Are We Living In Nick Bostrom’s Speculation

7/28/2019 Are We Living In Nick Bostroms Speculation

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Are We Living In Nick Bostroms Speculation?

Danila Medvedev

[email protected]

Lappeenranta

2003

The rapid development of computing technologies can make

possible realistic computer simulations inhabited with

intelligent humans. The Simulation Argument, proposed by Nick

Bostrom[1] in the article Are You Living In a Computer

Simulation, states that if such simulations will be created by us

or our descendants, then we almost certainly live in a computer

simulation. This paper analyses serious mathematical and

logical errors in the Simulation Argument. It follows that the

Simulation Argument is incorrect and the reality of our world

remains a question of individual beliefs.

I. Introduction

The idea that our world might be a computer simulation is a

relatively recent one. The first ideas of full reality simulation

appeared only about 20 years ago. In 1989 Jaron Lanier coined

the term virtual reality, but only since 1990s it became

conceivable that a whole world could be simulated. Computer

games, especially 3D ones, such as Doom, Quake and many

more recent titles, showed how the world (or at least a large part

of it) could be recreated on the computer monitor. Several


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science fiction movies made in the end of 1990s and in the

beginning of the 21st century elaborated on these ideas,

developing some of the philosophical consequences of

simulations and, more importantly, communicating them to the

wide audience for the first time.

Abre los ojos (Open Your Eyes), 1997 [2] The maincharacter in this movie signed a contract with a cryonics

company. After his death his body was frozen and his

mind placed into a computer simulation. In this story, the

personalities of all humans are simulated only to the extent

necessary for their interactions with the main character.

For example, one of the secondary characters, apsychiatrist, has two daughters, but does not know their

names.

Dark City, 1998 [13] This movie was also a mysterythriller, hence it showed a more mystical picture of the

world and never explained the mechanism of the

simulation. However, it led to the Matrix and The

Thirteenth Floor films, which developed the idea of world

simulation more rigorously and in more details.The Matrix, 1999[2] [8] In this film most of the humans are

connected to the large computer simulation (the Matrix)

from birth, but they do not know about it, unless someone

from outside the simulation can tell them the truth. The

machines that run the simulation can make arbitrary

changes to the simulation in real-time. Humans from the

real world can be inserted into the simulation as new

people. The Matrix became the first widely known filmabout simulation and it introduced many people to the

ideas of simulated realities for the first time.

The Thirteenth Floor, 1999 [13] This movie introduced theidea of nested simulations and travel from one level to

another. A simulation of the early 20th century city is

developed in a computer company (in the end of 20th

century). It turns out later that the real world is in fact also

a simulation, run from what appears to be 21st or 22nd


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century. Characters can enter the simulation (or exit it)

only by being inserted into the body of existing human.

Vanilla Sky, 2001 [15] This is an American remake ofAbre lost ojos. The story has not changed much and basic

scientific and philosophical premises behind the story are

also the same.

An interesting theme that is present in The Thirteenth Floor, The

Matrix and Dark City is the idea of limited size of the simulated

world and of people coming to the literal end of the world (also

happens in The Truman Show, 1998) and perceiving the limits.

In addition to being presented in popular culture, these ideas are

being pursued by professional philosophers now. Thephilosophical ideas behind The Matrix are further developed in

the Philosophy of the Matrix section of the film website [12].

But the most profound development related to these ideas was

the controversial theory, known as the Simulation Argument.

The main idea of the Simulation Argument, as proposed by Nick

Bostrom [1] is that if we dont think that we are currently

living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believethat we will have descendants who will run lots of such

simulations of their forebears.

This idea was further developed in the works of Robin Hanson

and Barry Dainton. In his paper How to Live in a Simulation [7]

Hanson gives some recommendations on optimal behaviour for

people who believe that they might be living in a simulation.

Unfortunately, his ideas are based on the wrong premises (aswill be shown in this paper) and his suggestions are far from

rational and effective. For example, at one place Hanson

speculates that simulations [might] tend to be ended when

enough people in them become confident enough that they live

in a simulation and therefore you might want to prevent too

many others learning that they live in a simulation [7]. This is

nothing more than a random speculation, demonstrating

disregard for likelihood, internal consistency and rationality ofthe hypotheses. It could very well be possible that when enough


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people realise that they live in a simulation, they will be taken to

the real world and simulation will be stopped. Later Hanson

suggests that seeking people who might be visitors from the

outside and making them interested in you can be beneficial. He

completely ignores a just as likely possibility that our world is a

GTA[3]-like game. Such speculations clearly have no use

except to satisfy peoples curiosity and entertain them.

In Innocence Lost: Simulation Scenarios: Prospects and

Consequences [2] Barry Dainton introduces several new

concepts, such as different modes of virtual life. Then he makes

the simulation argument in a way similar to Are You Living In a

Computer Simulation?, making the same mistakes. In the end ofthe article he discusses several possible ethical arguments

against our simulation:

1. The Objection from Lesser Value simulations shouldnot be created because life in a simulation is inherently

worse than life in reality.

2. The Deception Objection simulations should not becreated because it involves mass deception.

3. The Self-Interest Consideration simulations should beprohibited to be sure that you are not in a simulation

yourself.

The first two arguments are worth considering, but the last one

is clearly invalid, as it also suffers from the causation error and

circular reasoning fallacy.

The simulation argument is closely related to one of thefundamental questions of philosophy the choice between two

alternative world views, materialism and idealism. The

distinctive feature of the simulation argument is that some of its

aspects are materialistic and some agree with objective idealism.

In particular, the idealistic concept of the first cause reflects the

start of the simulation by its creators and the concepts of ideas

or ideal numbers corresponds with the simulation as a

computer program. The materialistic beliefs that the world isunderstandable and that our senses reflect the reality accurately


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are wrong. Simulation is the world that has been pulled over

[mans] eyes to blind [him] from the truth [8].

It can be said that overall the metaphysical nature of the

simulation, as observed by its inhabitants is mostly idealistic. Atthe same time, from the point of view of the creators of the

simulation, its nature is materialistic. The consciousness (and

intelligence) of a simulated human is the emerging property of

computer components, highly organised by means of complex

software programs. The base reality itself (and therefore the

metaverse) can be materialistic in nature.

Unfortunately, all papers on the topic of simulation argumentlisted above contain a number of similar errors, namely circular

reasoning, auto-reference, ignoring observational bias, causality

errors and disregard for the control of the simulation by its

creators. The existing critique of the simulation argument

usually ignores the most serious errors and concentrates on

particularities. The level of logical argumentation is usually low.

I was not able to find any articles with a comprehensive analysis

of the simulation argument.

In this paper I provided a detailed analysis of the simulation

argument, demonstrated the logical errors in the original

reasoning, suggested several alternatives to the simulation ideas.

I also examined the ethical principles of posthuman civilisations

in regards to running simulations and formulated several

hypotheses about these principles that are not dependent on

qualities of our own civilisation.

Based on the conducted analysis it can be concluded that the

simulation argument is wrong. It seems to be impossible to

avoid logical mistakes made by Bostrom. It has to be admitted

that the reality of our world is still the matter of individual

belief. At the same time, the reality of our world does not

impose any limitations on the prospects of technological

development, the possibility of reaching the posthuman stageand creating ancestor simulations.


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In the first part of this paper I provide a summary of the original

paper by Nick Bostrom and list the tacit assumptions of the

simulation argument.

In the second part I examine the main formula for calculatingthe probability of living a simulation is and demonstrate

calculation errors made by Bostrom.

In the third part I discuss the logical mistakes in the simulation

argument. In this part I also demonstrate the inconsistency

between Bostroms arguments and the scientific approach.

In the fourth part I give independent arguments against us livingin a simulation that are not related to the errors in the original

paper.

In the last part I comment on Bostroms original interpretation

of the simulation argument. I propose the idea that simulations

are fully controlled by the creators.

Definitions

In this paper a number of special terms related to the problem of

world simulations are used. Terms suggested by other authors

are used in their original meanings.

Posthuman civilisation a civilisation of human descendants,

who were changed to the degree when they no longer can be

considered humans. A posthuman civilisation would probablypossess advanced computational technologies, nanotechnology,

strong AI technologies and many others.

Simulation a computer program modelling in some form the

intelligence and/or consciousness of one or several people, as

well as a physical environment that they can interact with.

Realistic simulations model the environment similar to the real

world.


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Ancestor simulation a simulation of a part of past human

history.

Base civilisation a civilisation that exists in the real world

and not in the simulation.

First-level simulation a simulation run by the base

civilisation.

Parent civilisation (with respect to some simulation) the

civilisation that runs this simulation.

Metaverse a hypothetical set of all existing universes. Thisset includes all basic realities, as well as all simulations run

from any of the universes (both real and simulated) in this set.

II. Overview of the original article

In the first part of the paper (The Assumption of Substrate-

Independence), Bostrom describes the prerequisites for the

simulation argument. He first outlines the assumption ofsubstrate-independence, the idea that it is not an essential

property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-

based biological neural networks inside a cranium and that

mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical

substrates [1]. Although no references are provided and the

issue is not discussed at length, it appears consistent with

current scientific paradigms in the computer science and

biological sciences. There have been some opposition to thisidea from Roger Penrose [7] and a few other authors, who

suggested that consciousness is possible because of specific

quantum mechanisms in the human brain that cannot be

reproduced on other substrates, but these ideas are not accepted

by most of the scientists in these fields.

In the next section (The Technological Limits of Computation),

Bostrom gives a detailed analysis of the computationalrequirements for the simulation of human mind and entire


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civilisations. The most important indicators are the following:

Computational complexity of the human brain: ~10161017operations per second.

Maximum human sensory input: ~108 bits per second.Computational cost of the realistic simulation of human

history: ~10331036 operations.

Computational power of a nanotech-based computer: 1021operations per second per cm3.

Maximum computational power per 1 kg of mass: 5*1050operations per second.

The estimates he provides appear sound and well-grounded.

It must be noted, however, that this analysis is irrelevant to the

simulation argument. As will be explained later, only capacities

of the base civilisation are significant. If we assume that we

might live in a computer simulation, only the capacities of the

parent civilisations are important, but there is no way to

determine them.

In the main section (The Core of the Simulation Argument),Bostrom suggests a formula for calculating the probability for a

random person to live in a simulation. He concludes that at least

one of the following propositions must be true[4]:

Share of civilisations that reach posthuman stage is close tozero.

Share of posthuman civilisations that are interested in runningancestor-simulations is close to zero.The majority of people live in one of the simulations.

There are a number of serious mathematical errors in this

section. In addition, Bostrom makes several unwarranted

assumptions about variables used in these formulas. A detailed

explanation of these errors will be provided in part 3 of this

paper.

In the next section (A Bland Indifference Principle), Bostrom

explains and justifies the logic behind his calculations and


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attempts to show that selecting a human from our world can be

considered random for the purposes of the simulation argument.

It is in this section that the major errors are made, including

using a false analogy in the example about DNA. Part 4 of this

paper deals with the reasoning errors in the simulation

argument, uncovering a fallacy of circular reasoning and other

mistakes. Additionally, in part 5 several reasons are given

against simulating a world similar to our own.

Finally in the last section (Interpretation), Bostrom gives various

explanations for the formulas derived in the main section. The

main mistake done there is ignoring the fundamental difference

of the simulations that they are primarily governed by thesimulators and only secondary by various laws designed for the

simulation. In part 6, the errors in the interpretation are

explained.

Necessary assumptions

The original paper introduced certain basic ideas about

substrate-independence and computation possibilities, but failedto mention necessary philosophical and world view assumptions

necessary for the simulation argument. Below, I try to provide

the most important hypotheses that should be true in order for

the simulation argument to be valid and logical.

1) There is a basic reality. Without it, the whole discussion

about realities and simulations would be pointless. We must also

note that assumption about reality existence is on a level similarto the question of whether our universe is real or just a

simulation.

2) It is possible to run a world simulation inside a reality. In

the original article this hypothesis was just taken for granted by

the author without even mentioning it. However we do not have

sufficient experience with simulations to be able to prove that a

simulation indistinguishable from the reality can be created atall. The best simulations to date are modern computer games


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and movies, but even the most advanced of them are only

partially realistic. Bostrom refers to the works of Drexler and

Kurzweil, but these authors mostly discuss the technical aspects

of reality simulations and not philosophical aspects of such

possibility.

3) There are no simulation cycles, where some sequence of

nested simulations ends up with the original reality or part

of it. If cycles were possible we would be left without real

criteria for defining the world a simulation. Moreover, in such a

case our conception of reality would be shattered strongly

enough to make the simulation argument irrelevant.

4) The complexity of the simulation is less than the

complexity of the parent universe. This follows from the

mathematical principles of information encoding. The

importance of this assumption is that it leads to objective

differences between simulation on different nesting levels and

between simulations and reality.

5) The laws of logic and mathematics are absolute. If it is notso, than it might be possible that the law of excluded third and

other laws of logic are false in our universe and simulation

argument (just like any other argument) is inherently invalid. It

must be noted that it is entirely possible to run a simulation

where logic does not work from a logical world.

6) There are a finite number of simulations. The simulation

argument relies heavily on calculations of probabilities andaverage values for all universes. If there are an infinite number

of simulations (or an infinite number of universes), such

calculations are no longer valid.

Additionally, the simulation argument implies several less

general assumptions about the metaverse.

1. The base reality contains at least one human civilisation.2. A human civilisation has non-zero probability of


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becoming a posthuman civilisation. (No distinction is

made in simulation argument between those civilisations

that can become posthuman and those that cannot.)

3. A posthuman civilisation has non-zero chances to launchat least one simulation.

III. Calculation errors in the original paper

In addition to the logical weaknesses, the formulas that are used

to calculate probability of living in a simulation have various

errors and shortcomings. Some of them are not very important

and do not affect the reasoning, while others are more serious.

Infinite universes

One minor error in the formulas concerns a possibility of

infinite number of civilisations. Frank Tipler [10] have shown

how infinite computational capacity can be possible near the

Omega Point, a hypothetical point prior to the Big Crunch

(collapse of the Universe). Other scientists [16] extended this

theory to the possibility of thermal death of the Universe

(another possible outcome the infinite expansion). If infinite

computational capacity is possible, all variables used in the main

formula (fP, and ) are invalid. This does not invalidate the

simulation argument, as the formula can easily be expanded to

cover the case of infinite number of simulations, but it might

affect some of the corollary arguments. A stronger objection is

the possibility of multiple universes in reality (not being

simulations) or multiple human civilisations in the base physical

universe. This leads to a wide range of possibilities, such as:

The posthuman stage will only start after most of the humancivilisations on different planets meet together (see below

the arguments about posthuman stage being in the far

future). This allows a larger number of real humans than in

the case of one real civilisation and the same number of

simulated realities.


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Depending on the nature of the multiple universes, thedifference between civilisations simulated in different

universes might be negligible (see below arguments about

identical people in simulations), while the difference

between real civilisations in different universes is large

enough. By considering several simulations to be just

instances of the same one we reduce the number of

simulated humans. Real humans, on the other hand, are

still different in different universes.

Another aspect of using average values that Bostrom ignores is

that different civilisations are in different positions. If additional

assumptions listed above are valid (especially the one about

decreasing complexity of nested simulations), then those

civilisations that are deeply simulated (simulated in a

simulation in a simulation etc.) are less likely to reach a

posthuman stage (and therefore run simulations themselves). In

this case, using an average value offP is misleading, because

there can be observable signs in the world indicating that the

civilisation is likely to be deeply simulated. We can speculate

that our ability to think about creating simulations is an

indicator that we are closer to reality (how close and whether weactually are in reality is, of course, uncertain). Thisisanargument

(althoughnotadecidingone) againstindifferenceprinciple.

Number of individuals

Special attention must be paid to calculating the number of

individuals with human experiences (). It is possible that even

though the raw number of simulated people is large, the numberof unique simulated people will be much smaller. There is also a

possibility that a significant fraction of simulated people is

fundamentally different from us by lacking self-consciousness.

Identical people

In his paper, Bostrom does not mention any reasons for running

an ancestor simulation, taking the desire to do it for granted.


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This lack of specific reasons given for running a simulation

means that currently no specific requirements for the

simulations are known. Thus it is entirely possible a posthuman

civilisation that will run many simulations will use identical

people for these simulations.

The possibility of having identical people in different

simulations raises a lot of questions. This is a serious

complication, because the issue of identity is far from simple

even in more basic cases. There can be strong arguments both

for regarding them as a single person and against it.

These people can have similar, indiscernible or even completelyidentical personalities. The same can be said about their

experiences. The simulation rules, governing accumulation and

propagation of changes in time can be designed for the

convenience of the people running the simulation. There is no

reason why in a simulation dedicated to the medieval Japan

people in the rest of the world and in other epochs must be

different from people in other simulations.

The consequences of this possibility for the simulation argument

are not obvious. It is not clear whether these people should be

regarded as individuals or simply as instances of one individual.

In the latter case the total number of simulated individuals ever

can be comparable with the number of real individuals in the

base reality. This in turn means thatfsim can attain a large value,

such as 0.5.

Non-conscious people

Another possibility that affects the simulation argument is

simulating non-conscious people. This can be done for ethical

reasons, because simulating a real world (supposedly similar to

our human history) necessarily causes harm and suffering for

simulated people. It can be argued that posthuman civilisations

will have a deep respect for conscious entities in any form andare unlikely to cause suffering to them unless absolutely


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necessary.

These non-conscious people may nevertheless be intelligent. Or

they may be controlled by the central simulation program and

have no individual intelligence whatsoever. Bostrom discussesthis possibility, saying The rest of humanity would then be

zombies or shadow-people humans simulated only at a

level sufficient for the fully simulated people not to notice

anything suspicious. He talks about this only in relation to the

me-simulations, where a small number of people are fully

simulated and the rest are shadow-people. He then goes on to

say that this option can be safely ignored because the number of

people in full ancestor-simulation is necessarily much bigger, aseach one probably includes billions of people.

Bostrom mentions only one possible reason for creation of

shadow-people that they might be cheaper to

simulate than real people. He completely ignores the ethical

aspect, which will undoubtedly be more important for the

posthuman civilisation than the material aspects. There exists a

real possibility that simulations with shadow-people may besufficient for all practical purposes and that posthuman

civilisation will not want to fully simulate real conscious people.

The main criteria for allowing the simulation will be the ability

of the simulated entity to have subjective experiences, including

ability to feel pain and suffering. If that is the case, then the fact

that we have conscious experiences proves that we most likely

do not live in a simulation.

Errors in the formula

First, it should be noted that most of the adjustments to the

formulas used in the original argument do not help to avoid

circular reasoning and other logical errors. Therefore, only most

important comments are given about the formulas in this paper.

Bostrom provides the following formula for calculating theshare of people living in a simulation:


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(1)

wherefP is the fraction of all human-level technological

civilisations that survive to reach a posthuman stage, is theaverage number of ancestor-simulations run by a posthuman

civilisation and is the average number of individuals that

have lived in a civilisation before it reaches a posthuman stage.

Bostrom claims thatfsim is the actual fraction of all observers

with human-type experiences that live in simulations [1], but

he is obviously mistaken. The formula, as it is written, makes

practically no sense. The numerator is equal to the averagenumber of people simulated by one civilisation and not to the

total number of simulated people (by all civilisations in the

metaverse). The denominator makes no mathematical sense but

it is similar to the average number of people living in a

civilisation and one level below (in simulations run in this

civilisation). Evidently, the value offP will usually be very close

to 1, because

and

CPH number of posthuman civilisations, Csim number of

simulations.

Therefore the value offsim, calculated using the formula (1), will

be in most cases extremely close to 0.5, which obviously

contradicts Bostroms conclusions.

The first necessary change is adding the total number of

civilisations Cto the formula:

(2)

The next problem is that the in the denominator of the formula

(1) is a wrong value for the number of individuals that have


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lived in a base civilisation before it reaches a posthuman stage.

This is a specific number that has nothing whatsoever in

common with the average value for all civilisations in the

metaverse. Therefore the next change is a replacement of with

the new variableHbase, the number of people that lived in the

base civilisation before it reached the posthuman stage:

(3)

A similar problem is that the number of simulations that the

base civilisation runs is probably different from the average as

well. An additional variableNbase should be added. Assumingthat the number of individuals in the first-level simulations is

similar to the average for the simulations, the following change

should be made:

(4)

This formula is more correct than the one suggested byBostrom.However, even with all these changes there is still one

fundamental problem with the formula. ThefP variable is

completely irrelevant for the base civilisation. As will be shown

later, the base civilisation is governed by different laws than the

simulated civilisations. Since the transition to the posthuman

stage by the base civilisation is a non-repeating event, whose

outcome is already determined (although it usually cannot be

obtained from within a simulation) and which directlycorresponds with the nature of the reality (existence of the

metaverse). With regards to the base civilisation, instead of

fPprobability a different variable have to be used that takes on

the values of 0 (base civilisation reaches the posthuman stage

and, ifNbase>0, the metaverse exists) and 1 (base civilisation does

not reach the posthuman stage, there is no metaverse and we live

in the real world).

Using the probability term


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In most of the paper, Bostrom uses the term probability, which

can be misleading for the reader. In my opinion, a better term

would be degree of certainty. It is more correct, because

Bostrom speaks not about repeating random events and finding

the outcome of the future test, but about deducing whether a

certain statement about already occurred event is true or not.

The degrees of certainty can also be calculated using probability

theory (if they conform to the Kolmogorov axioms), but the

transition from probabilities to degrees of certainty that Bostrom

makes when switching from calculating the probabilities in the

metaverse to applying the found values to our existence is, in

my opinion, not entirely correct.

It is also questionable to what extent the probabilities can be

calculated for the completely deterministic world, such as a

computer simulation that does not use any input from the real

world after it is launched.

Another problem with the use of the probability term is that it

implies that if the mathematical calculations are correct, then the

outcome is governed by these probabilities. Degree ofcertainty term, on the other hand, better shows that the final

answer is very much dependent on the additional information

that might be missing (as is the case with other philosophical

speculations about the nature of our world). By using

probability theory, it is not possible to get any fundamentally

new information that was not available before (one can only

modify the form in which this information is presented),

therefore the answer depends very much on the assumptionsabout the nature of the metaverse that we make (as will be

shown in the next section).

Possibility of nested simulations

Bostrom says: It may be possible for simulated civilisations to

become posthuman. They may then run their own ancestor-

simulations on powerful computers they build in their simulateduniverse. [1, p. 9]. Bostrom does not speak about this before,


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but his earlier calculations actually directly depend on this

assumption.

Bostrom claims: Therefore, if we dont think that we are

currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled tobelieve that we will have descendants who will run lots of such

simulations of their forebears. [1]. But if there are no nested

simulations than it is only possible to have simulations in the

base reality and we arrive at completely opposite conclusion. In

this case if we believe that our descendants (or ourselves) will

run simulations, we live in the real world.

It therefore makes sense to examine the probable reasons thatmay cause simulated civilisations to be unable to run their own

simulations or become posthuman. There are several such

reasons possible.

1. It might be too expensive to run a nested simulation(running nested simulations can increase the

computational cost of the first-level simulation very

quickly).2. It might be technically impossible due to the laws of

nature in the simulation.

3. The parent civilisation may unobtrusively prohibit runningthe nested simulation or even thinking about doing that.

Since the base reality civilisation will have complete

control over the simulation, it can easily do that. The base

reality civilisation may have no interest in having nested

simulations. Since the purposes of creating simulations areto a large extent selfish, if creation of nested simulations

does not serve these purposes, the base civilisation will

have an option to prohibit that.

In addition to the reasons against allowing nested simulations,

there are reasons against running simulations of the posthuman

civilisations in general. They will be examined later.

IV. Reasoning errors in the original paper


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The main mistakes in the Bostrom article are related to circular

reasoning, auto-reference, observational bias and causation

errors. To sum it in a few words, it is not correct to derive

anything from our experience if we live in a simulation.

Circular reasoning

If we do not live in a simulation, the whole logic of usingfI orfP

is invalid, becausefsim is precisely zero. We know that we do not

run any simulations and therefore whole argument is flawed.

This is a common logical fallacy, known as a circular

reasoning[5]. It was used, for example, by Rene Descartes to

construct an argument that God exists, known as the CartesianCircle [3].

One may object to this by saying that even if we do not run any

simulations today, there might be simulations run in the future

and they must be accounted for. Clearly such argument is

without merit. Taking into account future simulation not only

makes no sense (if we assume that we live in a real world, the

simulation argument is useless), but also violates severalimportant philosophical and physical principles. First, it violates

the causality rules by allowing future events to affect our present

world. Second, it ignores the fact that uncertainty principle in

the quantum mechanics makes future effectively non-

deterministic and it is impossible, neither practically, nor in

theory to predict what simulations will be run by us in the

future.

We can conclude that all probabilities used (explicitly or

implicitly) in the simulation argument, including the probability

of our own particular experiences being implemented in vivo

rather than in machina [1], depend on the qualities of the base

civilisation and thus on whether we are the base civilisation or

not.

Observational bias


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In trying to guess the nature of the metaverse there is significant

inherent observational bias that must be accounted for. The

problem of the simulation argument is that many assumptions

are made about the metaverse and all simulations based on our

present experience and the qualities of our civilisation.

There is no way to predict with confidence what kind of

ancestor simulations we will create in our posthuman future. It

might be possible that the transition to posthumanity will only

happen in hundreds of thousands of years and most of the

simulations will cover 1000th century and beyond. It is entirely

possible that if extraterrestrials land on Earth and give us

everything necessary to become a posthuman civilisation, wewill all change ourselves to become alien posthumans (because

the knowledge and technologies are alien, not human). We will

then have no reason to create ancestor simulations that look like

our 20th or 21st century, instead we will create simulations of

alien ancestors. There are countless other possibilities.

It is even less possible to predict the nature of the base

civilisation if we are not it. We have as much chances doing itcorrectly as a monster from Quake correctly guessing what kind

of world Quake was programmed in.

Bostrom indirectly assumes the existence of the metaverse and

then draws his conclusions about the probabilities, but the main

premise of metaverse existence is not proven. The main problem

of the simulation argument is that to know whether we live in a

simulation or not is important in order to define the rules of themetaverse. This in turn is used to calculate the probabilities of

living in a simulation. But if the argument bases the conditions

of the experiment on its outcome, it cannot be valid.

If we live in a simulation, then we do not define the rules of the

metaverse. Then any arguments such as there are certainly

many humans who would like to run ancestor-simulations if

they could afford to do so [1] are flawed. The moral, the lawsof nature, the concepts of consciousness, everything is defined


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by the original civilisation. And if we are not it, there is no way

we can be sure about anything in the metaverse.

The effects of observational bias are not discussed in the

original paper. Bostrom completely ignores the impossibility ofdeducing the nature of the metaverse from within a simulation.

Unscientific approach

In addition to the logical mistakes described above, there can be

some confusion about what the simulation argument actually

proves. As was shown above, it necessarily makes the

assumption of metaverse existence. Therefore we can say thatthe simulation argument helps to determine where (in a

simulation or in a real world) a random person is, given that his

world is a part of the metaverse. The simulation argument

cannot be used to tell whether the metaverse exists and therefore

does not provide even the slightest hint as to whether we live in

a simulation or not.

Even if our civilisation is likely to get capacity and desire to runsimulations in the future, it says absolutely nothing about our

own origin. To put this into perspective, there are many

alternative hypotheses about the origins of our world: creation

by one of many gods, the Big Bang, living in a simulation, etc.,

and simulation argument does not help to make a choice

between them.

While there is evidence to support some of these hypotheses(most notably, the Big Bang), there is no evidence to support or

refute the simulation hypothesis. The only evidence available to

us at this time the subjective experience of our existence in

this world is predicted equally well by the hypothesis that we

live in a simulation, as it is by the hypothesis that we live in a

real world. Philosophy or science in general do not allow

unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the world. We can

only judge the validity of these hypotheses by accumulatingadditional evidence, not by using preconceived ideas about the


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world.

There may be some possible ways to determine the nature of the

metaverse or to test whether we are in a simulation or not from

within a simulation. But it is also possible that such informationcan only be introduced to our world externally (or cannot at all

if we are living in a real world). This is closely related to the

idea of auto-reference or the ability to independently and clearly

perceive yourself. A detailed explanation of the issues related to

auto-reference can be found in Gdel, Escher, Bach. The Eternal

Golden Braid by Douglas Hofstadter [5].

Another important implication of the scientific approach is thatuntestable hypotheses should be ignored. S. Novella [13] asks

What can a scientific sceptic say about such claims? Only that

they are outside the realm of science, and that science can have

only an agnostic view towards untestable hypotheses. For this

reason whether we live in a simulation or not should be a matter

of personal belief, not scientific enquiry, unless additional

evidence is uncovered.

V. Arguments against the simulation hypothesis

In addition to uncovering logical errors with the simulation

argument, it makes sense to point out several factors that can

affect whether we live in a simulation or not. They all have in

common an assumption that our civilisation might have some

special qualities that are unlikely to be present in a simulated

civilisation.

There are no reasons to be sure that the suggestions listed below

are correct. Still, they are interesting, because they do not

depend on the characteristics of our reality and are determined

purely by universal qualities of a posthuman civilisation capable

of running simulations.

It is possible that our time is usually not particularly interestingto simulate. There can be various reasons:


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globalised world is less interesting than national and localsocieties

the 20th-21st century technological society is still tooprimitive to be worth simulating

simulating large populations have no real benefits as opposedto smaller ones

multi-cultural civilisations are too random and simulatingthem has no practical purpose.

If any one of these reasons is valid, the fact that we live in early

21st century means that our world most likely is a real one.

Another very likely possibility is that posthumans do not run

simulations with conscious individuals for moral reasons (asdiscussed earlier), instead replacing them with intelligent, but

non-conscious entities. In this case the fact that we are

conscious (apparently we do have subjective experiences)

proves that we are not in a simulation. As was said earlier,

Bostrom only discusses the possibility of shadow-people

being used in me-simulations, but he ignores that they may be

most practical for the ancestor-simulations as well.

It is interesting to mention the Self-Interest Consideration,

proposed by Barry Dainton. He makes a ridiculous suggestion

that civilisation may decide not to create simulations as if this

can have any effect on the nature of their own world, but he

ignores a very real possibility of certain motivation that would

prevent any posthuman civilisations from creating simulations

with conscious people.

There is a possibility that simulations of posthuman civilisations

(or posthuman individuals) are not interesting. The posthumans

are unlikely to be significantly influenced by the society and

may not have a society at all. That would remove one of the

main points of simulating a civilisation observation and

analysis of group dynamics. Many posthumans in the real world

might live in personal simulations and simulated posthumans

are unlikely to be significantly different. Posthumans will alsobe capable of travelling between metaverse levels, moving from


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a simulation to a parent world and vice versa.

This possibility significantly reduces the total number of

simulated people by eliminating nested simulations (as shown

earlier). Additional ethical and other considerations can lead to aban on simulating civilisations capable of reaching

posthumanity (because those running a simulation would have

to actively interfere or terminate such simulation). In this the

case the fact that we can think about becoming posthumans and

are certainly moving in this direction is an indicator that we do

not live in a simulation.

Posthuman stage in the far future

Bostrom says [the] simulation argument works equally well for

those who think that it will take hundreds of thousands of years

to reach a posthuman stage of civilisation. But this is not the

case. The development of posthuman civilisation in the base

reality may take much longer than in a simulation, for example

because all simulations have accelerated scientific and

technological development for convenience of the observers. Ifthat is the case, theHBASE value (the number of people who lived

in the base civilisation before it reached the posthuman stage)

can be much greater than . That would forcefsim, to be much

lower, making the probability of living in a real world much

higher.

VI. Errors: Interpretation of Simulation Argument

Laws governing the simulations

In his article Bostrom almost always ignores the distinctive

feature of a simulation. It can be expected that in most cases

those running the simulation will have a complete control over

it. This means that any historical patterns, ethical considerations

and even laws of nature in a simulation are of secondary

importance. The events in the simulation will always primarily


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depend on the will of the observers, who are running the

simulation.

However, Bostrom ignores this and often incorrectly states that

the simulation will be governed by some specific laws. Forexample, he says that in order forfI (the share of posthuman

civilisations interested in running simulations) to be very small

there must be a strong convergence among the courses of

advanced civilisations [1]. Then Bostrom describes two

possibilities that posthuman civilisations will not run

simulations for ethical reasons or that they will simply lose the

desire to do it but he says nothing about the possibility of

parent civilisation prohibiting its simulations from runningnested simulations.

It will be very easy for a posthuman civilisation to control all

first-level simulations and prohibit them from running any

additional simulations. It might also be possible that all

computers in simulations will not be simulated but (for

efficiency, security or for some other reasons) the software will

run directly on computers of the parent civilisation. This meansthat nested simulations can be run, but they will not contain any

real (conscious or real by any other definition) people. At the

same time, the individuals from a first-level simulation will

have an impression of actually running a simulation.

Extinction

Bostrom makes a similar mistake while speaking aboutextinction of a simulated civilisation as a natural event. If there

are simulated civilisations then the majority of them will

probably not go extinct in a natural way, but will be terminated

by the simulators. The mechanisms for these two kinds of events

are obviously different, since simulators are not limited to

terminating civilisations in natural ways. There are many

possible alternatives. For example, simulated civilisations can

be slowed down (or even paused with saving the simulationstate) by simulators when these civilisations approach the


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posthuman stage. It must be noted that being paused (with the

possibility of being launched again) is probably better than

going extinct.

The best alternative option is the one where upon thetermination of the simulation all humans will be transferred

from there to the parent universe. A less pleasant alternative is

an artificial termination. The simulation can just be stopped and

erased, regardless of the situation in the simulated world and

without apparent reason (from the point of view of simulated

humans, though they probably will not even notice the

termination). The simulated world can also be destroyed in any

way conceived by the simulators before the simulation itself willbe stopped. This can be perceived by the simulated humans as

apocalypse, Armageddon, Judgement Day or Ragnarok. But

again, these events will be caused not by the processes in the

simulation, but by outside forces.

Rewards, Punishments and Afterlife

In his article, in a nave attempt to draw some loose analogieswith religious conceptions of the world [1, . 10],

Bostromsuggests possible mechanisms for several religious

concepts.Based on the moral absolutism he proposes a

metaverse where parent civilisations impose rewards and

punishments on the simulated human beings and even provide

afterlife to them based on their behaviour in the simulated

world.

As was discussed earlier, we have no reasons to make any

assumptions about the base civilisation if we are not one. Any

ideas about morals of the parent civilisations are by their nature

extremely speculative. In addition, the reasons for the existence

of the simulation can vary greatly. A simple illustration is the

difference between acceptable (as defined by simulators)

behaviour for Quake monsters and sims in the Sims game.

But there are even stronger objections against these pseudo-


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religious ideas.

1. It is extremely irrational and plain silly to reward or punishyour own creations (especially if they are essentially

computer programs). The possible exception areexperiments with artificial selection or training, but that

has nothing to do with ethics and morals and criteria can

be totally arbitrary.

2. The idea of afterlife is somewhat logical, as explainedabove in the, but there are no reasons to believe that there

will be any sort of reward or punishment. The posthuman

beings capable of running a simulation are very unlikely to

have an irrational and barbarous mentality necessary forthat.

VII.Conclusion

Bostroms formula for calculating the probability of living in a

simulation contains serious mathematical errors. The probability

theory is used in the original paper incorrectly and without

taking the philosophical aspects of the problem into

consideration. The arguments based on the mathematical

calculations have additional logical errors, such as circular

reasoning, and ignore the observational bias.

Based on the analysis done in this paper, we can infer that the

simulation argument is incorrect. It seems to be impossible to

avoid the logical errors made by Bostrom. In addition, there are

some reasons to concede that certain qualities of ourcivilisations point to our existence in reality.

It can be concluded that the reality of our world remains the

question of personal beliefs. At the same time, the reality of our

world does not impose additional limitations on the prospects of

the technological progress, the possibility of reaching the

posthuman stage and running simulations.


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VIII. References

1. Are You Living In a Computer Simulation? Nick Bostrom.

Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255.http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

2. Abre los ojos (Open Your Eyes). Alejandro Amenbar,

1997http://www.imdb.com/Title?0125659

3. The Cartesian Circle. Philosophy

Circlehttp://www.philosophycircle.com/features/features39.html

4. Dark City. Alex Proyas,1998http://www.imdb.com/Title?0118929

5. Gdel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. Douglas R.

Hofstadter. BasicBooks, 1979

6. Innocence Lost: Simulation Scenarios: Prospects and

Consequences. Barry Dainton, 2002,

Draft.http://www.simulation-argument.com/dainton.pdf

7. How to Live in a Simulation. Robin Hanson, 2001, Journal

of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 7.

http://www.transhumanist.com/volume7/simulation.html

8. The Matrix. Andy Wachowski, Larry Wachowski,

1999http://www.imdb.com/Title?0133093http://www.whatisthe

matrix.com

9. Philosophy & The Matrix. John Partridge, Christopher

Grau, Colin McGinn, Kevin Warwick et

al. http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/rl_cmp/phi.html

10. The Physics of Immortality. Frank Tipler. Doubleday,

1994Summary of the Omega Point theory:

http://www.math.tulane.edu/~tipler/summary.html


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11. Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of

Consciousness. Roger Penrose, Oxford University Press, 1994.

12. The Simulation Argumenthttp://www.simulation-

argument.com/

13. Skepticism and Religion Revisited. Steven Novella. The

New England Journal of Skepticism Vol. 1 Issue 3 (Summer

98) http://www.theness.com/articles/skepticismreligionrevisited-

nejs0103.html

14. The Thirteenth Floor. Josef Rusnak, Daniel F. Galouye

(novel), 1999 http://www.imdb.com/Title?0139809

15. Vanilla Sky, Cameron Crowe, Alejandro Amenbar,

2001http://www.imdb.com/Title?0259711

16. Source unknown. An announcement by a group of British

scientists in 2001.

[1] Nick Bostrom a researcher in the field of philosophy of

science, ethics of technology and science, transhumanism. From

2000 to 2002 a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy of Yale

University (USA), from 2003 a Research Fellow in Oxford

University (United Kingdom). Author of 16 articles on topics ofanthropic principle, technological development, artificial

intelligence and simulation argument. Author of the book

Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects. 2002. Routledge,

New York.

Personal site: www.nickbostrom.com

[2] On 15 May 2003 Matrix: Reloaded, the second part of the

trilogy, was released. Third part, Matrix: The Revolutions, is


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scheduled for November 2003. The actual simulation, the

MMORPG (massively multiplayer online role-playing game)

The Matrix Online, will be released in 2004.

[3] Player in GTA (Grand Theft Auto) game series usuallydrives or runs around the city, causing mayhem and destruction

to the inhabitants of the city, killing pedestrians and shooting

policemen (www.grandtheftauto.com).

[4] This is an approximate interpretation of mathematical

formulas derived in this section of the original paper. Because of

the logical and mathematical errors made in the derivation, the

formulas are incorrect, thus making a strict interpretationimpossible. Bostrom gives his detailed interpretation of these

formulas in the corresponding section (Interpretation).

[5] An argument that uses circular reasoning (also known as

begging the question) makes a conclusion based on material

that has already been assumed in the argument.

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Are We Living In Nick Bostrom’s Speculation