See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/277281177Aristotle's InstitutionalismRESEARCH MAY 2015DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1716.6240DOWNLOADS6VIEWS271 AUTHOR:Clifford Angell BatesUniversity of Warsaw57 PUBLICATIONS 1 CITATION SEE PROFILEAvailable from: Clifford Angell BatesRetrieved on: 15 August 2015The Offices and the Institutional Character of Aristotles teaching on Regimes In the next three chapters we will look at Aristotle examination of the functioning of the offices within the regime.In Politics 4.4.1291a-38-b6, Aristotle mentions as part of a political communitythe magisterial, deliberative and judging or adjudicative parts.Yet there these offices where merely mentioned, it is only at the last three chapters of Politics 4 were Aristotle offers us a fuller examination of these three elements. Politics 4.14 opens with the last transition in book 4.This transition will look at the interior logic of the regime (politeia). Aristotle says Let us speak of what comes next again both generally and separately for each regime, taking the beginning point that is appropriate to it. (1297b35-37).And that beginning point is all regimes there are three parts that seem to govern how it functions and works as a regime (1297b37-38).And these three parts are the means by which the serious lawgiver (spoudaion nomotheten) has as his tools to give body and concrete character to a regime (politeia) (1297b38).Thus what we get here is the move to the institutions that are both made by the regime and which give the regime both form and body. Thus what particular institutions that are needed for a regime and how they are to operate is what is meant when Aristotle says what serious lawgiver must attempt to discern what is advantageous for each [specific regime] (1297b38).He continues on this point by noting that:As long as these are in a beautiful (kalon) condition, the regime is necessarily in a beautiful (kalon) condition; and regimes necessarily differ from one another as a result of differing in each of these parts (1297b39-40). Thus these parts are the instruments that help give the regime its condition as well as the instruments that carry out the actions of the regime both within the political community and towards other political communities. Now the three parts are do the following: 1) to deliberate about the common matters,2) the various offices needed by the regime and what each office ought to have authority concerning andwho should fill such offices and how they ought to be selected, and 3) the part concerning adjudication (1297b40-1298a3). Now what we get here is on one hand what looks like the division of labor within the regime for it to function beautifully (kalon) which is not meant to be a concern about aesthetic but rather the concern regarding the functioning well of the regime in a practical sensein terms of ability to act in the world.It is also interesting that Aristotle here, at Politics 4.14-16, switches the order of the elements in that earlier Politics 4.4 where gives the list of the parts of the political communityit is there he first mentions these three offices.And in that listing, the offices or the magisterial element are mentioned prior to the deliberative element.Here when he goes in more detail with these three elements, giving each its own chapterhe starts with the deliberative, then goes on to address the offices.Now in both the 1291a38-b6 ordering and the treatment here at the end of Politics 4, the adjudicative element is put last and stays in the same place.But in the order of these three parts in 4.4.1291a38-b6 are not the first mentioning of those partsin fact they are the second mentioning of those parts in Politics 4.4.In fact it was the adjudicative or judging element is the first mentioned at Politics 4.4 where Aristotle says If, then, one where to regard soul as more a part of an animal than body, things of this sortthe military element and the element sharing in justice as it relates to adjudication, and in addition the deliberative element, which is the work of political understandingmust be regarded as more a part of a [political community] than things relating to necessary needs (1291a24-29).Yet at 4.4.1291a34, a little after the above passage, he returning to the listing of the part where he left off at 1291a23.Here he then lists the well off as the seventh part (1291a34-35), then magisterial as the eight (1291a35-39), then he mentions the deliberative and the adjudicative is this final list of parts of the political community in the first half of Politics 4.4.But what is the implication of switching the ordering of the discussion the magisterial and the deliberative as he does here?It is perhaps the deliberative deals with deciding and making decisions and that is at the heart of ruling and thus it must be at that must be dealt with firstbecause all the other officesboth the magisterial and the adjudicative flow out of the deliberative.I say they flow out of the deliberative because they do decide but decide about more limited things that the deliberative element doesthe deliberative element is to decide about the most import and key issues concerning the regime.This is to say that the deliberative element deals with the whole of the regime, whereas the magisterial and adjudicative deal with specific and narrower sets of functions. In attempting to grasp what Aristotle is doing here in this last section of Politics 4, we need to realize this attempt to divide the nature of the given regime into its functional part looks all to similar to and can get easily conflated with the very common yet modern understanding of the division of powers.is the teaching about "the separation of power" teaching in Montesquieu.Although Aristotle gives us the reader of the last three chapters of Politics 4 his treatment of what he presents as the fundamental working parts of any regimethe deliberative, magisterial (that is to say the offices) and judicial functions.Yet Aristotles discussion here is NOT a teaching of separation of power as one would see in either Montesquieu or the Publius of the Federalist Paper.In Aristotle those distinctions are about the differing functions of a government.Aristotle distinguishes between functions in a political entity -- this view as Martin Diamond argues would allow for a political institution to possess one or more of the functions.Whereas for Montesquieu and his student Publius, these functions are seen as powers which for the sake of individual liberty must be separated, or else if these powers be possessed by any one body and that body would possess absolute power. Thus the separation of powers suggest that function are solely the source of one institution and not another.Aristotle's discussion allows for the possibility that one political institution could possess all three functions and not be tyrannical -- but be a good regime.It is therefore assumed the distinction of "power" to these functions indicates a change and hence deviation from Aristotle's teaching. However, Montesquieu's teaching of "separation of powers" is put in a strict historical context of how political institutions arose in England and France (etc.) and is not a generic discussion of political institution like discussion as presented in Aristotle's Politics IV (where the three functions are discussed). Montesquieu's discussion within a particular course of historical development of political institutions -- legislatures, executives and judges who exercise certain specific functions -- making laws, executing laws and adjudicating disputes about laws -- is limited by the desire to preserve "freedom" which the given political systems claim as their authoritative principle -- their regime.Did not the historical experience of the European people show that when all power was unified in the hands of the ruler of the nation state, it usually resulted in despotism.Note that power was divided in the political system of the Middle Ages between local authorities and larger Imperial authorities, as well as Church authorities of differing levels.This was not the case in the classical system of the polis, in the polis political authority was unified under a single political rule.The modern notion of political centralization is similar to the political centrality of the ancients rather than of the middle ages. Montesquieu's teaching about "the separation of powers" is a lesson from experience turned into a teaching of principle.But is it a real change from Aristotle's teaching?I would argue that as the American Constitution shows, although we have a "separation of powers" system following Montesquieu's teaching the separate powers nevertheless exercise functions, in the Aristotelian sense, which would seem not to be appropriate in a strict "separation of powers" view.Does not the Executive and Judicial engage in deliberation as does the Legislature and Executive engage in adjudication, etc.Although the powers are in fact separated creating a system of checks and balances, to insure that no one single branch of government overpowers the others and create one institution with all the powers (-- the definition of tyranny in The Federalist Papers--), nevertheless deliberative, executive and adjudicative functions are possessed by all three branches.What ultimately distinguishes them is what their institutional function ultimately is and not what is required to achieve that function.In other words, what distinguishes branches is their end ant not the means they use to achieve their ends.In this light, Montesquieu's teaching about "the separation of powers" is similarly a teaching about difference in ends rather than in means. Let us return to Aristotle and his treatment of the factions of the regime here in the last three chapters of Politics 4.In the remaining of chapter 14, Aristotle will focus on the question of the deliberative part of the regime, the part that decides and thus rules.Yet when we look at this treatment of the deliberative part we need to recall the earlier treatment of the politeuma and how they interact with each other or if they needs must do.Then Aristotle in chapter 15 will examine the offices and wrapping both this examination of the functioning parts and Book 4 as a whole in his examination of the adjudicative element. Chapter 7 On Deliberative Element What is the deliberative element?It is first mentioned in Politics 4.4.1291a27 where Aristotle lists it with the other parts of the polisin fact he lists it 9th between the magisterial offices and the adjudicative offices (4.4.1291a27-b6).Now as we return to Politics 4.14 where Aristotle begins he more detailed examination of the deliberative element we notice that unlike the Politics 4.4 ordering, the deliberative begins the discussions of the offices, and the magisterial (chapter 15) and adjudicative (chapter 16) offices follow the examination of the deliberative element. So what is the deliberative element and what does it do?It is the part of the regime that decides and makes decisions concerning the most important things that the regime must address in its ruling or governing.Thus the deliberative body or part deals with: 1) war; 2) peace; 3) alliances and their dissolution; 4) what judicial penalties that merit death, exile or confiscation of ones property or ones and ones family means to survive; and 5) the choosing and auditing of officials (1298a4-7).So clearly the deliberative element is that which decides for the regime and for the political community it shapes and governs. For the power to decide is the power to path what choices the political community will act on and what they choices they will not action on.Thus the deliberative part is thus the choosing part of the regime.Now this ought to remind us that such a part would be first and foremost found in the politeuma, the governing part of the regime (politiea).And thus we are to recall the teaching regarding the politeuma in Politics 3.7.26-31, where it seems to be synonymous with the regime (politeia).So when we are trying to understand where does the deliberative element operate, it operates within the scope of the politeuma, which is the part of the community that rules the regimethus the members of the politeuma are composed of those who are indeed citizens, those sharing in rule, in the regime. And within that body we find the deliberative element and how we find it will differ from regime to regime, as each regime will be shaped by not only a different sort of who are truly the citizens and which of those are to be truly to be understood to be a part of the politeuma. Varieties of Modes where All decide Now returning the detailed examination of the deliberative element in 4.14, after defining its scope and concernsto once again repeat them: war, peace, alliances and their dissolution, what judicial penalties that merit death, exile or confiscation of ones property or ones and ones family means to survive, andthe choosing and auditing of officials (1298a4-7)we now look at how it will be shaped or how it will function. Here we see the scope of what kind of deliberation is dealt with by this part of the regime, but that leads us to how it will be done and by whom.On this point Aristotle says: It is necessary either that all these sorts of decision be assigned to all the citizens, that all be assigned to some of the citizens (for example, by assigning all to one particular office or several, or some to some and some to others), or that some of them be assigned to all of the citizens and others to some (1298a7-9). Thus those five functions above are to be divided up by these three modes: 1) By having all those decisions to be made by all those who are held to be citizens in the regime and have an active share in ruling. 2) By assigning this decision function to some number of those who are citizensthis is what we call representative government as those who are chosen and again this can be arranged where (a) one office is created and all those who are chosen are members of it or (b) create several offices where some are put on one and others another. And lastly the division of some of the 5 functions be assigned to all the citizens together and others of the functions to be delegated to an office composed of one or few citizens to decide (1298a9) Now Aristotle makes a very important point here, when he says [n]ow that all decide concerning all is characteristically popular; for the people seek this sort of equality (1298a10-11). Thus the view where all must decide on all things is the view inclined by the demos, the people as well as those whom are inclined towards the democratic regime.The view that many being equal, all should rule together, else if rule is divided or given over to a few or to one, the demos hold leads to the rule of those people who decide and not what the people collectively would decide.Hence the popular view of Aristotle time was suspicious of representational offices in that such offices give power to a few and the rule by a few is often held by oligarchic in character. Yet, some oligarchic regimes do have a form where all the citizens, that is all the oligarchs, all decide together.So what is being talked here is not simply the democratic principle that all should vote, but rather the view that all who are citizens of the regime (and who is a citizen in one style of regime may not be a citizen in another) ought to equally share in ruling.Thus, the view, that all who are citizens ought to collectively decide, is very much the line of argument of those who champion participatory democracy. But again those who desire such participatory democratic also seek to expand who is a citizen, and thus who really truly has a vote in the decision, to the widest possible number.From grasping the meaning of how the principle that all decide concerning all things is democratic in principle, we have to turn to the differing ways this way of deciding is to be carried out.He points out that there are several modes in which all decide (1298a12). By this Aristotle is pointing to ways by which all can come to decide.Thus he seems to be pointing to the modes by which all citizens can be engaged in the collective decision process.About this Aristotle says that there are four modes of having all decide.The first mode is to have the citizens each rule by turns (1298a13-14). The example he gives for such a procedure is the regime of Telecles of Miletus (1298ab14). Now regarding this regime of Telecles nothing is know about this regime, so the reference that Aristotle gives has not surivied from his time to offer us now any clue to what is meant by this ruling in turn.So the example of Telecles is rather useless for us in order to understand what he is talking about. From what is presented in the text, to rule in turn would be a way one person rules for a day.This assumes the one selected to rule would be replaced by someone to rule the text day, assuming daily turns. We see something like this process in the Presidency of the EU where the country hosting the Presidency goes in turns among the member-states, each holding it for a 6 month period.Adding to this form of ruling by turns after mentioning the example of Telecles, Aristotle notes the following as a variety of this given mode: and there are other regimes in which deliberation is carried out by officials meeting jointly, with all entering office by turns from the tribes and the smallest parts of the city until all have been gone through, and they meet [all together] only concerning legislation or matters affecting the regime, or to listen to announcements by the officials (1298a15-20). Thus in this mode they (all the citizens) will each enter office in turns from one group to another (as is done in Athens) or by some mode by which they divide themselves, until all the citizens have held a turn, then they go about again and againonly meeting together either to address the most significant regime effecting matters (which ought to be rare) or to hear announcements by other official within the regime. About this particular mode of arranging the deliberative element, Carnes Lord notes: The practice of governing through joint official boards (synarchiai) seems to have become fairly common by Aristotles day. The smallest parts referred to here would seem to be political subdivisions of the type of the quarters (dmoi) of Athens (Lord 2013, 121n53).Regarding the next mode, it is when all the citizens decide together but meet only with a view of limited number of concerns (for example1) choosing officials, 2) making laws or passing legislation, 3) dealing with issues of war and peace, and 4) conducting audits) yet regarding other matters deliberation is carried out through offices arranged to deal with each sort of thing, and the offices are chosen from all by election or by lot (1298a19-24). Aristotle here gives us no examples here and what he says here seems rather clear.What is interesting about those offices to whom decisions about those other matters (other than the just mentioned four concerns) is now to be delegated are either to be selected by an election where the citizens vote out of all of their fellow citizens whom should hold what office or by lot. Now of these two ways of selection election by lot seems to be the most efficient then election by voters casting ballots for whom they want if the number of citizens is rather large.One need to remember Condorcets Paradox and other issues of the mechanism of majority decision making which points to the fact as the number of people voting and the number of possible choices is not somehow severely limited the likelihood of getting a majority winner significantly decreases with the amount of voters and of choices (Shepsle 2010, 53-89). But in smaller communities, when actual people picking whom they want is less difficult than in large population communities, so these two methods of election remain. The next mode ofall ruling is when the citizens get together in connection with offices and audits and to deliberate about war and peace and about alliances, while other matters are administered by offices that are chosen by election to the extent possible [rather than by lot] those in which it is necessary to have knowledgeable persons ruling (1298a24-28). Thus although citizen gather or assemble to deliberate matters 1) involving offices within the regime, 2) audits of those offices, and 3) to deliberate about war and peace and things regarding alliances.As for other matters they are to be administered by others.But here the mode of selection is one where the preference is for election of people, where you choose the person and the reason for this is to choose the best person.Now election by lot is still an option, but its for this mode its the least preferable because the reason why one is selecting officers here is there is some specific knowledge involved in ruling or performing the given function (1298a28-29). The forth mode of all ruling is said to echo the last form of democracy mentioned in Politics 4.4. and 4.6.This forth mode, Aristotle says: is when all meet to deliberate on all matters, while the offices decide on nothing but merely make preliminary decisions. This is the mode in which the final sort of democracy the sort that we assert bears comparison with dynastic oligarchy and tyrannical monarchy administers itself now (1298a29-33). Here this mode by which all are involved in the acting of deciding is both the most radically democratic and tyrannical in character and habit. But we need to remember what Aristotle said about this form of democracy at Politics 4.4.1292a4-37 and later at Politics 4.6.1293a1-11 where the real cause of its rule being akin in character and habit to tyranny is that the rulers are not to be bound by the law but by their desires, that they rule by decree and the law is what ever they decree it to be. Also in that last democracy at Politics 4.4.1292a4-37 and later at Politics 4.6.1293a1-11 the rise of demagogues are explicitly remarked on that enflame the rulers (the many in the assemblys) passions and desires and they not being bound by law succumb to the flattery and suggestions of the oligarchs.Now this can be for good or ill, but usually the trend is for the ill more than the betterits a matter of the chance nature and character of the demagogue.If the demagogue has a bad nature or character things will most likely end badly.But even if the nature and character of the demagogue is noble and good, the outcome could also likewise turn badechoing that famous line about the path to hell being covered with great intentions.Thus the last mode of where all decide leaves us relooking at what came earlier and see that if this one is the form that is also the one found in the most tyrannical of the varieties of democratic regime, what about the others.There seems to be an implicit assumption that this form being associated with ill rule, is perhaps less choiceworthy than the other three modes discussed earlier.But what about those earlier forms we have little to see what and how they are merited, except the 1st mode in its larger form is said to be more common when Aristotle is writing (Lord 2013, 121n53). Other than that we have little to choose one of the top three being more choiceworthy than the others. Now again Aristotle make it clear that the principle of all decidingis implicitly democratic in its character.If the democratic principle is when all should decide, then the principle that some ought to decide in all matters is held to be oligarchic (1298a34).So from the earlier mode of four seem to address democratic modes, here we now are to be given oligarchic modes.And we must remember that in oligarchies what is the principle is not so much some or few rule, but that the rich or those with means (poroi) rule.So the mode of selection who not only can vote but also who is eligible to decide is based on an assessment of their means (poroi) or wealth. In oligarchies, its those whom have means or wealth who are understood to be the citizens, that is those who rule. Again we must clearly understand that what Aristotle means by the citizen is different than most understand citizenship today.Today citizenship is understood more as a status of being a member of a community.Thus citizenship is understood as something like nationality, the place where one is from and under whose laws one is governed by.Most of our contemporary understanding of citizenship conflates it with being a subject that is being a subject to a system of laws or rules.For Aristotle there was a clear distinction between being a subject and a citizen, in that a citizen is one who shares in rule of the community.Thus to be a citizen is to rule, to govern, either directly or indirectly.Whereas being a subject means one is governed by and ruled by others. So when we are talking about deliberating here, who is deliberating are only the citizens and only the citizens. So the previous account of the mode of deliberating where all decidewhose character and principle is said to be democraticcould be operative either in a democracy or an oligarchy. That is to say that if the regime is only rich and only the rich are citizens, then even if they all decide and deliberate in any of the four mode mention above, the regime would be an oligarchy whose mode of deliberating was democratic in principle. From the varieties of Modes where all decide to those where some decide As move to examination of what comes next where after examining the modes where all decide Aristotle turns to the modes where some or few decide. In the text Aristotle says [a]ll these modes, then , are democratic, while having some decide in all matters is oligarchic (1298a34)and offers the transition from the form where all decide to the form where some decide.And where the former was seen to be democratic in character, the latter is seen to be oligarchic.But again we need to remember these form of some deciding is not nor will not be exclusive to the deliberative element of only oligarchic regimethere can be a democratic regime where the organizational form of the deliberative element is set to where some not all decide and that regime would still be democraticalthough that particular form of the deliberative element would be at odds with the democratic inclination (which as was said above favors all deciding). Like the first set of modes where all decided, these sets of modes are likewise four in number, something we find out only after the presentation of the different modes. In fact what Aristotle says about the varieties of mode of some deciding is that [it] too has several varieties (1298a35). Now this is similar to what occurred in the presentation of the modes for all deciding, we find out there are four forms at the end where the fourth form is addressed.But before we can contrast the two presentations we need to present the ways the form of some rule are. The first mode, Aristotle says is [w]here they are elected on the basis of moderate assessments and are numerous because of the moderateness of the assessment, where they do not attempt change in matters where the laws forbid it but instead follow the laws, and where it is open to anyone possessing the assessment to take part in deliberation, such an oligarchy is, by the fact of its moderateness, a political one (1298a35-40).1Notice what begins as an explanation of the particular mode by which some will come to decide ends up labeling this practice as creating a very moderate oligarchy where its form will be more political (which I understand to mean to be governing for the benefit of the community, not merely part and thus rule over unwilling peoples and thus having to rely on force to maintain oneself) of in character than despotic.But lets focus on the form of the mode before focusing on the direction the 1Here I prefer the understanding of the 1298a38-40 text of Peter Simpson (Simpson 1997, 198) and Lords earlier(Lord 1984, 140)than that of Lords second (Lord 2013, 121), where he raises the specter of polity in this passage.The Greek reads oligarchia men politike de estin he toiaute dia to metriachein; so to translate politike as if it were politeia is a bit of imposing one interpretation upon the translation. mode pushes the regime.Here the some who decide will be chosen on the basis of an assessment of their wealth and/or means (poroi) which is set low and it is set by a law which is not to be changed. Thus to change the law would be thus to change the regime and so here is a case where a particular mode of shaping the deliberative element seems to determine a particular form of regimea moderate oligarchic one.But we need to recall slightly that the second democracy of Politics 4.4 and the first democracy of Politics 4.6 also had assessments to them and would not such a principle be also true for that form of democracy?So what appears to be only for an oligarchic regime also might be suitable for a particular form of democracy where low assessments determine who is a citizen and who is not. Let us now turn to the next modewhich is where the ones who decide will be elected or chosen.Now what he says is When all do not take part in deliberation but only those elected to do so, and they rule in accordance with law, it is oligarchic as before (1298b1-2) Here we are told that if the deliberative body is are to be some not all of the citizens whom are chosen or elected by their fellow citizens and rule according under the law such a mode is oligarchic in form.Now this suggest that the mode of selectionthat is election or voting to choose this one rather than that citizenis that what makes this mode oligarchic in character.The view is to elect by lot is the truly democratic principle because since all are equal it does not really matter that one is chosen over the other, but to chose one over the other has an implication that one chosen is more choiceworthy and thus better than the others not-chosenand such implies an inequality that the one who chooses notices in one but is absent or missing in the other who is not chosen. The third mode is that of dynastic selection, where the ones who hold the office of deciding choose themselves and where son succeeds father in holding the office (1298b2-4). Now Aristotle here says this arrangement is also oligarchic (1298b4-5). But notice the principle here is dynastic succession where the ones (or perhaps one) deciding chooses themselves and passes on the power to decide for the regime and the political community on to their children.Now the mode of operation and not the number who is doing the deciding is the issue and as such why is this more oligarchic than monarchial.In fact when the examination of dynastic succession arising in oligarchies are addressed in Politics 4.5.1292b5-11 and 4.6.1293a26-34 where such succession is a characteristic of monarchic rule and the last form, where the rule of law is abandoned, is said to be tyrannical in character. But this third mode actually is two separate modes in that one question is the self-election of those who hold officethat is those who have the authority over such deliberations choose who will hold their office nextand the process of dynastic replacement are two separate modes. As we turn turning to another mode, Aristotle here raises a 'but' to what was just said about the form of dynastic succession.Now what is presented here as a 'but' offers a different version of the issue of the means by which the "some who are to decide" are to be chosen or appointed.Aristotle writes: But when some have authority in some matters [and all in some]for example, when all have it concerning war and peace and audits, and officials in other matters, these being chosen either by election or by lotit is aristocracy or a regime. If persons chosen by election have authority in some matters and persons chosen by lot in others, with those chosen by lot being chosen either simply [from all] or from a preselected group, or if persons chosen by election and by lot have authority in common, these are features on the one hand of an aristocratic regime, and on the other of a regime (1298b5-12) So what we get here is a mixed picture where the various matters of deliberation are divided up and some of these matters are to be decided by people who have been either chosen by lot and others issues by those elected by those who can vote.Now this particular mode is either aristocratic or like the rule of a regimewhere as when election is the method of selection is held to be aristocratic in character and where lot is the method it is held to be like a regime.2The next dimension of this mixed mode, is the group of those whom are chosen.If they are chosen from all the citizenssuch a decision would have the character of a regime.And if they are to be selected from a pre-selected group, such implies that not all are equally meriting selection or being chosen and thus have an aristocratic character. .This last mode is a very complex mode of dividing the authority to decide on issues into distinct bodies that have responsibility for different matters actually offers four outcomes: 1) some from all elected by vote, some from all by lot; 2) some elected from a list of selected individuals, some chosen by lot from a list of selected individuals; 2 I will not here deal with the general issue of the regime form called regime, I deal with that in chapter 7.By the regime like rule in contradistinction to aristocratic rule, I take to mean that regime-like rule is to rule people politically, that is by ruling and being ruled in term and hence treating people generally equally, whereas to rule aristocratically is that he best would rule over the lest best and such is the rule by unequals. 3) some from all elected by vote and some chosen by lot from a list of selected individuals; And 4) some elected from a list of selected individuals, some chosen from all by lot. So if you add these four possible out come to the earlier modes of some deciding you have eight different varieties in the mode of selecting some to have authority such matters. So if one were to give the list here it would look like this: Modes of all deciding 1.All ruling by turns 2.Where Fundamental issues are dealt with by all, on other less key issues they are deal specific offices established to deal with it, who are (a) chosen by lot (b) elected by vote 3.Like Above, but for the most part the lesser or more technical decisions to made by offices that for the most part elected. 4. The Four Mode:All decide about everything together, where the offices are there to make preparations and preliminary decisions Modes of some deciding 1.Open to all who meet the low asses- ment set by law unchangeable. 2. Few are elected (chosen) to decide 3. Those who are the in the offices that have the power to decide choose who next hold office. 4. When sons replace fatherin dynastic fashion 5. Mixed Variation (a)some from all elected by vote, some from all by lot (b)some elected from a list of selected individuals, some chosen by lot from a list of selected individuals (c) some from all elected by vote and some chosen by lot from a list of selected individuals (d) some elected from a list ofselected individuals, some chosenfrom all by lot Now Aristotle end his presentation of the modes of both the decision by all and decision by some.Wrapping up the presentation of the modes of the deliberative element Aristotle writes [t]he deliberative element is distinguished in relation to the regimes in this manner, then, and each regime administers matters in accordance with the definition mentioned (1298b12-13).This is to say that each regime will choose the mode that best suits the regime.Thus modes that have oligarchic forms and those that have democratic forms will be suited to the regime in connection what it wants.If the democratic regime seeks to make itself more democratic it will choose the forth mode of deliberation of all deciding, whereas a more moderate democratic regime would not. What is very interesting here is how the modes of arranging the deliberative element mirror or echo the variations within the presentation of democratic and oligarchic regime in Politics 4.4-4.6.You see this with the forth mode for all deciding echoing the last democracy of both Politics 4.4 and 4.6, and the 4th mode of some deciding echoing the forth form of Oligarchy in Politics 4.5 and 4.6. And the remainder of 4.13 will look at the way the different regimes shape and order its choice of modes for the deliberative body within their given regime. He will first turn to democratic regimes then later to other regimes on how to use these various modes of the deliberative element to shape the direction one would like move the regime towards.This is to say, some choices of modes will allow a regime to rule better and choices of other modes may lead to the regime working less well or radicalizing and creating the means by which revolution or regime change will occur. He first turns to the last democracy of Politics 4.4 and 4.6, on how you order the rules regarding attendance in attending the deliberative body where all will decide. He notes: In the sort of democracy which is now most particularly held to be democracy (I mean, the sort in which the people has authority even over the laws), it is advantageous with a view to deliberating better to do the same thing that is done in regard to the courts in oligarchies. For they arrange to fine for nonattendance those they want to have adjudicate to ensure that they do adjudicate, while the popular sort provide pay for the poor.This should be done in regard to assemblies as well. For all will deliberate better when they do so in common the people with the notables and these with the multitude. (1298a13-21). Thus by penalizing those whom one would want to participate but they have better things to do, this balancing make the deliberative element more closely similar to the balance of the people in the regime.If the wealthy opt out, they will be under-represented in the decision process and that will lead to unbalanced choices. So such a law penalizing those who fail to go to the deliberations moderates the regime, where as without such a lawwhose character is similar to the practices of the courts in oligarchies as Aristotle mentionsthe radicalizes as the decisions more and more are at the advantage of the poor and often at the expense of the others (be they the rich, the better off, the wiser, etc). The general tendency in such regime is not to fine non-attendance but rather paying the poor to attend.Now this policy, favored by democrats, and is popular by the poor who now see attending the assembly as a way to survive and a means to live rather than by hard labor for others. The danger here is the wealthy and the better off who have better things and the pay one gets hardly covers the cost of what would be lost to them if they attended rather than attended to their own affairsleading to the poor having an incentive to attend where as the rich and well off a disincentive.So this moderating this mode by the law about fine or pay leads to different consequences. Aristotle not addresses the issues of proportions of each group within the political community and the need to balance their interests in the deliberative body if the city is to be well governed in the eyes of all parties. The need for balance occurs not only within groups but even from the different locations and areas within the community as well.To have more from one part or area and less from another might lead to disproportionally, which Aristotle will discuss in Politics 5, which can lead to the rise of factional conflict.On this issues Aristotle says: It is also advantageous if those who deliberate are chosen by election or by lot in equal numbers from the parts of the city; and where the popular sort among the citizens greatly exceed the notables in number, it is advantageous too either not to provide pay for all but only for as many as will balance the multitude of notables, or else to exclude the excess by lot [from participating] (1298b21-26). What is especially interesting is to contract what Aristotle says above with what thinkers like Hegel, Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill about the need for proportional representation in deliberative bodies if there is to be true representation within them. Such policies are for Mill and Hegel a matter of principle, whereas for Aristotle a matter of prudence and what one is trying to do regarding the given regime.If proportionality leads to better governing then such moves would make sense.But if they dont, rather they lead to other pathologies, such as too great control by elites or the notables, this might lead to the regime changing from one form to another either by incremental practice or by revolutionary reaction by grieved parties by this trend.After dealing with this example from democracies, he now turns his attention to examples that arise from oligarchic regimes.Aristotle saysIn oligarchies it is advantageous either to elect additionally certain persons from the multitude to serve as officials, or to establish an official board of the sort that exists in some regimes, made up of those they call preliminary councillors or law guardians, and to [have a popular assembly that will] take up only that business which is considered in the preliminary council; for in this way the people will share in deliberating but will not be able to overturn anything connected to the regime (1298b27-33.)What Aristotle raises here is the giving certain body, who will be composed of the people, the multitude the ability to have a say but not overturn the regime.Here one thinks of the Roman practice in the Republic of the people tributesto whom the people could appeal if they thought the Consuls or the Senate was being too harsh or acting unfairly toward the peoples interests.Thus it gives the many a voice and some ability to influence or have input into decisions, but not power to do things that would harm or change the regime. On this line of thinking about how oligarchic regime can shape the nature or make up of the deliberating element so as the regime will work better.Aristotle writes, Further, it is advantageous to have the people vote on measures which are either the same as those brought before them [by a preliminary council] or not contrary to them, or to allow all to advise but the officials to deliberate. Here the opposite of what occurs in regimes should be done: the multitude should be given authority to veto measures but not to pass their own, these being referred to the officials (1298b33-39).Aristotle thus suggests the multitude have some level of input on measures, but what should happen is they should be allowed to give input that will advise but then allow the official(s) to decide. Thus what is important is the ability of the many in such a regime to have means to advise those who are deciding and feel that their advice was taken seriously by those making the decision. To do as the regimes, especially the popular regimes do, that is to give the desired group a veto would be rather problematic in such an oligarchic forms of regime. Now turning to the practice of regimes (especially popular ones) where the many usually are the rulers.In order to give the few or a minority some power, they arrange that the few have authority to veto measures but not to pass them; measures of the latter sort are always referred to the many (1298b39-40).Here the practice of this regime is to give a veto to the well off or rich, not merely giving them a voiceas they already have a voice, but their smaller size within the regime makes their voice less effect against the interest and superior number of the multitude. Thus what is suitable to regimes (especially popular ones) is opposite to what is suited to oligarchic regimes in this case.3 With wrapping up this point, Aristotle ends his discussion of the deliberative element. He ends this chapter saying by addressing the question of deciding or deliberating, he was also addressing the question of ruling and being authoritative in the regime (1299a1). For Aristotle the deliberative is the ruling part or the part that is authoritative within the given regime.Again we need to realize the source of authority in Aristotle here is the power of deciding and that is tied to judging wellwhich is understood as the use of reason appropriate for such thingphronesis, or from the Latin 3 Now if the polity view of this use of politeia in this passage would be correct, such contradiction between the so-called polity and the oligarchy on this matter would be contra to teaching that so-called polity is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy as some hold.For my discussion on this debate about so-polity see chapter 7. term, prudence. Again in few contract the discussion of deliberation to what Modern political thought has in substitution of deliberationlegislation.This does not mean there is no legislation in Aristotle, but rather the Modern thinkers from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel on stress the centrality and import of legislation.Again, this occurs because the emphasis of the modern on the will rather than reasonand deliberation is very much concerned with reasoning well. Chapter 8 On the Offices As we move to from our examination of the deliberative element, we not turn to chapter 4.15 whose focus on the offices within the regime and their variety and differences.Aristotle notes that this part of the regime also involves many differences (1299a3) that like the different modes that the deliberative element too shape, the offices likewise will vary and how they vary will both is shaped and shapes the given regime.This is to say that the variety and shape that the offices take and the variety of their scope will necessarily differ from regime to regime. In an attempt to examine the offices and their function within a regime, Aristotle seems to have raises five question (1299a3-13):1.[H]ow many offices are there? 2.What do they have authority concerning? 3.The length of time of each offices term. 4.Should the office be permanent, for a long duration or temporary? 5.Who should be selected for an office, who should do the selecting, and how should they be selected?Aristotle says from those five questions one should be able to distinguish how many modes can exist, and then fit the sorts of offices to the sorts of regimes for which they are advantageous (1299a13-14). Aristotle says that in a political community there is a need for many functionaries and not all of these functionaries (who many chosen by election or lot) ought to be understood to be as official of the regime (1299a15-7). This is why Aristotle says it is not easy to know which office should be called an office (1299a15). He gives the example of priests, which he says must be something apart from the political offices as well as equippers and heralds, and also envoys, [whom] are [also] chosen by election but these are not to be seen as official with authority within the regime (1299a17-20). Regarding how one ought to distinguish the offices Aristotle gives us this division:Of the sorts of supervision some are political, and are either over all of the citizens with a view to a certain action (as, for example, a general is over them when they are campaigning) or over a part (for example, the manager of women or the manager of children); some are related to management of the household (for they often elect grain measurers); and some are servile, and of such a character that cities that are well off arrange to have slaves do them (1299a19-25). So here we have a nice sorting system to divide the different type of functionaries within a political community to distinguish them from one another by their function and what that function is regarding.We can divide between those functions that are Political and sub-political in that the political ones deal with the community (or a part of it) as a whole, whereas the sub-political deals with those functions that likewise occur within the household (oikos) as well and those that are servile (like care of the trash or waste, etc).Of the political functions, which have concern for a specific action or concern for the political community, these are to be divided between those that have authority over all the citizens (such a general in campaign) or a part or class of the citizens (such as the manager of women or the manager of children).Of the sub-political the division is between those that deal with the household (oikos) and those that are servile. After this discussion over what are truly offices and are not, Aristotle now gives us a general rule.He says: Simply speaking, those should be most particularly spoken of as offices to which are assigned both deliberation and judgment concerning certain matters and command, but most particularly the latter, for command is more characteristic of ruling. But these things make almost no difference with a view to use, as no judgment has ever been handed down to anyone disputing over the term, though there is room for some further treatment of them in thought (1299a25-31). Thus what simply distinguishes what is truly an office from mere functionaries is that offices commandthat they exercise the authority to rule and to act for the political community and on behalf of it. But notice here the offices that command are assigned both deliberation and judgment concerning certain matters (1299a27).So what would distinguish the offices from the deliberating element that was addressed in the Politics 4.14, is that the latter deliberate and exercise judgment concerning what generally ought to be done and about questions that effect the nature and direction of the regime itself, were as to the officestheir exercise of deliberation and judgment is limited in scope and concern.Thus the offices are thus subordinated to the deliberating element of the regime in that the latter exercises the greatest authority and power than the former.The power and function of the offices are usually shaped by the deliberating element of the regime.Now yes, the offices exercise deliberation and judgment but such exercise is limited to what the function of the office and what it is concerned with. In modern political thought, when speaking about the offices or the magistrates within a regime, this is referred to as the executive.And the executive is one who executes or carries out deliberated decisions.Now Aristotle does not explicitly address what modern political thought calls executive power, but he does speak of commanding and ruling.And thus this discussion of the offices shows the commanding and ruling that deals with exercising certain functions for the regime. What Sort and How Many? After dealing with the question what is the proper concern of the offices one would assume that Aristotle would start flushing out the five questions regarding the offices he started his examination of them with.And at first glance this is what looks what comes next, but looking closely at what he does he breaks with the initial order he gives the questions regarding the offices.Instead he goes to say [w]hich sort and how many offices are necessary for a city to exist, and what sort are not necessary but rather useful with a view to a serious (spoudaian) regime, are questions one can raise in relation to every regime, but especially in the case of small cities (1299a32-35).Thus the kind of offices and their number are to be dealt with together not separately as the initial listing at 4.15.1299a5-6, but instead raised in connection between 1) the issue of what is necessary for a political community to exist and what is useful for that political community to have serious regime and 2) the size of the political community.The first suggest that there is a difference between what is necessary for the political community to exist and what is useful for it to have a serious regime.Now the latter points to what must be and the latter points to what is advantageous to be.Thus one could still have a political community without the latter, but not without the former. Before turning to the question of size, let me address an interesting point.Notice here that Aristotle does not speak about the good regime but the serious (spoudaian) regime. This echoes very much the discussion found in Politics 3.4 where Aristotle discusses the differences the good man vs the good citizenwhere he shifts between not only the good agathos but also the serious spoudaios man and citizen (see Bates 2003, 40-46).Now in the Politics 3.4 text serious was used over good (agathos or kalos) because the connection of the citizen to the type of regime and the differences of regimes would lead to differences regarding what would be expected of a citizen within that regime.The serious citizen was the one who best approximated that regimes understanding of what is just and goodthat regimes understanding of artevirtue or excellence. And thus avoid suggesting the relativity of the good and virtue or excellence, Aristotle choose to use serious rather than good.Thus its use here at Politics 3.15 suggest the regime here is not to be confused with the best regime or the regime that is simply good (agathon) but rather regimes that are serious about ruling well and not only surviving but flourishing.4 Now let us address the other issue raised by the concern for size of the given political community and how this affects the sort and numbers of offices that are either necessary or useful. Now initially he says this concern is one especially so for small political communities (1299a35).But now that he gets into the discussion he first talks about large ones. Regarding large political communities he says that they can and should arrange to have a single office to handle a single task: because there are many citizens, many persons can take up office, the offices being held after a long interval or only once, and each sort of task is better done when the care (or supervision) of it is handled as a single matter rather than together with many other matters (1299a35-40). Notice that large political communities are both able to and ought to assign a single task to a single office because they have enough persons to spread about and take on such concerns. Also, in large political communities, he suggest it is possible that offices can be held after a long interval or only once is very much tied to the amount of citizens who are eligible to take up the task of such an office there are within the community.If there are large number of people capable of dealing with that task then rotating them and limiting holding that office once per person makes sense.If such is not the case then allowing those who are capable of holding office for a long interval would make sense. 4 Thus to be serious is to take seriously what is the meaning of Eu Prattomenthe last word in Platos Republicwhich both means both being or fairing well (eu) and doing well (eu). Now in regard dividing offices to deal with single tasks rather than bundling tasks together, here again the size of the number of citizens who are able to address such tasks effect the choice to assign separate tasks to separate offices or to bundle tasks together.Hence the ability to engage in the division of labor in such tasks becomes not only possible but necessarily if the regime is to function well.But the ability to divide the tasks about is very much tied whether or not one has enough capable citizens to hold such offices or not.If one has enough citizens with the necessary skills or abilities to perform the given tasks then one both can engage in such a political division of labor.But when there is a dearth of talented or skilled citizens then your choices are likewise limited.We will see this more clearly when Aristotle will discuss small political communities. Regarding small political communities, Aristotle notes that many offices are given to a smaller number of people (1299b1-2).Given that smaller communities will have much fewer people in them than larger one, thus the amount of people with the necessary skills and abilities to execute the necessary tasks for the political community tend to be much more limited.Aristotle says, Because of the lack of manpower it is not easy to have many persons in the offices, for if this were the case, who will be those who succeed them? Sometimes small cities need the same offices and laws as large ones; but the latter need them often, while the former do only at long intervals. Hence, there is nothing to prevent small cities from mandating that they supervise many things at once (1299a2-8).The lack of people able to fill the jobs is simply not there, so either you let the ones who can do, do.And given the fact that those who can do different are often the same group of peoplethat is to say people with skills are more likely have other skills that are needed as well that others in the community dont have.And because of this, Aristotle says, that those who have the skills to do the tasks will not interfere with one another (1299b8).This is to say they will too much to do and too few people who can do it, so most of these will not be interesting in seeking to do more and thus leave other tasks to other people. Also he notes that in such small political communities that account of the lack of manpower it is necessary for them to make their boards of officials like spit-lamps (1299b8-10).Now the example Aristotle gives needs some explanation. The term obeliskoluchnia means a spit used as a lamp holder.Joe Sachs notes that this item is a roasting-spit made to double as a lamp-stand, for use on military campaigns (Sachs 2012, 132n132.Carnes Lord says the term implies this item is an item with a dual purpose (Lord 2013, 124n56). Yet, Sachs suggest that the dual purpose does to echo the example of the Delphic knife mentioned at 1252b2, [which is] an all-purpose implement for carving, but something designed to combine two unrelated functions (Sachs 2012, 132n132). So in smaller political communities given the smaller size of the pool of skilled people and their range of combined skill sets you might have offices being assigned tasks of unrelated functions given the skill set of the people holding the office. So the amount of people with the necessary (and also useful) skills that one has within a given political community will very much determine the question of how many offices are needed and what things do offices deal with.He shows this when Aristotle says[i]f, we are able to say how many offices necessarily belong to every [political community] and how many [offices] are not necessary but ought to be there, the one who knew this could more easily combine into a single office the sort of official functions it is fitting to combine(1299b10-14).5What Aristotle seems to suggest that having this ability is much more needed in shaping the offices for a regime of a small political community than a larger onein that given the lack of people with the needed skill and the overlap of skills in people with the needed given skills the overlapping of functions to offices is much more difficult a question than for larger political communities with large pool of skilled individuals. But would this skill also be needed in a large political community but where the pools of people with the required skills were very small and those persons with the necessary skills often had other needed skills that others lacked?So the ability to know what function ought to be combined with what office is not only true regarding small communities, but also in communities that knowledge is not widely dispersed among the citizen population.While dealing with this issue Aristotle brings our attention to something that is fitting not to neglect, which is knowledge of what sort of matters should be supervised by many boards on a local basis and over what sort a single office should everywhere have authority (1299b15-16).He suggest that some issues or matters ought to be supervised by a number of official bodies on the local basisthat is close to where the matter needs to be addressed.Others should have one official supervising that issue through the political community.Thus some issues and concerns are uniform throughout and general for the given political community and thus can be and ought to be under the 5 On this passage I found Sachs 2012, 132-133 both more on target and clearer than Lord 2013, 124. care of one office or responsible body.Whereas, other concerns or functions are so tied to local situations and those conditions will vary in different areas or localities within a given political community that to assign it to one office or responsible body would make it more difficult for that office to work well. Now the examples he gives hit this point homethat market-managers ought to have authority over a specific market would very much depend on the nature of the given market in question (1299b17). Different types of markets, different market managersfor the not people have the same level of knowledge regarding all kinds of good. Thus markets of different kinds of goods need market managers who are knowledgeable about those goods and their value. Now the reason why jurisdictions of offices need to be taken account is very much tied to whether arrangement of offices to the matters they are tasked to address is orderliness or in good order, or not. This is to say making sure the offices are not only rightly tasked but the tasking is done in such a way that the effectiveness of the arrangement is highlighted. If the market is very large, it would be rather difficult for a single official to effectively supervise italso even if the given office might be composed of more than one official, again the size of the community and the amount of activities being done by that community will effect this question greatly.So to summarize up to now this discussion not only do we need to know 1) what offices are needed.But 2) which function can be incorporated with another function in a given office.Yet it is also needful to know 3) are the given concern or task something of local specific or universal and generally uniformits scope of authority or jurisdiction.But now, Aristotle raises another questionwhether one should distinguish offices on the basis of their activity or of the human beings they supervise (1299b18-19).Or in other words, should the offices be distinguished between what is being supervised or who is supervised. Aristotle then attempts to clarify this point by raising the question of educationshould there be one office addressing education throughout the regime or should there be a separate office for education of women, and another office for the education of children?Now this again deals with the question of orderliness or effectiveness.What would be more effective would also be dependant how many persons with suitable knowledge were available to fill such postif very few then one is kind of limited with how one can arrange such an office.But if you have a much larger pool of talented candidates then things can be arranged more effectively and allow more care for specialization of focus or the part of the community being assigned to cover. Regime Specificity The next concern is regarding the offices and the question of the regime. Now he asks whether the difference in the given regime will also lead to a difference in the offices.Will the types of offices vary per regime? (1299b21)Aristotle asks: whether the same offices have authority in, for example, a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, but are not made up of equal [numbers of] nor similar sorts of persons, but rather of different sorts in different regimes (in aristocracies, for example, of the educated, in oligarchies of the wealthy, and in democracies of the free), or whether it happens that certain of the offices exist as a result of these very differences, and that in some cases the same offices are advantageous, while in others they differ (for it is fitting for the same to be large here, small there) (1299b22-30). The suggestion is that different regimes will have different sort of people who are citizens of the regime and thus be the pool of people to be eligible for the offices under that regime.The assumption is that a given regime will not compose the offices equally of the same sorts of people that another regime would.And that among regimes, different sort of people are favored over the others.For example this chart would spell it out: Type of regimeThe Type of People Favored 1)Aristocracy The educated 2)Oligarchy The wealthy (plousios) 3)DemocraciesThe Free 4)Monarchy [the group is not specified] It is interesting that of the regimes verities that he mentions here only monarchy has no corresponding group.If by this means there is no such group for that group, or that he would rather stay silent regarding the group fitting for monarchy one does not know.On the relativity of the office to the various regimes, Aristotle starts to flush out the ways that given regimes will favor certain offices or shape them in certain ways.Aristotle notes: Some offices are indeed peculiar to particular regimes, such as that of the proboulon; this is not democratic, whereas a council (boule) is popular (of the demos). For there should be something of this latter sort which takes care of the proboulon for the people, so that they can pursue their occupations; this is oligarchic [only] when they are few in number. But the number of the proboulon is necessarily few, and so this is necessarily oligarchic (1299b31-35). Now the proboulon is a council (boule) that pre-deliberates things.6Buy pre-deliberate is to deliberate beforehand, that is a body or office that will deliberates a matter before others will decide or approve it. Now Aristotle says that such a body inclines a regime oligarchic direction. Now such pre-deliberation bodies might occur in a democratic regime.Aristotle states that if the body is composed of many citizens then it is less 6 Carnes Lord translated proboulon a preliminary councillors, where as Peter Simpson (1997) translated it as pre-councillors and Joe Sachs (2012) translated it as pre-councilordiffering from Simpson by the single rather double l.Now I am not happy with any of these translations of ton proboulon as pre-council is not that clear and pro-council evokes the Roman pro-councils which was an ruling office over a foreign distant territory for the Republic and later the Empire. Because of these two points I will opt to leave it in the Greek.Now such a practice can be found in contemporary political practicefor example the role the British Cabinet plays in pre-deliberating policy decisions before bringing them whole House for a vote.Or the role committees play in the US Congress where issues are discussed more in detail in Committee (and in sub-committee) and the committee shapes the way the legislation is to be framed worded and if it goes to the floor [although the whole chamber can force a committee to end debate and send the bill to the whole chamber for a voteby the process called Cloture.But as to the name to this general practice there is none that is generally used.So lack such a term for this process, I thought it best to leave the Greek term alone. oligarchic than then it is composed of a few persons.The fewer such a pre-deliberating office or body has in it, the more and more oligarchic it is. Aristotle points to where both these offices exist, the proboulon have been established as a counter to the council (boule); for the council (boule) is popular, the proboulon oligarchic (1299a36-37). Again this might be done to give the power to block or check the power of the ruling force within the regime. He points to a counter casewhere even the council (boule) can be overpowered by the citizen per se: Yet even the power of the council is overturned in those sorts of democracies in which the people themselves meet and transact all business. This is usually the result when those coming to the assembly are either well off or get pay [to attend]; for as they have leisure they can collect together frequently and decide all things themselves (1300a1-5). This example offers a radically democratic mode that after a council (boule) has deliberated about a policy or decision the whole body of the citizenry must approve. Now even in an oligarchy where all the citizens vote to ratify what a council (boule) has deliberated is likewise democraticthis does not mean that the regime is democratic, but that the given practice is a democratic one and may or may not push the regime into a more inclusive direction. Now after noting this radically democratic practice of all the citizens deciding together, he turns to other peculiar offices. Aristotle notes thatThe manager of children, the manager of women, and any other office that has authority for this sort of superintendence is aristocratic, and not democratic. For how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out? Nor is it oligarchic, for the wives of oligarchs live luxuriously (1300a5-8). Thus offices that seek to regulate the character of the people or specific groups of people, such as the women and/or the childrenthis office has an aristocratic character.As too would the Roman office of the censorwhose job was the policing of morals and the character of the citizens. The attempt to regulate the character of the citizens on one level does not seem democraticas the democratic principle per se is freedom and freedom is held to be the ability to do what one desires.Yet we see if this is taken to its radical position it is also tyrannical in character.This doing what one wants goes to the extreme in the democratic regime form in the last democracy, it all too often ends with the rise of a tyrant who was formally a demagogue or peoples champion. What is funny here is that Aristotle suggests that the wives in democracies and in oligarchy are both in need of regulationbut both regimes tend to fight against such regulating.Now after the discussion of these aristocratic tending offices, he ends his discussion on the question of what sort and how many offices are needed for a regime and moves on to the question of how these officials for offices are to be selected (1300a9-10). Now before one turns to the question of selection let us look at the argument as it has travelled so far.At the start of this investigation into the offices we were told at Politics 1299a3-13 Aristotle would address these five questions:1.[H]ow many offices are there? 2.What do they have authority concerning? 3.The length of time of each offices term. 4.Should the office be permanent, for a long duration or temporary? 5.Who should be selected for an office, who should do the selecting, and how should they be selected?But what we got instead were: 1.What sort of officeswhich are necessary versus useful 2.How many are neededsmall versus large political communities 3.Regime specificities of and on offices 4.Next will be discussing how offices are selected. Now so length of time [question 2 from the original 1299a3-13 list] was briefly touched upon in the discussion of small versus large political communities, but not thoroughly (1299a35-b14).And the question of should the office be permanent, for a long duration or temporary [question 4 from the 1299a3-13 list] has yet to be discussed and we will see later was not discussed.Instead we had a very long discussion on how certain offices are tied to certain regimes and others others (1299b15-1300a8). And what Aristotle will talk about nextoffices and their selectionis the last question on the 1299a3-13 list. So what we got so far is different from what we were told we would getnow the reason for this is perhaps tied to the question of how the size of the political community and the population and make up of the citizens within it effects the number and sort of offices both needed and useful for the given regime.Add to that how the given regime of the political community will favor some forms of offices over others and also effect the way the offices operate as well. The Selection of Officials Now as he starts his attempt to treat the selection of the officials, Aristotle says he will beginning from the beginning (1300a10).And what is that beginning?Well he says [t]he varieties of selection depend on three defining principles, which when combined necessarily embrace all the modes (1300a11-12).What are these three modes?They are firstly (1) who appoints the officials (1300a12-13), secondly (2) from whom [or what group] the officials are selected (1300a13), and lastly (3) how [or in what manner] they [the officials] are selected (1300a14).He then notes that in each of these three cases there will be three varieties within each case (1300a14).But when one looks at what presented in the next section of the Greek text, we are not given three modes of three but three modes of two varieties eachusing a either this or that form of comparisonwhich goes like this: (1) either all or some select (1300a15), (2) either from all or from special group (1300a15-19), and (3) chosen by election or by lottery (1300b19). Now these next sections of Aristotle are some of the most difficult with a number of textual amendments to the Greek manuscripts and this has led to some editors of the Greek manuscript to suggest corrections and others to refuse to make them.7So lets go through carefully these thee modes and the possible verities.

7 This has had some editors of the Greek text such as Dreizehnter to suggest an edit of the Greek manuscript to change the three for two (Dreizehnter 1970, 122).Yet Lord (1984 and 2013), Simpson (1997), Reeve (1998), and Sachs (2012) all reject Dreizehnters edit of the manuscript and prefer the original three in the manuscript. So following from the above orderhe then will give the varieties in each case. So starting with the first mode either all of the citizens select or some [of the citizens select] (1300a15).Notice that the either or structure of the choice gives us two not three varieties.The third non-stated variety is at best implied to be a mixture of the two varieties and later Aristotle will make this claim for mixing more clearly than its merely silent implication here.8So what would a mixing of this mode look like?Peter Simpson suggest the mixing would what Aristotle would note later that both all and some together (Simpson 1997, 202n83).But how would that work?Could it be that some would appoint a candidate and all would appoint another and then either both would hold office together?But that would only work in an office with more than one official to be placed in it. Another possibility would be when either (a) all do an initial selection of a number of preliminary candidates and then the some will elect who will fill the office or (b) the inverse. But then again Reeve opts to leave this mode with only two varieties and refuses to suggest a conjecture for the third not stated variety (Reeve 1998, 130).As for the second modethey select either from all or from certain special persons, [distinguished] by assessment, for example, or family, or virtue [or excellence] (arte), or some other such thing (as in Megara it is from those who returned from exile together and fought in alliance against the people) (1300a15-19). So again those who are to be selected are either from all the citizens or some special designated group. Now this 8 Lord (2013), Sachs (2013), Simpson (1997), and Rackham (1944) take for grated the missing third variety of each mode is the mixture of the two stated varieties; and so does Newman (1973) in his commentary. passage on the second mode differs from the first mode by clarifying what is meant by some.In the first mode the nature of the some is left unstated or not clarified. But here in the second mode he makes clear the some is to be some special group or class of people.Now the gives some examples of how they are to be distinguished as a group: (a) by some assessment of their wealth, (b) by their familywhich means those who have long clear heredity linage in the community, (c) by their possession of some virtue or excellenceperhaps a virtue or excellence that the regime needs or would like to foster, (d) or something otherof which he gives the example of Megara which Aristotle discusses further at Politics 5.3.1302b30-12 and 5.5.1304b34-39where exiles who were expelled by a democratic revolution return and overthrow the democratic regime and restore the pro-Spartan Oligarchy.Now the example for the 1300a18-19 passage is that this group or returnees who overthrew the democracy now were treated as a special class and offices where only to be filled from this group.So this last form of some opens up the different forms of them some to many different possibilities.There are many ways that a group of people can be marked out within a regimethey may have done something essential to the regime or that the regime holds as essential, or they possess some trait or characteristic (aside from virtue or excellence) that separates from the rest of the community.Two obvious modes of distinction, form our contemporary prospective, but were not spoken by Aristotle here are race and ethnicity.Aristotle is strangely silent about the question of ethnicity in the Politics, yet it [as well as race] is still something present and something that could be a source of special preferment. Now, lets us turn to the third and final mode, which is selection is made either by election or by lot (1300a19).Now selection by election is where people are chosen by the citizens or some sub-group of the citizens.Now one can vote openlyas the early Romans did where people vote by dividing up physically from those who vote one way or the other. So the number of divisions would reflect the number of choices. The way the Democratic Iowa Caucus in the American party-primary process does a similarwhere as the members of the caucus divide into the different parts of the room where there is a representative for each of the various candidatesand the one with the less people in that area is removed from the next round until there are no more defector. So one can move or divide up, raise one hand, and speak up and state your preference, or by casting a ballot where there are different boxes and you put your vote into the specific candidates box.But all of this is publicand everyone present can see ones vote.Another way is secret ballotingwhere the vote is not known by othersand who is voting is anonymous (that is there is no easy way to know who voted for whom). And by such ways there are many ways that such ballots can be created.The other way of selectinglotteryoffers very little difference.Names are to be placed into a pool (or perhaps all the citizens names are in the pool) and some process of random selection chooses who is to be selected.The key to selection by lot is the randomness of the process.Now as Aristotle mentioned earlier the concept of selection by lottery is a very democratic one, whereas selection by election is very aristocraticso the variety this mode chooses will incline the offices toward one regime or away from another. After going over the three above modes and their varieties, Aristotle adds some further complexity to the model.He says: And these may again be conjoined, by which I mean that some offices may be selected by some and others by all, some may be selected from all and others from some, and some may be selected by election and others by lot (1300a19-22). Now this leads to him addingIn the case of each of these varieties there will be four modes (1300a22-23).9Now these modes are different from the previous mentioned ones above. Now given the confusing nature of the 1300a23-31 passage I will present several different translations of it so you can see the best attempts to give a faithful rendition of the textI will present Carnes Lord translation of it first: For either all select from all by election or all from all by lot (and from all either by turn, for example on the basis of tribes, quarters, or clans, until all the citizens have been gone through, or from all each time), [or all select from some by election or all from some by lot]; and offices can be selected partly in one way, partly in another. Again, if some are selecting, they may do so either from all by election or from all by lot, or from some by election or from some by lot; or 9 Now here arises a disputeSachs (2012, 134n133) says The manuscripts have the number four, but the text of this entire passage is uncertain, and exactly what is being counted when is unclear. The translation follows from Rosss [(1957)] version, which incorporates a number of emendations.In Sachss translation he says six modes not four. Now Reeve (1998, 131) will delete the various emendations by Ross and keep four modes.Lord (2013, 126) likewise keeps the four modes, as will Simpson (1997, 203), but Simpson in his note clarifies the mess in his notes. offices can be selected partly in one way, partly in another I mean, [for example,] they can be selected from all partly by election, partly by lot (Lord 2013, 126). Next is Peter Simpsons translation of this same passage: For either all appoint from all by election or all appoint from all by lot (and from all either in sectionsfor example, from all according to their tribes and wards and clans until all the citizens are gone throughor from all every time), [or all appoint from some by election or all appoint from some by lot], or they appoint partly in this way and partly in that. Again, if it is some who do the appointing, they do it either from all by election or from all by lot, or from some by election or from some by lot, or they do it partly in this way and partly in that (such as partly from all by election and partly by lot) (Simpson 1997, 203). The next is from Joe Sachs: For either all appoint from all by election, or all from all by lot, or all from some by election, or all from some by lot (and if from all, either by turns, for instance according to tribes, districts, or fraternal groups, until it goes through all the citizens, or else from all together), or also some are done one way and others another. If, in turn it is some who do the appointing, this is either from all by election, from all by lot, from some by election, from some by lot, or some one way and others another by which I mean in some cases from all by election and in others by lot, or in some cases from some by election and in others by lot (Sachs 2013, 134-135) And lastly I will give you C D C Reeves translations: Either all select from all by election or all select from all by lot (and from all either by sections-by tribe, for example, or by deme or clan, until all the citizens have been gone through--or from all on every occasion); or from some by election or from some by lot; or partly in the first way and partly in the second. Again, if only some do the selecting, they may do so either from all by election or from all by lot; or from some by election or from some by lot; or partly in the first way and partly in the second-that is to say, for some from all by election and for some by lot (Reeve 1998, 131). From all of these translations of the 1300a23-31 passage there is lots of confusion.Peter Simpson in the notes of his translation offers this solution: The Greek of this passage is notoriously controversial. I follow the manuscript readings as given by Newman and abandon Dreizehnter but insert, with many editors, the words marked by square brackets (the only addition that seems necessary for the sense). Aristotles meaning is that we take each of the three differences in the third term and combine them one after the other with the four combinations formed by the first two differences in the other two terms (omitting the third difference, the two pairings, in these other two terms). Thus, the three differences (election, lot, election and lot) are combined in turn, first with the combination of all appointing from all, second with the combination of all appointing from some , third with the combination of some appointing from all, fourth with the combination of some appointing from some (Simpson 1997, 203n87). I find myself agreeing with Simpson here and his summing up what the four modes that are talked about at the start of 1300a22-23.And following from what he says we can see a twofold interconnection between the modes of selection and the interconnections between those doing the selecting and those being elected. Thus what is called the four modes are the possible outcomes of the variations of those doing the selecting and those being elected.Thus those four modes are: 1.All appointing from all2.All appointing from some3.Some appointing from all4.Some appointing from some And they are then to intersect these three means of selections: (a) election, (b) lot, and (c) both election and lot. Now from these four modes we finally get twelve combinations apart from two conjunctions that are tacked on (1300a32).Let me give a list of the twelve combinations: 1.All selecting from all by election 2.All selecting from all by lot 3.All selecting from all by both election and lot 4.All selecting from some by election 5.All selecting from some by lot 6.All selecting from some by both election and lot 7.Some selecting from all by election 8.Some selecting from all by lot9.Some selecting from all by both election and lot 10. Some selecting from some by election 11. Some selecting from some by lot 12. Some selecting from some by both election and lot And the two conjunctions that are either omitted or added to this list are: 1.Selection is by both some and all 2.Selection is from both some and all Now Aristotle turns to relationship between the selection process and the various regimes.Aristotle will first focus on democratic forms, those suitable to popular rule he says are two.They are to be appointments (a) that are made from all citizens in sections and (b) when it is made from all the citizens together (Simpson 1997, 203n88) either by election, lot, or both election and lot (1300a33-34).Now either by turns or in all the citizens together points to the passage at 1300a24-26.And the selection by turns is to be done of either some section of the citizens such asdeme, quarters, or clans.So let us look at this movement through after discussing the democratic forms of selection, to the other forms. After discussing the forms of selection that are considered to be democratic and popular, Aristotle then turns to a discussion of those suitable for a regime.The text reads: When all select but not at the same time, and select either from all or from some, either by lot or by election or both, or select from all and some from some [either by lot or by election or] by both (by both I mean some offices by lot and others by election), it is characteristic of regime (1300a34-39).Now given he has talked about a specific form of regime (politeia) when he talked about the forms of selection that are democratic we are expecting him to talk about specific regime types.So his use of the term regime (politeia) raises questions whether if this is about the forms of selection of officials that are to be applicable to regime (politeia) as a specific form of regime or to any regime per se.10 But regardless of the question how he is using regime in this section of texthe say those form of election he just mentioned are suitable for regime (politeia) or a regime (politiea). But perhaps we need to understand this passage in light of what comes next where Aristotle says: When some select from all by election or by lot or by both (some offices by election and others by lot), it is characteristic of an oligarchic [regime], though by both is more oligarchic; when some offices are selected [by all] from all and others from some [or offices are selected by election], or some by election and others by lot, this is characteristic of a regime [run] in [an] aristocratic fashion (1300a39-b2). 10 If one does not assume the regime here is what some translators call polity and leave politeia as one would translation it as the classwhich I have been for the purposes of this chapterregime. For the examination of about what is held to be the politeia called politeia see chapter XX above. The passage just quoted speaks how some selection varieties trend towards oligarchy and others trend towards a regime [run] in [an] aristocratic fashion and thus suggest some selection variations trend toward one form of regime and others another.And given oligarchic and aristocratic forms seem blurred hereperhaps the above discussion about those variations suited for a regime was regarding regime in the generic usage.It adopting the so-called polity interpretation would simplify this greatlybut the Greek text is very far from clear and simple hereso to offer the simple and smooth solution might distort what Aristotle is trying to say here. Now let again us return to where we left off. After the sentence at 1300a39b2 which discusses both oligarchic and aristocratic forms simultaneously.Now in the next sentence Aristotle clearly focuses on the oligarch forms of mode of selection.He writes, It is oligarchic when some select from some [by election], and similarly when some select