap, research and development of Re-generatively Injected LP guns (RILP) forvarious ground and naval applications,will most likely continue.3 In all fairness,there is much to be said in favor of LPtechnology, despite its disadvantages.Chiefly these are its inherent growth po-tential and high level of design flexibil-ity. LP guns possess controlled, variablelethality and permit a relatively largerstowed load due to improved efficiencyof LP storage and reduced volumetric re-quirements in comparison to SP combus-tible solid cases. Other advantages aresafer storage of LP via compartmentali-zation, improved piezometric efficiency,and extended barrel life due to a muchcleaner and better controlled combustionprocess. Last, but not least, RILP tech-nology represents a rational leverage ofthe substantial investment already madein the LP version of the revolutionaryCrusader. Notwithstanding a myriad oftechnical and logistic problems, givensufficient time and resources, LP tech-nology could mature to warrant its futureimplementation as the principal arma-ment system in heavy armored vehiclesand the FCS in particular.

Electro-Thermal-Chemical GunsEncouraging results have been obtained

with Electro-Thermal-Chemical (ETC)experimental guns. In principle, an ETCgun utilizes a chemically energetic (reac-tive) working liquid instead of conven-tional solid propellant. It requires consid-erably less electrical energy to achieveadequate projectile propulsion than itspredecessor, the Electro-Thermal experi-mental (ET) gun. It needs relativelysmaller and lighter auxiliary equipmentto produce and store electricity. Thisequipment could ultimately be reducedto a suitable size to warrant its installa-tion in an armored vehicle. Energeticworking liquid is naturally prone to beproblematic in operation, handling, stor-age, and supply, such that its utilizationwill pose a potential safety concern anda logistic burden, much similar to LPguns. As in LP, ETC implementation re-quires new industrial and military infra-

structures for production, deployment,and logistics.

Current developments are aimed at amedium caliber (60-80mm), antitank gunwith a firing rate of 10-15 rounds/min.At this caliber range, various types ofrounds could be comprised of KE pro-jectiles and CE rounds, as well as future‘smart’ sensor-fuzed munitions. The ulti-mate objective is aimed at an ETC auto-matic gun with a muzzle energy of 20+

MJ (corresponding to 2500-3000 m/secfor medium calibers) which is compara-ble to that of the conventional, solid pro-pellant 140mm gun. Much like LP guns,ETC technology allows better control ofthe pressure (propulsion) generated, sothat it is maintained relatively close to itsmaximum while the projectile is movingdown the barrel, resulting in more en-ergy conveyed to the projectile.

This is quite contrary to conventionalSP technology, where the pressurequickly diminishes as the projectile de-parts from the combustion chamber.ETC technology is recognized by manyto show promise of “infinite” or multi-stage variable lethality and improvedpropulsion controllability. It also requiressignificantly less electrical energy incomparison to Electro-Magnetic (EM)guns that use only electricity for projec-tile propulsion. Nevertheless, ETC tech-nology, as promising as it may seem, re-quires further fundamental research be-yond the laboratory stage. Much detailedresearch and testing has yet to be accom-plished in the field and at weapon sys-tem level. It must achieve maturation towarrant its applicability as a stand-alonesolution, or in conjunction with othermature technologies, or with existing120/140mm guns.

As an additional practical alternative,ETC technology could be combined withexisting conventional SP 120mm and/orfuture 140mm guns and ammunition,though a new cartridge and modifiedgun chamber are required. It represents anear-term upgrade application of alreadyleveraged and proven technology. Thesize of the electrical equipment is muchsmaller than that of current EM researchguns and present ETC as a viable up-grade proposition. Research has shownthat specially designed ammunition andETC gun technology could be combinedwith existing conventional SP guns tofurther enhance the performance of thelatter up to 30% and beyond. Augment-ing the energy of solid propellant is pos-sible by implementing a plasma regen-

erative injector and combustion controlto the conventional pressure chamber. Inthe event that ETC technology will be-come practical, existing conventional120mm and future 140mm guns couldbe economically converted into ETC/SPguns as one more step in the evolutionof SP guns. There are still various pre-dominating problems to be addressedand resolved before ETC guns can be-come a practical proposition in conjunc-tion with conventional solid propulsion.The combination of controllable, repeat-able inner ballistics with a compatiblesolid propellant, and the significant in-crease in performance (e.g. muzzle ve-locity) in large caliber guns, has yet tobe demonstrated.

Regardless of whether ETC technologywill become a viable proposition, the useof large consumable ammunition in ad-dition to ‘energetic’ liquid propellant iscontradictory to the requirement of re-duced dependency on logistics andweight. The combined implementationof SP with ETC, will probably not jus-tify the enormous investment in design,development and deployment associatedwith the fielding of an entirely new tankfleet. Though new and promising tech-nology, it will not change the nature ofarmored warfare.

Electromagnetic GunsElectromagnetic (EM) railguns or coil-

guns, also known as Pulsed-Power EMguns, are expected to launch light pro-jectiles (KE, up to 5 kg) with 30-60mmin diameter, at unprecedented hypervelo-cities between 4000-8000 m/sec (30-60MJ). Contrary to conventional SP guns,the EM pulse travels at near the speed oflight (@ 186K miles/sec) and thus pro-vides propulsion means inherently im-mune to natural limits of gas expansion.At these extremely high velocities, EMguns are unsurpassed, being more effi-cient than any other type of existinggun.4,5 EM railguns operate on the sameprinciple as ‘linear’ electric motors. Thebarrel consists of two (or more?) highlyconductive rails with the projectile posi-tioned between the latter and enclosed inthe leading bore. As high current is sup-plied to the rails, a strong magnetic fieldis created by the electric arc across therails which accelerates the projectiledown the barrel. Hypervelocities appearto improve the effectiveness of kineticenergy projectiles against some types ofhomogenized armor but may not do soagainst others. It increases with velocityagainst explosive reactive armor if the


projectiles are segmented, but will notincrease against a variety of complexcomposite armors. The benefit of hyper-velocity projectiles is obvious againstRHA, missiles, helicopters, and low fly-ing ground support aircraft, but requiresfurther development for full adaptationto antiarmor complex applications. Forinstance, in order to achieve muzzle en-ergy of merely 9 MJ at velocities of2500-4000 m/sec, a Compensated PulsedAlternator (CPA) system that weighed20 tons was used as recently as less thana decade ago. Considerable size, low en-ergy density, and a multitude of unre-solved technical problems indicate thatEM guns still have a long way to go be-fore they could become practical enoughto be incorporated as the main gun arma-ment in a relatively small, highly mobileweapon system such as the FCS.

Because of the high secrecy associatedwith outer-space military weapons appli-cations, no recent information has beenpublished nor released about EM gunsand their applicability. Many in the re-search community believe that signifi-cant technical breakthroughs have beenachieved over the last ten years, but have

not become public knowledge. In Inter-national Defense Review (IDR)4 it wasreported that ARDEC and DARPA, withfunding assistance from the SDI office,embarked upon a two-phase, multi-task-ing joint venture, to demonstrate thatboth rail and coil type EM guns couldrepetitively fire projectiles at 2500-4000m/sec with a muzzle energy of 9 MJ(equivalent to 120mm SP KE round).Phase I was divided into multiple tasksculminating with the construction of re-petitively firing skid guns. In phase II by1995, they were supposed to down-selectone of the concepts identified in phase I,as the basis for a self-contained, vehicle-mounted 15 MJ EM gun. The mobiledemonstrator vehicle was supposed to beequipped with an EM gun firing at a rateof 4 rounds in 24 sec.

Two contracts have been awarded. Oneto the University of Texas (UOT) underARDEC, and the other to MaxwellLaboratories under the Defense NuclearAgency (DNA). In 1989, it was reportedthat the Maxwell Single Shot Gun (SSG)was a simple bolted design, 8 m long,weighed 18 tons and had a 90mm circu-lar bore. The associated capacitor was

rated at 32 MJ. Reportedly, MaxwellLabs succeeded in accelerating aplasma-armatured projectile weighing1.1 kg up to 3500 m/sec, correspondingto a muzzle energy of 7 MJ. As of today,ME systems have been demonstratedwith 30-35% efficiency, though 50% isthe acknowledged practical maximum.

Under SDIO sponsorship, the Westing-house Research and Development Centerconstructed a 56mm/60 MJ “Thunder-bolt” railgun for lethality demonstrationsat high-end hypervelocities. Much detailcould have been reported herein aboutrecent advancements in ME technologyresearch if it was not considered classi-fied information. There are still funda-mental issues that must be investigated,researched, and developed before EMguns could become a practical proposi-tion, among them: 1) Material ablationeffects due to extremely high frictionwith the atmosphere at hypervelocitiescould cause the projectile to burn un-evenly, resulting in substantial degrada-tion of its ballistic trajectory accuracy,velocity attenuation, and subsequent re-duction in penetration effectiveness. Ma-terials demonstrating low ablation must


also possess high mechanical strength(hard to find); 2) Interface repulsiveforce between the projectile and the ac-celerators (rails or coils) must be deter-mined to quantify the critical implica-tions in safety, structural integrity andlaunch reproducibility; 3) Selection ofgun barrel material for overall weight re-duction while maintaining adequate re-sistance to ablation and durability; 4) Ac-celerations of 106 g’s produce previouslyunknown and unique material problems(e.g. vaporization) with critical implica-tions for both lethality and accuracy. [Athypervelocities, materials behave likeliquids, requiring the implementation ofhydrodynamics, gas thermodynamics,and compressible fluid dynamics to rep-resent the impact interaction between thepenetrator and its target]; and 5) Reduc-tion of electrical equipment size (e.g. ca-pacitors, compulsators, and homopolargenerators) and development of coaxialinductors and first-generation, Barber re-petitive opening switches operating atextremely high-current; 7) Railguns ex-hibit difficulty with initial acceleration.To avoid excessive heat and stress asso-ciated with the initial projectile launchphase, a method of gas-injected running-start for initial acceleration (up to practi-

cally 1 km/sec), prior to the projectileentering the railgun breech, has been de-veloped. This method introduces me-chanical complexity and additional un-desired logistic burden.

Nevertheless, in spite of immense tech-nical challenges, especially extensivepulse and power requirements for ex-tremely short periods of time, and virtu-ally nonexistent infrastructure, EM guntechnology is the preferred long-term ul-timate choice. Consistent improvementsin super high-efficiency copolymer resin-based capacitors, compulsators (e.g.UOT developed ‘alternator’ type gener-ating sharp-pulse shapes), homopolargenerators, HPG (e.g. Faraday rotatingdisk requiring large inductors for sharp-pulse shaping), high energy density su-perconducting inductors, and very high-density EE storage devices (‘super ca-pacity’-batteries), will yield dramaticallyreduced volume and weight. Sizablecomputers that only 30-40 years agofilled-up enormous volume and weighed30(+) tons, have been reduced in volumeand weight into today’s personal com-puters. There is no logical or any knownphysical barrier to preclude it from hap-pening also to EM guns if driven by

high priority operational requirements,and given sufficient time and adequateresources. Ten years ago, under projectMile Run, DNA conducted research toreduce a 10 ton EM system into an af-fordable 1.2 ton package with 32-50 MJcopolymer resin-based capacitor technol-ogy, intended to be fitted in a tracked ve-hicle for ground mobile lethality andfeasibility demonstrations. EM gunshave reduced vulnerability and operateon electrical energy alone.

Electrical energy is much simpler totransport, handle, store, and control thanany ETC or LP energizing “liquids” thatrequire special handling and storage, andcould become a paramount hazard con-cern. The notion of simplified logisticswill further tip the scale in favor of EMguns. An FCS equipped with main sys-tems operating solely on electrical en-ergy is a tremendously reduced logisticburden. Even if friction and atmosphericattenuation will limit the antiarmor pro-jectiles to only say, 6000 m/sec, it is stillby far superior to any existing conven-tional gun. EM gun technology, thoughstill in a premature stage and presumed



Training Lethal Crews by Sergeant First Class (P) Ernest Roth

Throughout annored warfare's history, victory at the sma11 unit level has gone to me tank crews that were able to act and react faster than their opponenlS. Poorly trained and prepared crews were, and still are, nothing more than targets, casualties waiting to happen. Today, many tank crews are weak in the tactical skills that will allow them to survive while defeating the enemy.

What follows are some observations on why many tank crews fail on the ban1efield. TIley are based on my experience as an observer/controller at the National Training Center.

Often, crews lack "tactical sense." They cannot analyze and plan an upcoming opemtion at their level because they don't know how to visualize and anticipate the battlefield. Many crews do not have an awareness of their own situation, much less the enemy's technical capabilities, how the enemy operates tactically, or how the effects of terrain will impact on them all. Because crews cannot do these things, they can't lake advantage of the ebb and flow that make up every battle to best position themselves to kill and swvive. Situational awareness and tactical sense are directly related. Tank crews often display poor situational awareness, leading to confusion and slow response. Confusion and slow response times means

poor actions on contact. Additionally, crews will not display much initiative at seizing opportunities or reacting to the unexpected, which is the bread and butter of all successful tactical operations. The result? One less Iartk and crew in the fight. Many tankers have a poor understanding of the technical aspects of their weapons systems. Obviously, if crewmen don't understand how to optimize the tank's fire control system, they will be at a great disadvantage on the battlefield. They might also be dead.

The core of this problem is a lack of well thought-out, focused, and aggressively executed training at crew level. Training tends to be top-heavy, with little emphasis on individual or crew skills. Most units do a poor job of defining what really needs to be trained at the crew and platoon level. The frrst step in developing lethal crews is defining realistic collective tasks. Only tasks that are absolutely critical to mission success should be included in a collective task list. Critical collective tasks should be selected from tasks that are related to "shoot," "move," and "communicate." Collective task lists often include too many tasks, and are very generic, leaving crews to guess at what tasks they should train given the usual training constraints al l units have to deal with. Of the five manuals that relate to tank company craining - FM 17-

15, FM 71-1, FM 71-1 MfP, ARTEP 17-237-10-MfP, and FM 17-12-1-2-only the last one discusses crew training, and then only in very broad tenns. As a result, training is often haphazard and broad in nature. Following is an example of a platoon collective task list focused on shooting, moving, and communicating:

• Perfonn tactical planning • Produce a platoon fire plan • Prepare for tactical operations • Conduct rehearsals for a mission • Perfonn platoon fire and movement • Perfonn an attack by fire • Assault an enemy position • Occupy a platoon battle position • Action drill • Contact drill • React to indirect fife drill • Change fonnation drill

Fundamentally. being a lethal crew is simple - kill the enemy and swvive. Using terrain, and acquiring and engaging the enemy must be second-nature and quick. A tank crew contributes to banlefield success by being at the right place at the right time and killing the enemy. To kill the enemy, a crew must first fmd them by searching constantly in a focused manner. Focus comes from the ability to anticipate enemy actions and locations, to recognize signatures, and to have a sense of how terrain af-

34 ARMOR - September·October 1997

fects both the crew and the enemy. Contributing to survival are movement routes and firing positions that give cover and concealment. proper speed, and early acquisition of the enemy as well as the skills to kill him quickly. Maintaining situational awareness enhances a crew's survival. While simple in concept, situational awareness requires much practice and discipline to develop to a high degree. Communication is keeping the boss, other crews, and subordinates informed of what you and the enemy are doing, your status, any support that you may need, and any other important information. The two paragraphs above are functions of shooting, moving, and communicating; training must develop the self-discipline to perform these functions continuously, whatever the circumstances. Collective ta~k lists should include only those functions.

After identifying the right collective tasks, crews can begin training using the crawl, walk, run technique. An excellent start is to play through historical small unit engagements using a terrain board with micro armor while the NCOs and officers in the company look on. Replaying historical engagements has several advantages. First, they reinforce doctrine by showing what happened when units followed, or failed to follow, doctrine instead of just talking about it. Second, leaders can learn visually how every battle, however large or small, has periods of intense activity and lulls. The instructor can show how movement techniques, standard drills, communications, use of terrain, killing, and the ability to "read" the battle are related, and when applied together result in lethal crews. Reading the battle is quickly analyzing the situation and understanding what you have to do to create a result in your favor. Finally. historical replays give today's soldiers a link to the past that reinforces a sense of continuity and stimulates thought and the will to emulate the past performances of others. Some good examples include: the battle of Singling. Hill 253 during the Battle of Kursk. 25th Panzer Regiment's attack against the French 3rd DLM. and II th Panzer Division's small unit actions along the Chir River in 1942. Accounts of Israeli armored actions during the 1973 war also provide good examples for use as historical vignettes. A bibliography at the end of this article lists sources where these and other vignettes can be obtained. Using the terrain board, leaders can train soldiers to analyze situations quickly and teach techniques and methods of shooting. moving. and com

municating, as individual crews and as part of a platoon. The instructor gives tactical problems to the leaders (tank commander and above) with a time limit to come up with a solution. One leader is selected to move to the terrain board and show his solution. Other leaders and the instructor ask questions about how the demonstrator arrived at his solution and point out its strengths and weaknesses. Then another leader is chosen and the process repeats itself. The advantage of this technique is that it allows everyone to learn that there is more than one way to solve a tactical problem. It also leads to a standard way of thinking within the unit about tactical situations; this is the first step in developing an effective SOP

Tactical problems should be simple at first. Moving a tank from point A to point B is a good start. Leaders should be given a fair amount of time to work out a solution. As NCOs and officers gain experience and knowledge, the problem~ can become more complex and the time allotted for solutions shortened. Eventually a platoon will be given a problem and each leader will demonstrate how his crew would contribute to the overall success of the platoon.

Some things must happen for this type of training to be successful. First, the technique requires an instructor with both an excellent grasp of history and knowledge of the tactical thought necessary to have success on the modern battlefield. Ideally, both the commander and the first sergeant should be able to do these things. If they are not able to act as instructors, another leader must step up. There are almost always one or two soldiers in every unit that meet the prerequisites. Second, this training must be scheduled at least one day every two weeks, preferably weekly. Third, leaders must train their soldiers on the things they learn in these classes. Sergeant's Time, UCOFT, PGT, and the SIMNET all provide a good training environment for junior leaders to train their soldiers on the things they have learned on the terrain board. Company leadership must hold subordinates accountable for passing on lessons learned. Finally, the training event must remain focused on crew level tasks that must be accomplished to be lethal on the battlefield.

The walk phase of crew level training is an extension of the crawl phase using the same methods and techniques at a training area. Because it costs so much to operate tanks. the unit may have to substitute with IfM~1WVs. M1I3s. or simulations. It is time now for the entire crew to pelfoml the task instead of just

the tank commander. The training should be built around a lane and focused on one crew task from the collective task list. As with the terrain board, initial situations should be simple to allow the crew to build competency, and the task should be repeated until the crew displays a high degree of proficiency. Too often, units try to train too many tasks, allowing little or no time to repeat tasks _. much less repeat them until they become second nature. This is critically important, because so much of what a tank crew does in combat is based on drills. Drills only become such when the crews doing them can act almost without thinking. The same is true of SOPs.

The company or troop leadership must be involved in evaluating the lane. The experience the commander and first sergeant bring to the lane is very important in teaching junior leaders how to do something better. More importantly, their presence reinforces the importance of tactical proficiency. During crew training, two lanes will normally be used to teach separate tasks and maximize training time. The commander, first sergeant, executive officer, and a platoon leader or platoon sergeant can operate the lanes as observer/controllers. When the commander and XO are going through a lane as tank commanders, the other platoon leaders or platoon sergeants can act as observer/controllers. This allows a company or troop to train two critical tasks per training period for every crew. While this may not sound like much, an entire average battle task list can be trained over a six month period if the company trains two tasks per month. By keeping the tasks trained in anyone period to a minimum, crews can repeat a given task many times until they are truly proficient - not just familiar - with that task.

Lanes should be set up to reward those crews that do things right by allowing them to kill and survive. A lane should also punish incorrect tactics and techniques by "killing" the crew, or the crew failing to "kill" the enemy. Obviously, the terrain and tactical problem should allow a crew to use cover and concealment and force it to correctly acquire and engage enemy forces. Using two O/Cs per lane allows the training to be viewed from two separate locations, giving a better overall picture of how a crew tackles a tactical problem. The company or troop leadership must know what the pace of each training event will be so that they can be at the right places in time to observe


events. The focus should always be on tactics, techniques, and procedures that are directly related to killing and surviving - being lethal. Finally, a capable OPFOR must take part in the lane. Tanks or units assigned as OPFOR must understand that their primary task is to help train BLUEFOR. The OPFOR must be competent at tactics and able to use OPFOR doctrine effectively. Controllers must make sure that the OPFOR takes part in rehearsals for the lane and in AARs that follow each exercise.

The final level of tank crew training - running - is platoon-size lanes. The focus of these lanes is the same as tank crew lanes. Platoon lanes require more planning and resources than crew lanes; battalion level effort is required. The battalion or squadron staff must plan and resource the execution of platoonsized lanes. They must control O/Cs, OPFOR, and any support elements involved in the training exercise. The staff must also conduct training rehearsals of all involved personnel. The primary lane trainers are companyltroop commanders, executive officers, and first sergeants.

As with crew lanes, a single tactical exercise should be trained with the focus on lethality. Supporting individual tasks should be observed and noted during the exercise, then talked about in the AAR. If a task is required in combat, then it must be included in the training. If a unit ignores casualty evacuation, for example, it will not be able to perform during an ARTEP or in combat when all tasks must be done. As with crew lanes, a tactical exercise must be repeated until the platoon and its crews are proficient. Three to five repetitions is the goal of each lane. Conditions must change for each run down the lane so that the platoon and crews do not merely copy what worked the last time they did the exercise. Each exercise should be progressively more demanding. Having OPFOR vehicles fully exposed on the first run, than partially exposed, and finally hull or turret down is a way to increase the difficulty of a lane. The goal is for tank crews to be able to acquire and take action on vehicles, signatures, soldiers, and weapons systems, not just whole tanks. An AAR should follow each run to give the platoon's crews feedback and identify areas for improvement or sustainment. Two days should be allotted for each platoon per lane.

Before each exercise, the senior lane trainer should have a briefing with his controllers to identify key issues to be observed during the exercise. A "pre

battle" briefing provides O/Cs with a focus and results in much better information for the senior trainer's AAR. Observations should be linked to small unit collective and individual tasks that support lethality. At the end of a lane. the O/Cs should get together with the OPFOR commander and conduct a "post-battle" assessment. Both strong and weak points of the crew are discussed using key issues to provide focus. Key issues can be refined at this time allowing the senior trainer to set up his AAR. Notes made during this meeting can be used by the crew during later runs down the lane to assess improvement. There are many possibilities to generate enthusiasm in crews. If desired, you can induce competition by timing like runs to detennine which crews are most lethal and able to negotiate the course in the shortest amo"tJnt of time. If a crew is destroyed, it is disqualified, and if it bypasses OPFOR vehicles, a time penalty is assessed. Lethality is the synergy of annored maneuver and gunnery and should be the ultimate goal of crew training. There are individuals with a natural aptitude for fighting. Good training will make them even more lethal than they naturally are, improve weak crews to a dependable level of proficiency, and transform your target crews into more of the killers for which our armored force is reknowned.

..

Sergeant First Class (P) Ernest Roth enlisted in the Army in June 1984. He seNed in I Troop, 3/2 ACR, Amberg, Germany, from Nov 84 to Sep 91, and in 1-6 Infantry, Vilseck, Germany, as a scout platoon sergeant from Sep 91 to Mar 95. He is currently aSSigned as an obseNer/controller at the National Training Center.

Bibliography and Sources

FM 25-100

FM 25-101

FM 17-15

FM 71-1

FM 71-I-MTP

FM 17-121-2

FM 17-237-10-MTP

CMH Pub I 1-7 '"Three Battles: Arnaville. AItuzzo, Schmidt"

CMH Pub 30-2 "Combat Actions in Korea"

CMH Pub 100-!-l "Small Unit Actions"

CMH Pub !O-l-!-l "German Defeme Tactics Against Russian Breakthroughs"

CMH Pub 104-22 "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia"

Comments Sought On Initial Draft of ARTEP 71-1 MTP And on Revision of FM 17-98

The P:atoon and Company Team Doc Comments can be sent to this headtrine Branch is currently revising ARTEP quarters bye-mail or regular mail. 71-1 MTP, The Tank and Mechanized InPlease include the name and telephone fantry Company Team Mission Training number of your POC with the comments. Plan, which will be published as an initial draft and distributed to Tank and Mecha The mailing address is: nized Infantry Battalions Army-wide in July 1997. Additionally the manual will be Director, DTDD on the Armor School's Doctrine Home AnN: ATZK-TDD-P page. The branch is also beginning revi U.S. Army Armor Center sion of the 9 September 1994 edition of Fort Knox Kentucky 40121-5000 FM 17-98, Scout Platoon.

We are looking for your specific com The e-mail address is: ments on tl"1e content of the ARTEP 71-1 MTP and FM 17-98, along with any sug [email protected] you have that will assist in making these manuals the best tools br training the Armor and Infantry Company For further information, call CPT John Teams as well as the Scout platoons of Washburn at DSN 464-3228 or commerthe future. cial (502) 624-3228.


mailto:[email protected]

The tactical vignette is a training toolfor tactical decision-making during mis-sion execution. The Marines have longused similar vignettes, which they callTactical Decision Games (TDG), in theMarine Corps Gazette as an efficient andinexpensive exercise for leaders at alllevels. An article detailing the uses ofthe TDG can be found in the May-June1997 issue of ARMOR.

The following tactical vignette serves asthe first in a series of scenarios devel-oped by the Doctrine Division of theU.S. Army Armor Center. Readers areencouraged to send their solutions forthe tactical vignette to ARMOR as ameans of discussion and instruction. Theauthor’s solution, along with several ofthe best solutions from the field, will bepublished in a subsequent issue of themagazine.

Situation:You are the commander of A Team

(tank heavy), TF 2-8. You are the ad-vance guard company (AGC) of the TFas it conducts a movement to contact.The brigade commander wants the taskforce to find, fix, and destroy the ad-vance guard of an MRR that is movingeast. This will allow the rest of the bri-gade to maneuver and destroy the regi-mental main body, with enough combatpower left to block the second-echelonMRR. The task force commander directsthe AGC to find, fix, and destroy theFSE allowing the task force main body tomaneuver into the flank of the AGMB.

Your team consists of two M1A1 tankplatoons and one mechanized infantry,(BFV) platoon. An engineer platoon andthe mortar platoon follow in support;you have priority of mortars. Your teamis moving on an axis south of the taskforce based on an erroneous report thatthe FSE was at CP 8. The terrain ismostly open desert flanked by moun-tains, with some high terrain in the cen-ter of the zone. As you approach the in-tersection at CP 6, your 1st Platoon re-ports seeing approximately 20 vehiclesmoving east and starting to deploy vicin-ity CP 2. A moment later, task force

scouts report they have identified theAGMB north of Hill 560 moving easttoward CP 4.

You suddenly realize that the elementidentified by 1st Platoon must be theFSE and that it is probably deploying toengage the task force from Hill 110. Youattempt to contact the task force com-mander but receive no response. The lasttransmission with the task force hadthem approximately 15 minutes out fromCP 2. Based on the scout’s last report,the AGMB is 20 minutes from CP 4. Itwill take you 9-10 minutes to movenortheast to engage the FSE or 11-12minutes to move northwest to interceptthe AGMB. You must act now! What doyou do?

Requirement:In 2 minutes or less, make your de-

cision and issue your FRAGO andany other reports you would submit.Readers wanting to submit their solu-tions to the scenario should providethe following: Fragmentary order tothe company team, the rationale be-hind your decision, and a sketch ofyour plan of action. Mail your solutionto ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, FortKnox, KY 40121-5210 or send yoursolution by e-mail to:[email protected]

Tactical Vignette 97-1

“The Battle of Durango Valley”

WHAT’S YOUR NEXT MOVE??

The use of simulations as a trainingtool for military operations has grownrapidly in the past decade. These simula-tions, often referred to as “wargames” or“battle simulations,” have leapt fromsimplistic board games to highly techni-cal and accurate computer simulationswhich realistically portray hand-to-handcombat; tactical, operational, and strate-gic level planning and execution; as wellas real-time employment of combatforces, ranging from the individual sol-dier to the theater level. The industry hassucceeded in incorporating the capabili-ties and vulnerabilities of our modernmilitary equipment — as well as the hu-man elements of morale, experience, andleadership — in an inexpensive, low-level unit trainer, the computer wargame.This article describes how commercialcomputer wargames might be used at thecompany/team level as an additional oralternative training tool and to addressthe feasibility of fielding commercialwargames for training soldiers at com-pany level and below.

The Army’s primary simulation devel-opment organization is the U.S. ArmySimulation, Training, and Instrumenta-tion Command (STRICOM). STRICOM,which along with the Naval Air WarfareCenter Training Systems Division, pro-vides the military services with realistictraining simulations for many differentmilitary platforms and levels of training.On the whole, STRICOM has suc-ceeded, providing excellent simulationssuch as MILES, UCOFT, Janus, SIM-NET, BBS, as well as the battlefieldtracking system for CMTC (CMTC-IS),which tracks and records vehicle move-ment and records the battlefield for after-action reviews.

However, there is a gap in the trainingtools available to soldiers at companylevel and below. While STRICOM hasdeveloped excellent trainers that providequality training to soldiers, they are usu-ally corps- or post-level resources notavailable to company-level trainers on adaily basis. While STRICOM has over300 simulations either in existence or indevelopment, existing commercial com-puter wargame simulations may fill the

void that currently exists for simulationsat the company, platoon, and squadlevel.

Two of the computer wargames cur-rently available that can be used to trainat the company/team level are Steel Pan-thers II, from SSI, and TacOps, from Ar-senal Publishing. Both are ground war-fare simulators employing a modern da-tabase of weapons and equipment in aneffort to accurately depict modern tacti-cal combat.

Steel Panthers II allows you to portrayany of the major military powers andcontains virtually all of the equipmentfielded from the end of World War II totoday. The game’s strengths lie in itsgraphics and sounds, providing the userwith detailed icons for each piece ofequipment and accurate battlefield soundeffects. Another strength of Steel Pan-thers II is the flexibility of its battle edi-tor. The user can create his own maps,orders of battle, and tactical situations, asdesired. One drawback to Steel PanthersII is that its reliance on “turn-based”play — where one player moves and/orshoots all of his equipment and then theother player, or computer, does the same— does not accurately depict the fluidityof the modern battlefield.

The designers of TacOps felt their gamecould succeed on its own as a simulationwithout the eyewash of fancy graphics,sounds, and animations. In TacOps, theuser plays as either the U.S. Army, U.S.Marine Corps, or Canadian forces versus

various opposing forces. TacOps pro-vides a detailed online database of weap-ons and equipment and includes tablesof hit and penetration data for variousweapons and ranges. TacOps also comeswith an editor (although not a map edi-tor), allowing the user to customize anyof the game’s scenarios as needed. Tac-Ops, however, does not use a standard“turn-based” system for resolving com-bat. Instead, each player enters his ordersfor a turn and they are then executed si-multaneously, allowing for a more realis-tic approach to the sequence of events incombat.

By using the respective game’s sce-nario/battle editors, each may be used tosimulate any number of tactical situ-ations at the CO/TM level. As an exam-ple, consider the breaching of a tacticalobstacle. Prior to going to the field forCO/TM lane training, a company com-mander can use the game as a walk-through rehearsal of the breaching opera-tion. He can create or load a map thatrepresents the nature of the terrain hisunit is preparing to train on, and then hecan create an order of battle representingthe task organization of his CO/TM. Ad-ditionally, he can also dictate the compo-sition and disposition of the OPFOR andthe layout of the obstacle for the sce-nario. Once the commander has set uphis initial scenario, he has several op-tions on how to execute the computer re-hearsal. He and his platoon leaders can


Estimated ComparisonComputer Wargames Janus SIMNET

Cost $40-$50/Copy $$$ $$$

Training Level CO/TM/PLT/SQDIndividual

BN/BDE BN/CO

Controlling Agency

CO/TM Cdr Post/Corps thruDivision

Post/Corps thruDivision

Frequency Daily Annually Event driven

Realism Computer Icons Computer Icons Actual crewPositions

Using Computer WargamesTo Train at the Co/Tm Level

by Captain Darren P. Fitz Gerald and Captain James E. Ward

play the part of the BLUFOR and allowthe computer or the XO to play the partof the OPFOR, or, he can play the OP-FOR while his platoon leaders executetheir tasks.

For the following example, the com-mander will play the part of the OPFORwhile his platoon leaders execute themission, allowing him to control and ad-just how the OPFOR may influence thebattle, based on the performance of hisplatoon leaders. As the simulation be-gins, the platoon leaders maneuver theirplatoons, analyzing the terrain throughwhat they can see on screen, as well asthrough the game options that depictlines of sight and cover and conceal-ment.

Once the lead platoon makes contactwith the obstacle, the commander hasthe option to use his OPFOR to engageimmediately or wait until the breach be-gins. The lead platoon leader picks anappropriate piece of terrain from whichto provide suppressive fire, and uses thegame’s indirect fire system to call smokebetween the obstacle and the OPFOR.The smoke in the game will obscure en-emy observation and line of sight, allow-ing the breach force to move forwardand begin breaching the obstacle.

As the breach force negotiates the ob-stacle, the game incorporates an appro-priate delay to simulate the time neededto breach the obstacle, throughout whichthe support force must continue to usedirect and indirect fire to suppress theenemy on the far side of the obstacle. Bycomparing the armor protection of indi-vidual vehicles against the lethality andaccuracy of the weapons firing at them,and subsequently incorporating the dis-tance and obscuration on the battlefield,the game makes a realistic prediction ofwhich shots will hit, miss, damage, ordestroy the vehicles at which they areshooting.

Upon breaching the obstacle and estab-lishing security on the far side, the as-sault force moves through the breachlane and assaults the remaining enemyon the far side of the obstacle. The as-sault force must employ sound fire con-trol and distribution techniques in orderto defeat the OPFOR controlled by thecompany commander. Again, the simula-tion calculates the hit probability forboth OPFOR and BLUFOR and deliversrealistic results as the assault force closeswith the enemy.

Neither simulation forces you to fightdoctrinally, however, the commander canrequire his platoon leaders to follow theprinciples of war and apply the breach-ing fundamentals in order to train those

concepts. Additionally, dependent on thecommander’s training objectives, he canrun as many iterations of this same sce-nario as necessary, subtly altering it eachtime in order to achieve his goals. Thisbreach mission is only one example ofhow these computer wargames may beused. They also have the capability tomodel other offensive and defensivemissions, as well as meeting engage-ments.

Some of the benefits of using computerwargame simulations are that they pro-vide a realistic model integrating enemyand friendly BOS capabilities. They alsoallow the trainer great flexibility in de-termining which tasks and scenarios hewants to train. Although the wargamesmentioned above do not have any com-puter network play capability, there arecomputer wargames that do. Networkplay would allow for multiple force-on-force missions and training scenariosplayed from different computer termi-nals. Another advantage of commercialwargames is that there is already a sys-tem in place, through STRICOM, for theacquisition of commercial wargamesimulations. Acquisition and funding forthese wargames could be handled muchas other computer software already is: atbattalion and company level. Becausethe unit cost for these simulations isroughly $40-$50, with approval fromhigher headquarters, a battalion could lo-cal purchase copies of these simulationsfor use at the CO/TM level.

Although these computer simulationsare a great training tool, they are farfrom perfect. One disadvantage of pro-curement of these simulations is that thestart-up costs would be seemingly high.Also, most of the better simulations re-quire Pentium computers, and the Armystill has many, many 386 and 486-basedpersonal computers. From the tacticalperspective, there are weaknesses to us-ing these simulations as trainers: somesimulations do not accurately portrayOPFOR doctrine, some allow varied de-grees of command and control, and oth-

ers ignore control of logistical supportfunctions.

From the example provided above, it isevident that these computer simulationscan effectively be used beyond the scopeof amusement as a tool to develop tacti-cal skills. The simulations allow small-unit leaders to experiment with newtechniques and procedures, and also canprovide an opportunity to practice andrehearse repetitive, complicated tasks be-fore deploying to the field environment.No simulation is meant to be totally real-istic, as evidenced in the STRICOMmotto “All That Is Not War is Simula-tion,” which applies even to maneuvertraining in the field. However, use ofthese simulations is not intended as asubstitute for maneuver training, but as asupplement. An adept leader will be ableto overcome these shortfalls and adaptthe simulation to fit his planned trainingobjectives. Finally, these computer war-games do provide CO/TMs an organictraining tool that can be easily under-stood and enjoyed by all soldiers.


CPT Darren Fitz Gerald gradu-ated with a BS in Computer Sci-ence from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy in 1992 and was com-missioned as a lieutenant in Ar-mor. He spent four years with 1-66 Armor at Fort Hood, andserved as a platoon leader,scout platoon leader, and Battal-ion S1. He is currently a studentat the Armor Officer AdvancedCourse. His follow-on assign-ment will be as an ROTC in-structor at Kemper MilitarySchool in Missouri.

CPT James E. Ward graduatedwith a BS in Computer Sciencefrom the U.S. Military Academyin 1992 and was commissionedas a lieutenant in Aviation. Hespent three and a half years with2-1 Cavalry and 1-10 CavalrySquadrons at Fort Hood. Heserved in the positions of aero-scout platoon leader, liaison offi-cer, and assistant operations of-ficer. He is a student at the Ar-mor Officer Advanced Course.His follow-on assignment will bethe advanced aircraft transitionto the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior.

Brigadier General Bolte’s article inthe November-December 1996 issue ofARMOR provided excellent insight intothe new Tank Weapon Gunnery Simu-lation System/Precision Gunnery Sys-tem (TWGSS/PGS) system which unitsare currently fielding. Although his ar-ticle primarily focuses on the technicalaspects of the system and its use ingunnery training, he does begin to ex-plore maneuver issues at the end of hisarticle. At Fort Lewis, 1-33 AR, 3/2IDrecently completed a TWGSS/PGS ma-neuver and gunnery rotation in lieu ofcrossing the mountains and conductingsimilar training at Yakima TrainingCenter. The exercise goal was to sus-tain platoon and individual gunneryskills, improve platoon maneuver tasksand battle drills, explore the new simu-lation system’s limitations, and reduceunit OPTEMPO. This exercise was theproduct of a brainstorm of our BrigadeCommander, COL Peter W. Chiarelli,who had previously served as the G3for First Cavalry Division at Fort Hoodand was extremely impressed with thesystem. It was this relationship that en-abled us to borrow a company TWGSSand PGS set from Fort Hood; other-wise the exercise would have been lim-ited in scope to gunnery only.

Exercise ConceptThe exercise had three phases. Al-

though it is the reverse of conventionalplatoon and gunnery training, we initi-ated training at the platoon level byconducting a Janus exercise which al-lowed platoon leaders to practice manyof the tasks which they would have tocomplete in the Situational TrainingExercise (STX) lanes, on the same ter-rain which they would actually conductthe tasks. This consisted of one day forsystem familiarization, one day for anattack lane, and one day for a lanetraining defense of a battle position.The objective was to train troop-lead-ing procedures, battle drills, fire distri-bution and control, engagement areadevelopment, and validate platoonstandard operating procedures. Thistraining paid large dividends in the pla-toon STX lanes as all platoon leadershad established a solid foundation inthese tasks to build on during the STXlanes.

STX LanesThe second phase was platoon STX

lanes. Although the terrain on Fort Le-wis is heavily wooded, we were able totake advantage of the drop zones and

some open areas to conduct the STXlanes. The first two days in the laneswere independent training days forcompany commanders to train platoonson skills and tasks, such as TWGSS/PGS gunnery, actions on contact, battledrills, and developing an engagementarea. On the afternoon of the secondday, the platoon leader received an op-erations order from the company com-mander to conduct a hasty attack thenext morning. A platoon observer/con-troller linked up with the platoon at thispoint and stayed throughout the nextthree days, concentrating on observingthe platoon leaders’ preparation foreach mission. At 0900 the next morn-ing, after a short road march, the pla-toon conducted a hasty attack into asmall 1.5km x 3km “bowl” surroundedby woods. The OPFOR was an M1A1-equipped with TWGSS, an M113equipped with MILES, and a dis-mounted AT team equipped withMILES. This simulated a degradedcombat security outpost (CSOP). TheBradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) pla-toons’ OPFOR consisted of two BFVswhich also had a dismounted AT team.After the scenario was completed, thesecond O/C, who was the permanentlane O/C, downloaded the data from


TWGSS/PGS: Pushing the System

by Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Campbell, Jr. and Captain Christopher K. Kennedy

“The objective wasto train troop-leadingprocedures, battledrills, fire distributionand control, engage-ment area develop-ment, and validateplatoon standard op-erating procedures.”

the OPFOR vehicle’s Turret Drive Re-trieval System (TDRS) card. In theM1A1 or BFV, the TDRS card fits in-side the TWGSS or PGS computer.This card is a computer PCI card thatfits into the side of a laptop computerand utilizes SAAB TWGSS/PGS soft-ware to download data retrieved fromthe TWGSS/PGS computer in theM1A1 or BFV. The O/C or master gun-ner can also program into the card thenumber and types of rounds each vehi-cle will have “on board” for each sce-nario, as well as ammo dispersion andload time for each round. The informa-tion that the O/C downloads showswhere the BLUEFOR vehicles hit theOPFOR vehicles and identifies eachweapon system and type of ammuni-tion used. The lane O/C subsequentlymarked and labeled these hits andmisses on a data board which we con-structed to show the crews where theirrounds were impacting and where theywere receiving direct fire hits. Thisboard had several M1A1 and M2 sidesilhouettes and frontal silhouettes; thefront was OPFOR vehicles and theback was BLUEFOR vehicles. Thecomputer identifies which vehicle firedeach round and presents the azimuthand elevation of the projectile, as wellas a silhouette illustrating the point ofprojectile impact. We duplicated thisdisplay with our board to provide thisinformation to the platoon during theafter-action review (AAR). While thelane O/C debriefed the OPFOR, thecompany commander issued a FRAGOto the platoon leader to conduct a tacti-cal road march and prepare for a duskattack.

In the afternoon, once the platoonwas set in the new assembly area, thelane O/C downloaded the platoon’sTDRS cards and transferred the infor-mation to the data board. At this point,the platoon O/C and the lane O/C pre-sented the platoon with their first for-mal AAR. The format was essentiallythe basic AAR format, except that,when we talked about what happenedduring the engagement, we used thedata board to illustrate the results of thebattle. This aided the O/C in presentinggunnery results and maneuver mis-takes. The feedback provided a limitedinformal TC/BC Proficiency Couse,which COL Chiarelli felt would be animbedded byproduct of using theTWGSS/PGS system.

A few hours later, the platoon con-ducted another hasty attack against adegraded CSOP, this time in open ter-rain on Rogers DZ, the largest dropzone on Fort Lewis. Once again, the

lane O/C downloaded OPFOR infor-mation from the vehicle TDRS cardsafter the attack. In the morning, theO/C downloaded the BLUEFOR infor-mation, marked and labeled hits andmisses on the data board and bothO/Cs guided the platoon through theirsecond AAR. The company com-mander then provided the platoon witha final FRAGO, which was to defend abattle position in Rogers DZ.

After about 20 hours of structuringthe engagement area, which includedutilizing ACEs to dig battle positions,the platoon conducted an early morningdefense against an MRC or TC. At theend of the defense, the platoon was en-gaged with artillery which delivered apersistent chemical agent. The platoonmoved to an operational decontamina-tion while the lane O/C simultaneouslydownloaded nine to ten OPFOR cardsand transferred pertinent information tothe data board. Once the platoon com-pleted operational decontamination, theO/C downloaded the platoon’s cardsand transferred the information to thedata board. The platoon received its fi-nal AAR from the O/Cs and thenmoved back to a company assemblyarea to prepare for gunnery as the twoother platoons in the company sub-sequently completed the STX lanes.This did not take long, as the schedulewas echeloned so that when the firstplatoon was completing the defenselane, the second platoon was conduct-ing the first attack lane at 0900 thesame day. This allowed company com-manders to observe and participate ineach platoon’s STX lane.

Gunnery

The third phase was a full gunneryexercise. Gunnery on Fort Lewis was alittle more tricky than maneuver be-cause, although we were able to usedrop zones, the largest drop zone wassimultaneously occupied by STX lanesas another company was conductinggunnery. Additionally, to run a Tank/Bradley Table (TT/BT) VII-XII on thesame drop zone required over fortymain gun and troop targets and TT V/BT VI live fire required ten more tar-gets. This may not seem like much onmost installations, but since we usuallyconduct TT/BT VII-XII at YakimaTraining Center, the majority of targetsand lifters were across the mountains.SFC Barry Putney, our Battalion Mas-ter Gunner, and MSG Larry Burch, ourBrigade Master Gunner, worked withRange Control and TASC to finallymeet all of our target needs. The sec-

ond challenge was to create a challeng-ing TTV and BTVI on a narrow, con-fined MK-19 range and create anotherrange on the drop zone which could ac-commodate TT/BT VII-XII with mini-mal movement and changeover of tar-gets. SFC Putney, with the help of thecompany master gunners, designed andbuilt these ranges from the ground upin less than three weeks.

TT V and BT VI were conducted on arange usually utilized for Mark 19 fa-miliarization. Although limited to onelane, we were able to build a solidrange for both gunnery tables. TT/BTVII and VIII were conducted on PointSalines Drop zone using TWGSS/PGS.SFC Putney was able to place almostall of the targets at doctrinal ranges +/-100m-200m. Feedback provided tocrews through the TWGSS/PGS systemwas comparable to live fire. The crewcould see the splash on the target dur-ing engagements. During their AARdebrief, using the laptop computer, theycould see exactly where they had hitthe target and the azimuth and eleva-tion of the strike. For the A2 tank en-gagement, we were forced to use aMILES transmitter on the .50 Cal. asthere is no TWGSS transmitter for thisweapon. Scores were comparable toprevious gunneries conducted inYakima, although to conduct a validtest we would have had to fire bothmain gun and TWGSS/PGS on thesame range during the same weatherconditions. TT/BT XII was conductedon the same range as TT/BT VII andVIII. Changeover from one range tothe other was minimal due to the rangedesign. There were two drawbacks toconducting TT/BT XII on Fort Lewis.The first was that, due to intervisibilitylines and drop zone size, we were lim-ited to 2200 meters as our farthest en-gagement line. This meant that therange bands for TT/BT XII were closerthan desired.

The second drawback was that theTWGSS/PGS system in panel gunnerymode (there are two modes: combat,for force on force and panel gunnery,for gunnery tables) does not providemultiple vehicle target feedback. Incombat mode, you can load multiplecards and it will show where a vehiclefires and impacts and where he re-ceives fire. Therefore we were not ableto see where vehicles were double-servicing targets and shooting out oftheir assigned sectors within the pla-toon. We could count target hits bywatching the targets fall and we couldfind out how many rounds were ex-pended to kill those targets, but we


could not actually distinguish one tar-get hit from another using the com-puter. This could be corrected with asoftware upgrade by SAAB, whichproduces the system.

Maneuver Lessons Learned

TWGSS/PGS was an excellent simu-lation device for force on force train-ing. Later in the exercise, we scannedmaps of the maneuver areas into thelaptop computers and were able to takeadvantage of the full capability of theAAR system. Once OPFOR andBLUEFOR cards are downloaded intothe laptop computer, a global position-ing system in the TWGSS/PGS systemthat tracks vehicle movement duringthe exercise also shows the platoonwhere the enemy was, where BLUE-FOR vehicles were, who shot whom,which weapon system was used, whereeach vehicle hit and was hit, and howthe scheme of maneuver developed.During the exercise, we learned toclear each vehicle’s TDRS card justprior to execution of the mission. Thismeant storing fewer events on eachcard, lessening the chance of a com-puter lockup due to data overload.Even if the cards are clear, the systemcan only reliably hold eight cardsdownloaded from tanks and about fiveto six cards downloaded from Bradleys(each time a vehicle fires or is hit is anevent. Bradleys have more events be-cause of the 25mm chain gun) before itlocks up during AAR playback in AARmap mode. Another lesson that welearned is that, although MILES andTWGSS/PGS are compatible, they donot operate well with each other. Youmust mount retro reflectors on theMILES vehicles to direct the TWGSS/PGS beam back to the TWGSS/PGS tomake the system compatible. An exer-cise like ours, where we needed theretro reflectors for gunnery, makes thisimpossible since each company systemcomes with only a limited number oftarget retro reflectors. Even if retro re-flectors are mounted on the MILES ve-hicles, the feedback system would beof minimal use as the system showsimpact points only on the TWGSS/PGS vehicles. Additionally, MILES im-pacts on the TWGSS/PGS vehicles aredisplayed as sectional blocks instead ofimpact points. MILES also has an ad-vantage over TWGSS/PGS in force onforce. Since it is not a precision gun-nery instrument like TWGSS/PGS, theMILES vehicle has a larger killing po-tential. We recommend either using onesystem or the other. Another lesson thatwe learned was that PGS TOW is an

excellent weapon system. During thedefense of a BP STX lane, a BFV pla-toon completely destroyed a TWGSS-equipped tank company with TOW, aperformance that would be rare from aMILES BFV platoon.

Gunnery Lessons Learned

TWGSS/PGS was an excellent toolfor TT/BT VII-VIII. The feedback sys-tem offered crews information, such asazimuth and elevation of shots, whichthey could not receive during live fire.The one drawback was that most crewshad an inordinate amount of troublehitting targets with the coaxial machinegun on both tanks and BFVs. This wasdue to an extraordinary amount of7.62mm dispersion built into theTWGSS/PGS program and the fact thatonly every third tracer is presented inthe GPS and GPS-E. Although thetracer-to-ball ratio is the same as inlive-fire gunnery, the increased disper-sion makes machine gun use extremelydifficult. The technicians from SAABwho visited our unit during training in-dicated that the Army had requested thetracer simulation ratio and felt that theproblem could be remedied through asoftware upgrade or changing thetracer-to-ball ratio to 1:0; either waythis problem must be corrected to har-ness the full potential of the system’scapabilities. As stated previously, wealso had to use MILES for the .50 Cal.,making A2 engagements difficult toevaluate since the MILES transmitteron the .50 Cal. is notoriously difficultto zero. If the intent is to use theTWGSS/PGS system for home stationgunnery, the Army needs to purchase.50 cal. transmitters from SAAB. Wehad previously discussed the problemswith the AAR feedback system forTT/BT XII. We are currently givingfeedback to SAAB on these problems.Once again, a software upgrade shouldbe able to solve the multiple card prob-lem in panel gunnery mode.

Conclusion

TWGSS/PGS is an excellent systemwhich, with some minor improvements,could provide an almost true to lifesimulation for gunnery and maneuver.Although TWGSS/PGS was originallyintended for home station gunnery, thesystem has also proved to be an excel-lent maneuver simulation. The feed-back system, and the fact that crewsmust prepare their vehicles for preci-sion gunnery instead of simply aligninga rifle scope to a laser, creates a more

realistic environment, and allows formore informative AARs. Although wehave not experienced the improvementsof MILES 2000, we can evaluate thesystem against MILES and MILES II.TWGSS/PGS appears to be a bettersystem for home station maneuver andgunnery training. Brigadier GeneralBolte mentioned GAMER on page 47in the earlier mentioned article. Thissystem allows O/Cs to receive real-time feedback and save the engage-ment for feedback during the AARwhich is one step above currentTWGSS/PGS capabilities. The systemalso allows TWGSS/PGS to evaluateindirect fire and mine simulation withinthe scenario. Although relatively ex-pensive (around $500,000), this systemwould allow for greater home stationmaneuver training and feedback forAARs. TWGSS/PGS is the future ofhome station training in the U.S. Army;we should use it as frequently as possi-ble and push the system to its limits.We should also continue to improve thesystem as more feedback is obtainedthrough frequent use.


LTC Don Campbell graduatedfrom Kansas State Universityand received his commission inArmor as a ROTC DMG. Healso received his MS from Cen-tral Michigan University. He cur-rently commands 1st Battalion,33rd Armor at Ft. Lewis, Wash.Previous Armor assignments in-clude S3, 2 Brigade, 1 ID(M)and XO, 4th Battalion, 37th Ar-mor, both at Ft. Riley; and S3,4th Battalion, 69th Armor, FRG.He also served as an assign-ment officer for Armor Branchat PERSCOM.

CPT Chris Kennedy receivedhis BA from Widener Universityin Pennsylvania in 1989. Heearned his commission in Ar-mor from Officer’s CandidateSchool at Ft. Benning, Ga. Heis currently the S3 Air for 1stBattalion, 33rd Armor. Previousassignments include assistantcorps training officer for I Corpsat Fort Lewis, and company ex-ecutive officer and tank platoonleader in 4th Battalion, 67th Ar-mor in Friedberg, Germany.

The Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR)team is perhaps the least understood, ifnot most underutilized asset that theheavy battalion task force has in its bagof tricks. However, with proper educa-tion, leadership, and coordination, thisasset can greatly assist units for boththeir reconnaissance and surveillancemissions and their counterreconnaissancebattles. Although this article focuses en-tirely on GSR assets, some of the princi-ples addressed here apply universally tousing slice or support elements.

How the System Works

This type of radar workssimilarly to those used toguide civilian aircraftsafely into airports, al-though the Army system,the PPS-5B (Figure 1) isolder, more spartan, andonly tracks targets in twodimensions. The radar hastwo major components, theradar transmitter (RT) andthe controller indicator(CI). The RT puts out theelectronic waves, and theCI (Figure 2) is used to in-terpret them. Basically, theradar puts out electronicbursts of energy at a con-stant rate. These pulses re-flect off targets and causean echo, which is thentransformed back into anelectronic signature by thecontroller indicator. Thesystem determines rangeby the length of time thatthe echo takes to return tothe radar. Targets must bemoving, or have movingparts, like an engine idling,in order for the detectionto be accurate.

The system can detecttargets by three methods:

•• Through an audio return on head-phones. Once the range gate marker isset at the desired range of detection, theradar cycles through its scanning sector.The operator will hear the signature ofthe target located at the range he has di-aled in on the range gate marker. An op-erator can hear footsteps, engine noises,wind or rain.

•• Through a bright spot on the Bscope. The B scope on the controller in-dicator shows a vertical trace line thatoscillates back and forth across thescreen as the radar sweeps through itssector of scan. Targets and “clutter”show up as brighter areas. Reflections

from the ground show up as less brightareas, and areas not covered by the radarappear dark.

Because the trace creates a map-likeimage over the distance the radar covers,it can be used to visualize dead space.

•• Through a spike on the A scope.The A scope gives a temporary pictureof activity along a particular bearing,and constantly changes as the radarsweeps through its sector. Targets appearas spikes on the one horizontal bar.

After detecting a target, the operatorhas to stop the radar from scanning anddial the range gate marker (visible onboth the A and B scopes) onto the target.Once the range gate marker is on the tar-get, the operator will hear the loudestsignature, and from this, can get a range,down to 1m distance, and an azimuth.The azimuth and distance are then trans-posed onto a plotting board or a surveil-


Ground Surveillance Radar Operations in Heavy Units

by Captain Frank Sobchak

lance card and plotter(SCAP) to get an 8-digitgrid, much the same waythat a polar call for fire iscomputed.

CapabilitiesThe radar team can pro-

duce an 8-digit grid, accu-rate to 10m and based onthe quality of the operator,for vehicular targets out to10km, and out to 6km forpersonnel. Operators havedetected targets beyondthese distances, but gettingan accurate grid past 10kmis nearly impossible. Op-erators can track multipletargets and can identify thetype of target, eitherwheeled or tracked, fromthe audio signature. Skilledoperators can tell exactlywhat type of vehicle thesystem is tracking from itstelltale audio signature(e.g., the whine of turbineengines in an M1-seriestank). Many NCOs whoserved on the Inter-GermanBorder before the declineof communism state that itwas extremely easy to dis-tinguish the bouncing oftrack on older Warsaw Pactvehicles equipped withtheir Christie-derived sus-pensions.

During the counterreconnaissance bat-tle, GSR teams are effective hunters in ahunter-killer team. Once the GSR detectsenemy movement, operators can vectorthe killers toward the enemy (Figure 3).By tracking enemy movement andfriendly movement on their plottingboards, the operators can calculate an in-tercept course for friendly forces, andtalk the friendly force into position tokill the threat.

For reconnaissance, GSR teams can of-fer great night capabilities and decentdaytime capabilities. The GSR soldier(96R, an all-male, combat-exclusionMOS) should be skilled in scout tech-niques of infiltration, intelligence gather-ing, and reporting. Furthermore, they areavailable for cross-FLOT operations(with security support or detailed plan-ning), and for use as standard scouts,even if their radar is inoperative or inef-fective due to terrain. They should alsobe masters of the scout’s primaryweapon: the call for fire.

The system slaves off vehicle batteries,and can be remoted 50 feet from theprime mover. However, an operator muststill be present at the CI (only 12 feetmaximum from the RT). While the entireradar can be dismounted and manpackedto an OP, weight and special batteryneeds makes this impractical.

Limitations

The radar has a 10-15 minute setuptime and a 5-10 minute tear-down timeand cannot be operated on the move.Consequently, offensive operations incontinuous operations or a movement tocontact are extremely difficult.

Because the radar is a line-of-sight sys-tem, terrain will create dead space likethat of any direct fire weapon system(Figure 4). The radar cannot lookthrough or over hills, mountains, or in-tervisibility (IV) lines. Additionally, theradar waves are broken up by trees, par-ticle smoke, rain, or fog. This leads totwo main conclusions:

•• Radar effectiveness is based upon theterrain you will be operating in (part ofMETT-T); if you have thick woods withfew sparse areas, the radar is limited toopen areas and straight roads. This is theradar’s weakness in LIC operations ineither woods or urban areas.

•• Because most people with binocularscan see 10km line-of-sight during thedaytime, the radars make their money atnight.

Like any other weapons system, theGSR is only as effective as the operatorusing it. If the system is not leveled,doesn’t have a correct center scan, or theoperator is not proficient in detecting orpinpointing targets, the system will be asineffective as a non-boresighted tank.

Enemy forces can easily use direction-finding (DF) to locate and kill the GSR,which was a high-priority target for theSoviet forces stationed in East Germany.Although the soldiers sardonically jokethat their job is seven seconds to Hell(the time necessary to DF a GSR), real-


Fig. 2.Controller Indicator

istically there are almost no countriesleft that have this capability. Further-more, if a threat exists, the operators canscan intermittently and displace to avoidfire.

Tactical Considerations

The MTOE personnel authorization(Figure 5) has a significant effect onGSR operations. The current DS com-pany operations platoon contains oneHUMINT (Human Intelligence) squadand one GSR squad made up of fourteams. Each team is composed of anM113 and three personnel (one track hasfour personnel with the squad leader),and a headquarters with a platoon leader,platoon sergeant, and an HMMWV. Thiscauses problems in two areas, coordina-tion and sleep plans.

Usually the GSR/operations platoonleader is the brigade LNO for the directsupport military intelligence companyand can do little or no coordination forhis teams. If he does get a chance to getout of the brigade TOC, he may only seeone of the two task forces being sup-ported or might only visit his HUMINTsquad. This leaves task forces and teamscoordinating directly with an E6 (byMTOE, which would not be a majorproblem), or more likely an E5 or E4.Although some of these junior teamleaders conduct great coordination, manydo not understand the intricacies of re-connaissance and surveillance to effectproper coordination. The fact that thesquad leader still has to run his ownteam adds to coordination problems. TheS2 should take a vested interest in thecoordination of the GSRs attached to hisbrigade or battalion, but many do not.

This lack of leadership available for co-ordination causes problems in fratricide,logistics, and employment.

Failure to coordinate for near and farrecognition signals, call signs, COM-SEC, and locations cause instanceswhere GSR teams get killed by the unitsthey support. Another problem is that thePPS-5’s radar signature, sometimes andat certain frequencies, will cause the ra-dar warning receiver of an AH64 Apacheto go off, indicating to the helicoptercrew that it has detected a ZSU-23-4 ra-dar (Gun Dish). This unfortunate elec-tronic problem, along with a failure tocoordinate, caused a fratricide incidentwhich destroyed a GSR team and killedtwo crew members during Desert Storm.Simple coordination directly or by FMcan prevent the wasting of this asset.

Without logistical coordination, GSRteams support units, but frequently don’thave individual, crew-served, or antitank

weapons (AT4s) to defend themselves.This problem is further accented whenthe GSR teams move from supportingone team (or the scout platoon) to sup-porting another. Head count for meals(or forgetting to tell the GSR team thatLOGPAC has arrived) is also too often aproblem. Mistakes in employment occurwhen leaders do not want to, or forgetto, coordinate with the subject matter ex-pert, the GSR team leader or squadleader, and employ the team in an un-sound tactical method.

Second, the MTOE causes furtherproblems. Even if teams have all threecrew members, usually all three crewmembers are awake while they are con-ducting operations. The team leadermans the M2 machine gun, provides se-curity, and monitors the radio. The seniorradar operator (SRO) mans the radar andlistens on the earphones. The third sol-dier provides dismounted security andplots targets picked up by the SRO


Fig. 3. Vectoring Fig. 4. Dead Space

Fig. 5. MTOE Strength

(based on METT-T, he could be in thedriver’s compartment or resting). Due topersonnel shortages and the standardlosses from nondeployables and chapteractions, etc., some teams have only twomembers, with the SRO taking up theslack, which further constrains opera-tions and slows reporting. Additionally,monitoring duties must be rotated atleast every hour to keep the operatorfresh because viewing the radar screenand hearing the earphone noises tend tolull some operators into unconscious-ness. Some task forces and companiesdo not take this into consideration andhave the GSRs scanning all night, andmoving during the day, and then repeatthe cycle, never allowing for rest, whichother members of the company usuallytake at night. One suggestion to solvethis problem is to keep your GSR teamsworking reverse cycle, taking their restduring the day when the radar is less ef-fective.

Since each GSR team has only one .50caliber M2 for protection, they shouldeither have some sort of security pro-vided for them, or be infiltrated to a po-sition (hide site) where they can be con-cealed and enemy contact is highly un-likely. Providing security through somesort of command relationship benefitsboth the attached and supported unit. Itprevents the GSR from becoming a“loose cannon,” wandering around thebattlefield, and provides security for theteam.

Employment Principles

Generally, maneuver commandersshould rely on the subject matter expert(the GSR team leader or platoon leader)to position his unit. However, everyoneneeds to know some of the general rulesfor effective GSR employment. Higherterrain is usually better because it allowsyou to look over small bumps in the ter-rain and presents less dead space. Find-ing a location that has a hard back-ground (trees, hills, mountain) makes forclearer radar returns. Having a good con-cealed position is critical to survival.Orient your sector of scan to cover thedesignated named area of interest (NAI)so that it maximizes the system’s rangeand minimizes dead space (avoid closehills and mountains). The system has anaverage sector scan of 90 degrees, so po-sition the radar where you can take ad-vantage of this large sector. Do notwaste it covering point NAIs. Havinghigh terrain to the flanks and rear, be-yond the sector being covered, is a bo-nus. These features can absorb the rear-and side-lobe radar signature, making itharder for the enemy to find the radar.

Offense

GSR employment is more difficult inthe offense. It is most difficult in themovement to contact, but several optionsare still available. One is to attach two ormore GSR teams to a company/team onthe flank to protect that flank from anenemy counterattack. The teams wouldsubsequently bound forward in a leap-frog fashion to ensure constant coverage.This method requires detailed planningand rehearsal, to synchronize the set-upand tear-down of the two systems to en-sure seamless coverage.

During a stationary counterrecon battleprior to the offense, the GSRs could beused in hunter-killer operations.

Finally, they could be attached to theTF scouts to establish a stationary OPwith a scout far across the FLOT look-ing at enemy reserves or repositioning.

DefenseGSR teams can be attached to the

scout platoon to establish an OP past theFLOT with a scout vehicle and eithermonitor the same or different NAIs. Onevariation of this is to establish the OPwith just the GSR team, although it isrisky and not recommended.

Teams could be attached to the battal-ion’s forward or flank to provide nightsecurity, and cover an NAI to observewhere the enemy main attack is comingfrom.

Teams also work well attached to acompany as the hunters in a hunter-killerconcept. The GSR can even talk the kil-ler toward the prey with azimuths usingthe vectoring technique.

Common Problems•• Poor use in the offense. Many task

forces either expect too much of theGSR, thinking it can operate on themove, or giving it multiple missions toperform in too short a time. Or theythrow up their arms and under-utilize theGSR (providing security for the CTCP)because they do not coordinate forbounding coverage.

•• Coordination. This causes severalproblems: First, lack of understandingcan cause underutilization and nonpar-ticipation in the R/S plan (the GSR maybe attached to a CO/TM without an NAIto cover, or SIRs to answer, or any sortof plan). This can be fixed with coordi-nation with the subject matter expert,either the GSR platoon leader, platoonsergeant, squad leader, or team leader.Second, lack of coordination can causefratricide — the unidentified vehicle ap-

proaching your rear or flank that youshot may have been the GSR sent to es-tablish an OP on the flank of your com-pany. Third, without logistical coordina-tion, teams may not have ammunition orfood to carry out their mission.

•• Inefficiency. This stems from threemajor areas: Lack of a rest plan becauseof multiple missions burns out crews andmakes them combat ineffective. Lack ofsecurity or a good plan/hide site makesthem an easy kill for the enemy. Use ofGSRs as a scout (mobile as opposed toOP) degrades their ability. If you can usethe 10km range of the radar, you should.I have seen task forces attach GSRs(with functioning radars) to scout pla-toons to plus up the strength of a scoutplatoon, and not plan to use the radar atall, even though the radar had a goodmission available to work with the coun-terrecon screen. If possible, use the radarproperly.

FuturePlans are for the PPS-5B to be phased

out of the Army inventory without re-placement. Originally, they were slatedto disappear in FY95, current plans arefor FY99, but that may change again.Most likely, soldiers in the 96R MOSwill be retrained to 96U (UAV operator)or reclassified, although evaluation of aBritish radar (MSTAR) and an Americanimagery system (Nightstalker) might in-dicate that American GSRs are not deadyet.

ConclusionAlthough GSR assets are frequently

misunderstood and underutilized, a taskforce which uses the combat multiplierof the GSR properly can greatly assisttheir reconnaissance and surveillancemissions and their counterreconnaissancebattles.


CPT Frank Sobchak is a 1992graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy. While in the 24th In-fantry Division, he served as theBICC in the armor battalion andas the GSR platoon leader andheadquarters XO in the militaryintelligence battalion. He hasgraduated from MIOBC, AOAC,and Ranger School, and is cur-rently a student at the SpecialForces Qualification Course atFort Bragg, N.C.

tection. Hesko bastions should be usedfor inner perimeters and to protect sol-diers’ living areas at a static checkpoint;they may also be used as serpentine bar-riers, but unless reinforced with moredense materials they will not stand up tomany vehicle hits. The inner compoundof CP A2 included over 150 Hesko bas-tions and over 350 cubic meters ofgravel fill, topped off with over 3,000sandbags.

Wood sentinel sheds at the entrances tothe checkpoint were placed behind con-crete barriers (approximately four feetthick) and surrounded by double layersof sandbags — creating good cover andconcealment for barrier guards whenneeded. The windows of the guard shackwere shatterproof Plexiglas over wiremesh, creating a double layer of protec-tion.

Checkpoint obstacle and barrier plans(vehicle serpentine) are essential to con-trol checkpoint operations, and are a vi-tal element of force protection. A shortand narrow serpentine can restrict andimpede movement, while a long andwide serpentine will be ineffective incontrolling movement through thecheckpoint. For static checkpoints, tetra-hedrons constructed of heavy duty steel(e.g., railroad rails), 50-gallon drumsfilled with debris and reinforced withwire, anchored concertina wire sections,and telephone poles split in half length-wise [laid on the ground and anchoredunder a tracked vehicle at a 45 degreeangle to create speed bumps] are idealfor use in an obstacle/barrier plan as theyare easily made or procured and aresturdy and durable enough to withstandcontinual vehicular traffic. Light one-man-lift tetrahedrons, 55-gallon drums,concertina wire and pickets, sandbags,and split telephone poles can be used ef-fectively for a temporary checkpoint;they are transportable by 5-ton truck orby Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The well-planned and evenly-spaced serpentinewill canalize movement through thecheckpoint while providing an additionalmeasure of force protection.

Perimeter lighting is very importantand can be easily provided by using astandard 10,000 kilowatt military gener-ator light set (which can be towed be-hind HMWWVs, 113 Series vehicles, orBradley Fighting Vehicles). One light setcan provide adequate lighting for a CP75-100 meters in length (good enoughfor a temporary checkpoint of 24-48hours in duration); however, for a long-term deliberate checkpoint, two light sets

would be more efficient and effective,offering a contingency in case of mainte-nance troubles. Portable light units(mounted on a telescoping tripod, on aguard shack roof, or on a guard tower)provide additional barrier and perimeterlighting wherever needed [portable lightunits should be positioned to support IDchecks and/or vehicle searches at CP en-trances and on the CP vehicle searcharea]. Perimeter lighting is an importantelement of checkpoint operations, as itserves two purposes: it assists the occu-pying force in conducting normal opera-tions with enhanced visibility during thehours of darkness, but just as important,a well-lit checkpoint sends a message ofactivity, alertness, and vigilance.

Operational Force Protection Measures

Operational TTPs established and exe-cuted on the checkpoint will assist inforce protection, the key element in es-tablishing and operating a successfulcheckpoint is the professional soldierwho executes his mission on a daily ba-sis with pride and vigilance. A profes-sional-looking and acting soldier, backedby the firepower of an M1A1 tank or aBradley Fighting Vehicle, creates an at-mosphere of deadly force that local ci-vilians and factional elements acknow-ledge and respect. A “We mean busi-ness” attitude and image establishes thebase relationship for all activities,thereby reducing the possibility of ac-tions against the checkpoint.

Checkpoint personnel must be capableof rapid transition from a peaceful tocombat posture, should the need arise.Operations should always be supportedwith direct fire weapons and a form ofcommunication. Entrances to the CPshould be supported with your most le-thal firepower asset [e.g., an M3A2 Cav-alry Fighting Vehicle facing oncomingtraffic] and be manned at all times toprovide security and communicationssupport for barrier personnel.

Barrier sentinels should operate underthe two-man rule (one pulling securityfor the other) at all times. An additionalform of communications (e.g., a Mo-torola radio or PRC-126 squad infantryradio) on the ground can greatly assistmovement of traffic through the check-point and during potential threat situ-ations. Redundant security measures andredundant communications are anothermethod of enhancing force protectionwhile conducting normal checkpoint op-erations.

Defensive procedures, such as CP alertrehearsals, vehicle searches, and use ofMP canine units, contribute to force pro-tection and deadly force image. CP alertexercises conducted on a regular basisensure that soldiers and leaders are readyto defend the checkpoint at any time.No-notice alerts from an external ele-ment provide an element of surprise andrealism. Prior to occupying the check-point, the author would coordinate analert exercise time window and scenariowith the Troop TOC. A 100-percent alertduring the designated time windowwould be executed at the CP, with theTroop TOC providing intelligence up-dates to the CP as it executed the exer-cise. The CP would be defended accord-ingly for a specified time, requiring thesoldiers to execute tasks ranging fromcasualty evacuation to conducting nor-mal checkpoint traffic flow while at fullalert. Following stand-down, normal CPoperations resumed and an AAR wasconducted. Soldier reaction time, profi-ciency of individual soldier skills, com-mand and control discipline, and prepar-edness to defend the checkpoint greatlyincreased with the execution of no-noticealert exercises.

Direct fire target reference points(TRPs) and indirect fire targets shouldbe close to Threat AAs for ease of iden-tification during checkpoint defense op-erations or exercises. Quick identifica-tion of targets located around the check-point are vital to defensive operations,and should be reviewed daily by all per-sonnel. A detailed sector sketch posted inkey locations (i.e., at the entrance or exitof the soldiers’ living quarters; in eachsentinel shack, observation tower, orfighting position; and inside the turret ofeach vehicle) will continually serve as areminder. However, the best approach isthe constant question and answer ses-sions between leaders and their soldiersregarding checkpoint defense operations— every soldier must know the CP de-fense plan.

Random vehicle searches, hasty anddeliberate, will ensure that local civiliansand factional elements will not attemptto transport contraband through thecheckpoint (or Zone of Separation). Ve-hicle searches often resulted in the con-fiscation of arms, ammunition, and ex-plosives. Persons found to be violatingthe GFAP (General Framework Agree-ment for Peace) of the Dayton Peace Ac-cord were dealt with in specified IFORRules Of Engagement. While the use ofvehicle searches will not completely


Checkpoint Operations (Continued from Page 21)

eliminate transport of contraband, theywill effectively disrupt the trafficking ofsuch items which, in turn, will also re-duce external threats to soldiers on thecheckpoint.

If available, military police caninesearch teams attached to a checkpointserve many purposes and can produceimmediate results. Search dogs will finddesignated contraband items, such as ex-plosives, weapons, or drugs, and use ofcanine search teams reinforces the vigi-lance and deadly force image projectedat the checkpoint. One such GFAP of-fender was so intimidated by the sight ofa canine search team that he voluntarilygave up his contraband (pistol and am-munition) prior to the dog searching hisvehicle. Search dogs can also provideadvanced notice of trouble — signalingthe barrier security personnel of unseenexplosives placed on a vehicle. Caninesearch units are an excellent asset forconducting checkpoint operations, and ifavailable will directly contribute to mis-sion success while providing an addi-tional force protection measure.

Medical evacuation planning and exe-cution is a critical task for checkpointoperations, and can often test leaders andsoldiers alike. Detailed planning ofmedevac (ground or air) procedures fornumerous situations, such as individualor vehicle mine injuries, must be ad-dressed. CP medevac plans must be spe-cific, detailed, and rehearsed on a regularbasis. Medevac rehearsals at CP A2 wereincorporated with CP alert exercises toensure all personnel could execute theirspecified tasks, and someone else’s, ifneeded. Restrictions and obstacles nearthe CP must be recognized and dealtwith – for example, clearing vegetationor removing debris to support a helicop-ter landing zone. If activity surroundingthe CP is too heavy to execute groundmedevac or land a helicopter, then sol-diers must know how to aeromedevac acasualty by hoist. During medevac oremergency situations, it is natural forcheckpoint personnel to become focusedon the immediate activity; however,leaders must ensure security and forceprotection are maintained.

Relief in place during checkpoint op-erations will not differ much from thesame activity executed in the high inten-sity conflict (HIC) environment. Reliefsideally should be conducted during peri-ods of limited visibility and during peri-ods of minimal activity near the check-point. A plan for relief must address spe-cifically time, method, and sequence of

relief; time of transfer of responsibilityfor the CP; actions on contact during re-lief; transfer of responsibility procedures;target handoff procedures; contingencyplans for changes of mission, etc. Execu-tion techniques of the relief will vary byunit, however, a RIP checklist will facili-tate ease of transfer between units. Dur-ing execution of the relief, normal CPoperations must continue; A2 wasunique in that it was large enough thatthe outgoing unit could reposition vehi-cles to alternate positions and still main-tain assigned areas of surveillance as therelieving unit occupied primary vehiclefighting positions on the CP. RIP opera-tions conducted on a regular basis be-tween organic units can become very ef-ficient, but leaders and soldiers alikeshould not take this for granted anddowngrade security measures for speedof relief. The RIP checklist should spe-cifically address the following: current“enemy situation” (factional military orpolice operations, civilian activity or dis-turbances, criminal activity, expectedfactional operations, etc.), changes to theCP defense plan (TRPs, indirect fire tar-get numbers and locations, obstacles andbarriers added or removed, etc.), changesin supporting units (fire support assets,civilian contracted elements, LOGPACtimes or methods of resupply, etc.),changes to access rosters, updates onsuspected criminals, etc.

“Regardless of the mission, command-ers must protect their forces at all times.They must be ready to counter activitythat could bring harm to their units orjeopardize the mission.” (FM 100-5, Op-erations) In the low intensity conflict en-vironment, peacekeeping missions willoften include ambiguous situationswhich will require peacekeeping forcesto deal with tense or violent situationswithout becoming participants — one ofthe keys to success must be the preven-tive measure called force protection.Force protection is more than wearingyour Kevlar vest and full battle rattle, ortraveling in a four-vehicle convoy; allare necessary measures taken by leadersat all levels to ensure that our soldiersare not unnecessarily injured or killed. Inthis environment, FP is a critical elementof checkpoint operations and requiresdetailed planning and stringent execu-tion.

This article is not all-inclusive regard-ing checkpoint operations, nor is it in-tended to be a doctrinal revelation. It is,however, intended to assist the scout pla-toon leader in planning, and executing,

checkpoint operations, specifically ad-dressing the important element of forceprotection. It is increasingly likely thatthe United States Army will continue toconduct stability operations throughoutthe world for years to come, and no mat-ter the region, country or situation, forceprotection will be a major issue forevery level of command, all the way tothe platoon leader.

Bibliography

FM 7-98 Operations in A Low Intensity Conflict,October 1992

FM 17-98 Scout Platoon, September 1994

FM 100-5 Operations, June 1993

FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low IntensityConflict, December 1990

1st Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry TACSOP


1LT Patrick R. Milligan pre-viously served as M3A2 scoutplatoon leader of A Troop andassistant S3 with 1st Squadron,1st Cavalry in Germany andBosnia. He received a RegularArmy commission in May 1995as a finance officer, but was de-tailed to Armor. He recently at-tended Finance Officer BranchQualification Course and iscurrently assigned to HHD,39th Finance Battalion in Ha-nau, Germany, where he is thedetachment executive officer.An ROTC Green to GoldScholarship Recipient (2 yearscholarship), he is a Distin-guished Military Graduate ofAustin Peay State University,Clarksville, Tenn. His prior en-listed service as an 11B and19D (5 years) includes air as-sault squad leader, 3-502 INF,101st Airborne (Air Assault) Di-vision; HHT, 2d Squadron, 2dACR, during Operation DesertShield/Storm; and A Co., 2/4INF, Neu-Ulm Germany. Hehas attended Armor OfficerBasic Course, Scout PlatoonLeaders Course, Airborne, andAir Assault Schools.

jams, ROK units on unscheduled roadmarches, the occasional vehicle break-down, and the occasional accident allserve to stress the C2 nodes as theymaintain control of the march units. TheC2 nodes use the road march table totrack the actual progress of march units.Vehicles in need of assistance must re-port their locations accurately, so that theC2 nodes can vector in the support. Fi-nally, accidents or incidents must be re-ported up immediately, so that the appro-priate elements can take action.

In wartime, the road march would befurther complicated by the increasedtraffic of other units, SOF activity along

the route of march, and the increasednumber of elements in support of thetask force. In wartime, units in Koreacan expect to see from 8 to 12 divisions(3 mechanized and 6 to 9 motorized) ina 20km by 20km area.

Conclusion

The reward for good planning is asmooth road march, one in which lostvehicles, wrong turns, or traffic jams arenonexistent. Avoiding accidents, damageto equipment, and lost training time arewell worth the effort required to plan co-herently and completely.

ROAD MARCH PLANNING (Continued from Page 9)


CPT Don L. Willadsen is a 1991graduate of the U.S. Military Acad-emy. He served in 3/11 ACR in BadHersfeld, FRG, as a tank platoonleader. He served in 3-77 AR (now1-33 AR) as an S3 LNO and com-pany XO in Mannheim, FRG, andFort Lewis, Wash., as a training of-ficer in the DPTM at Fort Lewis,and S3/Air for 2-72 AR at CampCasey, Korea. He is a graduate ofABN, AASLT, AOBC, SPLC, andCMOAC. He is currently the com-mander for D Company, 2-72 AR,at Camp Casey, Korea.

high-risk in development, but with leap-ahead variable lethality potential throughhypervelocity, is chosen as the preferredmain gun armament system for the FCS.

For demonstration purposes only, ourvisionary and conceptual EM gun is con-structed of six ‘barrels,’ three are of25mm, and the other three of 35mm (in-ner diameter) for two kinds of ammuni-tion. Each ‘barrel’ is comprised of fiveequally spaced accelerating rails whichalso act as cooling fins to enhance heatdissipation. Only one barrel is firing at atime, and only one type of ammunition(25 or 35mm) is being fired in everyburst. The multi-barrel assembly is en-closed in a stealthy rail support structurethrough which ambient air is forced forcooling. The anticipated controlled vari-able rate of fire is from 1 to 60 projec-tiles/min, depending on battle conditionsand availability of targets, while optimiz-ing and conserving energy. Obviously, itis highly dependent upon the rate ofelectrical consumption for firing projec-tiles and the cooling requirements of thebarrels. There are two magazines (700/25mm and 400/35mm, caseless projec-tiles only) on each side of the gun andeach separately stores one type of am-munition. Ammunition is fed directlyfrom the magazines to the dual feed EMgun via mechanical ‘twisters’ that reori-ent the projectiles from their originaloutboard position in the magazine toalign them with the firing direction.There is no need for any manual loadingor an autoloader since the ammunition isfed directly from the magazines to theguns.

Granted, much research has yet to beperformed to overcome the present limi-tations of EM guns before they reach astate of maturity. The EM gun will firerounds at unequaled velocities, whichwill directly contribute to lethality. With-

out propellant case, EM rounds are muchsmaller, requiring less storage space, andtherefore could be carried in greaterquantities for extended firing operations.Because plasma containment and energyconversion efficiency tend to improvewith bore diameter, it is possible thatsingle, larger barrels with 90mm diame-ter will be used. The latter represents amajor disadvantage in that the larger thediameter — the lower the ammunitioncomplement, the heavier the gun, andthe more difficult it is to reach highervelocities.

An interesting and promising ‘spin-off’of EM technology is EM Armor.5 It isstill highly classified and in its infancy,but some initial reports indicate that steelplates that get ‘energized’ upon impactcould form a unidirectional strong mag-netic field that is capable of deflectingand attenuating shape-charged warheads(increasing survivability up to a factor of10). If this is feasible, there is anothermajor application for electrical energyavailable on board the FCS to assist inits protection against anti-armor threats.

Note: All information contained in thisarticle was derived from open-sourcesand the analysis of the authors.

Notes1Major Held, B. J., “Tomorrow’s Smart Tank

Munitions,” ARMOR, March-April 1995, p. 21.2Lt. Colonel (Ret.) Boschma, J.H., “Smart Top

Attack Weapons,” ARMOR, September-October1996, p. 8.

3Defense Daily, 20 November 1996, p. 285.4Pengelley, R., “A New Era In Tank Main Ar-

mament - The Options Multiply,” INTERNA-TIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, 11/1989, p. 1521.

5Metzgar, T. L., “From Dreamworld To Real-world: Electromagnetic Guns,” November/De-cember A&DS/ 19, p. 41.

6Editorial, “We Have a Winner!,” ARMOR,July-August 1993, p. 6.

Western Design HOWDEN (WDH) isa small defense company in Irvine, Cali-fornia, which specializes in the design,development and production of ammuni-tion and material handling systems forthe U.S. and international military mar-kets. WDH’s track record includes a va-riety of air, land, and seaborne weaponsystems which require automated feed,resupply, and optimized ammunitionpackaging. WDH has been involvedamong others in the Tank Test Bed, AC-130 U Gunship, AH-64 Apache, andTank Compact Autoloader Programs.

FCS (Continued from Page 33)

Mr. Lawrence D. Bacon is theDirector of Graphic Arts at WDHwhere, for the past 18 years, hehas been responsible for creatingnumerous concepts for automaticammunition handling, loading andstorage systems.

Dr. Asher H. Sharoni is the Di-rector of Engineering at WDH. Heholds a Sc.D. in Mechanical Engi-neering from MIT and a M.Sc. &B.Sc. in Mechanical and Indus-trial Engineering from the Tech-nion, Israel Institute of Technol-ogy. Dr. Sharoni is a former colo-nel in the Israeli Defense Forcesin which he was involved in vari-ous major armored weapons de-velopments. Dr. Sharoni has ac-cumulated more than 30 years ofexperience in armor design andproduction.

battalion or the division as we can trulyincrease the situational awareness of thecommanders and then do what philoso-phers of war have exhorted throughoutthe ages, get the right mix of force to theright/critical place on the battlefield atprecisely the right time. Information sys-tems can give us this edge in the nextfight.

This downsizing does not overlook therequirement to train. Smaller is not bet-ter, better is better, to paraphrase GENSullivan, our retired CSA and a distin-guished tanker. The current Chief of Ar-mor wrote in an e-mail note to the CG ofTRADOC, “Digital equipment doesn’tmake a digital force. The force must bewell trained and experienced to be deci-sive.” (MG Harmeyer Note to the CGTRADOC, 28 March 1997) We can con-centrate on the task at hand, which istraining ourselves and our troopers totake the maximum advantage of the digi-tal equipment and information systemswe have within our force. The tank bat-talion commander will have just tankersto train, and a higher leader-to-led ratiowithin the battalion.

Are there more changes possible due toour new abilities to focus battle com-mand? There certainly are, and theyshould be the focus of other articles inthis journal and other professional jour-nals. For instance, the entire system ofTOC/TAC/Rear/Command Group needsto be evaluated and streamlined for rapiddecision-making and command and con-trol at the brigade, division, and evencorps level. Our staff system needs an-other look; after all, we’ve been using

the French staff sys-tem since Black JackPershing adopted it in

France in 1917. The focus of main effortfor this journal right now needs to be,what should we, the armored force, looklike in the Army after next?

An undated, unsigned e-mail forwardedall over the Army contained this impres-sion of the Advanced Warfighting Ex-periment, “the results were much betterthan the pessimists expected and notquite as good as the optimists were hop-ing for. Under normal NTC rotation con-ditions, it would have been labeled adraw.” (undated note off the Army e-mail, Subject: AWE at NTC) In my ownexperience against the OPFOR, a drawis not that bad, and considering that thefellows in COL Goedkoop’s brigade hadto spend time learning how to use theappliqué equipment and make sense ofthe systems, it reinforces the Chief ofArmor’s point that digital equipmentdoes not a digital force make. We needto train and train hard. This, in itself,does not alter the fact that the potentialfor a real breakthrough in how we fightis just around the corner.

The focus on the size and purpose ofour tank battalions is worthy of lots ofchin stroking and deep thinking. Eitherwe armored force officers do this, or theBeltway bandits and Armed ServiceCommittee staffers will do it for us. I seethe battalions of the future being thebuildings blocks for the reinforced bri-gades of the future, which in turn will dowhat our divisions of today do. It will bea while, and our hair will be white, or inmy case completely gone, before thistransformation happens throughout theforce. It may be that brigade command-

ers will be the big boys to aspire to belike — they will probably need to bebrigadiers, with colonels as the XO/DepCdr, with subordinate battalions assignedas the mission dictates; sounds like thecombat commands of the original Ar-mored Force, doesn’t it? In that kind ofenvironment, the battalion’s structureseems like a pretty big deal to me.

These have been one man’s thoughtsand musings, based on 20 years in ourArmored Force. BG Chaffee, the fatherof the modern armored force, once saidthat the armored force is not only thetank, but all arms and services, withequal glory for all. We need to recapturethat spirit and recast the Armored Forceas THE force for the warfare of the in-formation age. What do the rest of youthink? If you don’t write it, no one willever know.

Battalion After Next Cont’d. from Page 13


LTC Kevin C.M. Benson is cur-rently the Chief of War Plans atThird U.S. Army. He served inarmor and cavalry units in theUnited States and Germany, asthe Chief of Plans of the XVIIIAbn Corps, and as the Regimen-tal Executive Officer of the 2d Ar-mored Cavalry Regiment. He isa graduate of the Army Com-mand and Staff College, and theSchool of Advanced MilitaryStudies. He has been publishedin Parameters, Military Review,Army, and Armor, Infantry, andSpecial Operations journals.

There are no refresher courses for the 19Kor 19D like there are for the 11M, 11C, 11H,and the 11B. The Armor curriculum is gearedmore for the officer than the enlisted. I ask,why are there no courses related to the du-ties and tasks for a cavalry scout or a tankcrewman? Why are there no courses for theNCOs to become more familiar or reinforceskills needed to lead and maintain the multi-million dollar equipment and vital manpowerof the armored forces?

True, there is the PLDC PreparationCourse, Infantry Weapons Specialist Course,Civil Disturbance Course, to mention a fewavailable to Armor enlisted men without writ-ing the school of origin permission to takeand receive credit, or being told to just takethe subcourses.

It would be nice to see the, “19D CavalryScout Course,” “The Armored Crewman Re-fresher Course,” and NCO refresher courses

to the related fields. If need be, take coursesfrom the other school areas of the Army Cor-respondence Course Program that are part ofthe METL or “skill tasks” and compile theminto a course. Generate a new curriculum forthe Armor enlisted soldiers so that they, too,can get knowledge, course credit, and promo-tion potential like the rest of the brancheswithin the U.S. Army.

SGT WILLIAM C. BROWNHHC, 1/118th Inf Bn

218th Inf Bde

How to Find a Friend

Dear Sir:

I’d like to pass along some good informationfor your readers about how to find your old

military comrades on the Internet. Veteranswith internet access can get help at the fol-lowing website:

www.army.mil/vetinfo/vetloc.htm

Anyone who has an addition or correction tothe site, or who would like to be listed as apoint of contact may get in touch with BenMyers, P.O. Box 6019, Lake Worth, FL33466-6019, or email at:

[email protected]

In addition, an index of web pages contain-ing information about the military and militaryorganizations is available at the following lo-cation:

www.army.mil

BEN MYERS1SG RetiredTanker/Cav

LETTERS (Continued from Page 3)

Red Army (1989)

The War in 2020 (1991)

Twilight of Heroes (1997)by Ralph Peters. Pocket Books, Inc.,New York, N.Y.

Next time you’re hanging around the Inter-mediate Staging Base, or standing in the com-mander’s hatch waiting for the Sava River todrain, chances are good that you’ll reach intoyour cargo pocket for whatever you grabbedat the PX before heading down to the motorpool. Tankers and cavalrymen have made mil-lionaires out of Max Brand, Louis L’Amour,Stephen King, and Clive Cussler. Living cheekto jowl with three other guys for months onend can lead one to appreciate a few mo-ments of solitude. After all, casual small talk isnot too manly. But reading a good paperback?Well, any trooper could go for that.

Most of us do, and when we do, we reachfor some brain junk food, like westerns, or de-tective novels, or spy books. But being sol-diers, we often pick up something military intheme. There is no shortage of such stuff onthe racks down at Wal-Mart. Most of it is prettyharmless, and some proves mildly informativein a professional sense. But if you’re like manyof us, you want something that’s really useful,but not straight history, and not written like the-20 manual. What you want is a damn goodmilitary novel, real armored warrior stuff.

In that case, stick with fellow professionals.Some still swear by Tom Clancy, although he’sapproached the level of self-parody in his lastfew Jack Ryan novels. At bottom, brotherClancy remains a “wanna-be,” an overweightformer insurance salesman who pals aroundwith high-ranking officers and has an inordi-nate interest in firearms and modern weap-onry. Like Howard Cosell on Monday NightFootball, he never played the game. Some-times, it shows. You can’t learn only by watch-ing, folks.

No, if you want real Army stuff, stick to nov-els by real soldiers: Ed Ruggero, Harry Coyle,or Leonard Scott, among others. Best of all,check out the most gifted American militarywriter of them all, a lieutenant colonel of mili-tary intelligence named Ralph Peters. He’senough to restore your faith in the S2. If youhaven’t read Ralph Peters, you haven’t read agood war book lately.

Peters has written numerous books and arti-cles, but three of his novels in particular willappeal to tankers and cavalrymen of all ranks.They’re all in paperback, and widely available.Taken as a trilogy, they trace the arc of ouronce and future Army.

For openers, try Red Army. This 1989 workdescribes the invasion of Western Europe.Back in the 1980s, such World War III bookswere all the rage. General Sir John Hackett,Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, and Tom Clancy,wrote three of the best. Peters turns the genreon its head and gives us a very honest, excit-ing, and (dare I say?) sympathetic portrayal ofour Soviet enemies, a great armored army onthe attack. The book is about people, warriorsboth like us and, yet, not like us at all. Thehardware is in there, but in a Peters book, thetanks and guns remain tools, not stars. Hiswars, like real wars, are fought and won bymen.

The stories in Red Army grip you. When youread the gruesome story of Major Bezarin’srunning tank gun battle in and among a pan-icked German refugee column, or follow anoutnumbered air assault team’s lonely, coura-geous stand at an encircled bridgehead, youcannot help but marvel that this massive jug-gernaut never did cross that well-patrolled bor-der. Ever wondered how the big one wouldhave turned out? Red Army offers one verysobering version.

The author also gives enough high-level in-sight to put the reader in the big picture. Aslong predicted, the Soviets in Red Army pushtheir main effort through the North GermanPlain, smashing up the British and West Ger-mans. The Americans down south make anappearance, but Peters does not dwell ontheir role. The Soviet soldiers, from motor rifle-man to front commander, hold center stage.You can’t help but admire them, even as yougive thanks that this bloody war never hap-pened.

Looking at Red Armyalmost ten years later,you see the AmericanArmy’s past in stark re-lief. For more than fortyyears, our armor battal-ions and cavalry squad-rons held the lineagainst the Soviet mech-anized hordes. To seewhat your regimentalCSM or battalion com-mander means whenhe talks about the ColdWar, and why it con-sumed us as an Armyand a nation, read RedArmy. Those are theguys we beat.

For a look at the un-certain, dangerousworld of the presentArmy, look at Ralph Pe-ters’ 1997 effort, Twilight

of Heroes. You won’t find a tank in the book,but you will find a lot of great characters fight-ing an undeclared war on narcoterrorists in thebadlands of Bolivia. The book is the story of aCold Warrior in his final days, Colonel JohnChurch. Named for the gaunt, overage-in-grade commander who succeeded to com-mand of the 24th Infantry Division in 1950 af-ter the North Koreans snared Major GeneralBill Dean, Peters’ protagonist holds the line farfrom home. Church is the face of today’sArmy, outnumbered, out in the backwaters ofthe Third World, fighting phantom enemieswho can kill you just as dead as any Sovietsabot round.

Church does not fight alone. Readers willrecognize familiar faces, including a Com-mander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Commandwho bears an uncanny resemblance to theGulf War commanding general of the 24th In-fantry Division (Mechanized). The bad guyscome in several flavors, all drawn believably:drug dealers, elderly Nazis in hiding, and slick-tongued D.C. bureaucrats playing fast andloose with our lads out on the firing lane. Atthe climax of the book, with the Yankees encir-cled and desperate, armored troopers will findthemselves wishing that Colonel Church andhis comrades had a platoon of M1A2 Abramstanks on hand. But in Twilight of Heroes, theAmericans live by wits and character, not bigguns. In an Army with a lot fewer tanks thanany of us might wish, that’s reality. Ralph Pe-ters shows us the face of today’s small, uglywars.

“He’s enough to restore your faith in the S2...”

Ralph Peters’ Novels: More Than Just a Quick Read



The Fighting Pattons by Brian M. Sobel,Praeger Publishers, Westport, Conn.,1997. 248 pages, $49.95.

While this book is about the Patton family,going back to an ancestor just before theRevolutionary War, the bulk of it is devoted toGeorge S. Patton Jr. (III) of World War II fame,and to his son George S. Patton Jr. (IV).There are no fewer than five George SmithPattons in the narrative, and the author ishighly successful in keeping them clearly iden-tified.

The portions devoted to GSP III are interest-ing, but I found essentially no new ground be-ing broken here. I did wonder if Hammelburgwould come up, and it did, but only briefly (formore detail, see ARMOR September-October1996). Also, nothing particularly new was dis-cussed regarding the motor vehicle accidentthat ultimately leads to Gen. Patton’s death(see also ARMOR November-December1995).

Most of the book is about GSP IV, and to hisbuilding an Army career independent of his fa-ther’s reputation. Given the comparisons inevi-tably made, this is not an easy task. Greatwars make great generals, and his father hadWWII.

Yet GSP IV had no great war. He had terri-ble wars, the Korean War and Vietnam, butnone that captured the imagination and sup-port of the American people.

While he seems resistant to talking about hispersonal life, GSP IV does seem open abouthis military life, and is not reticent in discussinghis lack of aptitude for his early schooling, de-scribing himself as a “lousy student.” He re-peated his first year at West Point, as his fa-ther did. He graduates with the class of 1946.

After being in Germany, and Korea, he re-quests assignment to Vietnam and serves twotours there. He makes some penetrating ob-servations about relations with the press andthe public perception of the war in Vietnam.

He says a turning point was at Ap Bac inJanuary 1963, where reporters had free run tosee for themselves what was happening, onlylater to receive a briefing in which they weretold things they knew were not accurate. Hesays we lost them at this point.

During an exchange with a captured NorthVietnamese captain, Patton asks, in French,who is winning the war, and the captain re-plies, “you are,” but then states that his sidewill win because the U.S. will tire of the warfirst. This is a good example of how well theenemy had gauged us, and equally how littlewe knew about the enemy.

Patton distills his experience into advice, andhere underscores the importance of knowingthe customs and background of the countrywhere you are, and of your adversaries, andrightfully suggests that our deficiency in thisregard hurt our effort in Vietnam.

He additionally stresses the importance oflanguage training. His knowledge of French

served him well in Vietnam, and he suggeststhat those now in school should considerlearning Arabic.

During his second tour, Patton is com-mander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment(Blackhorse). He says he was broken-heartedwhen our troops left Vietnam, and it was a lowpoint for the Army.

GSP IV refers to Creighton Abrams as hismentor, and serves with him often. During Pat-ton’s first tour in Germany, when he failed tomove his tanks off the road fast enough,Abrams punches him in the face and knockshim to the ground. Later, Abrams gives Pattonthe opportunity to press charges, but Pattonquickly refuses. They are portrayed as life-longfriends, and when Abrams is Chief of Staff ofthe Army and dies in office, Patton serves as apallbearer at his funeral.

One of the great accomplishments of Pattonand other professional soldiers in the 1970s isthat they held things together during a time ofgreat turmoil. For example, upon a return tourto Germany as assistant division commanderof the 4th Armored Division, Patton has to dealwith drug and alcohol abuse among troops,racial unrest, run-down facilities, and low mo-rale among short-timers who had just comefrom Vietnam. There are bomb threats to thedivision, and Patton personally receives multi-ple death threats.

Though wounded in Vietnam, and then suf-fering a broken hip in Germany which almostresults in early retirement, Patton serves fivemore years, which includes being assistantcommandant of the Armor School and CG ofthe 2nd Armored Division, the first time a fa-ther and son commanded the same division.Following this, when Patton is given a postinghe objects to, his career does suffer, and hedescribes being eased out of the Army. Hisdeparture from service is a painful sequence.Rather than select a retirement ceremony withthe 2nd Armored Division, he chooses insteadto retire at the monthly ceremony at FortKnox. It is a quiet way to end a 34-year ca-reer, and he leaves as a Major General in1980.

In reading the book, I frequently wonderedwhat Patton’s rank was when he went tonew assignments. The information was even-tually forthcoming, but I wanted to know itright away. It is also not clear whether PattonIV starts out as an Armor officer or Infantryofficer. After West Point, he attends the ba-sic officers course at Fort Benning, so Infan-try is the assumption.

Some of the references to mystical experi-ence and reincarnation were a bit disconcert-ing, but GSP IV states that for a long time hethought everyone believed in reincarnation justas his family did. One sequence I did find par-ticularly moving was his father’s prediction ofhis own impending death, and his farewell tohis family. There are eleven photos, includingtwo of GSP IV with his father and two withAbrams. There is also a useful index. An effi-ciency report and other personal appraisals ofPatton are referenced in great detail, which

makes a reader wonder, why not just a sen-tence? Perhaps Patton wanted to get theseratings on the record.

This is not a broad view of the man – thereare no quotes from detractors, no counteringopinions, which on the surface seems strange,since the book is not written by Patton but bysomeone else. However, this lack of bad newsdoes not make the book any less valuable, orless believable for that matter; it is simply Pat-ton’s story told mainly through author Sobel.While a bit pricey, military readers will find thisbook a good read that can be finished in threeor four nights. Even if you do not have astrong interest in the Patton family, the por-tions of the book on Vietnam alone and Pat-ton’s observations on the war make it worth-while. Patton IV leads a full and remarkablelife, and this review has only scratched thesurface. General Patton now operates thefamily’s Green Meadows Farm in Massachu-setts.

Is this book successful in developing an im-age of GSP IV that keeps him separate fromhis father’s accomplishments? I rememberGSP IV from the mid-1960s, when he was anLTC and I was a lieutenant, and we both livedin the Newgarden BOQ at Fort Knox. To me atthat time, he was the son of Gen. George S.Patton Jr. of World War II fame.

Now I view him in a different way, as MGPatton who served our country in hard placesduring difficult times, and whose father alsohappens to be a famous WW II general.

PAUL S. MEYERCincinnati, Ohio

Former USAARMS InformationOfficer and Armor School Historian

NOTE: If not available at a bookstore, thepublishers note that credit card orders may beplaced by calling 1-800-225-5800.

The Storm Of Steel - From the Diary ofa German Storm Troop Officer on theWestern Front by Ernst Junger, NewYork, NY: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1996. (Re-print of London: Chatto and Windus, Inc.,1929) ISBN 0-86527-423-1. 319 pages,$13.95 (paperback).

Once a generation, a battle-hardened soldiertells a tale so encompassing and descriptivethat it chills the reader to the bone even dec-ades after the smoke has cleared. In TheStorm of Steel, Ernst Junger captivates thereader as he vividly and thoroughly recountsall the horrors and frightening realities oftrench warfare on the Western Front, 1914-1918. From the stench of rotting corpses tothe incessant drumming of artillery fire, fromthe blur of the night flares to the foul grit of liceand trench foot, Junger brings the readeralong through a four-year odyssey as a pla-toon leader and company commander in theunbelievable savagery. This is a gripping, hor-


BOOKS

rific, and fantastic story of leadership and self-less service.

Not unlike Guy Sajer in The Forgotten Sol-dier, Junger struggles to understand why fatehas brought him to such a grim existence. Herelates how: “I learned from this four years’schooling in force... that life has no depth ofmeaning except when it is pledged for anideal, and that there are ideals in comparisonwith which the life of an individual and even ofa people have no weight.” (316) He writes ofhow he seemingly traded his youth for thehigher ideals of Germany and how war islargely an inner, existential experience.

Against this powerful theme, Junger relatesmany amusing anecdotes of a soldier in a for-eign land. He describes his relationship with ayoung French girl; remembers the late nightcard games in the trenches; and even de-scribes how he and several of his cronies hap-pened across some red wine, got drunk, andalmost walked into a British dugout by acci-dent. Throughout the book, Junger expresseshis admiration for the British Tommy, whom heregards as a most formidable foe. He continu-ally praises the bravery and skills of his en-listed soldiers and holds them in close affec-tion. During the Battle of Cambrai, he comesacross his younger brother, Fritz, who waswounded; here he takes excerpts from both oftheir diaries to illustrate the fury of battle.

He continually expresses his anger towardthe generals for the stupidity and bloodshed oftrench warfare: “I cherished the firm suspicionthat this operation had been ordered from therear and by map, for it could not have oc-curred to anyone who had seen the lie of theland to give such orders as these” (292); thenhe becomes an ardent supporter of the newinfiltration (von Hutier) tactics. He asserts theneed for constant rehearsals, retraining, andreconnaissance before any mission. Jungeralso places leadership from the front as atenet of success. Junger was wounded 14times and received every medal for valor thathis country gave, to include the Pour le meriteafter the Battle of Amiens.

Despite the historical significance and first-hand account of the Great War, I believe thiswork has relevance today for two reasons.First, like Junger, we are faced with changesdue to improved technology. Yet it is still thesoldiers at the small unit level that must applythe new technology in order to succeed. Thereis no substitute for experience, rehearsals, andleadership from the front. Junger addressesthis as he retrains and drills his soldiers on thenew system of infiltration tactics. Second, inlight of the new technologies, many of the les-sons Junger discusses are timeless. Basictroop leading procedures and care for the sol-dier have not changed very much sinceJunger’s time and his thoughts on them havemuch relevance today. These are universallytreasured lessons that all soldiers should pon-der and exercise.

Also worthy of mention, as this book went topaperback print in October 1996, Ernst Jungerwas still alive in Germany at 101 years old.

After a brief stint in the Freikorps, he left theGerman Army in 1923 to become a writer. TheStorm of Steel was originally published in Eng-lish in 1929 in London, with Junger doing hisown translation.

This is truly a superb work, and every pro-fessional soldier will find value in it.

CPT DOUGLAS BOLTUCFt. Smith, Ark.

Patton’s Tank Drive, D-Day to Victoryby Michael Green. Motorbooks Interna-tional, Osceola, Wis., 1995, 160 pages,$19.95 (paperback).

Patton’s Tank Drive starts with a brief over-view of Patton’s early military career. The de-velopment of armored vehicles within the U.S.Army following World War I is covered withsome mention of Patton’s role in training tankunits. The book then leaps forward to Patton’sinvolvement in North Africa during World WarII. The book continues, covering Patton’s rolethrough Sicily, France, the Battle of the Bulge,and his march across Germany. It concludeswith Patton’s “Postwar Thoughts” and finally,his death.

The most striking feature about Patton’sTank Drive is that it is primarily a picture book.Much to the author’s credit, he cautions read-ers at the beginning that it consists mostly ofphotogrpahs for entertainment. Overall, thereis very little text, but the photographs are out-standing. Those familiar with the Patton Mu-seum in Fort Knox will recognize many of thephotographs. Some of Patton’s letters and hisbetter known speeches to the troops are in-cluded as well. There is an ample amount ofinformation relating to the development of thearmored fighting force, although much of itdoes not necessarily involve Patton.

One small annoyance is the captions seldommatch the photographs they accompany, andeven rarer do they correspond with the subjectof the author’s text. Typically, the captionscover a story or individual soldier’s experiencecompletely unrelated to the photograph. How-ever, the information in the captions is interest-ing even if incongruent with the text or photo-graph. I did find the wartime reports and theafter action reviews particularly interesting.

For those interested in a photographic his-tory of Patton and the tank, it is an enjoyablebook. If you want a good picture book ontanks, or a memorable souvenir of the PattonMuseum, then I highly recommend Patton’sTank Drive. However, those seeking some-thing more in-depth involving Patton or hisWorld War II campaigns may be surprised ordisappointed.

JOHN MURPHEYCPT, Armor

CAARNG


But what about the future? Peters has writ-ten about that, too. By far his darkest, mostdepressing work, The War in 2020 offers, inPeters’ own words, “a book about night-mares.” Do you ever wonder what mighthappen if everything really went to hell? Pe-ters has, and his 1991 novel serves up apretty grim scenario. Even so, the authorpresents his usual stress on character andpeople, not things. The future may be bleak,but the U.S. Army is still in there swinging,just the way we’d want it.

The world of 2020 is an even bigger messthan most of us could imagine. A remili-tarized Japanese state stands opposed to anexhausted America. Arming and assistingunsavory allies, including intransigent Irani-ans and other bellicose Central Asian pow-ers, the Japanese unleash their high-tech-nology war machine on the rotting corpse ofRussia, half-heartedly re-Communized fol-lowing an aborted fling at democracy. It isthe Russian Civil War of 1917-20 again. Thistime, though, the United States helps the en-feebled Reds.

Leading the small but potent American ex-peditionary force, Colonel George Taylor’s7th Cavalry Regiment brings into play a truewonder weapon. America’s last major Armyunit, the 7th relies on the new M-100 “FlyingFrog,” a sort of armed V-22 Osprey tiltrotoraircraft on steroids. The M-100s are chockedto the gills with stealth capability, jammers,and an unerring electromagnetic gun, not tomention great cavalry troopers. Guided bythe brilliant intelligence analysts and collec-tors of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, Taylor’s7th joins with the ramshackle Soviets to tryto stop the powerful Japanese and their nu-merous fanatical friends. If Force XXI evergoes to war, will it look like this, great flyingcavalry raids spanning near-continental dis-tances?

The War in 2020 strikes the reader as vi-sionary, exciting, and disturbing, all at thesame time. For a country enjoying a peacedividend, busily carving up the remnants ofour Cold War armed forces, Peters providesa wake-up call. Peace is not at hand, now orin the future. And when the great warcomes, in 2002 or 2020, our Army will beonly as good as its mounted arm of decision.

This, then, is Ralph Peters’ contribution:three well-written military novels guaranteedto interest and challenge all professional sol-diers. Peters clearly understands the art ofsoldiering, and that shines through on everypage. He has made the best use possible ofhis own military experience. The books ringtrue because the author has been there. Hehas marched in our boots, and is marchingstill. Shove a Peters novel in your cargopocket next time. You won’t regret it.

LTC DANIEL BOLGERCarlisle Barracks, Pa.

Ralph Peters’ Novels(Continued from page 51)

Although a sub-hand receipt holder, a tank pla-toon leader is responsible for the accountability ofmillions of dollars worth of equipment. Unfortu-nately, he often discovers critical equipment is miss-ing or unserviceable during such inopportune timesas pre-combat inspections, command directed in-ventories, or during missions. To help circumventthis problem at the company or troop level, a com-mander uses a monthly 10% inventory to track hisproperty and keep hand receipts accurate. A similarconcept, weekly platoon 10% inventories, is an ex-cellent way for a platoon leader to manage propertyaccountability and increase the overall readiness ofhis platoon’s equipment.

A weekly 10% system does not require a signifi-cant investment of time. With major end items, ba-sic issue items, and organizational property, a typi-cal tank platoon leader signs for approximately 120different items. Thus, to quarterly inspect all prop-erty, the 10% system requires a 12-item layout perweek. Compared with a 100% inventory, which usu-ally requires three to four hours, inventorying 12 items demandsonly about 15 minutes per week. Requiring only this short timeallows the platoon leadership to schedule the inventory when itwill not interfere with other field or garrison training.

The weekly 10% system is very flexible. The platoon leader cantailor what property he will inventory, based upon upcoming mis-sion requirements, concern over the condition of property, or aneed to initiate supply action. Not only is the inventory flexible inits content, but also in its method. By providing the platoon theinventory list just prior to the layout, the platoon leader can spot-check how well junior leaders are maintaining their equipment. Ifhe distributes the inventory list in advance, the platoon leader’ssubordinates will most likely pre-inspect and service the equip-ment prior to the layout. Both methods of inspection serve a differ-ent, but equally valuable, purpose.

Designing and implementing a weekly platoon 10% inventorysystem is simple and can be utilized in garrison or in the field.The only requirement is a copy of the platoon hand receipt andsome variation of an inspection checklist. An easy and convenientway to organize the system is to use a desktop spreadsheet pro-gram. One spreadsheet contains a list of all property organized bynomenclature, NSN, and date of last inventory. Another spread-sheet is a template for an inspection checklist. A simple cut andpaste operation from the property list to the inspection checklistmakes it easy to prepare the paperwork for the layout and trackthe dates of when the platoon last inventoried the property. Asample Microsoft Excel property list and inspection checklist(based on one unit’s MTOE) is available for download and modifi-cation on the ARMOR home page.

When used faithfully and inconjunction with periodic 100%layouts, commander’s monthly10% inventories, and properpre-combat inspections, aweekly platoon 10% inventorysystem enhances a platoonleader’s property accountabilityprogram. This system fosters ahealthy emphasis on propertyaccountability for all leaders andsoldiers in the platoon and in-creases the unit’s overall readi-ness.

1LT James Warder is a1995 graduate of the U.S.Military Academy. He servedas tank platoon leader in BCompany, 1-33 Armor, 2d IDfor 19 months. Currently, heis the scout platoon leader of1-33 Armor. His military edu-cation includes ABN, MWS,and AOBC.

The Weekly 10% Inventory Systemby First Lieutenant James E. Warder

PIN: 075616-000

Figure 2. Portion of Property List

Figure 1. Sample Inspection List

Documents

Armor, September-October 1997