Aristotle on Artifacts Sagp Apa Central 2016

7/23/2019 Aristotle on Artifacts Sagp Apa Central 2016

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ARISTOTLE ON ARTIFACTS

It is standardly held that Aristotle denies that artifacts are substances. There is no

consensus on why this is so, and proposals include taking artifacts to lack autonomy, to be merely accidental unities, and to be impermanent. In this paper, I shall argue thatAristotle holds that artifacts are substances. However, where natural substances are

absolutely fundamental, artifacts are merely relatively fundamental—like any substance,an artifact can ground such nonsubstances as its qualities; but artifacts are themselves

partly grounded in natural substances.

Consider an artifact such as a house, a statue or a toaster. Such artifacts exhibit many ofthe marks characteristic of substances. Primary substances are identified in Categories 5

as being incapable of standing in a predicative relation to a subject. Yet a term referringto an individual house, no less than a term referring to a natural substance such as a

human or a horse, can stand in the subject position, but not the predicate position, of asentence expressing a categorical proposition. Also, an individual substance lacks a

contrary. Just as there is no contrary for an individual man, there is no contrary for anindividual statue. And neither an artifact nor a natural substance admits of variation of

degree with respect to being a substance. As I shall note below, Aristotle does allow fordegrees of substantiality among different kinds of substances, but he denies that a

substance of one kind admits of variation of degree within itself. For example,

T1 one man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may bemore or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful

may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same

quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at differenttimes. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other

time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man isnot more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is

substance, more or less what it is. (3b37-4a9)

So too a toaster does not admit of variation of degree: one toaster may be a better toasterthan another, but one toaster is not more of a toaster than another, or more of a toaster at

one time rather than at another time.

An artifact, no less than an natural substance, seems to possess what Aristotle calls themost distinctive mark of substance: while remaining one and the same, it can admit

contrary qualities. That is to say, a toaster admits of qualitative variation while remainingnumerically identical. This seems to be true for both synchronic and diachronic

qualitative variation. The fact that a toaster is smaller than a house but bigger than a breadbox does not make the artifact somehow two things. And an artifact such as a

toaster appears to persist through qualitative changes.



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In the Metaphysics, Aristotle arguably rejects features such as impredicability and being asubstratum persisting through changes as marks of substance in favor of such marks as

being a ‘this’, exhibiting unity and being separate. But at first blush, artifacts would seemto possess these marks no less than natural substances. I can refer to an artifact by

demonstration, just as I can demonstratively refer to a natural substance. The parts of an

artifact are unified by reference to the definition and characteristic activity of the whole, just as in the case of the body parts of living things. And an individual artifact appears to possess a capacity for independent existence no less than an individual animal. Of course,

much depends on the interpretation of these marks of substance, and a rival view ofseparation will be central to my argument below.

Despite these considerations, most Aristotle scholars have ascribed to Aristotle the view

that artifacts are not substances. I shall rehearse some of the reasons given for this view below. But first I shall note that the textual evidence for this ascription is slight. Indeed,

Aristotle no where unambiguously denies that artifacts are substances. He does canvassrejecting that artifacts are substances in the following passage.

T2 But it is not yet clear if the substances of destructible things are separate;

except it is obvious that it is not possible for some cases—those things thatare not able to exist apart from individual things, for example a house or

utensil. But perhaps (is! s) neither these things themselves nor any of theothers that are not formed by nature are substances, for one might posit only

nature as a substance in destructible things. (1043b18-23)

I shall come back to T2 down the road. But since Aristotle qualifies the rejection with a‘perhaps’ (is! s), the passage is consistent with the view that artifacts are substances but

not unqualifiedly substances. Aristotle implies that artifacts are not unqualifiedlysubstances in the following passage.

T3 Of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, others

artificially, and others spontaneously; but everything which is generated isgenerated by something and from something and becomes something. When

I say "becomes something" I mean in any of the categories; it may come to be either a particular thing or of some quantity or quality or in some place.

Natural generation is the generation of things whose generation is by nature.That from which they are generated is what we call matter; that by which, is

something which exists naturally; and that which they become is a man or a plant or something else of this kind, which we call substance most of all

(malista). (1032a2-19)

The most that can be drawn from T3 is that artifacts are not called substances most of all.(Aristotle believed that many living things arose spontaneously through abiogenesis, and

these too are not substances most of all.) The greek adverb malista is the superlative ofmala, very, and suggests that there are two degrees of substantiality (or at least two

degrees of being called a substance) and so there are both (things called) substances and



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(things called) most of all substances. Aristotle uses the term only in a few other passages—for example, in T4 and T5, below.

T4 The term "substance" is used, if not in more, at least in four principal cases;

for both the essence and the universal and the genus are held to be the

substance of the particular, and fourthly the substratum. The substratum isthat of which the rest are predicated, while it is not itself predicated ofanything else. Hence we must first determine its nature, for the primary

substratum seems most of all (malista) to be substance. (1028b33-29a2)

In T4, Aristotle asks what, among such contenders as the substratum, the form oressence, the universal and the genus, has the best claim to substantiality; he writes that

the substratum seems to be substance most of all—a claim he goes on to reject, partly onthe grounds that the substratum is not separate.

T5 If we hold this view, it follows that matter is substance. But this is

impossible; for it is accepted that separability and individuality belong mostof all (malista) to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the

combination of form and matter are more truly substance than matter is.(1029a26-30)

How ought we to take this distinction between substances and substances most of all?

Let’s take T5 as a point of departure. As we have seen, a characteristic mark ofsubstances is that they are called ‘separate’. Above, we followed Fine (1984) in taking

separation to involve a capacity for independent existence. In [author 1], I have arguedthat separation terminology often refers to a notion of grounding and cannot be reduced

to capacities for independent existence. Grounding is a relation that back explanations byrelating derivative entities to more fundamental entities. If one fact grounds a second then

the second obtains in virtue of the first fact obtaining. For example, we might hold thatcertain biological facts are grounded in—that is to say, obtain in virtue of—certain

chemical facts. To say that aspects of biology are explained by reference to aspects tochemistry is not to say that chemical facts are not themselves grounded. For example, we

might hold that chemical facts are grounded in physical facts, and so aspects of chemistryare explained by reference to physics. Chemical facts in this story are not absolutely

fundamental but they play the role of fundamental relata in the explanation of certain biological facts. Call the chemical facts in this example relatively fundamental. My

proposal is that the distinction between most-of-all substances and substances that are notmost-of-all substances is the distinction between absolute and relative fundamental

entities. That there would be degrees of substantiality in this way does not violate the prohibition in T1. An individual substance is not more or less what it is, from one time to

another or in one respect. But an entity can play the role of ground with respect to a givencontrast class of derivative items, while not being itself ungrounded.1

Why are are artifacts not absolutely fundamental? One might hope that one of the extant

explanations in the secondary literature as to why artifacts are not substances could betweaked to provide an explanation.



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Some scholars hold that artifacts lack autonomy. For example, Gill (1991, 213) writes

that “artifacts are not self-preserving systems but depend on external agents both for thefull realization of their being and for their maintenance. Artifacts lack autonomy, and for

this reason they are ontologically dependent on other more basic entities.”2 Adapting this

thought to our purposes, we might say that a house, for example, is not absolutelyfundamental since it depends on the artisan for its production, and other craftsmen for itsupkeep.

Other scholars hold that artifacts lack the integrity of natural substances. Kosman (1987,

369), for example, holds that artifacts are not substances since artifacts are accidentalunities, like kooky objects (e.g. white horse).

3 One way to cash out this line of

interpretation is to consider the relation between the matter and the form of ahylomorphic compound. In a natural substance, the matter may be correctly described as

a natural kind distinct from the compound: Aristotle holds that human flesh is a kind ofearth. But the compound’s matter is best characterized by reference to its form. What it is

to be flesh, say, is to be a material capable of realizing human form. And an account ofwhat it is to be a human ear, to give another example, will detail the contribution the

perceptual mode of hearing makes to the overall activities characteristic of humans. In anartifact, by contrast, the form is artificially imposed on a matter best described in terms of

the natural substance. The material of a house is best characterized as wood and so on. InT2 Aristotle seems to hold that the artifactual material retains its natural character and

even has a better claim to substantiality than the form of the house. Adapting this thoughtto our purposes, we might say that a house, for example, is not absolutely fundamental

since it is dependent on something distinct from the house, since the substance of thehouse is its wood and other materials.

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These accounts might explain why, given that Aristotle holds the views that he does hold

on artifacts and biogenetic living things, he characterizes the former as substances but notmost-of-all substances. Artifacts are grounded in other items—a full explanation of an

artifact must make reference to the artisan so to explain its generation and maintenance,and to the natural material so to explain the (merely accidental) unity of the hylomorphic

compound.

But these accounts fall short in providing an explanation why Aristotle holds the viewsthat he does hold on artifacts and living things. To bring out this point consider in more

detail the alleged disanalogies in causal explanations between artificial and naturalgeneration. First, we have seen that Gill and others hold that artifactual production and

natural generation differ with respect to the efficient cause. On this line, Aristotle holdsthat the efficient cause for production involves reference to something different in

essence from the artifact—namely, the artisan. But given that the efficient cause is theform of the artifact, it is unclear why Aristotle does not allow the role of the artisan,

whose soul in some sense actualizes the form and whose activity makes that formmanifest in a material, to be an enabling condition allowing the form to be efficacious,

just as in the case of an natural generation such as the growth of the acorn, the presenceof sufficient sunlight and water is an enabling condition allowing the parent oak to be



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efficacious. Why is the artisan a part of the metaphysical explanation of production andthe presence of sufficient sunlight and water not a part of the metaphysical explanation of

the growth of an acorn?

Next, consider the material cause. The material explanation of natural life partly consists

in providing a systematic account of the organization of organic body parts. These partsare best characterized by reference to the formal and final causes of the organism. Ahuman hand, for example, is best described in terms of its contribution to the

performance of activities characteristic of humans. A hand that is incapable of makingthis contribution, such as a severed hand, is merely homonymously called a hand. In the

production of an artifact, by contrast, Kosman and others hold that the material is bestdescribed in terms of the natural substance upon which the artifactual form is imposed.

But it is unclear why Aristotle would not allow that the parts of an artifact are bestcharacterized as a potentiality for the artifactual form. Why is the best description of the

material parts of house made in terms of natural materials and not in terms of thefoundation, roof beams and so on—parts which, like body parts, are characterized by

their contribution to the whole house.

So these features—lack of autonomy and merely accidental unity—do not provide a fullysatisfying explanation why artifacts are not most-of-all substances. What we seek is an

account of artifacts from which these features will emerge. I shall sketch one suchaccount.

Aristotle asserts in the following passage that it is the artifactual form which is not

separate.

T6 Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean the matter andthe form in combination) or not?

If not, all things in the nature of matter are

perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hardto determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some

cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does not exist in separation.(1060b23-28)

T6 is compatible with my claim that an artifact is relatively fundamental, or fundamental

within the restricted ontology of the Categories. For Aristotle is considering in T6 whatis separate within an expansive ontology, a domain which includes form and matter. In

this context, ‘separate’ plausibly means absolutely fundamental. T6 might suggest thatthe reason an artifact is not absolutely fundamental is a deficiency primarily with its

form, and neither a problem with the unity of the hylomorphic compound nor its relianceon external agents for generation and maintenance.

From what are artifactual forms inseparable? That is to say, on what are artifactual forms

grounded? I suggest that artifactual forms are partly grounded in natural substances. Hereare two ways of cashing out this suggestion. T6 suggests that artifactual forms are

inseparable from the hylomorphic compound. And Aristotle’s examples of artifactualdefinitions would seem to support this suggestion. For example, at 1043a7-8, Aristotle



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canvasses defining a house as bricks and timber arranged in such-and-such a way; in T4,he appears to take a statue to be defined as an arrangement of bronze. These definitions

make reference to the material of the compound. If this is right, then the form of anartifact is partly grounded in its natural matter. The form of a thing corresponds to its

definition. On this line of interpretation, what it is to be a house, say, is to be an

appropriate material arranged in a certain way.

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An alternative is this: artifactual forms are grounded in natural forms. The formal cause is

a mode of explanation for a thing’s activity which corresponds to the real definition forthat thing. A statement of a definition for an artifact makes essential reference to humans.

Suppose we try to define a house alternatively to the above characterization—that is tosay, without essential reference to a certain matter. A house may be defined as a structure

for the provision of shelter, but of course if such a characterization is to tell us what it isto be a house, ‘structure’, ‘provision’ and ‘shelter’ must be abbreviating complex

descriptions. A house is a structure of a certain kind, which provides something in acertain way. But moreover, the shelter that it provides is specific to the needs of those

intended to be housed within the structure. What it is to be human partly grounds what itis to be a house. Similarly, the formal cause of a sculpture is caught up in the intentions

of the sculptor, the role of the plastic arts within a society and so on.6

To sum up, I have argued that artifacts are substances, since they are relativelyfundamental, but they are not called substances most of all, since they are not absolutely

fundamental. Artifacts are not absolutely fundamental, not because they are non-autonomous or because they are accidental unities, but because artifactual forms are not

ungrounded. And I have sketched two ways in which we might think of artifactual formsas being grounded in natural substances.

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1 This interpretation draws an attractive picture of the relation between the Categories

(where there is the best evidence for taking artifacts to be substances) and the

Metaphysics (where there is reason to hesitate to ascribe this view to Aristotle). Allow mesomething of an aside on this point. In the Categories, Aristotle asserts that individual

substances such as you and I are primary substances. But in the Metaphysics, Aristotleviews the forms of these individuals as the substance of the thing, and there is a scholarly

discussion whether this is an inconsistency or a change in Aristotle’s metaphysicalviews. Within the restricted ontology of the Categories, individual substances are

maximally fundamental. One might view the Categories as presenting a static ontology, asnapshot picture of the world, with its substances, qualities and so on, but without

viewing these items as changing through time. But in the Metaphysics, the domain ofobjects is expanded to include forms and materials as the causal explanations of the

activities of the individuals of the Categories. In this expanded world, individualsubstances are not maximally fundamental. To put the point in another way, in the

Categories individual substances are treated as if they are absolutely fundamental, but inthe Metaphysics. The differences between the Categories and the Metaphysics can be

explained without ascribing neither inconsistency nor change.



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2 Compare Irwin (1988, 571-72 n. 8) who however ascribes to Aristotle merely a doubt

that artifacts are substances, on the basis of their lack of autonomy. Gill cites in supportthe following passage:

T7From this it is evident that if substance is the cause of the existence of eachthing, we must look among these "differences" for the cause of the being ofeach thing. No one of them, nor the combination of any two of them, is

substance, but nevertheless each one of them contains something analogousto substance. And just as in the case of substances that which is predicated

of the matter is the actuality itself, so in the other kinds of definition it is thenearest approximation to actuality. E.g., if we have to define a threshold, we

shall call it "a piece of wood or stone placed in such-and-such a way"; andwe should define a house as "bricks and timber arranged in such-and-such a

way"; or again in some cases there is the final cause as well. And if we aredefining ice, we shall describe it as "water congealed or condensed in such-

and-such a way"; and a harmony is "such-and-such a combination of highand low"; and similarly in the other cases. (1043a2-12)

T7 does not provide unequivocal support, however. Aristotle is considering toy examples

of artifacts, such as the bronze circle, and states that relevant differentiae, such as more orless, straight or curved, and so on, are a cause of being for artifacts. From the context, it

is reasonably clear that Aristotle considers such differentiae as part of the formal cause.The formula corresponding to the form of a bronze circle might define the circle as a

closed curved figure, for example. However, Aristotle continues, such formal causes arenot substances but are merely analogous to substances. In what way are such formulae

analogous to substance? It is likely that artifactual formulae are analogous to naturalsubstances in so far as they are formal causes. Moreover, since Aristotle’s concern in the

Metaphysics is with identifying substances within the most unrestricted domain ofobjects, one might read T7 as merely excluding artifactual forms from being most-of-all

substances, when one considers the broader context of T7.3 Compare Halper (1989, 171-72), Gerson (1984) and Ferejohn (1994).4 In this shortened submitted version of the paper, I shall discuss just these two views of

Aristotelian artifacts. In the full version of the paper, I shall discuss Katayama’s view that

artifacts are not substances since their species are not eternal.5 This interpretation, however, arguably runs into similar problems as the views that

artifacts are non-autonomous or accidental unities: the position leaves unanswered whyartifacts are defined by reference to a specific material but humans, say, are not defined

as flesh arranged in a certain way. In [author 2] I argue that these examples such as thoseat 1043a7-8 and in T4 are broad definitions, corresponding to a causal account of the

thing, and not narrow definitions, corresponding to the form.6 In the fuller version of the paper, I develop these suggestions and argue that the view

that artifactual forms are grounded in matter or natural forms can explain why artifactsare non-autonomous, accidental unities.7 Works Cited



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Ferejohn, M. 1994. ‘The definition of generated composites in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’

in Scaltsas, Charles and Gill edd. Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gerson, L. 1984. ‘Artifacts, substances and essences’ Apeiron 18: 50-57.

Gill, M. L. 1991. ‘Aristotle on self-motion’ in Gill and Lennox edd. Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Halper 1989. One and Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Columbus: Ohio State University

Press.Irwin, T. 1988. Aristotle’s First Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Katayama, E. 1999. Aristotle on Artifacts. State University of New York Press.Kosman, A. 1987. ‘Animals and other beings in Aristotle’ in Gotthelf and Lennox. edd.

Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology. CambridgAZZZZe: CUP.

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Aristotle on Artifacts Sagp Apa Central 2016