Armor Magazine March April 1998

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 04368

For the most part, the mail that comes into ARMOR iscomplimentary about what we are doing with your maga-zine. You generally like the mix of articles and largely ap-prove of the “tad of this and tad of that” recipe, rather thana thematic-based approach. You like having some picturesto break up the text, and you uniformly enjoy Jody Har-mon’s artistry. We always appreciate that kind of warmand fuzzy feedback.

However, there is also the occasional reader whodoesn’t like what is going on within these covers. Eitherthe mix of material isn’t right, or we aren’t focusing on thecorrect issues, or we’ve committed some other fault. Wefind that cold and prickly feedback less comfortable, butevery bit as useful.

We need to hear from you periodically, thumbs up orthumbs down, to ensure that we keep our eyes focusedon the leveling bubble. If we have the formula pretty muchright, let us know. If we have done bad things to thepoochie, by all means let us know, so we can effectchange if necessary. We can effect change easily, if youwant it, and the status quo is no problem, either.

When criticizing, there are a couple of factors about theoperation everyone should keep in mind:

— Other than those writers who are tasked to writeschoolhouse articles, all of the authors are volunteering toshare their opinions. Some of them you will not agreewith; some of them will spur you to action; some of themwill make you wish you had written it down first, becauseyou had been saying the same thing for the last couple ofyears; some of them will make you wish you could betheir senior rater just once. But the bottom line is this: theyare volunteering to stand up.

— What appears in the magazine is the best of what peo-ple send in, and we publish in about the same proportionof each type of article that we receive. If you have a com-plaint that there is too much of this, or not enough of that,get off your butt and write something. It is intellectually alltoo easy to snipe, but it takes a lot more in the guts depart-ment to be the one laying it out for the comments of others.

— The contents of the magazine are unofficial. Sure, theChief of Armor pays the bill, but a long line of Chiefs havefelt secure enough in the position to allow this forum toexist. You can say that the emperor’s clothes are thread-bare, or even missing, and not commit career suicide. Inthat kind of environment, then, you will see pieces that arenot always within our published doctrine, other pieces thatseem fantastic, and ideas that totally tick you off. I saythat this is the strength of our magazine, and it was one ofthe things that, as an ROTC cadet over twenty years ago,appealed to me. I thought it would be pretty darn cool tobe affiliated with a part of the Army that thought and gavea public forum to what oftentimes amounts to dissent.

That said, if the magazine ever heads in a direction thatyou feel is suspect, say so. It is your publication, andtruthfully, you have a large say in our direction. Pre-1973,when the United States Armor Association printed themagazine, the Association’s Executive Council oversawthe magazine’s ops. The current Chief of Armor, MG Har-meyer, like his predecessors, continues to follow GeneralStarry’s lead in 1973 of promoting this professional dis-course and encouraging debate as healthy for each oneof us personally and professionally, for the branch specifi-cally, and for our Army generally. It works for me. Howabout you?

— TAB

Was it Good for You?

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-98-2

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

March-April 1998, Vol. eVIl No.2

Features

7 Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Chris Baggott

12 OPFOR Counterreconnaissance at the National Training Center by Captain Richard Randazzo

14 KILL OPFOR: The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at the NTC by Captain Robert B. Brown

16 National Training Center on Wheels by Major Ron A. McMurry

17 Press the Attack: A 5-Step Technique For Offensive Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Slater

20 A Crisis of Confidence in Armor? by Mike Sparks

23 Global Cavalry by Captain William S. Riggs

30 TASK FORCE REMAGEN: Sustaining a Heavy Task Force via Aerial Resupply by Major Mark A. Olinger

33 The Wheel Versus Track Dilemma by Paul Hornback

35 Modernizing the M577 A2 by Captain Walter B. Sturek Jr.

38 The Modernization of Austria's Mechanized Forces by Walter A. Hamburger

41 Spain's Armor Force Modernizes by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio J. Candil

43 Tactical Vignette 98-2, "The Defense of Kozda"

45 Solutions to Tactical Vignette 97-2, "Ambush at Dogwood Crossing"

48 Armor's Role in the Future Combined Arms Team by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

50 Simulations and Training by Major Mark Alan Eastman and Mr. George Helton

56 An Azimuth Indicator for Tank Gunners? by First Lieutenant Curtis Taylor

61 On the Way ... Leadership is the Focus of 1998 Armor Conference

Back 1998 Armor Conference and Armor Trainer Update Tentative Agenda Cover

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 5 Commander's Hatch 6 Driver's Seat

58 Reviews

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u.s. Army Armor School

Director, Armor School COL Richard P. Geier E-Mail: [email protected]

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u.S. Army Armor Center

Commanding General MG George Harmeyer E-Mail: [email protected]

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Article Addressed Issues“No One Wants to Discuss”

Dear Sir:

MAJ Donald Vandergriff’s article, “Withoutthe Proper Culture: Why Our Army CannotPractice Maneuver Warfare,” ARMOR, Jan-Feb ’98, serves as a startling testament of thefrightening condition of our Army today. MAJVandergriff proposes that it is impossible forthe Army to adopt maneuver warfare givenour current culture of, among other things,“centralized control,” our focus on “individual-ism and self-promotion,” and “zero-defects.” Istrongly applaud MAJ Vandergriff’s assess-ment of our culture and his determination thatmaneuver warfare is beyond our grasp, giventhese cultural weaknesses.

MAJ Vandergriff proposes a real revolutionin the Army culture. I believe that he has ad-dressed the issues that no one wants to dis-cuss in his assessment of the Army today.Before we can successfully execute the ArmyAfter Next, we must look at our basic selvesand come to terms with our shortcomings andfaults. The problems in personnel manage-ment, leadership, and centralized control areshort-sighted reactions and habits benefitingonly the current Army and not the Army thatour junior soldiers and leaders will lead andoperate in 2010 and beyond.

I applaud his call to tear down the facadesof centralized control and address the culturalreasons for not adapting to maneuver war-fare. Our failure to meet his call will stymiethe adoption of whatever form of warfare wetake on in the next century and contribute tothe further demise of our professional culture.

To the “Technos,” I must challenge yourthoughts in regard to the development ofGerman military reform by quoting GeneralCharles de Gaulle, “the superiority of good(German) troops was abundantly clear. Howelse is one to explain the prolonged successof the German armies against so many oppo-nents? For the 1,700,000 deaths which theycounted in all, the Germans, better trainedthan anyone else, killed 3,200,000 enemies;for the 750,000 prisoners which they lost,they took 1,900,000.” James S. Corum, TheRoots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt andGerman Military Reform, (University Press ofKansas, 1992), p. 13.

As military professionals, we must all recog-nize that we are currently at a paradigm inmilitary affairs. It is time to look into the eyesof the elephant and change our course beforewe are overcome by our own minutia.

Undoubtedly, many of you will think myviews and comments are a bit reactionary. Iwould encourage you to study Dwight Eisen-hower’s experiences in the 1920s when hewas threatened with court martial for advocat-ing stronger tank forces.

MAJ Vandergriff, I raise my glass in yourhonor and accept your challenge to start arevolution in military thinking. Our failure to

follow your call will only lead to failure on to-morrow’s battlefields.

ANDRE HALLCPT, Armor

(USAR)

Heavy Force EmphasisFlirts with Irrelevancy

Dear Sir:

I am a currently serving Armor officer. I writeto voice my displeasure with the irrelevanceto which the Armor Center is condemning mybranch. I also wish to state my dissatisfactionwith ARMOR Magazine, that increasingly dila-tory and backward-looking professional jour-nal published by the Center.

As much as Armor Branch may wish other-wise, WWII is over. As inconvenient as it maybe to our heavy force structure, the Cold Waris also over. The probability that, in the fore-seeable future, we will fight another industrial-ized nation in high-intensity mobile armoredwarfare is so close to zero that it might aswell be zero. The Abrams and Bradleys aremagnificent vehicles, but the major conflictsfor which they were designed are in our past.The present and future requirements for ar-mor are much “lighter.”

I am not suggesting that Armor Branchabandon the heavy force completely — it is,after all, the ultimate guarantor of Americandominance in land warfare. I am concernedthat by concentrating almost exclusively onheavy force operations, Armor Branch is be-coming increasingly irrelevant to the kind offorce projection operations that are certain tobe the wave of the future.

We need light, strategically mobile armoredvehicles that are capable of operating in a lo-gistically austere environment. We do nothave such armor now, nor were we going toget it with the miserably conceived ArmoredGun System, nor do we have, as far as Iknow, a serious initiative to develop or other-wise obtain such armored vehicles. Why isthis? Why are we the only army in the worldwithout armored cars or wheeled light ar-mored vehicles? I submit that the rest of theworld is not wrong in their appreciation of theutility of light armor. I believe it is Fort Knox’sview — that the only bona fide armored vehi-cles are track-laying, 20-70 ton behemoths,capable of shooting it out with some allegedFuture Soviet Tank — that is narrow-minded.However limited the role of light armor in theconfines of the Fulda Gap, the wide rangingbattlespaces of the CNN, force projection agescream for armored vehicles which are bothstrategically and tactically transportable to,and logistically supportable in, the hot spotsof the world on a moment’s notice.

What would a light armored wheeled vehicleoffer the force in terms of capability? The listincludes traditional armor virtues:

- Mobility, both strategic and tactical, en-hanced by fuel economy and high operational

readiness rates, meaning a small logistics tail,which also serves to increase strategic andoperational maneuver capability.

- Armor protection against small arms, theprincipal Third World threat.

- Firepower. A modest turret supporting a25mm Chain Gun, coax machine gun, andthermal sight, especially if stabilized, woulddominate most any Third World fire fight.TOW and mortar variants would round out acombined arms team.

- Shock effect against poorly armed oppo-nents.

- Ground reconnaissance over large areaswith great speed.

- High powered, mobile radios, capable ofcalling in fire support from whatever sourcesare available.

The vehicle should not be designed to de-feat a heavy armor threat. First of all, addingsuch a requirement would, as we discoveredwith the AGS, increase weight and cost anddecrease strategic and tactical mobility, de-feating the very purpose of the vehicle. Thefact is, most potential adversaries have nomodern armor capability. What modest capa-bilities they possess can be defeated by acombination of lightweight anti-armor weap-ons and fire support called in with tactical ra-dios — this was how the Marines defeatedthe Iraqi armor thrust at Khafji. If the enemypossesses sophisticated heavy armor, thenour task force could always deploy Abrams todefeat it. The U.S. armed forces already pos-sess a plethora of tank-killing systems and isin no need of yet another.

The absence of a light armored vehicle hasin the past, and will in the future, hurt Armyoperations. Grenada is a textbook example ofthe efficacy of small amounts of armor inThird World environments. While the 82dlacked armor and was pinned down on theairfield taking casualties, a small Marine ar-mored force overran the northern 4/5 of theis land, including the capita l c i ty. InMogadishu, soldiers died because no armorwas available to rescue them. Our fine infan-trymen on rapid deployment missions deservearmor fire support that can deploy with them.

Even our own armor scouts and battalionsare disadvantaged by our failure to providethem an adequate reconnaissance vehicle.The scout HMMWV is a failure. No real ar-mor; no turret; inadequate, add-on optics —the HMMWV was designed as a utility vehicleto replace the jeep, not as a scout car. Ourscouts routinely lose the battle in training ex-ercises because they don’t have a vehicle ca-pable of detecting the enemy before the en-emy detects them. We can do better.

On page 7 of the April 1997 issue of Sol-diers, I am appalled to find a story about theMilitary Police Corps’ new Armored SecurityVehicle. Wheeled, armored, and with turret-mounted weapons, the vehicle is in fact anarmored car which an armored scout or cav-alryman could use for any variety of missions.It looks remarkably deployable, ideally suitedfor providing armor support in Third World en-

ARMOR — March-April 1998 3

vironments. I’m sure the vehicle has its limita-tions, but it also clearly affords capabilities notfound elsewhere in the Army inventory. I amashamed that the MPs are growing to fill theneed we in the Armor community failed tomeet. Task force commanders in need of lightarmor or ground reconnaissance can now calltheir Provost Marshal rather than their cavalryand armor commanders. Have we givenaway our seat at the table?

And as the MPs slap us in the face, whatare we doing in the Armor Force to preparefor future missions? If ARMOR is any indica-tor — nothing! This magazine has becomedevoted to military history, extolling the pio-neers of armor between the wars, reveling inWWII armor exploits, congratulating ourselveson the mature armor doctrines of the ColdWar period, and then propagandizing us re-garding high-tech heavy force warfare in thecoming century. Rarely is an article in themagazine controversial or thought-provoking.(The letters are often worthwhile, however.)

I would suggest that ARMOR focus on thevery real conflicts that engulf the world, andthe wide spectrum of armored battle found inthose conflicts. ARMOR should also debatethe critical decisions facing Armor Branch dur-ing these truly revolutionary times in militaryaffairs. The magazine should be forward look-ing, providing the intellectual and practical un-derpinnings for a redirected and revitalizedArmored Force.

I remain convinced that armored warriorscan prove themselves decisive on a greatmany battlefields throughout the world. How-ever, we must have more versatile vehiclesand organizations if we are to be effective inthe full gamut of conflict. A vital and aggres-sive Armor Branch will enhance our nationalsecurity. The Armor Center and ARMORmagazine can do a better job in keeping Ar-mor Branch in the vanguard of the Nation’sland forces.

STEPHEN L. MELTONLTC, Armor

Professor of Military Science

ARMOR Needs a ForumFor “Out of the Box” Thinking

Dear Sir:

As a recent re-subscriber to the magazine, Iwant to congratulate you on its growth. It wasrefreshing to see some challenges to sys-temic compliance in the form of MAJ Vander-griff’s article on OPMS and MG Bautz’ re-minder that it’s high time to return to princi-ples, from the top down. There is a degree ofsameness, though, that seems to have per-petuated itself over the years — fat tanks, bigguns, and technical orientation.

Armor now, and for the foreseeable future,faces and will face unparalleled challenges.Among them are operational relevance in amuch changed global geography, deployabil-ity as a part of a strategic combined armsteam, and demonstration of any real grasp of

the meaning of the “information revolution” toforces, leaders, and the art and practice ofwar. There seems to be a lot of bandwagoni-tis — too little real jousting.

What suggests itself is providing a forum forthoughtful, not axe-grinding, men and womenin, or interested in, the Armor Force to ex-press “out-of-the-box” views. One meansmight be to have a “Cavalry Journal” sectionin each issue. My notion is to recapture thespirit of open discussion and argument of thatrevered periodical, perhaps omitting Patton’simprovements to the saber and the like.

We have a lot of good minds out there. Weneed ’em all! Time is past due to give theirthoughts exposure to the force rather than let-ting them atrophy from disinterest, poor poli-tics, or the other Halon extinguishers of the“system.”

BG (Ret.) JOHN KIRKLakewood, Wash.

Beef Up Armor Platoons,Don’t Reduce Their Size

Dear Sir:

I read LTC Kevin C.M. Benson’s article,“The Armor Battalion After Next: A ModestProposal,” with great interest. It seems ironicthat while the Infantry School is examiningthe re-expansion of the rifle squad, the baseinfantry unit of maneuver, back to 11 menfrom its current 9 men, a noted Armor/Cavalrythinker calls for the reduction of the tank pla-toon, the base armor unit of maneuver.

I must weigh in against his proposal for anumber of reasons. By reducing the platoonto a mere three tanks, he would eliminate theflexibility of the tank platoon to conduct split-section operations, a likely method of employ-ment in a MOUT environment. Since infantry-men think about MOUT extensively, to includeuse of tanks, and it is quickly becoming themost likely terrain for future conflict, this is anot an inconsequential consideration. Withonly three tanks, someone does not have awingman, likely the platoon leader. Withoutsomeone directly responsible for the tank pla-toon leader’s security while he orchestratesthe fight from the front, he is now forced torevert to a pure “command and control” roletoward the rear, slightly out of harm’s way.We now realistically reduce the tank platoonto only two effective engagement systems. Fi-nally, while I am personally not a big “battlecalculus” fan, if we take tank casualties, onetank destroyed or otherwise out of the fightreduces the platoon to 67% strength. Mostunits call for reconstitution at 70%, the pointwhere units consider themselves combat inef-fective.

I propose a return to the five-tank platoon.Additionally, in keeping with LTC Benson’sdesire to reduce the number of tanks in a bat-talion, let’s go to two tank platoons in a com-pany. This will still give the company twelvetanks, two less than now. Now we also have

two robust platoons, both capable of split-sec-tion operations and able to absorb somecasualties, instead of three weak platoons.The platoon leader still does not have a wing-man, but he does not need one. He can fightas part of the “heavy” section, the main effort,or he can revert to a more traditional “com-mand and control” posture, slightly offset andin slightly less danger, but still have four ef-fective engagement systems.

A further proposal is, instead of eliminatingD Company, convert it into a LAV-equippedcavalry troop. Now, you have a superb recon-naissance capability with a fidelity for sus-tained operations the scout platoon nevercould achieve. Place the battalion mortars inthis organization since they most likely getused in support of the scouts, anyway.

I question the combining of the battalion XOand the S3 into the X3. Are we really sayingthat we can have one man do both jobs?Most majors have enough on their plate tryingto fulfill one of those jobs. They are bothtough jobs. Furthermore, when does he sleepin a tactical operation? Or in garrison, for thatmatter? While the battalion staff needs reduc-tion, a total elimination of the staff, especiallythe operations, plans, and training staff, isprobably unrealistic.

CHRISTOPHER M. COGLIANESECPT, Infantry

Ft. Campbell, Ky.

LAV Unit Would Fill GapLeft by Disbanding 3/73 AR

Dear Sir:

The disbanding of the 3/73d Armor in 1997has left the 82d Airborne Division, the world’spremier large reaction force, in a situationwhere it has no organic, air-droppable, armor(or protected gun system) capability that canbe inserted with the rest of the division byparachute. If you have a secure airfield tobring in armor, you’d send the 3d ID in thefirst place; if you need to secure that airfield,you may need armor on the ground with theinitial assault force.

Is there a possible solution that does notrequire starting from scratch to give the 82dwhat it needs: mobile shock capability withcannon firepower that does not require a se-cure airfield to land? I believe so, and it existsnow.

I’d build a wheeled light cavalry squadronaround the GM Light Assault Vehicle (LAV)and several existing variants, currently usedby the USMC. I’d use the Panhard VBL (Vehi-cle Blindee Leger or Light Armored Vehicle)for the smaller vehicle needs of the squadron.I’d base unit trailers, including those outfittedas work spaces for command/staff functions,on the Italian TANGRAM concept of enclosedamphibious trailers. The LAV and VBL are

4 ARMOR — March-April 1998

Continued on Page 54

The 1998 Armor Conference is rapidlyapproaching, and the Fort Knox team isin the final stages of planning this annualevent. From May 17th through the 21st,the United States Army Armor Centerwill once again become the focal pointfor tankers and cavalrymen all over theworld, for it is in this setting that the Ar-mor Force conducts an open and honestdiscussion of the issues affectingmounted warriors. As is the standard atthe Home of Mounted Warfare, we havecome up with an outstanding program.The two-day Armor Trainer Update(ATU) will take place on May 17th and18th, giving our Army National Guardand Army Reserve brethren the opportu-nity to discuss issues specific to their ar-eas. The Unit Scheduling Conferencewill be held in conjunction with the ATUand will give units from all componentsthe opportunity to schedule the FortKnox training areas and the highly suc-cessful Virtual Training Program. Themuch acclaimed Armor Conference GolfScramble will be held on the 19th, fol-lowed immediately by the garden partyand Regimental Assemblies. The ArmorConference itself will kick off on the20th. We have added a half day to thepresentation schedule, so you can expectto receive two full days of briefings/dis-cussions prior to our adjournment late onthe afternoon of the 21st.

The Armor Center looks forward towelcoming an estimated 800 guests fromlocations all over the world. It’s interest-ing to note that each year we see an in-crease in the attendance of soldiers andofficers from allied nations. This is a tes-tament to the quality and content of ourconference presentations, and this yearwill be no exception. Numerous govern-ment contractors will once again set up

displays in Skidgel Hall giving every-body the opportunity to see the latestmilitary equipment and next-generationtraining devices. The planning andpreparation for this event is enormous,and our continued success can be attrib-uted to a post-level effort involving hun-dreds of people. I extend my heartfeltthanks to all those responsible for thepresentations, social activities sponsoredby the Armor Association, and overallsupport provided by the Fort Knox garri-son. I encourage everyone to attend thisfirst-class Armor Center symposium.

Past armor conferences have focusedon emerging technologies, new equip-ment, digitization, and ever-changingmission requirements. The U.S. Armymounted force has the best equipment,the most highly-trained soldiers, and themost effective training programs in theworld. All of our technology and newequipment is useless if not for our mostvaluable asset: well-trained, well-led,combat-ready soldiers. Thus, “leader-ship” will be the focus during the 49thannual Armor Conference with a themeentitled “The Mounted Leader Todayand Into Tomorrow.”

The Armor branch has produced someof the Army’s most visionary leaders.Notable historical figures, such as Chaf-fee, Walker, Patton, Abrams, and Sulli-van, were able to inspire and lead sol-diers at all levels throughout some of themost turbulent times in our nation’s mili-tary history. Periods of dramatic change,introductions of new equipment andtechnology, and changes in organiza-tional structures were significant chal-lenges for them to overcome. We findourselves in the same situation today. Ifthe Armor Force is to continue a tradi-tion of excellence, today’s leaders need

to exercise the same qualities and fore-sight as those in the past have demon-strated. Today’s leaders must not only bevisionary, but also infused with the war-rior spirit. In a peacetime Army, manage-ment skills are often those most recog-nized and rewarded. It is much harder todistinguish the true warrior leaders fromthose that are simply managers. It is ourwarrior leaders, who can capably leadsoldiers and manage resources in peace-time, who will win our future battles andwars.

This is the challenge I pose to you: wemust do everything in our power to at-tract, develop, and retain the best sol-diers and officers who will lead the Ar-mor Force into the next century. Techno-logical advances and new equipmentfielding are important, but we must notoverlook some of the basic fundamentalsof soldiering. We must recreate an envi-ronment where inspirational leadership,technological competence, and the war-rior spirit can permeate throughout ourforce. We’ve seen what future conflictsand missions will look like, and we’veseen that the small-unit leader with bootson the ground is the most importantfacet of a military operation. The speak-ers who will deliver Armor Conferencepresentations will include our senior ar-mor/cavalry leadership and the seniorleadership from the Infantry, Aviationand Artillery Schools, and each is cogni-zant of the fact that effective leaders willmake or break our Army.

I highly encourage you to attend thisevent. I guarantee you will leave FortKnox with a better understanding of thechallenges we face, and with a sharedvision of where we, as a mounted force,need to focus our efforts. See you at theConference!

MG George H. Harmeyer Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center


1998 Armor Conference

A Focus on the Leadership Challenge

As you read this article, the new 17-12-1/2 is at the printer. In January, it wentout to the force on disk. The manual hasbeen improved as a training tool, andwill make gunnery training more chal-lenging. The bar has been repaired andraised a bit; more importantly, this man-ual sets the stage for raising the barmuch higher over the next three years. Itis an interim manual only; within threeyears, separate gunnery manuals forM1A1 and M1A2-series tanks must bepublished. These manuals must changegunnery training standards radically, totake even further advantage of our kill-ing and training systems.

This manual should have been revisedin FY 96. There has been a real need tocombine M1, M1A1, and M1A2 gun-nery into one standardized gunnery pro-gram. Once begun, the revision involvedmore input from the field than has beenusual in the past. A Master Gunners’conference (the first in several years)was hosted by Crew Gunnery DoctrineBranch in November, 1997, and thepresentations and discussions involvingMaster Gunner Branch, III Corps,USAREUR, U.S. Marines, and ArmyReserves/National Guard were very use-ful in resolving issues and identifyingcritical updates and revisions. To all in-volved in the conference, thanks forhelping the entire force. To our“stuckees” for this new manual, espe-cially MSG Delabar, SFC Lipsey, andSSGs Pease and Machell: “Well done.”Now, get back to work.

Following are the significant changes:

•• Standardized Tables added for allAbrams tanks that incorporate up tofour targets in an engagement.

•• Delayed target presentations (between10 to 25 seconds).

•• All M1A2 gunnery employment tech-niques added.

•• New scoring procedures developed.The same scorecard is used for theM1A1 and M1A2 tables (only thepoints for given times are different),which eliminate the need to use theold charts (times/points ON the score-

card). Once trained, you will find itmuch easier to use in the tower.

•• Added requirement for IVIS/Digitaltraffic (for those vehicles so equipped)to qualify tank tables. A digital contactreport must be sent after each engage-ment. Crews that lose the digital linkduring the engagement may completethe engagement, then pull off formaintenance. IVIS competency is acore crew competency and must be re-inforced during Tables IV, VIII, andXII.

•• New crew penalty for “not adhering toconditions:” 0 points for the engage-ment. No more “30 point for crew cut”for cheating. You lose the engagement.

•• 30 point penalty for not engaging alltargets in an engagement.

•• 10% penalty from the TOTALSCORE for killing friendly targets onTT XII.

•• Minimum and maximum lateral spreadfor targets implemented. Based onrange of targets, the goal is that twotargets cannot be acquired in 10 pwr.

•• Added “screening under extreme con-ditions” that gives guidance, tank-to-target range, and the target dimensionsfrom 500m to 1500m in 100m incre-ments. Intent is to use this informationonly when conditions make it impossi-ble to screen normally, and should notbe used because they might makescreening “easier.”

•• Weapon planning for 120mm maingun increased from 2000m to 2500m.This advantages the increased killingdistance of the gun when planning en-gagement/displacement.

•• Deleted requirement to remove/installthe breechblock on TCGST. Station 5requirements are now: clearing thegun, function check, firing pin check,and firing circuit check.

•• Eliminated stations 11, 12, 14, 15, 16from the TCGST. They are performedin the UCOFT. Eliminated station 13,because it had nothing to do with vehi-cle/crew safety.

•• Updated the COFT/AGTS prereq-uisites for live-fire training.

•• Allows COFT/AGTS to be used inplace of TT I through III. Specifies the

engagements which can replicate thetables. Units should still prefer to usethe tables in order to train crew inter-action on the actual platform.

Six additional improvements weremade in this new manual:

•• A screening test action checklist wasadded to guide “tower talk” duringscreening.

•• Boresighting and zeroing techniqueswere added for tank-mounted machineguns.

•• Chapter 4 (Fire Control System Cali-bration) and Chapter 5 (ScreeningTest) were combined into a new Chap-ter 4 (Fire Control System Calibrationand Maintenance) for M1, M1A1, andM1A2 tanks.

•• TCGST roll-up sheets were added forindividual, platoon, and company.

•• Tactical tables have been placed backin the manual.

•• An Appendix B replaces FM 17-12-7,Tank Combat Training Devices.The Chief of Armor has given us three

years to devise new gunnery trainingstandards and techniques. Future tank ta-bles must test armor crewmen on theirgunnery, tactical, and information man-agement skills. Tactical Gunnery Train-ing must eliminate canned scenarios andpredictable engagements. Firing ranges,as well as vehicles, must be completelydigitized. Alibis must be eliminated, andcrews required to “fight through” mal-functions. The qualification “battlefield”must require target acquisition and en-gagement “beyond the fenders” (let’s tryspreading arrays out to the rear fenders)using TWGSS. This raises the possibilityof two or more TTVIII qualificationruns, one using TWGSS, in order to in-crease acquisition/engagement spreadwhile ensuring safety. While there mustbe Armor-wide tasks (engagements), therange scenarios must be unit METL-driven; there should be several versionsof TT XII, for example.

That should keep Crew GunneryBranch busy for three years. Our forcewill benefit, especially if our entire forceparticipates in the process.


Repairing and Raising the Bar:FM 17-12-1/-2 Revisionby CSM David L. Lady, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

A successful defense depends on find-ing, targeting, destroying, or suppressingthe enemy reconnaissance assets beforethey can report the unit’s defensive posi-tions.

FM 34-2-1

Security operations obtain informationabout the enemy and provide reactiontime, maneuver space, and protection tothe main body ... counterreconnaissanceis an inherent task in all security opera-tions.

FM 17-95

Counterreconnaissance is the sum ofactions taken at all echelons to counterenemy reconnaissance and surveillanceefforts through the depth of the area ofoperations. It is active and passive andincludes combat action to destroy or re-pel enemy reconnaissance elements.

FM 17-95

Recent studies conducted by the ArmorCenter, TRADOC, and the RAND Cor-poration, as well as Combat TrainingCenter (CTC) take-home packages, indi-cate that serious weaknesses exist incounterreconnaissance doctrine, organi-zation, and training. There is a growingbelief throughout the mechanized com-munity that these weaknesses are solv-able through a more focused reconnais-sance and counterreconnaissance plan-ning effort. Clearly, force-on-force re-sults from the National Training Center(NTC) continue to be the catalyst behindthese beliefs. This paper provides a con-flicting opinion regarding procedures toresolve this perceived training shortfall.It emphasizes that security operationsexecution, discipline, and enforcedstandard operating procedures, vice in-creased planning or a revision of doc-trine, will achieve required trainingstandards.

A Typical NTC Battle and Synopsis:

Training Day (TD) 4, 1300 hours: 1stBrigade, 99th Division (BLUFOR) hadjust completed executing a movement tocontact against the opposing force’s (OP-FOR) 32nd Guards Motorized RifleRegiment (GMRR) in the NTC’s centralcorridor. The brigade attack began at Hill720 with movement oriented from eastto west. Based on templated BLUFORand OPFOR movement rates, it was an-ticipated that first contact would occursomewhere in the vicinity of Phase Line(PL) Red (vicinity Barstow Road). 1stBrigade reconnaissance forces identifiedthe lead OPFOR motorized rifle brigade(MRB) formation approximately 20 kmswest of PL Red (vicinity Crash Hill).The OPFOR’s orientation focused at twopredominant choke points (Brown andDebnum passes). The lead elements ofboth units gained contact at Hill 876. Al-though 1st Brigade fought tenaciously,the results were similar to many otherNTC fights: a victorious OPFOR and adefeated 1st Brigade. Within minutes af-ter the end of the battle, 1st Brigade wasgiven a follow-on mission to conduct adefense in sector that included both theNTC’s northern and central corridors.The 52nd Division (the NTC’s notionalhigher headquarters) anticipated that thebrigade would have approximately 36-40hours to plan and prepare the defensivesector.

TD 4, 1700 hours: After a hasty mis-sion and course-of-action analysis, a sub-sequent wargame, and leader’s recon-naissance, the 1st Brigade commanderissued guidance to his subordinate com-manders. TF 1-2 (AR) would defend thecentral corridor while TF 3-4 (IN) (-)would defend the northern corridor. Onearmored team from TF 3-4 was desig-nated the brigade reserve. Both taskforces were responsible for counterre-

connaissance operations in their desig-nated sectors. Task force scout platoonswere placed under the control of the bri-gade S2 and were positioned forward ofthe task forces with the mission of pro-viding early warning of enemy recon-naissance forces prior to the maneuverbattle, and to focus indirect fires duringthe battle.

TD 4, 2000 hours: TF 1-2 designated ATeam (mech) as its counterreconnais-sance force with a subsequent mission asthe task force reserve. A Team estab-lished its counterreconnaissance posi-tions along PL BLUE (Granite Pass tojust west of Chod Hill). Fourteen combatsystems were spread north to southalong a frontage of approximately 10kms (800-900 meters between vehicles).TF 3-4(-) also identified one mechanizedinfantry team (B Team) as its counterre-connaissance force, also with a sub-sequent task force reserve mission. TheB Team (mech) commander positionedhis forces along PL BLUE (vicinityEcho Valley from Granite Pass to Refrig-erator Gap).

TD 6, 0600 hours: The 32 GMRR at-tacked. Both division and regimental re-connaissance forces had easily pene-trated 1st Brigade’s counterreconnais-sance screen line during the previoustwo days. The OPFOR commander es-sentially had a 90-percent accurate readof the BLUFOR defenses. With limitedforces to conduct the mission, the 1stBrigade had decided to economize hisdefensive preparation efforts along thenorth wall of the central corridor. Need-less to say, the OPFOR commander fullyunderstood the inherent weakness of theBLUFOR defense and attempted to ex-ploit it. An MRB-size forward detach-ment (FD) was organized from availableOPFOR assets and was given a terrain-oriented mission focused at Hills 876


FROM THE NTC:

Executing The Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fightby Lieutenant Colonel (P) Chris Baggott

and 780. Fundamental to this FD terrainobjective was the implied task to fix(prevent BLUFOR maneuver against theregimental main body) BLUFOR forcesin that proximity. Simultaneously, as theFD attacked in the south, the 32 GMRRmain body attacked along the centralcorridor’s north wall.

TD 6, 1000 hours: Change of Mission.The 1st Brigade defensive sector hasbeen penetrated and two MRBs are con-solidating on the OPFOR objective. TheAAR will begin in six hours.

BATTLE ANALYSIS

OPFOR:

The success or failure of the OPFOR’sattack against a defending enemy is al-ways predicated upon the success of thereconnaissance effort or, to use a non-doctrinal term, the success of the OP-FOR’s “reconnaissance pull.” Recon-naissance pull emphasizes identifyingand exploiting enemy weakness. This re-connaissance technique determinesmovement routes suitable for maneuverthrough an analysis of enemy dispositionand composition and “pulls” the mainOPFOR attacking force along the path ofleast resistance. Generally speaking, theOPFOR will never be able to mass suffi-cient combat power in accordance withdoctrinal norms to attack a typicalBLUFOR defense. At a minimum, theOPFOR commander would expect tohave an overall 3:1 superiority when at-tacking a prepared BLUFOR defense.More importantly, and key to the focusof OPFOR reconnaissance efforts, isthat, at the point of penetration, the OP-FOR expects to achieve a positional 9:1force ratio advantage. The reality of theNTC is that, at best, numerical parity be-tween competing forces (BLUFOR de-fense to OPFOR offense) has becomethe standard. Thus, to gain situationalnumerical superiority at the point ofpenetration, the OPFOR commander isforced to attack on a narrow front. Fromthe above discussion, it is obvious thatOPFOR success is undeniably linked toits reconnaissance effort. When OPFORreconnaissance fails, the OPFOR com-mander will be unable to identify thepoints or point of penetration and focushis combat power. Simply speaking,without adequate intelligence (a mini-mum read of 90 percent of the composi-tion and disposition of the BLUFOR de-fense), the OPFOR commander is forcedto fight the complexity of a deliberatedefense using a combat formation simi-lar to that he would employ during aregimental meeting battle.

Back to our example. Two nights priorto the OPFOR attack, divisional recon-naissance forces attempted to movethrough the BLUFOR defensive sector.Granted, continuous training and a thor-ough understanding of terrain is an un-disputed OPFOR advantage.

Starting at dusk, division reconnais-sance troops begin probing the BLUFORdefense, looking for possible holes alongthe counterreconnaissance line. The OP-FOR effort is staggered over time (wavetechnique) and not all reconnaissancetroops will begin moving at dusk. Somewill begin at midnight and others in theearly morning. This is done, simply, toprovide a continuous reconnaissancepush with the belief that some time dur-ing the night some or all of the counter-reconnaissance troops will become lesseffective (sleep deprivation, loss of focusand situational awareness). In this case,by first light on TD 5, 50 percent of di-vision reconnaissance were on their re-spective reconnaissance objectives and50 percent were dead. Throughout TD 5,division reconnaissance accurately re-ported the disposition and compositionof each BLUFOR defensive position.

Regimental reconnaissance initiatedmovement at dusk TD 5. As regimentalreconnaissance moved into the BLUFORdefensive sector, remaining division re-connaissance moved through theBLUFOR rear area. No link-ups or ex-change of information between recon-naissance forces occurred. Based uponthe movement success of division recon-naissance the night before, regimentalreconnaissance would use near-identicalmovement routes. Similar to the pre-vious night, regimental reconnaissancewas 50 percent effective in passingthrough the BLUFOR defense enroute totheir assigned reconnaissance objectives.Since the OPFOR reconnaissance planassumed less than 100 percent success,there were sufficient redundant person-nel and systems to cope with a 75 per-cent attrition rate and still be capable ofachieving the reconnaissance objectives.

The success of the reconnaissance ef-fort set the conditions for the OPFORcommander to exploit inherent BLUFORweaknesses. The knowledge gained fromdivision reconnaissance enabled the OP-FOR battle staff to identify the exactpoint of penetration. It also allowed thesystematic and focused use of combatmultipliers (artillery, close air support,EW, etc.) either to isolate or destroy en-emy forces at the point of penetration.To see the enemy in order to maneuvereffectively against him, and ultimatelydestroy him, is not solely linked to the

reconnaissance effort. Prior to the mis-sion, the OPFOR commander refined theenemy situational template and con-ducted a thorough leader’s reconnais-sance. These efforts enabled him to un-derstand the nature of the terrain in hisarea of operation and gain an apprecia-tion of the enemy that he would face.Not only did this allow him to developan effective scheme of maneuver, it pro-vided focus to his reconnaissance, secu-rity, and direct and indirect fire plansthat supported the maneuver plan. Thus,through effective reconnaissance, theOPFOR commander methodically eitherrefined or discarded potential operationalplans, branches, and sequels.

BLUFOR:

Simply speaking, successful counterre-connaissance will enable BLUFOR unitsto gain and maintain both initiative andmaneuver dominance. Without question,most BLUFOR commanders generallyunderstand the linkage and importanceof the counterreconnaissance effort inachieving operational success in any de-fensive battle. Historically, however,most BLUFOR planning efforts are fo-cused on the close battle and, to a certainextent, the deep fight. Habitually,BLUFOR units will designate a counter-reconnaissance force from available ma-neuver units. Yet, there may or may notbe any linkage to the overall BLUFORreconnaissance and surveillance plan.Task force and brigade assets may workindependently from the counterrecon-naissance force. During this specificNTC battle, the BLUFOR commanderorganized his defensive sector into three,almost mutually detached, specific com-ponents: reconnaissance and surveil-lance, counterreconnaissance, and themain battle area.

The brigade S2 conducted the intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)analysis process and determined whatspecific intelligence had to be collectedto answer the commander’s critical in-formation requirements (CCIR). ThisIPB analysis resulted in the reconnais-sance and surveillance (R&S) plan,which attempted to integrate reconnais-sance forces into the overall intelligence-collection effort. Further, the R&S planassigned specific intelligence acquisitiontasks to specific units for action. Duringthis battle, the R&S plan clearly identi-fied five named areas of interests(NAIs). The NAIs were designed to de-termine OPFOR avenues of approachthrough key maneuver choke points.Task force scouts, combat observationlaser teams (COLTs), ADA scouts, and


minimum maneuver forces were inte-grated into this effort.

The brigade plan specified that eachtask force was responsible for counterre-connaissance within its assigned sector.TF 1-2 (AR) was designated A Team,while TF 3-4 (IN) was designated BTeam. Additionally, both teams weredesignated as their respective task forcereserve. Both A and B Teams assumedthe counterreconnaissance line just priorto dark, thus no coordination occurredwith forward brigade reconnaissanceforces. A and B Teams maintained a 50percent sleep plan. The rest of the bri-gade behind A and B Teams prepared or-ders and waited for first light to placeobstacles and prepare fighting positions.

In addition to infiltration, OPFOR re-connaissance will conduct route recon-naissance for the subsequent main regi-mental body as well. BLUFOR recon-naissance, however, rarely conductsroute reconnaissance. Instead, their focusis strictly infiltration (avoiding contact atall cost, penetrating enemy defensive po-sitions and movement to a predeter-mined observation point). Throughoutboth nights prior to battle, OPFOR re-connaissance forces attempted to movethroughout the enemy defensive sector.

Though detected at times, the OPFOReffort was largely successful. Since theBLUFOR counterreconnaissance effortwas linear, all that the OPFOR was re-quired to do was to penetrate the thinlyheld counterreconnaissance screen lines.At night, most of the rest of the brigadewas asleep. Additionally, since both Aand B Teams were alert at night, theywere required to rest during the day.They conducted limited planning andvirtually no rehearsals as the brigade re-serve force. The BLUFOR commander’sOPFOR defeat mechanism, his reserve,was unprepared to conduct its mission.Needless to say, during the battle, the re-serve was neither at the right place, noravailable at the right time, to support theBLUFOR plan.

An isolated battle at the NTC? Not re-ally. Unfortunately, more and more timesthis has become a training standard. Itdoesn’t have to be. Simple adjustmentsof counterreconnaissance and reconnais-sance tactics, techniques, and procedurescould remedy this training shortcoming.

Doctrine

An analysis of division through com-pany doctrinal publications shows thatthe term or the mission of counterrecon-naissance is rarely found. The logic be-

hind this is simple. Counterreconnais-sance, in and of itself, is not a mission.Rather, it is a component of defensivesecurity operations. FM 71-3 (Armoredand Mechanized Infantry Brigade), FM71-2 (The Tank and Mechanized InfantryBattalion Task Force), and FM 71-100(Division Operations) discuss the impor-tance of countering enemy reconnais-sance and surveillance efforts. It is acontinuous process that is conductedthroughout the depth of the assignedarea of operations. Further, security op-erations consists of three distinct tacticaloperations: screen, cover and guard. Thesize and composition of the securityforce, and what type security operationis to be conducted, is always dependenton the commander’s estimate, as influ-enced by the factors of METT-T. Theconcept of enemy information denial, orcounterreconnaissance, is an integral as-pect, or enabling task, in each of thesemissions. The type of security operationto be conducted is based upon the ordersreceived, the commander’s estimate, andhow it is influenced by the factors ofMETT-T. Counterreconnaissance, in andof itself, is little more (though it may be-come a critical aspect in ultimate mis-sion success) than a tactic or techniqueemployed during security operations.

The genesis of BLUFOR security prob-lems in either the offense or defense canbe linked directly to poor planning, de-velopment, and execution of the securityarea. Frequently, BLUFOR units willtask one or two companies/teams as thecounterreconnaissance force, perhapstask-organize scouts, engineers, andCOLTS with them, and assume that theyhave solved the enemy reconnaissanceproblem. In reality, what has actually oc-curred is the development of a linear“counterreconnaissance screen line” andthe implied belief by the remainder ofthe brigade that they are relieved of anysecurity or force protection operations.The OPFOR has simply to penetrate thisscreen line (a relatively easy task whenyou echelon the OPFOR reconnaissanceeffort over time) since the remainder ofthe BLUFOR is normally fast asleep.

When the situation is reversed, the suc-cess of the OPFOR counterreconnais-sance effort rests with the universal clearunderstanding that security operationsare everyone’s responsibility, are con-tinuous, and are fought throughout thedepth of the defensive sector. Woe be itto an OPFOR leader, soldier, or unit whopermits a BLUFOR reconnaissance forceto penetrate any defensive position. Ad-ditionally, OPFOR counterreconnais-sance tactics are not isolated to limited

visibility operations. During daylight,there is a incessant effort by the organi-zation to identify, isolate, and eliminateany reconnaissance forces that happenedto infiltrate the defensive sector. EW as-sets focus on identifying enemy recon-naissance radio transmissions. Heliborneforces, in concert with the ground ma-neuver commander, will patrol potentialkey terrain observation points in order toidentify and ultimately destroy enemyunits. Active dismounted patrolling oc-curs throughout the defensive sector. TheOPFOR tactical operations center, underthe direction of the chief of operations(OPFOR S3), manages the entire effortwhile planning and preparation for thenext battle is conducted simultaneously.The synergistic effect of this combinedeffort will normally lead to one of twopotential outcomes: the elimination ofany BLUFOR reconnaissance threat orrendering the BLUFOR reconnaissanceeffort ineffective.

If a BLUFOR unit loses the counterre-connaissance battle with the OPFOR, theloss begins almost immediately after theconclusion of the last fight. TheBLUFOR is most vulnerable to OPFORinfiltration and reconnaissance duringthe period immediately after change ofmission (COM). BLUFOR units areguaranteed that, immediately after COMfrom the last fight, they must reconstitute(unit or individual), attend an after-ac-tion review (AAR), and prepare for afollow-on mission. Preparation for thefollow-on mission includes both theplanning for the maneuver fight and thecounterreconnaissance battle, as well.Yet, there are techniques available to sat-isfactorily complete planning for thesubsequent operation, reconstitute, andexecute security operations simultane-ously.

Planning the Securlty Fight

The normal counterreconnaissancetechnique employed (evident in the ex-ample given) by a rotational brigadeconducting a defense at the NTC is toidentify either a tank or infantry team asthe security force. The team may be re-inforced with additional combat, combatservice, and combat service support as-sets. Normally, this team is also taskedas the brigade reserve. The brigade com-mander’s final OPFOR defeat mecha-nism conducts security operations atnight and is expected to rehearse as thebrigade reserve during the day. Obvi-ously, from a time management perspec-tive, to satisfactorily complete one ofthese two tasks to standard is difficult,


but to expect that both can be masteredis absurd. Yet, we continuously relearnthe same lessons. Perhaps the most tell-ing systems failure is what this processtells the rest of the command indirectly:“A Team is solely responsible for coun-terreconnaissance.” What this translatesto are an unrehearsed reserve and astrong but shallow security crust. Onceyou are through, everyone else is fastasleep. What will further exasperate theproblem is that the team identified as thecounterreconnaissance force may or maynot have conducted home station train-ing in this capacity. OJT (on the jobtraining) is normally not a good trainingtechnique at any of the three CTCs.

A technique to get through this securitydilemma is not to identify a counterre-connaissance force in the first place andto attempt to ingrain the attitude withinthe command that security and forceprotection is continuous and everyone’sresponsibility. Consider that the execu-tion of security operations is inherent inany defensive operation and the support-ing task of counterreconnaissance willfollow logically the exploitation, pursuitand consolidation phases of an offensiveoperation, or counterattack or consolida-tion in the defense. Planning for counter-reconnaissance thus becomes a follow-on phase of an ongoing operation.

A tremendous guide to assist in the de-velopment and planning of the counter-reconnaissance task is FM 34-2-1 (Tac-tics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)for Reconnaissance and Surveillanceand Intelligence Support of Counterre-connaissance). The title of the manualmay be misleading. It does not, in fact,furnish counterreconnaissance TTP.Rather, it is a guide in the developmentof the R&S plan as a mechanism to fo-cus security operations in general, andthe conduct of counterreconnaissancespecifically.

The key point is that the planning forsecurity operations, and the enabling taskof counterreconnaissance, logically flowsat the conclusion of the immediate op-eration and its execution is, in fact, theoperational linkage to any subsequentmission. Planning in this manner elimi-nates the concern or predicament that theunit will be forced to execute securityoperations without the benefit of either amature or rehearsed plan. Granted, thebattlefield conditions anticipated at theconclusion of the maneuver battle maynot hold true, but the organization willhave at least a 60 percent security planready for execution. A few adjustmentsto the plan may be all that is necessary

to achieve a more acceptable 80 percentsolution. Perhaps even more germane tothis discussion, a security operationsSOP, similar to that of the OPFOR, thatfollows the completion of any offense ordefense, may rectify this potential battledynamics dilemma.

As a unit transitions from the offenseto the defense, the higher headquarterswill normally provide defensive sectorgraphics. This may be little more than aforward and rear boundary and left andright limits. The brigade will assign taskforce sectors and the task force will as-sign company/team sectors or battle po-sitions. This minimal information ismore than enough to develop the unit’ssecurity plan. Within the various defen-sive sectors, a combination of securityand defensive preparations should occur.Clearly, the unit must prepare its defen-sive positions skillfully, and must antici-pate the threat of both day and night en-emy reconnaissance movement.

Mounted and dismounted patrollingmust be integrated into the entire effort.The task force and brigade commandposts orchestrate the entire effort. Heli-borne, EW, ADA, and indirect fires areintegrated into the operation. Forward ofthe task force sector and well within therange of supporting indirect fire systems,scouts (to include COLTS, ADA, and en-gineers) are focused at potential infiltra-tion movement routes. Care must betaken not to over-task these limitedscouting resources.

Commanders must prioritize and curbtheir named area of interests (NAI) ap-petite. Specifically, a task force scoutplatoon cannot effectively monitor morethan two or three NAIs. More often thannot, there has been a tendency at theNTC to task a single scout platoon toobserve in excess of five NAIs at anyone time. The effect of this tasking isthat none of these NAIs will be observedeffectively. Additionally, to enhance ef-fectiveness, NAIs must be developedand issued with a specific task and pur-pose.

Too often, BLUFOR scouts will go for-ward armed with little more guidancethan to observe a piece of terrain. Terrainis important only in respect to what itcould afford enemy or friendly forces.For example, when a scout is tasked toobserve a critical maneuver choke pointNAI, he must be able to identify and ob-serve both TAIs (target area of interests)and triggers within the NAI. Addition-ally, the scout must have a redundantcommunications capability in order towork through any enemy jamming.

There are numerous other tactics andtechniques that can be integrated into theoverall security effort but the impact re-mains the same: an inherent awarenessthroughout the command of the impor-tance of security operations, counterre-connaissance throughout the depth of thedefensive sector, centralized commandand control, and decentralized executionof the combined effort. In our example,the intricacies of security have been inte-grated as a logical concluding (phased)operation of an ongoing mission, andcan yet be further refined to become lit-tle more than a task force or brigadeSOP.

Training Implications

•• See the Battlefield — FM 100-5 (Fi-nal Draft, 5 August 1997) states thatwhen conducting operations, Armyforces must perform five fundamentalactions when applying military power:see, shape, shield, strike, and move.1

Seeing is more than understandingyour own capabilities and limitations,but it involves understanding those ofthe enemy as well. Unit commanders atall levels must understand basic enemydoctrine and tactics. This is not the soleresponsibility of the military intelligencecommunity. Commanders will oftenspend numerous hours developingground maneuver courses of actionswithout a full appreciation of enemy ca-pabilities or constraints. Tactical maneu-ver (OPFOR or BLUFOR) can beviewed as little more than the applicationof common sense to the terrain. Unitsshould wargame against an uncoopera-tive enemy. Too often during a wargame, a course of action will be ac-cepted without a full appreciation of theenemy. The brigade or battalion S2 (if heplays the enemy commander during thewargame) can be easily and often dis-counted by an energetic S3 or com-mander. The key point is that it is theresponsibility of the unit commander tobe well versed in enemy order of battle,doctrine, and potential tactics.

•• Visualize, Plan and Prepare Secu-rity Operations Throughout the Depthof the Defensive Sector. Commandersshould avoid the operational pitfall ofexecuting a linear security or counterre-connaissance plan. This falls into thecategory of “easy say, hard do.” Theframework of the defense includes deepoperations forward of the FLOT, securityoperations throughout the area of opera-tions, the main battle area, reserve andrear operations. Too often as an organi-


zation, we will become completely fo-cused on defensive preparations in themain battle area and give limited guid-ance and time to security and force pro-tection responsibilities. In terms of an ef-fective defense, these tasks must bemore in balance. Command posts mustbe able to battle-track not only thepreparation of the defense, but securityoperations as well. Security is an opera-tional requirement and not the sole do-main of the unit S2. Additionally, the useof scouts as a counterreconnaissanceforce must be weighed carefully againstthe mission and available resources.Often, scouts involved in counterrecon-naissance will not be alive during thedeep or main battle area fight. If thecommander’s operational plan includesscouts focusing indirect fires deep, con-sideration must be given regarding anyadditional tasks scouts can be expectedto complete to standard during the secu-rity fight.

•• Simplicity is a Combat Multiplier.We, in the Army, have institutionalized acommon belief that any complex prob-lem can be solved through better andmore focused planning. Some suggestthat the method to resolve the issue offaulty security execution is through theidentification of an additional staff offi-cer (chief of reconnaissance) to managethe task and the development of a recon-naissance order (to be planned prior tothe subsequent mission order). They lookat the OPFOR’s regimental chief of re-connaissance as an example of this proc-ess. Not only are they wrong about theOPFOR, they are wrong about the crea-tion of another staff agency or agent toexecute the task and, most importantly,they have added more complexity to theissue. The OPFOR’s chief of reconnais-sance is the BLUFOR’s brigade S2 byanother name. They forget that the OP-FOR has had the opportunity to planeach battle’s reconnaissance and surveil-lance prior to the start of the maneuverrotation. They forget that the OPFOR isnot only familiar with the terrain butpractices its trade constantly. Granted, interms of planning or execution, many se-curity lessons can be learned from theOPFOR. But, to suggest that the solutionto poor security operations is to furtherincrease our planning efforts and insti-tute another staff planning layer is,frankly, absurd. The answer to the taskof counterreconnaissance is an aware-ness that security operations should beplanned as the final phase of any opera-tion (understanding that the plan will notbe perfect and will have to be adjustedto comply with battlefield realities), that

the burden of counterreconnaissance be-longs to the entire organization and mustbe conducted continuously throughoutthe depth of the battlefield, that it ismanaged by the unit commander and hisbattle staff (certainly not the domain ofthe S2), and that whenever possible it isconducted in accordance with estab-lished unit SOPs.

•• Rehearse, Sequence, and Resourcethe Security Effort. The rehearsal is themost important part of the deliberateplanning process, period. It is the lastopportunity for the unit to deconflict,cross-check, and prepare. This statementwill more likely than not cause an uproarwith all clipboard-wielding OCs (ob-server/controllers) and planning zealotswho have convinced themselves that ifsomething tactical is broken, the key toits fix is more planning. I won’t belaborthe point. Unfortunately, the issue re-mains that we have a tendency to re-hearse the battle through the task of of-fensive or defensive consolidation andreorganization and rarely expend any ef-fort in follow-on security operations.Viewing security operations as the natu-ral linkage that is sequenced between thelast battle and next battle to be foughtwill ensure that you have at least a pre-liminary plan to execute, and if neces-sary adjust. Additionally, don’t forgetyour combat multipliers. Orchestrate theeffort with indirect fires, EW assets,ADA, logistics, etc. Have enough redun-dancy in the plan so that when a keyunit or individual is not available(AARs, reconstitution) another can takehis place.

•• Force Protection. Don’t ask yoursoldiers to do something in training thatyou wouldn’t ask them to do in combat.CTC gamesmanship should be highlydiscouraged, and our leadership shouldalways be on the lookout for it. Scoutspositioned forward of the FLOT shouldbe in range of friendly indirect fire sys-tems. This includes not only those con-ducting ground infiltration, but alsothose conducting air insertions. Also,consider the duration of the mission as-signed and the methodology to sustainand evacuate that force. More germaneto this discussion is the fact that there isa direct correlation between force protec-tion and how the unit conducts the taskof counterreconnaissance that deniesfriendly information to the enemy. An ef-fective security operation will take theinitiative away from the opposing com-mander. The success or failure of the re-connaissance effort, regardless of thecompetitor, will normally predict theoutcome of the imminent battle. Specifi-

cally, in this example, reconnaissancefailures will force the OPFOR to attackunder unfavorable conditions and willintensify overall BLUFOR survivability.

•• SOPs, Battle Command and BattleTracking. FM 25-100 states that all ac-tivities within an organization should beconducted within a “band of excellence.”Essentially, this performance band dic-tates that a unit should strive for the con-sistent “80 percent” product rather thanattaining only a few 100 percent andmany failures. Clearly, time is the limit-ing factor that prevents consistent excel-lence in all areas. Despite what is in ourtraining doctrine, the environment of theCTCs have invariably placed units in theposition of performance peaking onlyduring the maneuver battle. At COM,key leaders are expected to participate inAARs from platoon level on up, conductunit and individual reconstitution, decon-taminate if necessary, and prepare for thenext fight that will undoubtedly comewithin the next 48 hours. This period oftime, from COM to the time that a unitis prepared to execute a follow-on mis-sion, will often approach 12 or morehours. This cycle is also the time that aBLUFOR unit is most susceptible to OP-FOR reconnaissance and infiltration. Tosolve this training problem is not neces-sarily easy, but it can be fixed. First, itmust be universally accepted in the unitthat the S2 can certainly facilitate con-ducting the task of counterreconnais-sance, but security operations is every-one’s responsibility. In the OPFOR, se-curity is a command function. Battle-tracking of the security mission is con-ducted on the chief of operations (unitS3) situation map. There is a continuousdialogue throughout the security fightbetween the OPFOR commander and hissubordinates. The entire unit is aware ofits counterreconnaissance responsibili-ties, and with religious fervor complywith the unit security SOP. Enemy re-connaissance forces are tenaciouslytracked, hunted down, and killed. Whilethe leadership of the OPFOR is conduct-ing AARs and other tasks, battle captainsmonitor and manage the security effort.The key to successful security operationsresides in disciplined forces, focused bat-tle command, simple but achievableplans, and battlefield awareness.

Concluding Thoughts:

Care must be taken not to take CTCbattle results and assume that they are



The success or failure of most NationalTraining Center battles is determinedlong before the main combat forcesleave the line of departure. An attackingforce with good intelligence can effec-tively plan and maintain the initiative,while a poor intelligence effort oftenleads to haphazard planning and a blind,ineffective attack. With this in mind, theOPFOR places a fundamental emphasison detecting and destroying the at-tacker’s reconnaissance effort. This arti-cle will describe how the OPFOR con-ducts effective counterreconnaissancescreens in order to provide ideas forBLUFOR commanders to refine the exe-cution of their own counterreconnais-sance missions, and to provide BLUFORcommanders with some techniques todefeat the OPFOR screen line when at-tacking. This article addresses each ele-ment of the Battlefield Operating Sys-tems (BOS) and explains their synchro-nization within the OPFOR MotorizedRifle Battalion (MRB) counterreconnais-sance effort.

Situation

Once a mission is received, the MRBcommander, the MRB executive officer(XO), and the Motorized Rifle Regiment(MRR) scout platoon leader, will con-duct a combined map reconnaissance todetermine possible scout avenues of ap-proach, possible support-by-fire posi-tions, probable kill sacks, and positionsfor OPFOR vehicles. If time permits, theMRB commander, executive officer, andscout platoon leader will conduct a jointarea reconnaissance to confirm or denytheir initial map assessment. Once thisinitial planning stage is complete, andhis intent for the counterreconnaissancebattle is fully understood, the MRB com-mander will focus on preparing the maindefense, and the MRB XO will assumeresponsibility for the counterrecon fight.

During the subsequent operations or-der, the MRB XO will issue the conceptand intent of the counterreconnaissance

operation, including proposed locations,requirements for closing lanes in obsta-cle belts, and guidance for patrolling ob-stacle belts. The scout platoon leaderwill then brief his vehicle locations,which positioned themselves after the in-itial planning session, providing eight-digit grid locations, as well as task andpurpose for each scout vehicle. He willalso provide the scout platoon radio fre-quencies, engagement and disengage-ment criteria, and any newly gathered in-telligence.

The MRB XO will generally positionthe Counterreconnaissance Patrol (CRP),consisting of three BMP2s and twoBRDMs, in ambush positions alongprobable mounted infiltration routes 800to 1,000 meters in front of the MRB tac-tical obstacle belt. The XO will also in-corporate AT-5 and air defense systemsinto the MRB counterreconnaissanceplan, placing them on key terrain nearthe MRB reserve/quick reactionaryforce. In addition to the MRB assets po-sitioned by the MRB XO, each MRCwill position its own individual screenline consisting of one T-80 tank and twoBMPs 100-200 meters behind the tacti-cal obstacle belt in the main defensivearea.

The MRB creates a substantial four-belt counterreconnaissance screen withscouts, CRP vehicles, MRC screens, andAT-5s in position. Although each ofthese counterreconnaissance forces mustalso prepare defensive positions for themain battle, the OPFOR commander un-derstands that denying enemy reconnais-sance is the key to victory, and therefore,that is where he weights his defensiveeffort.

Command and Control

The MRB XO commands and controlsthe counterreconnaissance fight from hisBRDM. This gives him the flexibility toquickly reposition himself and providesbetter communications than a tracked

vehicle. The enhanced communicationproves vital to the XO as he must moni-tor both the scout’s intelligence net andthe MRB command net. As scouts sendreports on the intelligence net, the MRBXO coordinates between the four coun-terreconnaissance belts on the commandnet, ensuring positive hand-off of enemyforces. If necessary, the XO will instructthe scout platoon to coordinate directlywith a killer team, but he will continueto monitor and control the entire effort.All vehicles send spot reports on thecommand net to ensure attachmentsmonitor the proceedings, but all engage-ments occur on internal frequencies.

To further facilitate command and con-trol, the XO issues a specific task andpurpose to each belt of the counterrecon-naissance effort. Scouts are the forwardeyes and identify and report approachingenemy vehicles, engaging the enemyonly in self defense. Scouts will main-tain visual contact with enemy vehiclesuntil positive hand off occurs with theCRP or MRC screening forces. The CRPassumes responsibility of the enemyforces from the scouts and if it is capa-ble, destroys them. If the force is toostrong for the CRP, it will pass the en-emy back to the tanks in the MRCscreen line. The MRC screen line willthen engage to destroy the enemy forcebefore it locates the defense’s main ob-stacle belt.

Positive hand-off between each recon-naissance belt is essential to help elimi-nate fratricide. Therefore, the OPFORwill conduct detailed counterreconnais-sance rehearsals at the MRB, MRC, andMRP levels. These rehearsals stress theinitial identification of the enemy vehicleand the tracking of that vehicle until it isdestroyed.

Fire Support

During the planning process, the XOand the scout platoon leader plan illumi-nation and HE targets. As the scouts and


FROM THE NTC:

OPFOR Counterreconnaissance At the National Training Center

by Captain Richard Randazzo

CRP deploy following the initial plan-ning process, they will confirm or adjusteach target. They will also place VS-17panels with chemical lights at the grid ofeach artillery target to further facilitateeffective calls for fire.

Once the counterreconnaissance battlebegins, the scouts will utilize illumina-tion rounds to provide the CRP easy vis-ual identification of enemy forces. If en-emy forces stop, the scouts will destroythem with indirect fires, adjusting fromeither VS17 panels or chemical lightTRPs.

Intelligence

The scout platoon, which consists ofvismod BRDMs, BMPs, RKHs, GSRsand ERPs, deploys throughout the depthof sector. It usually sends two BRDMsand two RKHs to attempt identificationof the enemy’s line of departure prior tothe attack. It positions the remainingforces along key terrain coveringmounted and dismounted avenues of ap-proach. To maximize the reconnaissanceeffort and ensure redundancy, each vehi-cle will also position a two-man dis-mounted observation post. Scout BMPsgenerally block mounted avenues of ap-proach or are incorporated into theMRBs counterreconnaissance fight.

Air Defense

Dismounted SA-14 teams are em-ployed on the high ground along theflanks of the main defensive area. Al-though they position themselves alongthe probable air mobility corridors, thescout platoon often identifies enemy airassets first; therefore, the ADA SA-14teams must monitor the intelligence netto ensure they have a common view ofthe battle with the scouts. The air de-fense BRDMs will clear possible enemylanding zones and are quickly assimi-lated into the quick-reaction force/re-serve.

Mobility/Countermobility

Both scouts and CRP vehicles emplaceprotective obstacles to aid in the destruc-tion and detection of the enemy. Wireand mines are usually employed on theOPFOR side of an intervisibility line(IV) or after a turn on a single vehicletrail. Like the main obstacle belt, loca-tions of the protective minefields mustbe reported higher and incorporated intothe MRB’s obstacle plan. Additionally,boulders and tank ditches are sometimesused to block the small avenues of ap-proach along the flanks. When obstacles

are utilized, either a scout BMP or aCRP BMP will overwatch the obstacle.

Maneuver

As defensive preparations begin, theMRB commander allocates one third ofeach MRC’s combat power into theMRB’s third counterreconnaissance line.Although substantial forces are alreadyforward (scouts, CRP) his maneuverforces must still dig in.

During daylight, one MRP from eachMRC will conduct the counterreconnais-sance screen while the other MRPs pre-pare their defensive positions. Thescreening MRP will identify the CRP ve-hicles to its front and any friendly scoutplatoon positions along its flanks. TheBMPs dismount their crews and conductdismounted patrols of high ground thatcan observe their battle positions.

During limited visibility, the position-ing of the MRP screening force becomescritical as battle hand-off between theCRP becomes more difficult. Each MRCcommander positions his screening forcewhere it can still observe main avenuesof approach, but during limited visibility,he also ensures it possesses a clear hand-off from the CRP vehicles. If his sectorincludes a flank, MRC commanders willreinforce that area, placing two vehiclesin a “backstop” position behind the ex-isting CRP vehicle. The third MRP vehi-cle is responsible for the remainder ofthe sector and ties in with the flankMRP. All three MRCs will array in thisformat.

Backstopping the MRP screen lines arethe AT-5 assets and the MRB reserve.Usually the OPFOR will place one ortwo AT-5s on a key piece of terrain tohelp identify any penetrating enemy ve-hicles with their thermal sights. TheMRB reserve, made up of the MRBcommander’s tank and BMPs andBRDMs from the MRB, is a flexibleforce which reacts quickly to any pene-trations of the screen line and to anythreats in the rear or flanks.

Recommendations

The OPFOR is successful during thecounterreconnaissance fight primarilybecause they echelon their counterrecon-naissance forces. Unlike the BLUFOR,the OPFOR involves the entire battalionin the counterreconnaissance fight, there-fore increasing the probability of detect-ing infiltrating forces. The four-echelonstructure allows the OPFOR the flexibil-ity to reinforce high-speed avenues ofapproach without risking other areas.

A second key to the OPFOR’s successis centralized command and control.Having one commander who is responsi-ble for the entire counterreconnaissancefight ensures that, not only is the missionplanned, rehearsed, and executed, but itis also synchronized at the MRB leveland includes all BOS elements.

The OPFOR will usually position themajority of its vehicles to cover theflanks, as they are the most likely infil-tration routes leading into a sector.Therefore, “a way” the BLUFOR com-mander may penetrate an OPFOR screenline would be to infiltrate his scoutsdown the center of the defender’s sectorwhile a tank company attacks one flank.Although the terrain in the center isoften open, and may not be conducive tounobserved movement, the BLUFORwill gain the element of surprise wherethe OPFOR is the weakest. The tankcompany should provide enough distrac-tion to allow the scouts to penetrate thescreen line quickly before they are de-tected. To improve chances of success inthe center sector, scouts should also at-tempt to infiltrate dismounted.

A second technique to penetrate an OP-FOR screenline would be to hold the LDtimes of infiltrating scouts until after0200 hours. Although this would notguarantee the OPFOR is asleep, it wouldincrease the chances of being successful.

Conclusion

The OPFOR allocates over 30 vehiclesto detect and destroy enemy reconnais-sance attempting to penetrate their de-fenses. Their four-echelon defense isvery successful in destroying the en-emy’s reconnaissance effort. By prevent-ing the BLUFOR attackers from acquir-ing the knowledge required to achievesuccess, the OPFOR consistentlyachieves decisive defensive victories.

CPT Richard Randazzo graduated fromthe U.S. Military Academy in 1993. Hehas been an MRC commander, MRB ex-ecutive officer, and the division and regi-mental scout platoon leader at the Na-tional Training Center for 34 rotations. Hisnext assignment will be as an assistantprofessor of military science at SouthernIllinois University at Edwardsville.

The author would like to thank CPTRoss Brown, CPT Rob Kaderavick, and1LT Geoff Smaltz for their help and in-sights with his article. Lastly, he would liketo thank CPT Steve Mandes for his lead-ership and training.


Even before tank turn-in is complete,the assessments are well underway. First,did we win? Second, though probablymore important, what did we learn? Asanyone with NTC experience knows, thewon-loss record is always subject to de-bate, and no observer/controller has eversaid: “You won big; don’t change athing.” But the assessments of 3rd Ar-mored Cavalry Regiment’s recent de-ployment to the fictional land of Tierradel Diablo are more important to the Ar-mor Force than mere bragging rights. Abrigade combat team rotation speaks tothe training level of the specific brigade,but does not evaluate the entire bri-gade/division model. Every ACR rota-tion serves to validate the existence of aheavy ACR: as an expensive, unique or-ganization, we are expected to produceresults. If the performance is not com-mensurate with the cost, the leaner Armycan’t afford to maintain an organization,regardless of its tradition and heritage.

As O/Cs everywhere will tell you, thebattle record is less important than thelessons learned. The NTC is traditionallya place where we spend a lot of time fo-cused on how to improve the things wedid wrong. In this article, we want totake the opportunity to identify thethings we did right. What can the Armorcommunity, and the entire Army, sustainand improve upon, based on the suc-cesses of the regiment?

Some of the lessons are neither pro-found nor new, and are applicable toevery unit that deploys to Ft. Irwin, butsome successes are directly tied to theorganization of the ACR. Of the former,the critical lesson is that there is no sub-stitute for lethal platoons, troops, andcompanies. NTC battles are won and lostat the company/troop level by effectivegunnery, small unit drills, and the tenac-ity of individual troopers who refuse toquit. The regiment must sustain the train-ing plan that produced its lethal units.

That means giving junior leaders timein the field with their units, and it meansfocusing their training efforts on a lim-ited number of fundamental, critical bat-

tle tasks that are trained again, andagain, and again, until they can be exe-cuted routinely. We call these criticalbattle tasks the “Big 5” at each level. Atthe troop level, they currently includescout-tank integration, building an en-gagement area, hasty breach, reporting,and casualty evacuation. We evaluateboth our mission essential task list(METL) and our “Big 5” annually at atwo-day warfighting seminar attended byall troop commanders, first sergeants,and above. Once we agree on our train-ing focus, we go to work. We live by themotto “Talkin’ ain’t fightin’.”

In the regiment, troop commanders areallocated 25 OPTEMPO miles per quar-ter for troop-level training. Troop com-manders plan this training, establish itsbasis against METL and “Big 5,” brief itto the regimental commander at theQTB, and execute it. Most often, thesetroop FTXs are embedded in the unit’sgunnery exercises. It is in these troopFTXs that junior leaders build the confi-dence necessary for independent, aggres-sive operations on the battlefield.

Being lethal in a training environmentalso means training with the multiple in-tegrated laser engagement system(MILES). The regiment uses MILESduring crew drills, platoon, and troopEXEVALs, and maintains a MILES gun-nery program. Some may question theuse of valuable training time developing“non-wartime” skills, but boresight disci-pline, whether trained with MILES or amuzzle boresight device (MBD), is criti-cal to wartime success. The skills re-quired to boresight with a MBD are gen-erally not at issue, as they are proven atgunnery two to three times a year. Thehard part is developing the drill to get itdone in a tactical environment. Whetheron Table VIII or at NTC, “killer crews”are equally deadly with sabot or MILESbecause their junior leaders take the timeto understand the capabilities of theirsystem, and are disciplined in mainte-nance and boresighting.

During continuous operations through-out the course of the rotation, individual

tank companies and troops fought sevenfights independent of the regiment’s ma-jor training day battles. These includedcounterreconnaissance against MRC-sized recon detachments, screens to de-feat MRB-sized forward detachments,and economy of force operations to de-feat up to MRB-sized attacks. A testa-ment to the lethality of the regiment’ssmall units, the troops and companiesdefeated the OPFOR in all seven en-gagements. Sustaining platoon and troopproficency in fire and maneuver meanstraining under realistic conditions. Simu-lations cannot replace real terrain, whereplatoon leaders, platoon sergeants, andcommanders are forced to deal with in-tervisibility lines, obscuration, and a liveenemy that gets a vote on the plan. Priorto NTC, the regiment conducted platoonEXEVALs in the Ft. Carson trainingarea, and troop and squadron EXEVALsat the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site(PCMS). The exercise at PCMS wasparticularly important, as every platoonand troop enjoyed a minimum of eightmission iterations: three zone recon,three movement to contact, and two de-fend, with CSS tasks embedded in everymission. Multiple iterations provided thetime to analyze mistakes and improveperformance. Moreover, by increasingthe capabilities of the OPFOR (force ra-tios) and changing conditions on the bat-tlefield (limited visibility, NBC) from it-eration to iteration, we challenged eachtroop in the regiment.

At PCMS, the regiment was able totrain METL tasks on difficult terrain atnear-doctrinal distances, ensuring wemet the regimental commander’s intentthat we do nothing for the first time atthe National Training Center. This in-cluded a full fledged deployment to anoff-site training area, using rail, line-haul, JAAT, and road march. Deploy-ment was trained using the Reception,Staging, Onward movement, and Inte-gration (RSOI) model, complicated bycivilians on the battlefield, a terroristthreat, and force protection requirements.OPFOR and O/Cs were resourced by thenon-rotational squadron and other units


KILL OPFOR: The 3d Armored CavalryRegiment at the NTC by Captain Robert B. Brown

from the mountain post, including 1-12Infantry and 43d ASG. A luxury in anera of limited land and OPTEMPO, thistraining opportunity represents the differ-ence between winning and losing,whether at the NTC or on an actual bat-tlefield.

All units must recognize that soldier at-titude is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Someunits enter the NTC overawed by thereputation of the OPFOR, and it showsin their performance. They attack tenta-tively, then stop and die when engaged.A frequent comment from O/Cs and theOPFOR was the surprising tenacity of3d ACR troopers: they absolutely re-fused to die. Instead of relinquishing theinitiative to the enemy, the regiment’screws, platoons, and troops carried thefight to the enemy, disrupting his deci-sion cycle. Individual tanks and Bradleyswould not accept defeat, and were confi-dent in their ability to outshoot, outma-neuver, and outfight the OPFOR. Thereis a reluctance in many BLUFOR unitsto talk about winning, and yet the OP-FOR’s motto remains “Kill BLUFOR.”We adopted the philosophy that “ifsomebody’s keeping score, we want towin.” During each training event, wealso worked to develop a distinct dislikefor being “killed.” Although it is MILES,and we can re-key, we never want ourtroopers to be complacent about losing aconfrontation with an enemy on the bat-tlefield.

An ACR, even with two ground squad-rons, possesses inherent organizationaladvantages over a standard BCT pack-age. Obviously, the 166 combat systems(82 M1A1s, 84 M3s) deployed with twoground squadrons outnumber the 116 as-signed to a two-battalion BCT. But doc-trinal distances and cavalry missions re-duce numerical advantages. Rather thanmassing fires of multiple battalions, as aBCT does, an ACR is designed to fightmultiple squadron engagements over abroad front. It does not synchronize fireson squadron objectives or engagementareas, but allocates resources to weightthe main effort, and uses artillery and at-tack aviation “deep” to attrit enemy for-mations. The regiment, with two groundsquadrons and one aviation squadron,fought the entire battlespace of the Na-tional Training Center. In most battles,this battlespace included the Valley ofDeath, the central, and northern corri-dors. In the final battle, the regimentfought from the Drinkwater Valley to the“turtle fence.” The responsibility for fourmajor avenues of approach forced theregiment to disperse reconnaissance and

security assets, then to maneuver quicklyto mass killing fires, demonstrating theflexibility of the ACRs “hunter-killer”organization and organic air-ground inte-gration.

At every level, the regiment is de-signed to find, fix, and destroy the en-emy using hunter-killer teams. Regimen-tal assets “hunt” the enemy, and squad-rons “kill” it. At the regimental level, theMI company possesses an Analysis andControl Element (ACE) with real-timedownlinks from strategic assets, as wellas a Collection and Jamming Platoonand EH-60 (QUICKFIX) aircraft to pro-vide initial intelligence. RegimentalColts and ADA Sensor Scouts confirmELINT hits and trigger initial fires of at-tack aviation, direct support, and rein-forcing artillery. For the squadrons, firstcontact is made by the OPCON Air Cav-alry Troop Scout Weapons Team (SWT),with the OH-58C as the hunter, and theAH-1 as the killer. The SWT, in turn, isthe hunter for the cavalry troop. Thecavalry troop uses habitual scout pla-toon-tank platoon hunter-killer teams todevelop the situation for the squadron,which maneuvers the tank company tokill elements identified and fixed by cav-alry troops.

Air-ground integration provides theflexibility to fight across extended front-ages. As the situation dictates, the regi-ment uses habitually task-organized aircavalry troops to provide recon pull, oruses the entire aviation squadron forwardfor security and early warning. Attackaviation can quickly react to penetrationsor flank threats, attriting enemy forma-tions and providing time to repositionground assets. During the rotation, theaviation squadron was often augmentedwith a ground cavalry troop, and as-signed a maneuver corridor as an econ-omy of force. During one such mission,this air-ground team delayed an entireMRR for 90 minutes, enabling the regi-ment to reposition forces and defeat theMRR attack well forward of its objec-tives with no penetration.

While the Army has long acceptedsuch advantages of task organization and“fighting as a combined arms team,” itcan be argued that the BCT organizationsacrifices readiness for dollar efficiency.Centralizing armor, infantry, aviation,and artillery saves money by reducingredundant support systems, and appealsto branch parochialism by allowing offi-cers to be rated by others in their ownbranch. The cost in readiness is the timerequired to develop teamwork, esprit,and confidence once task-organized.

While at home station, individual battal-ions will train task-organized during ma-jor events, but will always operate underdistinct training schedules, conflictingSOPs, and different agendas that reflectthe personalities of their commanders.

The regiment does not suffer theseproblems. With the exception of DS ar-tillery and engineer battalions, the tank-ers, scouts, artillerymen, and CSS belongto the squadron and troop commanderwith whom they deploy. Every dailyfight, from command maintenance tosquadron EXEVALs, is fought with or-ganic combined arms. Personalities,SOPs, and battle drills are understoodlong before deployment begins, eliminat-ing the growing pains experienced byBCTs when they initially deploy. By en-tering the NTC at a higher training level,the regiment can avoid that first con-fused, embarrassing defeat that cansometimes snowball into a rotationwhich fails to meet training objectives.

None of these comments suggest thatthe 3d ACR enjoyed a flawless rotation.The regimental and squadron staffsstruggled with synchronization andmassing effects of CAS, indirect, and di-rect fires, achieving success after severalbattles of trial and error. Tellingly, weclimbed a learning curve when integrat-ing our DS artillery, engineers, signal as-sets, and other off-post units. We identi-fied holes in our SOPs and training. Westeadily improved initial shortcomings inobstacle planning, preparation, and re-porting. We learned that FM communi-cations across doctrinal distances do notjust happen. But there is a common feel-ing in the 3d ACR that, for all the mis-takes and room for improvement, weknow “what right looks like” in an ar-mored force, and it looks a lot like anarmored cavalry regiment.

CPT Robert B. Brown was commis-sioned as an Armor officer with a BA inPolitical Science from Trinity University,San Antonio, Texas. He is a graduate ofAOBC, SPLC, AOAC, CLC, and RangerSchool. He served as a tank platoonleader, scout platoon leader, and adjutantwith 4-67 Armor (Bandits!), Friedberg,Germany. He is currently assigned as as-sistant regimental S3 (Plans) for 3d ACR,Ft. Carson, Colo., and will take troopcommand in February 1998. The authorwishes to thank COL Martin E. Dempsey,MAJ Paul E. Funk, and CPT CharlesLombardo for input and advice in thepreparation of this article.


Army National Guard and U.S. ArmyReserve maneuver units, as well as someforeign nations’ armed forces, may soonsee a significant upgrade to their force-on-force and force-on-target training ca-pability. New technology is already inplace, and successfully providing Armytrainers with a Combat Training Center(CTC) level of quality training.

Maneuver training for the United StatesArmy requires astute management of theinteraction of a complex set of factors.Among others, these include equipment,maintenance, ammunition, weather,troops available, time and, of course,leadership. Reserve and National Guardunits must train to the same standards asthe Active Component, yet the ReserveComponents (RC) often are burdened bythe additional factor of geography. RCcommanders have to consider that agiven brigade or battalion command’ssubordinate units may be separated fromeach other and their maneuver trainingsites by hundreds of miles.

Finally, for RC commanders who havelong been frustrated that their training isa factor of how much money they havefor buses, a solution is at hand.

A new system, combining MILES IIand GPS, is now available that has thecapability to rapidly turn any available10-acre tract into a precision maneuvertraining site that will rival facilities of theNational Training Center (NTC).

As technical improvements transformedMILES (Multiple Integrated Laser En-gagement System) to MILES II, naviga-tional technology quantum-leaped to un-earthly precision using orbiting satellites.The marriage of MILES II and theGlobal Positioning Satellites (GPS) wasfirst implemented as a fixed-site systemat the NTC in Fort Irwin, California.

In 1985, long before Southwest Asianhostilities, MG Crosby Saint, III Corpscommander at Fort Hood, began lookingfor a system that would bring NTC-leveltraining to the RC and active units. Hisinsight eventually led to the awarding ofArmy contracts to LORAL, the companythat developed and manufactured theoriginal MILES equipment in 1975.1

The Electro-Optical Systems Divisionof LORAL (now a part of LockheedMartin), developed MILES II to increasethe capabilities of the original MILES.2

By integrating GPS, and configuring

wheeled vehicles and trailers for mobilecontrol centers, video/graphics produc-tion, and an air conditioned classroom forAARs, the system was complete. Testingbegan in 1988, and the final contract wasawarded by the U.S. Army Simulationand Training Command (STRICOM) toLORAL in 1993. It was accepted by theU.S. Army in 1995 to support training atFort Hood, Texas.3

In the last two years, the PrecisionRange Integrated Maneuver Exercise(PRIME) has been used by units of the1st Cavalry Division, the 4th Infantry Di-vision, a brigade of the Louisiana Na-tional Guard, and the 3d Brigade, 49thArmored Division, Texas Army NationalGuard. Two platoons of German infantry,representing the Bundeswehr’s Jagerbat-taillon 642 in Brunholder, Germany, wereattached to the 49th Armored Divisionfor annual training in June of 1996. TheGerman platoons also used the mecha-nized infantry lanes of the PRIME sys-tem. German trainers echoed the acco-lades of their U.S. counterparts in theirreviews of the PRIME armor and mecha-nized infantry lane exercises.4

The PRIME system’s high “quality as-surance” attribute is a result of its abilityto eliminate cheating. Playback review ofactual video maneuver graphics andthrough-sight gunnery video supportshonesty in training evaluation, and maybe used for focused retraining. Learningfrom mistakes becomes an exciting AARdiscussion among troops when shown“who shot who when” on color moni-tors.

Prior to the original MILES, as used inthe old Tactical Engagement System(TES), troops were often lulled intothinking that they were training to stand-ard when, in reality, they were nowherenear combat ready. Inherent weaknessesof TES included cardboard targets thatcould not shoot back, controller subjec-tivity of troops firing blanks, and a gen-eral lack of accurate data that could beprocessed by the “honest broker” trainer.5

NTC training proved that MILES II andGPS could be integrated to eliminatecheating and allow for precision in iden-tifying strengths and weaknesses.

With PRIME, each squad leader andeach vehicle is outfitted with equipmentthat transmits precise identities and posi-tions to the control van. This data is up-

dated automatically every few seconds.The MILES II system will not allow a“dead” soldier to fire his weapon, but an-other “live” soldier can use a “dead” sol-dier’s weapon, thus allowing the mostcasualty-producing weapons to remain inthe battle. PRIME targets have “shoot-back” capability, using a computer todesignate hits or misses based uponweapon trajectory and position informa-tion. As the problem progresses, colorvideo monitors, with standard militarygraphics, display precise GPS positions.Enemy coordinates, minefields, etc., arealso displayed and recorded for AARplayback.

An on-board vehicle video system tapesthrough the gunner’s sight picture and re-cords audio from the crew’s intercom.Although PRIME is promoted as a ma-neuver training system, these featuresmake it a formidable gunnery trainer aswell.

FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 revisedhow the U.S. Army trains. PRIME takesthe principles of these manuals and al-lows for a CTC-level of force-on-forceand force-on-target training that can beset up in less than 24 hours in any avail-able local training area. In effect, thetraining mountain is brought to Moham-med. The resulting enhanced monitoringof training effectiveness greatly reducessubjectivity, promotes honesty of thetrainer and trainee, and provides a signifi-cant upgrade to the after-action review.

Notes

1From an interview with Mr. Al Zimmerman,Director, Training and Simulation Systems, Lock-heed Martin, Electro-Optical Systems, Pomona,California, 17 Jun 96, at Fort Hood, Texas.

2Schirmer, James, “Making MILES Work ForYou,” ARMOR, Nov-Dec 1995, p. 30-33.

3Zimmerman interview, 17 Jun 96.4Interview with MSG Reiner Redel, Bundes-

wehr Jagerbattaillion 642, 15 Jun 96, Fort Hood,Texas.

5TC 25-6, Training with MILES, September1982, p. 1-0.

MAJ Ron A. McMurry is assistant S3of 3d Bde, 49th Armored Division,TXARNG. Also contributing to this arti-cle were MAJ Louis F. Goode and LTCLarry D. Rutherford.


National Training Center on Wheelsby Major Ron A. McMurry

Your outfit fought a successful defenseagainst a determined enemy. With his of-fense stalled, the enemy force has fallenback into a defensive posture. You arestill assessing the damage from this re-cent battle when a warning order comesin from your headquarters — prepare toattack. You immediately set to work get-ting your unit moving toward accom-plishing this new mission, faithfully fol-lowing the steps of the troop-leadingprocedures, as you have been trained.You complete your estimate of the situ-ation, properly considering all the perti-nent points. Now you are ready to de-velop friendly courses of action, a fewdifferent concepts of operation to presshome this attack, which you will thencompare and analyze before selectingthe best. Now is when the problem oc-curs. You know this is not Duffer’s Driftand you will only have one chance toget it right. Where can you turn for as-sistance in quickly framing your plan ofattack?

There is a time-consuming disconnecthere because, while the troop leadingprocedures are an excellent tool for ar-ranging your thoughts and activities,they are only a means to an end. Theycannot help you make thatintuitive leap between de-veloping the situation anddeveloping courses of ac-tion, conceptually assign-ing tasks toward what FM71-2 terms “the visualiza-tion of how the enemy isto be defeated and of thebattlefield after the missionis accomplished.” There issurprisingly little literatureavailable to illustrate howcourses of action for offen-sive operations are con-ceived. The intellectual un-derpinings for this effortare clearly laid out in BG(Ret.) Wass de Czege’sFive Essential Elements of a Plan of Ac-tion, but this lacks the level of detailnecessary when dealing specifically withoffensive actions. My quick survey hasfound that, except for a helpful sectionon the offense in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle

Platoon and Squad, most are either in-conclusive checklists on the back ofthings such as the Infantry Leader’s Ref-erence Card, GTA 7-1-31, or theTanker’s Beale Wheel, GTA 17-7-1, ormust be deduced from the subtasks ofoffensive ARTEP Mission Training Plans(MTPs). This is often because it is feltthat either planning an attack is an obvi-ous affair, or from the desire not to stifleor suppress innovative and creativethinking. My argument, however, is thatany aid which helps get the offensiveplanner started with developing coursesof action will save precious time and isthereby welcome.

For the defense, there are severalhandy guides to help visualize the battle-field and prepare courses of action. Mostnotably is the 5-Step Technique to Buildthe Defense, a straightforward, one-page,visual aid to the defensive planner. Thisis generally attributed to then-LTC DaveGross and is found in several publica-tions (Ft. Leavenworth’s TCDC and Ft.Knox’s AOAC Battle Books for exam-ple) and was recently updated by LTCBen Santos in his article appearing in theMarch-April 1997 edition of ARMORMagazine.

These simple, yet thorough, checklistsclearly help the commander with his fivedecisions (mission analysis, task organi-zation, combat support and combat serv-ice support priorities, and battlefield ge-

ometry). There are, conversely, no ge-neric ‘how-to’s for offensive planning.

I would be the first to admit that notwo situations are exactly alike. More-over, we should not suppress initiativeby directing a prescriptive, cookie-cutterapproach to the development of offen-sive courses of action. I propose, none-theless, that there is a certain utility inhaving a simple methodology to fallback on to assist leaders at all levels andtypes of organizations wrestling with theproblem of how to “hit the other fellowas quick as you can, and as hard as youcan, where it hurts him the most, whenhe ain’t looking.” The many ‘playbooks’in use among tank and infantry units,usually originating from Combat Train-ing Center experiences, do not alwaysmeet this need, as they tend to be tootied to a particular CTC situation. Whatfollows then are the five steps youshould consider, the five questions youmust answer, as you develop your courseof action to press the attack.

To start with, you must determine thedefender’s vulnerabilities. You must beable to answer the question — where isthe enemy weak point? I could quote

Sun Tzu here, but itseems pretty obviousthat you do not want toattack into the de-fender’s strength. Find-ing this weak point isnaturally the hard partand will require somehomework. It involvesthorough and extensiveoffensive intelligencepreparation of the battle-field (IPB), integratedwith reconnaissance andsurveillance (R&S) ac-tivities and relatedmeasures, passive andactive, to secure yourforce. You should look

to identify flank or isolated positionsand, if possible, deduce a trace of the ap-proximate geographical extent of the de-fender’s kill sack or engagement area(EA) and the obstacles emplaced to sup-port it, so as to know where not to go.


Five Essential Elements of a Plan of Action

BG Huba Wass de CzegeADC(M) - Big Red One

• Find and track the enemy (before he finds you throughout the battle).

• Prevent the enemy from finding and tracking you (until too late toinfluence the action).

• Fix the enemy in depth with supporting efforts (with minimum requiredto prevent repositioning or maneuver against your main effort).

• Maneuver so the main effort engages the enemy from a position ofrelative advantage (with overwhelming power at the point of decision).

• Follow through (to the next action).

Press the Attack:A 5-Step Technique For Offensive Planningby Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Slater

Seek to locate the defender’s own R&Sforces positioned to secure his force,finding them before they find you. Youmay even go so far as to audit the de-fender’s key direct-fire weapons, espe-cially those assets most dangerous to you(tank reserves, machine gun platoons,antitank systems, etc.), factoring inranges to determine where you are leastexposed to the effects of mutually sup-ported, interlocking fire or timely rein-forcement. In effect, this may requireyou to perform the battlefield calculus inreverse.

Once the enemy picture is clear, orworking with whatever you have at thispoint, you must find a way to sneak inon the defender. As you develop eachcourse of action you should ask, “Whatis one way to attack it?” You should ar-ray your forces along this axis back-wards from the enemy’s weak point,through the line of departure, to the as-sembly area or hide positions fromwhere the action will commence. Thisaxis should follow covered and con-cealed routes which avoid the defender’sstrength, i.e., the EA he is planning toinvite you into.

Your aim here is to select an axiswhich allows you to maneuver yourforce, mounted or dismounted, to mass

at the weak point you decided upon inanswering the first question. By massyou can forget all this three-to-one stuff.As a generally accepted rule of thumb,an attacker should have a three-to-oneadvantage over a defender. It is also agenerally accepted rule of thumb that adefender can contend with being out-numbered three to one. The logical con-sequence of the three-to-one attackermeeting the one-to-three defender, allother things being equal, is that all bat-tles will be a draw or a stalemate —which is as good as a win for the de-fender. Your course of action must up

the ante on the defender in order to en-sure success. You are trying for at least asix to one advantage at the point of im-pact — two platoons against a squad,two companies against a platoon, twobattalions against a company, etc. Tocontrol this much force, you should startputting pen to paper (or to acetate). Yourcourse of action will literally start to takeshape as you add objectives, basicgraphics, and offensive fire controlmeasures. Additionally, you shouldspend some time examining how thefriendly force will move along the axiswith an eye to both preventing fratricideand avoiding piecemeal commitment.

For the next step you will want to con-sider how to gang up on the defender;that is, address how to task-organize aforce to overwhelm the weak point? Theaim here is to assign the correct task toeach of your subordinates. Often, theirspecific requirements will fairly wellmandate their composition. You couldstart with the reconnaissance forces whowill find the enemy, simultaneously con-firming your template. They should thenmove to a position to provide securityand early warning to the force if this wasnot implicit with step one. Secondly, youmay need to nominate support forcesthat will move to a position to overwatchand suppress the defender. Their purposeis to fix the enemy. They may also beinvolved in a deception effort. Finally,you must decide which part of yourforce will conduct the main attack. Thisforce, moving along the axis chosenabove, will likely be required to breachthe defender’s tactical or hasty protectiveobstacles, plus assault through those ob-jectives resulting from step two. Reserveand follow-on forces may also be allo-cated in concert with this main attack.


PRESS THE ATTACK: A 5-STEP TECHNIQUE FOR OFFENSIVE PLANNING

1. Where is the enemy weak point?-Thorough offensive IPB integrated with R&S activities; security-ID flank or isolated positions; CSOPs and armored reserves-Extent of enemy EA and obstacles; audit enemy AT systems

2. What is one way to attack it? (Ar ray backward from OBJ to LD/AA)-Utilize covered routes, mounted or dismounted; avoid enemy EA-Maneuver to mass at the weak point, seek 6:1(+) force ratio-Objectives and fire control measures to prevent fratricide

3. Task organize a correct force to overwhelm that weak point.-Reconnaissance forces find the enemy, confirm template; protect-Support forces fix enemy; suppress, overwatch, and deceive-Main attack finishes enemy; breach, assault, and reserves

4. Integrate combat support arms with priority to the main effort.-Multiply combat power; AD, AV, CAS, EN, EW, FA, MP, etc.-Isolate the weak point; suppressive and obscuration fires-Survivability, observation, displacement plan; FIST, key assets

5. Plan for sustained operations against an uncooperative enemy .-Sectors for consolidation; branch plan to continue attack-Establish reorganization criteria, priority; rearm, refuel, refit-Casualty evacuation; EPW and NBC contaminated personnel

Figure 1

Figure 2

Remember that at this point you are stilldeveloping courses of action, dealinglargely with concepts and major musclemovements. Do not get side-tracked withthe details of specific events, such asclearing the objective. This type of preci-sion work, critically important to a suc-cessful outcome, should wait until afteryou have settled on a scheme of maneu-ver for the attack.

Having gotten through steps two andthree, you should now look for ways tocrush the defender. Can you further mul-tiply combat power against the weakpoint? Step four entails the integration ofcombat supporting arms, with priority tothe main effort. You are seeking to iso-late that weak point with suppressive

and obscurative fires, either electronic orhigh explosive, targeting at a minimumknown enemy locations to allow for con-current activities by the fire support co-ordinators.

Your course of action should also ac-count for observation and displacementplans for these key assets to ensure theirparticipation and survivability for the du-ration of the mission. Once the weakpoint is identified, it should serve as acentral focus for all other functions,whether it’s MPs doing battlefield circu-lation control or engineers working onroute development. To really crush thedefender, everyone in the force musthave a task and purpose toward thatgoal, from beginning to end.

You know your opponent to be a deter-mined foe. Your course of action must,therefore, follow through the attack.Have you planned for sustained opera-tions against an uncooperative enemy?At the very least, you should assign sec-tors for consolidation or a general axis ororientation for a branch plan to continuethe attack. Anticipating at a minimumthe need to reorganize on the objective,you may have criteria and assets for re-arming or refueling, etc., and for thehandling of EPWs. Anticipating worstcase, you may need to superimpose a re-dundant casualty evacuation scheme andprovide for chemical decontamination. Itis the follow through which will postureyou at the desired end state of your at-tack, where you visualized your courseof action would take you.

The goal of this 5-step approach topress the attack, compiled at Figure 1, isto capture the elements inherent with of-fensive planning. Those that find a pic-ture a useful medium to communicatethe planning and development of coursesof action will see that Figure 2 also con-tains all these elements. In tandem, theyare a handy aid, with a snappy title, tocarry around in your kit bag and turn towhen you do not know where to start.This technique is just as relevant forhasty as for deliberate attacks, and for allechelons. For a truly hasty attack, wheretime is of the essence, this technique isall you will need to organize yourthoughts. It can certainly give you agood framework with which to buildupon — a template, if you like, to gener-ate the appropriate instructions in orderto get your outfit moving. Steps two tofive can also be adjusted to accommo-date changes to your answer to step one,as either the defender’s picture is clari-fied or options against different enemycourses of action are weighed. Offensiveoperations are very complex, but at theirheart almost all have addressed or an-swered these five basic questions.

LTC Doug Slater is a 1979 graduate ofthe U.S. Military Academy. He currentlycommands 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry atFt. Knox, Ky. Previous Armor assign-ments include S3, 4-66 Armor, 3d ID,Aschaffenburg, FRG; S3 and XO, 3-37Armor, and as a G3 (Plans) Officer, 1stID, Ft. Riley, Kan. He also served as anExchange Officer with the Royal ArmourCorps, Warminster, England.


Figure 3

BUILD THE DEFENSE: STEPS

1. Where do you think the enemy is going?-From IPB-Commander’s Estimate

2. Where do you want to kill him?-Engagement Areas (EA)-Physical recon is best

3. Position forces to kill him with dir ect fire.-Walk engagement area with element leaders-Point out battle positions to commanders-Best killing ground (EA) should be main effort

4. Position obstacles to support killing him there.-Force enemy into your killing ground-Engineers must understand that’s what you want to happen

5. Plan indirect fires to support killing him there.-Mass at the critical plan (EA) at the right time-Maintain control by establishing priorities

The First Crisis: Yom Kippur War, 1973

First-generation, wire-guided Saggerantitank guided missiles (ATGMs) oper-ated by joystick control are fired byEgyptian infantrymen at Israeli tanks op-erating without infantry support, taking aheavy toll on the armored forces coun-terattacking the Egyptian surprise attackand invasion of the Sinai across the SuezCanal. Later in the war, IDF tankerslearn to turn and fire towards the firingsignature of the Sagger missiles, disrupt-ing the Egyptian infantrymen’s aim.They learn also to dodge their tanks atthe last second to evade the missiles.One tank came home after a missionwith over a dozen Sagger wires drapedover its hull.

One of the results of that war was crea-tion of tactics, techniques, and proce-dures (TTP) that integrated infantry inM113 armored personnel carriers toclear out ATGM positions ahead oftanks. Another result was the develop-ment of a better protected tank, the verylow silhouette Merkava I, which provedinvincible against first generationATGMs and RPGs in the later war inLebanon in 1982.

The Second Crisis: South Lebanon, 1997

Second-generation, Russian signature-less ATGMs like the 9K111 Fagot (AT4Spigot in the West) are being used byHezbollah to knock out the once-invinci-ble Merkava IIs in mountainous and ur-banized Southern Lebanon. After 28missile hits, Hezbollah guerrillas havebeen reported as having learned whichare the weak areas of the Merkava II andfire two missiles in rapid succession atthat spot. Three Merkava II tanks havebeen knocked out, resulting in two deadsoldiers. Without a firing signature, theFagot (semi-automatic command line-of-sight) SACLOS ATGM can be control-led until it hits the specific spot on thetank aimed by the firer, who holds thecrosshairs there and is free from thetank’s counterfire. The tanker doesn’tknow he’s under attack until the ATGM

hits his tank. The IDF is consideringpulling the Merkava IIs out of Lebanonand have dispatched the legendary Gen-eral Tal, creator of the Merkava MBT, tothe scene to solve the problem.

We owe a great deal of debt to the Is-raeli Defense Forces (IDF) who, on thefront lines for freedom, are encounteringthe latest weapons made in both the for-mer Soviet Union and the West. Whatthey learn the hard way, we need to heedin our future armored vehicle designsand in our own TTP.

When the tank as we know it receivessome setbacks in battle, there will al-ways be a chorus of those who proclaimthat the tank is dead. This shrill messageis delivered with an arrogant attitude thatsuggests we are somehow “above” hav-ing to use extreme physical measures tofight battles today and certainly in thefuture. What these people really opposeis the reality that, in war, EXTREMEphysical measures are needed to win.The modern battlefield is covered byfire, and to advance forward requires ar-mor protection, or else casualties willmount, as we saw in both World Wars,Vietnam, and more recently in Somalia.These critics of the tank invariably offerus no solutions or alternatives, other thanfighting on foot without tanks or fromthe cockpit with “wunderweapons” ofthe air. Their goal seems to be killing thetank as an end unto itself. What these in-dividuals fail to realize is that, in war,there is a constant ebb and flow ofweapons and countermeasures. The min-ute you develop an advantage, a counterweapon is created. To stay on top, youhave to keep advancing new ideas.Those that want to give up the tank sim-ply want to call it quits, and give up,which will be disastrous on the next bat-tlefield. In war, the side that decides tostick to bows and arrows gets wiped outby the side with firearms.

If the tank is now endangered by theantitank guided missile, firing beyondvisual ranges without signatures, then thetank must adapt to regain the edge. Thecritics of the tank are partially right: tra-ditional tankers who do not want toadapt to the modern battlefield are mak-ing the tank obsolete, so we must change

the tank paradigm or else it will bechanged for us by our misinformed de-tractors.

The world is rapidly urbanizing; peoplecause wars, and people live in cities.Tanks will not only be required to leadstampedes in open rural desert areas, à laDesert Storm, to defeat other tank armiesin third-generation maneuver wars, butthey must fight in closed terrain and as-sist in stability operations in defensiveposture situations like Bosnia and SouthLebanon. Tanks must lead the way intothe cities, but avoid a replay of fightinginfantry-pure, as in Somalia, or tank-pure, as the Russians did in Chechnya.Tanks will be vital to withstand enemyfires and lead assaults by shock action.Supporting the tank will be shock infan-try in their own armored personnel carri-ers; some with a large-caliber, fire-sup-port cannon to blast buildings/bunkers,others with a telescoping boom ladderwith a capsule to take fire teams to therooftops or selected windows or floorsby mouseholing, instead of the predict-able helicopter rooftop assaults. We’llneed other vehicles with fire fightingmodules or trailers to put out buildingfires before the city we are trying to saveburns down. If tanks cannot swim, atleast the APCs should be capable of thiswithout preparation in order to secureriver crossings for combat engineers tobridge. However, once the area is se-cured, maintaining control of urban areaswill require the defensive use of tanks.

Some of the best ideas to defeat preci-sion guided munitions/missiles comefrom the Russians — I suggest readingthe recent article in Military Parademagazine at the internet address:http://www.milparade.ru/19/102-105.htmand especially the schematic athttp://www.milparade.ru/19/105-f.gif.

The following are descriptions of de-vices the future tank will need to prevailin the city fight. When the future tankventures into the open, the fight willoften be beyond visual range — missileversus missile. This tank must be air-droppable, so it can be deployed alongwith airborne forces from the drop zone.America is a strategic air power, as Eng-land was once a sea power. Our security


A Crisis of Confidence in Armor?by Mike Sparks

interests require significant forces thatcan move decisively within hours — notdays, weeks, or months.

The future tank crew must fight layingdown so the entire vehicle can be scaleddown to a size no larger than aHMMWV. This is a modern equivalentof the “belly flopper” concept tried inthe 1930s with the low-tech automotivetechnology then available. It didn’twork, but it did give birth to the incred-ibly successful Jeep and is on display inthe National Infantry Museum at FortBenning, Georgia. The future tank mustbe less than the height of a standing man

because height is the chief visual give-away on the battlefield.

The future tank should be armed with alarge-caliber cannon for direct-fire en-gagement of other tanks, as well as ameans to reduce enemy strongpoints inthe attack. The tank commander shouldstill be able to look out from the highestspot and command his tank.

Working along with the future tank’ssmall size is that its power plant andtracks are silenced to evade enemy de-tection, as German Army M113s havebeen modified. The engine has its ex-haust routed and cooled to preclude de-

tection of its infrared signature. A heat-reflective tarp can be rapidly pulled overthe top of the tank to hide it from viewand detection. A dust skirt could preventdust from spewing out the rear as thetank travels across dry ground. Camou-flage strips are integral to the tank tobreak up its outline and blend into sur-


Conceptual drawing by ARMOR artist JodyHarmon illustrates some features of a futuretank favored by the author.

rounding vegetation. Auxiliary powerunits (APUs) must be organic to the tankso it can operate its FLIR and image in-tensifiers, etc., without having to turn themain engine on.

Stealth must be valued within the Ar-mor community. The days of brazenlyoperating in the open, based on the be-lief that Chobham armor makes the tankinvincible, are over. It doesn’t work atNTC Fort Irwin, and it certainly doesn’twork anymore in Southern Lebanon,even with the superbly armored MerkavaMBT. The Armor community must em-brace stealth in design, tactics, and pro-cedures, or they will by inflexibilitydoom the tank in the U.S. to obsoles-cence while other countries adapt theirAFVs and make them work on the 21stcentury battlefield. What would GeneralsAbrams and Patton be advocating today?

Every tank should have a dozer bladeto dig its own defilade fighting positionsand clear barricades and obstacles. Weshould not have to wait for a separateunit to do this for us. Just as the individ-ual soldier has an e-tool to scrape out adepression and then a fighting hole froma temporary stop position, the futuretank must be able to entrench itselfquickly to withstand enemy attacks.

One writer in a 1972 issue of Infantrymagazine, reacting to the mines encoun-tered in Vietnam, noted that the futurearmored personnel carrier should haveits tracks outside the vehicle hull, notunderneath, so mines explode away fromthe body. We should do this on the futuretank as well as mold the hull in a Vshape, as the South African DefenseForces do with their mine resistant vehi-cles, to create a very hard, sturdy, mine-resistant tank. Armored vehicles will bekey in keeping supply and communica-tions roads open into cities during con-flict by warring sides.

Trying to stop bullets at the chest withflak jackets is too late, and so is trying tostop ATGMs at the tank hull. What isneeded is a moving shield that can posi-tion itself to meet an incoming missilethreat and pre-detonate the warhead asafe distance away from the tank. Thatfront shield should be the dozer blade. Ashield on the turret could prevent de-struction by top-attack missiles like ourown Javelin, TOW IIB, and the SwedishBofors BILL. A shield on the rear, andon each side, covers the rest of the tank.These shields are controlled by computerto move into position and swat incomingATGMs and RPGs, just as they impact,so their warheads do not impact the tankitself. These stand-off shields would also

protect against road-side bombs similarto those being used by Hezbollah againstIDF armored vehicles keeping supplylines open to their bases in southernLebanon.

The IDF tankers do not know they areunder attack until the second-generationRussian ATGMs hit them, thus they arenot able to dodge the missiles. What isneeded is a very low power electronicumbrella that can warn the tank that mis-siles are flying towards it. The devicecan alert the crew to move the tank as itlaunches smoke grenades and decoys tofoil the aim of the ATGM firer and foolthe missile.

If the tank is static with the engine off,the shields should be able to move tocover the tank and swat the missiles,sacrificing themselves to save the tankand crew. The shields themselves mustbe easily replaceable in the field.

Like the superb Merkava, the tankmust have space in its rear to carry someescort infantry, supplies, extra ammuni-tion, or a vertical launch missile module,the latter being lowered into place by asmall crane organic to the tank like theHMMWV LOSAT system has. The ver-tical missile tubes would be armed withfire-and-forget ATGMs like the Javelinor the Enhanced Fiber Optic GuidedMissiles (EFOGM) for extended rangetargets.

All fuel for the tank should be outsidethe hull at the rear of the vehicle, likethe M113A3, to prevent a fire if the ve-hicle is hit.

The IDF pioneered use of the Un-manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as a re-connaissance tool. However, it’s beenoverused and, not unlike our use of heli-copters in the Vietnam War, has becomean obvious signal to the enemy that weintend to fight soon in the area where theUAV flies. The failed September 5 IDFFlotilla 13 naval commando raid, where12 men were killed, has been directly at-tributed to UAVs overflying the targetarea and alerting the enemy to preparean ambush. Situational awareness mustnot be a two-way street — we shouldsee the enemy, and he must be in thedark.

One way we could do this is by em-ploying a fiber-optic periscope from thetank itself, extending up to 30 feet highto spot the enemy with sensors and vis-ual images before they can fire ATGMs.Tanks can kill the enemy first with theirown or trailer-mounted anti-personnelEFOGMs. With a mobile observationtower that retracts like a submarine peri-

scope, the tank can stay hidden in theterrain.

The next step might be to have a he-lium balloon that can be inflated and un-reeled aloft from the tank periscope toan even greater height than the 30-footpole, say 100-200 feet — a tetheredUAV — that stays over friendly territoryso the enemy is not alerted to our recon-naissance efforts, yet can see for milesover the next hill. This would be a high-technology version of the observationballoon used so effectively in WWI toadjust artillery fire into the trenches.With such a capability built into the fu-ture tank, armored crews can call forsupporting arms or use their own be-yond-visual-range weapons to silence thesignature-less ATGM threat.

One thing we might do to help fix thesituation in South Lebanon would be toloan some M1A2 Abrams MBTs to theIDF to give them time to redress theMerkava II’s armor problems. This willalso give us technical feedback on howour tanks fare against the latest ATGMs.

We could also loan the IDF someHMMWV-mounted EFOGM firing unitsso they can use them in concert withtheir UAVs to suppress HezbollahATGM firing positions.

Ultimately, we should develop a Mo-bil-Trac trailer with wheels-tracks (thebed trailer being used for the U.S.Army’s Explosive Stand-off MinefieldBreacher-ESMB-system) with verticallaunch EFOGM missiles and a telescop-ing periscope or tethered observationballoon with fiber optic links to the tanktowing it. This would enable the IDFcrews to see Hezbollah terrorists firstwithout having to overfly a UAV.

We must also develop, as soon as pos-sible, an anti-personnel EFOGM thatuses fuel-air explosives technology toclear out enemy infantry firing signature-less ATGMs. This warhead must be ableto penetrate bunkers, buildings and fight-ing positions with overhead cover.

We are kidding ourselves if we thinkwe can go cheap and fight with onlylight forces on foot supported by aircraft.If we want to fight our enemies in aneven strength, or even from numericalinferiority, we can give up on the ar-mored vehicle and suffer the conse-quences. We do not have, in a 10-divi-sion Army, the option of trading casualtyfor casualty with a Third World country



The U.S. Army lacks a rapidly deploy-able mounted force with the necessaryfirepower, mobility, protection, and sup-portability to meet America’s worldwidecommitments.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Unionand the ensuing “peace,” the armedforces of the United States have partici-pated in over 25 major deployments in a7-year period, as opposed to 10 majordeployments during the 40 years of thecold war (Army Vision 2010).

Current Military Capabilities(USMC, Light, Heavy)

The Armed Forces of the United Statesin the post-cold war era are constantlyrequired to do more with less. This ap-plies to all aspects of our Defense De-partment and greatly affects our abilityto carry out national policy. In an ever-changing world with greater volatilityand a reduced U.S. military capability,American defense planners are having tore-look theories of power projection andforce composition. Reviewing the typesof possible missions, three come to mindwith the early deployment of force cen-tral to all. 1) Major Regional Conflict(MRC), 2) Stability and Support Opera-tions (SASO), and 3) Forced entry op-erations in support of either 1 or 2. Allthree mission types require the early in-troduction of credible combat units thatare able to support/secure follow-onforces or take direct action themselves.Regardless of statements made by otherservices, ground forces (i.e., the Army)ultimately are required to win conflictsand demonstrate American resolve,which argues that future conflicts mustbe truly joint operations maximizing thestrengths of each service. The Air Forceand Navy can gain air superiority overmost nations, and in most types of ter-rain can limit the enemy’s ability to re-

position large formations. However, theirability to secure drop zones, airfields,and port facilities are limited. Armyforced-entry operations revolve aroundsecuring airfields, while Marines focuson port facilities, each designed to facili-tate the deployment of follow-on forces.This presents a potential enemy with fewoptions to counter in his defense againstthe introduction of U.S. forces (airfieldsand ports). With these considerations inmind, what ground forces does the coun-try possess that can actually carry outrapid power projection operations?

The Marine Corps is equipped, organ-ized, and trained to be the country’s ex-peditionary force. The Marine MEU(light infantry battalion-sized unit) pos-sesses the ability to seize limited objec-tive from the sea as long as the objectiveis relatively near an ocean. If objectivesare in land-locked countries, or locatedfar from the sea, the Marines are se-verely limited. In addition, with the pro-curement of advanced missile technol-ogy by many nations, the employment ofMarine forces places considerable riskon the ships bringing them ashore.

Consider the problems and losses facedby the British in the Falklands againstArgentinian defenses. The Marine Corpsis currently working on equipment anddoctrine for extended projection opera-tions from ships over the horizon thatwould enable small forces to move up to500 miles inland for short periods oftime on specific missions. However, inthe end, the ability to project credibleground combat power into a theater isnot a Marine Corps function.

The Army’s rapid deployment lightforces (82nd Airborne) are billed as“strategically mobile,” yet possess lim-ited combat power and mobility once onthe ground and, thus, are not a realisticsolution to forced entry operations in

other than situations where the enemylacks a cohesive military and/or armoredforce. Light forces also must be droppedwithin walking distance of their objec-tives, thus their employment is quite pre-dictable for a defending enemy. Themethod of dropping airborne forces ontoairfields revolves around the assumptionthat the enemy does not possess suffi-cient antiaircraft gun and missile de-fenses to defend their key airfields andports.

Due to the limited tactical mobility andfirepower of American airborne forces,their ability to quickly expand air-headsand initiate offensive operations is se-verely limited. (Note: This is why Sovietairborne forces were mechanized.)

Heavy forces have two realistic optionsfor deployment. 1) Forward-deployedunits (Germany, Korea, and Kuwait) canrail, barge, or HET into theater, as seenin Bosnia, or 2) Pre-positioned ships.The movement and sustainment of heavyforces of any useful size by air is not arealistic option and therefore not consid-ered in this article. With either forward-deployed forces or pre-positioned ships,the movement of heavy forces is slowand cumbersome, not to mention the tre-mendous amounts of logistical supportrequired once in the theater of opera-tions.

The use of pre-positioned ships de-pends on a multitude of factors, rangingfrom having a secure port to disembarkvehicles to air-heads that will supporttroop transports flying in soldiers to linkup with their equipment. All of this as-sumes that the enemy has not sunk thepre-positioned ships prior to their arrivalat a port facility. Therefore, the use ofheavy forces in support of power projec-tion operations is limited to their abilityto be shipped and is therefore, realistically,not a good option if time is a factor.

Global Cavalry

by Captain William S. Riggs

Author’s light armored cavalry concept would be based on LAVs or similar vehicles.


Role of the Army and Force Projection Missions

The Army is faced with the unpleasantbut necessary task of restructuring whileretaining the ability to win future con-flicts. Army Vision 2010 outlines sevenmajor missions for the Army. The major-ity of these missions discuss the employ-ment of light forces, special operationsforces, and information systems. Theemployment of heavy forces is limited tomajor conflicts and limited SASO-typemissions.

This article revolves around this issue:the nation doesn’t have a rapidly deploy-able mounted force able to get where itis needed (within hours) and have cred-ible combat power once on site. If thiscapability existed, the mounted forcecould set the conditions for the follow-on forces to be successsful in their mis-sions.

The days of large field armies ofmassed tanks facing the Soviets at theFulda Gap are much less likely now. InDesert Storm, we were given the “war ofchoice,” one in which we were allowedmonths to build up forces; a war ourequipment, organizations, and doctrinewere specifically designed to fight. Inaddition, the campaign took place on thebest possible armored warfare terrain.

Today, we cannot clearly identify ourfuture foes. Possible enemies range fromthugs and bandits armed with AK-47s inHaiti, to hodgepodge armies in Bosnia,to manpower-intensive armies like NorthKorea and China, to the most modernand best equipped armies of the MiddleEast. The current threat is whomever thenational policy makers decide it is and,thus, we must be prepared to meet alllevels of threat with the best possibleforce mix available today within theconstraints of allocated resources.Clearly, based on the past ten years, op-erations in the future will revolve aroundmissions like Bosnia, Albania, Zaire,Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia. This is notto say that we should not plan on fight-ing a large conventional land army withadvanced technology, but rather that weacknowledge the reality of our worldand plan for it.

To some extent, larger conventionalthreats will be kept in check by globalpolitical and economic pressure and byour unquestionable ability to wage high-tech conventional warfare through theuse of precision munitions and electronicmeans. Countries that are not part of theglobal economy will be the scenes of fu-ture conflict due to the inability of worldorganizations to influence them. In aworld of “haves” and have-nots,” most

future Army operations probably lie withthe “have-nots.”

Requirements

The Army fights and wins groundwars. The problem facing us today is ourability to get to those wars quickly withthe correct mix of forces. The questionfaced by the mounted force today is, canwe get to a conflict with a credible forcein a timely manner and influence eventsin our favor? With a smaller overallforce structure, we need to refocus theemployment of the force to ensure thatwe get the most bang for the buck, aswell as maximizing the strengths of ouremerging technologies and our sisterservices. The Marines have a niche mar-ket for what they do. The Army has theability to win most wars if it can get tothem. The “can get there” issue is the di-lemma. If a large conflict develops, wemust call up National Guard and Re-serve forces to round out the Army, trainunits, prepare for deployment, deploy,receive equipment, move into theater,and start operations. The commitment ofcredible U.S. ground forces is a time-phased issue, which may lead to an un-favorable resolution for the nation due tothe Army’s inability to physically influ-ence events on the ground in a timelymanner.

The force required would have to pos-sess some traits not found in today’sArmy. The force envisioned should bedeployable, mobile, lethal, survivable,supportable, and employ the latest infor-mation technology.

• Deployable: The organization must beinstantaneously deployable by all AirForce cargo aircraft in force packagesthat can accomplish a variety of mis-sions.

• Mobile: The organization must possessthe mobility necessary to self-deployonce in theater, operate across all typesof terrain, to include river crossingswith light bridges, as well as the abil-ity to operate over long distances withminimal support.

• Lethal (Firepower): The organizationmust have organic firepower that willenable it to defend itself, as well as re-alistically present a threat to the enemyforce.

• Survivable (Protection): The equip-ment should provide a level of protec-tion to the crew equal to or greaterthan the current BFV. Protection forvehicles should include electronic andinformation-sharing technologies aswell as conventional armor.

• Supportable: The force should be to-tally supportable by air. The organiza-tion should have very limited logisticalrequirements and be able to operatewithout supplies for two to three days.

• Technology: Every vehicle in the or-ganization should share a common ap-pliqué-type information system. Theorganization should also have accessto theater and national intelligence as-sets.

Deployability: The rapid deployabilityof the organization is key and should beviewed as strategic mobility. In addition,the force should be permanently task-or-ganized to facilitate immediate deploy-ment and training as a combined armsteam. The entire organization should bedeployable by C-130 aircraft or larger.

Mobility: There are three major typesof mobility — strategic, operational, andtactical. The proposed organization mustmaximize mobility in all three areas.

- Strategic: With the shift from for-ward-deployed forces to CONUS-basedforces, the Army should maintain a rap-idly deployable, task-organized or modu-lar-packaged mounted force at all times.This force should be deployable by allU.S. Air Force cargo aircraft and shouldbe immediately available once on theground. The current use of airborne andRanger units to seize airfields is ex-tremely dangerous and presents greatrisk to the infantry commander once onthe ground with enemy armored forces.Strategically mobile mounted forcescould present the enemy with multiplechallenges. No longer could he focus hisforces on likely U.S. entry points (portsand airfields), but he would have towatch every road and dirt track capableof supporting a C-130 or C-17. Oncemounted forces were on the ground andable to influence the enemy, introductionof conventional infantry and armoredforces becomes much simpler.

- Operational: Operational mobility isbest described as the organization’s abil-ity to operate over extended distances insupport of operational objectives. Theimmediate movement of the organizationfrom a port, airfield, or landing area tothe area of operations is critical. Cur-rently, HET or rail support is necessaryto move heavy units from the port of en-try to the battlefield. Operational mobil-ity also includes the ability to cross un-improved bridges and water obstaclesunaided to position the force when andwhere it is needed. A major factor sel-dom considered is the constraint on mo-bility imposed on heavy organizations bythe extensive logistics tail required forsustained operations. Combat vehicles


can cross rough terrain, while supportinglogistical organizations cannot. Support-ing logistical organizations can movegreat distances with organic assets, whilethe combat vehicles cannot. Logisticalsupport requirements must always beconsidered as part of a unit’s overall mo-bility.

- Tactical: When discussing the mobil-ity of a vehicle, most people picturetanks crossing a World War I-type “no-man land.” Mobility should take intoconsideration all aspects of the vehicleAND the overall organization’s mobilityrequirements. Mobility should be viewedas a vehicle/organization’s ability tocross open terrain, bridges, water obsta-cles (rivers), factoring in distance, speed,and logistical support. Overall, the or-ganization should possess better mobilitythan HMMWV-based units.

Lethality (firepower): The organiza-tion must possess the same or better fire-power than found in today’s mechanizedinfantry battalions. However, firepowershould not be restricted to the size of thegun carried by a particular vehicle butrather the effects that the organizationcan bring to bear. The organizationshould possess the latest precision muni-tions and have the ability to direct muni-tions from other systems and services tomaximize the lethality and flexibility ofthe unit.

Survivability (protection): The systemshould possess equal or greater protec-tion than the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.Today’s weapons systems bring intoquestion traditional ideas of survivability.In the past, designers of armored vehi-cles focused on the ability of a vehicle towithstand a hit, within the front 60-de-gree arc, from the highest caliber ormost dangerous antitank weapon of theday. However, with advances in minewarfare (smart mines, top attack mines,etc.), precision guided munitions, hand-held antitank charges, top attack mis-siles, hyper-velocity or kinetic missiles,and kinetic energy tank rounds, most ar-mored vehicles are obsolete before theyroll off the production line.

Future concepts of protection will re-volve around a mix of armor and activedefenses to protect the vehicle. With thatin mind, we must re-evaluate our con-cepts of survivability and focus on all as-pects of protecting a vehicle. If almostany antitank type of munitions can pene-trate an armored vehicle (with the excep-tion of select Western main battle tanks),what remains? Mobility! The vehicleshould take advantage of all availableelectronic detection and warning devices(laser, mine, NBC detection/warning de-

vices), crew survivability measures (spallliners, fire suppression, mine blast pro-tection, and mobility following a minestrike), mobility (the ability to movefaster than an enemy can acquire, track,and engage), and information systems(digital network allowing situationalawareness). The concept of adding ar-mor packages to a vehicle, like the ill-fated Armored Gun System, presents afalse sense of security while increasingthe vehicle’s weight and decreasing itsmobility.

Supportability: The organization shouldrequire limited logistical support relativeto that of heavy forces. The limited lo-gistical concept supports the limitationsof forced entry operations and theamount of logistics that they are able tomove, as well as the requirement to sup-port the unit by air. Logistical supportfrom the air is not seen as the primarymethod of resupply, but rather as a vi-able option during initial entry opera-tions and long-range reconnaissance mis-sions. The force envisioned would oper-ate from a single vehicle chassis, drasti-cally reducing the number of differentparts that must be carried, while signifi-cantly increasing the number of partsthat can be carried for the common fam-ily of vehicles (FOV). The single FOVconcept also reduces the number andtype of mechanics necessary to fix thevehicles. Fuel economy must be similarto that of a truck or BFV and the entireorganization should be able to travel twoto three days without any external logis-tical support. The organization’s logisti-cal support equipment must be fully in-tegrated into all digital networks andpossess the ability to go wherever theirsupported unit goes (i.e., no LOGPAC;logistic vehicles use digital networks tomaneuver independently over extendeddistances, water obstacles, and aroundenemy positions to deliver supplies).

Information Systems: The envisionedorganization should maximize all avail-able information technologies (digital in-formation/communications network, longrange radios, secure mobile phones,TACSAT, TELE-MEDICINE, ASAS,UAV, and access to theater and nationalintelligence assets (J-STARS, AWACS,and satellite imagery), as well as the ca-pability to expand as new systems be-come available. All vehicles in the or-ganization should possess digital infor-mation/communications packages thatenable independent operations at all lev-els (scouts through CSS operations). Ra-dios must be multi-functional SINC-GARS/UHF/VHF for long range com-munications over rough terrain and withother services. Communications systems

must also enable the organization tocommunicate for support or to pass in-telligence in a joint and/or coalition en-vironment. When considering communi-cations and information systems, weshould attempt to maximize all availableassets, to include commercial off-the-shelf systems.

This article proposes giving the U.S.Army a truly “full spectrum force,” ca-pable of rapid global deployment, withthe firepower, mobility, protection, infor-mation, and logistical ease of supportnecessary for a range of missions. Theorganization would not take the place ofheavy units, but would rather be amounted force that specialized in rapiddeployment/forced entry, SASO, andtheater-level ground reconnaissance dur-ing Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs).

The critical argument is that of time;most agree that the HMMWV is not theideal reconnaissance platform, nor was itdesigned to be. On the other hand, canwe afford to wait until 2010 for the de-velopment of an FSCS type vehicle de-signed to optimally operate in opencountry (NTC), as opposed to its morelikely employment environments (urbanand restricted terrain) as seen in allglobal conflicts other than the Gulf War?The proposed organization is not in-tended to take the place of the FSCS,which is a superb concept, but rathermeets an existing requirement that —since the death of the AGS and otherlight systems — has gone unmet. Manywill scoff at the idea of fielding an or-ganization that does not fit traditional“Armor” or “Cavalry” structure, or con-duct traditional roles. These argumentshave been heard many times before withthe advent of the machine gun, the tank,the airplane, and the all-helicopter divi-sion. Of concern is a growing fascinationwith technologies that reduce the num-ber of soldiers required while the experi-ence of each deployment brings criesfrom joint force commanders for moreinfantry and tanks. Also of concern isthat a technologically inferior, yet com-petent, enemy may nullify our advan-tages by changing battlefield conditions(note U.S. experiences in Vietnam andSomalia, and Russian experiences in Af-ghanistan and Chechnya). The currenttrend is to do more with fewer soldiers;however, we should look for realisticways to balance technology with combatrealities. The answers for the Army donot all lay with technology, but ratherwith a healthy balance of the two, erringon the side of the soldier. Recently, tech-nology has aided the fight, but has notreduced the actual need for more andmore soldiers with the ability to apply


physical force to decide the final out-come of a situation or collect intelli-gence through the Mark I eyeball (HU-MINT).

Certainly, this mounted rapid deploy-ment force is not the “be-all, do-all”force, nor will it solve all of the Army’sproblems. This article attempts to gener-ate professional discussion within theforce by highlighting current weaknesseswithin the mounted force and outlining apossible solution.

Concept of design

When setting out to design the “objec-tive” organization, all aspects of a forcewere examined. The design attempted toincorporate ideal manning levels,weapon systems, command relationships,logistical requirements, and operationalemployment theories, regardless of po-litical, financial, or branch bias.

The organization design focuses on theconcept of self-contained packages whilegiving the commander all necessary as-sets to accomplish a range of missions.All organizations are permanently task-organized to maximize effectiveness andto establish relationships as we actuallyfight. Headquarters were designed tocommand and control only; they werestripped of control of all units other thanthose organic to subordinate maneuverunits (i.e., no engineers or MI companyat regimental level because these assetsare broken down to the troop and squad-ron level).

The General Motors (GM) Light Ar-mored Vehicle (LAV) Family of Vehicles(FOV) is the platform proposed for em-ployment in the “medium” ACR con-cept. The proposed LAV organizationcan be fielded today with equipmentavailable “off the shelf” and serve as avaluable addition to our force structurewhile meeting the needs of the Army.

Traditional procurement procedures canbe radically reduced if testing and evalu-ation data are accepted from other coun-tries currently operating the vehicle. Ve-hicles can be leased, and select DS anddepot-level maintenance can be con-tracted. Why not send the vehicle backto GM for depot-level work, rather thancreating an infrastructure to support thesystem? In times of limited funding, wemust develop innovative ways of resour-cing to maximize benefit to the opera-tional forces, not Army infrastructureand the defense industry.

The ageless argument of wheels versustracks will not be discussed, as data canbe presented to support either case.However, military employment ofwheeled vehicles around the worldclearly indicates the effectiveness ofthese systems to meet a range of mis-sions across all types of terrain.

Overview

The proposed LAV-based unit is organ-ized along cavalry regiment lines and isdesigned to operate on a non-linear bat-tlefield and during SASO. The regimentintegrates the latest technology in com-munications, surveillance, and intelli-gence collection systems with groundtroops, aviation troops, UAVs, and jointsystems. The organization crosses tradi-tional branch boundaries to incorporatethe best systems available, while maxi-mizing the overall effectiveness of theunit. With the advent of the tactical in-ternet, satellites, JSTARS, UAVs, LRAS,laser warning devices and other ad-vanced systems, we must reexamine ourmethods of employment and collection,as well as our ability to support/conductactual maneuver warfare.

The units (from troop level up) are de-signed to be deployable packages ormodules. Each troop can receive datafrom joint and national assets while de-ployed independently of the squadron.

Employment Scenarios

Rapid Deployment/Forced EntrySupport: The LAV cavalry organizationis exceptionally well-suited to supportrapid deployment and forced-entry op-erations. The LAV cavalry troop is aself-contained (modular) package withthe mobility, firepower, protection, andlogistical structure necessary for the sup-port of light forces. Since the deactiva-tion of the 82d Airborne Division’s 3-73rd Armor, the mounted force hasfailed to provide a rapidly-deployablemounted force in support of the light in-fantry. The Javelin missile has been des-ignated as the stopgap for the loss of theSheridans, however, it is not designed toblow large holes in buildings, nor is itwell-suited for rapid armored maneuveragainst enemy forces. Traditional meth-ods of air-dropping LAVs can be em-ployed, if required, to support landingzone operations. However, the LAV of-fers an option to traditional airborne em-ployment of vehicles. Why not land theunit along a remote road or strip, then

move off to collect intelligence or tofight the enemy on terms favorable tous? The C3I capabilities of an LAVtroop may also aid the “operationalground commander” as light forces lackadvanced digital “situational awareness”and communications packages. The rela-tively light logistical impact of an LAV-based unit is also of value as initial entryforces do not have the support structurenecessary to support large logistical re-quirements.

SASO Employment: The LAV organi-zation is particularly well suited forSASO environments. The organizationhas the ability to operate independentlyacross extended distances with the pro-tection and firepower necessary to deterand defend. The LAV organization iswell-suited for SASO in that it can oper-ate immediately in a logistically “imma-ture” theater of operations, thus provid-ing the necessary protection and pres-ence for the introduction of conventionalforces. With a digital communicationsystem that provides “situational aware-ness,” the troop/squadron commanderhas the ability to monitor a much largerarea than previously possible with con-ventional forces. Major tasks formounted units in SASO environmentsinclude: convoy security over long dis-tances, checkpoint operations, observa-tion point duties, and quick reactionforce (QRF) operations. Fast, wheeledorganizations lend themselves well tothese tasks, as seen by wheeled organi-zations employed in Bosnia by Europeannations during UN and later IFOR op-erations. Wheeled units have the abilityto cross small bridges, (the majority ofbridges in the Third World) which areincapable of supporting armored vehi-cles, as well as the ability to travel ex-tended distances, at road speeds, with thesupported unit.

Major Regional Conflict (MRC):(Theater reconnaissance) The proposedorganization is not designed to “fight”like a traditional ACR, due to its en-hanced mobility, lack of armor protec-tion, and improved “situational aware-ness.” The organization will focus on thetheater commander’s Critical Informa-tion Requirements (CCIR) that cannot beeffectively answered/detected by elec-tronic means. Based on this concept, theorganization will operate as small, semi-independent section/platoon-sized unitsacross the battlefield to collect specificintelligence for the commander. The em-ployment of this type of organization


also enables the commander to simulta-neously attack targets throughout thedepth of enemy territory, thereby givinghim a mounted “Deep Strike” capability,as was required in western Iraq to huntSCUDs during Desert Storm. One of theprinciple features of LAV-based units isthe human aspect of reconnaissance.Modern electronic systems provide ex-ceptional and timely battlefield informa-tion but lack the ability to collect HU-MINT-type intelligence by talking to lo-cals, interrogation of prisoners, physicalinspections of sites and equipment, androute and area reconnaissance.

Testing of New Equipment: Due to itsunique abilities, the LAV ACR offers anexcellent platform for testing new tech-nologies. In addition, it may form a linkto the development of doctrine for theArmy After Next. However, testingshould be “field testing” by troops, notAWE type testing with umbilical cords

tied to contractors’ test benches. The unitmust retain its rapid deployment capa-bilities.

For the purpose of this article, only theLAV troop and LAV squadron will beaddressed.

The LAV Troop

Intelligence: Each troop has the capa-bility to receive intelligence data frommultiple sources. J-STARS down-link,All Source Analysis System (ASAS),and UAV down-links may be options,but to maximize the troops’ capabilities,they must have the ability to see the“whole” picture. These assets are nor-mally found in brigade and higher eche-lons; however, due to the troops’ require-ment to deploy quickly in immaturetheaters and operate over large distances,these systems are needed at the lowestlevel. This enables individual vehicles/

sections to avoid enemy concentrationsand seek only the information requiredby the commander.

Maneuver: The LAV cavalry troop isdesigned as a “complete package” withthe assets necessary to conduct a rangeof operations. The unit organization isdesigned to stand alone or operate aspart of a squadron. The troop consist ofthree scout platoons of three reconnais-sance LAVs and three 90mm or 105mmLAVs. The reconnaissance LAV (Cana-dian “Coyote” recce vehicle) is equippedwith a Long Range Acquisition System(LRAS) suite (GSR/FLIR/thermal sight/camera/laser) on a 10m telescopic mastor ground-mounted, laser detection/warning, munitions guidance laser,25mm cannon, Javelin ATGMs, and anappliqué-type digital information/com-munication package. Each section con-sists of a reconnaissance vehicle and anLAV 90mm/105mm. The LAV 90mm/105mm, as the wingman, provides thenecessary protection for the recce vehi-cle.

Fire Support: Traditional “high explo-sive” artillery support is not employedby the LAV unit. Scout sections rely ontroop-organic, breech-loading 120mmmortar fires for HE and smoke support.When targets of interest to the theatercommander are located, the unit calls forCAS, Army Aviation, MLRS, orATACMS. Each scout LAV and selectothers have laser designators and theability to digitally call for Hellfire sup-port. Hellfire missiles can be fired fromLAV-based Hellfire vehicles, or fromOH-58D helicopters. Mortar LAVs mayoperate independently of their platoon insupport of scout platoons/sections.

Air Defense: No dedicated ADA vehi-cles move as part of the troop. The troophas an organic ADA capability with anAWACS down-link, and each section-sized unit is issued STINGER missiles.With the ability of each vehicle to “seethe battlefield” through the appliqué sys-tem, air battle management can effec-tively be coordinated and directed. Thetroop XO’s C2 LAV has an AWACSdown-link capability. During forced en-try operations and long range reconnais-sance operations, air defense becomes acritical asset. The ability of the unit tomaintain situational awareness of air op-erations is significant when consideringthe troop’s reliance on CAS/Army avia-tion support. During forced entry opera-tions, the troop has the ability to quickly


expand the SHORAD air defense um-brella over friendly forces and air fields.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability:Troop mobility is provided by vehicle-mounted light Israeli rakes and magneticpre-detonation/detection devices. Coun-termobility is provided by MOMPS/WAM mines. Organic, engineer type,survivability equipment is not necessarydue to mobile nature of the organization.If survivability positions are required,theater heavy engineers can be re-quested. NBC protection/detection isprovided by organic chemical detectionequipment. In an NBC environment,LAVs could locate contaminated areasand pass their locations via their digitalinformation/communications network.

CSS: The key to the LAV organizationis its ability to operate with limited lo-gistical support. However, to maximizethe troop’s capabilities, the CSS systemsmust be capable of providing long rangesupport, primarily fuel, independently,over all terrain. The LAV squadron CSSsystem would not operate a traditionalLOGPAC but rather would inde-pendently maneuver forward through theuse of digital communications to ex-change fuel/water and ammunition trail-ers. The 1SG, XO, and supply sergeantLAV each tow a trailer (1SG=fuel,XO=fuel, Supply=water/fuel). Sectionsor individual vehicles link-up, when nec-essary, with the 1SG/XO/supply sergeantfor fuel, water, and rations. When the1SG/XO/supply sergeant’s trailers be-come low, squadron CSS LAVs maneu-ver forward and exchange full trailers forempty ones. Ammunition resupply isconducted on an as-needed basis.

The key to independent operations ofLAV resupply vehicles, as opposed tocentral control, is the ability to use ap-pliqué type systems to avoid enemy con-centrations, minefields, and built-up ar-eas. The troop has two medic LAV am-bulances. Troop medics should betrained to 18-series standards and be ableto employ digital TELE-MEDICINEtechnologies. The section’s leader shouldbe a PA, at a minimum, to provide criti-cal medical treatment forward. The twomedic LAVs give the troop the necessarymedical support to operate over ex-tended distances and on a wide frontage.

The maintenance/recovery LAV is ableto repair minor faults/damage forward aswell as cannibalize damaged LAVs. Ifrequired, it can recover damaged LAVs

back to squadron maintenance collectionpoints.

A PLL supply LAV carries a robustPLL capable of supporting the troop’sClass IX requirements with limited ex-ternal support for an extended period. Asignificant advantage of a single FOV isthe ability to carry an increased PLL forone type of vehicle, the ability to canni-balize damaged/destroyed vehicles, andthe requirement for only one type of hullmechanic. An additional benefit of theLAV FOV is the ability to use commer-cial truck parts for repairs.

C2: The principle feature that enablesthe LAV organization to conduct inde-pendent long range operations is the ap-pliqué type digital information system.Every vehicle is given the whole picture,“situational awareness,” and is able tooperate independently within the frame-work of an interconnected communica-tion system. The troop commander isprovided with a recce LAV to enablehim to move forward and “see” the ac-tual battlefield through his ownsights/eyes. The XO is mounted in a C2LAV (TOC) which is the troop’s combatinformation center with an ASAS,Ground Station Module (GSM)/J-STARS down-link, and UAV down-link.The vehicle contains all necessary elec-tronic systems to enable the troop toconduct independent operations. Thetroop has two TACSAT communicationsystems and all vehicles have an inte-grated SINCGARS/UHF/VHF radio/datasystem.

Garrison: Two HMMWVs and anFMTV are provided for garrison opera-tions. These vehicles are not intended fordeployment.

The LAV Squadron

Intelligence: The intelligence platoonof the squadron consists of an S2 C2LAV, a DF/Jammer LAV, four UAVLAVs (4 UAV, 2 control stations), and aTrojan Spirit LAV. The squadron com-mander has a CTT (Commanders Tacti-cal Terminal) LAV assigned as his vehi-cle. The S2 LAV contains an ASAS,GSM (JSTARS) down-link, and a UAVdown-link. Once the squadron is de-ployed, the intelligence platoon providesall “intelligence” related inputs into thecommon digital appliqué-type system,thus providing all vehicles with a com-mon picture of the battlefield. TheDF/Jammer LAV supports the reconnais-sance effort in locating enemy electronic

signatures and jamming when required.The UAV section flies missions in sup-port of the reconnaissance effort, as wellas finding routes through difficult terrainor around enemy positions for theground troops.

Maneuver

AT Company: Squadron ground “kill-ing” capabilities are in the form of theHellfire AT company. Employed as acompany or in platoons, Hellfire vehi-cles maneuver in support of the recon-naissance troops. The company consistsof three platoons of four vehicles eachand a HQ platoon consisting of the CO,XO, 1SG, supply, maintenance, andmedics. All vehicles have digital com-munication systems and the ability tooperate independently in support of thesquadron or troops.

Aviation Troop: Once deployed, theLAV squadron gains an aviation troopconsisting of OH-58Ds (Warrior). Theaviation troop is employed in support ofsquadron/troop reconnaissance objectivesor to provide Hellfire missile support.

Lift Platoon: Once deployed, thesquadron gains a UH-60 lift platoon,consisting of four utility aircraft and twomedevac helicopters.

Fire Support: Squadron fire supportconsists of an ALO/Tactical Air ControlParty (TAC-P) LAV, and an FSO LAV.The squadron should never be in a posi-tion where it has the need for massedconventional artillery. CAS and ArmyAviation are the squadron’s primarymethods of engaging targets throughoutthe depth of the enemy rear. Divisionand Corps MLRS and ATACMS areused on select targets, based on targetimportance.

Air Defense: As with the troop, air de-fense is provided by all squadron vehi-cles coordinated through the commondigital information/communications net-work. The air defense fight is managedby the TOC C2 LAV with an AWACSdown-link. The ability of the unit tomaintain situational awareness of air op-erations is significant when consideringthe reliance on CAS/Army aviation sup-port. During forced entry operations, theability to quickly expand the SHORADumbrella over friendly forces and air-fields is critical.

Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability:The squadron engineer platoon consistsof six squads of engineers mounted in


LAV APCs with light Israeli mine rakesand vehicle-mounted magnetic pre-deto-nation devices. Mobility is provided bythe mine rakes, vehicle-mounted mag-netic pre-detonation devices, and MI-CLICs, while countermobility is provideby Volcano/MOMPS/WAM mine sys-tems. Engineer survivability assets arenot included in the LAV regiment due tothe nature of the organization and typesof missions foreseen. If digging assetsare required, they can be attached fromcorps. The squadron’s mobility assets areprimarily reserved for critical mobilityneeds. Countermobility equipment canbe used to quickly establish obstacles todelay enemy forces or to aid in the es-tablishment of a squadron, CAS, or avia-tion engagement area.

CSS: CSS is coordinated through thedigital appliqué network, but is operatedas semi-independent sections/vehicles.

Medical Platoon: Two LAV aid stations(MAS/FAS) are each manned by a sur-geon and 18-series medics. Each aid sta-tion has TELE-MEDICINE capabilities.Platoon equipment includes six LAV am-bulances, and two attached UH-60 am-bulances.

Support Platoon: Capabilities includethe ability to move supplies forward,through enemy territory, and on to thetroops. The support platoon consists of aHQ section (PL and PSG) mounted intwo CSS LAVs, a fuel section consistingof 12 CSS LAVs with fuel trailers, and acargo section consisting of 12 CSSLAVs with cargo trailers. The fuel sec-tion transports all squadron bulk fuel intrailers, while water and other supplyitems are transported in the LAV’s inter-nal cargo bed.

The ability of each vehicle to “see” thebattlefield through the digital networkenables independent movement forward,cross-country, and across water obsta-cles, while avoiding enemy contact. Thesupport platoon must also be able to set-up and execute Forward Area Armingand Refueling Points (FAARPs). At-tached aviation lift aircraft give the pla-toon flexibility in methods of resupply aswell as providing general lift support tothe squadron.

Maintenance Platoon: The mainte-nance platoon consists of a HQ element,a recovery section, a maintenance/PLLsection, and a Maintenance SupportTeam (MST) that is organic to thesquadron. The HQ element consists ofthe SMO and SMT mounted in an APC

LAV. The recovery section is mounted inthree recovery LAVs and assists in re-covering troop and squadron vehicles.The recovery section is also responsiblefor the maintenance of squadron andHHT vehicles. The maintenance/PLLsection consists of three CSS LAVs withcargo trailers. The maintenance/PLLLAV section performs general mainte-nance for the squadron, stocks PLL, andprocesses the squadron’s Class IX re-quests. The squadron PLLs must be ro-bust enough to support all squadron ve-hicles, for an extended period of time,without relying on the RSS AuthorizedSupply List (ASL).

The MST: The MST is organic to thesquadron to provide direct support main-tenance capabilities. The MST consistsof a turret LAV, a missile LAV, and twoCommunications and Electronics (C&E)LAVs.

C2: The squadron command group ismounted in three C2 LAVs (SCO, SXO,CSM). The commander is mounted in aC2 LAV with the CTT communicationpackage for the overall BC of the squad-ron. The S3 has two C2 (CTT) LAVs,one for himself (TAC) and one for the“battle captain” (TOC). The TOC C2LAV is the squadron combat informationcenter with an ASAS, a GSM (J-STARS)down-link, and a UAV down-link. Thesquadron S1 and S4 are also mounted inC2 LAVs. The squadron is authorized apermanent S5 and CA team alsomounted in an LAV. The communica-tions section consists of two LAV C2 ve-hicles which aid in squadron communi-cations. The squadron is authorized twoTACSAT communication systems.

HHT: The HHT commander and XOeach have an APC LAV. The 1SG andsupply sergeant are mounted in CSSLAVs with fuel trailers. The mess sec-tion is mounted in two CSS LAVs withcargo trailers.

Conclusion

The concept of fielding a new “special-ized” organization of wheeled vehiclesin direct financial competition with fu-ture systems may not seem practical. Ar-guments can be made that we should notbuy an “Okay” system but rather weshould hold out for the “perfect” system.The LAV-based organization does notmeet the needs of the heavy TF recon-naissance platform (FSCS) due to in-creased size and other concerns whenoperating close to heavy conventional

units. The current force mix of light in-fantry forces or heavy mechanized forcesdoes not give the Army much flexibilityduring deployments, nor does it supportactual warfighting requirements. Eitherthe U.S. sends light infantry (low cost,low return) or it gears up TRANSCOMand deploys a heavy mechanized forcewith excessive logistical requirements(high cost, limited return). There is nomiddle ground.

As a mounted force, we must ask our-selves one question. Do we want to re-main relevant? If we rest on the gloriesof Desert Storm and wait for the next“big one,” we will see more and morereductions in our force. This has startedwith the reduction of four tank compa-nies to three in the heavy battalion.

We must sell ourselves to the Armyand the joint community as a critical ele-ment in any operation, not just majorconflicts. We must become the firstground asset a CinC demands upon re-ceipt of mission.

The LAV cavalry regiment meets theneeds of the Army today as well as act-ing as a stepping stone to the Army AfterNext. To ensure that the mounted forceremains a valuable and desired player inthe evolving roles and functions of thenation’s armed forces, we should exploreall options available in pursuit of the op-timum force.

For more information on the proposedLAV regiment, please refer to theAWWG web page at:

http://www.awwg.org/docs/currentproj/index.html#2acrlav

CPT William S. Riggs received hisROTC commission in 1986 fromWentworth Military Academy. He hasserved as an M60 tank platoon leader,5/112 AR, TXARNG; M60A3 tank com-pany XO, 2/72 AR, Camp Casey, Korea;M1 tank company XO, 1/32 AR, duringDesert Storm and BMO, 1/32 AR, Ft.Hood, Texas; and squadron asst. S3,3/11 ACR and brigade asst. S4, 1 Bde,both in Germany. Additionally, he com-manded an M1 tank company in 4/67 ARin Germany, then served as TF assistantS3 with 4/67 in Bosnia. Prior to his cur-rent assignment as a small group instruc-tor for AOAC, he was a doctrine writer forthe Directorate of Training and DoctrineDevelopment, Ft. Knox. His military edu-cation includes AOBC, AOAC, CLC,CAS3, and the Air Assault Course.


At the beginning of 1969, some of ournation’s hardest fighting units were as-signed to the XXIV Corps, commandedby Lieutenant General Richard G. Stil-well. Major ground combat units as-signed to this corps were: 3d Marine Di-vision, 101st Airborne Division (Airmo-bile) and the 1st Brigade, 5th InfantryDivision (Mechanized).

With this size of ground force, MilitaryAssistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)felt confident that XXIV Corps coulddefend the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)while simultaneously executing majoroperations into North Vietnamese Army(NVA) base camps located along the re-mote western areas of the country. Majoroperations against NVA base camps,once safe havens for the enemy, werepart of MACV’s strategy of destroyingthe NVA logistical system.

No longer would U.S. and allied forcesbe content to sit back and allow NVAforces to make the first move.

In early January, the NVA reopenedRoute 922 from Laos into the A ShauValley, and anti-aircraft guns were in-stalled both in Laos and in the valley. Astraffic expanded to 1,000 trucks per day,allied aircraft ran into intense fire fromthe NVA guns that took a heavy toll.MACV intelligence indicated that NVAforces probably would be moved into theDa Krong River area, and possibly intothe mountains west of Hue and south-west of Quang Tri. Once in these posi-tions, the NVA would be postured tolaunch surprise attacks against populatedareas as far south as Da Nang. In lateJanuary, XXIV Corps began conductinga series of regimental-size operationsnear the rugged Laotian border. Theseoperations had the task and purpose todeny NVA units’ access into the popu-lous coastal lowlands by destroying hisforces and interdicting access to mainsupply routes from Laos. The 4th MarineRegiment, 3d Marine Division, operatedin the Khe Sanh region during Operation

Scotland II. While the 9th Marine Regi-ment, 3d Marine Division, initiated Op-eration Dewey Canyon against Route922. Route 922 entered South Vietnamfrom Laos and became Route 548 thatcurved through the Da Krong River areaand entered into the A Shau Valley. Itwas the NVA’s most important main sup-ply route in I Corps.

During the initial phase of the opera-tion, starting on 19 January, the 9th Ma-rine Regiment, 3d Marine Division, es-tablished fire bases to support later ma-neuver operations. The second phase in-volved patrolling around the fire bases toeliminate NVA pockets of resistance. On11 February, the third phase began witha three-battalion, regimental offensivepushing towards the Laotian border withsupporting aircraft and artillery. This of-fensive lasted for seven weeks, coveringmore than 30 miles of enemy territory.By the end of the month, the 9th MarineRegiment, 3d Marine Division, had


TASK FORCE REMAGEN: Sustaining a Heavy Task Force via Aerial Resupplyby Major Mark A. Olinger

nearly run out of terrain. They had sweptsouth to the Laotian border, eliminatinga majority of the enemy resistance.When Operation Dewey Canyon was of-ficially terminated on 18 March, the 9thMarine Regiment, 3d Marine Division,had captured over 525 tons of weaponsand ammunition, including 12 large122mm cannons. These 122mm cannonswere the first ever seen inside of SouthVietnam. The 9th Marines, 3d MarineDivision could justifiably claim a majorsetback had been meted out to the NorthVietnamese.

Prior to the ending of OperationDewey Canyon, XXIV Corps directedthe very innovative employment of the1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division(Mechanized). The brigade was task-or-ganized with the following major units:Headquarters and Headquarters Com-pany, 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division(Mechanized); 1st Battalion, 77th Ar-mor; 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry; 1stBattalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized);5th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery(155mm, Self-Propelled); and the 75thSupport Battalion. The brigade’s com-mander was directed to send a mecha-nized heavy task force to conduct a re-connaissance of Route 9 to the Laotianborder. This reconnaissance would alsoprotect the northern flank of U.S. and al-lied forces in the Da Krong River areaand the A Shau Valley. Colonel JamesM. Gibson, Commander, 1st Brigade,5th Infantry Division (Mechanized),formed Task Force Remagen around the1st Battalion, 77th Armor. Task ForceRemagen was named in honor of the 7March 1945 crossing of the RemagenBridge over the Rhine River by the 9thArmored Division, which spearheadedthe breakthrough into Germany duringWorld War II.

Task Force Remagen was composed ofHeadquarters and Headquarters Com-pany, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor; twomechanized infantry companies; a tankcompany; a self-propelled 155mm artil-lery battery; armored engineers; and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Later the 1stBattalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized),replaced the 1-77 Armor as the control-ling headquarters. On 16 March, the1,500 soldiers of Task Force Remagendeparted Ca Lu down the dirt roadwaytoward the Khe Sanh Plateau.

Leading the task force was an engi-neer-reinforced scout platoon that slowlycleared its way through the antitankmines on the upward winding road. Thismechanized force built bypasses aroundwash-outs, maneuvered through the nar-row defiles, and crossed streams withtheir armored vehicle launched bridges(AVLB). Since there were no availableforces to secure the defiles and streamcrossings, the AVLBs continued withTask Force Remagen after crossing. Lift-ing of the bridges prohibited the advanc-ing task force from using ground lines ofcommunication for resupply, causing itto be completely sustained by an airlines of communication. Sustaining amechanized task force entirely by aerialresupply for an extended time periodhadn’t been accomplished during the Vi-etnam War. Under normal conditions, lo-gisticians would have been kept busy de-livering ammunition, general supplies,and repair parts to the task force, alongwith providing the required maintenancesupport.

On 19 March, Task Force Remagenreached the abandoned Khe Sanh Pla-teau. Allied forces at Khe Sanh had beenwithdrawn the previous summer to CaLu. They encamped for the night, andthe next morning M113 armored person-nel carriers and M48A3 tanks maneu-vered west through the abandoned Spe-cial Forces camp at Lang Vei. TaskForce Remagen reached the South Viet-namese/Laotian border and establishedpositions.

Looking across the Laotian border atthe sinister Co Roc, a granite ridge run-ning along the Laotian side of the borderand overlooking the Khe Sanh Plateau.The task force would prowl through theregion until the end of April, encounter-ing light resistance. However, the taskforce was continually harassed by accu-rate mortar fire from the Co Roc ridge.Unlike Operation Dewey Canyon, whereGeneral Creighton Abrams grantedauthority for limited Marine attacksacross the border, this permission wasnever given to the Task Force Remagencommanders. For 47 days, this task forceoperated in rugged terrain along the Lao-tian border demonstrating that even re-mote base areas were vulnerable to at-tack by a mechanized force. Operating incountry long thought to be impenetrableto armored vehicles, this combined arms

team again demonstrated the advantageof mounted forces in a jungle environ-ment. Concurrent with Task Force Re-magen, the remainder of the brigade wassupporting Operation Montana Mauler inlate March, west of Con Thein along theDMZ under 3d Marine Division opera-tional control. Task Force Remagenwould return to its base camp at Ca Luending operations along the South Viet-namese/Laotian border on 29 April.

Significant to operations in South Viet-nam was the use of helicopters in the lo-gistic support role. Their use freed Armycommanders from a complete depend-ence on ground transportation. The heli-copter became an indispensable link inthe forward area of operations becauseof its ability to operate in virtually anyweather condition, day or night, with lit-tle or no preparation of landing zones.Before Task Force Remagen would ter-minate operations on the Laotian border,they would be delivered such diversetypes of cargo as hot food, medical sup-plies, ammunition, consumable supplies,and repair parts.

For 47 days, Task Force Remagen op-erated at distances between 40 to 60kilometers from its base camp and reliedentirely on aerial resupply. U.S. Armyand U.S. Marine cargo helicopters air-lifted all material and supplies to TaskForce Remagen. Requests for suppliesand repair parts were forwarded fromTask Force Remagen to the ForwardSupport Element, which in turn for-warded the requests to the 75th SupportBattalion Logistics Operations Center atQuang Tri. The requested supplies andrepair parts were assembled overnightand either flown or sent by convoy tothe Forward Support Element for furtherdelivery to the task force by helicopter.A unit trains concept was used to sup-port the task force forward, consisting oftracked maintenance personnel, supplysoldiers, and wheeled vehicles. All sup-plies and repair parts were flown to thetask force in their field locations; repairparts were exchanged for the defectiveparts, and installed on the spot. Defec-tive parts were returned to the ForwardSupport Element for repair. Major re-pairs and overhauls were accomplishedunder arduous field conditions and in-cluded replacing 12 engines weighingover 4 tons, 18 sets of tracks, and 7transmissions. Fresh water was placed in


“For 47 days, this task force operated in ruggedterrain along the Laotian border demonstrating thateven remote base areas were vulnerable to attackby a mechanized force.”

containers ranging from 3-gallon col-lapsible drums to empty shell casings.Over 59,000 gallons of bulk fuel, 10,000rounds of artillery ammunition, and1,000 tons of general supplies weremoved by helicopters from the ForwardSupport Element at Vandergrift CombatBase during the course of the operation.

During this operation, Task Force Re-magen received an average of 13 heli-copter sorties per day. It was estimatedthat with an average of 30 minutes perround trip, four helicopters could havemet the task force’s average daily resup-ply requirements. The majority of thesemissions were carried out by UH-1, CH-46, and CH-47 aircraft. The UH-1s oper-ated forward to the platoon level, whilethe CH-46s and CH-47s transportedheavier and more bulky loads to the taskforce and company trains. Task ForceRemagen demonstrated the feasibilityand effectiveness of an intensive aerialresupply campaign in support of a heavytask force.

What are the doctrinal lessons learnedfrom Task Force Remagen that are appli-cable to commanders and staff officersin today’s Army and into the 21st Cen-tury?

• Heavy forces are effective in a low-intensity conflict environment.

• The combined arms team is a winnerand, when properly task-organized,can mass firepower against our ene-mies where they least expect it.

• Heavy forces can be sustained overan extended period of time by aerialresupply.

• Army Aviation in the logistics sup-port role is a true combat multiplier.

• Use of the Forward Logistics Ele-ment or Forward Logistics Base con-cept is feasible as demonstrated bythe 75th Support Battalion.

We must ensure the lessons learned areadopted. This will prevent us from re-peating the mistakes of the past.

References

Heiser, Joseph M., LTG, Logistic Support, De-partment of the Army, Washington D.C., 1974.

Mahon, John K. and Romana Danysh, InfantryPart I: Regular Army, Office of the Chief ofMilitary History, United States Army, Washing-ton D.C., 1972.

Matheny, Michael R., Major, “Armor in Low-In-tensity Conflict: The U.S. Experience in Viet-nam,” ARMOR, July-August 1988, Fort Knox,Ky.

Morrison, Wilbur H., The Elephant and the TigerThe Full Story of the Vietnam War, HippocreneBooks, New York, N.Y., 1990.

Ott, David Ewing, MG, Field Artillery 1954-1973, Department of the Army, WashingtonD.C., 1975.

Stanton, Shelby L., The Rise and Fall of AnAmerican Army, Presido Press, Novato, Calif.,1985.

Starry, Donn A., General, Mounted Combat inVietnam, Department of the Army, WashingtonD.C., 1978.

Stubbs, Mary Lee and Stanley Russell Conner,Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and ArmyReserve, Office of the Chief of Military His-tory, United States Army, Washington D.C.,1969.

MAJ Mark A. Olinger was commis-sioned an Infantry officer in 1983 fromCalifornia State Polytechnic University,Pomona. He served as a platoon leader,company XO, S3 Air with 3rd Battalion,327th Infantry and brigade S3 Air, 1st Bri-gade, 101st Airborne Division (Air As-sault) prior to attending the Quartermas-ter Officer Advance and Aerial Deliveryand Material Officer Courses. Key mili-tary schooling includes: Marine Amphibi-ous Warfare School, CAS3, OperationsResearch Systems Analysis Military Ap-plications Course I, and the Commandand General Staff College. Other assign-ments include group supply maintenanceofficer and detachment commander, 5thSpecial Forces Group; company com-mander, 528th Support Battalion (Air-borne); Deputy J-4, Joint Special Opera-tions Task Force/Special OperationsCommand South; support operations offi-cer, 528th Support Battalion (Airborne);operations research analyst, National Se-curity Agency; support operations officer,201st Forward Support Battalion, 1st In-fantry Division (Mech); and support op-erations officer, 125th Forward SupportBattalion, 1st Armored Division. He iscurrently serving as the Forward SupportBattalion S2/3 observer/controller at theNational Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

“Over 59,000 gal-lons of bulk fuel,10,000 rounds of artil-lery ammunition, and1,000 tons of generalsupplies were movedby helicopters fromthe Forward SupportElement at Vander-grift Combat Baseduring the course ofthe operation.”


by Paul Hornback

With the development of any newArmy combat vehicle, the question,“Which is better: a wheeled vehicle or atracked vehicle?” surfaces again andagain. In order to answer this question,the U.S. Army has tested and studied themerits and shortfalls of wheeled andtracked combat platforms for the past 30years. Results indicate that no single cri-terion can be applied that will answerthe wheeled-versus-track issue for allsituations and missions. In fact, the un-derlying premise in resolving thewheeled-versus-track dilemma is deeplyrooted in the complex variables regard-ing the platform’s combat mission, ter-rain profile, and specific vehicular char-acteristics. Tests and studies, however,established a set of criteria to determinea platform’s optimal configuration. Al-though most of this information is overten years old, the basic factors which im-pact the physics of mobility have notchanged and are still relevant.

MOBILITY . Mobility, as defined bythe 1988 Mobility Analysis for the TRA-DOC Wheeled-Versus-Track Study, isthe ability to move freely and rapidlyover the terrain of interest to accomplishvaried combat objectives.1 Mobility isthus measured by a system’s freedom ofmovement (percent of the terrain overwhich the vehicle is mobile) and its av-erage speed or travel time over that ter-rain. A platform’s gross vehicle weightand its footprint (the area of track or tirewhich impacts the ground) determine theresultant ground pressure that the plat-form imparts on the soil. The soilstrength, coupled with the vehicle’s char-acteristic ground pressure, determine aparameter entitled Vehicle Cone Index(VCI), which is a key first-order dis-criminator of a platform’s mobility. Thehigher the VCI, or ground pressure, theless mobile the platform becomes. Fig-ure 1 shows that, as ground pressure in-creases, so does the percentage of No-Go Terrain (terrain over which a combatplatform is immobile) due to tractionloss in wet, temperate areas.

A vehicle’s mobility is impacted by itstractive ability over various soil types(dry, wet, sand, or snow-covered) and itsability to maneuver over obstacles, crossgaps, and negotiate varied vegetation. Asa general rule of thumb, a lower VCI not

only equates to better soft-soil mobilitybut also indicates better performance onslopes, in sandy terrain, over obsta-cles/gap crossings and when overridingvegetation.2 From a mobility perspective,tracked vehicles offer the best solutionfor a versatile platform that is requiredto operate over diverse terrain, includingextremely difficult ground, becausetracks inherently provide a greater sur-face area than wheels, resulting in alower VCI.3 Recent operations in Bosniahave demonstrated the inherent weak-nesses of wheeled vehicles with regardto mobility and protection.4 When opera-tions were conducted on roads, wheeledvehicles demonstrated excellent mobilityand speed; but when off-road usage wasrequired, and wet or snow conditionsprevailed, mobility suffered.

Wheeled vehicles inherently attainfaster road speeds and, therefore, offerthe best solution where unrestricted mo-bility is not the primary mission driverand on-road usage exceeds off-road us-age. So, vehicle weight and off-road us-age constitute two key criteria for mobil-ity. Figure 2 compares the average 100km mission travel time for both wheeledand tracked platforms as off-road usageincreases (recall that mobility was de-fined as both freedom of movement andtravel time over the terrain).

As off-road usage dominates the vehi-cle’s profile, tracked configurations pro-vide significantly better mission traveltimes. Consequently, Army studies indi-cate that when a vehicle’s mission re-quires off-road usage greater than 60percent and gross vehicle weight ex-ceeds 10 tons, a tracked configuration ispreferred for combat roles.6 However,

when the gross vehicle weight exceeds20 tons and off-road usage remainsabove 60 percent, a tracked configura-tion is required to guarantee the best mo-bility for unrestricted, all-weather tacticaloperations.7

SURVIVABILITY. A combat plat-form’s survivability is dependent on nu-merous criteria, to include mine and bal-listic protection, size/silhouette, andstealthiness. Tracked vehicles, by design,are inherently more compact thanwheeled vehicles.8 The primary reasonsfor a tracked vehicle’s compactness arereduced suspension clearance, wheelturning clearance, and the absence ofmultiple transfer cases and drive shaftsthat are integral to the design of multi-wheeled vehicles. Army studies have in-dicated that, for a comparable VCI (orground pressure) at the same gross vehi-cle weight, wheeled platforms require upto six times more volume for drive trainand suspension components than trackedplatforms. This results in up to a 28 per-cent increase in vehicle volume if thesame interior volume is maintained.9

Survivability analyses clearly indicatethat a larger size is more readily seenand subsequently hit and destroyed. Ad-ditionally, as a combat platform’s size in-creases, so does the gross vehicle weight(provided the same ballistic and mineprotection are maintained), which tendsto degrade vehicle mobility and deploy-ability.

In general, wheeled platforms are morevulnerable to small arms fire and gre-nade, mine, and artillery fragments, dueto the inherent weakness of wheeled sus-pension designs, components, and tires.10


0

5

10

15

20

25

7.4 7.8 10.6 11.6 13.5 15.7 19.4 37

Ground Pressure (lbs/sq in)

% N

o G

o T

erra

in (

trac

tio

n)

Generally as VehicleGround PressureIncreases, Cross

Country TrafficabilityDecreases

Figure 1

The Wheel Versus Track Dilemma

Wheeled vehicles may now be able tocontinue movement for limited distancesat reduced speeds when tires are punc-tured by small arms rounds, battlefielddebris, or shrapnel, due to the advent ofrun-flat tires. Run-flat tires typically con-tain a hard rubber insert (some with ni-trogen filled cells) inside the tire. The in-sert bears no vehicle load until the tire ispunctured, at which point the load istransferred to the insert and vehiclemovement may continue for a limiteddistance and speed.

On the plus side, wheeled platformsprovide a reduced noise signature whilemoving, primarily due to less vibrationand metal to metal contact on runninggear. Improvements in track technology(i.e., Roller Chain Band Track) and de-coupled running gear have decreasednoise signatures for tracked vehicles, butnot to the level attained by wheeled plat-forms.

Tracked platforms do provide a skid-steer capability which allows the vehicleto pivot steer (or neutral steer) and virtu-ally pivot in place. This unique maneu-ver capability enhances survivability bypermitting a 180-degree directionalchange when confined or built-up areasare encountered, and while traveling onnarrow road surfaces.

From a survivability perspective,tracked vehicles offer smaller silhou-ettes, reduced volume, enhanced maneu-verability, and better ballistic protection,providing a balance that equates to amore survivable platform.

SUPPORTABILITY . A combat plat-form’s supportability is dependent on nu-merous factors, to include fuel usage, re-liability, and O&S costs. Wheeled vehi-cles traditionally offer better fuel econ-omy due to the reduced friction lossesinherent in wheel/tire suspensions andrunning gear. The better fuel economytranslates into smaller on-board fuel stor-age requirements or greater operatingranges for wheeled platforms.

Previous articles and studies have con-cluded that wheeled vehicles are intrinsi-cally more reliable than tracked vehiclesand, therefore, require less maintenanceand supply support (spare parts). How-ever, one must bear in mind thatwheeled vehicles generally have a higherpercentage of on-road usage whiletracked vehicles incur more off-road us-age. Obviously, the more severe cross-country terrain results in reduced reli-ability for the tracked vehicle. A recenttest of the Up-Armored HMMWV, run-ning a scout profile with 68 percent off-road travel, resulted in significantly lower

reliability when compared tothe same platform runningat a tactical truck profile ofonly 40 percent off-road.

Given that wheeled plat-forms offer better fuel econ-omy and reliability (to anextent), then Operating andSupport (O&S) costs arelower than those demon-strated by tracked platforms.This makes wheeled plat-forms excellent candidatesfor support roles whereoverall mileage is high andprimarily conducted on-road.

CONCLUSION . Figure 3presents an overview of the

key advantages demonstrated bywheeled and tracked platforms based onthirty years of Army tests and studies.

Wheeled and tracked vehicles each ex-hibit advantages that can be optimizedfor the 21st century battlefield, providedthe platform’s combat mission, terrainprofile and specific characteristics arecarefully assessed. For combat vehicles,vice combat support or combat servicesupport vehicles, Army studies unani-mously conclude that a tracked configu-ration is the optimal solution for tactical,high-mobility roles (off-road usagegreater than 60 percent), gross vehicleweights in excess of 20 tons, and mis-sions requiring unrestricted terrainmovement, continuous all-weather op-erations, smaller silhouettes/dimensionalenvelopes, and greater survivability.

Notes

1“Mobility Analysis for the TRADOC WheeledVersus Track Vehicle Study, Final Report,”Robert F. Unger, Geotechnical Laboratory, De-partment of the Army, Waterways ExperimentStation, Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss.,September 1988, 1.

2Ibid, 26.3“Wheels or Tracks,” Military Technology, Vol

XVIII, Issue 7, Jul 1994, 14.4“Is There Any Future for the APC,” Military

Technology, Vol. XXI, Issue 3, March 1997, 103.5“Mobility Analysis,” 48.6“Wheeled Versus Track Vehicle Study, Final

Report,” Studies and Analysis Activity, Head-quarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand, Fort Monroe, Va., March 1985, 1-99.

7Ibid, 1-92.8Ibid, 1-62.9Ibid, 1-62.10“Wheels or Tracks,” 11.

Mr. Paul Hornback is a general engi-neer with the federal government. He ispresently assigned to the HQ TRADOCCombat Development Engineering Divi-sion, Fort Knox Field Office, which pro-vides reliability, maintainability, and sys-tems engineering support to the Director-ate of Force Development, Fort Knox, Ky.He holds a Bachelor of Science in Me-chanical Engineering and a Master ofScience in Industrial Engineering, bothfrom the University of Louisville. His mili-tary experience stems from a six-yeartour as a UH-1N helicopter pilot in theU.S. Marine Corps.


100 KMMission

Travel Time

01020

3040

5060

20 30 40 50 60 70

Percent Cross Country(Europe Wet)

Ho

urs

0

20

40

60

8045 55 65 75 85 95

Percent Cross Country(Arid Sand)

Ho

urs

Wheel

Track

Figure 25

Tracked Wheeled Vehicles Vehicles

Route Flexibility

Cross Country Mobility

Traction on Slopes

Road Speed

Logistics

O&S Costs

GVW, Volume, & Payload

Maneuverability/Turning Radius

Transportability

Weight Growth Potential

Gap & Obstacle Crossing

✔✔

✔

✔

✔✔

✔✔

✔

✔✔

Study Results

Figure 3

The battle tempo of today’smechanized forces requires com-mand and control capabilitiesflexible and mobile enough tokeep pace with the fight. Thecurrent configuration of theM577A2 lacks the capability toeffectively communicate with theforce while moving. This articlefocuses on how to substantiallyimprove the M577A2’s capabili-ties, utilizing equipment and suppliescurrently available. To facilitate this dis-cussion, I will utilize the heavy cavalrytroop’s TOC mount, the M577A2, as thebase vehicle. The fast-paced nature ofcavalry operations requires that this TOCbe capable of performing its duties onthe move. All modifications discussedare also directly applicable to the taskforce and brigade.

The basis for all modifications was theestablishment of capability goals basedon past experiences. These goals focusedall modification efforts. Each modifica-tion made to the M577A2 had to meetthe following criteria:

• Deployability/Durability - Each addi-tion must be easily removable as a unitand withstand shipment and re-installa-tion in pre-positioned equipment.

• Maintenance - Crew members andmechanics must have unrestricted accessin order to conduct vehicle maintenance.

• Command and Control - Each modi-fication must enhance the crew’s capa-bility to track battles while maintainingpace with the force.

• Planning - Modifications must en-hance the crew’s capability to mass-pro-duce orders (without external power sup-port) and provide a semi-sterile environ-ment for the commander to plan whilemaintaining noise/light/litter discipline.

• Load Plan - Modifications must en-hance the vehicle’s load plan to mini-mize crew difficulty in accessing per-sonal equipment while ensuring that per-sonal equipment does not clutter avail-able working space.

• Mobility - Modifications must im-prove TOC set-up and tear-down times.

Considering these criteria, modifica-tions focused on improvements in thevehicle’s communications equipment,mission support equipment, and battle-tracking equipment. This article dis-cusses each modification and concludeswith a cost and time estimate.

Communications

The current M577A2, equipped with astandard VIC-1 configured with fourSINCGARs radios (VRC-92x - Long-range/Long-range), inhibits the crew’scapability to track the battle while mov-ing. With all four radios on, each crewmember connected to a C-box stationconstantly hears traffic on all four radiosthrough his CVC helmet. To fight thisproblem, my crew constantly employedquick commo modifications. The set-upof each modification depended onwhether we were moving or stationary.Every time we reconfigured, we incurreda temporary loss of communications. Af-ter suffering through a squadron-levelexercise with this system, we researched

current vehicular communication sys-tems available in the Army supply sys-tem to fix this problem. We found thesolution in the field artillery’s FIST-V(M981). Its VIC system enables eachcrew member to monitor any combina-tion of radios through each C-Box. Thefollowing figure depicts a simple sche-matic of this interface.

The black circles represent toggleswitches that control the input/output ofeach radio to the CVC. This system en-ables each crew member to monitor anycombination of nets. This is especiallybeneficial for the cavalry troop XO, al-lowing him to focus on any net, basedon information requirements. These spe-cial C-boxes are not compatible with theTOC’s standard 1780. The complete sys-tem requires the installation of the spe-cial M981 1780 and C-boxes. Installa-tion entails simply replacing theM577A2 1780 and C-boxes with theM981’s 1780 and C-boxes.

Complete communications security inan assembly area requires land line com-munication with the TOC via switch-board. In order to facilitate quick estab-lishment of the troop “hot loop,” wemounted the switchboard inside theTOC. This versatile wooden mount pro-vides a permanent location for pluggingin WD-1 wire leads from platoons. Thismodification also reduces the time forTOC setup/teardown and establishmentof the “hot loop.”

The final modification made to TOCcommunications was a net recording ca-pability. Installation of voice-activatedtape recorders not only enables the crewto review key messages/FRAGOs for


Modernizing the M577A2

A Unit Tries to Improve

The Venerable 577 for

Better Commo, Battle Tracking,

And Mission Support

by Captain Walter B. Sturek Jr.


Coffin Bench

15"

60"

15"

Sets in center of the TOC on the floor,bolted into the floor

Figure 2. Coffin Bench

REAR FRONT

SWITCHBOARD

SENSITIVEITEMS

C-BOX

1780

54"18"

22.5"FMs, TMs,DA FORMS

1523

1523 1523

1523

LIGHTS

TOC LEFT SIDE WALL

VA VA TAPE RECORDER

REPORTREPORT REPORT REPORT REPORT

C-BOX

Figure 3.TOC Left Side Wall

INVERTER

C-BOX

BATTERIES

MAP BOARD &CLASS II STORAGE AREA

LIGHTS

BOX - 53"

MAP BOARD - 75"

38"

REARFRONT

TOC RIGHT SIDE WALL Figure 4.TOC Right Side Wall

75"

53"

12"

24"

22"

36"38"

4"

FRONT VIEW SIDE VIEW

MAP BOARD/CLASS II STORAGE BOX DIMENSIONS

WOOD SCREWS

Figure 5.Map Board

clarification but also facilitates AARs. Inorder to eliminate background noisefrom within the TOC, the recorders mustdirectly interface with the radio mount.To do this, splice the microphone cordfrom the tape recorder with a connectorof an old hand mike, and then plug thehand mike connector into either thespeaker connector of the radio mount ordirectly to the RT.

Mission Support Equipment

Mission support equipment modifica-tions modernized the TOC’s planningprocess and decreased the time for pro-ducing an OPORD. Current TOC con-figurations utilize the SICUP extensionwith AC-powered fluorescent lights.Powering these lights poses no problemfor the battalion task force or brigadeequipped with generators. Organicpower provided by the M577A2 onlypowers DC equipment. The solution tothis problem was the purchase and in-stallation of a power inverter. The powerinverter we installed was a 24-volt sys-tem producing 1800 watts. A 24-volt in-verter reaps the benefits of theM577A2’s 24-volt system and has easilyreplaceable 40 amp automotive fuses.This amount of power facilitates the useof a laptop computer with printer, aswell as a copier, without requiring exter-nal power assets. The laptop computerand printer provides the commander aninterface for filling in a shell troopOPORD format and produces a legiblehard copy order. The copier machine en-ables the TOC to mass-produce hard-copy OPORDs for issue. The copier ma-chine also proved invaluable in copyingsmall overlays (81⁄2 x 11) produced bythe commander. The commander’sHMMWV solves temporary storageproblems by transporting the copierwhen the TOC is on the move.

Internal modifications to the M577A2consist of a new map board, book shelf,and storage box (coffin). The internalmap board mounts on the right wall andshelf of the TOC. Hinged at the top, thismap board installs as a complete unitwith approximately seven screws andprovides internal storage space for sup-plies and BII. Its design facilitates easyaccess to the TOC’s battery compartment

while mounted. Its easeof installation/removalmakes it easily deploy-able. The map board’slarge surface area formaps, and its angledfront, allows the user(especially the com-mander in the planningprocess) to modifygraphics. The angled map board accom-plishes this by providing a user-friendlyslightly horizontal surface. Glued to themap board underneath the map are12"x12" cork panels. The cork facilitatesthe use of colored pushpins for trackingunit/vehicle locations. Mounted on theleft sidewall is a bookshelf for storage ofFMs/TMs and supplies. Finally, thecrew’s gear mounts on the sides of theTOC by attaching two steel cables (ramptiedown cable for rail-loading) alongboth sides of the vehicle. Mounting thecrew’s gear in this fashion eases accessto TA-50 and frees space on top of thevehicle for stowage of the extension andother equipment.

Tracking the Battle

The modifications discussed enhancethe crew’s ability to track the battlewhile maintaining pace with the troop.Even with these modifications, battletracking in the M577A2 requires a soundSOP and a well-trained cohesive crew.Effective battle tracking during offensiveand defensive operations requires a four-man crew consisting of a dedicateddriver with three RTOs: troop XO (moni-tors troop and squadron command), NBCNCO (monitors O&I), and the commochief (monitors A&L). In order to mini-mize internal vehicular noise duringhalts, the commander’s HMMWV slavesto the TOC. This minimizes internalnoise for the RTOs and eliminates theneed to start the vehicle for batterycharging. When the commander’sHMMWV is available during the plan-ning process, this technique also elimi-nates the need to utilize the M577A2’snoisy generator and engine.

Cost Analysis

All modifications discussed are avail-able through the supply system or ob-

tainable through local purchase. Figure 6details the costs.

Although somewhat costly, the com-munication modifications comprise themost critical enhancements to theM577A2. Most units fielding the newVIC-3 system are only fielding it withthe M1A1 tank and M2 Bradley. TheM981 VIC system is available now (CLIX). Local purchase items include thecopier machine, tape recorders, inverter,and cork boards. Plywood and 2x4s areavailable on most installations. It takesapproximately 20 hours for completeconstruction/installation of all modifica-tions (2-3 hours for the commo system,17 hours for the map board and book-shelf). Removal of the bookshelf/mapboard takes approximately 15 minutes.

The modifications discussed enhancethe capabilities of the M577A2 to per-form its mission as a tactical operationscenter. Although focused at the cavalrytroop TOC, the criterion of deployability,ease of maintenance, durability, andcommunication enhancement applies toboth battalion- and brigade-level TOCs.Offensive operations require a mobileand efficient command and control node.The modifications discussed above trans-form the standard M577A2 into this es-sential platform.

CPT Walter B. Sturek Jr. is a 1993graduate of the the United States MilitaryAcademy. He has served as a tank pla-toon leader, scout platoon leader, andcavalry troop executive officer in 3/3ACR. Key personnel in development ofthese modifications were CPT Richard D.Moon, 1LT Ernest Litynski, SSG MarkKastner, SPC Daniel Sumners, PFC Ma-rotz, CPT Neil Corson, and SFCLawrence Eversole.


Cost Estimate> Amplifier, Audio frequency (1780) - $4,045

- NSN 01-144-5970> Cable, Splitter - x 4 $1,156

- NSN 01-348-2264> Control Intercom Unit (Charlie Box) x 4 $9,756

- NSN 01-144-5995> Inverter $ 724> Copier Machine w/Toner $ 820> Plywood (2) 4x8 sheets $ 50> Wood (3) 2x4 $ 10> Cork Board $ 24> Voice activated Tape Recorders x 4 $ 160

> Total cost for (1) Troop/Company TOC = $16,745

Figure 6. Cost Estimate

“The modifications discussed enhance the ca-pabilities of the M577A2 to perform its missionas a tactical operations center.”

by Walter A. Hamburger

Shortly after this article was accepted,Walter Hamburger passed away, accord-ing to colleagues at his Vienna law firm.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union,Austria stood between two large militaryblocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, asituation that did not seem without dan-ger to the country. But during thoseyears, the Social Democratic Party lead-ing the coalition government was con-vinced that there would be no war inEurope soon, and that conclusion, alongwith the fact that Austria was a neutralcountry, resulted in her army getting thesmallest military budget (less than 1 per-cent of the GNP) in Europe.

One result was that the military couldnot buy much in the way of heavyweapons. Instead, something called thesmall-unit defense concept was devel-oped. Key zones were identified, ave-nues of approach that any aggressorwould have to pass through, and thesezones were fortified. Old Centuriontanks were bought at scrap prices andthe turrets, with their excellent 105mmguns, were mounted in concrete bunkers.In this way, the nation obtained a largenumber of antitank bunkers, well dis-placed in the terrain, for the scrap priceof some worn-out MBTs.

When the Eastern Bloc fell apart at theend of the ’80s, Austria’s geopoliticalsituation changed. The possibility arosethat the four independent states thatcame into being along her borders mightbecome involved in warlike disputes. Infact, such an event occurred muchsooner than expected. In 1991, the Yugo-slav war of secession brought fighting toAustria’s southern borders. Serbian gre-nades hit Austrian territory, and airplanesoverflew Austria as far as Graz, a pro-vincial capital. These flights, whichstopped when Austrian interceptor planesappeared, were partly for reconnaissancepurposes, but some were attempts to at-tack Slovenian positions along the Aus-trian border from behind.

As a consequence, the Austrian Gen-eral Staff developed a reorganization

plan for the armed forces. On the onehand, it focused on antitank and antiair-craft defense. It also shifted the Army’sfocus toward defense of Austrian terri-tory closer to the nation’s borders. It wasdesigned to allow the Army to be in aposition to react faster, which also meantthat troops would need greater flexibilityand mobility. Given this new defenseconcept, the chronic lack of modernheavy weapons had to be addressed, andthe purchase of such arms became an ur-gent priority.

Fortunately, Austria was in the marketfor heavy weapons at the same timemany of the Cold War combatants weregreatly reducing the size of their armies,so surplus arms were available at verylow prices. The decision was made topurchase these surplus weapon systemsand upgrade them, partially with modifi-cations manufactured in Austria. Thiswould allow a great improvement in ca-pability at a low cost, and also help tolower the rate of unemployment.

First, 112 M109A2 and A3 self-pro-pelled howitzers were purchased from adownsizing British Army of the Rhine.These, together with M109s which werealready in the Austrian artillery arsenal,will now be brought to the AustrianM109A5 ÖE standard. These refits in-clude new Austrian hydraulic rams andprimer magazines, which allow the rateof fire to be doubled, new barrels thatextend the firing range to about 30 km,and navigation upgrades that will allowthe howitzer crews to set up in their fir-ing positions autonomously. In addition,the modified howitzers will be able tocarry a larger quantity of ammunitionand will be equipped with a reinforcedhydraulic system, as well as being ableto provide higher electrical and engineoutput. Before the offer relating to theBritish howitzers became known, 54M109s had been ordered in the U.S.;these will also be modified to the A5 ÖEtype.

Austria is now testing a battle area ra-dar and artillery reconnaissance and fir-ing system. These systems will be ableto detect and distinguish mobile targetson the battlefield, day and night, in any

weather conditions. They will be able todetect the firing of artillery, heavy mor-tars, and rocket launchers up to a battle-field depth of 15 km with a precision of100 m in azimuth and 10 m in range, aswell as being able to control friendly ar-tillery fire.

The M109A5 ÖE navigation systemwill enable each individual gun crew todetermine the coordinates of its firingposition, transmit them by radio to thecomputer, and act independently. Thesystems will make the guns almost“semi-autonomous,” and thus minimizereaction times by speeding position ref-erence and surveying.

The electronic artillery fire control sys-tem consists of an artillery computer, adata input-output unit for the observers,and a data input-output unit for the guns.With this system, it will no longer benecessary to transmit the full wording offiring orders or requirements by radio orwire from the artillery to the computer.Fire control decisions can be transmittedby pushing a button. This shows howmuch the transmission of firing orders isaccelerated by the introduction of thissystem.

As a result of the purchase of the vari-ous models of the M109 howitzers andtheir modernization, it was possible totake all towed artillery pieces, most ofthem World War II models, out of serv-ice. Thus the Austrian artillery is to beequipped with refitted, but very up-to-date, armored self-propelled 155mmhowitzers at a very reasonable price. TheSwiss Army has joined Austria in this ar-tillery upgrade project, and since bothcountries have a relatively large numberof these systems, almost 500 of the ar-mored self-propelled 155mm howitzersof the latest standard will exist in CentralEurope in the near future.

While a recently planned modern-ization and reinforcement of air defenseis on the drawing boards, acquisition hasnow been postponed for one to twoyears. Instead, money will be spent onarmored vehicle acquisition, a packageof 585 vehicles. It includes new armoredvehicles of Austrian design and refits, inAustria, of second-hand foreign tanks,


The Modernization of Austria’sMechanized Forces

again to create employment opportuni-ties. The cheaply-purchased surplus ve-hicles will be brought up to the lateststandard, a great step forward for theAustrian Army.

The armored vehicle acquisitions in-clude about 90 Jaguar missile-armedtank destroyers that will be purchasedfrom the German Army to replace Aus-tria’s Kürassier cannon-armed tank de-stroyers used by the antitank defensecompanies in the armored infantry bat-talions. The Jaguars are equipped withlaunchers for the HOT/K3S, a 4000m-range missile which has a tandem war-head able to penetrate 1300mm of RHA,even if the target is equipped with addi-tional reactive armor. With these sys-tems, the Austrian Federal Army willhave, for the first time, antitank weaponsof the most modern type and long range.Eight missiles are stored in a drummagazine and can be reloaded automat-ically. The missile’s hit probability isgreater than 94 percent and the rate offire is also remarkable. The Kürassierswill be used to reinforce the antitank de-fense units of the rifle brigades, witheach brigade getting 16 of these systems.The fighting power of the Kürassierswill also be considerably increased by arefitting program.

To strengthen and modernize its ar-mored forces, Austria is getting 114Leopard IIs from the Dutch Army. TheseMBTs, which are one of the most mod-ern, replace M60A3s. With their 120mmgun, low silhouette, and powerful en-gine, the Leopard IIs have a fighting ca-pacity three times higher than that of theM60A3s with which the Austrian armyhas been equipped until now. The Aus-trian Leopard IIs will also undergo a re-fitting which might be similar to the up-grades done by the German Army. Afterthis, the Leopard IIs will be like new, butat a low price, and will constitute a con-siderable reinforcement of Austrianmechanized troops.

As a first installment for hardening therifle brigades, an order was placed sometime ago for 68 wheeled armored per-sonnel carriers. These Pandur APCs,which will be used by Austria’s UNpeacekeeping forces, are being built bythe Austrian Steyr company. When thedelivery of this Pandur lot is completed,production will begin on the 269 Pan-durs which will be part of the Army’s ar-mored vehicle upgrade package. Beyond


Austria is buying 114 usedGerman Leopard IIs, above,from the Dutch Army.

About 90 Jaguar antitank mis-sile carriers, at right, camefrom the German Army. Theyare built on the Marder chas-sis and mount the HOT K3Santitank guided missile.

The Ascod tracked IFV, above, isa joint Austrian-Spanish collabo-ration. Its turret mounts a 30mmMauser dual-feed automatic can-non.

Also entering the Austrian inven-tory has been the Bofors BILL an-titank guided missile, which is ca-pable of shaped-charge top at-tack of vehicles hidden in defi-lade positions.

that, another buy of 200 Pandurs is ex-pected.

The Pandur’s three, equally spaced ax-les effectively spread its ground pres-sure, and the two pairs of front wheelsare steerable, to permit tighter turnswhile allowing the driver to continuesteering even if one of the front wheelsis damaged. The independent wheel sus-pension results in extremely good cross-country mobility and allows a low sil-houette, with the top of the hull reachingonly 1.81 m with a road clearance of 42cm.

A built-in control unit allows adjust-ment of tire pressure, even during action,to permit selection of the optimumground pressure in any type of terrain.All wheels are provided with “run-flat”tires which permit continuation of themission for another 50 km, even if thetires are damaged. Extremely goodsprings and shock absorbers allow highspeed both on the road (100 km/h) andacross rough terrain. The armor protectsagainst armor-piercing ammunition of7.62mm caliber, as well as against frag-ments of 155mm shells. Protection canbe increased across the frontal arcagainst 12.7mm and 14.5mm ammuni-tion.

The 269 Pandurs will be in severalvariants, 224 armored personnel carriersequipped with 12.7mm machine guns,and 45 armored reconnaissance vehicleswith two-man turrets carrying 30mmMauser machine cannons with dual-beltfeeding. Later additions will include car-riers for battlefield surveillance and be-tween 30 and 40 vehicles armed withHOT 4000 missiles as tank destroyers.Kuwait decided to purchase the Pandurafter testing it in the desert, but the pro-visions of Austrian law do not permit thedelivery of war materiel to areas of ten-sion, so these APCs are to be assembledby a U.S. subsidiary of the Austrian

Steyr company and will be armed with30mm Bushmaster machine cannons.Moreover, the Belgian Army orderedquite a number of Pandurs, and Sloveniawill also build them under license forher army.

The last item in the armor acquisitionpackage is the Ascod tracked armoredinfantry fighting vehicle, which was de-signed and built by the Austrian Steyrcompany in cooperation with the Span-ish Empresa Nacional Santa Barbara,with the predominant share of the com-ponents being manufactured in Austria.The Spanish Army has already ordered anumber of these vehicles. The Ascod isequipped with the same two-man turret,mounting a Mauser 30mm machine can-non as well as a coaxial 7.62mm ma-chine gun, as the Pandur. Because of theseven track rollers, the pressure on theground is only 64.9 kPa. The road speedof the IFV Ascod is 70 km/h. It seemsthat at least some Ascods per unit will beequipped with long-range antitank rock-ets. At critical points, the armor willwithstand 3 cm projectiles.

What appears remarkable and whatmakes the Ascod one of the best IFVs isthat its engine power is almost the sameas that of the M60A3 MBT, but withonly half of its weight (M-60 471 kWand a weight of 50.2 t, compared with441 kW and 27.3 t of the Ascod which,moreover, has an automatic six-speedgearbox. The electrically-traversed two-man turret of this IFV is equipped with athermal sight for the commander and thegunner and a laser rangefinder. The30mm Mauser machine cannon is stabi-lized and has a rate of fire of 800 roundsper minute. Both high explosive andsubcaliber projectiles feed alternativelyfrom the left or right, with the latter ableto penetrate RHA steel of 120 mm froma distance of 1 km.

In addition to acquiring the armor sys-tems, Austria will also substantiallystrengthen its antitank defenses withininfantry brigades, a decision spurred bythe changing geopolitical situation inAustria’s neighborhood. The number ofSwedish Bofors “Bill” antitank missiles,top-attack weapons with a 2000m range,is to be increased by new purchases sothat each brigade will receive 30 sys-tems. At the same time, they will replacethe 106mm recoilless rifle systems,which will be taken out of service. Alsoenvisaged is the future purchase of alarge number of light antitank rockets,probably of the Panzerfaust 3 type, capa-ble of substantially better performanceand the ability to be fired from indoors.

How carefully the Austrian Army han-dles its limited budget is shown by thefact that it did not buy the M578 ar-mored recovery vehicles along with theM109 howitzers from the British RhineArmy because these were apparently tooexpensive or in a bad condition. Rather,30 of these vehicles were acquired at ascrap price from the Dutch Army andbrought to an almost new condition bythe Austrian military repair workshops.

With this acquisition plan completed,Austria’s armored forces and antitanktroops will enter the beginning of thenew century meeting a new and higherstandard.

Walter A. Hamburger was a native ofAustria and had a degree in ElectricalEngineering. As a student of military his-tory, he wrote numerous articles for,among others, the British Army Review,and two booklets with the titles “Öster-reichs Wehr - und Sicherheitspolitik imVisier” (A critical look at Austria’s defenseand security policy) and “40 Jahre Öster-reichisches Bundesheer” (40 years of theAustrian Federal Army).

The Pandur armored car, in the reconnaissance version, above, and inthe armored personnel carrier role, at right.


The Armor - 2000 Program

The Spanish armored force’s ambitiousmodernization program started in 1991-92, when redundant American equipmentbecame available as a result of the TLE(Transfer of Limited Equipment) Treaty.The redundant American equipment, de-ployed in stocks all over Germany, wasto be transferred to some of the lesswell-equipped NATO armies. Spain re-ceived some 400 M60A3 MBTs, a bigimprovement for an armored fleet thenmainly composed of M48A5s and up-graded AMX-30s. While the M60s werea significant improvement, they were notconsidered adequate for the 21st century.The Spanish Army made its case to theMinistry of Defense, which was the ori-gin of the Armor 2000 program. It callsfor Leopard 2 A5 MBTs, with a plan tointroduce them by the end of the century.

The Birth of a Project

The acquisition of the Leopard 2 weap-ons system grew into a Spanish ArmyGeneral Staff program to integrate mod-ern armor into the Spanish Army. “Pro-grama Coraza - 2000” (Program Armor- 2000) was created in March 1995 byorder of the Army Chief of Staff and af-ter approval of the Defense Minister.

Coraza - 2000 has not yet reached itsmaturity, but has already managed notonly the beginning of the Leopard 2 ac-

quisition, but also other important devel-opments as well, like the procurement ofthe newly developed Ascod infantry/cav-alry combat vehicle, nicknamed “Pi-zarro” in Spain. This new tracked ar-mored vehicle, jointly designed by theSpanish company SBB (Santa BarbaraBlindados) and Steyr, the well knownAustrian manufacturer, promises to be-come a successful product and couldlikely be adopted by other armies inEurope and elsewhere.

Since its creation, Coraza - 2000 hasfocused on the initial steps needed forthe integration into the Spanish Army ofthe Leopard 2 A4 tanks received fromsurplus stocks of the German Bunde-swehr, while preparing the industrial andmilitary effort required to produce theLeopard 2 A5 tank, or Leopardo 2E as itwill be called by the Spanish Army.

Coraza - 2000 grew out of the previousand existing program that, since 1992,had been managing deliveries, reception,and integration of the M60A3 MBTs,M110A2 8-inch, self-propelled howit-zers, and other various armored vehicles,such as M113 APCs and M548cargo/ammunition carriers. The programis responsible not only for procurementof all this equipment, but also for sup-port, including logistics, training, alloca-tion of resources, and budget manage-ment. As anyone familiar with these is-sues can imagine, a day at work withinCoraza - 2000 can be a hectic and thrill-

ing experience. The program is organ-ized as a management directorate withauthority to submit instructions and di-rections to all the Army subunits con-cerned. It includes general management,logistics and general support, training,technical specifications, budget control,administration, and personnel.

Logistics and general support takes intoaccount transportation and, in particularfor those involved in the Leopard 2 Pro-ject, procurement of spare parts andmaintenance support. It is also involvedin the definition of technical and generalcriteria for the maintenance of the Leop-ard 2 A4 tanks recently issued to opera-tional units. Training refers to the gen-eral organization of courses, preparationof technical and field manuals, procure-ment of training aids and simulators, andsupport to training centers.

These days, all this activity focuses onthree main weapons systems: the Leop-ard 2 MBT, the Ascod/Pizarro AIFV, andthe Auxiliary Armored Vehicles projects,which include the combat engineer vehi-cle, a new armored bridge-launching ve-hicle, and an armored recovery vehicle,all based on the M60.

Coraza - 2000 works under direct or-ders and supervision of the Director forProcurement of Equipment and Arma-ment (DIAM) at the Army LogisticsCommand (MALE), a two-star general.The program is led by a brigadier gen-


Spain’s Armor Force Modernizes

From U.S. M48s and M60s

To the Leopard Family

and a New IFV,

Spain’s Armored Force

Is in Transition

Spanish Army Leopard 2 A4s parade in Madrid on Spanish Armed Forces Day.

by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio J. Candil

eral belonging to the combat arms, as-sisted by a chief of staff with the rank oflieutenant colonel or full colonel, alsofrom the combat arms. Officers andNCOs working at the program belongeither to combat arms — mainly Armorand Infantry — or to the Technical Engi-neers Corps, which is equivalent to U.S.Army Ordnance.

The LEOPARD 2 Project

The aim of the Leopard 2 Project is toguarantee the smooth integration into theArmy of the Leopard 2 A5 as the mainbattle tank of the Spanish Army in thenext century. Under a leasing agreement,the German Army has provided theSpanish Army with 108 Leopard 2 A4tanks. So far, these tanks have equippedtwo mechanized infantry brigades inte-grated into the mechanized division thatis Spain’s contribution to the multina-tional army corps-size unit, EURO-CORPS, formed by France, Germany,Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg, withits headquarters presently located inStrasbourg, France.

The leasing of these 108 tanks is linkedto an agreement calling for Spain to startproduction in 1998 of at least 200 newLeopard 2 A5 tanks. The Army has re-ceived approval from Spain’s Ministry ofDefense to procure a total of 320 MBTs,along with 23 Buffel 3 armored recoveryvehicles. These tanks are going to beproduced by Krauss-Maffei of Munich,under some kind of industrial coopera-tion agreement with Spanish companies.Negotiations have been taking place forseveral months and a formal contract isdue to be signed.

The Ascod/Pizarro AIFV Project

On February 9th, 1996, the SpanishCouncil of Ministers finally gave thegreen light to the procurement of the As-cod Pizarro, a newly developed infantryand cavalry combat vehicle. More than400 will be provided in the next ten

years, com-pletely replac-ing old M113APCs in themechanized in-fantry units andcavalry formations.

This new armored combat vehicle willform the backbone of the main defenseforces, together with the Leopard 2 A5,well into the next century. Several differ-ent versions of the Pizarro are expectedto be developed, including a CP version,a mortar and fire support vehicle, and anambulance, all due in the short run.

The Austrian Army has already se-lected this vehicle for its mechanizedunits as well, and an initial batch of 112Ascod vehicles will be procured to startreplacement of the Saurer 4K4E/F APCsstill in service. Recently, the AustrianArmy has also started procuring surplusLeopard 2 A4 MBTs from the DutchArmy to replace M60A3 tanks.

The Ascod/Pizarro AIFV has a combatweight of 24 metric tons, is armed witha Mauser 30 mm cannon, and carries upto six infantrymen. It took part in a re-cent competition organized by the Nor-wegian Army, together with the U.S. M2Bradley and the Swedish CV 90, andperformed very well, even though theSwedish vehicle won the contract.

Auxiliary Armored Vehicles Projects

As M60A3 TTS tanks will still remainin service for several years, in second-line units or mobilization forces, Coraza- 2000 will continue keeping an eye ontheir status and operational readiness.Nevertheless, as the combat value of theM60 has faded, several projects have be-gun to adapt them into a family of auxil-iary armored vehicles, always very muchneeded by the combat forces.

Started already is the development of anew armored vehicle launching bridge

(AVLB), based on the M60A1 chassisand equipped with the new MLC 70class Leguan bridge, which is capable ofsupporting the new Leopard 2 A5 tanks,as well as any other tanks and armoredvehicles in the Spanish inventory. Forthe time being the Army has contractedfor an initial 12 vehicles. A new combatengineer vehicle based on the M60A1/A3 tank is also being developed; this hasan external appearance similar to theU.S. M728 CEV, but without the 165mmdemolition gun, to be replaced by a spe-cial backhoe. It will also have a front-mounted dozer blade. An initial batch of38 vehicles is being procured now. Bothprojects are conducted in close liaisonwith Engineers at the Army LogisticsCommand.

An armored recovery vehicle has beendeveloped, also using the chassis of up-graded, but old, M47 E2 tanks, (thesetanks in fact were upgraded to M60 con-ditions and most of its parts are interop-erable with M48A5 and M60 parts), thusobtaining a cheap and efficient recoveryvehicle capable of working with mostlight armored vehicles and MLC 60 ve-hicles. It can also haul self-propelled ar-tillery howitzers and guns of the M109and M110 types, but is not capable ofhauling the new Leopard 2 A5 tanks,which is the reason the Leopard 2 pro-ject will procure an initial batch of 23“Bergepanzer 3 Buffel” of MLC 70, thatwill be coproduced in Spain, too.

In the longer run, other projects couldcome as well, including self-propelledarmored antiaircraft vehicles, with bothguns and missiles, and a new SP artil-lery, based on 155/52 long-range guns.


The Leopard 2 A5s, above, will be the backbone of the Spanish Ar-mored Force. Also joining the force will be the new Pizarro AIFV, ajoint Spanish-Austrian project, armed with a 30mm autocannon.


Situation

Enemy. The S2 reports that within thebrigade’s area of operations, the 13thMRD is conducting an attack to seizeKodza Airport a key logistical site, thatwill allow enemy forces easy access intothe theater of operations. Within the bat-talion’s area of operations, the 3rd MRRis conducting an attack to seize the cityof Kodza. This will allow the regimentto seize additional logistical sites (hospi-tal, stores, and water) that will supportthe division.

The most probable course of action isfor the 3rd MRR to attack along Avenueof Approach 1, enveloping the TF fromthe west maximizing their combatpower. The most dangerous course of ac-tion is for the 3rd MRR to attack withtwo MRBs abreast, forcing us to fight intwo directions and deny us the ability toconcentrate our combat power.

Friendly. TF 3-37 defends BP 22 at260630SEP98 to destroy enemy forcesin EA Crush in order to protect the west-ern flank of the brigade’s main defensevicinity of the Kodza Airport.

Company Situation. You are the com-mander of Charlie Team (tank heavy),TF 3-37. You are the main effort of TF3-37 that is defending in sector. The bri-gade commander wants the task force toprotect the west flank of the BDE maineffort TF 2-10 AR, which is defending akey logistical site (Kodza Airport) eastof the city of Kodza. Delta Company hasbeen attached to TF 2-10. TF 3-37 is ar-rayed with two companies forward andone back. Bravo Team is occupying BP1, oriented on TRPs 2 and 3. AlphaTeam (mech) is occupying BP 3, ori-ented on TRPs 2 and 4. The TF com-mander’s intent is to destroy the enemyin EA CRUSH by establishing a deliber-ate defense on BP 22, reinforced by ex-tensive obstacles in the engagement area;this will deny the enemy from seizingthe city of Kodza (See Figure 1).

Your team consists of two M1A1 tankplatoons and one infantry (BFV) platoonand a MANPACK Team. You have pri-ority of mortars and are responsible fortriggering artillery targets AB001

through AB003. Currently, the companyis occupying BP 2, oriented on TRPs 1and 2 and is backed down in turret downpositions, having withstood an initial ar-tillery bombardment. However, you havetaken some losses.

1st Platoon (mech) is down to 3 BFVs,while 2nd Platoon reports that one tankhas received heavy track damage and an-other suffered severe gun tube damage.

3rd Platoon reports no damage to any oftheir tanks.

Bravo Team has just made contact anddestroyed three BMPs, and the TF scoutsin the west report that the MRB will bein their sector within the next 15-20minutes. As you are monitoring these re-ports, you hear Terminator 6 (TF com-mander) trying to raise the Alpha Teamcommander or his XO. He has lost all

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-2

“The Defense of Kozda”


Figure 1. Mapboard for the defense of Kozda.

WHAT’SYOURNEXTMOVE??

in a foreign war. The armored vehicle isa tool that a professional Army can haveand more effectively employ than a rag-tag guerrilla force like Hezbollah can.This advantage must not be squandereddue to traditional inflexibility, employingexcuses that the tank is not suited for thetasks asked of it whenever it suffers set-backs, and falling back until the tank isonly useful for ego-gratifying tank-on-tank duels in the open. Nor should thetank be abandoned by avant-gardeiconoclasm and nonchalance that we aresomehow “above” having to use extrememeasures to fight battles today. War isoften an all-out, extreme activity — astruggle — not to be taken lightly. Thisstruggle does not just take place duringthe actual fighting, but before — in thedebates over force structure design,training, and equipping our forces. Now

is the time to win on the next battlefieldby seeing it as clearly as possible andpreparing for it, not what we wish it tobe, but what it already is and will be.

Sources:

Ed Blanche, “Hezbollah find chink in IDF’sMerkava armour,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29Oct 97, p. 17.

Steve Rodan, “Israelis eye more Merkava armor,”Defense News, 3-9 Nov 97, p. 8.

Mike Sparks is the director of the non-profit military reform think-tank, the 1stTactical Studies Group (Airborne), whichhas two web sites at http://www.geoci-ties.com/Pentagon/5265/ and Penta-gon/7963/. Improvements to U.S. Army

tactics, techniques, and procedures andequipment are given through officialchannels at no charge. Suggestionsadopted include the wire-cutting featureon the M9 bayonet, all terrain bikes/carts,and the new tripod-carrying modificationto the medium machine gun spare barrelbag. A former Marine officer and enlistedman, he is now in a Special Forces U.S.Army National Guard unit. A graduate ofMC Basic/AIT, PLC OCS, Officer Basic,Infantry Officer Course, Army Airborne,Combat Life Saver, and IDF parachuteschool, he holds a Bachelor of Sciencedegree in history/education from LibertyUniversity. His works have been publish-ed in ARMOR, Infantry, Special Warfare,Army Logistician, Aviation Digest, MCGazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Be-hind the Lines, and the Fort Bragg Postand Fort Benning Bayonet.

CONFIDENCE from Page 22


radio communications with Alpha Team,and the last transmission the A Teamcommander sent was that he was engag-ing three armored vehicles and wasdown to 9 vehicles. The TF commandernow believes that the MRR is attackingwith two MRBs abreast along Avenuesof Approach 1 and 2. The TF scouts inthe east confirm this by reporting that anMRB is moving fast along Avenue ofApproach 2 and will be in Alpha Team’ssector within the next five minutes. TheTF commander believes that the enemywill successfully penetrate Alpha Team’sposition, leaving his flank exposed. Heorders you to block penetration of AlphaTeam’s sector (See Figure 2). You mustact now! What do you do?

Requirement. In 5 minutes or lessmake your decision and issue yourFRAGO and any other reports youwould submit. Readers who submit theirsolutions to the scenario should providethe following: fragmentary order to thecompany team, the rationale behind yourdecision, and a sketch of your plan ofaction. E-mail your solution to:[email protected], or mail your solution to ARMOR,ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY40121-5210.

In the July-August issue of ARMOR,we’ll include some of the solutions sentin by readers, along with the author’sproposed solution.

On page 45, we recap the November-December issue vignette, “Ambush atDogwood Crossing,” and follow this re-cap with the author’s solution.

-Ed.

Figure 2. Aerial view from behind Battle Position 3.

Situation:

Terrain (see Fig. 2, Battalion graphics)

Obstacles - Dogwood Creek is a naturalobstacle which will restrict tactical move-ment because it offers only three fordingsites within the area of operation.

Avenues of Approach - Axis Californiais a high speed avenue of approach thatwill allow maneuver to be masked bythe high ground nearby and the woodline to the east of CP 5. Route Kayla is adismounted avenue of approach that pro-vides outstanding cover and concealmentup to CP 6. Occupation of CP 6 will al-low dismounts to engage suspected en-emy armored vehicles to their flank,causing disruption to the enemy COA.

Key Terrain - Dogwood Creek is keyterrain since the creek can restrict or im-pede friendly maneuver. The ridge lineon PL Yorktown is key terrain because itaffords outstanding observation to thenorth, which will provide an advantageto friendly or enemy forces.

Observation and Fields of Fire - Theridge line along PL Yorktown providesgreat observation and fields of fire be-cause it is the high ground that domi-nates the terrain within the area of op-eration.

Cover and Concealment - The highground near CP 5 and the wood line tothe east of CP 5 provide great cover andconcealment as friendly forces maneuveralong Axis California.

Enemy. The enemy is con-ducting a defense out of con-tact. The 13th MRD has de-ployed a forward detachment(MRB) ahead of the divisionto secure a key logistical sitefive kilometers north of PLYorktown (airfield). The for-ward detachment has been es-tablishing hasty fighting posi-tions and protective obstaclesfor the last 24 hours in prepa-ration for the arrival of themain body within the next 12hours. Our task force (TF 1)will attack against an MRC(along PL Enterprise) that theforward detachment has de-ployed forward to provideearly warning and to disruptand attrit enemy forces thatenter their engagement area. The MRCis currently at 70% strength. The MRChas been identified by a UAV that flewover their positions two hours ago. Thedefending MRC deployed a CSOP 2-3kilometers forward of its main defensivebelt (along PL Yorktown) to provideearly warning and call for indirect fire toharass enemy maneuver. The CSOP is anMRP which is reinforced with a tank.

Friendly.

BrigadeMission: 1st Brigade attacks in zone

230630SEP97 to destroy enemy forces vi-cinity OBJ Amanda in order to allow 2ndBrigade (the division’s main effort) to

maintain freedom of ma-neuver as they attacknorth to seize key logisti-cal site vicinity OBJ Brit-tany.Intent: (Purpose) The

purpose of this attack is toallow 2nd Brigade to at-tack north maintainingfreedom of maneuver toseize the airport vicinityof OBJ Brittany. The air-port allows the division toprovide more responsivelogistical support withinthe area of operation. Wewill accomplish this mis-sion by conducting an at-tack with three TFs at-tacking abreast, envelop-ing enemy forces from theeast and west. This willprevent the enemy frommassing fires, forcing him

to fight in three directions.

(End state). At end state, enemy de-stroyed in zone vicinity OBJ Amanda al-lowing 2nd Brigade to maintain freedomof maneuver as they attack north to seizeOBJ Brittany (see Figure 1. BrigadeGraphics).

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TF 1 - Task: Seize OBJ Kara

Purpose: Allow 1st Brigade to maintainfreedom of maneuver to destroy enemyforces vicinity OBJ Amanda.

On order, continue the attack north to de-stroy enemy in zone to LOA New York

Responsible for triggering brigade artil-lery target AB1002. Priority of artillery upto PL Enterprise

TF 2 - Task: (Brigade main effort) SeizeOBJ (Amanda #1)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade’s west-ern flank

Responsible for triggering brigade artil-lery target AB1000. Priority of artillery atPL Enterprise

TF3 - Task: (brigade supporting effort)Seize OBJ (Amanda #3)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade’s easternflank

Responsible for triggering brigade artil-lery target AB1001

Task Force 1Mission: TF 1 attacks in zone along Axis

California 230630SEP97 to destroy enemyforces vicinity OBJ Kara in order to allow1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneu-

THE PROBLEM:“Ambush at Dogwood Crossing” from the November-December 1997 issue of ARMOR


Figure 1. Brigade Graphics

Figure 2. Battalion Graphics

ver and maximize its combat power as itattacks to destroy enemy forces vicinityOBJ Amanda. On order, continue to attacknorth to LOA New York, destroying enemyforces in zone.

Intent: (Purpose) The purpose of our at-tack is to destroy enemy forces in zone.This will allow 1st Brigade to maintainfreedom of maneuver and maximize itscombat power as it attacks to destroy en-emy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda. We willaccomplish this mission by conducting anattack enveloping enemy MRC 1 from thewest. (End state) At end state, OBJ Karahas been seized, and TF conducting con-solidation and reorganization operations inpreparation to continue the attack north toLOA New York.

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TM A - Task: (TF main effort) SeizeOBJ Kara.

Purpose: Prevent MRC 1 from attackinginto the flank of TF 2 or TF 3

Assault force during TF breaching opera-tions

Responsible for firing one green startcluster at PL Enterprise to signal TM B tolift fires

Responsible for triggering artillery targetsAB1002 and AB002

Priority of fires at PL Yorktown

Accept one tank platoon from TM C tomaximize combat power to seize OBJKara, effective immediately

TM B - Task: Support by fire

Purpose: To suppress enemy forces onOBJ Kara in support of TM A’s attack

Occupy terrain vicinity SBF 01, whichwill provide effective suppressive fires oneastern MRP

Lift your fires as TM A fires one greenstar cluster as they pass PL Enterprise

Support force during TF breaching opera-tions

Responsible for triggering mortar targetsAB001 and AB003

Initial priority of fires up to PL Yorktown

TM C - Task: Breach

Purpose: To clear a lane for TM A’s at-tack to seize OBJ Kara

Attached assault and obstacle platoon ef-fective immediately

Responsible for identifying point ofbreach

Detach one tank platoon to TM A effec-tive immediately

Company SituationYou are the commander of TM B (tank

heavy). Your team is attacking in zone as

part of a three-team task force attack. TMB is the support force. You are responsiblefor establishing a support by fire position(SBF 01) to suppress the enemy MRP onthe eastern side of OBJ Kara. You havepriority of mortar support throughout thisoperation and are responsible for triggeringAB001 and AB003. Your team has just de-ployed along PL Lexington in anticipationof contact with the enemy CSOP (see Fig-ure 2. Battalion Graphics).

You direct that 2nd platoon (tank) and 3rdplatoon (tank) establish an overwatchwhile 1st platoon (mech) bounds forwardtowards CP 2. You direct 1st platoon to fo-cus its observation from CP 5 to CP 3, 2ndplatoon from CP 6 to CP 7, and 3rd pla-toon from CP 7 to CP 8. During 1st pla-toon’s bound, they receive fire, and 2ndplatoon reports seeing a signature from afiring BMP east of CP 5. As the team con-tinues to develop the situation, it conductsthe following actions and gains the follow-ing information:

3rd platoon conducts a reconnaissance byfire and reports a vehicle moving vicinityof CP 8.

2nd platoon initially identified a tank tur-ret west of CP 7; the tank has since backeddown into a defilade position, leaving onlyits antennae visible. The platoon addition-ally identified and destroyed a BMP vicin-ity NX065550.


THE SOLUTIONS:

Author’s Solution

FRAGO:

“GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6, FRAGOfollows. Situation: The enemy is over-watching the ford site and occupyingSBF01. We have a possible BMP at grid062556, a stationary tank at 074557, andpossible BMP moving west near grid081557. BREAK.

“Mission: Team B conducts a hasty attackto destroy enemy forces along PL YORK-TOWN to establish SBF 01 in order to sup-port the task force’s attack on OBJ KARA.BREAK.

“ Intent: We will destroy the CSOP in or-der to establish our support by fire positionand suppress enemy forces as the TF at-tacks to seize OBJ KARA. BREAK.

“Tasks to subordinate units:

“RED (MECH) , Seize the crossing siteand establish near side security. On order,establish the left flank of SBF 01 vicinityCP6. Report when set. BREAK.

“DISMOUNTS, Clear enemy dismountsalong Route Kayla and anchor the leftflank at CP6 oriented towards CP5.BREAK.

“WHITE , Support by Fire BLUE’s as-sault to seize SBF 01. Orient fires fromCP6 to CP8. BREAK.

“BLUE , Seize SBF 01. Move through theford site. Establish the right flank of SBF01 vicinity CP8. BREAK.

“FIST, Suppress the enemy positions atCP5 and CP7 with artillery fires. TriggerAB001 to mask our movement to the fordsite. BREAK.

“BLACK 5 , Move with BLUE. Reportmovement of enemy or friendly forces ma-neuvering from the east. You are second inpriority of calling fires. BREAK.

“BLACK 7 , move the trains to a hideposition vicinity PL LEXINGTON.BREAK.

“I’m moving with BLUE. Once we’re seton SBF 01, RED orients from TRP1 toTRP3, WHITE from TRP2 to TRP3,BLUE from TRP2 to TRP4. ACKNOW-LEDGE, OVER.”

RATIONALE:Since the enemy is currently occupying

my SBF position, and I am in a timecrunch to establish it, I must conduct ahasty attack to destroy him or force him towithdraw in order to establish my SBF po-sition. First, I get the company team to at-tack known enemy positions with directfire, while the FIST suppresses them withHE and uses smoke to cover RED’s seizingof the crossing site. WHITE supports byfire from his position since he has visualcontact with the enemy, and will supportBLUE’s assault. BLUE then assaultsthrough to destroy or force the withdrawalof any enemy along PL YORKTOWN, andestablishes the center of the SBF01.

I’m counting on our firepower and move-ment to quickly gain a position of advan-tage over what enemy remains along PLYORKTOWN before we establish SBF 01and turn our attention on KARA. I makesure we crosstalk with the teams and letthe TF know what’s going on.

AUTHOR’S NOTE: We purposely re-duced unnecessary verbiage staying awayfrom the perfect school house solution thatwould be unrealistic in the heat of battle.We want to provide to the readers a quickrealistic FM fragmentary order from thecompany commander to his subordinates.

predictive and will provide an absoluterepresentation of actual combat. No onewill dispute that the CTCs, in general,and the NTC, specifically, have en-hanced our training effectiveness and ourcombat readiness. Yet, we must be cau-tious in any training assessment con-ducted at the CTCs that forecast cate-gorical battle facts. Bluntly speaking, theCTCs are little more than a higher mag-nitude form of “laser tag.” Despite themost serious efforts, the CTCs cannotreplicate nor adequately simulate themoral domain of conflict. History hasshown that battlefield performance maybe enhanced by improved physical andC3I systems, but the moral domain ofconflict continues to remain predomi-nant. This moral domain embodies thetrue spiritual and human aspects of com-bat.2 Failure at the CTC results in aflashing CVKI (combat vehicle kill indi-cator) light and a painful exercise in re-constitution. Failure on the battlefield re-sults in dead soldiers and a failed mis-sion. The CTCs cannot replicate themoral impact and paralyzing conse-quence of effective enemy indirect fireconcentrations. Further, it is doubtfulthat our Army’s leadership would allow

any combat unit to disintegrate to lessthan 5 percent combat strength beforebeing pulled or relieved from the battle-field. It is highly questionable that anybrigade-size maneuver unit would re-ceive such a large variety of time-sensi-tive combat missions that we demand atthe CTCs. I do not suggest, however,that the CTC training methodology is in-correct. Training efficiency demands thatwe continue on this course. Yet, we mustbe cautious in our interpretation of train-ing results. Specifically, when discussingsecurity operations, we may have missedthe mark when we conclude that NTCfailures reflect deficient doctrine, tactics,and mediocre planning.

Although we must continue to focus onall phases of security operations, particu-lar emphasis on preparation and execu-tion is warranted. Incessant planning isnot the answer. Not all answers to battletraining failures can be directly linked tofaulty planning. Focused and relativelysimple security operations SOPs, cou-pled with disciplined execution through-out the organization, will resolve themystery of conducting the task of coun-terreconnaissance. This article has at-

tempted to provide a methodology to dojust that. Through the use of simple butflexible SOPs, a shared responsibility forsecurity operations throughout the com-mand, and planning for security as a se-quential or concluding phase of any mis-sion may alleviate some of these trainingchallenges.

Notes1FM 100-5 (Final Draft, 5 Aug 97), p. 5-1.2FM 100-5, p. 2-10.

LTC (P) Chris Baggott, currently in thesecond year of a War College SAMSFellowship, is the command designee of3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (June,98). He has commanded two armoredcavalry troops, served as a brigade S4,and as S3 of a tank battalion and threecavalry squadrons. Additionally, heserved as aide de camp to the 3rd Ar-mored Division Commander; G3 Plans,III Corps; brigade XO, 3d Bde, 1st Cav;and commander, 1-11 ACR (OPFOR).His military education includes AOAC,Airborne and Ranger Courses, CGSC,SAMS, and Defense Strategy Course.


COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE from Page 11

A Reader’s Solution

(Submitted by 1LT Dan Head, HHC,2nd BDE, 3ID, Fort Stewart, Ga.)

Frago:Guidons, Black 6, Frago follows:

Situation: Probable enemy CSOP withtanks and BMPs in hasty defense from060555 to 082557.

Mission: No change

Execution:

Redleg: Call for mortars. Fire for ef-fect, grid 062555, one BMP on a hilltop.Repeat twice.

Red: Move to CP 2 and dismount.Clear Route Kayla up to CP 6 and reportwhether or not the enemy is in positionon the reverse slope of the ridge.Bradleys support dismounted move upRoute Kayla and cover company sectorfrom CP 6 to the edge of the battalionsector. Watch ATGM position vic062555. Use impact of mortar rounds asthe trigger to start your move.

White and Blue: Overwatch Red’smove and destroy any enemy vehicles

spotted. DO NOT fire into Route Kaylaonce dismounts are on the ground.White, you have from CP 6 to CP 4.Blue, destroy any remaining enemy onthe ridge. White moves first, covered byBlue. White occupies CP 7. Blue occu-pies CP 8. Once White and Blue are set,Red moves to CP 6 and remounts.

Black 5: Move up behind Red to covertheir move forward to the dismountpoint. Stay on the ridge. BattlecarryHeat.

RATIONALE:

Now I am in good shape. I have de-stroyed one enemy vehicle, and havegood ground and have taken no losses.What I do not want to do is charge up tothe defile at Dogwood Creek while indirect fire contact. In order for the bat-talion mission to succeed, my companymust reach SBF 1 without taking seriouslosses. I must first clear the woodlinealong Kayla to avoid enemy dismountedATGM fire to my flanks and rear as Iadvance and set my SBF position. Thebest way to do this is with my dis-mounts supported by their Bradleys. Theproblem is that the infantry platoon must

cross over 1000 meters of open groundbefore they reach the relative safety ofthe woodline. I will use my tanks andindirect fire support to suppress and de-stroy the enemy while Red gets into po-sition and dismounts. I know that the en-emy is well within range of my tanks, soin many ways I actually hope that theytry to shoot Red, so that my tanks canengage and destroy them with superiorfirepower.

Once Red has cleared up to CP 6 andhas eyes on suspected enemy locations, Ican bound my platoons forward, executeplatoon defile drills, and seize our SBFposition. While White moves to seizeSBF 1, Blue can destroy any enemy thathas remained in position. Once Blue andWhite are set in the SBF, I can safelybring up Red’s Bradleys and remountthe infantry.

The XO moves to cover Red in caseany enemy tanks are hidden in thewoodline or in the vicinity of CP 5. Ican trust him to determine when and if itis safe to fire over Red’s head and tocross talk with the Red platoon leaderand platoon sergeant before he fires. Hebattle-carries HEAT so that he will notcause fratricide with SABOT petals.

The question is, “What will maneuverforces bring to the future battlefield?” Innumerous journals and on TV talk shows,writers and military pundits say that weare on the verge of a “Revolution inMilitary Affairs.” Whether this is true ornot, a reflective professional force musttry to look dispassionately upon the cur-rent world, imagine the future, and pro-ject roles for the profession of arms.Within this reflection and the questionposed above are multiple levels of detail,ranging from “What will the combinedarms team of the future look like?” to“Do we have to gain and hold ground to“win” the next war or protect a vital na-tional interest?”

The current raging debate within theArmored Force began with a very infor-mative piece on the Division AdvancedWarfighter Experiment (DAWE) beingheld at Fort Hood. Brigades with con-tinuous situational awareness are destroy-ing divisions. Long-range fires are thekey to victory. Done completely in simu-lation, it is “showing” that a new defini-tion of maneuver may be “that which al-lows the commander to place his artilleryin the most advantageous position to de-stroy enemy forces without resorting tothe close fight.” The roots of this entireeffort — the emergence of separate deepand close battles — can be found in theearly writings of the “Boat House Gang,”who brought us the 1982 edition of Air-Land Battle, GEN Starry’s ruminationson Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA), andthe concept of simultaneous deep andclose battle. Let us examine this emerg-ing definition of maneuver and what itmeans to the combined arms team andArmor.

What seems to be developing in DAWEis the ability to defeat opponents outsideof direct-fire range. In DAWE, maneuveris translated as the ability to position in-direct fires (and attack aviation) relativeto the enemy. Is this new and differentfrom conventional wisdom? Yes and no.Those of us who watched the Gulf Warfrom the sidelines should remember Sec-retary of Defense Cheney speaking interms of a joint combined arms teamwhen he talked of ground maneuver en-hancing the effectiveness of air-deliveredfires. In terms of the Army Force XXIfight, indirect fires are supposed to do agreat majority of the killing and, from thelens of DAWE, appear to be on the edgeof becoming the primary means of de-feating/destroying the enemy. Practically,while I will never completely agree that

we can do all our killing from longrange, there are a number of reasons whywe should break up the cohesion of theenemy force prior to us closing and com-pleting the task with tank cannon fire.

From reading some reports on DAWE,it seems that there are two stages withindecisive ground operations; shaping op-erations and initial decisive operations. Inthese stages, armor and infantry forcesare used primarily to secure artillery fir-ing positions and, I infer, attack aviationFARRPS. These heavy forces attack onlyif necessary to complete the destructionor defeat of the enemy. The armored andmechanized infantry then is not used somuch as a decisive maneuver force, butas a maneuver mopping-up force.

I agree that armor and infantry need tolook at new ways of integrating decisivemaneuver into non-linear operations. Ialso agree that the advances in indirectfire systems and attack aviation willchange how we fight. The central fact re-mains that simulations are just that, anddecisive maneuver of ground forces will,I believe, remain essential to decisivevictory. Frankly, I just don’t see how wecan defeat the enemy without maneuver-ing ground forces in a combined armsfight, culminating with direct fire engage-ments. Unless, and until we can com-pletely divorce ourselves from the line ofcommunication required to sustain amodern force, maneuver will be requiredto both protect our own LOC and turnthe enemy off of his. Again, this maneu-ver enhances the effectiveness of air-de-livered fires as well as artillery-deliveredfires.

The disadvantages of stand-off and fightare that we can do this until our un-manned sensors are blinded by lasers, ourMLRS batteries are caught by tacticalballistic missiles, our attack helicopterbattalions run into ADA ambushes, or itrains, snows, or fogs up. Then we musthave the capability to roll out a combinedarms team and take the battle to the en-emy. Close combat is what assures vic-tory.

Since the dawn of man, warriors havesought the means to kill at longer ranges,avoiding the calamity of close combat.Army AirLand battle weaponry and doc-trine, Air Force strategic and interdictionbombing campaigns, even some elementsof our nuclear arsenals are attempts tokill the enemy deep to take pressure offof, or even obviate the need for, the closecombat forces. The concept which is

emerging from simulations, though, isvery clear and attractive. Why close withthe enemy when you can defeat himfrom a distance? Close combat, highcasualties, the confusion of the melee, thedisadvantages of the decisive engagement(ability to disengage, reposition, etc.)should be avoided. Separation of closecombat forces is desirable; to close withthe enemy is undesirable. In the offense,closing with the enemy in the direct-firemode is best kept for mopping up thebattlefield, a task which must be com-pleted quickly so the armored heavyforce can get out front to secure more fir-ing positions.

We must ask ourselves, “Is the generalconcept of defeating/destroying an enemyfrom a distance a good idea?” We willhave to admit that, from the time of thebow and arrow (Crecy and Agincourtspring to mind), the commander’s objec-tive has been to break up enemy forma-tions at a distance, thus making the closefight easier or unnecessary. We must alsorecognize that the concept has a down-side — a heavy reliance on sensors to de-fine a battlefield and indirect fires todominate the enemy. The inclination tothe asymmetrical approach could lead ournext opponent to use a low yield airbursttactical nuclear weapon to fry our “off-the-shelf” appliqué computers with EMP.Voilà, loss of advantage. Why, though, isthe silver bullet of killing impersonally atlong range attractive?

There is an American tendency to lookfor a fast, cheap — in terms of Americanlives — way to win, (look at the newestworld champions of baseball), like thehigh-tech air force. The high-tech sen-sor/shooter fight is sexy, clean, andsteeped in the tradition of our firepower-based army. Following the logic of sen-sor-shooter link and kill at long range, thedivision deep fight and close fight havemelded as simply “the fight.” What isnow defined as a division deep operationis subsumed within the commander’s bat-tlespace due to the technology of existingand developing systems. Since “the fight”generally occurs outside of direct-firerange, but is not a separate deep fight,what appears to be developing is a “mid-dle/long” distance fight. With the ad-vanced fires capabilities being demon-strated in the DAWE, the commanderdoes not have to fight simultaneously inthe conventional sense of the term. Long-range artillery fires can continually attritan attacking or defending enemy untilwhat remains of the enemy force eventu-


Armor’s Role in the Future Combined Arms Teamby Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

ally reaches the close combat area, wherehe is greeted with a hail of Hellfires andmaybe even a sabot or two. Therefore, si-multaneous attack becomes continuousattack.

Over-reliance on artillery-delivered firesmay sound like WWI all over again. Themain killer in our grandfathers’ war wasartillery-delivered firestorms. Lines oftrenches were built, at least partially, toprotect both the infantry and the indirectfire assets. The stalemate in the trencheswas overcome in 1918, first by the Ger-mans using combined arms assaults of in-fantry and artillery (Hutier tactics), andthen by the Allies using combined armsoffensives of infantry, armor, and artillery(Cambrai). Although history shows usthat fire alone is not the answer, it seemsthat the combined arms fight still has along way to go with coordinated actionsof infantry, armor, artillery, and attackhelicopters. Having maneuver formationsfollow closely on the heels of long-rangeartillery fire will have the greatest effectand is not a new concept.

It is hard to think of a mission, otherthan full armored combat in the desert,where we will be able to use long-rangeindirect fires with impunity. The risk ofcollateral damage and fratricide will pre-vent the full use of these assets. Howwould an MLRS battery 30 kms away,directed by an unmanned sensor, help inthe following situations:

• Light infantry surrounded in thestreets of Mogadishu.

• Preventing a mob of Bosnian Serbsfrom destroying a Muslim village.

• Ejecting the Panamanian DefenseForces from Panama City.

Our Armored Force and Army will haveto test these concepts in many ways, notwith a “HU-AH, Can Do!” attitude, butone which will really test the concepts,and perhaps, upset a branch’s rice bowl.

Simulated, computer-assisted gamesand CTC battlefield testing will surelyshow the limitations of long-range fires.We should not do the testing just at theNTC, a sterile background tailor-madefor deep battle, just as were the deserts ofIraq. The testing should also be on terrainmuch more representative of potentialconflict areas — inhabited, partially ur-banized, partially forested, with a varietyof ongoing human activities other thanwarfare occurring — places like Vietnam,Panama City, Grenada, Somalia, Haiti,and Bosnia — like the Joint ReadinessTraining Center. The OPFOR there inter-mingles with the innocent populace — alow-tech tactic proven to confuse high-tech armies. Of course, anytime our long-range fires kill innocent life by mistake,

the CNN player will “broadcast” the pic-tures to an outraged public, forcing pol-icy and targeting changes on the BlueForce commander.

I predict that “experiments” of this sortwill also show that a new form of thecombined arms team will emerge. Allarms will play to their strengths. For ex-ample, the armored force will drive theorganized enemy forces away from thepopulation centers and afford the trooperswho still have to go into harm’s way rea-sonable levels of protection. The otherelement of the combined arms team willbe the Special Forces and light infantryforces, who engage in civic action andsmall-unit, high-intensity actions, thenight ambush patrols and security mis-sion, all of which allow the populace toenjoy their lives free from the enemyforce. A new combined arms team? No,not really, just another form of BG Chaf-fee’s comment of a force of all arms withequal glory for all. Imagine the combinedarms team of a Special Forces Groupcommander with his group, an aviationtask force, a light infantry battalion, andan armored battalion task force. A com-bined arms team, yes indeed!

We are prisoners of our paradigms. Forcenturies, Western warriors have de-signed armies to meet on open fieldswhere they are to destroy a target-richenemy array. This kind of warfare is be-coming increasingly rare, for a variety ofreasons, and is not likely to make acomeback any time soon. Most of ourfoes will not conveniently don distinctiveuniforms, separate themselves from thepopulace, and motor around in dense ar-rays of distinctive vehicles, offeringthemselves up for the slaughter. Ourmore likely opponents for the foreseeablefuture will hide in the towns, among theirsupporters, wearing us down in a low-tech struggle we’d rather not fight. As wedesign the future Army, let us not be pris-oners of the past.

Dominant maneuver by armored forcesmay not be the same thing in differentareas, but that is what armored forceswill bring to the battlefield. We will de-stroy organized enemy units or drivethem away. We will act with relative im-punity as we overmatch other potentialopponents, while we protect our troopers.Dominance of a battle area will allowother members of the combined armsteam to accomplish their missions by en-hancing the strengths of the units withinthe combined arms team, the total beinggreater than the sum of the parts. Beinginvolved with warfare personally, and onthe ground, accomplishes one other ex-tremely important role in the place waroccupies within human interaction.

R.E. Lee, on Marye’s Heights after thebattle of Fredericksburg, said that it wasgood that war was so terrible lest wegrow too fond of it. Distant killing doesraise moral issues. The personal nature ofcombat diminishes, and we must think ofthat effect. Will it become too easy toconduct operations because we commitmachines, as opposed to troopers? Thefarther away we get from the close fight,the more we forget our machines are kill-ing other people. War becomes clean forus. War must remain a matter of horror,and close combat is necessary to preservehumanity.

I return to the original question, whatwill maneuver forces bring to the modernfuture battlefield? The armored force willcontinue to bring the capability for deci-sive maneuver, speed, mobility, andshock effect. This is happening now inBosnia, happened in Haiti, and did nothappen soon enough in Somalia. Ar-mored forces operate in all terrain (find acopy of then MG Starry’s work on armorin Vietnam) and can dominate that ter-rain, from rubber plantations, to urban ar-eas, to open plains. The sensor-shooterlink can be shortened as we will, but toreally dominate ground we have to puttroopers on it. Low-tech societies believewhat they can see, and the Stealth can’tbe seen (unless it is raining!). Trooperson the ground, with armored vehicles,lend the unmistakable aspect of power toa situation. In the, thankfully rare, con-ventional wars of the future, our ability todestroy forces without closing into tankcannon range will save our troopers’lives, and I vote for that. But the wars ofthe future will not be in the desert andthe open sterile terrain, the “tactician’sdream, and logistician’s nightmare” de-scribed by Rommel.

Troopers will still be required to go intoharm’s way on ground that will be “tankcountry” because armored forces arethere. Armored forces will continue tobring speed, mobility, and shock effect tothe battlefield. Our position as armoredforce officers will remain as advocates ofthe combined arms team and the advan-tages of dominant maneuver with forcesthat seize and hold ground.

LTC Kevin C.M. Benson is the Chief ofPlans, Third U.S. Army. He has served inarmored and cavalry units in the U.S.and Germany, as the Chief of Plans,XVIII Abn Corps, and as the regimentalexecutive officer of the 2d Cavalry Regi-ment. He will take command of a battal-ion in 1998. He is a graduate of Com-mand and Staff College and the Schoolof Advanced Military Studies. He grate-fully acknowledges the mother lode ofmaterial he read on the SABERNET.


“Therefore it is said that one mayknow how to win but cannot necessarilydo so” ...Sun Tzu.

The old saying is “Live and learn.” Wemust reverse this in war to “Learn andlive.” We have the technology to train —defined at task level, in constructive, vir-tual, and live environments — the fullcapability and synergy of our combatsystems, battle-focused for the full con-tinuum of warfighting.

Technology enables the solution — atrained and ready Army with precision inthinking, planning, and execution.

Computer simulations are growing inimportance as training devices becausethey add realism to training and poten-tially reduce training-related costs. Train-ing devices range from the inexpensive,such as terrain boards, to technical, mul-timillion-dollar, computer-driven simula-tors and systems. Simulations are impor-tant tools used in training and testing. Inthe 1970s, war games were convertedinto two-dimensional computer applica-tions that played in real time, allowingbattalion, brigade, and corps staffs toconduct exercises. In the 1980s, techno-logical advances provided the capabilityto network multiple, similar, weaponsystem simulators into an interactive,electronic battlefield where militarycrews conducted realistic, task-basedtraining. The primary example for ma-neuver units is Simulation Networking(SIMNET). SIMNET initially allowedfor force-on-force free play and more re-cently, structured, task-based training. Inthe late 1990s, the Close Combat Tacti-cal Trainer (CCTT) will replace SIM-NET, and the groundwork for joint exer-cises and training with allied and coali-tion forces is under development.

Computer simulations provide impor-tant training opportunities and capabili-ties not always feasible or affordable infield training exercises. Large-scale fieldexercises that emphasize battle planning

and command and control of forces arecostly, require a sizable maneuver area,are time-consuming, and cause signifi-cant downtime for lower echelon person-nel. Training in simulations provide op-portunities for individuals and units topractice techniques and procedures, im-proving proficiency in required skills,both before and after participating infield exercises. The loss of resources ormaneuver constraints should not leadone to the conclusion that (virtual/con-structive) simulations are a “one-for-one” replacement training tool for thoselost resources. Virtual and constructivesimulations are not designed for the vali-dation of mission essential task list(METL) tasks. As a result, this powerfulcapability presents a leadership chal-lenge for leaders and units to determinethe proper use of training simulation de-vices and systems within available re-sources.

The real art in determining the properuse of available simulations is to under-stand what tasks can be trained by thedifferent types of simulation. One mustalso understand how well those tasks canbe trained, by whom, and at what level.The purpose of this article is to providesome insight on the capabilities of cur-rent simulations and how to optimize aunit’s training program using simula-tions.

The first step in understanding how toincorporate simulations into a unit train-ing program is to understand the defini-tion of each type of simulation: construc-tive, virtual, and live. Constructive simu-lations are identified with complex, com-puter-driven models most often associ-ated with exercises dealing with battal-ions, brigades, divisions, and corps. Theprimary training audience of constructivesimulations is the commander, subordi-nate commanders, and battle staffs asso-ciated with that echelon of command.Virtual simulations are designed to trainindividual soldiers and crews in collec-tive training tasks. Virtual simulations

are often associated with crew-servedweapons systems and focus on trainingdevoted to emphasizing familiarity, skilldevelopment, and practice. These simu-lations contain simulators that closelyreplicate all or parts of tanks, armoredpersonnel carriers, and other equipment.Virtual simulations normally require thetraining unit to immerse itself into thesimulated battlefield. Live simulationsare training events where all the soldiers,leaders, units, and staffs physically de-ploy (usually against an OPFOR) anduse (weapons) simulators to replicatecertain parts of combat. Live simulationstake place almost anywhere the maneu-ver space is available (home station,combat training centers).

As resources dwindle, there is increas-ing recognition that, while traditionalfield (live) training exercises are the pre-ferred method of training, and essentialfor validation of critical METL tasks,they can have significant limitations andare often cost-prohibitive. In some cases,these limitations can be overcome orminimized through the use of simula-tions. For example, gunnery and fieldmaneuver can be limited by the highcost of fuel, training ammunition, and re-pair parts; lack of space; safety and envi-ronmental concerns, as well as a lack oftime required to prepare for and under-take such exercises. Simulations areavailable to assist a unit in refining skillsneeded to effectively and efficiently con-duct those valuable but costly exercises.

Several factors influence the trend to-ward increased use of constructive andvirtual simulations, including safety, re-duced costs, environmental protection,land use restrictions, and training sce-nario flexibility (exercises can bequickly reset, and the factors of METT-Tmodified as required). Simulations are atool to maximize training opportunities,especially when resources are limited.Training using simulations can prepare aunit to get the maximum benefits fromscheduled field training exercises by pro-viding a flexible training system to theunit before deployment, and as a sustain-ment and integration training tool.Therefore, simulations should be consid-ered and incorporated into your overalltraining strategy at all levels, regardlessof resource limitations.

The Army, in formal training fieldmanuals, does not currently prescribe


Simulations And Training:Integrating Constructive, Virtual, And Live SimulationsInto Unit Training Programs by Major Mark Alan Eastman and Mr. George Hel ton

simulations as required training devicesbecause they are not available to allunits. Additionally, there are a limitednumber of tested, standardized trainingexercises and structured training, orTraining Support Packages (TSPs),available for units to prepare training.Therefore, units must develop their owntraining, sometimes without the benefitof proven methods, to optimize the bene-fits of the simulation.

Virtual and constructive simulationsused in training depict the essence or ef-fect of live exercises (tasks, conditions,and standards) by providing cues/re-sponses that cause the training unit toperform the skills used and those skillsthat are transferable to a live training en-vironment (live simulation). The trainingoutcomes and behaviors accurately re-flect the training outcomes that wouldhave resulted from a similar live simula-tion exercise. A critical advantage insimulation training is the ability to useprepared exercises that control condi-tions and cues to ensure that the desiredtraining outcome is achieved, and to pro-vide the ability to record and play backthe events exactly as they occurred.There are several ways in which trainingdevices and simulations can support theperformance measures of a given train-ing exercise. The range of compatibilitygoes from those tasks that cannot besupported in simulation, a reminder thatvalidation of METL tasks must be donein a live simulation training environ-ment, to tasks that are highly supportedby a simulation (virtual/constructive) en-vironment where the training experienceis “much the same” as a field environ-ment (live simulation).

The supportability of a task trained in agiven simulation depends on whether thecues and responses available result inpositive or negative training. A cue insimulation is the stimulus (visual oraudio) that causes the unit to make a de-cision and execute a task. For example,an enemy tank fires on the unit, causingan action on contact or a FRAGO issuedby the next higher headquarters. Suffi-cient cues for the tasks being trained in astructured training environment are pro-vided to allow the participants to prac-tice tactics and techniques and sustainthose skills that are transferable to a livetraining environment. Most simulationsfocus on C2, maneuver, fire control anddistribution, and teamwork. In othercases, sufficient cues or responses arenot available, and the execution of cer-tain tasks result in a negative training ex-perience. An example of a negativetraining experience would be when thesimulation causes the user to learn a task

incorrectly. For example, SIMNET coulddrive the tank at an unrealistic speedwithout regard to the effects of terrain,causing the driver to employ unsafedriving habits.

The Army has the capability to repli-cate tactical engagements through con-structive, virtual, and live simulations,known together as the Simulation Tool-box. Before employing the proper simu-lation, the commander and his staff mustask and answer these four questions.

• Who is being trained? Who is the tar-get audience?

• What tasks are being trained? Whatare the terminal learning objectives(commander’s intent)?

• What resources are available? (time,OPTEMPO, ranges, CTCs, simulationdevices)

• What is the best environment to use,constructive, virtual, or live?

Answering these four questions assiststhe trainer in choosing the proper simu-lation. Several simulation methods canbe employed to meet overall training ob-jectives. Each simulation performs spe-cific tasks for the trainer. Selection of theproper simulation, or simulations, en-sures that tasks are trained to sustain andtraining outcomes are present. Figure 1provides a brief description of severalmethods and devices. This is not an all-inclusive list but provides some informa-tion to help the trainer select the appro-priate method of simulation to meet theunit’s training objectives.

Training Strategy Development

Several factors influence the develop-ment of a unit’s training strategy and thesimulations used to support that strategyincluding: current doctrine, the unit’sMETL/METT-T, and results of trainingneeds assessments.

The Army’s primary training publica-tions (FMs 25-100 and 25-101, alongwith TRADOC REG 350-70) containtraining methods that are relevant totraining in virtual, constructive, and liveenvironments. The following list of prin-ciples can assist you in developing atraining strategy incorporating simula-tions: (ST 17-12-7-3-1, p. 10)

• Make commanders the primary trainer• Train as you fight• Train to maintain• Train as combined arms and services

teams• Use performance-oriented, structured

training• Use appropriate doctrine• Train to sustain proficiency• Train using multi-echelon techniques

After the unit has determined its mis-sion from its METL, conducted a train-ing needs assessment, and determinedtraining needs, it must select a simula-tion to best fit the unit’s requirements.The manner in which simulations are in-corporated into your training program isa “green tab” issue with staff input. Gen-erally, simulation exercises should beconducted quarterly at the brigade level


Training DeviceTraining

EnvironmentTarget

Audience Purpose

Conduct of Fire Trainer(COFT)

Virtual Tank Cdr/Gunner Team

Train/sustain precision/degraded gunnery skills.

Platoon Gunnery Trainer(PGT) (M1A1) & AdvancedGunnery Training System(AGTS) M1A2

Virtual Tank Cdr/Gunnery Team/Plt Leader

Train/sustain platoon ofTC/gunner teams on firecoordination, distribution,platoon coordination &precision/degraded gunnery.

Tank Weapons GunnerySimulation System/PrecisionGunnery System (TWGSS/PGS)

Live TC/Gunner Train/sustainprecision/degraded gunneryskills.

Tank Driver Trainer (TDT)

Janus

Virtual

Constructive

Driver

Plt & Co Cdrs/Bn & BdeStaffs

Train/sustain M1-series driver

Trains command andcontrol, synchronization, anddecision-making processes.

Brigade/Battalion Simulation(BBS)

Constructive Bde/Bn Cdrs& Staffs

Trains commanders andstaffs in decision-makingprocesses.

Simulation Networking (SIM-NET)/Close Combat TacticalTrainer (CCTT)

Virtual Platoon thruBattalion

Trains/sustains collectivetasks from crew thrubattalion level.

Figure 1: Selecting the Appropriate Simulation (Quick Reference)

and below. However, the number, type,and frequency of occurrence depends onthe METT-T factors (based on personnelturbulence and skill fade) at each loca-tion. Additionally, the commander is re-sponsible for determining the proficiencyof the unit in each task on the METL.He has the responsibility of conductingtraining IAW ARTEP and MTP stand-ards by which performance is uniformlymeasured. Simulations cannot give youan objective assessment of the unit’s pro-ficiency in METL tasks.

When selecting simulations, choose theone that provides the most benefit inachieving and maintaining task perform-ance. Therefore, do not select a simula-tion if a more appropriate trainingmethod is available. The key to choosingthe proper simulation is understandingthat simulations do not equal live train-ing, nor do they train every task well inevery situation. Simulations are trainingaids that allow the training unit to prac-tice skills and tasks in a scenario specifi-cally designed to present and observethose tasks. Placing the simulation train-ing experience into the overall develop-ment of the unit provides invaluable as-sistance. The Combined Arms TrainingStrategy (CATS) developed at Ft. Knoxis designed to help manage training re-sources in an integrated manner and toassist units in determining the proper“mix” of simulations in training. CATSestablishes a definitive relationship be-tween the mix of field and “simulationtool box training” by showing the train-ing events to be conducted, a more de-tailed description of the available simu-lations and training devices, and the re-sources needed to conduct those trainingevents. The following portion of this ar-ticle explains in more detail the differentaspects of the “simulation tool box” —constructive, virtual and live.

Constructive Simulations

In the majority of cases, these simula-tions are exercise drivers for CP-typetraining exercises where the commanderand staff are in field CPs. The adjacent,higher, and lower units are “played” incomputer workstations transparent to theprimary training audience. Communica-tion between the commander and work-station units is with organic communica-tions (some locations have internal TOCfacilities where communications are rep-licated by CB radios).

An example of a constructive simula-tion where the training audience doesnot personally or physically interact withthe simulation is the BBS (Brigade andBattalion Simulation). BBS is designedas a low-cost training simulation. BBS

provides maneuver brigade and battalioncommanders and their battle staffs theopportunity to practice decision-makingskills. BBS focuses on the execution ofArmy doctrine in a realistic, multi-threat,time-stressed combat environment. Thecommanders, with their battle staffs,must be able to develop, correlate, andassess large quantities of tactical and lo-gistical data. They must formulate situ-ational estimates, and make immediatedecisions in the C2 and synchronizationof combat, CS, CSS, and aviation assets.BBS supports training of combat maneu-ver commanders and the staffs at brigadeand battalion levels (BBS focuses heav-ily on combat support and combat serv-ice support). Company commanders, CS,and CSS units (role players) also receivevaluable secondary training as part ofany BBS-driven CPX. Normal trainingtime for workstation interactors and war-fighters is 6-8 hours. BBS is a person-nel-intensive simulation; for example, abattalion-level exercise requires approxi-mately 21 personnel (minus the staff sec-tions that would be located in the TOCand CTCP) to serve as the maneuverelements and role players. A companyexercise would take approximately 10personnel (minus site staff).

Although primary training audiencesdo not come in direct physical contactwith most constructive simulations, someof these simulations require direct inter-action with the training unit. This is thecase with the Janus simulation. Janus isan interactive, event-driven wargamingsimulation used to train platoon leadersthrough brigade-level commanders andtheir staffs. Training specifically focuseson the application of tactical doctrineand combat techniques. Janus focusesprimarily on ground combat operationsand the synchronization of direct and in-direct fires. Players must consider all as-pects of employing their forces, just asthey would in combat. Janus accuratelymodels both friendly and enemy weap-ons systems with resolution down to theindividual platform (e.g., T-80, M2, orindividual soldier weapons).

These systems have distinctive proper-ties, such as dimension, weight, carryingcapacity, weapons, and weapons capa-bilities; all of which can be affected byterrain and weather. Recent enhance-ments include, as one example, the abil-ity to conduct military operations in ur-ban terrain (MOUT) and improved dis-mounted infantry functionality, as wellas multi-sided, coalition-type operations,including non-combatants.

At the battalion and brigade level,Janus serves as an excellent trainingsimulation requiring detailed com-

mander-S2/S3 interaction as they de-velop and execute the ground tacticalplan. Commanders must apply soundwarfighting principles and achieve fullsynchronization of the BOS to fight asuccessful Janus battle. Normal trainingtime for workstation interactors and war-fighters is 8-12 hours. Janus is a lesspersonnel-intensive exercise than BBS.Approximately 12 personnel (minus thestaff) are needed to conduct a battalionexercise. A company requires approxi-mately 6 personnel.

Outcomes from constructive simula-tions are based on models of attritionand algorithms within the simulation.Most constructive simulations require in-teractive free-play from the workstationrole-players in both friendly and oppos-ing forces. Janus is used effectively totrain ground combat operations and thesynchronization of direct and indirectfires, while BBS is effectively used totrain battalion staff and higher levelstaffs while focusing on combat supportand combat service support tasks. Re-gardless of which specific constructivesimulation is used, all are efficient intraining leaders and staffs from platoonthrough brigade.

Virtual Simulations

As previously stated, virtual simula-tions normally require the trainee(s) tobe immersed in the simulated battlefield.The soldier, leader, staff, or unit then in-puts the applicable information into thecontrols of the simulator. Visual, sound,and motion playback cause the trainee tocontinue interacting with the simulatorthrough a prescribed number of tasks.

Virtual simulations are referred to assimulators because they are either a sin-gle part (SIMNET) or complete replicas(CCTT) of individual or crew-servedweapon systems and/or vehicles. SIM-NET exploits the ability of computertechnology to transfer data streamsacross networks containing large num-bers of simulators with real-time updateof simulators in the network. SIMNETtrains combat units at the crew throughbattalion echelons. Existing simulatorsare in the form of M1 tanks and infantryfighting vehicles. Emulations of fieldand air defense artillery, engineer, dis-mounted infantry, and combat servicesupport also exist through the use ofAutomated and Semi Automated Forces(SAF). The planned follow-on system isthe CCTT. The CCTT projected fieldingdate is FY98.

Virtual simulations are designed to pro-vide primary training to individuals andcrews in collective training. Major func-


tions of the CCTT include: improved ve-hicle and graphic fidelity, out-of-the-hatch view capability, and increasedweather functions. Scenarios suited forsimulation (constructive and virtual)have been developed to provide a“nested” environment that facilitatesconcurrent, multi-echelon training forunits in both the constructive and virtualenvironment. This program is currentlybeing executed at Ft. Knox, Kentucky,and is referred to as the Virtual TrainingProgram (VTP).

The VTP is a structured training pro-gram designed to specifically improvethe readiness of mechanized brigadesthrough the use of virtual and construc-tive simulations. They are used in con-junction with structured training supportpackages to provide the ability to trainspecified tasks in a “matrix type” format.These structured training support pack-ages include pre-developed operationsorders, graphics, and tables that exposethe training unit to a specified set oftasks, conditions, and standards devel-oped from Army mission training plans.This format allows units to progressfrom simple to complex tasks. The hard-ware and software used by the VTP,along with a professional observer/con-troller team (battalion and brigade level)provides a state-of-the-art after-action re-view during their training rotation. TheOCWS (Observer Controller Work Sta-tion) used in virtual simulation includesplayback of the battle (two-and three-di-mensional view), complete with audiocuts of communication, at any speed,any time desired, and from a 360-degreepoint of view. The constructive simula-tion center provides a Janus ArmyAnalysis Workstation (JAAWS) play-back of the battle exactly as it was exe-cuted, complete with charts and graphswith supporting statistical information.In addition, a comprehensive take-homepacket is mailed to the training unit toprovide assistance in developing homestation training programs.

Live Simulations: “The PreferredMethod of Training”

As training dollars are reduced and livetraining opportunities are being limited,the use of simulations as a part of a unittraining program is critical to unit readi-ness. If used properly, simulations cansharpen those “transferable skills” neces-sary for successful execution and reducethe actual training time needed to con-duct a validation of a unit’s METL-based Training Plan.

The most notable formal training in theArmy utilizing live simulations are the

Combat Training Centers — The Na-tional Training Center (NTC), the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC), andthe Combat Maneuver Training Center(CMTC). In each of these CTCs, troopsconduct tactical operations as units andutilize various simulations and simula-tion devices in the course of training.

Some of the simulation devices usedare MILES and SAWE-RF, which repli-cate weapons systems interaction anddamage resulting when these simulatorsare employed. In live simulations at thecombat training centers, much of the bat-tlefield is instrumented. The instrumenta-tion devices provide the opportunity forunits to train in a force-on-force environ-ment. By using electronic instrumenta-tion devices on tactical vehicles, thetraining, analysis, and feedback centercollects data for the creation, execution,and support of the after-action reviewprocess. Since live simulations are asso-ciated with force-on-force training exer-cises, the emphasis on training is on in-dividual and collective training. Residualand secondary learning occurs for theleaders, as well as enhancing the unit’sC2 processes, an area that can be trainedheavily in all types of virtual and con-structive simulations.

Simulations provide a combat rehearsalsystem for AC/RC units to plan and trainfor contingency missions using simula-tions for operations at battalion throughechelons above corps, including jointand allies.

Using simulations, we can go from “Ihear and I forget, I see and I remember, Ido and I learn” (Confucius, 500 B.C) to“I see, I do, and I learn” (Director,NASA Ames Laboratories).

Warfighting today is dynamic, multi-di-mensional, multifaceted, and constantlyevolving — it’s akin to managing chaos.Diplomacy, cultural/ethnic/religious con-notations, environmental impacts, just toname a few, preclude treating any con-tingency as business as usual, or gaininga situation snapshot. Timelines for mis-sion rehearsal have shortened. Shortenedtimelines make C2 and information sys-tems integration and fusion critical. Incurrent and future training, our goalsshould be geared toward harnessing andexploiting that information through train-ing with simulations. Future training insimulation will move toward exercisesroutinely combining virtual, constructive,and live simulations with instrumenta-tion. When these three tools are linked inthe same exercise, commanders couldtrain (constructive) with crews (virtual),operating on the “terrain” of the com-mander’s situation map, while individu-

als and crews (live) actually conductforce-on-force operations on the terrainrepresented on the commander’s map.Combining constructive, virtual, and livesimulations could have a number oftraining advantages as they, in combina-tion, create a synthetic, seamless envi-ronment of warfare.

While we are now armed with a betterunderstanding of the powerful possibili-ties of training with simulations and theircapabilities, several questions still re-main. How are we going to be able toprepare our soldiers, leaders, staffs, andunits for contingencies in areas we havenever been before to execute missionsacross the operational continuum? Givena generic METL and no METT-T untilthe mission order is issued, how do lead-ers and staffs select courses of action,validate their operational METL withMETT-T defined? Given the ability torapidly produce digital terrain databases,the answer will certainly include simula-tion as a way to preview the terrain andinfrastructure in developing variouscourses of action, which can be evalu-ated, stored, and repeated prior to selec-tion and execution in response to thecontingency.

Given the short amount of time avail-able to train, selecting the appropriatecourse-of-action, force structure, andtimeline is critical to battle-focusing theunit’s training prior to deployment.Given the appropriate fidelity, a terraindatabase could provide sufficient re-hearsal opportunities for a unit. There-fore, when the unit is deployed, they ar-rive with the feeling that they have beenthere before — an excellent moralebuilder where the commander’s intent isunderstood and the boldness of warfight-ing can be confidently executed withprecision. A deliberate end-state could bedefined and visualized from the assem-bly area to the objective, with a sharedview of the end-state desired prior toexecution: a way to see the “setting ofconditions for battle” and adjusting thoseconditions to maximize a unit’s lethality.

All of these aspects should be consid-ered as we continue to develop trainingsimulations and include those simula-tions in our training programs. Under-standing the capabilities and limitationsof the simulations and training resourcesavailable will help the unit to choose thecorrect simulation to maximize training.Simulation training devices are an excel-lent sustainment and integration toolwith enhanced capabilities designed tosharpen unit skills and make the maxi-mum benefit of the unit’s live trainingprogram. “These are hard times in whicha genius would wish to live. Great ne-


cessities call forth great leader-ship”...(Leaders)

References

Griffith, Samuel B., trans., The Art of War bySun Tzu. Oxford University Press, 1963.

Bennis, Warren and Bert Nanus, Leaders: TheStrategy of Taking Charge. Harper and RowPublishers, New York, 1985.

To find more information about the CATS Strat-egy (produced by the Training DevelopmentDivision, Directorate of Training and DoctrineDevelopment, Ft. Knox, Ky.), call Mr. MikeKelley @ DSN 464-2505 or commercial at502-624-2505.

ST 17-12-7-3-1, The Battalion Commander’sTraining Handbook; May 97, (produced by theTraining Development Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine Development, Ft. Knox,Ky.) - call Mr. Mike Kelley @ DSN 464-2505or commercial at 502-624-2505.

MAJ Mark A. Eastman is currently as-signed as the S3, 1st Squadron, 16thCavalry. He was previously assigned asthe Chief of Mounted Warfare simulations(SIMNET/CCTT/JANUS/BBS), Observer/Controller Team (Warthogs), 16th Cav-alry, Ft. Knox, Ky. He is a 1986 Distin-guished Military Graduate of the Univer-sity of Louisville. He received a Master’sDegree from Chapman University, Or-ange, California in 1992 and is a gradu-ate of the Command and General StaffCollege. He served as a tank platoonleader, executive officer, and scout pla-toon leader for 2-72 Armor, Camp Casey,Korea; as an observer/controller for theArmor Task Force Training Team (Co-bras), Operations Group, National Train-ing Center; and as the Alpha and HHCcommander and S3 Air, for the 4th Bat-talion, 37th Armor, 1st Infantry Division(Mechanized), Ft. Riley, Kansas.

Mr. George A. Helton, Jr. is currently as-signed as the assistant Chief of MountedWarfare simulations (SIMNET/CCTT/JANUS/BBS), Observer/Controller Team(Warthogs), 16th Cavalry, Ft. Knox, Ky.He is a 1979 graduate of the Universityof Kentucky and received a Master’s De-gree from Western Kentucky Universityin 1985 and is a 1993 graduate of theUnited States Army Management andStaff College. He served as an educationspecialist in the analysis division in theDirectorate of Training and Doctrine from1985-1991, Chief of the Analysis Divisionfrom 1991-1992, and as the senior train-ing developer for 5-16th Cavalry andProject Sword from 1992-1993.


amphibious, so the need for bridging isgreatly reduced for the squadron. I’d use tur-reted, breech-loaded 120mm mortars for allsquadron indirect fire support, an LAV variantwith the 75mm ARES dual-feed automaticcannon in the cavalry platoons, and the Pira-nha variant with the 105mm cannon for armorplatoons. The LAV-AD provides mobile air de-fense cover for the airborne force.

The squadron could be structured like astandard armored cavalry squadron or basedon a concept of individual platoons under asingle headquarters being parceled out asneeded, with the mortar, engineer, ADA, andvarious support platoons remaining under thesingle headquarters. The cost of the wheeledvehicles is far less than tracked vehicles inboth initial and life cycle, and the weight fac-tor makes it very attractive for airborne opera-tions. Appliqué armor can be added ifneeded, either before the operation or onceon the ground.

I have long advocated the use of wheeledvehicles for light armor, and have long beenworried about the lack of amphibious capabil-ity at most levels of the Army. Adopting thisconcept might solve two problems that the82d faces, and give the Army some food forthought at the same time.

LARRY A. ALTERSITZLTC, FA, USAR

Westville, N.J.

(For a similar view, see “Global Cavalry,” inthis issue. - Ed.)

Using What We HaveUntil New Developments Mature

Dear Sir:

LTG D.S. Pihl’s comments in the Nov-Dec’97 issue about my article, “The M1A2Abrams: The Last Main Battle Tank?” (Jul-Aug ’97), are puzzling, to say the least.

He says, “...the analogy is not there, i.e.,ships to tanks.” This is an amazing statement,considering the facts. Both the battleship andthe main battle tank are heavily-armored,gun-armed, combat vehicles designed primar-ily to do battle with others of their own kind.

The terminology is the same, i.e., both shipsand tanks have hulls, decks, turrets, spon-sons, etc. Even our basic tank formationswere copied directly from naval warfare.

Second, General Pihl points out that “...youneed a mix of both chemical energy and ki-netic energy warheads...” Although it is farfrom certain that this present truism will stillbe valid in 2020, at no point in my article did Iadvocate one type of warhead over the other.While current self-guided missiles, e.g., Jave-lin, Longbow Hellfire) do have CE warheads,LOSAT shows that KE missiles are well withinthe realm of possibility.

Third, although the XM291 would indeeddeliver performance superior to the currentmain gun, it is another example of squander-ing precious resources on incremental, evolu-tionary development, when we should beworking on leap-ahead, revolutionary con-cepts. However good it might be, the XM291cannot overcome the limitations that are in-herent to gun armament.

EM or ET guns — provided they ever makethe transition from the laboratory to the field— will certainly be worthy candidates for FCSarmament, but note that even the WesternDesign FCS concept in the Jul-Aug ’97 issueincorporated self-guided missiles along withthe EM cannon!

Also in the Nov-Dec ’97 issue was a letterfrom James Agenbroad, pointing out that therecoilless rifle gunner on an M113 (see “TooLate the XM8,” ARMOR, Jan-Feb ’97) wouldbe exposed to enemy small arms fire. This istrue of the Australian APC shown in my arti-cle, but it would be an easy matter to installan ACAV-type armor shield to give the gunnersome protection (see p. 7 of the Jan-Feb ’95ARMOR for a photo of an M113 with a recoil-less rifle/gun shield installation as used incombat in Vietnam). It’s admittedly far from aperfect solution to the problem, but it is thebest of what can be had from hardware that’salready owned by the Army.

As for the M901 ITV, it is not capable ofairdrop. However...the ITV does have very in-teresting potential to be an airborne combatvehicle. Remove the awkward and ungainly“hammerhead” launcher, and attach a low-profile, four-tube launch assembly to the M27cupola in the manner of the French AMX-10PHOT antitank vehicle. Armed with a mission-

LETTERS (Continued from Page 4)

Program Coraza - 2000 has just startedits life, but a full potential for develop-ment lies ahead. The commitment isthere, and the challenge, too, which isnothing less and nothing more than thefull modernization of Spanish Armor upto the same levels as other Allied part-ners in the task of collective defense andsecurity. Program Coraza - 2000 is fullof possibilities with a big potential fordevelopment, and most likely will re-main in operation to deal with whatevernew armor projects the Spanish Armyundertakes.

Lieutenant Colonel Antonio J. Candilgraduated from the Spanish MilitaryAcademy in 1972 and was commis-sioned in Armor. He has served as atank platoon commander in the SpanishWestern Sahara in 1973-76, and is expe-rienced as an XO and company com-mander. A graduate of the Armor OfficerAdvanced Course at Fort Knox, he isalso a graduate of the Spanish ArmyCommand and Staff School, and the Ital-ian Army’s War College. He has beenassigned to several posts abroad, in Bel-gium, Italy, the UK, and Germany, and isnow director of Program Leopard withinthe Spanish Army Logistics Command.

Spanish Armor from Page 42

specific mix of Javelin, FOTT, and MPIM/SRAW missiles, such a modified ITV couldgive parachute-deliverable fire support in awide range of scenarios, without resorting to“obsolete” weapon systems like the 106mmrecoilless rifle. As an added benefit, the gun-ner would have complete armor protection.

There have been numerous suggestions inthese pages for XM8 alternatives, such as theLAV-105, and various light tanks. Unfortu-nately, all of these proposals would:

• Cost almost as much as the defunctXM8, and

• Require many years of test and evalu-ation before they would be acquired.

If there is enough money to buy LAV-105,Stingray, or other such vehicles, buy theXM8!

Despite its shortcomings, the M113/106mmis still the only option for a tracked, armored,air-droppable, fire support vehicle that costsalmost nothing to implement — a fact that noone has yet been able to refute — so whynot implement it?!

STANLEY C. CRISTSan Diego, Calif.

The Armor Branch Identity Crisis:Let’s Focus on What We Do Well

Dear Sir:

There has been much discussion recentlyover Armor’s relevance to the future of com-bined/joint warfare. Our branch is under at-tack, say some. We aren’t forward-thinkingenough. We aren’t capturing critical technolo-gies. The joint community and the Americanpublic no longer think that mechanized forcesare applicable to the challenges of the nextcentury. Even our own beloved Department ofthe Army has become more entranced withstand-off capability than funding a qualitylight/medium scout vehicle with adequate pro-tection.

Many believe that the solution to our branchidentity crisis is to convince the DOD hierar-chy that we can adapt to the changing situ-ation. Armor units are envisioned that are rap-idly deployable and can go anywhere. Theywill be extremely lethal, but selective in tar-geting to avoid collateral damage. We willwrap our arms around future technologiesand leverage them to our advantage, etc.,etc.

This is wishful thinking. We can’t be allthings to all people. Why are we trying tocamouflage what we are?

We, as a branch, encompass the heavyside of warfare. Mechanized units are notrapidly deployable. Armored warfare is amessy business with lots of collateral dam-age. We exist as a branch to close with anddestroy the enemy, seize key terrain, andeliminate the enemy’s will to continue resis-tance. We are about shock, rapid movement,firepower, and decisive action. We pride our-selves on our mental agility, detailed planning,

and violent execution. No one understandsthe combined arms team like we do. We arein the business of gaining intelligence throughreconnaissance, and most importantly, doingsomething with that intelligence. Let’s focuson the fundamentals.

Perhaps I’m a bit cynical, but I don’t thinkArmor’s relevance to the broad spectrum ofconflict is the issue here. Are we in revolution-ary, vice evolutionary, times? Probably. Areroles and missions on the table? Of course.Witness the continuing Air Force/Navy de-bates on air superiority programs. Each serv-ice wants a piece of the sexiest new tech-nologies and will take no prisoners in attempt-ing to leverage more budget clout with theCongress. Should the Armor community beintimately involved in future combat technol-ogy? We are the combat arm of decision anddesperately need to be at the forefront.

Unfortunately, the only way I can see Ar-mor’s relevance being fully demonstrated isthrough a conflict in which high-tech weap-onry (standoff, stealth, etc.) fails to achievethe purpose. We are a technological societythat prides itself on our gadgets. The Ameri-can public has been sold a bill of goods thatwe (the military) can achieve any ends vianon-risk (to us) weaponry. We all know that adetermined foe is ultimately persuaded byM1A1s and Bradleys parading through hiscapital. Potential adversaries receive onemessage when the 82nd Airborne alerts; theyreceive a more pointed one when M1A1s rollonto ships.

Let’s recognize our limits. Other servicesare successful on the PR front becausethey’re in bed with large defense contractorswho are located in certain states. One Sea-wolf submarine makes more waves (literally)than a whole fleet of FMTVs. As long as ourlarge end-items don’t register in the DOD top-ten of defense contracts, we’ll lack budgetarypull.

We need to capture the intermediate objec-tives first. If we need to establish Armor’srelevance to the Army or DOD, let’s focus onconsolidating mech, armor, and cav missionsunder the aegis of Armor Branch. Why shouldthe USMC even exist anymore? Particularlytheir tank battalions? Should Infantry give upthe mech mission to Armor and focus onLIC/SF/Ranger-type operations? My argu-ment is that all mounted warfare direct fireshould belong to the Armor community.

At the same time that we go after high-techweapon systems of the future, let’s focus onthe present. Let’s man our units at 90%+,even in the low-density MOSs. Let’s swallowsome appetite suppressants and reduce task-ings, even cut programs to reduce the bor-rowed military manpower drain. Let’s givemoney to training and insist that it occur. I’veseen more discussion on CFC campaignsthan troop-level training on some installations.We are mortgaging our present capability be-cause we’re chasing after the future.

We need to focus our efforts on gettingland, bullets, time, and people down to thetank company/cav troop level. No commanderI know currently commanding thinks he getsenough of any of these things. We have

made MTOE units the billpayer for other pro-grams we can no longer afford.

Our leadership at the JCS and Army Stafflevels are well aware of the usefulness of themain battle tank. I don’t think heavy warfareis dead, and I don’t believe most critical think-ers believe it, either. Fundamentally, I have totrust the senior leaders to make the correctstrategic decisions. We in the “field” arecalled to focus on our METL missions. Weensure that when they call for the main battletank, we’re ready to put depleted uraniumrounds into targets.

Until we can wrap our hands around theneed for a new generation of main battle tankto combat a real, vice imagined, threat, weshould focus on maintaining and training whatwe have. We can continue to fine-tune doc-trine; integrate more fully into “joint-ness”; putmoney into R&D so we don’t lose touch withtechnology; but we’re called upon to beready. Let’s scale back our appetite and re-gain our focus.

MAJ MARK G. EDGRENSXO, 1/2 ACR

Some Rules to Live By

Dear Sir:

While I read with great interest COL (Ret.)Paul Baerman’s “Three Things I Learned inthe Army,” I wanted to share my guiding 20principles that served me well during almost30 years of service, much of it in Armor.

• Take care of soldiers and they will takecare of you.

• Never stop learning.• Let sergeants do sergeant’s business.• When in charge, take charge.• If in doubt, don’t.• Bad news doesn’t improve with age.• Don’t ask others to do what you won’t do.• Don’t stifle initiative, reward it.• It is more important to listen than to

speak.• Think execution, not results.• Army is for 30, family is forever.• Never sacrifice your integrity.• Lead from the front.• Be accessible.• Maintain to train.• Share your good ideas, accept those of

others.• Everyone can make a mistake, but not

the same mistake twice.• Manage your own time; if not, someone

else will manage it for you.• It is sometimes easier to apologize after

the fact, than to ask for permission first.• When it stops being fun, it is time to do

something else.

ULRICH H. KELLERCOL, Armor (USA, Ret.)


Red 1, Red 3, I’ve got two stationarytanks left of TRP 2, over.

Roger 3, I can’t identify them, can yousend me a grid?

This is 3, working on it — I’m takingnear misses! — How ‘bout a little help?

3, I can’t help you if I can’t find thetargets — send me a grid!

Red 1, this is Red 4 — 3 is down — didanyone see who shot him?

Negative, we lost ‘em.

Anyone who has commanded a tank orBradley has undoubtedly encountered asituation similar to the one describedabove. It is an unfortunate reality ofcombat that the element with the mostcritical information is often too focusedon his own individual crisis to relay in-formation to the rest of his element. Dur-ing those critical seconds, the tank com-mander is trying to maneuver his tank,issue a fire command, and fumble withhis map to send an accurate spot report.Naturally, his tendency toward self-pres-ervation will take priority. For this rea-son, the tank or section in contact willfight for its life while the remainder ofthe element waits helplessly for informa-tion.

The problem is often more frustratingfor the gunner — who is, in most cases,the first to identify a target. He can seethe enemy clearly, but he has no ideawhere his tank is located or in what car-dinal direction his gun tube is pointing.In the past, the tank commander woulddrop down to the gunner’s primary sightextension (GPSE), identify the target,and try to estimate its location. However,with the new CITV, the TC’s role hasexpanded from merely confirming tar-gets to seeking out new ones. If, instead,the gunner had an accurate means tocommunicate in which direction he waslooking, he or his TC could send that in-formation over the platoon net andquickly bring the firepower of his wholeplatoon to bear.

History has shown, over and overagain, that the success of an entire mis-sion is often decided in these first fewminutes after the initial contact. This

success is contingent upon how quicklythe unit as a whole can react and deployagainst the threat. The key is informationflow, as General S. L. A. Marshall knewwhen he wrote in Men Against Fire,“strength will multiply and decisive ac-tion will become possible at the rate atwhich information flows to all con-cerned.” (p. 128)

The designers of the new IVIS systemhave appropriately identified this andmade dramatic improvements in the situ-ational awareness of all elements on thebattlefield. As one tank identifies a tar-get, an electronic spot report immedi-ately flows to all others on the networkand an enemy icon appears on the mapdisplay. This system will revolutionizeour ability to react to contact.

However, it does not go far enough. Inorder to bring effective fire upon thaticon on his screen, the tank commanderstill needs to translate what he sees intoinformation his gunner can use. He doesthis in the same way TC’s have sinceWorld War II — by yelling “traverseleft” or “traverse right” until the gunneridentifies the target — a very imprecisemethod, especially when dealing with

long range targets that easily blend withtheir background.

In the fight, a tanker — and particu-larly a gunner — thinks in terms of polarcoordinates (direction and distance)rather than Cartesian coordinates of lati-tude and longitude. Communication be-tween a gunner and tank commanderwill always be in relation to directionand distance. For this reason, both gun-ner and tank commander should have thetarget information available to them inthis format. Specifically, both gunnerand TC should have a readout of the gridazimuth of the gun tube in their respec-tive reticles. This is the information mostuseful to them, and the technology theyoperate should support that need.

The far-target designate system on theM1A2 uses a north-seeking gyroscope tocompute the direction to enemy targetsas it determines their location. The tech-nology, therefore, is already on the tank— all that is needed is a simple modifi-cation to provide that information to theTC and gunner.

Instead of slowly talking the gunneronto the target while constantly referringback to his IVIS terminal, the tank com-

An Azimuth Indicator for Tank Gunners? by First Lieutenant Curtis Taylor


mander could immediately relay the di-rection to the gunner with great preci-sion. He can then return to scanning theterrain from the hatch, or from his CITV,without concern that the gunner is look-ing in the wrong direction. Future gun-nery training could incorporate this prac-tice into the standard fire command forIVIS-initiated engagements. “Gunnersabot tank 2100 mils.” This will, obvi-ously, not replace the need for constantscanning of the terrain or good target ac-quisition training. However, the emer-gence of sophisticated surveillanceequipment, from satellites to UAVs, hasincreased the likelihood that an ap-proaching enemy will appear on a tankcommander’s computer terminal longbefore it comes within visual range. Agunner could then point his reticle in thedirection of his designated target andwait for the target to appear.

Not only would the azimuth displaygreatly enhance the precision of spot re-ports, but it would also create an entirelynew method for a platoon leader to con-trol and distribute the fires of his pla-toon. The platoon leader could quicklydivide approaching IVIS targets by issu-ing approximate mil directions for eachof his tanks (provided to him by his ter-minal). Each gunner then reports whenhe can identify his target and the precisemil direction. At the appropriate time,the platoon leader issues a fire commanddestroying four distinct targets. Immedi-ately after the engagement, each tank re-turns to its designated sector of fire(marked by two mil directions). There isonly minimal risk of “double-pumping”a single target because the platoon leadershould be able to identify when twotanks are aiming at the same target.

Observer controllers at the NTC fre-quently criticize tank platoons for failingto establish and adhere to individual sec-tors of fire — particularly in the offense.Furthermore, these sectors are rarelyproperly adjusted as the tactical situationdevelops. The result is wide gaps in ob-servation and an immediate focus on thefirst target that presents itself.

With an azimuth display, a platoonleader can establish sectors of fire basedon azimuths rather than terrain features,which are often difficult to describe overthe radio and tough to identify at night.If a gunner knows his sector is from2400 to 3000 and he hears a report oftanks at 2150, he knows to remain in hissector unless given instructions other-wise.

In the defense, a tank platoon leaderwith a map and a protractor can also plothis platoon sector sketch with unprece-

dented accuracy to ensure he has nogaps in his security plan. He can identifylikely avenues of approach by their nu-meric azimuth, making them much eas-ier for gunners to identify at night. Hecan also identify areas where friendlyforces are operating and require confir-mation to fire into these areas. For ex-ample, “Second Platoon is on our rightflank — all fires to the right of 50 milsmust be confirmed by Black 6.”

This system will also affect the com-munication between tanks in a platoon.A gunner could instantly react to a reporton the platoon net of enemy tanks at1400 mils without the need for transla-tion from his TC. The same scenario de-scribed earlier might sound somethinglike this:

Red 1, Red 3, I’ve got two stationarytanks at 850, over.

Roger 3 — I’ve got ‘em. Red 4, youmonitor?

This is 4 — Roger — I’m on ‘em.

Okay, Bravo section, 2 rounds sabot, atmy command, stand-by.

Alpha section continue to scan 1200 to1800.

An azimuth indicator will also have atremendous impact on the M1A2’s effec-tiveness against aircraft. The new rapidpulse range finder on the M1A2 has, forthe first time in history, made the maingun of a tank a legitimate threat to lowflying aircraft. The sophisticated firecontrol system, however, does not elimi-nate the human aspect of the problem.The gunner, with an extremely limitedfield of view, has only a split second toacquire his target before it has passedhim by. Anyone who has tried to acquirelow flying OPFOR A-10s at the NTCcan relate to this problem. A spot reportof “Incoming Bandits, East” still doesn’tprovide the precision the gunner needsto ensure he is pointed in the right direc-tion when an aircraft emerges over thehorizon. Imagine if a tank commander,viewing his IVIS display, receives a re-port of an incoming aircraft at 1500 milsand 5 kilometers. He immediately passesthe azimuth to his gunner who focuseson the horizon in that direction. Once theaircraft comes into visual range, the gun-ner can immediately begin tracking him,and, once within range, open fire. If thisscenario were repeated in every tank in aplatoon, an enemy aircraft would en-counter a deadly and somewhat accuratehail of main gun rounds before he hadthe chance to make even a single pass.

In May of 1940, the German Army ef-fectively annihilated the most powerful

armored force the world had ever knownin the span of four weeks. Although nu-merous causes are attributed to this suc-cess, one of the most significant was thepresence of a radio in every tank. Fewanticipated the incredible synergistic ef-fects that were realized when a armoredforce could communicate effectively andquickly relay critical information toevery combat element. As a result, theGermans, despite their inferior fire-

power, could develop the battle quickerand retain the initiative.

Half a century later, that principleholds true. Battles are ultimately won orlost at the point of initial contact. Anarmy that can react faster at that momentand deploy its forces will gain the initia-tive despite inferior numbers or equip-ment. The timely flow of information isfundamental to this process. But that in-formation is only valuable if it hasmeaning to the actual combatant — theman who pulls the trigger. In armoredwarfare, that man is the gunner. The bat-tle then hinges on passing information tothis one man that he can readily translateinto steel on target. Since gunners seethe world in terms of direction and dis-tance, information flowing to themshould be in this format. Therefore, weneed a simple way for the gunner to re-ceive and send information about what isin his reticle. An azimuth indicator in thegunner’s sight picture will accomplishthis feat. It is a fairly simple mechanism,utilizing existing technology on theM1A2, that will revolutionize the waytankers communicate within a crew andwithin a platoon. Most importantly, itwill allow a tank platoon to apply its fullfirepower instantly and accurately uponan enemy threat.

1LT Curtis Taylor is a graduate ofUSMA and the Armored Officer BasicCourse. He has served as a tank platoonleader and support platoon leader and iscurrently the battalion maintenance offi-cer of 1-12 Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas.


“Both gunner and TCshould have a readout of thegrid azimuth of the gun tubein their respective reticles.This is the information mostuseful to them, and the tech-nology they operate shouldsupport that need.”

SIMNET on a Budget?iM1A2 Abrams by Interactive Magic,$49.95. Requires Pentium PC with Win-dows 95, 2X CD-ROM, SVGA video cardand 16MB RAM.

iM1A2 Abrams is currently the only realisticfirst-person tank simulation on the market. Theheir to Microprose’s 1990 hit, M1 Tank Pla-toon, iM1A2 builds on its predecessor’s addic-tive game play and adequate realism. Playingas either a platoon leader or company com-mander, you must battle your forces throughthree modern day campaigns in Bosnia,Ukraine, and the Middle East.

Game play is the strongest point of iM1A2.You are able to play from any position in yourplatoon. As the TC, button up and use theIVIS to control your platoon and maintain situ-ational awareness. Unbutton and destroy lightvehicles with your .50 caliber. Drop down tothe gunner’s chair, select your ammo, and en-gage targets with Sabot, HEAT, MPAT, andSTAFF. Or move up to the appliqué computermap and command the battle from a highertactical level.

Movements to contact, retrograde actions,and hasty attacks are but a few of the missiontypes available. Playing as a task force com-mander, you control other combat assets,such as M2 and M3 Bradleys, Apache andKiowa helicopters, and scout/TOW HMMWVsto complete your mission. Using each unit’sstrengths results in a successful battle; misus-ing assets results in quick defeat.

Fire support is one of the most enjoyable as-pects of iM1A2. The commander has 105mm,155mm, and MLRS support available duringthe game, depending on priority of fire and themission. Watching MLRS land on a threat for-mation is an experience that has to be seen.A-10 strikes can devastate enemy formations;just make sure you destroy any SAM assetsbefore you call them in!

The sounds and explosions are well done,from the “ON THE WAAAY!” of the gunner tothe recoil sound of the main gun. Destructionof enemy tanks and vehicles is fun to watch.Destroyed targets burn long after destruction,cluttering the search for new targets in yourthermals. When a sabot hits a tank, the turretis apt to spin and fly into the air. Secondaryexplosions occur throughout the game as am-munition cooks off.

The artificial intelligence handles the threatwell. Once I was engaged in a deliberate de-fense and had a large enemy formation in myengagement area, so I jumped down to thegunner’s chair for some COFT-like fun. As Iplayed gunner and focused on the EA, athreat platoon managed to flank my defenseand rout my BP. I learned a valuable lessonabout tunnel vision in battle, and kept a watch-ful eye on the AI from then on to do the unex-pected.

All major former Soviet Union equipment isavailable as threats, even including some thatare just appearing now. The T-94 with its140mm gun is quite a surprise, and will pene-trate the frontal armor of your M1 under1500m. However, you mostly will face T-72s

and T-80s, along with BMP-1 and 2s, alongwith the occasional BMP-3, which is a foe tobe reckoned with. The Hind and Havoc heli-copters are potentially the most dangerousthreat asset; a wise commander saves hisMPATs to deal with them.

The modeling accuracy of iM1A2 is surpris-ing. Tanks respond to damage realistically,with mobility kills and systems breaking.Rounds damage realistically; long range fron-tal hits bounce off M1s; BMPs can be killed by.50 cal. at close range. Your HEAT and SA-BOT rounds may hit the enemy without caus-ing any damage. The T-80 and T-90 tankswith reactive armor prove difficult to kill at longranges. The M1A2 also is vulnerable from thesides and rear. The “invulnerable” myth is putto rest in this game.

iM1A2 has its drawbacks. The terrain isbland and featureless, without any trees andonly the occasional house dotting the land-scape. It is very difficult to assume a properplatoon BP without maneuvering each vehicleindividually into hull and turret down positions.Even SIMNET type trees would enhance thegame tremendously.

The game also does not permit you to mod-ify the initial setup of your forces, forcing youto hastily redirect units at the beginning ofeach battle. Platoon-level formations are accu-rate, but assuming a company or task forcewedge/column is nearly impossible. The abilityto create custom scenarios would also benice.

iM1A2 Abrams also gives the player an ap-preciation of the advantages the M1A2 offersover the M1A1. The CITV and IVIS allow theTC to have a much better situational picturethan was previously possible. The STAFF andMPAT rounds prove to be very effective. TheSTAFF is particularly effective at obtaining killson T-80s at over 2000m due to its top attackability.

The learning curve of iM1A2 is steep, buttankers will quickly identify familiar equipmentand understand its use better than civilianswho would buy this game. Once mastered, thegame becomes much more enjoyable to play,and demonstrates the true power of combinedarms on the battlefield.

The game also includes a multi-player capa-bility that allows players to play head-to-head,or cooperatively over a network or the Internet.The training potential of this game for TCscannot be ignored, as it provides a reasonablyrealistic M1A2 model and accurate gunnery.iM1A2 is almost as realistic as SIMNET andCOFT, and more realistic in some ways. At aprice of less than $50 a copy, it is also acheaper alternative, requiring only MultimediaPentium computers to play.

Two more tank simulations are due later thisyear, one reportedly with assistance from thedesigners of SIMNET. For those looking forsome realistic tank combat, iM1A2 is thegame for you.

2LT Niel Smith was commissioned throughROTC at James Madison University in 1997.

He is currently assigned as a scout platoonleader in Alpha Troop, 3-4 Cavalry, SchofieldBarracks, Hawaii. He welcomes all commentsat [email protected].

East Front by Talonsoft, A WWII Strat-egy Game. $54.95.

June 23, 1941- The Fuhrer’s glorious plan isworking perfectly. We have surprised the Rus-sians by crossing the river near Hisakliv beforethey could respond in force. Now you mustcontinue our success by taking your battalionand breaking out of the bridgehead.

This is just a sample of one of the manyscenarios you may face as a participant in Op-eration Barbarossa. You assume the identity ofeither a German invader or a Russian de-fender trying desperately to protect the Moth-erland. Thanks to Talonsoft, you can now re-live history. Take part in one of the greatestcampaigns of WWII in their newest strategygame, East Front.

Yes, another strategy game has hit the mar-ket. Another game to make your eyes glazeover has been added to the multitude of strat-egy games already on the shelf. Let this re-view help you decide as you move up anddown the aisle looking for something new andchallenging.

It does not take long to figure out the me-chanics of this game. The player’s guidestates, “East Front is easy to learn but a diffi-cult one to master.” The guide is very helpfuland within a short period of time you will beable to move units, shoot artillery, and call inair strikes. If you have not played a strategygame before, this is a good one to start with.

As in real battle, the ability to see the battle-field in a strategy game is vital. East Front of-fers six different views to help you see the en-tire field of battle. Use the Jump Map to get afeel for the overall battlefield. Switch to 2DNormal View to see the terrain in better detailand the units as either graphical icons or mili-tary symbols. For even more resolution, useone of the 3D views that allows you to see theunits as miniatures with individual fighting po-sitions. You will also see the bullets fly andimpact their targets in this view.

The best feature that this game has is that itremains challenging. You do not becomebored quickly. You won’t want to file this gameaway with the other computer games that youquickly mastered and set aside. You must de-cide what level of command you are going toplay. The game allows you to maneuver andposition platoons, but you can command frombattalion to corps level as either a German ora Russian. You decide whether you want toplay a Campaign, a Scenario, or generate aBattle.

East Front is designed for play in the cam-paign format. Playing in this mode enablesyou to choose a commander and fight a seriesof different battles as you progress through thecampaign. Your commander earns decorationsand promotions based on his tactical savvyand success in battle.


Playing a scenario enables you to fight apre-designed, historically consistent battle.Here’s your chance to make history repeat it-self or change the outcome of specific battlesalong the Eastern Front. The scenarios arenumerous and will take even the most avidplayer quite a long time to complete.

Generating a battle allows you to pick thebasic features of some specific scenarios. Thisis a good place to practice certain missionsbefore you embark into playing a scenario orcampaign. Choose the year, month, area, ter-rain, weather, and the size and type of unit.Fight a meeting engagement in the dead ofwinter on the open plains or conduct a rivercrossing in a heavily forested area. Thechoices are almost unlimited.

The designers also included some game op-tions that enable you to make the game aseasy or as challenging as you want. You canfight the computer at levels ranging from easyto impossible. Furthermore, there is the abilityto increase the uncertainty of the battlefield byincreasing the level of the “Fog of War.”

Not challenging enough? Then design yourown scenario. You have the ability to designthe terrain and map that you want to fight on.Make each hex exactly the way you want it.Then customize your units and organization toyour specifications. Sounds difficult, but again,no advanced computer degree is necessary.

After having fought many tenacious and ex-hausting battles against the computer, you canalso match wits against another living andthinking opponent. Use the two-player hot seatmode to play an adversary using only onecomputer, or play long distance via the In-ternet or e-mail options.

System Requirements. For those of youwho do not have a Pentium-based computer,do not despair; this game worked well on anolder 486DX. The game does require Win-dows 95, a 486DX or Pentium PC (Pentiumrecommended), a double speed CD-ROM, 8MB RAM minimum (16 MB recommended).

For those questions that the Player’s Guidejust cannot answer, Talonsoft’s Homepageprobably can. This is a great site that you canbrowse. You’ll find the answers to many fre-quently asked questions as well as discoversome good tips, techniques, and tactics. Lookfor their page at www.talonsoft.com.

Talonsoft’s East Front is a fun and challeng-ing WWII strategy game that will hook thenovice and keep the strategy game enthusiastsufficiently challenged. While playing, do notbe surprised if what seems as if only minuteshas passed, when in reality it is hours. Justremember, you have PT in the morning. GoodGaming!

CPT BOB HUGHESLeavenworth, Kan.

Armored Fist 2: M1A2 ABRAMS, de-veloped by NovaLogic. $44.95. For DOS6.2 & WIN95 computer systems.

Abstract: The program Armored Fist is areal-time armor simulation that allows theplayer to take command of one the United

States military’s most advanced weapon sys-tems. The simulation is comprised of three lev-els to accommodate users of various levels ofinteraction. The simulator allows instant com-bat for users who want instant action andcampaign play for those who want to attempta role of leadership that many want, but only aselect few can have. Includes a multiplier op-tion for campaign warfare.

Minimum Requirements: DX4-100, Sound-blaster-compliant sound card, 120MB diskspace [for single player], keyboard, 4X CD-ROM, SVGA monitor, 2 MB VESA SVGA card,16 MB RAM.

NOTE: Although it is possible to play thegame with this configuration, I do not recom-mend it. Attempting to play the game at thislevel will not give the full effect and graphicsthat makes this a fully interactive simulation.

Recommended Requirements: P120-P133,SoundBlaster-compliant sound card, joystick,12X CD-ROM, SVGA monitor, 4MB PCI SVGAcard, 32 MB RAM; 33.6-56.6 kbps modem;300 MB disk space.

Tested On: Dual P120, 64MB RAM, 4MBSVGA PCI card, Windows NT, running WIN95Boot, Thrustmaster, SoundBlaster 32, 1.6GBdrive, Courier I-modem 128 Kbps ISDN.

Setup of the game is extremely easy, withstep-by-step instructions, to include the multi-player setup. The user need only know barecomputer basics to install the game.

The game start-up screen gives three playoptions: Easy Mode, which gives the user aneasy but unrealistic control of the tank; Realis-tic Mode, which gives an extremely accuratecontrol of an M1A2 tank; and Realistic Modew/Auto Lock, which gives the user the abilityto control the tank in a “real-world mode,” butthe user does not have to concern himselfwith targeting the main gun or .50 cal. I rec-ommend tankers [E1-E9] play in RealisticMode and tankers [O-1 to O-10] play in Real-istic Mode with Auto Lock. This will allow offi-cers to concentrate more on command andcontrol, rather than gunnery. But try them both.

The next screen is the Choose a Campaignscreen, where a user can choose campaign orsolo action. The Menu screen will appear aftera game selection is made. From there, aplayer can choose “multi-player” or “standalone” game play. I do recommend playing inmultiplayer mode, especially for those userswho want to experience a measure of thecomplexity of command and control on thebattlefield. For tank commanders, platoonleaders, and yes, even Black Six himself, thecompany commander, it is a must to play Ar-mored Fist 2 in multiplayer mode. Speakingfrom personal experience of the confusion thatexists in trying to command a group of tanks, Irecommend those young officers who will beentering AOBC in the near future play Ar-mored Fist 2 in multi-player mode to obtain ataste of what will be expected of you whenyou enter MTT in your 13 weeks of AOBC.

As for the game, Novalogic has outdonethemselves. The graphics far surpass F22 [an-other game by NovaLogic], F-16 Fighting Fal-con Gold, and M1A2. It can be argued that thegraphics even surpass those seen in SIMNETand CCTT, for those who have 4MB graphicscards and Hi-Res monitors. The game gives

realistic sounds and views, to include [my per-sonal favorite] that a gunner cannot fire themain gun until a loader gives an “Up.” In addi-tion, unlike SIMNET, the damage the tank re-ceives in battle is more realistic compared tothe actual tank’s capabilities, removing thosequestionable deaths that SIMNET Warriorsoften suffer in the SIMNET, although theWarthogs [SIMNET instructors] will argue thatthe SIMNET is the next best thing to being ina tank [excluding CCTT]. Well, after playingArmored Fist, I say throw out the SIMNETsoftware and replace it with Armored Fist soft-ware.

The game has proven itself so well that,within my own unit, my commander has al-lowed me to supplement the virtual trainingprogram [UCOFT, GUARD FIST] with the us-age of Armored Fist 2 on the company’s LANnetwork, to include networking with other unitsfor force-on-force simulations. However, aboveall, remember this: A simulation, no matterhow good, or real, will NEVER replace in-the-field training mounted on real tanks. Simula-tions should only be used as training aids tosupplement in-the-field mounted training exer-cises.

ALEXANDER R. TAMBASCIA2LT, Armor

D-Troop, 2-172, 86 Bde

Fighting on the Brink: Defense of thePusan Perimeter by BG (Ret.) Uzal W.Ent. Turner Publishing Company, Pa-ducah, Ky., 1997. 431 pages, $39.95.

The study of the Korean War has enjoyed arenaissance in the past decade. It began withthe publication of Clay Blair’s epic, The For-gotten War, in 1987, continued with manyother impressive accounts of the war and itsparticipants, and continues with Brigadier Gen-eral (Ret.) Uzal Ent’s fine volume. Fighting onthe Brink is a detailed account of the first fourmonths of the Korean War. The author inte-grates seamlessly a myriad of secondarysources into the text of the book’s 22 chap-ters, giving the reader a clear picture of thefighting during the savage first four months ofthe Korean War. By far the greatest strengthof Fighting on the Brink is how he weaves per-sonal accounts into the narrative, illustratingthe hardships and uncommon valor of the or-dinary American GI in the fight for the PusanPerimeter.

There are no new revelations or striking in-sights in this book. Instead, the author hascrafted a work that serves to remind us of thefolly and capriciousness of bad foreign policy,coupled with the cyclical attempts by politi-cians to reduce the Army to irrelevance. The“New World Order” of the post-World War IIera lasted long enough to see the Army emas-culated in men, equipment, and training, onlyto be committed in the hills and rice paddies ofKorea less than five years after the surrenderof Japan. The problems facing Captain BillTerman, commander of B Battery, 31st FieldArtillery Battalion, in training his men is typicalof the experience of most of the units ofEighth Army just prior to the start of the war:


“We have a very real problem in welding to-gether a good, efficient military team overhere; the procuring of supplies and equipment[is] erratic and inadequate, and, perhaps mostdiscouraging, the virus of insidious bureauc-racy permeating the voluminous paper admini-stration is time-consuming in the extreme.”Captain Terman was killed in action in August1950, but the insidious bureaucracy that ham-pered his battery and all peacetime armies, isalive and well today.

General Ent goes to great lengths to detailthe fight of Task Force Smith and all of thecombat of the first four months of the KoreanWar. In many cases, the author is uncritical ofthe poor performance of American units in theopening stages of the war. While no one ques-tions the dedication and patriotism of the indi-vidual soldiers, there is little doubt today thatmany of the regiments committed early to thefighting in Korea fought poorly. It is anguishingto read the account of then 17-year-old PrivateEarsel Bonds as he flees the Task ForceSmith aid station, and is told by a sergeant tothrow his weapon away because the enemywould kill anyone captured with a weapon. It isequally heartbreaking to read about the de-struction of 3d Battalion, 29th Infantry atHadong Pass on 27 July 1950. Once againmen discarded weapons, equipment, andclothing to escape the North Koreans. I grittedmy teeth as I read how dozens of soldiers sur-rendered to the North Koreans, while othersfled the battlefield, and still others fought theNorth Koreans at every opportunity; a battalionof nearly 900 men reduced to less than 300 ina single day. It was a poorly trained and ledbattalion that performed in a predictable man-ner.

While the author does a commendable jobof writing, the editing of Fighting on the Brinkis less than stellar. There are numerous mis-spellings throughout the text and many of thepictures in the book are of poor quality. Manyof the photos are poorly reproduced versionsfrom other works. Fighting on the Brink hasnumerous maps that illuminate the narrative,but they too are of mixed quality. Like the pho-tos, most are reproduced from other works,with some of the copies of poor quality.

Fighting on the Brink is a worthy addition tothe history of the Korean War. It is the mostdetailed account of the first four months of theKorean War available. The author succeeds inmaking the book “live” by making the recollec-tions and remembrances of hundreds of sol-diers the centerpiece of each chapter. The reallessons of the war come from the voices ofthose soldiers, reminding us not to forget thefutility and agony of the first four months of theKorean War. That, of course, is the real valueof Fighting on the Brink. The experiences ofTask Force Smith and the rest of the soldiersand Marines who fought to defend the PusanPerimeter remind me to never allow myself tosuccumb to “insidious bureaucracy,” but al-ways focus on the training and readiness ofmy soldiers. The next deployment is only aphone call away.

ARTHUR W. CONNOR, JR.LTC, Armor

Army Advisory Group Maxwell AFB, Alabama

The Sleeping Giant; American ArmedForces Between the Wars by J.E. Kauf-mann and H.W. Kaufmann, Praeger Pub-lishers, 1996. 216 pages, $55.00.

The Sleeping Giant; American Armed ForcesBetween the Wars attempts to document themilitary’s fight for survival, preparedness, mod-ernization, and money. The authors, J.E. Kauf-mann and H.W. Kaufmann, do a decent job ofchronicling the military services’ attempts to re-main competitive in a dangerous world. Intheir introduction, the authors state that theywanted a book that “synthesizes the period”without creating a cumbersome text for the av-erage reader. To varying degrees, the authorsmet the challenge of synthesizing military de-velopments. Unfulfilled was their attempt atmaking this a readable book.

The available literature on the American mili-tary in this era is surprisingly small. Whilethere are many articles and some official histo-ries, there are few books. I began reading thisbook assuming that this would be a scholarlyeffort worthy of its steep $55 price tag. I wasvery disappointed. The Sleeping Giant shedsvery little new light on American military policyand development. The book draws from manysecondary sources, rarely tapping the wealthof information that exists at the National Ar-chives, the Center of Military History, and theMilitary History Institute.

While chronicling the military’s struggles inthe inter-war years, the authors’ inherent biasagainst the isolationist government is blatant.They argue that the shortsightedness of theRepublicans, who controlled both Congressand the presidency, directly lead to America’sweakness both militarily and politically. If itwere not for FDR’s keen understanding of for-eign affairs and his willingness to listen to hismilitary leaders, America would not have beenable to continue as quickly to the Allied wareffort.

While describing the military’s successesand failures to improve their readiness, thebook leaves the reader with many unan-swered questions. For example, on pages 77-80, the authors bemoan the government’s un-willingness to authorize money to improve orcreate coastal fortifications at Alaska, PuertoRico, Guantanamo Bay, and various locationson the American mainland. The authors neverexplain why these locations were vital to thedefense of American interests; nor do theymention that coastal defenses were rapidly be-coming obsolescent due to improvements inships and aircraft. The authors also miss anexcellent example of how the rapid pace oftechnology can cause costs to skyrocket. Onpage 79, they note the installation of new 16inch guns in a battery of the Panama Canal’sPacific defenses. By the time the guns wereinstalled in 1929, the Coast Artillery Corps de-cided they needed to be in casements andthat anti-aircraft guns were needed to protectthe big guns from aircraft. Yet the authors’tone in the rest of the book was that the U.S.needed coastal artillery. They never discussthe tactical and strategic importance of theweapons in defending American interests.

The Sleeping Giant’s most significant contri-bution is that it warns the reader of the dan-gers in believing that there is a post-Cold War

dividend. The politicians accepted the notionof a post-World War I dividend and vastly re-duced the armed forces. The quality of life forservice members dropped radically. Corre-spondingly, the quality of recruits also de-creased. Many military bases were closed andconsolidated to reduce costs. Training fundswere also reduced so that by 1933, only re-cruits got target practice with their rifles. Thefunding for development of new equipment(what we now call force modernization) basi-cally stopped for almost ten years. When fund-ing did start trickling into the military, it was forhigh profile, big-ticket items like battleships,cruisers, and aircraft. The Army suffered muchlonger because it was not glamorous andcould not compete with the high profile Navy,Marines, and the Army Air Corps. New logisticequipment was virtually ignored until the mid-1930s. There was even a vigorous debateabout the role of the National Guard in militaryplans. Does any of this sound familiar? Whiletoday’s military does not face reductions assevere, it plays a much larger role in U.S. pol-icy than the military of 70 years ago.

I have many complaints about this book.First, I found it very hard to follow the authors’arguments because they jump from one sub-ject to another without warning. This poorstructuring dilutes the argument and makes fora hard read.

Second, as I perused the book, I stumbledacross 20 pages of maps, illustrations, dia-grams, and charts located in the center of thebook. The reader must derive their meaning;they are never mentioned in the text. Whilesome of the charts appear interesting, theirsmall size and poor definition hinder thereader. I also found a few errors in the charts,most notably in Figure 17 – the vehicle arma-ments on the top do not match the bottom.Simple errors like these draw into question thereliability of the data presented in the book.Overall, the below-average qualities of thesediagrams detract from the reader’s under-standing of the text.

Finally, the authors list nine pages ofsources; some from individual participants andofficial documents, but most from newspapersfrom the time period and books published dec-ades after WWII. The lack of primary sourcesis disturbing for a book purporting to be ofgreat scholarly value. The authors may arguethat they are only trying to highlight what thepeople knew at the time, but the authors donot list even one Gallop poll taken during theinter-war years. This is especially disturbingsince FDR often focused on public opinionand commissioned many polls on his behalf.Although these polls played a part in the gov-ernment’s domestic policies in the 1930s, theyare not discussed in the book.

The Sleeping Giant chronicles the develop-ment of the U.S. military between world wars,but does not provide many insights into thethought processes and decisions made bymilitary and civilian leaders. The book pre-sents more questions than answers. More re-search and definitely more than 216 pages areneeded to cover such a broad and complexsubject.

C.J. HORNCaptain, Armor

Ohio State University


Clear your schedules and mark yourcalendars! The 1998 Armor Conferenceis rapidly advancing into our sector, andonce again the U.S. Army Armor Centerand Fort Knox will host one of the coun-try’s largest annual military symposiums.First held in 1949, the Armor Confer-ence has greatly increased in popularityover the years, and it continues to serveas a valuable opportunity for leadersfrom all branches and components tocome together to discuss current and fu-ture issues impacting our rapidly chang-ing profession. This year’s conferencewill be held Tuesday, May 19th throughThursday, May 21st and carries thetheme, “The Mounted Leader Today andInto Tomorrow.”

Leadership is the central tenet of thisyear’s theme, and it marks a dramaticchange from other subjects we’ve cho-sen in the past. In today’s turbulent mili-tary environment, this one personal at-tribute is absolutely critical to the sur-vival of the Armor branch and the Armyin general. As stated in his Commander’sHatch editorial, Major General GeorgeHarmeyer, the Chief of Armor, views thechallenge of instilling and fostering atrue warrior spirit in our junior leaders asone of our greatest priorities. As a result,he has extended invitations to some ofthe Army’s most noted visionaries, whowill share their views on instilling a war-rior ethic in our leaders of tomorrow.Conference participants will find the nu-merous briefings and open discussionsextremely rewarding. In a slight changefrom previous years, MG Harmeyer hasadded a half day to the conference onThursday, May 21st.. This exciting addi-tion allows the opportunity for specialpresentations given by members of thecombined arms team.

The annual Armor Trainer Up-date (ATU) will once again pre-cede the conference on May17th and 18th. This two-dayevent focuses on the challengesfacing our Army Reserve andArmy National Guard brothers-in-arms. As the number of mili-tary commitments around theworld continues to rise, theseunits face even greater trainingchallenges. The ATU provides aperfect forum to discuss theseimportant issues. Last year, over300 Army Reserve and NationalGuard members attended thisevent, and we estimate an evengreater number of attendees thisyear.

The G3/Directorate of Training,Plans, and Mobilization will hold

the 6th annual External Unit SchedulingConference at the Armor Inn, held inconjunction with the ATU, on May 18th.Units from the Active and Reserve Com-ponents, as well as from other branchesof service, will vie for the opportunity toschedule Fort Knox’s vast simulationsfacilities and range complexes. As train-ing dollars dwindle, these cost-effectivetraining facilities at Fort Knox becomemore and more attractive to units whowish to hone their combat skills. Conse-quently, the number of units taking ad-vantage of this opportunity has greatlyincreased every year.

One of the most popular aspects of theconference is the numerous contractorexhibits that are set up at Skidgel Hallduring the entire week. Last year, over150 displays demonstrating the latestbreakthroughs in the defense industry,equipment prototypes, and state-of-the-art training devices were available forpublic viewing, and we expect an evengreater number this year. For many, thisis a once in a lifetime opportunity to seethe absolute best our defense industryhas to offer in one consolidated setting.Between the ATU and Armor Confer-ence, we’ve set aside one entire day forconference attendees to walk through thearea and observe the latest innovations.There is something in this forum thatwill interest everyone, and you will findyourself spending hours browsingthrough the exhibits.

In keeping with the “leadership” focus,the General Frederick M. Franks Awardwill be presented on the last day of theconference to an individual who hasdemonstrated a lasting contribution tothe ground warfighting capabilities ofthe U.S. Army. This year will mark the

fourth time we’ve made the presentationof an award originally conceived by for-mer Chief of Armor, then-Major GeneralLarry Jordan. The nominees for thisprestigious award must have demon-strated leadership characteristics pos-sessed by the award’s namesake, includ-ing one or more of the following: offereda vision for the future of the mountedwarfighting force that significantly im-proved combat survivability, lethality, ormobility; developed an innovation inequipment, material, or doctrine that sig-nificantly enhanced the effectiveness ofcombat arms’ mounted elements; exem-plified professional excellence in de-meanor, correspondence, and leadership;and displayed a love of soldiering. Lastyear’s award recipient was COL ThomasF. Metz, then Director of the EXFORCoordination Cell, who was instrumentalin the execution of the Army’s TaskForce XXI Advanced Warfighting Ex-periment.

The Armor Conference has attracted amuch greater audience than just the ar-mor and cavalry community. This eventis an absolute must for everybody who isconcerned with the current and futurestates of our military, or those who aremerely interested in enjoying a week offun, activities, and camaraderie. Despitecontinuing military cutbacks and de-creases in funding, we face increasingmission demands every day. The onlyway we can survive these constant fluc-tuations is to demonstrate the resolveand demeanor that can inspire subordi-nates, peers, and superiors alike. The Ar-mor Force is committed to bringing backthe warrior ethos to its ranks. If youhave the same resolve and desire as wedo, we’ll see you at the conference!


Armor Conference Points of Contact

Event POC DSN Number CommercialArmor Conference CPT Dave Bowlus 464-4007 (502) 624-4007

Armor Conference SFC Morris Lockert 464-1065 (502) 624-1065

Armor Trainer Update MAJ Thil Hall 464-1579 (502) 624-1579

External Scheduling Conference Jim Hornback 464-3555 (502) 624-3555

Contractor Displays SFC Kim Thompson 464-1250 (502) 624-1250

USAARMC Protocol Jack Eubanks 464-6615 (502) 624-6615

USAARMC Protocol Sherry Cart 464-6103 (502) 624-6103

Armor Association Connie Bright 464-2610 (502) 942-8624

Armor Magazine LTC Terry Blakely 464-2249 (502) 624-2249

VIP Billeting/Transportation Reservations 464-6180 (502) 624-6180

On-post Housing Carolyn Burton 464-3491 (502) 943-1000

Armor Classic Golf Scramble Golf Manager 464-4218/1548 (502) 624-4218/1548

On the Way...Leadership is the Focus of 1998 Armor Conference

1998 Armor Conference and Armor Trainer Update(Tentative Agenda)

16 May - 21 May 1998

“The Mounted Leader Today and Into Tomorrow”

DATE TIME EVENT HOST/SPEAKER LOCATION

Saturday, 16 May 1500-1900 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference Protocol Gaffey Hall, Bldg 2369

Sunday, 17 May 0730-0930 Registration for ATU/Armor Conference Protocol Gaffey Hall, Bldg 23690900-0910 ATU Welcome/Administrative Info SACG Haszard Auditorium0910-1030 ATU Presentations TBD Haszard Auditorium1050-1200 ATU Presentations TBD Haszard Auditorium1200-1330 Lunch1330-1510 ATU Presentations TBD Haszard Auditorium1530-1630 ATU Presentations TBD Haszard Auditorium1830-2200 No Host Social for ATU SACG-RC Fort Knox Leader’s Club

Monday, 18 May 0800-1700 Armor Conference Early Registration Protocol Fort Knox Leader’s Club0800-1700 External Scheduling Conference G3/DPTM Armor Inn0900-0905 ATU Administrative Info SACG Haszard Auditorium0905-1000 ATU Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1020-1200 ATU Presentations TBD Haszard Auditorium1200-1300 Lunch1200-1700 Contractors’ Displays DFD Skidgel Hall, Bldg 17241200-1700 Battlelab Demo MMBL Bldg 2021, MWTB1200-1700 Close Combat Tactical Trainer Demo CCTT PO Bldg 2020, MWSTC1300-1700 Brigade and Regimental Commanders’ Meeting OCOA Rivers Auditorium1300-1700 USAARMC Sergeant Major Armor Update CSM Lady Haszard Auditorium 1300-1800 Subject Matter Expert Briefs DTDD, DFD TBD1430-1530 Honorary Colonels of the Regiment OCOA Gaffey Hall, Rm 2191800-UTC Pre-Golf Classic Social Business Ops Gallotta’s

Tuesday, 19 May 0700-1600 Registration Protocol Fort Knox Leader’s Club0800-1200 External Scheduling Conference (if required) G3/DPTM Armor Inn0800-1200 1st ATB Initial Entry Training Workshop 1st ATB Rivers Auditorium0800-1800 Subject Matter Expert Briefs DFD, FXXI, TSM Abrams0830-1530 3d Annual Armor Golf Classic Scramble Business Ops Lindsey/Anderson Golf Courses0800-1700 Contractors’ Displays DFD Skidgel Hall0800-1700 Battlelab Demo MMBL Bldg 2021, MWTB0800-1700 Close Combat Tactical Trainer Demo CCTT PO Bldg 2020, MWSTC1630-1800 CG’s Garden Party MG Harmeyer Quarters One1830-2130 Regimental Buffet and Assemblies OCOA Fort Knox Leader’s Club

Wednesday, 20 May 0730-1200 Late Registration Protocol Gaffey Hall (Message Center)0800-1700 Contractors’ Displays DFD Skidgel Hall0800-1700 Battlelab Demo MMBL Bldg 2021, MWTB0800-1700 Close Combat Tactical Trainer Demo CCTT PO Bldg 2020, MWSTC0900-0915 Welcome/Admin Announcements COL Geier Haszard Auditorium0915-1010 Presentation MG Harmeyer Haszard Auditorium1030-1120 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1120-1130 Patton Museum Presentation MG (Ret.) Sheridan Haszard Auditorium1130-1200 Armor Association Meeting Armor Association Haszard Auditorium1200-1400 Lunch/Visit Contractors Displays Skidgel Hall1400-1450 Presentation BG Wilson Haszard Auditorium1450-1540 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1600-1650 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1830-UTC Cocktails/Armor Association Banquet TBD Patton Museum/Armor Inn

Thursday, 21 May 0800-1700 Contractors’ Displays DFD Skidgel Hall0800-1700 Battlelab Demo MMBL Bldg 2021, MWTB0800-1700 Close Combat Tactical Trainer Demo CCTT PO Bldg 2020, MWSTC0900-0905 Administrative Remarks COL Geier Haszard Auditorium0905-0950 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium0950-1000 Presentation of the Franks Award TBD Haszard Auditorium1015-1040 Presentation Infantry School Haszard Auditorium1040-1105 Presentation Artillery School Haszard Auditorium1105-1130 Presentation Aviation School Haszard Auditorium1200-1300 Chief of Armor Luncheon TBD Fort Knox Leaders’ Club1315-1400 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1400-1445 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1500-1545 Presentation COL Kalb Haszard Auditorium1545-1630 Presentation TBD Haszard Auditorium1630-1700 Closing Remarks MG Harmeyer Haszard Auditorium

For up-to-date information, visit the Armor Conference website at:http://147.238.100.101/arconf/ or http://www.knox.army.mil/arconf/

PIN: 076071-000

Documents

Armor Magazine March April 1998