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Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul: "De Anima" ii, 1-3
Author(s): Robert BoltonSource: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1978), pp. 258-278Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182048.
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Aristotle's
definitions
of
the
soul:
De
A nima
II,
1-3
ROBERT BOLTON
Just
as in public assemblies
they are accus-
tomed
to newly introduce
a law and if
the
law
newly introduced
s betterthey abandon
the
previous aw,
so
ought
one to proceed
in
the
case of
definitions as
well and to
pro-
pose, oneself, an alternatedefinition. For if
it is
seen
to
be
better and
makes the thing
defined
clearer it
is obvious that
the
definition
in
force will have
been aban-
doned,
since there are not several
definitions
of
the same
thing,
Topics
151 b 12-17
1. It is
a philosophicalcommonplace
hatAristotle's
definition
of the soul
as the
form
of the body contains
an important
anti-dualist
olution to
the
mind-body
problem.It is also
widely understood
that Aristotlewas
not
entirely unbending in his
attachmentto an anti-dualist
solution
of
the
problem.
He claims
n
variousplacesthat
the intellect s not the
formof
any
type of body and,
hence, is capable
of existence
as a functioning
entity
separate
from
the body.
And he is committed
to the existence
of
an
ensouled
but immaterial
living being,
the prime mover,
who
not
only
carries
on the psychic
activity
of thinkingbut derives
hegreatestpleasure
from
it.
Various
attemptshave been
made to either explain
away
the
doctrines
which
seem to
conflict with the anti-dualist
thrust of
the
definition
or
to minimize
their importancein
Aristotle's
most mature
thought.
But none of these
attemptshasyet managed
o secureandmain-
tain
significant
support.'
I
want to offer here a new suggestion
or dealing
with the
problem.
My
proposal
s that the structure
of the familiar
definition
of the
soul as
the
form
of
the bodyhas not
been properly
understood.
When this is
correctly
understood, shall
argue,the definition
can
be seen to
be
consistent
with
the
doctrine
of
the
prime
mover, with
the
theory
of the
separate
ntellect
and,
most
interestinglyperhaps,
with
various
ypes
of
mind-body
dualism.
I
begin
with a consideration
of a little
noticed
matter.
2. Thewell-knowndefinitionof thesoul,asthe formof a certainkindof
body,
n DeAnimaII, 1,
s offeredas
an account
whichmentions
omething
258
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common
to every soul
(nrL
OLVOV
rri.
%&1s
4'Xis,
412 b
4).
But
at theend of
the chapterAristotleconfesses hatthis account s merelya "roughgeneral
account
sketched
in outline" (ri
. . .
'ooyEypa&pq&,
13
a
9-10).
This
indicates,
somewhatsurprisingly,
hat
the
accountis in
some
way imper-
fect. Butin what
way?
The significance
of the language
which Aristotleemploys
to
qualify
his
definition
s revealed
most
fully
in the
Topics
andin the
History
ofAnimals.
An
account "in
outline" ('rmT)
is,
according
to the
Topics,
a
general
(xa06Xov)
ccountwhich
does not give an
"accurate
definition"
&xpLpls
X6yos)but
whichdoes
permit
us to
know
(yvwpieLv)
the thing
described n
some way (101a 18-24).For Aristotlethere are two ways in whichsome
thing
may be made
known,
either by
reference
o what
is
prior
and
more
intelligible
to us or to
what is prior
and
more
intelligible
absolutely 141
a
28-30,
b 3-19;
cf. PosteriorAnalytics
1 b
33, ff.).
An account"inoutline"
belongsclearly
to the former
type.
An
account
by
reference o
things that
are more intelligible
absolutely
conforms
to
"accurate
understanding"
(&XpLS
BLavoLCL)nd
this is the opposite
of what
is
given
in an account
"in
outline" (141 b 5-14,
101a 21 33).2
History
of Animals
491 a 7-14
(which
closely parallels
De Anima
413 a 9-20)
further
describes an account "in
outline" as one which gives derivative facts ('ar
avA1O3x6'ra)
about some-
thing
in
contrast
o giving
thetheoretical
principles
alr(aL)
by
reference o
which such
facts
are explained.3
Theopening ines of
De Anima
11,2 characterize
n detail the
differences
betweenthat sort
of account
which
is morefamiliar
o
us and which
merely
states some
fact (TOr
'rL)
nd its more
perfect
counterpart.
Since,
as
we have
just
seen,the former
ypeof
account s the
account
"in
outline",
hese
lines
giveus the
reasons
which
must haveled
Aristotle
o think
that the
account
in
outline
in II,
1
was
imperfect.
The reasons
are
these
(1)
The initial
account while
more obvious
(qvepvrpepos)
than
others
is still
obscure
(&aacp's)
nd so in need
of replacement
by
onewhich
s
more
ntelligible
n
the
order
of explanation
xarar
'rv
Xoyov
vpW+u.'repos)
(413
a
1
1-13). (2)
The initial accountshares
he
faultof most
definitions
which
peoplegive of
merely
displayingsomething
that is the
case ('rO rL)
without
giving
the
essence
(oUria)
f the thing
defined
(413a 13-16).
3)
The initial
definition
is
like a
conclusion
(av1LuipaaVc)
bout
the thing defined
ratherthan a
statement
of the
reason
('ob
a'L'TLov)
or
such
conclusions
(413
a
16-20).
Given thatAristotle
s
contrasting
here the type
of definition
of which the
famous
accountof the
soul
in II,
1
is an
instance
with
another
superior
type,4we need to askwhatthese contrasts mplyas to the exactcontentof
the
definition
of II,
I
and as to what
precisely he
defects
of that definition
are.
259
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4/22
3.
As commentators
have pointed
out, the
contrasts
drawn in
brief
betweendifferent ypesof definitionat the beginningof DeeAnima 1,2 are
laid out at more
length in
the Posterior
Analytics,
especially
n Book
II,
chapters
8-10. But the
significance
of that
discussion
for our questions
concerning
he
statusof the
definition
of the soulin
De AnimaII,
I
has
not
been fullyexplored.
Before
turningto the
Analytics,
however, t will be useful
to describe
n
some detail
various
problems
of interpretation
n
De Anima
II, 1-3 which
are connected
with our
questions
about
the definition
of II, 1. Light
can, I
think,
be shed
on all
theseproblems
by attention
to the theory
of types
of
definition n the PosteriorAnalytics.
The first groupof
problemsworth
our
attention
here hasto do with the
content
of the
definition n
II,
1
or, as
we should
say,of the
definitions
n
II,
1, since
there s more
thanone.
Are thesevarious
definitions quivalent?
Here are
the definitions
which
Aristotle
offersus:
(1)
Soulis the
substance,
n the sense
of the form,
of a natural
body
which
has life
potentially
412
a 19-21).
(2)
Soul
is the first
actualityof
a naturalbody
which
has life
potentially
(412
a 27-28).
(3) Soul is the firstactualityof a naturalbody whichhas organs(412b
5-6).
(4) Soul
is the
essenceand
definingprinciple Xoyos)
f that
sortof
natural
body
which
haswithin
itselfa source
(&px~)
f its
change
and stability
(412b 15-17).5
We may
allowthat the
first
two definitions
whichAristotle
gives
us pose
no
problem
in relation
to each other
since
he gives
the
second simply
to
explainwhat he
meansby
the first.But
the third
the
account
of soul
as
the
first actuality
of a natural
bodywith
organs raises
apparent
difficul-
ties. Aristotletreatssoul as the principleof life; thingsareensouled f and
only
if
they have
life
(413a 21-2).
But must
something
have organs
to
be
alive?
In fact we know
that certain
microscopic
living
creatures
are
composed
of
undifferentiated
iving tissue.
They
engage
in
life functions
such
as nutrition
and
reproduction
withoutemploying
any
organs
orthose
functions and do not
possessany
organs
at all
in
the
sense
of
parts
which
perform
distinctive unctions
not performed
by
other
parts cf.
De
Partibus
Animalium
645
b 3
ff., at 14). We
might
well
suppose
that Aristotledidn't
allow
for
this
because
of his
inadequate
understanding
of
biology.
But
Aristotlehimself
regards
ertain
material
objects,
namely
the
stars,
as alive
even
though
he
believes
that
their
matter
s undifferentiated nd cannot
be
altered or moved internally n any way
and
that, hence, they
do
not have
260
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5/22
organs.6
This
apparent
nconsistency
holds, moreover,not only
between
the thirddefinitionand thingsAristotlesays elsewhere.It holds between
the third definition
and the second. The
second definition requires
only
that to be
ensouled7
a
body
must be in a certainstateof readiness o
engage
in one or another
ife function,
whether t has
organs
or not.
It will be
said
that
Aristotlewants
to
argue
n the De
A
nima
that
only
a
body
with organs
could
be
in such a state.
But he doesn't
argue
for this.At best he merely
claims t (412
a
28,
f.).
And even this he does
not do
unambiguously.
For
he
allows that
if a
thing engagesregularly
by
naturein
patterned
change
of
place
that is enough
to make
it alive
(413
a
22-25).
We know that he
believes that the starsand thespheres n whichtheymovedo this and that
he denies
thatthey
haveorgans.So
we
have
good
reason
o want
the second
definition
of soul to cover the stars.
If it covers the
stars,
however,
then
it
seems incompatible
with the thirddefinition.
Itmight
be arguedthat the
secondand third
definitions
are not
meant to
be equivalenton the
groundthat the
"bodywith organs"
mentioned
n the
third definition is explicitly
introducedin
the text as a
body
of a more
restricted
ype
than the "body
which has
life potentially"
of
the second
definition (412 a 27
-
b 1).
If this were
so we could take
the second
definition,which coversthe stars,as the accurateone andregard he third
as
covering
not all of the living
but only a
certain
part of it. But the
third
definition is
said to
mention"something
ommon
to everysoul" (412
b 4).
The fourth
definition introduces
further
problems.It
apparently
says
that
any
naturalbody which
has an internal
source
of patterned
hange
is
ensouled. But in
the
Physics (192
b 9-23) Aristotle
claims
that all
the
familiar natural bodies have
an internalsource
of patterned
change.
(Cf.
De
Caelo268 b 27,
ff.). So on his
definition
rockswould seem
o be alive.
And Aristotle would deny
that rocks are
alive (De
Anima
412 a
13-15).
Some will
urge
that this fourth
claimis not
a definition,that
it only gives a
necessary
condition for being an ensouled
body and no
more. Butit must
do more to
play
the role Aristotlegivesto it
in its context
(412b 10-17).
He
argues
hat the
thing
that
keeps
an
axe from
being
alive is that it doesn't
as
an axe
have
the kind of natural
body that
engages
in
its proper
motion
-
chopping
-
in
the cgurse
of
nature
from some
internal mpulse.
Butrocks
do
engage
in their
proper
motion
under
internal
mpulsein the course
of
nature (Physics
192
b
12,
ff. at b
18). So
the argument
would seem to
require
hat
they
are alive. Even if we treat he fourthclaim as giving
only a
necessary
condition for
being
alive,moreover,
hat still creates problems.
For,again,the starsare alive and,hence, ensouledand theydo notengage
in
any proper
natural movement under internal
impulse (De
Caelo 290 a
261
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27, ff., 291b 13). On this reading, furthermore,the definition would
require hat nothing kept alive, as we say, by externalartificialmeans can
reallybe alive, even if it continues o engage in all its proper ife functions.
This would not only be an unfortunate hing for Aristotle o say, it would
put
the
fourth definition in conflict with the second and third. On those
definitions, t is enough for something o be alive that it engage in organic
life functions, whether with external or artificialassistanceor not.8 We
might try
to treat
the fourth claim as giving only sufficientconditionsfor
being ensouled.The definitioncould be readas sayingthat soul is the form
of a natural
body
of the
type
which
has an internalsource of change, bul
perhapsof another ypeaswell.Butthis interpretation, esidesapparently
making
rocks
alive, would seem to spoil Aristotle's rgument. f something
with another sort of body than the one mentioned can be ensouled, how
can the fact that an axe doesn'thave that sort show that it's
not ensouled?
Aside from these
problems
t is worth
reviewing he old troublesmen-
tioned
earlierwhich bear on all the
definitions.
In
the very chapterwhere
these definitions
occur,
and
in
many
other
places, Aristotle claims that
some of the
parts,
hat is some of the life
functions,
which
makeup the soul
are
separable
from the
body
since
they
are not the actualities
of
any body
or bodily organ (413a 6-7).9This seems to be ruled out in advanceby all
the
definitions,
since
any non-bodilyentity
which
exercised
any
one of the
life
functions
(as
the intellect
does,
430 a
17-22)
would
have to be alive
(413
a
22-25)10
nd hence
ensouled
(a 21-22).
All
of the definitions eem to
rule out the
possibility
that
anything
other
than
a natural
body
can
be
ensouled
or, hence,
alive. The third
definition,
which
supposedly
mentions
something
common
to
every soul,
is
especiallyproblematic
n this
regard
since it is later
explicitly
claimed that "the soul whichcan think"
i]
VOqTLXyL
[iuxid)s connected
with no
organ(429
a
22-29).
Aristotlealso claimsat the end of
De Anima
II, 1that it is
notyet clear
whether
the whole
soul11
of a
living thing
is the source of the
activity
(6v?eXVXeLa)
f its
body
as a sailor is the source of the
activity
of a
ship
(413
a
8-9)
-
apparently eaving
the
door
open
to various ormsof
dualism.
Since he has
just
said
that, given
the third
definition,
"it is
unnecessary
o
inquire
further
whetherthe
soul
and the
body
are
one"
(412
b
6, f.),
it is a
long-standingpuzzle why
Aristotle hould make this
remark.12
The prime
mover
gives
rise
to
the
final
problem.
It is
alive
and
is, hence,
an ensouled
entity(Metaphysics
072b
13, ff.,
cf. De Anima402 b
5-8).
But
the life function
of the
prime
mover does
not
belong
to
any
natural
body
and
is, afortiori,
not the
first
actuality
of
any body.
The standard
ways
out of these difficulties nvolve
attributing
o Aris-
262
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totle inconsistency,
changeof mind, or mystery-making.13
ut the incon-
sistency, f such therebe, is so bald that it is hardto see howAristotlecould
have
failed to face it. And the hypothesizedchange
of mind
on Aristotle's
partis unacknowledgedand
has been hard
to establish n
any
convincing
way.14
So solutions depending
on these
things
have not been
satisfying.
And it seems too much out
of character hatAristotleshould
simply
have
regarded he whole matter
as an
impenetrablemystery
or that
proposal
to
be satisfying.
4. Do the remarkswhich
Aristotlemakes at the
beginning
of De A nima
II, 2 about varioustypes of
definition
and about
the defects in the account
of the soul in II, 1help us to moresatisfactorily
esolve
any
or
all of these
difficulties?
As we saw earlier, he definition,or definitions,
of the
soul in De A
nima
II, 1 are implied by II, 2,
413 a 16, to be like conclusions
OuuR%ep&ixlrx).
That word
is used in PosteriorA nalytics I,
10 to describe
one of the three
types
of
definition
discussedthere (94 a 7-9, 13-14).
This
type
of
definition
is contrasted
both with the
indemonstrableaccount of what
something s
and
with the
syllogisticallybased accountof
what something
s.'5The
third
type of definition,16
nd hencethe sortwe
are dealingwith
in
De
Anima
II,
I, is the so-called
nominal
definition theaccountof what
a name signifies
(93
b
30).'7What implications
of this result
are relevant orour purposes?
A
nominal
definition is the account of
some entity or
phenomenon
which we have
at the initialstages of inquiry
before we have
an accountof
its essence.
The definitionencapsulates he
central items of information
about an entity which we
have at a given pre-terminal
stage.'8 These
central
items
of information'9will, in Aristotle's
view, typically
concern
explicable eaturesof the entity
under nvestigation.So he characterizes
he
definitions which
display
these features as "conclusions"
(avRnpep&u-
iu,rr).20
There
are,
for
Aristotle,
two characteristic
ypes
of
definition
which functionas conclusionsof syllogisms thosewhichexhibita feature
(but not the
whole) of the essence
of the entitydefined, and
thosewhich do
not
exhibiteven an element
of the essence
but do exhibitsomeproper
xLO'
o0'r6)
eature which
is explicableby reference
to the essence.2'
The first
type
will
exhibit
a featurenecessarybut not
sufficient for the presence of
the
thing.
The second will, characteristically,
xhibit a feature
sufficient
but
not necessary
or the presenceof the thing.22
Aristotle
takes it that nominaldefinitions
signify a kind and delineate
the referenceof the nameof a kind.23How
do they do thiswhen they only
exhibit featuresnecessaryor sufficient ormembership n theclass denoted
by the name of the kind
but not both? Aristotle holds
that grasping a
263
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nominal
definitioninvolves
a knowledge
of the existence
of members
of
the class in question24 nd that the definition itself involves an implicit
reference o the
most familiar
actualinstancesof the kind defined.25
The
definition
identifiesthe
kind as
the one to which
those actual instances
belongand the
membership f
the kindas
whateverhas the
same
essence
as those instances.26
Given this, both types
of nominal
definitions
do give necessary
and
sufficientconditionsof
a sort forbeing instances
of the kindsthey
define.
But they
do not
do this by exhibiting
generalfeatures
of
those instances,
possessedby
them as instances
of their kinds,
which are
necessaryand
sufficient for belongingto those kinds.Instead theydo so by meansof a
reference o theessence
of certainactual
familiar
objects,anessencewhose
content is not
spelled out in
the definition
but whose
possession is
necessary
andsufficient
or membership
n the kinddefined.
5. With this
material
n handwe can
now return o the
De A nima to see
what
light is shed on the
account
of the soul which
we find there.
As we
have already
seen, the
famousdefinition
of the soul in II,
I is a
nominal
definition. The
use of the term 'uuv rrpwuvx'
(413a 16, 18)
to describe
it
makes
his clear.
Butwhatkind
of nominaldefinition
s it,
one thatexhibits
a necessary onditionof soul or one thatexhibitsa sufficientcondition?I
want
to suggest hat it is
a nominal
definitionof the
lattertype:It points
to
themost familiar
qvepavrpTa)
nstances
of soul
by meansof
a
description
whichexhibits
onlysufficient
conditions
for beingan instance
of soul, and
defines the soul as the
genericformpossessed
by those instances.
The
evidence
for taking
he nominaldefinition
to
be of this type
is
of two
sorts,direct textual
evidence and
more
general inductive
evidence.
The
more
general
nductive
evidenceis, perhaps,
he more
striking,
o we
may
begin
with
it.
Ifwe understand he
definition(s)
of
soul
in De A
nima
II,
1
in
the
way
suggested,
then
the variousproblems
which
we have
mentioned
concerning
he
definition(s)
can all be resolved,
and
Aristotle's
emarks
n
De Anima II,
1
can be seen to
be consistent
with
all of
his doctrines
mentionedelsewhere.
The
first
of
our worries
about the definitions
in
II, I
had
to do
with
whether
they are extensionally
equivalent.It seemed
to
us doubtful
that
theyare,
but we
werenot reading
he definitions
n a
way
it is
open
to us to
read
nominal
definitions.The definitions
of
II,
1
are
equivalent
f
they
are
read as nominal
definitions
which exhibit
sufficient
conditions for
be-
longing
to the kind
defined.
On such
a
reading
the
second
definition
will
say that soul is that generic first actuality possessed by those (actual
familiar ases
of)
naturalbodies primed
or
certain
ife
functions
which
we
264
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recognizeas
ensouled).27
t will
not
say
that
these
(familiar)
bodies
are
the
onlyoneswhichhavethatactualitybut rather hatthatactuality s the one
which
they have. The
third
definition
will
say
that soul is
the
generic
actualitypossessed
by
(the
actual
familiar
cases
of)
naturalbodies
with
organs(which
we
recognize
as
ensouled).
Since the familiar
bodies
which
are
primed
for the
familiar ife functions
are,
at
least
in
part,
the same
as
the familiar
bodies with
organs,
the two definitions
will
be
extensionally
equivalent.
The fourth
definition
will
say
that soul is the
generic
form
possessed
by
those
(actual
familiarcases
of)
bodies with an internal
ource
of their
activity which
we
recognizeas
ensouled).28
Here
the familiar
ases
are again,at least in part,the same as for the other definitions.Since the
generic
form of each
of
these
groups
of
entities is the
same, these
definitionswill all be
extensionally
equivalent.Given this we cannot
say
that the
starsor the
microorganisms
withoutorgansconformto
the
second
definitionbut
not
to the
third.For
the third
does not
say
thatonly entities
with
organsare
ensouled.
It
says,
merely,that
only things
with
the
same
generic
actuality
as certain
familiar
bodies
with
organsare
ensouled.Nor
can we
say that
the
fourth
definition
requiresthat
rocks are
ensouled. It
does
not say
thatevery
naturalbody
withan internal
ource
of its
activity
s
ensouled.
It says
only
that
thingswhich
have the
samegenericessence as
the
most
familiar
casesof
self-moving
bodiesare
ensouled.
And
thisneed
not, and in
fact does
not,
includerocks.29
For similar
reasons
the
starsdo
not
have
to be
self-moved
to be
alive;
andentities
whose
life is
maintained
artificiallycan
still live
-
providing
their
essence is of
the rightgeneric
type.
The
definitions
of II,
I
do
not
tell us
directlywhat
thattype
is,
so
they
do
notsettle
these
matters.
Earlier
we
noted
difficulties
in the
way of
treating the
definitions as
exhibitingonly
suffitcient
onditionsfor
the
presence
of soul. As the suf-
ficient
conditions are
treated n
Aristotle'snominal definitionsof the
type
we areconsidering,however,thosedifficultiesno longerface us.The third
definition of
the
soul, as
the
first
actualityof
the most
familiarcases
of
natural
bodies
with
organs, is
said to
mention
"something
common
to
every
soul." It
is
clearthat
it cannot
do this if
it
onlygives
straightforward
sufficient
conditions
for the
presence
of
soul. But
on
Aristotle'sway
of
construing
nominal
definitions
which
exhibit
sufficient
conditions t
does
give
something
common. It
identifies
the
generic
form
common to all
ensouled
things.
For
Aristotle,any
nominal
definition
identifies
the kind
that its
corresponding eal
definition
displays
(Posterior A
nalytics 93 b
38
- 94 a 2).
Treating
he fourth
definition
in
theway
suggested,
moreover,
does not
265
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spoil
Aristotle's ontention
hat axesare not alive.
Sincethe definition
does
identifythegenerickindto whichall ensouledthingsbelongit canbe used
to
rule
axes outof that
kind.
Since
it
onlyexhibits
sufficient
conditions
for
belonging
to the
kind,an
argument
hat
axesare
notalive which
was
based
on
it would
likely
not
be very
convincing
even
if sound.
But
Aristotle
does
not in
factuse
it to argue
that
axesare
notalive.
When
he discusses
he
axe
(412
b
10, ff.)
he is
only illustrating
his contention
that
soul
is the
generic
form
of (among
other
things)
a special
type
of body
-
one otherthan
the
type
the axe
has
-
and
not arguing.
The reading
of
the definitions
n II,
1 proposed
here
also
provides
us
with
a simple way to resolve the worries over the conflict between those
definitions
and
the
various
claims
which
Aristotle
makes
concerning
the
separability
of the intellect
from
the
body.
The definition
n
II,
1
- in
any
of its forms
-
does
nothing
to
rule those
claims
out.
If a functioning
intellect
has the
same
generic
type
of
actuality
as
familiar
functioning
organic
entities,
ndependent
of anyattachment
o
any
body,
then
it is
alive
and ensouled
-
and
it is so
according
o the
definition.
The
prime
mover
too will
count
as
a case
of a living
and,hence,
ensouled
entity,according
o
the definition,
since
the
actuality
of the
prime
mover
s of the same
generic
typeas thatof the mostfamiliarensouledentities.
Given this
understanding
f
thedefinition
of
II, 1,
moreover,
we
cannot
claim
that
on
that definition
the mind-body
problem
does
not
arise.
The
claim made
at the end of I1,
1
that nothing
up
to
that
point
has ruledout
the
possibility
hat
the
soul is the
actualityof
the
bodyas
the sailor
s
of the
ship
is compatible
with
what
has
gone
before,
understood
n its
natural
dualistic
sense.
The definition does
require
that
as a
whole
the
soul of
the
most
familiar
ensouled things,
including
sailors,
is incapable
of its full
func-
tioningapart
rom ts body -just
as the sailor
s
incapable
of functioning
as
a sailorapartfrom a ship.Butsincethedefinitiondoes
not of itself
require
thatevery
functioning oul
be embodied,
t
by
itselfleaves
itopenthat
most
of the life functions
of even
the
familiar
ensouled
things
can
go
on disem-
bodied
-
just
as
most of the
psychic
functions
which a
sailor
employs
in
sailing
can go on
apart
from
any
ship.
This constitutes
the general
inductive
evidence
for
the readingof
the
definition
of the soul
in De
Anima
II,
1
proposed
here. If it is
a
nominal
definition
of the
sort
proposed,
hen
we areno
longer
faced
with
inconsis-
tencies
between
different
works
(Metaphysics
XII,
and De
Anima II)
or
between
different
books
of
the
De
Anima
(II
and
III)
or within
a
single
chapter
II,
1)
of the
De Anima.
266
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6. We need now to look more closely
at
the
text
to
see what
direct
support t offers for our readingof the definition.
What we should be
given
in De Anima
II, 2,
ff.
according
o the
opening
sentence of that chapter,
is a new account of soul which stands to
the
account of II,
1
as explanation to fact
(IT'ra
to
O"Tl)
nd as reason
to
conclusion (a'L'Tov
to
oavIepacvia).
So we should
expect
to find a
new
account from
which
the old account s somehow
derivable.
If we can find
such a new account that should help
us to understandwhat form the
old
accounthas in Aristotle'sview.
The conclusion of II, 2 is that a certain account of soul has been
demonstrated.The conclusion reads: "It is thereforeevident,from these
considerations,that the soul is a certain type of actuality and defining
principle (Xoyos)
of
that
which
has the capacity
for life"
(414
a
27-28,
reading
TOLOVTOv
at a 28 as at 412 a 21). This definitionof soul which is said
to have been establishedomits explicitreferenceto
the
body altogether,
unlike the earlier
definitions
n
II,
1.
But according
o this definitionsoul is
the form of that which has a certain capacityor potentialityand Aristotle
has just said (414 a 16-17, 25-27) that what has a given potentiality is
always matterof a certainsort.30So this definitionsays, implicitlyat least,
that
the soul is a certaintype of actualityor form of a certain ype of living
body. So understood, he definition s, in its general mport,equivalentto
the definitions of II, 1.
Is there, then, any other generaldefinition from which this definition is
derived
over the course of II, 2? The most prominentgeneral proposition
about soul
offered in the chapter is the one introduced
at 413 b 11-12:
"Soul is the
source
(&pXA)
f
and is delimitedby
the life
functions,
such as
nutrition, sensation, thought and motion." This proposition is the first
account of
soul
at which Aristotle arrivesafter having begun,
at 413
a
20,
his searchfor a
new definition.And the patternof
the discussion
ollowing
this new accountis what we would expect giventhe interpretation f the
opening
lines of
11,
2
defendedearlier.The new
account
of soul is
higherup
in the
order of explanation than the account of II,
1
since
from it that
earlieraccount
is derived,as follows:
(1)
Soul is the
source
(&pyA)
f and is delimitedby any
one or more of the
life
functions nutrition, ensation, houghtand motion (413
a
22-25,
withb 11-12).
(2) The defining life function of plants (413 a 25-31) and that of animals
(b 1-4)
-
though probably not all life functions (b 24-29)
-
are the
functionsof an appropriate ortof body (b 27-29).
267
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but it exhibits
a
sufficient
and
not a
necessary
condition
fora
squaring.It
focusesonly on the squaringof planefiguresand, as Aristotlewasaware,
not
only plane
areas
can
be
expressed
as
the
squares
of some
magnitude
but also
numbers.37Aristotle
offers
as
the correctdefinition
of
squaring,
"findinga
mean proportional"
413
a
19).
This
definition
s
repeated
n
the
Metaphysics (996
b
20-21)
as
a definition
of
squaring
generally ('rb
TE'rpaycvLCtLv)
without
any restriction as
to
type
of
magnitude.
And
it
covers
numbers
as
well as
plane areas.38
n the
Metaphysics
his
definition
of
squaring,
"finding
a
mean
proportional,"
s
given
as a
paradigm
of
a
statementof the
essence
(ovaia
and
#
oTn)
of
something
996
b
10-12).
So
if this is an accurate llustrationof the characterof the new definitionof
soul
in
II,
2,
as Aristotle intends
it to
be,
that definition
must
give
the
whole of the essence
of soul
and thedefinition of
II,
1
cannot give
even
a
part
of
the
essence.
Given
this
there
s, again,
only
one
type
countenanced
in
Aristotle's heory
of definition to
which the
familiardefinition
of
II,
1
can
belong,
and thatis the
type to which
we haveassigned t.
8.
Further ighton the
characterof
the definitionsof II,
1
can be gotten
from closerattention
o the
argumentwhich
leads to the first
definition of
soul
there.That
argument s
similar n structure
o
the one
we
have
just
been considering.It
concludes
that soul is
substance n the senseof
form,
being the
form of a
naturalbody which
has life
potentially(412 a 19-21).
The
curious hing
about thisconclusion,
which is the first
definitionof
II, 1,
is that it
focuses, ike414 a
12-13,on a special
rangeof life
functions.In it,
and
in
its
successor, life' has
the special
signification
ntroduced
at
412 a
14-15:
"nourishment,growth
and decay
through itself."
So
the
first
definition at 412 a
19-21says
that soul is the
form of those natural
bodies
which have
thecapacityfor
just theseelementary
ife
functions.But it has
to
identify
the
genericform
of, at least, all
organic
bodies (412
a
27, ff.)
and,
hence,
to
at least
identify the
generic formwhich
some such bodies
possessby havingother life functionsas well as these (cf. 413 b 11,ff.). To
do
this
the
initial
definitionhas to say
that soul is the
generic form
which
belongs
to
those
familiarbodies which
have the
basic functions of
nour-
ishment,growthand
ageing,
eaving t open that
the possessionof
soul can
involve
the capacity
for other
functions han
those.
Once
we
understand this we can
see what the
progression
from
definition to
definition n II,
1-2 is. The first two
definitionsof soul, as the
form
or
first
actuality of a
natural
body which has
the capacity for
nutrition,growth
and ageing, focus on
entitieswhich
possess one
special
typeof soul.This is the type"mostcommon" o livingthings(415 a 23-25),
a
fact
which
makes the first
two definitions
appropriate tarting
points.
269
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They characterize
oul generallyas
the genericform possessed
by entities
of the special type in question. The third definitionof soul, as the first
actualityof
a
natural
body with organs, ocuses
on a widerrange
of entities.
Entities
characterizedby any of the special types of sould defined by
reference o collections
of organicfunctionsare
in focus in thisdefinition.
The fourthdefinition
speaks of soul more generally
as the type of form
possessed
by a certainsort of natural
body with
an internalsource of its
activity.
This definition
focusesoncertainnatural
bodieswhichengage n
a
certain
range
of activitiesbut does
not tie thoseactivitiesdown
to organs.
The newdefinition of
II, 2 marksanotherstage
in the processof generali-
zation.Itdefines soulas the generic orm of thetype possessedby whatever
engages
in any life function.Here
the functionsare neither
tied down to
organs
nor tied down
to body.
9.
Having attended
to those features
of
the text which support the
readingof the definition
of II,
1
offered here,
we shouldconsider those
features
which mightbe thoughtto
go against
t. One of these
has
already
been alluded
to. At 412
b 4-6 and b 10Aristotle
peaksof onevariant
of the
account
of soul in II,
1
as an accountwhich "mentions
omething ommon
(TL
XOLV6V)
to
every
soul"
and which
"says whatsoul is in
general
(xa0o-
Xov)".As we have seen, however,these remarksare not inconsistentwith
the
interpretation
ffered here.39
The genericform of the
familiar
natural
bodies
with organs belongseven to
the separate
ntellect andto the prime
mover.
Aristotlealso says
at 412 b 6-9 that it follows
from his account of soul
that we do
not
need
to
inquire
whether"the
soul and the body
are one,"
since
an
actualityand
that of whichit is the actuality
orm
a
unity
in
the
strictest
ense.This does
require hat
any typeof soul
which s the actuality
of a
particular
body is not separable
n toto from that body
and
thatthat
body
is not
separable n toto from
that soul. But
it does
not
require
hat no
facultyor faculties of
such a soul
are inseparable
rom
the
composite
to
which
they
are attached
413 a 3-7),nor that such
a faculty
could
not
when
separateengage
in
some life function and be,
hence,
alive
and
ensouled
(413 a 20-25).40That
"thesoul and
the bodyare
one"
no more
requires
hat
every
ensouled
thing
s
embodied
han t
requires
hat
every
material
bject
is ensouled.The phrase"the soul"
s no more general
than
its
companion,
"the body."And the
phrase"the body"refers
not to
bodies
in
general
but
to the
special
bodies of certain
particular
hings
(412
b
6-8, 11-17).
In
the
Metaphysics,
n
language
which
echoes
that
in
the
De
Anima,
Aristotle
claimsthatin general"theproximatematterandthe form are one and the
same
thing" (1045
b
18-19).
The
unity
in view there isjust the sort which
270
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the adequacy
of the new definitionof soul in
I,
2. Does the claim
at the end
of II, 3 that the most appropriateaccountof soul
(Xoyos
oLxEL6TxTos . . .
'nep'p
vXiAs,
15 a
13) s a serialaccount
of each of the distinct ifefunctions,
spoil in any way the results
of
II,
2? In
particular
oes it show that the new
account
of
soul
in
II,
2
does not genuinely
give
the
explanation
(t'iTLov)of
the account of II,
1 or the essence (OL'Ta)
of
the actuality
which is
soul
according
o
the definition
of
11,
1. A problemarisesbecausethe
account,
in
sequence,
of the special facultiesis
said
to
be most
proper
not as an
accountof the special
facultiesbut as an accountof soul simply
(415a 13).
This stronglysuggests
that the generalaccountof II, 2,
though t explains
the accountof II, 1 in a way, is still not a full real definitionor accountof
the essence of
anything.
And this
is in
fact requiredby
other
evidence.
According o thePosterior A nalytics, the
trueexplanationof
some
fact (oTL)
is supposed to give
the essence of thatof which the fact holds
(90 a 5-15,
93 a 3-9). And according o the De Anima
no generalaccountwhichcovers
several species of some genus can give
the essence of anything
(414 b
25-27). The doctrine
of
the Metaphysics
1030
a
6, ff.) that only
ultimate
species have definitions
which, strictlyspeaking,give the essence
of any-
thing
is
clearly
in play in the De Anima. And given the doctrine
of
the
Metaphysics,we must conclude that thedefinitionof II,2 doesnot, strictly
speaking, tand to
the definitionof II,
1
as accountof essence
o accountof
fact.
But
the definition
of II, 2 is in fact
only put forwardasone which
will
suffice for
the time being (413 b 11-12).
Did Aristotlebelievethen that this
definition only leads
us in the directionof the mostproper
xplanationof
the definition of II,
1,
and that the full accountof the particular
aculties
would provide one
with such an explanation?
That seems thenaturalway
to
maketheconclusionof II, 3 consistent
with II, 1-2.It is easyto see how a
new serial account
of soul as the source
(ap)i')
of each
of the various
special faculties n sequencewould serveto establish he claimof II, 1that
soul
is
the
generic
actualitycertaincasesof
which
belong
to a
special
sort
of
naturalbody. For many of those faculties
will be explicitly hown by this
account to constitute, ndividuallyor collectively, ypes
of
soul
which
are
capable
of
existing only in such a body.
We can, however,
still speak of the definition
of II, 2 as giving,so far as is
possible,
the
full
essence or the real definition
of
the
genus
of
each
type
of
soul
-
remembering hat no such genus
can, strictly speaking,
have
an
essence
or, hence,
a
real
definition.
The
definition
of
II,
2
does
give
a
full
explanation (ai'TLov),
n
the
sense
of
that
term
employed
in
the
Posterior
Analytics,
of the fact (orL) tated in the definition
of
II,
1.
(The
doctrine
that
no
genus
can have an essence is not
found
in
the
Analytics.)
But
the
new
272
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Anima
II, 1-2
to the
initial
definition of
the soul.45
This
highlightsthe
importanceof the discussionof nominaldefinition n the PosteriorAna-
lytics,
since
that is
the one
place
where
Aristotle
explains n a full
way what
at
least one sort of
account
of this
type is like. It also
indicates hat
special
care
may
need
often to
be taken not
to
attribute o
Aristotleviews
stronger
than
thoseto
which he is
actually
committed
when, as
in
the case
of the
famous
definitionof
the soul,
whathe
says
only
describes he
objectunder
discussion
"in
outline."46
Rutgers
College,
Rutgers
University
1
The standard
contemporary
attempts to deal with the
problem are those of W.
Jaeger,
who
argued that the dualistic
doctrines are inconsistent
with the anti-dualist
definition
and
constitutean inheritance
rom Plato
which Aristotlenever
abandoned
Aristotle,
2nd
edn.,
Oxford, 1948, 217-219,
332-34); F. Nuyens, who
supposed that the
problematic
doctrines
while not
inconsistent with the definition
constituted with
it for Aristotle
a
mystery whose
threads he could not
unravel
(L'tvolution
de la
Psychologie
d'Aristote,
Louvain, 1948,
Ch. VII, especially
317-318); and W.
D. Ross, who argued
that
the
dualistic doctrines
belonged to an earlier
phase of Aristotle's
thought and were aban-
doned by the time
of writingof De A nimaII
("The
Development of Aristotle's
Thought,"
Proceedings f the British
Academy,43
(1957) 65-67). For the standard
older views, see the
discussion in R. D. Hicks,Aristotle,De Anima(Cambridge, 1907),pp. lxiv-lxix.
2
r4vrcand
&xpl0s
are
standardly contrasted with
each other. See
H. Bonitz,
Index
Aristotelicus
Berlin, 1870),p.
779. Physics 184 a 23-26
shows that
xao6Xou
s
sometimes
used
like
rimy
and contrasted
with
W'
&xpOEiaS.
See
also Prior
Analytics 46 a 10,
ff.,
a
28-30.
3
Cf.
De A nima402 b 16, ff
The account which gives the
akrla
s the
one which gives the
genuine
ri
bL.
This
is
presumed n the illustrationat 413
a 17-20 and is required
by
the
language, as we
shall see below.
4
Two other ways
of reading the opening
remarks of
II,
2
deserve consideration.
(1)
Aristotle s announcing the
method which he is about to
follow
-
beginningwith
matters
which are "clearer to us"
than the
definition of II, I (namely,
the accounts of the
particularfaculties of soul) and workingup inductivelyto a new account which is an
improvement on
that definition. (See R. D.
Hicks, op. cit., p. 322.
Hicks was following
Simplicius,
n
De
A nima, 96-97 Hayduck).
But Aristotle
does not produce a new
account
of
soul
at
the
end
of his discussion of the
special faculties. At the end of
II,
2 we
have
the
old
definition
reaffirmed 414 a 27-28; see
below Sec. 6);
and
there
is no new
definition
after
that. And
the accounts of
the special
faculties are
not
and cannot
be
derived from
any new
fully adequate general
account of soul as they would
be
if
they
were accounts
of
soul
which
are
"clearer o us."
(Such accounts stand to the
fully adequate
account
in
the
relation of fact to
explanation
and conclusion to
reason,
413
a
11-16).
The
relation
is
rather
he other
way around(see Sec. II). (2)
Aristotle
s
beginning
again
from
an
account
of
soul
which is
more obvious to us
than
the definition
of
II,
I
and
working
from
that
to
establish inductively the old definition which is itself "moreintelligiblein the orderof
explanation." (So, apparently,
Aquinas,
in
De Anima,
Sections
245,
ff.
Pirotta;
but
see
Section
244.)
But
the definition
of
II,
I
is
itself
an account
"in outline"
('rimy),
and
274
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AnalyticsII, 10.This is contrary o Aristotle'sassertionat 94 a I1 ff. (cf. 75 b 31-32) and
to
other evidence, but it is enough for our purposes in this paper that the definitions of De
Anima II,
I
belong to the type called "conclusions." Here, and in what follows,
the
discussion draws on the results of "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in
Aristotle:
PosteriorA nalytics
1I,
7-10,"
PhilosophicalReview, 85 (1976); referred o below as
ESTA.
On the point in question here see
ESTA, n.
14.
17
This conclusion is confirmed by
the other language used to describe the definition
in
De Anima II, 2. The definition is said
there to merely state a fact ('r
bT&)
bout the
soul
and
not to specify the essence (j
alrCat)
hich explains such facts. This language s used
in
the PosteriorAnalyticsto contrast
nominal with real definitions (93 a 16,
ff.,
93 b 29,
ff.).
The
definition is also said to give
an account of soul which is clearer to us but
less
knowable in the order of
explanation. This language is used to characterizenominal
definitions as opposed to other typesat Physics 184 a 18, ff.
18
PosteriorAnalytics,93 a 16-29 with 93 b 29-32 and 94 a 7-9.
19
The items can change from stage to stage; 93 b 7-14 at 12-14.
20 93 b38-94a9.
21
Some of these definitions give
"somethingof the thing itself' (T
axaroi,roe
fp&yRaros),
i.e. an element of the essence of the thing, 93 a 22-24, 27-29 with 94 a 7-9; others give
not
an
element of the essence but only a feature by means of which we grasp the existence of
the thing and are pointed to (a
knowledge of) the essence
(vpbs
[-T
C8?vai]
To Tv
kaTL)
due
to
the fact that the feature is exhibitable in a conclusion derivable from the essence
(93
a
27-29, a 35-37; cf. De Anima
402 b 21-22). There is a third type of nominal
definition, one which mentions
merely accidental features of the entity defined (93 b
29-37, cf. 93 a 24-26). But this typecan only function as a conclusion of a syllogismor a
statementthat
something is (Tb
bTL)
in
a
secondary
way (75 b 30-32). So this type
is
not
in
play
in De A
nima II, 1.
22
See
84
a, 11, ff. for the two permissible types of conclusions of demonstrations.
The
second
type could,
in
principle, exhibit the inherence of a proprium
n a
thing but
Aristotle thinks that such conclusions
are very rare (73 a 6-7, 16-20).
23
Nominal definitions are accounts
of what some word or phrase signifies
(0aiiwve),
93 b
29-32.
And significationhas two components, referenceand a fixing on a
kind.
(See
the
uses
of
ajo.clveLv
t
92 b 26-34, 93
b 39-94 a 2 and ESTA, Sec. 7.)
24
93
a 16-29
with 93 b 29-32 and
94
a 7-9, and ESTA, Sec. 6.
Cf. n. 26
below.
25
An exampleof the type of nominal
definition which specifies a feature
of the
essence is
'Thunder(OpovTi)s a certain type of noise in the clouds (4&posrs vrqGCv)'93 a 22-23).
This definition does not say that any noise in the clouds would be thunder.It says that
thunder is that certain type of noise in
the clouds, familiar actual instances of
which we
recognize
as thunder.
It says, hence,
that something
is an
instance
of thunder
f
and
only
if it
belongs
to
the same kind as those familiaractual nstances.
An
example
of
the
type
of
nominal
definition which specifies a properfeature
not a
part
of
the essence
is
'Eclipse
s
the
failure of the full
moon to cast shadowswhen nothing
visible
is
in the
way'(93
a 36 -
b
7).
This definition
refers us to familiar actual cases
of
eclipse by
means of
a
description
which provides us with a sufficient
condition for the occurrence
of an
eclipse.
It tells
us
that something
is an
eclipse if and only if it
has the same
essence or
cause
adxiTa
or
&6rt1)
as
those
actual cases of inability of the
full
moon to
cast shadows
under
a
visibly
clear
sky
which we recognizeas cases of eclipse. See ESTA,Sec. 9. For anotherdefinition of this
type
see the definition of
a citizen at Politics
1275
a
29-33
(with
a 33
ff.
at
b
5-7).
26
The indefinite 'TLS'plays
a crucial
role
in definitions
of
this
type (see
93
a
21-24).
It
276
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means "that
certainfamiliar."
This is
made clear
by
an
important
passage
in the
Physics
(1, 1, 184 a 16- b 14, at a 26, ff.) which revealsthat initial(nominal)definitions in science
are accounts
by
reference to actual cases of the
entity
defined which are familiar
to
us.
These definitions focus
by
means of such a
referenceonto a certain
familiarwhole
(QXov
n). See
ESTA,
Sec. 7.
27
Here and
in
what follows
I
make
explicit
in
parentheses
various features of
nominal
definitions which
Aristotle himself
normally
only brings
out in theoretical
discussions
of
definition. See nn.
25-26,
Sec.
7
below,
and
ESTA,
Secs.
6-9.
28
In
the fourth definition '"oLoa&'
412
b
16)
functions
as
'fIs'
does in
the
nominal
definitions at
PosteriorAnalytics
3
a 22-24
to indicate that it is a
special
sort of
body
that
is
in
question
here (cf.
'roip,&
a6paxn,
b
I
1)
and
not
just
any body
with an internal
source
of
change.
That
sort is
"the most familiarsort"with an internalsource of
change
and it
is
the function of the
'roLoo00'
o signify this. (Cf. Metaphysics,1035 b 16 and 1043 a 36,
where 'To&6a8E'
nd 'Tus'play,
interchangeably,
his
role.) So understood the
definition
does
provide
a
sufficient
condition.
29
It is
not
here
assumed that
Aristotle ever succeeds in
adequately
differentiating
the
innate
capacity for
motion of
living
things,
especially
plants,
from the innate
impulse
to
motion
(Physics
192
b
18)
possessed
by
al
inanimate
natural
objects.
See
F.
Solmsen,
Aristotle's
System
of
the
Physical World
Ithaca,
1960),
95-102. But
the
fourth definition
of soul
leaves
open the
possibilityof a
solution.
30
This
rules out
the
reading of 414
a 27-28 in J.
Owens,
"Aristotle's
Definition of
Soul,"
in R. B.
Palmer
and R.
Hamerton-KeUy eds.)
Philomathes
The
Hague,
1971), at n. 29.
31
Assuming the
primacyof
the actuality
of a
function to
the function,
as at 415 a
18-20.
This step in the argument s not explicitbut it is easily supplied.
32
In
fact
Aristotle's
claim at 413 b
24-27 is the
stronger
claim
that "it is likely
(Iotxe)that
the intellect
is a different
type
of soul, and
it alone is
separable."
That
IOLXE'
has this
force
is clear from
the parallel
passage
408 b
18-29 (cf. 430
a 17-25).
33
It might
be suggested
that the
definition of II, I is a
nominal
definition of
the
sort that
exhibits
necessary
conditions
for the
presence
of soul. If so,
then
according o
the pattern
at Posterior
Analytics94 a
3-9
the new
definition of II, 2
would
be a
combination of
the
old definition of
II,
I
and
what we have
been calling
the new definition. In that case
the
correct new
definition
would be: Soul
is the
source (&p
ii)
of
any
group
of
the life
functions,
which
source
is
always
possessed (as first
actuality)
by
a natural
body
which
has life
potentially.
In
this case each
type
of soul would have to be a
function
of some
natural
body.
But
Aristotle denies having claimed this in the very place where he is
developing
his
new
definition
(413
b
13-16,24-29). So
his
new definition
can
hardly have
this form.
34
"Source of life"
(&PX.
Tow
v, 413 b
11-13 with a
22-25) may
seem rather
thin and
commonplace
for a real
definition.
But Politics
1275 a 38
-
b
I
shows
that
genera of the
type
to which soul
belongs
are
very
thin in
content (cf. De A
nima
414
b 28-32) and
the real
definitions
of
entities of
this
type
may
be
quite
commonplace (see
Politics
1279
a 25-27
with 1278b
8-10,
ff.,
and for
the sort of
definition of figure
probably
n
view
at DeAnima
414 b
20, ff.,
see
Euclid,
ElementsI, Def.
14).
The account
of II,
I
may also seem
rather
technical for a nominal
definition. But
even a
relatively
advanced account
may
still
be
what is "familiar o
us"
and
only nominal.
(See
the
nominal definition of
squaringat 413
a
16-19;
cf.
Politics
1275 a
29-34 and n. 25
above.)
35
Note that the new
definition of
II,
2
is
not
defective in
this way
-
another
reason for
not
taking
it to be
the inferior
definition in view
at 413 a
1
1,
ff. Cf. n. 4
above.
277
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36
The squaring
of a plane rectilinear
igure which
has been reduced to a rectangle
with
unequal sides. For the theorems which Aristotlehas in mind in this connection see Sir
Thomas Heath, Mathematics
n Aristotle
Oxford, 1949), 191-193.
37
See, e.g.
Posterior
A
nalytics76 b 8,
and Heath, op. cit., 43-44.
38
To
square,
i.e. to find
the square root of, a number
is to find the mean proportional
between
two factorswhich, multiplied
together,yield the number.
"
See above, Sec.
5. Physics 184 a 16, ff. at a 23,
25 makes clear that all
nominal
definitions
and all accounts from the point of view
of what is more familiarare
accounts
of something
"in
general"
(x066ou).
The
infant's
notion of woman
as what
mother
is
contains an understanding
of what a woman is xa(6Xov.
It does mention a
characteristic
common
to all women
-
being not a
mother but what mother s
- but it only does
this in
an
indirect
way.
And
this mention
is indirect in the same way
as that in the
nominal
definitionof II, I on the reading givenhere.
40
In
view
of this Aristotle cannot
mean to say at 415 a 23-25 that
nutrition s a faculty
belonging
to
all living
things.He says that "the nutritive
soul is the firstand most
common
faculty by
which
life
belongs to all the things that
have life, taken
collectively,and
is the
faculty most
widely distributed over
that collection; but not
that it belongs to
each
member
of that collection. 434 a 22-26
coversonly those
thingswhich "live, and
have soul
from
birth to death,"
i.e. with mortal things, as Aristotle's
more careful
statement
of the
same
point at 413 a 31-32
confirms.
41
Taking
an essence ('ri
iv
elvaL,
045 b 3, to be a
form; 1032 b 1-2, with De Gen.
et
Cor.
335 b
35. Cf. 1037 a
1-2). The entitieswhich consist
of form without
matterhere
are the
categories,
but that does not affect the
point at issue. Aristotle,
moreover,describes
the
essence of the prime mover (1071 b 19-21) and that of the separate ntellect(De Anima
430 a
22-23)
in
the same
way. The substance
ov'ai)
of the intellect 408
b
19,430
a
18) s,
doubtless, substance n
the sense of form (412 a 6-9).
42
Cf.
Sec.
6
above. The
view of 414 a 19-20 is attributedby
Aristotle
to certain
of
his
predecessors.When they
spoke of the soul, as he points
out, they
were almost exclusively
discussing
the human soul (402 b 3-5).
Commentatorsagree that
the view is closest
to the
position
discussed
by
Aristotle in the
Eudemus and at De
Anima 407
b
27, ff.,
and
defended by
Simmias
at
Phaedo,85 e ff. (414 a 22-25
seems to recall
the
deficiency
n the
view discussed at 408
a 10, f.) Simmias was talking
about the human soul and
so was
Aristotle in the Eudemus see
W. D. Ross, Aristotle: Parva Naturalia,
Oxford, 1955, pp.
3-5).
Cf. Politics 1340 b
14-19.At De Anima
402 a
6-10 "soul"covers
only
animal
souls.
43
See E. Zeller,Aristotleand the EarlierPeripatetics,Eng. tr.(London, 1897),4.
44
See above, Sec.
2.
45
See
Bonitz, op. cit.,
under
'T&wos',
i'nro'runo0v',
nd
yv6pitos
and,
in
particular,
Metaphysics
1028 b 27-32
at
31-32,
1029 b
3-12;
Ethics
1094 a
25,
b
19-22,
1176a
30-32,
1179
a 33-35.
"
An earlierversion
of
this
paper
was read
to the Ancient
Greek
PhilosophyColloquium
(NYC).
Many points
in
the
paper
have
been
improved
as a
resultof the discussionon
that
occasion
and as a result
of later discussion
with John
M.
Cooper.
278