Argentina - Basic Protection Project - Implementation ...documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/156721482851458999/... · Web viewIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-77030;

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR3318

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(IBRD-77030; IBRD-80170)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$450 MILLION

TO THE

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

FOR A

BASIC PROTECTION PROJECT

December 15, 2016

Social Protection and Labor Global PracticeLatin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective December 15, 2016)

Currency Unit = Argentine Peso (Arg$)Arg$15.96 = US$1

US$0.06 = Arg$1

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP ANSES’ Individual Registry (ANSES Archivo de Personas)AF Additional FinancingANSES Social Security National Administration (Administración Nacional de la

Seguridad Social) AUH Universal Child Allowance Program (Programa de Asignación Universal por

Hijo) CPS Country Partnership StrategyDNPOIC National Directorate of Projects with International Credit OrganizationsENAPROSS National Social Security and Protection Survey (Encuesta Nacional de

Proteccion y Seguridad Social)ENGH National Household Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Gasto de

Hogares)EO Employment OfficeFA Family AllowancesFM Financial ManagementGDP Gross Domestic ProductGoA Government of ArgentinaICR Implementation Completion and Results ReportIFR Interim Financial ReportILO International Labour OrganizationIPPF Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework KOI Key Outcome IndicatorLA Loan AgreementM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMEF Ministry of Economy and FinanceMTESS Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo,

Empleo y Seguridad Social)PAD Project Appraisal DocumentPDO Project Development ObjectiveSCE Employment and Training Insurance (Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo)

SUAF Unified Family Allowance Payment System (Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares)

TA Technical Assistance

Senior Global Practice Director: Michal RutkowskiPractice Manager:Margaret Ellen Grosh

Project Team Leader: Marcela SalvadorICR Team Leader: Marcela Salvador

ARGENTINABasic Protection Project

CONTENTSData Sheet

A. Basic InformationB. Key DatesC. Ratings SummaryD. Sector and Theme CodesE. Bank StaffF. Results Framework AnalysisG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRsH. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes3. Assessment of Outcomes4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance6. Lessons Learned7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/PartnersAnnex 1. Project Costs and FinancingAnnex 2. Outputs by ComponentAnnex 3. Economic and Financial AnalysisAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision ProcessesAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey ResultsAnnex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and ResultsAnnex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICRAnnex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/StakeholdersAnnex 9. List of Supporting Documents

MAP

A. Basic Information

Country: Argentina Project Name: Argentina Basic Protection Project

Project ID: P115183 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-77030,IBRD-80170

ICR Date: 11/10/2016 ICR Type: Core ICRLending Instrument: SIL Borrower: Argentine RepublicOriginal Total Commitment: US$450.00 million Disbursed Amount: US$929.99 million

Revised Amount: US$929.99 millionEnvironmental Category: CImplementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance; Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security; Social Security National AdministrationCofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 01/30/2009 Effectiveness: 06/12/2009 06/12/2009

Appraisal: 03/16/2009 Restructuring(s):

07/10/201110/15/201208/22/201401/10/2015

Approval: 06/09/2009 Mid-term Review: 07/29/2013 07/29/2013 Closing: 09/30/2011 06/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality at Entry (QEA): None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): No Quality of Supervision

(QSA): None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)Other social services 99 99Public administration- Other social services 1 1

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)Improving labor markets 8 8Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services 92 92

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Jesko S. Hentschel Pedro Alba Practice Manager/Manager: Margaret Ellen Grosh Helena G. Ribe Project Team Leader: Marcela Ines Salvador Rafael P. Rofman ICR Team Leader: Marcela Ines Salvador ICR Primary Author: Maria Cecilia Zanetta

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)The project development objective was to increase the effectiveness of Argentina's income transfer programs for the unemployed and families with children by improving selected design features and the transparency and accountability of the Family Allowances (FA) and the Employment and Training Insurance (Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo, SCE) Programs, and by transferring beneficiaries from other, less effective schemes and programs, to the FA and SCE Program. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)n.a.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of SCE beneficiaries exiting into formal employment (Annual) Value (quantitative or qualitative)

8,400 9,000 11,000 15,208

Date achieved 12/31/2008 12/31/2011 12/31/2014 06/30/2016

Comments (including % achievement)

Achieved: The target was already exceeded by the Additional Financing (AF) original closing date of September 30, 2014. Target exceeded both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of SCE beneficiaries.

Indicator 2: Percentage of beneficiaries of SCE participating in training, education, or employment support activities (12-month moving average).

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

23.5% 30% 35% 38%

Date achieved 05/31/2008 12/31/2011 12/31/2014 12/31/2015Comments (including % achievement)

Achieved: The target was already exceeded by the AF original closing date of September 30, 2014.

Indicator 3: Percentage of spending on Family Allowances paid through the direct payment system (12-month moving average)


57% 90% 98% 100%


Achieved: Better than expected performance, with the Unified Family Allowance Payment System (Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares, SUAF) being fully implemented by December 2014.

Indicator 4: Number of children under 18 registered in ANSES Individual Registry (Archivo de Personas, ADP) database, who are either receiving Family Allowance Benefits from ANSES or are not receiving them due to reasons established in the legislation.


9,700,000 — 10,400,000 12,320,000

Date achieved 12/31/2010 — 12/31/2014 12/31/2015Comments (including % achievement)

Achieved: The target was already exceeded by the AF original closing date of September 30, 2014. (Note: This key outcome indicator (KOI) and the corresponding targets were added under the Additional Financing loan.)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of beneficiaries of SCE Value (quantitative or qualitative)

78,500 200,000 165,000 106,462

Date achieved 05/31/2008 12/31/2011 12/31/2014 12/31/2015

Comments (including % achievement)

Not achieved: The coverage of the SCE Program has not expanded as originally anticipated, partly as a result of the transfer of the SCE beneficiaries to other programs, including the Universal Child Allowance Program (Programa de Asignación Universal por Hijo, AUH).

Indicator 2: Number of Employment Offices (EOs) providing SCE services


181 350 370 408


Achieved: 408 out of 600 EOs distributed throughout the country are providing SCE training, education, and employment-support services. The target was already exceeded by the Additional Financing original closing date of September 30, 2014.

Indicator 3: Number of firms registered in SUAFValue (quantitative or qualitative)

411,894 627,389 792,197 1,193,911


Achieved: The target was already exceeded by the Additional Financing original closing date of September 30, 2014. (Note: Target values were extended to December 2014 under the Additional Financing loan.)

Indicator 4: Amounts claimed to ANSES for reimbursement when allowances to be compensated exceed expected contributions (12-month moving average).


Arg$2.40 million Arg$0.60 million Arg$0.09 million

Arg$0.00 million


Achieved: The target was already exceeded by 2011, when the previous compensatory system was eliminated by an administrative resolution. (Note: Target values were extended to December 2014 under the Additional Financing loan).

Indicator 5: Number of child allowance benefits paid by ANSES through SUAFValue (quantitative or qualitative)

2.57 million 3.26 million 3.70 million 2.71 million


Not achieved: Although the target was met by the Additional Financing original closing date of September 30, 2014, it later deteriorated because the income eligibility thresholds were not adjusted in relation to inflation and salary increases.

Indicator 6: Number of SUAF beneficiaries receiving their transfers directly in their bank accounts Value (quantitative or qualitative)

805,348 1,513,463 1,821,247 1,141,395


Not achieved: The underlying goal of this indicator was met, as nearly all beneficiaries currently receive payments through direct deposits. However, the lack of adjustment of income thresholds for FA eligibility has reduced the actual number of beneficiaries.

Indicator 7: Social protection survey is designed and implementedValue (quantitative or qualitative)

No survey implemented —

Surveys to be implemented in 2011 and 2013

Surveys implemented in 2014 and 2015


Achieved: Two National Social Security and Protection surveys (ENAPROSS I and II) were carried out in 2014 and 2015, respectively.

Indicator 8: Number of regular statistical reports on AUH prepared and published through ANSES website.


0 — 12 (4 per year) 8


Not achieved: ANSES stopped publishing the report for almost two years. Publication of the statistical report was resumed in 2016.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actual Disbursements

(US$, millions) 1 06/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 269.73 2 11/11/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 269.73 3 06/16/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 444.76 4 12/18/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 445.79 5 07/09/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 446.09 6 02/19/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 446.66 7 09/21/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 447.81 8 04/13/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 448.21 9 11/10/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 898.23

10 05/16/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 901.45 11 12/03/2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 902.49 12 06/09/2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 902.49 13 12/14/2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 921.02 14 06/16/2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 921.02

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$, millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

07/10/2011 — S S 446.09

Level 2 Restructuring to extend the closing date of the original loan for 21 months from September 30, 2011 to June 30, 2013 to allow the completion of TA activities under Component 3.

10/15/2012 — S MS 447.81 Level 2 Restructuring to extend the closing date of the original loan for additional 15 months from June 30, 2013 to September 30, 2014 to allow for the completion of a newly added TA

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$, millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes MadeDO IP

activity under Component 3.

08/22/2014 — S MS 901.45

Level 2 Restructuring, which made the following modifications to the AF loan: (a) introduced a new expenditure category ‘Fees’ to cover costs of training services offered to SCE beneficiaries; (b) reallocated proceeds of US$6 million to Category (4) SCE Grants and AF Grants; (c) added an additional TA activity under a newly added Sub-component 3.d; and (d) extended the closing date of the Project from September 30, 2014 to June 30, 2016.

01/10/2015 — S MS 902.49

Level 2 Restructuring, which reallocated unused funds from cancelled TA activities under Sub-component 3.d to SCE and AF grants to ensure full disbursement of the loan proceeds.

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. By the time of Project preparation, Argentina had significantly recovered from the 2001–02 economic crisis. Economy had been growing steadily at an 8–9 percent rate for five consecutive years since 2003. The strong economic growth, together with an unprecedented effort to provide income support to those in need, in the aftermath of the crisis, had brought back social indicators to precrisis levels. In this context, there was a window of opportunity to move from emergency income-support programs toward a more comprehensive, long-term, and sustainable strategy for social protection.

2. Despite the economic recovery, the importance of further developing a strong and inclusive safety net continued to be critical. Poverty remained high—at around 20 percent and significantly higher in the poorer regions of the country. Likewise, although income inequality had experienced a sustained decline since 2003, it was still higher than levels in the early 1990s, with a Gini coefficient of 0.48–0.50 in 2008. In addition, although unemployment had declined from the peak of 20 percent in 2002 to below 10 percent in 2008, it was expected to rise due to the global economic slowdown in 2009.

3. In view of the increasing fiscal pressures in the context of the global financial crisis and the country’s still tenuous social recovery, the Government of Argentina (GoA) requested the World Bank’s support in two areas: to (a) enhance the effectiveness of social protection policies and (b) create conditions to expand their coverage, if necessary as a consequence of the ongoing global financial crisis. The World Bank responded with the preparation of this Project, which supported improvements in two social protection programs that were considered core to the Government’s social protection strategy: (a) the Employment and Training Insurance Program (Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo, SCE); and (b) the Family Allowances (FA) Program. These two programs were selected among the full spectrum of Argentina’s social protection programs as they fulfilled four critical requirements, including (a) having an efficient, transparent, and accountable system for transferring resources to beneficiaries; (b) having a large enough scale to have an impact on the population’s welfare; (c) being scalable in emergency situations; and (d) offering adequate financial management (FM) procedures acceptable to the World Bank without major reforms. The Project design successfully combined the two into a single operation, effectively ensuring the availability of financial resources for supporting TA activities and enhancing their visibility, without slowing down disbursements for program improvements.

4. The World Bank was well positioned to respond to the GoA’s request for support in social protection, as it had been actively providing operational and analytical support to Argentina’s social sector programs since the 1990s, when the first workfare program (Trabajar) was introduced. Following the 2001–02 crisis, the World Bank provided substantial support in social protection through a robust portfolio totaling US$1.4 billion, focusing first on emergency programs and subsequently, shifting the focus toward active labor market and training programs.1 The World Bank also had an active program of analytical work in social protection, including a study of the pension system (completed in 2006); and two programmatic tasks, the first one focusing on labor market informality, and the second, on the future of social protection

1 Heads of Household Transition Project (P055483) approved on March 23, 2006, for US$350 million; Economic and Social Transition Structural Adjustment Loan (P083074) approved on May 22, 2003, for US$500 million; Social Protection VI Project - Heads of Household (P073578) approved on January 28, 2003, for US$600 million. 1

in Argentina following the emergency measures of the crisis period.2 These activities had prepared the World Bank well to respond to the request for continuous financing of the social protection system in Argentina.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

5. The PDO was to increase the effectiveness of Argentina’s income transfer programs for the unemployed and families with children by improving selected design features and the transparency and accountability of the FA and SCE Programs, and by transferring beneficiaries from other, less effective schemes and programs to the FA Program and the SCE Program. 3

Achievement of various dimensions of this PDO was to be assessed through three key outcome indicators (KOIs), as given in table 1.

Table 1. Original KOIs and their Justification

Original KOIs JustificationKOI 1 - Number of SCE beneficiaries exiting into formal employment

Assessing the effectiveness of the SCE Program in supporting reentry of participants in the labor market

KOI 2 - Percentage of beneficiaries of the SCE participating in training, education, or employment support activities (6-month moving average)

Coverage of the SCE training activities

KOI 3 - Percentage of spending in Family Allowances paid through direct payment system (12-month moving average)

Improved transparency and accountability of the FA Program through the consolidation of the Unified Family Allowance Payment System (Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares, SUAF) as the only channel for Social Security National Administration (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social, ANSES) to pay family allowances

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

6. The original PDO remained unchanged during the Project’s lifetime, including under the preparation of the US$480 million Additional Financing (AF) that was approved on March 23, 2011. An additional KOI (KOI 4) was added under the AF to capture the coverage of the scale-up of the FA benefit, which also included children of the unemployed or informally employed workers with low income under a newly instituted program—the so-called Universal Child Allowance Program (Programa de Asignación Universal por Hijo, AUH)—that received support under the AF. In addition, deadlines for targets for the three original KOIs were changed to December 2014, which was the revised Additional Financing closing date. Finally, the operational definition of KOI 2 was modified to eliminate volatility due to seasonal variations.4

2 The reports (Report No. 36092-AR “Informal Employment in Argentina: Towards Understanding Its Causes and Consequences” and Report No. 44194-AR “Argentina - Income Support Policies towards the Bicentennial”) can be found at www.worldbank.org/ar. 3 Loan Agreement (LA) (Schedule 1, page 5); Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (pp. viii, 10). There is also another slightly different definition in the PAD, which reads “The Project Development Objective is to increase the effectiveness of Argentina’s income transfer programs for the unemployed and families with children, by expanding the number of participants and improving design features, transparency, and accountability in two core social protection programs” (PAD - Results Framework, page 53).

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Table 2. KOIs and their Justification under the AF

AF - KOIs Justification

KOI 1 - Number of SCE beneficiaries exiting into formal employment

Unchanged - assessing the effectiveness of the SCE Program in supporting reentry of participants in labor market

KOI 2 - Percentage of beneficiaries of the SCE participating in training, education, or employment support activities(12-month moving average)

Minor modification of the operational definition - coverage of the SCE training activities 5

KOI 3 - Percentage of spending in Family Allowances paid through direct payment system (12-month moving average)

Unchanged - improved transparency and accountability of the FA Program through the consolidation of the SUAF

KOI 4 - Number of children under 18 registered in ANSES’ Individual Registry Database (Base de Administración de Personas, ADP), who are either receiving Family Allowance benefits from ANSES or are not receiving them due to reasons established in the legislation

Added - advances in the inclusion of beneficiaries in the AUH (AUH coverage)

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

7. The original operation benefited unemployed workers eligible under the SCE Program, which totaled 78,500 in December 2008. It also benefited the FA recipients through the SUAF system—children of formal workers earning below a designated threshold that received the grant directly through ANSES—that totaled over 2.5 million in 2008. With the Additional Financing support, the AUH benefited children of unemployed or unregistered low-income workers, which totaled almost 3.5 million in 2010.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

8. The original loan had three components:

Component 1 - SCE Program (US$80 million, equivalent to 18 percent of the loan proceeds). It supported the operation and scaling up of the SCE Program during 2009. The SCE Program was aimed at unemployed workers, providing a monthly income transfer, training, and job placement services for up to two years.

Component 2 - FA Program (US$365 million, equivalent to 81 percent of the loan proceeds). It financed FA grants to eligible formal salaried workers with family dependents. The grants financed only child benefits paid by the direct payment system, SUAF, through transfers to beneficiaries’ bank accounts.

Component 3 - Technical Assistance (TA) for the Social Protection System (US$5 million, equivalent to 1 percent of the loan proceeds). It provided support for capacity building within the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, MTESS), particularly in the area of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of social protection programs. These

4 The operational definition of KOI 2 was revised from a 6-month to a 12-month moving average to eliminate seasonal effects.

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activities were carried out by the Undersecretary of Labor Studies of the MTESS, in collaboration with the Secretary of Employment team.

1.6 Revised Components

9. The AF loan also had three components that replicated those under the original loan:

Component 1 - SCE Program (US$75 million, equivalent to 16 percent of the AF proceeds). This Component continued to support the operation and scaling up of the SCE Program during 2010 (under retroactive financing), 2011, and 2012.

Component 2 - FA Program (US$375.1 million, equivalent to 78 percent of the AF proceeds). Under the AF, the focus of this Component expanded to include not only contributory AF benefits as in the original loan, but also non-contributory FA benefits under the AUH Program, an expansion of the FA system that was instituted in late 2009. In both cases, grants were paid directly through transfers to beneficiaries’ bank accounts.

Component 3 - Technical Assistance (TA) for the Social Protection System (US$28.7 million, equivalent to 6 percent of the AF proceeds). This Component provided support for capacity building to the implementing agencies (the MTESS and ANSES), particularly in the area of M&E of the programs supported under the operation.

1.7 Other significant changes

10. Both the original and the Additional Financing loans were implemented largely as anticipated, except for the slower than expected implementation of TA activities and repeated changes in the TA activities to be implemented, with some of the original tasks being eliminated and others added to reflect the changing priorities of the MTESS. Even though TA represented only a very small proportion of the operation’s proceeds, these changes required a total of four Level-2 restructurings, four extensions of the closing date of the original and AF loans, and repeated reallocations of funds (see section H in the data sheet).5 Two TA activities originally included in the AF were not implemented: the SCE backup data center under the orbit of the MTESS and the FA field registration process under the direction of ANSES, which was partially implemented with local funds (see Annex 2 for a detailed description of all TA activities).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

5 The closing date of the original loan (IBRD 7703-AR) was extended twice, the undisbursed funds at the time of restructuring amounting to US$2.8 million and US$1.07 million (equivalent to 0.7 and 0.24 percent of the loan proceeds), respectively. The AF loan (IBRD 8017-AR) was restructured twice, with the undisbursed funds at the time of restructuring amounting to US$26 million and US$6.9 million (equivalent to 5.4 percent and 1.4 percent of the loan proceeds), respectively.

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11. Soundness of the background analysis. The operation’s design was fully supported by the World Bank’s previous analytical work,6 which had shown solid social consensus toward social policies aimed at integrating beneficiaries in the labor market (such as those supported under the SCE Program under Component 1) as well as a significant impact of FAs on social outcomes (Component 2). The analysis also showed the limitations of existing data and the need to develop new instruments to further refine the policy-making process, which informed the design of Component 3. Finally, the knowledge obtained through the preparation of the analytical work indicated the need for support on strategic programs targeted to the unemployed and children.

12. In addition, the operation adequately reflected lessons learned in the design and implementation of social protection operations, both in Argentina and in the region, providing support to already existing programs with very clear financial flow systems that relied on the banking system to reach beneficiaries.

13. The Project was also fully aligned with the strategic priorities of the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) that was being discussed concurrently with the preparation of this operation.7 Specifically, the two programs supported under the operation directly contributed to the goal of promoting social inclusion, one of the CPS’ three pillars.

14. Assessment of the Project design. Conceptually, the Project supported the natural progression in the ongoing development of Argentina’s social protection system. In particular, this operation correctly identified the need to support the GoA in its efforts to continue the transition from the emergency workfare programs that were set in place in the aftermath of the 2001–02 crisis while strengthening two core programs within the country’s social protection strategy. Moreover, the SCE and FA Programs met the necessary conditions in terms of transparency, scale-up, potential for expansion, and compatibility with the World Bank’s FM procedures. In addition, the operation identified substantial opportunities for operational improvements within these two programs (the strengthening of training services under the SCE Program and the expanded utilization of the SUAF in the case of the FA Program) to be supported under the operation. The World Bank team was also able to foresee a possible expansion of those two programs beyond the beneficiaries eligible at the time and incorporated enough flexibility in the PDO and overall implementation mechanisms to accommodate that expansion. Finally, by clearly separating the disbursement mechanisms corresponding to selected program improvements and TA activities, the Project design successfully combined the two into a single operation, effectively ensuring the availability of financial resources for supporting TA activities and enhancing their visibility, without slowing down disbursements for program improvements.

15. Adequacy of the Government's commitment. The operation was fully owned by the GoA as it supported the improvement of the already ongoing SCE and FA Programs. The original loan represented only 16.6 percent of the 2009 expenditures for the two programs, with the remaining amount being financed with national resources.8 At the agency level, commitment was also strong at the time of preparation as the MTESS and ANSES fully embraced improving 6 Analyses was carried out under the Argentina Income Support Advisory and Analytics Activities (P082177) and discussed in the final report (“Argentina - Income Support towards the Bicentennial” – Report No. 44194-AR).7 CPS (Report 48476-AR) discussed by the Board of Executive Directors on June 9, 2009.

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the SCE and FA Programs. Likewise, the Undersecretary of Labor Studies took full ownership of the various TA activities supported under the operation.

16. Assessment of risks. The four areas of risk identified at appraisal as Substantial were successfully addressed through mitigation measures. However, the complexity in the implementation of some of the TA activities supported under the operation, such as carrying out the first National Social Security and Protection Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Proteccion y Seguridad Social ENAPROSS 1), was underestimated.

2.2 Implementation

Outside the control of the Government

17. Agile disbursement mechanisms for grant financing. The operation confirmed the expediency of the underlying Project design, which provided sizable financial incentives for program reforms through agile and transparent disbursement mechanisms under an investment operation. Under the original loan, a total of US$444.75 million (equivalent to 98.8 percent of the loan proceeds) for the financing of the FA and SCE grants was disbursed within six months after effectiveness, as the Project's disbursement indicators reached their target levels at the expected dates.9 Program-improvement disbursements under the Additional Finance loan would have followed a similar pattern, except that they were delayed for almost 20 months due to ANSES’ non-compliance with two disbursement indicators related to information disclosure, as explained in the following paragraphs.

Subject to the control of the Government

18. Continuous progress toward an integrated social protection strategy. As foreseen during preparation, the two programs supported under the operation were expanded. These expansions received World Bank support under an Additional Financing loan (Loan No. 8017-AR) that was approved in 2011 for US$480 million. Specifically, a major reform to the FA Program was adopted in October 2009, when a new benefit aimed at the children of unemployed and informal workers was introduced under the noncontributory AUH Program. This reform resulted in a major shift in social protection policies as it created a permanent, non-emergency-related transfer program that provides income support to those outside the formal labor market. In addition, it significantly contributed to the expansion of coverage among vulnerable households, with nearly 4 million children expected to receive benefits under the AUH by the closing of the AF in 2014. Also, in 2010, the SCE Program was opened to new beneficiaries beyond the former beneficiaries of the ‘Jefes’ workfare program, who were the original beneficiaries.

8 The proceeds under the original loan amounted to US$450 million, which represented 16.6 percent of the overall expenses of the SCE Program (US$135 million) and the FA Program (US$2.57 billion) during 2009. 9 There were three disbursements for grant financing under the original loan, including (a) US$89.57 million in retroactive financing on June 19, 2009; (b) US$181.28 million when the indicators reached the “first disbursement level” in June 18, 2009; and (c) US$174.30 million, when indicators reached the “second disbursement level” in December 2, 2009. While the disbursement of grant financing under the AF loan also followed a similar scheme based on four disbursement levels, there was disbursement of US$246.64 million during the second quarter of 2013, and US$202.2 million in October 2013, for a total of US$451.06 million, due to ANSES’ delays in complying with information dissemination.

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Subject to the control of the implementing agencies

19. ANSES’ reticence to disclose program data. As part of the Additional Financing loan negotiations, it was agreed that ANSES would publish a four-monthly statistical report with basic data on the program's implementation. The publication of such report was included in the LA as a disbursement indicator, with the first report to be published in March 2011. However, delays in the publication of these reports together with lack of information on KOI 4 (number of children under 18 registered in the ADP database) held back disbursements totaling US$451.06 million for 20 months, even though other disbursement targets had been met. A summary of the statistical report was eventually published but subsequently discontinued once the program’s disbursements were completed. While the reasons behind ANSES’ reticence at the time to publish this information remain unclear, this report is now being routinely published under the agency’s Transparency Portal.

20. Slow implementation of TA activities. As mentioned earlier, the implementation of TA activities was much slower than anticipated. Although program-improvement disbursements proceeded as expected, ensuring the completion of TA activities (equivalent to only 1 percent and 6 percent of the original and AF loans, respectively) required two extensions to the closing date of the original loan for an additional 36 months, and one 21-month extension to the closing date of the AF loan. Clearly, the two types of disbursements had very different time horizons and, even though relatively small in terms of financing, the TA activities were the ones that determined the time horizon of the operation as a whole.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

21. M&E design. Project implementation was also supported by a sound set of disbursement indicators that adequately linked disbursements to progress toward selected program improvements. In addition, the Project benefited from an overall sound Program Result Framework. Both outcome and intermediate indicators were relevant and had clearly defined operational definitions. There were some weaknesses, however, in some of the operational definitions as follows:

KOI 1 (number of SCE beneficiaries exiting into formal employment) intended to capture the effectiveness of the SCE Program in supporting reentry of participants into the labor market. However, this indicator was not fully effective in capturing the impact of the SCE Program as it is heavily affected by the level of economic activity, which was, of course, outside the orbit of the program.

Intermediate indicators 5 and 6 (that is, Number of child allowance benefits paid by ANSES through SUAF and Number of SUAF beneficiaries receiving their transfers directly in their bank accounts, respectively), which intended to capture the expansion and transparency of the SUAF system. These indicators would have been better defined as the proportion of beneficiaries rather than as an absolute number.10

10 During implementation, the absolute number of SUAF beneficiaries did not increase as expected due to a slowdown in job creation as a result of the economic downturn and the slower than anticipated adjustment in the threshold for income eligibility in relation to salary increases. These factors are, of course, exogenous to the operation and negatively affected the performance of the indicators despite the successful implementation of program improvements.

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22. During preparation, the World Bank task team recommended that impact evaluations of the SCE and the AUH Programs be included under the operation.11 However, this recommendation was not accepted by the administration in place at the time. Not including a more in-depth impact evaluation of these two programs constituted a missed opportunity to learn more about the effectiveness of the two programs. Since the SCE does not have universal coverage, it would have been possible to conduct a randomized impact evaluation to compare labor outcomes among the SCE beneficiaries and their non-SCE peers.

23. M&E implementation. Access to monitoring data regarding indicators coming from ANSES was more difficult than expected, with delays and incomplete reporting on indicators that, in turn, generated substantial disbursement delays.

24. M&E utilization. Monitoring data generated during implementation allowed to systematically track progress toward the program improvements supported under the operation. In the case of the AUH, the eight reports published by ANSES to meet disbursement conditions provided the only data source on the AUH coverage that was publicly disseminated. In terms of TA outputs, the design and implementation of ENAPROSS 1 and 2 surveys constitute a significant contribution to data-driven policy making in the medium term. More aggressive dissemination efforts would have been desirable at the time to ensure both public and non-public actors benefited from the availability of the data collected. Both databases are now publicly available on the MTESS’ website.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

25. Safeguards. The Project was rated Category C, as it triggered OP 4.10 - Indigenous Peoples. Therefore, an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF) was prepared for the original loan and disclosed on the program’s webpage (www.trabajo.gob.ar). The IPPF was subsequently updated to provide the framework for carrying out actions to ensure that these indigenous communities fully benefited from the AUH Program under the AF loan. The updated IPPF was disclosed on the MTESS and ANSES websites (www.anses.gob.ar) on October 15, 2010, and published on the World Bank external website on December 30, 2010. The IPPF was fully implemented as anticipated.

26. Financial administration - FM. Overall, FM performance has ranged from Satisfactory to Moderately Satisfactory throughout the Project implementation period. Adequate FM arrangements were in place at the National Directorate of Projects with International Credit Organizations (DNPOIC) along with an enhanced control framework operating in ANSES and the MTESS, including a widened external audit scope to examine payment procedures and eligibility of beneficiaries. As a result of the enhanced fiduciary controls, no critical accountability issues or ineligible expenditures have been reported. Project staff found it challenging to some extent to use the interim financial report (IFR) disbursement method. The IFRs and audited financial statements were presented to the World Bank regularly, but with some delays. FM monitoring, including IFRs and audit reports reviews, were regularly conducted during supervision missions. While FM support was provided as needed, ensuring the quality of the IFRs remained a challenge throughout the operation’s lifetime.

11 The impact of the AF had already been established under the Advisory and Analytics Activities work.

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27. Procurement. All procurement processes were done under the provisions stipulated in the LA and the World Bank Procurement Guidelines.12 No significant issues were identified in procurement post-review missions and procurement audits. Components 1 and 2 did not involve procurement, as they financed grant transfers. However, there were substantial delays in contracting processes caused in part by the complexity of the TA supported under Component 3, which were implemented under agreements with entities operating at the subnational level.

28. Legal covenants. The Borrower complied with all the legal covenants.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

29. The operation can be expected to have a smooth transition after closing. The operation was fully implemented within the GoA’s public sector structure utilizing existing organizational and management structures of the MTESS, which is responsible for managing and implementing the SCE Program, as well as ANSES, which is responsible for managing and implementing the FA and the AUH Programs. Furthermore, these programs have ample political support and they are funded through the federal budget. Both programs continue to receive full support from the new administration.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

PDO relevance: High (both for the original and Additional Financing loans)

30. The PDO continues to be highly relevant, as it reflects the country’s long-term commitment toward enhancing the safety net in a sustainable and integrated manner. The continuous relevance of the PDO and its broad support across the political spectrum is underscored by the decision of the incoming authorities to preserve and expand the programs supported under this operation, even though their economic policies represent a drastic departure from those of the preceding administrations. Specifically, the new authorities have expressed their intention to build upon the SCE Program to provide compensation for unemployed workers with a renewed emphasis on training. In addition, the coverage of the FA Program has been expanded to include temporary workers.13 Likewise, self-employed workers are now included under the AUH. Finally, the new administration is also relying on the AUH Program to provide emergency financial assistance to cushion the short-term negative impact that the ongoing reforms might have on the most vulnerable groups.14

12 The specific procurement guidelines included Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-consulting services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants by World Bank Borrowers in January 2011 and revised in July 2014; Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants by World Bank Borrowers in January 2011 and revised in July 2014; and procedures set on operative manuals for each component.13 Presidential Decree 592/2016 (April 2016) includes temporary workers that contribute to the social security system at least three months during the preceding year. 14 Through the Presidential Decree 591/2016 (April 2016), the Macri administration granted a one-time subsidy in the amount of Arg$500 to retirees and pensioners receiving the minimum payment and the AUH recipients.

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31. The PDO is also in line with the World Bank Group's twin goals of alleviating poverty and boosting shared prosperity in that it seeks to protect poor and vulnerable children and the unemployed during a period of economic downturn. It is also aligned with the CPS 2015–1815 by increasing the asset availability among vulnerable households and individuals. Moreover, the PDO is very similar to the one in the new Children and Youth Protection Project, which is the largest operation in Argentina’s IBRD portfolio.16

Relevance of design: High (both for the original and Additional Financing loans)

32. The operation’s design also continues to be highly relevant. As discussed earlier, this design had several advantages, including the simultaneous financial support of program improvements and complementary TA.17 Specifically, the incorporation of disbursement linked to progress toward intermediate outcomes provided the necessary incentives while avoiding cumbersome procurement processes. In addition, although the potential mismatch in implementation time horizons needs to be taken into consideration, the incorporation of TA activities under the same operation served to ensure that the needed financial resources were available and increased their visibility. This type of design is being replicated in the follow-on operation, the Children and Youth Protection Project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development ObjectivesRating: Satisfactory (original loan); Moderately Satisfactory (Additional Financing loan)

33. The operation has largely met its development objective of increasing the effectiveness of income transfer programs for the unemployed and families with children by enhancing the design and implementation of the SCE and FA Programs and by improving the availability of data for monitoring social protection programs. First, there was significant expansion in access to training and employment services among SCE beneficiaries. Increased access has, in turn, resulted in a greater utilization of these services among the SCE beneficiaries, which is likely to have contributed to an increase in the proportion of beneficiaries exiting the SCE Program as a result of having obtained formal employment. Second, significant operational improvements were also attained in FA transfers, both contributory and non-contributory. The direct payment SUAF was fully implemented, which drastically improved the transparency of beneficiary identification and payment mechanisms of the FA Program. In addition, there were improvements in the inclusion of FA beneficiaries into the ADP database, which has enhanced the coverage of beneficiaries in the noncontributory AUH. Both the FA and the AUH Programs have been shown to have a strong social and economic impact.18 Finally, the operation has provided TA to enhance the MTESS’ institutional capacity. These activities were key in moving the development agenda, particularly the implementation of the first two social protection

15 Report 81361-AR discussed by the Board on September 9, 2014.16 The Children and Youth Protection Project, in the amount of US$600 million, received Board approval on June 30, 2016. The PDOs for this operation are to (a) expand coverage of the FA Program and (b) improve transparency of social protection programs implemented by ANSES.17 For example, in the case of Development Policy loans, the TA was not included under the same operation. Instead, if provided at all, it was supported with either self-standing TA loans that did not necessarily have the same timing of the Development Policy loan, or through grants that were put together ad hoc by the World Bank team.18 See, among others, Rofman, R. and M. L. Oliveri. 2011, Las políticas de protección social y su impacto en la distribución del ingreso en Argentina, Serie de documentos de trabajo sobre políticas sociales No. 6, Washington, DC: World Bank.

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household surveys, making available a diagnosis of the population’s level of access to social protection.

34. In assessing the operation’s PDO achievement, it is important to note that the causality chain differs from that of traditional investment operations (outputs intermediate outcomes outcomes, with outputs resulting from investments and activities being financed under the operation). Except for TA activities that constituted a small fraction of the loan proceeds, the operation did not finance specific project outputs. Instead, it supported a series of program improvements by linking sizable financial incentives (disbursements) to the achievement of a set of disbursement indicators with targets measuring progress toward such improvements (financial incentives intermediate outcomes measured by program improvements program effectiveness).

Intermediate Outcome 1: Expand the SCE Program, including the Cash Benefit and Availability of Training, Education, and Employment-support services - Partially Achieved

35. Expansion of SCE beneficiaries. The SCE expanded from 78,500 beneficiaries in 2008 to 106,462 in December 2015. The actual increase represents only a fraction of the anticipated increase in beneficiaries—23 percent and 32 percent of the expected increase with respect to the original and revised targets, respectively. The lower number is partly a result of the availability of benefits in other programs, such as the AUH.19 It should be emphasized, however, that expanding the number of SCE beneficiaries was not a primary objective of this operation. In fact, the original and revised targets represented only a small proportion of the pool of potential beneficiaries, which is estimated to be around 1.5 million unemployed workers (13 percent and 11 percent, respectively).

36. Expansion of the SCE training, education, and employment-support services. The number of services (education, training, and skills development as well as labor intermediation) provided under the SCE Program expanded significantly during the operation’s lifetime, from roughly 39,300 services being provided in 2008 to almost 107,000 in 2015 (see Annex 2).

37. Expansion of the employment office (EO) network throughout the national territory. The number of operational municipal EOs providing SCE services more than doubled during the operation’s lifetime, with nearly 227 new offices being added in the program (see Annex 2). The actual increase in the number of participating EOs amply surpassed the anticipated increase—134 percent and 120 percent of the expected increase of the original and revised targets, respectively. The EOs, which are located in municipalities in all 24 provinces, play a central role within the SCE Program, as they refer beneficiaries to training and education services and provide active support in job search to the SCE beneficiaries.

Intermediate Outcome 2: Shift to Direct Payment of Family Allowances through SUAF - Achieved

19 At the time, the SCE beneficiaries were not eligible for the AUH benefits. The families had to choose whether to get the SCE or the AUH benefits. Now, these two programs are compatible.

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38. KOI 3 - The proportion of total FAs benefits paid through the direct payment scheme increased from 57 percent in 2008 to 100 percent from 2014 onward, slightly above the revised AF target of 98 percent.

39. The number of firms registered in the SUAF more than doubled during the operation’s lifetime, from 411,894 in 2008 to 1,193,911 in December 2015. The revised AF target of 792,197 firms was exceeded by the Additional Finance original closing date and the actual increase in the number of firms was twice as large as anticipated.

40. Although the absolute number of SUAF beneficiaries receiving their transfers directly in their bank accounts has decreased, the direct payment system of the contributory FA Program (SUAF) was fully implemented and has enhanced the transparency of the FA Program. The reduction in the expected number of beneficiaries is the result of a decline in the rate of formal jobs creation and the lack of adjustment of income thresholds for FA eligibility.

Intermediate Outcome 3: Expand the Inclusion of Potential AUH Beneficiaries in ANSES’ ADP Database - Achieved

41. KOI 4 - Under the AF, the number of children under 18 registered in the ADP database, who are either receiving FA benefits from ANSES or are not receiving them due to reasons established in the legislation (those with complete information), has exhibited a steady increase, from roughly 10 million in December 2010 to 12.3 million in December 2015, amply exceeding the AF target of 10.4 million (see Annex 2).

42. Although the targeted field activities that were conducted by ANSES to identify and enroll potential FA beneficiaries were financed with ANSES’ own resources rather than by the Additional Financing loan as had been originally anticipated, they were first designed as part of the preparation of the AF loan. Including this indicator among the disbursement indicators helped maintain focus on this important issue throughout the operation’s lifetime.

Intermediate Outcome 4: Improve the Availability of Data for Monitoring Social Protection Programs - Partially Achieved

43. With the operation’s support, the MTESS’ Undersecretary of Labor Studies conducted a series of studies focusing on various labor-related issues and conducted two social protection surveys (ENAPROSS 1 and 2).

44. ANSES had a long tradition of producing monitoring reports on social programs from pensions to FAs and unemployment insurance and widely disseminating them in print and through its web page. Despite this tradition, the dissemination of these reports was halted between 2009 and 2015, except for a period during 2014 when succinct tables with basic data on the implementation of the AUH Program were published to comply with the Additional Financing disbursement conditions. Fortunately, a rich set of tables with cross section and time series data became available again in the ANSES portal under the new administration.20

45. The operation’s main outcomes are summarized in the following paragraphs.

20 www.transparencia.anses.gob.ar .

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http://www.transparencia.anses.gob.ar/

46. Improved effectiveness of the SCE Program. The operation’s impact on improving the effectiveness of the SCE Program is deemed Moderately Satisfactory. Under both the original and Additional Financing loans, the SCE significantly improved its effectiveness due to the expansion of the EO network as well as training, education, and employment services throughout the country. This expansion, in turn, helped increase the participation of SCE beneficiaries in a wide range of these services. The number of participants exiting the SCE Program into formal employment has amply exceeded expectations, suggesting the enhanced efficiency of the SCE Program. Specific outcomes include the following:

KOI 2 - Expanded utilization of training and employment services. The proportion of participants involved in training, education, or employment-support activities increased from 23.5 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in 2015. The actual increase amply surpassed the anticipated increase—223 percent and 126 percent of the expected increase with respect to the original and revised targets, respectively. There is some evidence suggesting that training services are positively linked to the probability of finding formal employment. 21

KOI 1 - Formal employment among the SCE beneficiaries. The number of participants exiting the SCE Program into formal employment had almost doubled during the operation’s lifetime, from 8,400 in 2008 to 15,208 in 2015, exceeding the original and revised AF targets (9,000 and 11,000, respectively). The number of SCE participants exiting into formal employment also rose as a proportion of the total number of SCE beneficiaries—from 10.7 percent in 2008 to 14.3 percent in 2015.

Transition from emergency to nonemergency employment programs. The increase in SCE participants included the incorporation of 70,000 former ‘Jefes’ beneficiaries during 2009, which contributed to the full dismantling of this emergency program by 2012. As former ‘Jefes’ beneficiaries exited the SCE Program, other target groups were incorporated, including refugees, recovering addicts, violence victims, those living with HIV, inmates, and so on.

Number of SCE beneficiaries. The only shortcoming in relation to the expected achievements under the SCE Program was the lower than expected expansion in the number of beneficiaries. The number of SCE beneficiaries was lower than anticipated because many beneficiaries ended up in other more appropriate programs for their situation, including the AUH Program. However, it is important to note that the expansion in the number of SCE beneficiaries was not included in the main PDO definition nor was there a KOI associated with it.

47. Improved effectiveness of FA transfers. The operation’s impact with regard to improving the effectiveness of FA transfers was deemed Moderately Satisfactory. Although the program improvements supported under the operation effectively contributed to enhancing the

21 For example, results from an ILO study focusing on the impact on employability of the MTESS professional training activities indicate that the probability of finding formal employment increases by 30 percent with respect to peers who did not receive such training (Castillo et al. 2014). However, the study takes into consideration all training recipients, not only the SCE beneficiaries.

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overall transparency of the FA Program as well as the AUH coverage, there was only partial success in enhancing the dissemination of AUH Program data during implementation. Specifically, the following were some of the successes:

Enhanced transparency of the contributory FA Program. With support from the original and Additional Financing loans, the direct payment system of the contributory FA Program (SUAF) was fully implemented. In turn, the implementation of the SUAF enhanced the transparency of the FA Program. Under the previous scheme, ANSES had no direct information on FA beneficiaries and had to rely on employers to control fraud or mistakes. As a result, there were many cases of duplication and incorrect payments as well as some cases of employers withholding FA payments to their employees. Under the SUAF, there is a direct link between ANSES and FA beneficiaries, who receive their monthly benefit directly through a bank account or cash payment, which constitutes a substantial transparency enhancement.

Improved coverage of FA transfers under the AUH Program. The Additional Financing loan provided support to the implementation of the newly established AUH Program, with a particular emphasis on enhancing the inclusion of potential AUH beneficiaries. Unlike in previous programs, FA benefits do not require an application from potential beneficiaries. Instead, ANSES automatically enrolls all children as potential recipients of the FA benefits and determines their eligibility using administrative records. As a result, the inclusion of potential beneficiaries and the completeness of their identification data in the ADP database is critical to ensure adequate coverage of FA transfers. This is particularly important in the case of the AUH Program, as those that are excluded from the ADP database tend to belong to population groups whose data is difficult to capture due to remoteness and lack of contact with public institutions. Under the Additional Financing loan, there has been an improvement in effectiveness of the FA coverage, the AUH in particular, by adding over 2 million children and youth of ages 18 years or younger with complete information to the ANSES ADP database, thus reducing the number of beneficiaries with incomplete records by more than half, from roughly 1 million in 2011 to 736,000 in 2015.

Partially improved dissemination of AUH Program data. As noted earlier, although the AUH Program information is now publicly disseminated on an ongoing basis, such information was only made available for a limited time period during the implementation.

3.3 EfficiencyRating: Substantial (for both the original and AF loans)

48. Overall, the Project’s efficiency is considered Substantial. Results from the economic analysis prepared for the original and AF loans were validated with actual household survey data. Results indicate that the economic justification of the project remains relevant. Specifically, results indicate that, at a cost of roughly 1.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the expanded FA benefits helped reduce extreme poverty by more than half and also reduced total

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poverty (from 18.7 percent to 15 percent) and inequality (from a Gini coefficient of 0.51 to 0.44) (see Annex 3). The economic efficiency of the enhanced SCE Program can also be expected to be Substantial due to the expanded utilization of training services. Although it is not possible to isolate the impact on SCE beneficiaries alone, results from an International Labour Organization (ILO) study focusing on the impact on employability of the MTESS professional training activities (including the SCE) indicate that the probability of finding formal employment increases by 30 percent with respect to peers who did not receive such training (Castillo et al. 2014).

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Moderately Satisfactory

49. Although the PDO remained unchanged during both the original and Additional Financing loans, there was a change in the KOIs (that is, an additional KOI was added under the Additional Financing loan to measure the impact of the newly established AUH Program). Thus, to arrive at the Project’s overall rating, the original and Additional Financing loans, are assessed separately. In the case of the original loan, only the SCE and non-contributory FA transfers are taken into consideration. In the case of the Additional Financing loan, the SCE Program and both contributory and noncontributory FA transfers are taken into consideration. The overall outcome rating is subsequently determined by weighting the partial ratings of the original and AF loans proportionally to the share of actual disbursements under each loan.

50. The operation’s outcome is deemed Satisfactory under the original loan to reflect its high relevance and substantial efficacy and efficiency. The operation’s outcome under the AF loan is deemed Moderately Satisfactory, to reflect the moderately satisfactory efficacy, high relevance and substantial efficiency. Overall, the Project is considered to be Moderately Satisfactory to reflect the weighted average of a Satisfactory and Moderately Satisfactory achievement during the original and AF loans, respectively (see table 3).

Table 3. Project Rating

Original Loan AF Loan

Disbursements US$450 million (48% of actual disbursements)

US$480 million (56% of actual disbursements)

Relevance High HighEfficacy (*)- SCE - FAs

Satisfactory- Satisfactory (18%)- Satisfactory (82%)

Moderately Satisfactory- Satisfactory (17%)- Moderately Satisfactory (83%)

Efficiency Substantial SubstantialPartial rating Satisfactory (5 out of 6) Moderately Satisfactory (4 out of 6)Weighted partial rating (**) 5 x 0.48 = 2.42 4 x 0.56 = 2.06Overall Project rating (***) Moderately Satisfactory (4.48)

Note:* FAs include the FA Program only under the original loan and both the FA and AUH Programs under the AF loan. ** The weighted partial rating considers the rating for the original and AF loans weighted by the proportion of disbursements corresponding to each loan. *** The overall Project rating considers the weighted partial rating and the disbursement ratio for both loans.

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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

51. The expansion of FA benefits for the unemployed under the AUH Program constituted an important step toward the development of a more integrated social protection strategy. Before the implementation of the AUH Program, FA benefits were linked only to employment in the formal sector of the economy. However, in countries where informality is widespread such as Argentina, this approach rendered a large proportion of the population without social protection. By extending these benefits to the unemployed and unregistered workers, the AUH Program constituted an important step toward correcting this imbalance. Simulations show that the program reduced overall poverty by 3 percent and poverty among households with children by 6 percent.22 The impact on children and youth is particularly important, as poverty incidence is higher among this population group.23 Moreover, the incidence of the AUH is largely concentrated on the lower deciles of the income distribution, complementing the coverage of the contributory FA Programs (see Annex 2). Similarly, the combination of cash transfers with training, education, and employment-support services under the SCE Program offer beneficiaries the opportunity to further develop their skill set and enhance their employability and income levels.

52. Programs supported under this operation can also be expected to have a particularly favorable impact on women. Women actively participated in the SCE Program, representing 57.8 percent of all beneficiaries in 2016. Likewise, women are the main recipients of the FA and the AUH transfers, regardless of which parent has custody (women represented 97.3 percent of all the AUH recipients in February 2014).

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

53. The operation has supported significant program reforms, including the expansion of the EO network, the implementation of the SUAF, and the expansion and improvement of the ADP database. In addition, ENAPROSS 1 and 2 constituted a significant contribution to data-driven policy making.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

54. Designed as a cash transfer conditioned on beneficiary children undergoing regular health checkups, receiving vaccinations, and being enrolled in school, the AUH has created positive synergies with health and education. With regard to enrollment, there are indications that the AUH Program has had a particularly positive impact for the age group of 16–18 years, which has a relatively large dropout rate.24 Similarly, by automatically registering eligible newborns in the

22 For more details, see annex 3 - Economic Analysis. 23 As of 2015, poverty among children (21 percent for people of age 18 years or less) was twice as high as those in active ages (10% for people of ages 19–64 years) and ten times higher than the elderly (2.3 percent for those aged 65 and above).24 Edo, M., Marchionni, M. and S. Garganta. (2016), “La AUH mejora la asistencia a la secundaria,” Foco Económico (http://Focoeconomico.Org/2016/05/11/La-Auh-Mejora-La-Asistencia-A-La-Secundaria/)

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ADP database into the Plan Nacer/Sumar Program, the AUH has contributed to the significant expansion in the coverage of these important health insurance programs.25

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

55. Not applicable.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Negligible to Low

56. The three programs supported under this operation are clearly sustainable. The funding provided under the original loan and the Additional Financing only represented 16.6 percent and 10 percent of the corresponding program expenditures, with the remaining being funded through the federal budget. Moreover, the three programs have ample political support, including that of the incoming administration, which, as described under section 3.1, has supported their further expansion. Likewise, the new authorities have expressed their support for a strong knowledge-generation function within the MTESS, including the regular implementation of ENAPROSS every four years. It should be noted that the incoming MTESS authorities are in the process of revising the overall framework underlying the employment and social protection programs under it orbits, which has caused a slowdown in implementation. However, the authorities have expressed their full support for the SCE Program and their intention to continue it.

57. The World Bank continues to be actively engaged in supporting Argentina’s social protection system. The Children and Youth Protection Project, in the amount of US$600 million, was approved by the World Bank’s Board on June 30, 2016. The PDOs supported under this new operation build upon the ones under the Basic Protection Project PDOs, as they focus on expanding coverage of the FA Programs and improving the transparency of social protection programs implemented by ANSES. Although the SCE Program is not receiving additional World Bank support under the new operation, the World Bank continues to be engaged in labor issues, through the Youth Employment Support Project, providing support for the expansion of the employment services to the unemployed.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory

58. The World Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is considered Satisfactory. Project preparation benefited from the experience of a well-seasoned task team with extensive experience in Argentina’s social protection sector from both the policy and operational standpoints. By supporting the shift from emergency-based programs to a more systemic and integrated approach toward social protection, the operation supported the next natural step in the continuous development of Argentina’s social protection system, which had received continuous

25 This program, which was supported by a World Bank project, fosters registration of unprotected population under provincial health insurance schemes that provide basic care through an innovative output-based financing scheme.

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World Bank support since the early 1990s. Although prepared during a period in which the relationship between the World Bank and the GoA was not at its strongest, the operation effectively focused on a policy area in which the strategies of both parties were fully aligned. While there were some minor design weaknesses in the Project Results Framework, the overall Project design was robust and innovative, resulting in an operation that supported significant program and policy reforms as well as complementary TA.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory

59. The operation received close supervision during its lifetime. The task team, which was based at the World Bank’s Buenos Aires office, provided ongoing support to the GoA during implementation.26 It also demonstrated great commitment toward ensuring successful implementation of the TA activities supported under the operation and full disbursement of the loan proceeds. This commitment was evidenced by the expeditious processing of two restructurings and two extensions of the closing date during the operation’s lifetime, even though undisbursed amounts (all of which corresponded to TA activities) represented a small percentage of loan proceeds. In addition, members of the World Bank supervision team engaged in research that helped verify the efficacy of the AUH Program. During supervision, the task team also provided substantial guidance and support in the areas of FM, procurement, and safeguard policies triggered by the Project (OP 4.10 - Indigenous Peoples), ensuring their implementation in accordance with the World Bank’s procedures.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Satisfactory

60. Overall, World Bank performance is deemed Satisfactory to reflect the satisfactory performance at preparation and the satisfactory performance during supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government PerformanceRating: Satisfactory

61. The Government’s performance is deemed Satisfactory. The GoA took important steps to transition from emergency support toward a more integrated and sustainable social protection strategy. In particular, the GoA demonstrated strong ownership of the three programs supported under this operation and commitment toward their implementation, enhancement, and sustainability. This is not surprising, given that the FA and the SCE were already core programs within the country’s social protection strategy and that the operational improvements supported under the original loan were strongly endorsed by authorities and the implementing agencies. Likewise, the subsequent expansion of the FA benefits under the AUH Program under the Additional Financing was a homegrown initiative that had ample support not just on the part of Argentine authorities but also of the society at large. Government support was also reflected in the substantial financing allocated to the programs supported under these operations, the FA and AUH Programs in particular. In this regard, it is important to note that the proceeds of the loans

26 Comments from manager, Implementation Status and Results Report 1, 5, 9, and 10.

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accounted for just a fraction of the corresponding program budgets. Government commitment was also demonstrated by completing the full transition of beneficiaries from former emergency programs (‘Jefes’ in particular) to the ‘Familias’ and the SCE Programs by 2012. It is important to note, however, that stronger support from the top Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) authorities would likely have supported a timelier compliance on the part of ANSES regarding the publication of AUH data as had been agreed in the LA.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

62. The overall performance of the implementing agencies is considered Moderately Satisfactory. There were, however, differences across the various implementing agencies.

63. The overall performance of the DNPOIC within the MEF is deemed Moderately Satisfactory. Throughout the operation’s lifetime, its performance was uneven in coordinating activities under the orbit of the other two implementing agencies (MTESS and ANSES) and serving as an effective counterpart to the World Bank task team. Moreover, ensuring the quality of disbursement requests and the IFRs was at times a challenge.

64. The performance of the MTESS is deemed Satisfactory. Specifically, the Secretary of Employment was effective in the implementation of the SCE Program, including the expansion of the EOs network and training and education services through the country’s territory. Likewise, the Undersecretary of Labor Studies was effective in implementing the first two social protection surveys as well as a set of studies with a focus on various labor issues. The unit is composed of a solid group of researchers with strong academic rigor, as shown by their designation as one of CONICET’s certified research centers focusing on labor studies.

65. The performance of ANSES is deemed Moderately Satisfactory. ANSES was responsible for Component 2 (FA and AUH Programs under the original and Additional Financing loans, respectively) as well as TA activities under Sub-component 3.c. While ANSES exhibited a stellar performance in the implementation of both the FA and AUH Programs, its reticence to publish information regarding beneficiaries resulted in a two-year delay in disbursement under the AF loan.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

66. Overall borrower performance is deemed Moderately Satisfactory to reflect the satisfactory performance on the part of the Government and the overall moderately satisfactory performance of implementing units.

6. Lessons Learned

67. Important lessons of experience emerged from the implementation of this operation that can be of use in the design of social protection projects in Argentina as well as Latin America and Caribbean and other regions. They can be summarized as follows:

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Investment operations can effectively support a two-pronged approach to simultaneously support program reform and TA. Results-based financing mechanisms that link disbursements to progress in outcomes provide incentives to improve programs while avoiding cumbersome procurement processes. Complementing this approach with traditional TA support helps ensure the timely availability of funds for and visibility of important support activities. However, it is important to acknowledge that the operation’s duration will most likely be determined by TA activities.

Long-term partnerships and collaboration between the World Bank and the borrower create conditions conducive for the progressive and sustained enhancement and expansion of social protection systems. The success of this operation was in large part determined by the accumulated operational experience and long-term vision of Argentina’s social protection that had been forged between the Argentine authorities and the World Bank over more than two decades.

Strong commitment is needed on the part of both the implementing agencies and the World Bank to ensure the implementation of TA activities. While this is always the case, it was even more so in the case of this particular operation, which combined large, relatively fast disbursements based on the achievement of program reforms with smaller, more cumbersome disbursements associated with the implementation of labor-intensive TA activities. While the MTESS exhibited a strong ownership of the TA activities supported under the operation, ANSES was clearly less committed, at least to financing them with the loan proceeds. Additionally, while TA may be a small amount of the overall loan, it often dictates the pace of implementation.

It is important for KOIs to reflect outcomes that are within the orbit of the Project. In the case of this operation, one of the KOIs (that is, employment rate of the SCE beneficiaries) was determined by economic conditions that went beyond the intervention supported under the Project.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

68. The Borrower has indicated that they have not further comments beyond those registered in Annex 7

(b) Co-financiers

69. Not applicable

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

70. Not applicable

20

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$, millions equivalent)Components Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions)Percentage of

Appraisal

Component 1. SCE Program 155.0 172.4 111.0%

Component 2. FA Program 739.0 739.0 100.0%Component 3. Technical Assistance (TA) for Social Protection System 33.7 16.3 48.0%Total Baseline Cost 927.7 927.7 100.0%Front-end fee 2.3 2.3 100.0%Total Financing 930.0 930.0 100.0%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Co-financing

Appraisal Estimate

(US$, millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$, millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower National budget 5,324.4 5,324.4 100.0%IBRD Loan proceeds 930.00 930.00 100.0%

21

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1 - SCE Program

1. This component supported the operation and scaling up of the SCE Program, which is aimed at unemployed workers, providing a monthly income transfer, training, and job placement services for up to two years.

2. With support from both the original and AF loans, the SCE benefited from the expansion of the EO network as well as training, education, and employment services throughout the country. This, in turn, has increased the participation of the SCE beneficiaries in a wide range of these services. The number of participants exiting the SCE Program into formal employment has amply exceeded expectations, suggesting the enhanced efficiency of the SCE Program. However, it is difficult to attribute this outcome to the SCE Program, as this indicator is affected by economic conditions, which are outside the orbit of the SCE Program.27

3. Specific intermediate results under this component include the following:

Expansion of the number of SCE beneficiaries from 78,500 beneficiaries in 2008 to 106,462 in December 2015. However, the actual increase represents only a fraction of the anticipated increase in the number of SCE participants—23 percent and 32 percent of the expected increase with respect to the original and revised targets, respectively. The lower number is partly a result of the transfer of beneficiaries to other programs, including the AUH.

The increase in the SCE coverage included the incorporation of 70,000 former ‘Jefes’ beneficiaries during 2009, which contributed to the full dismantling of this emergency program by 2012. As former ‘Jefes’ beneficiaries exited the SCE Program, other target groups have been incorporated, including refugees, recovering addicts, violence victims, those living with HIV, inmates, and so on.

Expansion of the EO network throughout the national territory. The number of operational municipal EOs providing SCE services more than doubled during the operation’s lifetime, with nearly 227 new offices being added into the program. The actual increase in the number of participating EOs amply surpassed the anticipated increase—134 percent and 120 percent of the expected increase with respect to the original and revised targets, respectively. As a result, the SCE Program now has a robust territorial coverage, with 408 out of the overall network of 600 EOs (68 percent) providing employment services to the SCE beneficiaries as of December 2015. These EOs operate at the municipal level and are distributed through all the provinces in the country. The EOs play a central role within the SCE Program, as they refer beneficiaries to training and education services and provide active support in job search to the SCE beneficiaries.

27 Unfortunately, there was no formal evaluation of the impact of the SCE Program on enhancing employability of its beneficiaries, even though the setup of the SCE Program was conducive to such evaluation. Since the SCE does not have universal coverage, it would have been possible to conduct a randomized impact evaluation to compare labor outcomes among the SCE beneficiaries and their non-SCE peers.

22

Expansion of the SCE training, education, and employment-support services. The number of services (education, training, and skills development as well as labor intermediation) provided under the SCE Program expanded significantly during the operation’s lifetime, from roughly 39,300 services being provided in 2008 to 106,956 in 2015. These services included (a) education, skills development, and training; (b) employment integration support (Employment Insertion Program, support for microenterprises, and so on); and (c) labor intermediation services (employment orientation workshops, management training for self-employed entrepreneurs, and so on).

Expanded utilization of training and employment services. The proportion of participants involved in training, education, or employment-support activities increased from 23.5 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in 2015. The actual increase amply surpassed the anticipated increase—223 percent and 126 percent of the expected increase with respect to the original and revised targets, respectively.

4. These operational improvements within the SCE Program may have, in turn, contributed to SCE beneficiaries obtaining formal employment. Specifically, the number of participants exiting the SCE Program and entering into formal employment has almost doubled during the operation’s lifetime, from 8,400 in 2008 to 15,208 in 2015, exceeding the original and revised AF targets (9,000 and 11,000). The actual increase exceeds by more than ten times the anticipated increase in coverage under the original loan (1,135 percent) and by more than twice the expected increase with respect to the revised Additional Financing targets (262 percent). The number of exiting SCE participants entering into formal employment also rose as a proportion of the total number of SCE beneficiaries—from 10.7 percent in 2008 to 14.3 percent in 2015.

Table 2.1. Evolution of the SCE Program in Terms of Coverage, Labor Intermediation Support and Impact, 2008–15

Dec. 2008 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2010 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012 Dec. 2013 Dec. 2014 Dec. 2015Intermediate IndicatorsNumber of beneficiaries of SCE

As of Dec. 31 78,047 122,012 149,852 197,181 120,148 69,982 90,055 106,462Number of Municipal Employment Offices (EOs) providing SCE services.

Annually 46 63 37 23 14 23 8 15Cumulative 225 288 325 348 362 385 393 408

Number of service provisions (i.e., skills development and labor intermediation)Monthly 39,317 52,565 71,389 121,680 104,246 68,504 69,138 106,956

SCE beneficiaries participating in training, education, or employment support activities12-month average 30.0% 27.4% 23.50% 26.0% 29% 36.6 35.5 38.0%

Outcome IndicatorsNumber of SCE beneficiaries exiting into formal employment

Annually 8,400 7,160 11,509 20,010 21,081 12,317 11,099 15,208Cumulative 8,400 15,560 27,069 47,079 68,160 80,477 91,576 106,784

Source: MTESS (2016).

Component 2 – FA Program

5. Under the original loan, this component financed FA grants to eligible formal salaried workers with family dependents. The grants financed only child benefits paid by the direct payment system, SUAF, through transfers to beneficiaries’ bank accounts. Under the AF loan, this component supported not only contributory FA benefits but also noncontributory FA benefits under the AUH Program, an expansion of the FA system that was instituted in late 2009. In both cases, the grants were paid directly through transfers to beneficiaries’ bank accounts.

23

With the operation’s support, there were significant improvements in the implementation of the FA and AUH Programs, as follows:

Full transition to the SUAF system. The proportion of total FA benefits paid through the direct payment scheme increased from 57 percent in 2008 to 100 percent from 2014 onward, slightly above the revised AF target of 98 percent. Concomitantly, the amounts claimed from ANSES by employers as reimbursements through the compensatory scheme was reduced from Arg$2.4 million in 2008 to zero in 2011, when the previous compensatory system was eliminated by an administrative resolution.

In addition, the number of firms registered in the SUAF more than doubled during the operation’s lifetime, from 411,894 in 2008 to 1,193,911 in December 2015. The revised FA target of 792,197 firms was already exceeded by the Additional Financing original closing date and the actual increase in the number of firms was twice as large as anticipated.

Although the absolute number of the SUAF beneficiaries receiving their transfers directly in their bank accounts has decreased, the underlying goal of this indicator was met, as nearly all beneficiaries receive payments through direct deposits. The reduction in the expected number of beneficiaries is the result of a decline in the rate of formal jobs creation and the lack of adjustment of income thresholds for FA eligibility.

Table 2.2. Expansion of the SUAF System, 2008–15

Dec. 2008 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2010 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012 Dec. 2013 Dec. 2014 Dec. 2015Firms registered in SUAF

As of Dec. 31 411,894 622,722 835,854 907,894 977.413 1,059,154 1,126,368 1,193,911Amounts claimed to ANSES for reimbursement when allowances to be compensated exceed expected contributions (Arg$ million)

12-month moving average as of Dec. 31 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.21 0.03 0 0 0Number of child allowance benefits paid by ANSES through SUAF.

Monthly, December 2,600,000 3,316,899 2,941,408 2,746,399 3,754,246 3,326,840 2,802,994

Percentage of spending on Family Allowances paid through the direct payment system12-month moving average as of Dec. 31 57.0% 76.2% 91.76% 99.98% 99.99% 99.99% 100% 100%

SUAF beneficiaries receiving their transfers directly in their bank accountsNumber as of December 31 877,683 1,026,150 873,107 827,254 1,484,196 1,513,463 1,141,395

Source: ANSES (2016).

Expanded coverage of the AUH Program. As shown on table 2.3, the number of potential FA beneficiaries (children and youth under the age of 18) included in the ADP database increased significantly during the Additional Financing loan’s lifetime, from 11 million in December 2010 to 13 million in December 2015. In addition to the increase in the number of registries, quality has also increased, with the percentage of registries with complete information (with parental links) increasing from 90.2 percent in December 2014 to 94.4 percent in December 2015. The combined effect of these two trends resulted in a net increase of almost 2.4 million children with determined eligibility (or lack of it) for the FA benefits

24

through the FA or the AUH Programs between 2010 and 2015—equivalent to a 24 percent increase.

Table 2.3. Children under 18 Years of Age included in ADP by Type of Record and AUH and AF Coverage 2010-2015

Family Allowances Dec. 2010 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012 Dec. 2013 Dec. 2014 Dec. 2015ANSES' ADP 11,045,348 11,466,481 11,663,016 12,088,598 12,626,123 13,055,740

- With complete records Number 9,962,408 10,383,541 10,909,750 11,426,850 11,913,661 12,319,704

Percentage 90.2% 90.6% 93.5% 94.5% 94.4% 94.4%

- With incomplete records Number 1,082,940 1,082,940 753,266 661,748 712,462 736,036

Percentage 9.8% 9.4% 6.5% 5.5% 5.6% 5.6%

AUH Program Number 3,513,064 3,507,223 3,314,179 3,478,267 3,597,367 3,723,763

Percentage 35.3% 33.8% 30.4% 30.4% 30.2% 30.2%

AF Program (i.e., SUAF System) Number 3,316,899 3,016,637 2,824,515 3,754,246 3,419,332 2,802,994

Percentage 33.3% 29.1% 25.9% 32.9% 28.7% 22.8%


6. With the operation’s support, the AUH has had a significant importance in expanding access to the FA benefits, surpassing in absolute numbers the coverage of the FA Program and providing the FA benefits for 30–35 percent of children between 2010 and 2015 (see table 2.3). In addition, the AUH Program reaches primarily children in lower-income groups, providing FA benefits to 36 percent of the children in the lowest income quintile in 2011 (see table 2.4). The AUH coverage decreases for the remaining four quintiles, from 28.6 percent for the second quintile to only 2 percent for the fifth quintile in 2011. Likewise, while AUH benefits represented 12 percent of the family income for households in the lowest quintile, their relative importance diminishes drastically for the other quintiles (ENAPROSS 1).

Table 2.4. Coverage and Relative Importance of AUH Benefits by Income Quintile

IPCF Quintiles AUH Targeting Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 AUH child beneficiaries (%) 36.0 28.6 16.7 3.6 2.0

AUH benefits as % of family income 12.0 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.2

Percentage of all children in each quintile 41.2 27.7 15.7 10.2 5.3

Source: ENAPROSS 1 (2011).Note: IPCF = Ingreso per cápita familiar (Household per capita income)

Component 3 - Technical Assistance (TA) for the Social Protection System

7. This component was intended to provide support for capacity building to the implementing agencies (MTESS and ANSES), particularly in the area of M&E of the programs supported under the operation. Activities under the orbit of ANSES focused on the design and implementation of a field registration process aiming at identifying and enrolling hard-to-reach beneficiaries into the FA Program. While ANSES carried out these activities (at least partially), they were financed with ANSES’ own funds rather than under this operation as originally

25

envisioned. Activities under the orbit of the MTESS were carried out by the Undersecretary of Labor Studies in collaboration with the Secretary of Employment team. The main outputs are summarized in the following paragraphs.

8. Design and application of the first two National Social Protection Survey (ENAPROSS 1 & 2). The ENAPROSS consisted of a series of quantitative and qualitative studies aimed at making a diagnosis and assessment of the population’s level of access to social protection (that is, monetary transfers including FAs, employment and social security, education, health, and housing and social infrastructure). These studies included the following:

ENAPROSS 1 was conducted in 2011 in the six most populated provincial jurisdictions (Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe, and Tucumán). Households living in a sample of 11,600 housing units were included in the survey, resulting in representation of 74 percent of the population of urban centers of 5,000 or more inhabitants. Results from ENAPROSS 1 have been published digitally and in print. In addition, the database has been made available to the public on the MTESS’ website.28

Qualitative and quantitative study of social protection in localities of 2,000 to 4,999 inhabitants of the Northwest, Northeast, Cuyo, and Patagonia regions. This study, which consisted of interviews of 11,400 households conducted in 2011–12, focused on the identification of the main barriers and challenges in ensuring access to social protection in small urban settlements. Results have been published digitally and in print.29

ENAPROSS 2 was conducted in 2015 in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, the Buenos Aires Metropolitan region, and the urban centers of 5,000 or more inhabitants in the provinces of Catamarca, Corrientes, Chaco, Jujuy, and Rio Negro. The ENAPROSS 2 database has been made available to the public on the MTESS’ website.30

9. Other studies focus on various aspects of employment and social protection, including among others:

Household typology of social protection based on results from ENAPROSS 1 (2015). This study resulted in the definition of three types of households based on their level of vulnerability (low, medium, and high) and the associated household characteristics. The results can help predict a household’s vulnerability based on observable characteristics and, consequently, enhance the design and implementation of social protection policies and programs.

28 MTESS. 2014. Protección y Seguridad Social en la Argentina: Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de Protección y Seguridad Social 2011 (ENAPROSS), Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. ENAPROSS 1 database (http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/enapross/basesyauxiliares.asp).29 Catalano, A. 2013. Protección Social: Barreras y Desafíos - Pequenas Localidades, Aislamiento Socioeconómico y Vulnerabilidad Social. MTESS: Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.

30 ENAPROSS 2 database (http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/enapross/basesyauxiliares2.asp).

26

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/enapross/basesyauxiliares2.asp

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/Enapross/PROTECCION_SOCIAL_LOCALIDADES_%202000_5000_HAB..pdf

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/Enapross/PROTECCION_SOCIAL_LOCALIDADES_%202000_5000_HAB..pdf

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/enapross/basesyauxiliares.asp

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/Enapross/Libro%20ENAPROS%20interior.pdf

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/Enapross/Libro%20ENAPROS%20interior.pdf

Survey of Employment, Social Protection, and Working Conditions of Rural Workers. Qualitative study on access to employment and social security and protection as well as working conditions of rural workers living in urban settlements of up to 25,000 inhabitants. This study was conducted in cooperation with the Superintendence of Work Risks (Superintendencia de Riesgos del Trabajo) by the National Registry of Rural Workers and Employers (Registro Nacional de Trabajadores y Empleadores Agrarios), which permitted expansion of the focus (that is, working conditions) and coverage of the study (a total of ten provinces). Results have been published and the database has been made available on the MTESS’ website.31

Study on the employment and working condition in the social economy. This study, which was conducted in 2015 (relied primarily on qualitative methodologies). The first phase consisted of a review of the literature focusing on the employment situation in the social economy and the regulatory and policy frameworks. The second phase consisted of 55 in-depth interviews, including 23 interviews with experts in the field as well as 32 interviews with workers from 30 social production units.

Survey of Formal Businesses and Employment Practices and Determinants. This study included interviews with 40 businesses in sectors characterized with high levels of informality to determine employment practices, including selection criteria, contracting modalities, and remuneration levels to, in turn, help inform the design of training and intermediation services. The Additional Financing operation also provided support to improvements in the MTESS’ technological infrastructure to ensure the adequate implementation of the SCE Program, including:

(a) Revamping of the MTESS website (2013). Both the design and performance of the MTESS website was enhanced with support from the Additional Financing loan, including the improvement of the user-friendliness of the user interface, overall visibility, and graphic design. Among other results, there was a 70 percent decrease in the annual number of malfunctioning incidents. The MTESS portal serves roughly 2,000 users distributed in 600 EOs throughout the country and it is one of the cornerstones of the service delivery (training and employment intermediation services) of the SCE Program.

(b) Expansion of MTESS storage capacity (2015). The operation provided financial support for the purchase of computer servers that will ensure that the MTESS technological infrastructure will be able to provide adequate storage capacity for SCE-related databases, including beneficiaries’ labor histories, for the next three to five years.

31 MTESS. 2014. Acceso a las políticas de protección y seguridad social de los asalariados agrarios: Principales resultados, Encuesta sobre empleo, protección social y condiciones de trabajo de los asalariados agrarios, Subsecretaría de Programación Tecnica y Estudios Laborales, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. En AA data base (http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/rural/basesyauxiliares.asp).

27

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/rural/basesyauxiliares.asp

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/rural/4_EnAA_Publicacion.pdf

http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/rural/4_EnAA_Publicacion.pdf

10. Some of the TA activities were not implemented. Two of them were under the orbit of MTESS: (a) the SCE backup datacenter (that is, Sub-component 3.b under the Additional Financing) and the mobile EOs to serve small and distant communities; (that is, Subcomponent 3.d added under the Level-2 restructuring that took place on August 22, 2014). These activities were cancelled by MTESS’ authorities in view of procurement delays and upcoming changes in administration. The other activity was the AF field registration process (Sub-component 3.c under the Additional Financing) under the orbit of ANSES, which was only partially implemented with local funds.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

28

1. Overall, the Project’s efficiency is considered substantial. The results from the economic analysis prepared for the original and Additional Financing loans were validated using actual household survey data and remain relevant in view of the operation’s implementation experience. This analysis was based on the expected social and economic impacts of the supported programs, including a simulation of potential impact of an expansion of coverage in line with the reforms implemented in late 2009 and supported by the Additional Financing.

2. Given that the original PAD did not contain an estimation of the economic rate of return, and in accordance with the last updated Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) Guidelines (July 2014),32 the present annex replicates the simulation based on current information about beneficiaries. The source of information used in this estimation, is the National Household Expenditure Survey (ENGH) held in 2012 by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos) with national representation. This survey allows for the identification of the beneficiaries of the FA and AUH Programs.

3. The estimation of the impact of the FA transfers under these two programs is based on the arithmetic exercise of income. In this regard, a set of indicators was estimated (as in the original PAD) including poverty, extreme poverty, poverty gap, and Gini index, with and without the existence of the FA and AUH allowances. Specifically, the impact of the two programs was estimated by considering total household income with and without the FA and AUH transfers. This exercise does not take into account any behavioral response. However, in other similar studies behavioral responses have been small33.

4. As mentioned earlier, the FA benefits consist of social income transfers, whereby all formal workers below a predetermined income threshold receive a benefit amount based on the size of the family that they must support. Therefore, they are considered to be a complement to family income, aimed at increasing per capita resources in larger households. However, this is a contributory program that excludes workers that are in an informal situation. For this reason, in October 2009, the FAs were expanded to unemployed and informal workers. This initiative, the so-called AUH Program), establishes noncontributory FA benefits for any family. Households whose members do not participate in the formal labor market will receive Arg$340 per child (in 2012),34 if they meet eligibility criteria, including income eligibility. This change to the family benefits allowance scheme benefits signaled a profound change in the social protection system because it created a permanent income transfer system that was not linked to an economic emergency. This program represents a paradigm shift in the design and role of social protection

32 In the absence of the net present value or economic rate of return estimates, the ICR analyzes the project’s efficiency using any other appropriate cost-effectiveness criteria to determine whether the project represented the expected least-cost solution to attain identified and measurable benefits by either an analysis of cost per unit of input or cost per unit of output. Whether benefits are measured in monetary or other terms, flows are adjusted to reflect real use of resources, and when distortions are considerable, values are adjusted to reflect social opportunity costs (ICR Report Guidelines, 2014).33 See Garganta, S. and L. Gasparini, 2015. “The impact of a social program on labor informality: The case of AUH in Argentina” Journal of Development Economics 115(C):99-110.

34 The benefit was updated every year.

29

in Argentina because they have abandoned the Bismarckian principle of contributions as an access requirement, replacing it with a scheme based on citizenship as the only condition (that is, Beveridgian principle).35

Figure 3.1. Family Allowances and AUH Beneficiaries. June 2009–May 2015

Jan-09

May-09

Sep-09Jan-10

May-10

Sep-10Jan-11

May-11

Sep-11Jan-12

May-12

Sep-12Jan-13

May-13

Sep-13Jan-14

May-14

Sep-14Jan-15

May-15

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

4,000,000

5,000,000

6,000,000

7,000,000

8,000,000

Family Allowances AUH


5. The FA policy covers more than 6 million (figure 3.1) out of the 12 million children under 18 years, absorbs 1.2 percent of GDP, and combines contributory and noncontributory financing programs. There are two main programs: the contributory FA system for a group of formal workers in the private sector, and the AUH for low-income informal workers and unemployed persons, including those not economically active. As shown on figure 3.2, the AUH focuses on the first and second income distribution deciles, and supplements the coverage provided by systems for formal employees, which do the same for the middle and higher deciles.

35 In Bismarckian social security systems, there is a tight link between contributions and benefits, thus redistribution is low. Conversely, in Beveridgean social security systems, benefits are quite flat and contributions are proportional to earnings, thus redistribution is large.

30

Figure 3.2. Coverage of FAs and AUH by Pre-benefit per Capita Income Decile, 2012

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Universal Child Allowance Family Allowances

Cove

rage

Family per capita income decile

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the ENGH (2012).

6. Figure 3.3 shows the results obtained from the arithmetical exercise of income. Results shows that the FA and AUH Programs had a positive impact on social indicators. Specifically, as a result of the FA and AUH transfers, extreme poverty dropped by 52 percent (from 6.1 percent to 3 percent), while poverty declined by 20 percent (from 18.7 percent to 15 percent). The poverty gap also dropped by almost 40 percent (from 8 percent to 5 percent). Finally, these programs together reduce inequality, dropping the Gini from 0.51 to 0.44. In turn, these results indicate that these two programs were effective in reducing poverty. While the poverty-GDP elasticity for the FAs between 2003 and 2013 was estimated at 0.47 (World Bank 2015), 36 these transfers reduce poverty by 17.2 percent with a 1.2 percent spending of the GDP, compared to the 0.55 percent reduction that would have been expected based on the previously estimated elasticity.

7. It is necessary to mention that these results are consistent with those achieved through the ENAPROSS 1, held in 2011 by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in the context of this project.

8. However, the ENGH was used because the ENAPROSS is not representative at the national level.

36 World Bank. 2015. Argentina: Notas de políticas publicas para el desarrollo, November 20, 2015, Washington DC (Available at http://documentos.bancomundial.org/curated/es/899411467995396294/pdf/106122-WP-P156046-PUBLIC-SPANISH-NotasdePolíticas-ARGENTINA.pdf).

31

http://documentos.bancomundial.org/curated/es/899411467995396294/pdf/106122-WP-P156046-PUBLIC-SPANISH-NotasdePol%C3%ADticas-ARGENTINA.pdf

http://documentos.bancomundial.org/curated/es/899411467995396294/pdf/106122-WP-P156046-PUBLIC-SPANISH-NotasdePol%C3%ADticas-ARGENTINA.pdf

Figure 3.3. Social and Economic Impact of the FAs and Universal Child Allowance, 2012

Poverty

Extreme poverty

Poverty Gap

Gini 15%3%5%

44%

18.70%

6.10%7.80%51.13%

With programs Without programs

Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the ENGH (2012).

9. It is important to note that these results are similar to the ones obtained utilizing data from ENAPROSS 1, which was carried out in 2011 by the MTESS with support from this operation.37 These results are also consisted with the simulation conducted to assess the economic impact of the AUH Program under the follow-on Children and Youth Protection Project. Specifically, two aspects were considered: (a) an estimation of the Project’s development impact, considering the corresponding costs and benefits; and (b) an analysis of the rationale behind the public sector provision of services. Results indicated that, in the short term, the AUH Program was expected to reduce poverty and extreme poverty by around two to three percentage points, respectively. A second set of benefits is based on the long-term impact that the AUH Program is expected to have in reducing school dropout rates. By simulating the program’s impact on the future flow of labor income that participants can expect, an internal rate of return of 8.2 percent was estimated. These estimations are, of course, only approximate, as they require a number of assumptions, including future labor markets trends.

37 Data from the ENGH has been utilized for this ICR, as ENAPROSS 1 was not representative at the national level.

32

SCE Program

10. The economic justification from the SCE Program is two-fold. One the one hand, it stems from its social protection impact, as the cash transfers to unemployed beneficiaries can be expected to have a positive impact on poverty, extreme poverty, and inequality. On the other hand, given the expanded access to training and employment intermediation services, the SCE can be expected to have a positive impact in enhancing the labor skills and employability of its beneficiaries. Specifically, results from an ILO study focusing on the impact on employability of MTESS professional training activities indicate that the probability of finding a formal employment increases by 30 percent with respect to peers that did not receive such training (Castillo et al. 2014). Although this study takes into consideration the entire universe of training recipients and not only the SCE beneficiaries and consequently the results are not fully applicable, it suggests a potential positive impact on employability. This is consistent with the larger-than-expected number of SCE beneficiaries exiting the program as a result of having found formal employment. It should be noted, however, that an economic evaluation of the SCE was not conducted during appraisal of the original or the AF loans.

33

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty

Lending Paloma Anos Casero Practice Manager GTCDR Manager Sarah Ruth Bailey Junior Professional Associate LCSHS - HIS Assistant Carla Lucia Bonahora Junior Professional Associate LCSHS - HIS Analyst Vanina Camporeale Senior Operations Officer GHNDR Operations Ana Maria Grofsmacht Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Febe Mackey Program Assistant LCC7C Assistant Marta Elena Molares-Halberg Lead Counsel LEGES Legal Juan Martin Moreno Senior Social Protection Economist GSPDR Social Protection Dena Ringold Lead Economist GSPDR Social Protection Rafael P. Rofman Lead Social Protection Special GSPDR Social Protection Marcela Ines Salvador Senior Social Protection Specialist GSPDR Social Protection Ricardo Schusterman Consultant GSURR Safeguards Santiago Scialabba Program Assistant LCC7C Assistant

Alejandro Roger Solanot Senior Financial Management Specialist GGODR Financial Management

Isabel Tomadin Social Development Consultant LCSHS Safeguards

Hermann A. von Gersdorff Consultant GMFDR Country Management Unit

Supervision/ICR Vanina Camporeale Senior Operations Officer GHNDR Operations Ana Maria Grofsmacht Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Marta Elena Molares-Halberg Lead Counsel LEGES Legal Juan Martin Moreno Senior Social Protection Economist GSPDR Social Protection

Rafael P. Rofman Program Leader LCC7C Country Management Unit

Marcela Ines Salvador Senior Social Protection Specialist GSPDR Task Team Leader Santiago Scialabba Program Assistant LCC7C Assistant

Alejandro Roger Solanot Senior Financial Management Specialist GGODR Financial Management

Paula Agostina Di Crocco Financial Management Analyst GG022 Financial Management

Mariela Alvarez Program Assistant LCC7C Assistant Silvestre Rios Centeno Program Assistant LCC7C Assistant Isabel Tomadin Social Safeguards Consultant GSURR Safeguards Cecilia Zanetta ICR Consultant — ICR Primary Author

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of Staff WeeksUS$

(including travel and consultant costs)

LendingFY2009 62.95 230,383.91FY2011 24.53 68,836.55Total: 87.48 299,220.46Supervision/ICRFY2010 37.03 138,048.99FY2011 75.98 136,278.19FY2012 76.28 201,670.48FY2013 37.57 83,558.59FY2014 33.47 92,738.16FY2015 19.20 62,534.28FY2016 22.87 96,057.33FY2017 7.94 21,093.71Total: 310.34 831,979.73

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

1. Not applicable.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. Not applicable.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

English Summary of the main points from Borrower’s contribution

1. Achievements, challenges and main lessons learned by the Project implementing agencies are detailed below.

National Directorate of Projects with International Credit Organizations

2. The Project was developed in the 36 months-term originally planned regardless of specific issues related to the additional financing Project, which are detailed further. It is worth mentioning that there was an initial delay of approximately two years for reasons explained in this report as well as in the opinions of the independent Audit.

Social Security National Administration (ANSES)

3. Given the design of both projects, there were two components whose execution involved ANSES.

Component 2: Support to the Family Allowance Payment System

4. The objective of this component consisted of supporting the Family Allowance Payment System, both the contributive and non-contributive subsystems.

5. Family Allowance Payment – Contributive System: The SUAF (Unified Family Allowance Payment System) is implemented by ANSES through a process of monthly payment. In order to manage SUAF, ANSES keeps a management Information system that includes a big database of people and their relations. ANSES transfers payments to the bank account of each worker through SUAF.

6. Family Allowance Payment – Non-contributive System: Decree 1.602/09 instituted the Universal Child Allowance (AUH) for children between ages 0 to 18 years whose parents are unemployed or work in the informal economy with income equal or less to the Adjustable Minimum Living Wage.

7. Within the AUH framework, each child and teenager should have the compliance of conditions annually accredited in a National Card of Social Security, Health and Education.

Subcomponent 3.C: Design and implementation of a registration process to identify and enroll potential AUH beneficiaries

8. The third subcomponent of the Technical Assistance included activities to be developed by ANSES, which comprised the design and implementation of a registration process to include eligible beneficiaries in the AUH program. To this aim ANSES would launch a national strategy to identify and enroll possible beneficiaries through a work program addressed to specific sectors.

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Evaluation of the Project objectives, design, implementation and experience

9. Design: it was adequate and it contributed to improve the execution of social security programs led by ANSES. Achievements: indicators of the Project have been complied with. Subcomponent 3.C: It was executed with ANSES’ funds. Notwithstanding, the action plan of this subcomponent was very useful to project implementation, even when it was not financed by the Bank funds.

Evaluation of Bank performance and effectiveness of the Bank-Borrower relationship

10. The challenges and objectives initially set out were achieved by the joint work done during Project preparation and implementation.

Bank strengths: Technical assistance during Project preparation and implementation. Collaboration in solving issues that arose during Project preparation and implementation. Valuable and timely recommendations during supervision missions.

Conclusions

11. One valuable lesson learned is that it is essential to promote articulation and coordination between the participant agencies in order to carry out an adequate implementation and to achieve objectives efficiently.

12. More generally, both the Basic Social Protection and its Additional Financing have contributed to improve and provide sustainability to the policies they supported financially and technically. Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security

13. Components 3 A y B are evaluated separately because Component A1 y A2 depended of SSPTyEL and Component B of the National Directorate of Technological and Systems Innovation.

Component 3 A1 and 3 A2. Social Protection Studies

Evaluation of Project objectives, design, implementation and experience

14. Loans 7703-8017-AR allowed to achieve the objectives of the study on the social protection status of households and resident population in urban agglomerations.

Critical evaluation of objectives and design

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15. Project objectives were achieved and revalidated. The initial design faced the challenge of building a sampling framework since INDEC’s was too old. The Project had to widen its objectives to produce the national sampling framework, thus causing a delay in the survey, which had to reduce its initially intended coverage.

16. This situation highlights the importance of having a reliable and updated sampling framework and to develop it in case it is not available.

17. The second lesson learned from the implementation of the national survey relates to the scale such an endeavor comprises. Trained staff is required in all provinces, and since INDEC refused to carry out the field work a consulting firm (OPSM SA) had to be hired. During the work, despite the close supervision of MTESS, the consulting firm’s lack of operational capacity to cover the 24 jurisdictions became evident, resulting in heterogeneous quality and delays.

18. This led to developing a new strategy for field work of ENAPROSS II by hiring the Provincial Statistics Directorates. These agencies showed more agility, better pricing and timely and accurate compliance. Thus, it is advisable to use these resources to undertake studies at a national scale.

19. Another aspect to be highlighted is the study on the social protection status of vulnerable groups like rural workers. The study, jointly financed by the National Registry of Rural Workers, SRT and the Bank loan, comprised 10 Argentine provinces, which was extremely important since there are few studies including this population.

20. Other complementary qualitative and quali-quantitative studies, on social protection, informal economy or reasons why companies hire workers informally were also very relevant.

21. Bank staff always supported the restructuring of studies and the way to approach them, collaborating with redefining and optimizing the use of resources.

22. The loan contributed to strengthening SSPTyEL institutional capacity on conceptual and methodological designs to facilitate the execution, processing and analysis of surveys at a national level.

Evaluation of its own performance during the evolution and implementation of the project, with special emphasis in lessons learned that could be relevant for the future

23. SSPTyEL grew along with the Project as its small and agile teams were able to generate conceptual, methodological, statistical, and IT developments that allowed for important achievements, for example, the generation of new studies, of their own software that was used for capturing data through mobile devices for the first time in Argentina. All of these opportunities were created by the project. The software was shared with other public agencies interested in statistical IT innovation as technical assistance.

Evaluation of Bank performance and effectiveness of the Bank-Borrower relationship

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24. Preparation and supervision missions were useful in the development of the Project, particularly in study redesign and optimization of available resources. Accompaniment and demand to comply planned schedules by Bank staff was also important.

Lessons and risks

25. There were important lessons learned regarding institutional strengthening of SSPTyEL statistics area. The agency was strengthened in: dealing with high-level projects, evaluation of suppliers for the required services, policy design related to vulnerable populations, developing strategic skills to contribute with relevant information to create public policies, which was particularly useful to the Social Security Secretariat.

Component 3.B Alternative Computing Center

Implementation of the Alternative Computing Center

26. The objective of this subcomponent was to implement an alternative computing center for MTESS to guarantee an efficient and safe management of SCE beneficiaries’ data in the Ministry. In particular, aiming at capturing information on professional training and employment promotion opportunities to benefit several users in the territory (OE, GECAL, Mesas Territoriales) as well as for policy follow-up and monitoring. It was focused on increasing the storage capacity and processing for new applications, based on the acquisition of hardware and the preparation of a building to serve as alternative Computing Center, so as to ensure the provision of services in case of catastrophes.

Alternative Computing Center

27. The current MTESS Computing Center has almost exceeded its main capacities, as well as the physical space, energy and refrigeration necessary to place new equipment. As a mitigating measure the General Directorate of Information Technology and Innovation has implemented several actions tending to reduce storage spaces to rationalize and increase the percentage of free space so as to reassign it according to needs. As a result, more control in data management is needed and the operation of the equipment is more complex, which impacts on the quality and performance of the main services provided, such as the labor intermediation platform and the management of projects implemented by Employment and Training Insurance. This situation made it necessary to count with a contingency computing center in case of insufficiency or failure.

28. Each of these centers would have the capacity to continue providing critical services, especially the management of six databases belonging to the Youth Employment Support Project, the Agreements, Covenants and Protocol area, beneficiaries’ management, labor intermediation and data warehouse. The new center will be located at least 1 km away from the older one, as prescribed by international security rules.

Achievements and results met

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29. It was not possible to carry it out the construction of the computing center due to a disagreement with the Bank’s technical staff on how to approach the civil works. Regarding the procurement of equipment, it was successfully done and put in place, together with some required electrical modifications. This acquisition multiplied the data processing and storage capacity, with the consequent improvement of the services provided.

30. As the alternative computing center was not constructed, additional equipment was acquired to hire services from other public centers.

Full version in Spanish

31. A continuación, se presenta de manera sucinta los logros, los desafíos y las principales lecciones aprendidas por las agencias implementadoras del Proyecto.

Dirección Nacional de Proyectos con Organismos Internacionales de Crédito

32. Independientemente de las cuestiones particulares desarrolladas por los Subejecutores y que se detallan seguidamente, corresponde mencionar que en lo atinente al financiamiento adicional del Proyecto; luego de una dilación inicial de aproximadamente dos años, por razones expuestas tanto en el presente Informe, como tambien en los dictámenes de Auditoría independiente, el Proyecto se desarrolló durante el plazo de ejecución originalmente previsto de 36 meses.

Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES)

Introducción

33. ANSES es un organismo descentralizado en el Ámbito del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social de la Nación. Es una de las mayores instituciones del sector público en la Argentina, tanto en terminos de gestión del gasto social como de cobertura de la población. Tiene a su cargo la gestión de prestaciones de seguridad social, tales como: jubilaciones y pensiones, programas de asignaciones familiares contributivas y no contributivas, fondos de desempleo e incapacidad y otros programas de protección social.

Componentes del Proyecto de Protección Social Básica y su Financiamiento Adicional que contaron con la participación de ANSES.

34. Dado el diseño de ambos proyectos, se establecieron dos componentes cuya ejecución involucró a ANSES.

Componente 2: Apoyo al Programa de Asignaciones Familiares

35. El objetivo de este componente consistió en apoyar al Sistema de Asignaciones Familiares de los subsistemas contributivo y no contributivo.

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36. Asignaciones Familiares – Sistema Contributivo: El SUAF (Sistema Único de Asignaciones Familiares) es implementado por ANSES a traves de un proceso de pago mensual. Para gestionar el SUAF, ANSES mantiene un sistema de información de gestión que incluye una gran base de datos nacional de personas y sus relaciones. A traves del SUAF ANSES transfiere las prestaciones a la cuenta bancaria de cada trabajador.

37. Asignaciones Familiares – Sistema No Contributivo: El Decreto 1.602/09 instituyó la Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) a los niños de entre 0 y 18 años de edad cuyos padres esten desocupados o trabajen en la economía informal con ingresos iguales o inferiores al Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil.

38. En el marco de AUH, cada niño y adolescente, a traves de la Libreta Nacional de Seguridad Social, Salud y Educación debe acreditar anualmente ante ANSES el cumplimiento de las condicionalidades.

Subcomponente 3.C: Diseño e implementación de un proceso de registración para identificar e inscribir potenciales beneficiarios en la AUH.

39. El tercer subcomponente de la Asistencia Tecnica incluía actividades a ser desarrolladas por ANSES, que comprendían el diseño y la implementación de un proceso de registración para incluir a beneficiarios elegibles en el programa de la AUH. Para ello preveía que ANSES lanzara una estrategia nacional para identificar e inscribir a los posibles beneficiarios a traves de un programa de trabajo de campo dirigido a sectores específicos.

Evaluación de los objetivos del proyecto, diseño, implementación y experiencia de su operación.

40. Con respecto a los objetivos del proyecto y a su diseño se considera que los mismos fueron adecuados y contribuyeron a mejorar la ejecución de los programas de seguridad social que impulsa ANSES.

41. En cuanto a los logros alcanzados, se puede destacar que se ha dado cumplimiento a los indicadores previstos en el proyecto. Con respecto al Subcomponente 3.C, cabe aclarar que la ejecución del mismo se realizó con fondos propios de ANSES. Sin perjuicio de ello, la planificación de las acciones a desarrollar en el marco de este subcomponente, fue un gran aporte para la implementación de las mismas aun cuando no se hayan llevado a cabo con financiamiento del Prestamo.

Evaluación del desempeño del banco y la efectividad de la relación con el mismo.

42. Se hace notar que el trabajo conjunto durante la preparación del proyecto y el periodo de vigencia del prestamo ha permitido alcanzar los desafíos y objetivos inicialmente pautados.

43. En dicho marco deben identificarse algunas fortalezas en la gestión del Banco Mundial, tales como:

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El Banco Mundial ha facilitado en todo momento la asistencia tecnica la preparación y ejecución del proyecto.

Asimismo, el Banco ha considerado y ha estado dispuesto para colaborar en la resolución de las distintas situaciones que se presentaron tanto en la preparación como en la ejecución del proyecto.

En las misiones de supervisión y control se han sugerido valiosas y oportunas recomendaciones para el logro de los objetivos.

Conclusión

44. En cuanto a los aprendizajes que se adquirieron durante la ejecución del Proyecto, se puede destacar que es fundamental propiciar la articulación y coordinación entre los organismos participantes para llevar a cabo la implementación en forma adecuada y lograr los objetivos previstos de manera eficiente.

45. En terminos generales se considera que tanto el Proyecto de Protección Social Básica como el Financiamiento Adicional han contribuido a mejorar y a dar sustentabilidad a las políticas a las que brindó apoyo financiero y tecnico.

Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social

46. Se presentan por separado las consideraciones de los Componentes 3 A y B en tanto las coordinaciones tecnicas han tenido dependencias funcionales diferenciadas. El Componente A1 y A2 ha dependido de la SSPTyEL y el Componente B ha dependido de la Dirección General de Innovación Tecnológica e Informática.

Componente 3 A1 y 3 A2. Estudios de Protección Social

Evaluación de los objetivos del proyecto, diseño, implementación y experiencia de su operación.

47. El Prestamo BIRF 7703/8017-AR permitió concretar los objetivos del Proyecto de Estudio sobre el estado de situación de la Protección Social Básica en hogares y población residente en los aglomerados urbanos de 5000 habitantes y más de un conjunto de dominios estadísticos de la Argentina. El Estudio cuyo campo fue realizado durante el año 2011 permitió trazar la línea de base de la situación de acceso a la Protección Social del 74% de la población residente en los aglomerados de 5000 habitantes o más. Este estudio denominado ENAPROSS I cubrió los dominios de CABA, 24 Partidos de GBA, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Provincia de Santa Fe, Provincia de Córdoba, Provincia de Tucumán y Provincia de Mendoza. El segundo estudio, ENAPROSS II, cuyo campo fue recopilado en el años 2014-2015 fue diseñado con la finalidad de complementar el estudio realizado en el año 2011, dando cuenta de la situación de acceso a la protección y seguridad social de los dominios estadísticos cuya realidad socioeconómica presentaba mayores índices de vulnerabilidad en relación a su población (Noroeste y Noreste argentinos) así como observar el acceso a la protección social que tenían los hogares y población localizados en una provincia del sur, en este caso Río Negro. El diseño del estudio tambien previó la comparación de la evolución de la situación ante la protección social

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de la población residente en el aglomerado del Gran Buenos Aires (CABA y 24 partidos del Gran Buenos Aires).

Evaluación critica de los objetivos y diseño.

Los objetivos del proyecto fueron alcanzados y revalidados en las dos ondas de estudio. El diseño inicial tuvo el desafío de tener que construir un marco muestral dado que no se podía contar con el marco muestral del INDEC que estaba envejecido y donde el Instituto estaba abocado a la operatoria del Censo 2010. En este sentido, el proyecto tuvo que ampliar sus objetivos construyendo el marco muestral nacional, perjudicando esto el cronograma de la encuesta que tuvo que reducir la cobertura inicialmente prevista.

Esta situación deja como lección la importancia de contar con marcos muestrales nacionales confiables y actualizados y la importancia de desarrollarlos en caso que no estuvieran disponibles.

La segunda lección aprendida en relación a la implementación de la Encuesta es acerca de la envergadura que expresa una Encuesta Nacional de esta naturaleza. El operativo de campo requiere de un staff construido a nivel de cada provincia con capacidad de realizar relevamientos en las mismas. En ese momento y ante la negativa del INDEC a encarar el operativo de campo se optó por recurrir a una LPI de firmas consultoras en la modalidad calificación por antecedentes y precio. Esta compulsa fue ganada por la consultora OPSM SA quien manifestó en los hechos fallas en su capacidad operativa como para dar cobertura a las 24 jurisdicciones. Esto nos dejó como lección que, si bien hubo capacidad tecnica de producir un relevamiento de calidad que fue cuidadosamente supervisado por el MTESS, su capacidad operativa era heterogenea y no conseguía cubrir en tiempo y forma todas las jurisdicciones.

La evaluación de esta situación nos lleva a desarrollar una nueva estrategia para realizar el campo de la ENAPROSS II a partir de la contratación de las Direcciones Provinciales de Estadística. La respuesta de estas agencias demostró enorme agilidad, mejora de los precios del producto y cumplimiento en tiempo y forma del operativo. Esta situación nos hace aconsejable utilizar esta vía para realizar este tipo de operativos en escala.

Otros aspectos a destacar fue el uso de los recursos del prestamo en el estudio de la situación ante la Protección Social de colectivos vulnerables como el de los asalariados agrarios. Este estudio que por asociación con el Registro Nacional de Trabajadores Agrarios y la SRT permitió alcanzar junto con el financiamiento del prestamo a 10 provincias de la Argentina fue de enorme importancia para el estudio de la cobertura en esta población que no es objeto de estudios cuantitativos de envergadura.

Se destacan tambien los estudios cualitativos y cuali-cuantitavos complementarios desarrollados tanto en materia de protección social como de caracterización de la economía informal o de los motivos que alegan los empresarios para la contratación de trabajo no registrado.

La reestructuración de los estudios y formas de abordaje de los mismos contó siempre con una fuerte interlocución con los oficiales de cuenta del Banco quienes

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colaboraron en las redefiniciones y en la optimización en la aplicación de los recursos.

El Prestamo contribuyó a fortalecer la capacidad institucional de la SSPTyEL en materia de realizar diseños conceptuales, metodológicos que permitieran la ejecución, procesamiento y análisis de encuestas de envergadura nacional.

Evaluación de su propio desempeño durante la evolución e implementación del proyecto, con especial énfasis en lecciones aprendidas que podrían ser relevantes para el futuro.

48. La SSPTyEL creció con el despliegue de este proyecto en la medida que sus equipos pequeños y ágiles fueron capaces de generar desarrollos conceptuales, metodológicos, estadísticos, informáticos que permitieron logros importantes: en la generación de nuevos estudios, de un software propio que fue implementado para la captación de datos a traves de dispositivos móviles que se aplicaron en forma extensa por primera vez en Argentina. Todas estas oportunidades fueron creadas por las condiciones creadas por el prestamo. La creación de este software permitió dar asistencia tecnica a otras agencias del Estado interesadas en la innovación informática en las estadísticas.

Evaluación del desempeño del Banco y la efectividad de la relación con el mismo.

49. Las misiones de preparación y supervisión del Banco han contribuido positivamente al desarrollo del Proyecto tanto en la interlocución en el rediseño de estudios como en la optimización de los recursos disponibles. Tambien ha sido importante el acompañamiento y exigencia del cumplimiento de los cronogramas comprometidos.

Lecciones y riesgos:

50. Las lecciones aprendidas fueron importantes en materia de fortalecimiento institucional del área de Estadística de la SSPTyEL. La Agencia se fortaleció en materia de encarar proyectos de gran envergadura y en la evaluación de proveedores de los servicios que requería.

51. Tambien se fortaleció en la contribución con el diseño de políticas referentes a la situación de colectivos particularmente expuestos a situaciones de vulnerabilidad.

52. Se desarrollaron capacidades estrategicas de contribuir con informaciones a la formulación de políticas en la materia que fueron aprovechadas particularmente por la Secretaría de Seguridad social del MTEySS.

Componente 3.B Centro Alternativo de Cómputos

Implementación del Centro de Cómputos Alternativo.

53. El Objetivo de este subcomponente es implementar un Centro de Cómputos alternativo para el MTESS que garantice la gestión eficiente y segura de los registros de datos de los beneficiarios del SCE en el Ministerio. En particular la captación de información sobre cursos de formación profesional y de oportunidades de promoción del empleo y disponibilidad de las

46

mismas para ser utilizada por diversos usuarios en el territorio (OE, GECAL, Mesas Territoriales) así como el seguimiento y monitoreo de las políticas.

54. En este sentido, contempla la ampliación de la capacidad de almacenamiento y de procesamiento para nuevas aplicaciones, en base a la adquisición del hardware y el acondicionamiento de un inmueble para servir de Centro de Datos alternativo al actual, a fin de asegurar la continuidad de servicios ante catástrofes en alguno de los Centros de Cómputos.

Centro de Cómputos Alternativo

55. Contempla la ampliación de la capacidad de almacenamiento y de procesamiento para nuevas aplicaciones, en base a la adquisición del hardware y electrónica de red y el acondicionamiento de un inmueble para servir de Centro de Datos alternativo al actual, a fin de asegurar la continuidad de servicios ante catástrofes en alguno de los Centros de Datos.

56. El centro de cómputos actual del MTESS se encuentra al límite en sus principales capacidades, así como tambien en el espacio físico, energía y refrigeración necesarias para el albergado del futuro equipamiento. Como paliativo actual, la Dirección General de informática e Innovación Tecnológica ha implementado diferentes acciones que tienden a la reducción de los espacios de almacenamiento para racionalizar y elevar el porcentaje de espacio libre a efectos que pueda ser reasignado atento a las necesidades, que se suscitan. Las consecuencias de emprender estas acciones conllevan a emplear un mayor control en el manejo de los datos, complejiza la operatividad repercutiendo en la calidad y performance de algunos de los principales servicios que se brindan, tal como la plataforma de intermediación-laboral o la administración de los proyectos del Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo. En ese sentido, el objetivo es emplazar un centro de cómputos alternativo que además de permitir la expansión de recursos necesaria para alojar más equipamiento, provea “Contingencia” al brindar continuidad de servicio ante fallas severas.

57. Cada uno de estos centros dispondría de las capacidades necesarias para continuar los servicios críticos del organismo, especialmente la gestión de las seis bases de datos que conforman el sistema de gestión de proyectos del Seguro de Capacitación y Empleo y Programa Jóvenes con Más y Mejor Trabajo, gestión de Acuerdos, Convenios y Protocolos, gestión de beneficiarios, intermediación laboral y explotación de datos (data warehouse). La localización física del nuevo centro de datos está definida a una distancia superior al km. del actual, de acuerdo a normas internacionales de seguridad.

Antecedentes

58. Desde el año 2003 el crecimiento en capacidad de servidores del MTESS fue del 400% en el período 2004-2007 y del 190% entre los años 2007-2010. Este crecimiento fue provocado principalmente por las tareas de re-diseño de los sistemas de apoyo a la gestión de los diferentes programas de empleo y capacitación laboral, pues se maneja una base de datos de personas de aproximadamente 2.400.000 (fundamentalmente del Programa Jefes de Hogar).

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59. Por otro lado, y en base a esta información la Secretaría de Empleo durante los últimos años ha llevado a cabo diferentes políticas activas sobre grupos de personas que reúnen determinadas características registradas electrónicamente.

60. En este sentido tambien se destaca que la Dirección General de Informática e Innovación Tecnológica debía cumplir con los lineamientos de Seguridad Informática emanados desde Jefatura de Gabinete, a traves de las Políticas de Seguridad plasmadas en la Decisión Administrativa 669/2004. Por esta razón ya está desarrollando con fuente de financiación de Gobierno una Consultoría para la Ingeniería del Proyecto que definirá los requerimientos y terminos de referencia para realizar la refacción y adecuación de un inmueble del MTESS para Centro de Cómputos Alternativo, lo cual incluye: (i) el diseño de infraestructura del Centro y obras necesarias y (ii) la definición de especificaciones tecnicas del equipamiento necesario de energía, cableado de red de datos; refrigeración, sistema de detección y extinción de incendios.

61. Asimismo, está previsto que la Consultoría de Dirección de Obra será financiada con fondos del Gobierno Nacional. La definición de los requerimientos tecnicos y aprobación de la adquisición del equipamiento de hardware y electrónica de red será realizada por la DGIIT que es la CTP de este subcomponente.

Logros y resultados alcanzados:

62. Con respecto a la obra civil y tecnica de sala del centro de cómputos, se informa que no pudo concretarse debido a comprensiones diferentes con los tecnicos del banco de cómo abordar la obra civil, si bien se realizaron 3 versiones diferentes de los pliegos tecnicos, con el material provisto por la Consultoría contratada para que realice la Ingeniería del Proyecto a fines del 2010. En este sentido, tambien se realizaron las adecuaciones edilicias de obra civil necesarias para soportar el peso del respectivo equipamiento en el edificio propiedad del ministerio.

63. Con respecto a la línea de adquisición de Equipos del nuevo centro de cómputos, se informa que se realizaron los trámites correspondientes a la adquisición, instalándose a la fecha la totalidad del equipamiento adquirido en el Centro de Cómputos actual. Para ello tambien se debieron realizar adecuaciones electricas y adquisición de equipamiento para acondicionamiento de aire, debido al mayor consumo energetico de los nuevos equipos.

64. Es claro que esta adquisición permitió al organismo conseguir los objetivos al triplicar la capacidad de procesamiento y duplicar la capacidad de almacenamiento de datos, con el consecuente beneficio de mejora de los servicios brindados, especialmente para el análisis e intercambio de información con otros organismos. Con respecto al objetivo de contingencia y continuidad de servicios, si bien no se logró la construcción del centro de cómputos alternativo, si se adquirieron los equipos necesarios para contratar dichos servicios en centros de cómputos alternativos del gobierno, utilizando equipamiento propio, como puede ser el caso de ARSAT (Empresa Argentina de Soluciones Satelitales).

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Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

1. Not applicable.

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Castillo. V., M. Ohaco, and D. Schleser. 2014. Evolución del Impacto en la inserción laboral de los beneficiarios de los cursos sectoriales de formación profesional. Serie Documentos de Trabajo 6, Buenos Aires: International Labour Organization.

Cortez , R. and D. Romero. 2013. Increasing Utilization of Health Care Services Among the Uninsured Population: the Plan Nacer Program. Universal Health Coverage Study Series. World Bank.

Gertler, P., Giovagnoli, P. and S. Martinez. 2014. Rewarding Provider Performance to Enable a Healthy Start to Life: Evidence from Argentina’s Plan Nacer, Policy Research Working Paper 6884, Latin America and the Caribbean Region Health, Nutrition and Population Unit, World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank. 2009–16. Argentina Basic Protection Project, Implementation Status Results Reports, Sequence 1–13. Washington, DC: World Bank.

———. 2009. Argentina - Basic Protection Project. Washington, DC: World Bank. (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336181468212678942/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project )

———. 2011. Argentina - Basic Protection Project - Additional Financing. Washington, DC: World Bank. (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/948491468212681052/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project-additional-financing)

Interviews Conducted as part of ICR Mission (April 2016)

MEFSilvia Mucci, (Director, Projects with Support from International Financial Institutions, DNPOIC)Gabriel Filc (Former Director, DNPOIC)Anibal Lopez (Former IBRD Project Coordinator, DNPOIC)Alfredo Alvarez (PCU)Claudia Rivero (PCU)Carla Elena (DNPOIC)Chief of Cabinet of MinistriesClaudia Silva (Director, Projects and Programs with External Financing)Maria Pilar Giribone (Consultant)MTESSMiguel Angel Ponte (Secretary of Employment)Jose Anchorena (Under-Secretary, Technical Programming and Labor Studies, SSPTEL) Monica Alcibar (Director, ICT)Esteban Eseverri (Director of Financial Programing, Employment and Training Programs) Carlos Ullua (Former Director of Financial Programing, Employment and Training Programs) Marta Novick (Former Sub Secretary, responsible for ENAPROSS, SSPTEL)Ana Catalano (Coordinator ENAPROSS, SSPTEL)Frida Szwarcberg (Coordinator, Special Programs and Projects, SSPTEL)Eduardo Roza (SSPTEL)Monica Muscolino (Director, Financial Programing, Employment and Training Programs) Claudia Wentzel (Coordinator SCE)

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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/948491468212681052/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project-additional-financing

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/948491468212681052/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project-additional-financing

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336181468212678942/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336181468212678942/Argentina-Basic-Protection-Project

Luis Fara (PCU Employment and Training Programs) Enrique Garrido (PCU Employment and Training Programs) ANSESMariana Spitaleri (Coordinator Projects with External Financing, ANSES)Manuel Gavernet (ANSES) Sergio Arguissain (ANSES) World Bank Task TeamMarcela Salvador (TTL)Rafael Rofman (Former TTL) Vanina Camporeale (Operations)Ana Grofsmacht (Procurement)Alejandro Solanot (Financial Management) Paula Di Crocco (Financial Management)

Note: ICT = Information and Communication Technology; PCU = Project Coordination Unit; SSPTEL = ; TTL = Task Team Leader.

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