Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing? The Dimensions

Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing?

The Dimensions, Drivers, and Risks of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in

China

ForthcomingintheJournalofStrategicStudies

David C. Logan

Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, NJ, USA

Abstract:

Experts increasingly highlight the dangers of nuclear-conventional entanglement, particularly in the U.S.-China context. This article develops a framework for assessing entanglement and its risks. Applying that framework to China, it finds that Beijing’s missiles are not as entangled as is sometimes feared, but ongoing trends may increase future entanglement. It also presents evidence that, counter to the prevailing wisdom, Chinese entanglement has not emerged as a strategic policy choice but, rather, as the byproduct of more parochial organizational dynamics. Strategic signaling and perception management will be key to controlling escalation risks stemming from nuclear-conventional entanglement in China.

Keywords:

US-China relations, nuclear strategy, escalation risks, deterrence theory, crisis management

EntanglementinChina’sNuclearForces D.Logan

2

Scholars have long observed that conventional conflicts run the risk of inadvertent nuclear use. While analysts have long explored the bargaining,1 psychological,2 organizational,3 and political drivers of such risks, they have recently highlighted an additional source of potentially dangerous inadvertent escalation4 risks: nuclear-conventional entanglement.5

Entanglement refers to a range of circumstances in which the operations of nuclear forces may overlap with those of conventional forces.6 Entanglement may occur when both conventional and nuclear systems are located in the same geographic area, when they are controlled by the same institutions and systems, when they are subject to similar employment practices, or when they rely on similar delivery systems. For example, when the U.S. proposed developing a long-range conventional strike capability by placing conventional warheads atop its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), many experts raised the possibility that an adversary might misidentify these missiles as their nuclear-armed counterparts.7 During the Cold War, NATO stationed nuclear forces along the Central Front to deter Soviet military invasion in part by introducing risks that such an invasion would escalate to the strategic nuclear level.

American observers have increasingly warned that China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces may be dangerously entangled. 8 However, much remains unknown about the

1 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). 2 Philip E. Tetlock, Charles B. McGuire, and Gregory Mitchell, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence,’ Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1991), 239-276. 3 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin, 2013). 4 Throughout the analysis, I define ‘escalation’ as meaning the first use of a nuclear weapon. 5 See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 35/ 4 (August 2012), 447-487; and Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, James M. Acton, (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017); Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,’ International Security 41/4 (Spring 2017), 50-92. 6 In this respect, I adopt a somewhat narrower definition of entanglement than other scholars who sometimes define the term to also include the possibility of using conventional forces to execute a disarming first strike against an adversary’s nuclear deterrent. See, for example, Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, James M. Acton, (ed.), 1; and James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War,’ International Security 43/1 (Summer 2018), 56-99. 7 For some discussion, see Amy F. Woolf, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,’ Congressional Research Service, 24 February 2016; and U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, 2008). 8 Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’; Joshua Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696-730; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,’ International Security 40/2 (Fall 2015), 40-45; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5 (September/October 2012), 60-62; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’; and Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report (Monterey, Calif.: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2013), 10; and Saalman,


3

structure and operations of these forces. This article seeks to further understanding of potential escalation dynamics in a U.S.-China conflict by developing a framework of escalation risks from nuclear-conventional entanglement and using that framework to assess China’s ground-based missile forces. In short, the analysis suggests that China’s land-based missile forces are not as entangled as many analysts have feared but that ongoing trends will likely alter the nature and degree of entanglement, potentially exacerbating future escalation risks.

The analysis offers theoretical contributions to the literature on nuclear crisis dynamics and empirical contributions to the understanding of China’s missile forces. Theoretically, it contributes to understandings of crisis escalation dynamics and how nuclear-conventional entanglement can influence those dynamics.9 First, it disaggregates the concept of entanglement into geographic, operational, and technological dimensions and provides a framework for conceptualizing and measuring degrees of entanglement across each of these dimensions. It also builds on previous work to better identify the paths by which entanglement can potentially escalate a conventional conflict to the nuclear level. Second, it specifies important perceptual variables affecting escalation risks stemming from entanglement by showing how both pre-crisis perceptions of entanglement and intra-crisis signaling can affect escalation dynamics. Much attention to entanglement has focused on its military-technical elements, though perceptual dynamics are just as important.10

Empirically, it sheds new light on China’s ground-based missile forces and potential entanglement within them. First, using extensive Chinese-language primary sources, it highlights new information about the structure and operations of China’s missile forces, particularly since the 2015-2016 Chinese military reforms. Earlier analyses of entanglement in China’s nuclear forces were conducted prior to the military reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), reforms which created the PLA Rocket Force and reorganized China’s missile forces.11 The new data presented here builds on and confirms previous findings, but also highlights new variables affecting entanglement risks in China including overlapping command and control and the operational and technical characteristics of missile systems which can either facilitate or hamper target discrimination. Second, and contrary to past work, it argues that entanglement in China’s missile forces emerged as the product of more bureaucratic dynamics and not a deliberate manipulation of risk. Evidence that Chinese entanglement was not a deliberate strategic choice suggests that Beijing is likely less well prepared for entanglement’s risks and may be more likely to adopt worst-case scenario judgments in a crisis or conflict. Conversely, the belief held by many American analysts that entanglement was a deliberate effort to deter through risk implies that China is prepared for entanglement’s risks—indeed, that it has made them central to a deterrent strategy—and may encourage the United States to take riskier actions. The growing strategic

Lora, ‘China: Lines Blur Between Nuclear and Conventional Warfighting,’ The Interpreter, 19 December 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/19/China-Lines-blur-between-nuclear-and-conventional-warfighting.aspx. 9 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 199-200. 10 Here, I borrow the terminology of Talmadge, who also highlights the importance of ‘perceptual variables.’ See Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ 11 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China's Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,’ Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter, July 2016), 68-75; and David C. Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,’ Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 83 (October 2016), 57-62.


4

competition between the U.S. and China, along with the increasing ‘securitization’ of the relationship, threaten to exacerbate these important perceptual dynamics.

Throughout, I rely on recent primary source Chinese-language materials, including military and popular media reporting, academic publications, and doctrinal and curricular materials published by the PLA, including The Science of Military Strategy published by the Academy of Military Science, The Science of Military Strategy published by the National Defense University, The Science of Campaigns published by the National Defense University, and The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.

The article begins by describing models for assessing entanglement and the risks that entanglement generates. Next, it uses this framework to examine the escalatory risks presented by Chinese entanglement. It then assesses the drivers of Chinese entanglement and presents evidence that Chinese entanglement is not a strategic choice but, rather, the result of more parochial political and organizational dynamics. Finally, it proposes measures to alleviate entanglement risks and closes with a general discussion of the drivers of entanglement in contexts other than the U.S.-China relationship.

Framework for Assessing the Risks of Entanglement

Thomas Schelling’s concepts of the threat that leaves something to chance and the manipulation of risk provide a useful starting point for understanding the intermingling of conventional and nuclear forces.12 By deliberately creating a situation in which the implicit bounds of a crisis or a limited conflict can spiral out of control, a state may compel its adversary to stand down. Schelling’s original formulation predicted that, in a conflict at lower levels of violence, the militarily inferior party would be more inclined to increase autonomous risk: ‘The less likely it is that the enemy’s aggressive advances can be contained by limited and local resistance, the more reason there may be to fall back upon the deliberate creation of mutual risk.’13 He specifically identified the introduction of nuclear weapons as a development which would enhance the shared risks in a limited war.14 Although for Schelling the ‘introduction’ of nuclear weapons meant their use in a conflict, the geographic, operational, or technological intermingling of conventional and nuclear weapons can generate similar risks of nuclear use.

Schelling’s manipulation of risk is a strategic choice available to states, but one they need not make. States may refrain from manipulating risks for a variety of reasons. The state’s leadership may be too risk-averse. The conflict may involve peripheral interests for which any increase in the risk of general or nuclear war could not be justified. The state may enjoy superiority at all levels of violence and not feel the need to further bolster deterrence against the adversary.

Following Schelling, Posen described a model of inadvertent escalation in which otherwise conventional conflicts can be pushed to the nuclear level despite the shared desire of states to avoid

12 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187-203; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 92-125. 13 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 193. 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 109-116.


5

a nuclear exchange. Posen identifies three drivers of this inadvertent escalation: the security dilemma operating in the midst of a conflict, the institutional dynamics of military organizations, and the frictions created by the fog of war.15 According to Posen’s model, the dynamics of the security dilemma prompt states in a crisis to adopt seemingly defensive or precautionary steps which are misconstrued by the adversary as offensive moves.16 At the same time, the desire of military institutions to seize the initiative, achieve a measure of ‘certainty’ in warplanning, and evade civilian control leads them to emphasize offensive postures and actions.17 Finally, the fog of war increases the likelihood of misperceptions, misunderstandings, and injudicious decisions.18 Together, these factors can push an otherwise conventional conflict toward the nuclear threshold despite the desired restraint of civilian leadership.

This article builds on this earlier work. Posen, for instance, provides important insights about the role of the fog of war, organizational proclivities, and operational dynamics in creating inadvertent escalation risks, including from the overlap of conventional and nuclear forces, but his analysis was applied in a Cold War context. To better understand analogous risks with respect to contemporary China, I build on that framework by disaggregating the dimensions of nuclear-conventional entanglement and specifying how entanglement between a state’s conventional and its nuclear forces increases the likelihood of nuclear use in a conventional crisis or conflict.

The framework beings by specifying three of what Talmadge calls ‘military-technical’ dimensions along which to evaluate the extent of entanglement between a country’s nuclear and conventional forces: geographic entanglement, operational entanglement, and technological entanglement. In doing so, it identifies factors by which entanglement can contribute to both Schelling’s intentional and Posen’s unintentional escalation risks. 19 Next, it identifies the escalation pathways generated by entanglement: heightened vulnerability, target ambiguity, and warhead ambiguity. Finally, in addition to the military-technical factors, the framework specifies two perceptual factors which can either increase or reduce the escalatory risks of entanglement: the pre-crisis perceptions of entanglement; and intra-crisis signaling.

Military-Technical Factors: The Geographic, Operational, and Technological Dimensions of Entanglement

Entanglement of a state’s conventional and nuclear forces can occur across three dimensions: geographic, operational, and technological. These dimensions are summarized in Figure 1 (below). Geographic entanglement occurs when a state positions its conventional and

15 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 12-23. 16 Ibid., 13-14. For Jervis’s original formulation, see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics 30/2 (January 1978), 167-214. 17 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 16-19. For explanations of the offensive orientation of military institutions, see Jack Snyder, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,’ International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984), 118-122. 18 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 19-23. 19 Both Schelling and Posen discuss forms of autonomous risk which could encourage nuclear use though, for Schelling, that risk is deliberately introduced by one party and, for Posen, the risk emerges inadvertently through a combination of organizational proclivities and perceptual factors.


6

nuclear forces within the same geographic spaces. This can be done in peacetime with conventional and nuclear forces garrisoned together or during a crisis or conflict, with conventional and nuclear forces operating in the same areas. The Cold War saw frequent geographic entanglement by the superpowers. U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe were often co-located with conventional forces precisely to raise the specter of nuclear escalation. Similarly, Posen warned how Soviet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Barents and Norwegian Seas might be mistaken for Soviet attack submarines (SSNs) and targeted by NATO naval forces.20 In general, the closer the nuclear and conventional weapons, the higher the geographic entanglement.

Figure 1: Military-Technical Factors of Entanglement

Conventional and nuclear forces can also be operationally entangled. Operational entanglement occurs when conventional and nuclear forces are operated by or rely on the same military institutions or practices. Conventional and nuclear forces may be operated by the same personnel, subordinated to overlapping command and control structures, employed under the same operational doctrine, share the same supporting maintenance and logistics infrastructure, or possess similar targets and mission sets. For example, Acton has warned how technological and doctrinal developments may have increased operational entanglement between U.S. conventional and nuclear systems today.21

Finally, conventional and nuclear forces can exhibit technological entanglement, which occurs when the delivery systems of conventional and nuclear forces are identical or indistinguishable. Dual-capable weapons systems increase a state’s degree of technological entanglement, as do conventional and nuclear variants of weapon systems that exhibit the same detection signatures to adversary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. These detection signatures may vary in at least two ways. First, conventional and nuclear systems may

20 Barry R. Posen, ‘Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank,’ International Security 7/2 (Fall 1982), 28-54. 21 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement.’

Geographic Entanglement

Operational Entanglement

Technological Entanglement

Military-Technical Factors


7

possess functionally-related observable differences (FRODs). 22 For example, the SALT II agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States included provisions for FRODs on certain bombers, cruise missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Variants of the Soviet Bear aircraft which could be used for bombing featured bomb-bay doors which distinguished them from similar Bear aircraft used only for reconnaissance. Second, even if the weapons systems themselves are indistinguishable, operational practices may distinguish between conventional and nuclear variants. For example, nuclear variants may be accompanied by additional support elements, including those for security or warhead handling, which would not accompany conventional variants.23 A greater ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear systems decreases escalation risks, while an inability to distinguish systems increases the risks. Today, both Russia and the United States create some technological entanglement by deploying dual-capable bombers, which can be armed with either conventional or nuclear weapons.24 The now-defunct U.S. Conventional Trident Modification proposal would have increased technological entanglement, as would the planned new nuclear-capable U.S. cruise missile.25 Table 1 (below) describes the geographic, operational, and technological dimensions of entanglement, along with representative indicators and empirical examples for each dimension.

22 The term ‘functionally-related observable differences’ is typically used in the context of arms control agreements to refer to those characteristics which clearly distinguish weapons systems limited by an agreement from similar ones not limited by the agreement or subject to different limitations. 23 Here, the line between operational and technological entanglement may blur, depending on the technical necessity of certain operational practices and support elements. If operational practices and support elements are inextricably tied to the system’s armament (either nuclear or conventional) they may best be thought of as technological entanglement. However, if the presence of certain operational practices or support elements is not necessary, but rather a choice, they may be thought of as a form of operational entanglement. I thank Fiona S. Cunningham for this observation. 24 James M. Acton, Tong Zhao, and Li Bin, ‘Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 September 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236. 25 On Conventional Trident Modification, see Woolf, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles.’ For concerns about the potential risks stemming from the new cruise missile, see William J. Perry and Andy Weber, ‘Mr. President, Kill the New Cruise Missile,’ The Washington Post, 15 October 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruise-missile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html?utm_term=.7b826f39569a.


8

Table 1: Three-Dimensional Framework for Assessing Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement

Geographic Entanglement Operational Entanglement Technological Entanglement

Description

—Conventional and nuclear

forces deployed or operating in the same geographic locations

—Conventional and nuclear

forces are operated under the same military institutions or practices

—Weapons or delivery systems of

conventional and nuclear forces are identical or indistinguishable from one another

Indicators

—Shared garrisons —Overlapping operating areas —Shared strategic choke points

—Units equipped w/ both nuclear and conventional weapons

—Overlapping command and control systems

—Shared or rotating personnel

—Dual-capable delivery systems —Indistinguishable detection

signatures

Example

—Soviet SSBNs and SSNs operating in Northern Europe

—Increasing U.S. reliance on dual-use command-and-control assets

—Former U.S. proposal for conventional trident modification

Along each of these dimensions, entanglement is not a binary state but a matter of degree. A hypothetical condition of total entanglement would be one in which each weapon and delivery system within a state’s arsenal has conventional and nuclear variants, both variants are operated across all units within the military, and the employment practices for both variants are identical. A hypothetical condition of total disentanglement might be one in which a state has no dual-capable weapon or delivery systems and in which nuclear and conventional systems are clearly distinguishable, operated by different organizations in separated areas, and subject to completely different employment practices.26

History provides examples of nuclear arsenals that exhibited both low and high degrees of entanglement. The early Chinese nuclear arsenal, especially prior to the introduction of conventional missiles in the 1990s, had a relatively low degree of entanglement. China’s nuclear forces were organizationally segregated in the Second Artillery and largely geographically sequestered in the center of the country.27 Its nuclear warheads were mounted on hulking liquid-fueled ICBMs, weapons systems with no conventional counterpart.28 By contrast, the United States

26 A state which does not deploy nuclear weapons might also be said to exhibit a condition of total disentanglement. 27 China also possessed putative air- and sea-based nuclear forces with its H-6 bombers and its single Xia-class SSBN, though neither of these ever truly matured. 28 The extent to which earlier nuclear and conventional forces may have shared command and control arrangements is unknown. A set of regulations issued in 1967 by the Central Military Commission that placed the newly established Second Artillery directly under its command, as opposed to the forces of the other military services, which were instead commanded through the Military Regions. However, the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution delayed the implementation of these regulations so that the Second Artillery was not seen as enjoying the ability to launch nuclear weapons independent of other components until 1984. For discussion and sources, see Fiona


9

during the Cold War had a relatively high degree of entanglement. Nuclear weapons were not operated by a dedicated force but, rather, spread across all the services. The United States deployed nuclear artillery, landmines, torpedoes, and depth charges, and entrusted them to military units also assigned traditionally conventional roles. Dual-capable aircraft (DCA) such as the B-52 and the F-111 could be armed with either conventional or nuclear payloads. Most nuclear-armed states today, however, exist somewhere in between these two extremes.

Entanglement in one dimension may also affect entanglement in another dimension. For instance, a state which develops and deploys a significant force of dual-capable missile systems (technological entanglement) may also be inclined to exploit economies of scale and organizational synergies by subordinating those missile systems to the same military units and supporting infrastructure and by assigning similarly trained personnel to operate them (operational entanglement). To the extent that systems rely on the same personnel and supporting infrastructure, they also may be more likely to be garrisoned or deployed together (geographic entanglement).

Mapping the Slippery Slope—Specifying the Escalation Risks of Entanglement

Having introduced a framework for assessing entanglement across three dimensions, I now discuss the mechanisms by which this entanglement can escalate a conventional conflict to the nuclear level. Entanglement between a state’s conventional and nuclear forces can encourage nuclear use through three mechanisms: heightened vulnerability, target ambiguity, and warhead ambiguity.29 This section describes these three mechanisms and the risks of nuclear use they generate.

First, nuclear-conventional entanglement can lead to the heightened vulnerability of the entangled nuclear forces. To the extent that conventional and nuclear platforms are indistinguishable, share the same supporting infrastructure, or deploy to and operate in the same locations, attempts to attack that state’s conventional capabilities might also erode its nuclear capabilities. If significant enough, these strikes could pose a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ dilemma and create incentives to launch. Even when short of eliminating the entangled state’s 30 second-strike capability, heightened vulnerability could increase the entangled state’s concerns about the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. This pathway approximates some of Posen’s discussion of

Cunningham, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China,’ NAPSNet Special Reports, 18 July 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. 29 Here, I borrow from the terminology of experts exploring similar risks in the U.S.’s conventional prompt global strike program. See M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?’ INSS Strategic Forum, No. 263 (February 2011); and James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013). 30 The ‘entangled state’ refers to the state which has entangled its nuclear and conventional weapons systems while the ‘adversary’ refers to the other state in a crisis or conflict. In the U.S.-China context, the entangled state refers to China while the adversary refers to the United States. At times, I also use ‘target state’ to refer to the entangled state.


10

inadvertent escalation risks during the Cold War when NATO military operations against Soviet conventional forces risked inadvertently degrading Soviet nuclear capabilities.31

Second, entanglement can create escalatory pressures due to target ambiguity. Target ambiguity refers to a misperception of intentions.32 An entangled state may be unable to determine whether an adversary’s strikes are aimed at its conventional or its nuclear assets. This is particularly true for shared infrastructure and supporting components. If a state believes its adversary might be targeting its nuclear capabilities, this can increase pressures to alert forces in order to increase their survivability or to use them before they are lost. Problems of target ambiguity can be exacerbated by heightened vulnerability, increasing a state’s anxieties about the adversary’s intentions and lowering its tolerance for further degradation of its nuclear forces.

Finally, entanglement can lead to warhead ambiguity, when it is unclear whether an incoming missile is armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead, potentially causing a conventional strike to be misinterpreted as a nuclear one.33 This pathway results not from the perceptions and actions of the entangled state but, rather, from those of its adversary. This is especially true for dual-use delivery systems.34 If one side in a conflict misperceives a conventional strike—or preparations for one—as nuclear, this may provide incentives to target the adversary’s remaining nuclear arsenal in an attempt at damage limitation or to utilize one’s own nuclear arsenal in the mistaken belief that the nuclear threshold has already been crossed. In the later empirical section assessing entanglement in China, I focus on the pressures stemming from heightened vulnerability and target ambiguity as these pressures would be experienced by China, while the United States would experience pressures stemming from warhead ambiguity. Figure 2 (below) illustrates the relationship between entanglement and these escalatory pressures.

31 Posen, Inadvertent Escalation. 32 This pathway is analogous to what Bunn and Manzo describe as ‘destination ambiguity’ risks in which ‘a state correctly or incorrectly concludes that the United States is attacking it with a CPGS weapon but does not know whether the strike is directed against its nuclear forces, conventional forces, or command and control centers.’ Bunn and Manzo, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike,’ 16-17. 33 James M. Acton, Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020). 34 Throughout the paper, ‘dual-use’ is used to describe systems which are able to carry both conventional and nuclear armaments, such as the DF-26. In addition, there may be conventional or nuclear variants of the same underlying missile, such as the DF-21.


11

Figure 2: Escalatory Pressures from Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement

Entanglement across each of the three dimensions discussed above—geographic, operational, technological—may be more likely to activate some of these escalation mechanisms. Geographic entanglement would likely increase all three kinds of escalation risks by increasing the chance that nuclear forces are inadvertently targeted, that the targeted country misperceives the intended target of the strike, and that conventional strikes launched by the targeted country are misidentified as nuclear strikes. Operational entanglement which could make conventional and nuclear forces dependent on the same supporting infrastructure would likely produce risks of heightened vulnerability and, to a lesser extent, target ambiguity. However, to the extent that forms of operational entanglement remain unseen, such as overlapping command and control structures, it is unlikely to generate warhead ambiguity risks. Technological entanglement would likely produce risks of warhead ambiguity and, to the extent that the adversary is unable to distinguish conventional targets from nuclear ones, both heightened vulnerability and target ambiguity. These risks can also produce interactive effects, with entanglement in one dimension influencing the escalatory risks of entanglement in other dimensions. For instance, in isolation, either geographic entanglement or technological entanglement may produce only moderate risks. That is, an adversary could avoid degrading a country’s nuclear capabilities by refraining from targeting systems deployed in certain areas or systems with certain identifiable signatures.35 However, if forces are simultaneously both geographically and technologically entangled, the discrimination challenge would likely increase significantly. Each of these pressures increases the incentives for

35 This would grant the adversary a degree of de facto sanctuary. Such sanctuary may not be appealing to the entangled state if it makes it easier to hold its nuclear forces at risk. Conversely, the adversary of the entangled state may be disinclined to providing sanctuary if the adversary believes the entangled state might exploit that sanctuary to shelter its conventional assets.

Geographic Entanglement

Operational Entanglement

Technological Entanglement

Escalatory Pressures

Dimensions of Entanglement

Heightened Vulnerability

Target Ambiguity

Warhead Ambiguity

Experienced by entangled state

Experienced by attacking state


12

the entangled state to use its nuclear weapons and its adversary to target them by generating use-it-or-lose-it pressures.

Though scholars have observed that, under conditions of mutual nuclear vulnerability it may be irrational to resort to nuclear use, these kind of use-it-or-lose-it pressures can nonetheless increase the likelihood of a nuclear strike, especially by the entangled state.36 The entangled state may depend on its nuclear forces for coercive leverage or intra-crisis signaling, using a nuclear (demonstration) strike to communicate resolve or reestablish deterrence in a way analogous to Powell’s strategy of limited retaliation.37 Mounting domestic political pressures may encourage nuclear use in order to avoid a potentially humiliating conventional defeat or disarming first strike, may encourage nuclear use.38 The entangled state may rely on its nuclear forces to offset the adversary’s conventional superiority and the possibility of losing this offsetting capability could increase both the likelihood and costs of defeat, encouraging its use before it is lost.39 The fog and pressure of an escalating crisis and use-it-or-lose-it dynamics may induce cognitive, organizational, or technological failure leading to what might otherwise be considered ‘irrational’ first use.40 Or the leadership of an entangled state, faced with the prospect of suffering a disarming first strike and an embarrassing defeat, may view nuclear use as a last ditch means of exacting a gratifying revenge.41 Use-or-lose pressures triggered by entanglement can increase the likelihood of any of these mechanisms potentially encouraging nuclear use.

36 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this point. See, for example, Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), chapter 2; and Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation,’ American Political Science Review 83/2 (1989), 503-519. Indeed, once deterrence has failed, as marked by the first nuclear strike, the deterrent value of one’s own nuclear arsenal has eroded. See John Steinbruner, ‘Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions,’ World Politics 28/2 (1976), 223-245; and Harold A. Feiveson, ‘The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons,’ World Politics 33/2 (1981), 282-298. For some relevant discussion in the U.S.-China context, see Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?,’ 58-59. 37 Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’; and Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Robert Powell, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence,’ Political Science Quarterly 100/1 (Spring 1985), 75-96. 38 Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 701-702 and 704-705. 39 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), 19-23; and Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 143-146. 40 For some relevant discussion in the U.S.-China context, see Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 699-701. Also see Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Schlosser, Command and Control; and Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,’ International Security 18/4 (1994), 66-107. 41 Rose McDermott, Anthony C Lopez, and Peter K Hatemi, ‘“Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It”: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,’ Texas National Security Review 1/1 (2017), 68-88, especially 71; and Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, ‘Revenge in International Politics,’ Security Studies 17/4 (2008), 685.


13

Perceptual Factors: Perceptions, Intentions, and Signaling

As previous scholars have observed, the military-technical factors described above are not the only variables affecting escalation risks from entanglement. Just as important are state perceptions. Rovner, for instance, cites the fog of war and attribution bias (which Rovner describes as ‘the belief that their counterparts are inherently evil’) as perceptual drivers which can cause the entangled state to adopt a worst-case framing.42 Talmadge similarly references the fog of war and also cites the mere outbreak of conflict as factors which could exacerbate an entangled state’s threat perceptions and, thus, the escalatory pressures it experiences.43 However, these crucial perceptual factors can be further elaborated for at least two reasons. First, they are common to all crises and conflicts and do not account for potentially systematic variation either within or across cases. Second, and relatedly, they are presented as uniformly magnifying escalatory pressures. That is, they neither are specific to escalation risks stemming from entanglement, nor do they permit any variation in the direction or intensity with which entanglement might produce escalatory pressures. Here, I introduce and analyze two perceptual factors specific to entanglement which can vary across states and shape escalatory pressures. These factors are summarized in Figure 3 (below).

Figure 3: Perceptual Factors of Entanglement

First, is the pre-crisis interaction between the actual and the perceived drivers of entanglement. A state may entangle its forces for several reasons. States may intentionally entangle their forces in an effort to bolster strategic deterrence by increasing autonomous risk of nuclear use. If entanglement increases the risk of nuclear escalation, and if both states are aware of this, then entanglement may be a tool for deterring a risk-averse adversary. However, entanglement

42 Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 696-730. 43 Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?,’ 62-64.

Pre-Crisis Perceptions of Entanglement

Intra-Crisis Signaling

Perceptual Factors


14

may also occur as the byproduct of other, less strategic dynamics, such as cost-saving efforts by military bureaucracies.44

The drivers of a state’s entanglement have important implications for the state’s sensitivity to and understanding of escalatory risks later in a crisis. States which intentionally entangle their forces for strategic purposes are likely more aware of and prepared for the attendant risks. Indeed, generation of risk is the raison d’etre of the entanglement. On the other hand, if entanglement has emerged for non-strategic reasons, the state is likely less aware of the accompanying escalatory risks and more likely to perceive ambiguous adversary moves as threatening to their nuclear deterrent, exacerbating escalatory pressures.

It is not only the actual drivers of entanglement that matter, but also how the adversary perceives those drivers. The logic here proceeds directly from the preceding analysis. If an adversary (e.g. the U.S.) perceives the entangled state (e.g. China) as intentionally entangling its forces for strategic reasons, it may assume that the entangled state is aware of and prepared for the risks to its nuclear forces. This may cause the adversary to be less cautious in executing operations which might (inadvertently) degrade the target’s nuclear deterrent. The adversary may also have undue confidence in its ability to clearly and credibly signal its more limited ambitions to the target. Conversely, an adversary which believes entanglement is not a strategic choice may be more cautious in its combat and signaling operations.

As illustrated in Figure 4 (below), the target (entangled) state’s actual motives for entanglement and the adversary’s perceptions of those motives can interact to generate varying degrees of escalatory pressures. All else equal, the escalatory pressures are likely to be lowest when the target state has entangled its forces for strategic reasons, but the adversary believes this entanglement is non-strategic. In this instance, a cautious adversary confronts an informed and prepared target state. The most escalatory combination is when the target state has not entangled its forces for strategic reasons, but the adversary believes this to be the case. Here, a more confident and aggressive adversary confronts a less informed and prepared target state. In this way, these factors exist prior to the outbreak of a conflict or crisis but can still influence how states act and react in a crisis or conflict.

Figure 4: Interaction between Actual and Perceived Motives and Resultant Escalation Risks

Actual Motives Intentional Unintentional

Perc

eive

d M

otiv

es Intentional

Medium Risk

Higher Risk

Unintentional

Lower Risk

Medium Risk

44 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement.’


15

Second, intra-crisis and intra-conflict state signaling can reduce or enhance escalatory pressures stemming from entanglement. Signaling can communicate the state’s military or political goals in a conflict and the risks it is willing to run in order to achieve those goals. If the state can credibly signal its limited aims and intent to not threaten the entangled state’s nuclear deterrent, this may reduce escalation risks. States may issue verbal or behavioral signals. Verbal signals consist of formal, direct, verbal communication about one’s goals. Verbal signaling can be used to clarify a state’s aims and intentions by, for instance, articulating its broader political goals in the crisis or conflict, or by establishing limits on how it intends to act. Behavioral signaling approximates what Schelling described as tacit communication: the implicit conveying of one’s intentions through one’s actions.45 This kind of signaling can assume particular importance ‘when one or both parties either cannot or will not negotiate explicitly or when neither would trust the other.’46 Such conditions are likely to abound in the fog and friction of war. In this way, a state’s behavioral signaling—how it actually behaves in the crisis or conflict—can take on increased importance in communicating its intentions to the adversary, acting as costly signals of capability or intent.47

One dilemma prevalent in a crisis or conflict is that signals may create tradeoffs in how they affect the military-technical factors and the perceptual factors of entanglement. For instance, steps taken to enhance the survivability and credibility of a target state’s nuclear forces—in other words, to reduce the escalatory pressures of military-technical factors—can simultaneously appear like preparations for a strike, exacerbating pressures from perceptual factors. This could include, for example, raising the alert level of forces, dispersing mobile missiles from their garrisons, and flushing SSBNs from their home ports.48 Manipulating escalation risks will require an appreciation for how these different variables interact.

Military-Technical Entanglement in China’s Missile Forces

Having developed frameworks for assessing the risks of entanglement in a crisis or conflict, I now apply them to the PLA Rocket Force. Observers have previously analyzed the possibility that Chinese entanglement could generate escalatory pressures.49 Early works include those by

45 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 53-80. 46 Ibid., 53. 47 Schelling, Arms and Influence, chapter 2; James D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 68-90; and Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 231-233. 48 See examples in James M. Acton, ‘Reclaiming Strategic Stability,’ in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson (ed.), Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 123-128. 49 See, for example, Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?,’ 50-92; Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 696-730; Cunningham and Fravel ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 40-45; Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ 60-62; Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,’ International Security 37/4 (Spring 2013), 49-89; and Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution.’


16

Lewis and Xue, who highlighted how the dual identity of China’s missile forces could cause the nuclear forces to adopt practices from their conventional counterparts, and Christensen, who argued that Chinese entanglement weakened the ‘firebreak’ between the nuclear and conventional domains, thus reversing some of the deterrent logic that dominated the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More recently, Rovner argues that, when the targeted state is an insecure regime, strikes against entangled nuclear and conventional assets may lead to nuclear escalation, especially if the target state is unable to determine the strikes’ intended targets. Talmadge has provided the most in-depth examination of the extent to which China’s missile forces are entangled through what she calls military-technical factors and also discusses how perceptual factors can influence escalation dynamics. Zhao and Li have argued that, despite American concerns, Chinese observers have paid scant attention to the potential escalation risks of entanglement.50

These analyses have contributed to our understanding of entanglement generally and within the Chinese case in particular. However, two factors limited the scope of these analyses. First, all were conducted prior to the wave of military reforms that affected the PLA at the end of 2015. Since then, there have been notable changes in the size, structure, composition, and operation of China’s missile forces. Second, these analyses did not fully interrogate important variables likely to affect escalation dynamics, including the extent to which China’s missile systems are readily distinguishable, command and control arrangements, the drivers of Chinese entanglement, and U.S. perceptions of those drivers. Talmadge identifies overlapping command and control networks as a potential source of entanglement risks in her theoretical framework but notes that the lack of detailed evidence about China’s potential overlap in its land-based missile forces makes the risks hard to assess. Here, I provide important empirical data needed to more fully assess operational characteristics of China’s missile forces. I also build on earlier work by specifying the operational and technological characteristics which might facilitate (or complicate) identifying and discriminating different missile systems.51 Finally, I provide important evidence about the drivers of entanglement in China. Past work has highlighted the important role of perceptions has not directly addressed the significance of these drivers, either by assuming that whatever entanglement exists is a deliberate strategic choice by Beijing or giving the issue little attention.

This section seeks to address these issues by applying the theoretical framework introduced above to China’s missile forces. The section begins with a brief overview of the history and structure of the PLA Rocket Force, the military organization commanding China’s land-based missiles. It then examines evidence of entanglement in these forces along the geographic, operational, and technological dimensions. Finally, it assesses the escalation risks of this entanglement and identifies ongoing trends which are likely to alter the nature and extent of future Chinese entanglement, potentially exacerbating escalation risks.52

50 Tong Zhao and Li Bin, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective,’ in James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 47-75. 51 For example, one of Rovner’s escalation variables is whether or not China can distinguish between attacks targeting its conventional forces and those targeting its nuclear forces but not how the attacking state can distinguish between those same targets. Rovner, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe,’ 719-721. 52 For the sake of space, I only address entanglement within China’s land-based missile forces, though the same analytical framework introduced above could be used to assess other areas of the PLA.


17

China’s Missile Forces

China possesses one of the world’s largest and most advanced arsenals of land-based ballistic missiles.53 The PLA Rocket Force, the military service operating China’s land-based missiles, is believed to control roughly 200 nuclear warheads along with more than 1,200 mostly conventionally-armed short-range ballistic missiles.54 China’s expansive arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles is unusual among the other nuclear powers and in part the product of the country’s particular strategic context.55 Many other countries lacked the industrial base and technological capability to develop the precision guidance systems necessary to make conventional ballistic missiles useful in modern military campaigns. Unlike France and the U.K., China’s geography and threat perceptions provided the strategic impetus for developing conventional ballistic missiles. Unlike the United States or the former Soviet Union and Russia, China has never been a signatory to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which would have constrained its development of shorter- and medium-range land-based ballistic missiles.

The Rocket Force’s dual identity as both a conventional and nuclear force is in part an historical byproduct. The Second Artillery, the predecessor to the Rocket Force, began exclusively as a nuclear organization.56 Created in 1966, just two years after China’s first nuclear test, the Second Artillery was established to oversee China’s nuclear weapons and prevent the ‘nuclear

53 ‘The Obama Nuclear Deterrent Modernization Plan and Schedule,’ Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 July 2016, 3; ‘China’s Offensive Missile Forces,’ Transcript of Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, 1 April 2015, 17. 54 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75/4 (2019), 172; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2020: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020), 85. Kristensen and Korda estimate roughly 290 total nuclear warheads, of which 220 are assigned to the PLARF. The 2020 DOD report writes that ‘China’s nuclear warhead stockpile [is] currently estimated to be in the low-200s….’ For conventional SRBM estimate, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2017: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), 31. 55 Phillip C. Saunders and David C. Logan, ‘China’s Regional Nuclear Capability, Non-Nuclear Strategic Systems, and Integration of Concepts and Operations,’ in James Smith and Paul Bolt, (ed.), China's Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming). 56 The Second Artillery underwent two major changes at the beginning of 2016 as part of a sweeping set of military reforms. First, it was renamed to the PLA Rocket Force. Second, its formal institutional status was elevated form that of an independent branch to that of a full-fledged military service. Despite these superficial changes, the force structure, administrative organization, and command and control of the force remained intact. For more information on the continuity between the former Second Artillery and the new Rocket Force, see Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces.’


18

blackmail’ of the world’s other nuclear powers.57 The Second Artillery was slow to develop, perhaps not deploying missiles until the early 1970s. Its first three decades were largely focused on fielding a small number of liquid-fueled, silo-based missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads. It was not until the 1990s that China added its first conventional missile units to the Second Artillery. 58 The conventional missile force grew rapidly, reaching 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles today, most of which are positioned opposite Taiwan. It is estimated that over half of missile personnel are assigned to conventional missile units.59 Rather than create an entirely new force for the conventional units, the PLA grafted the new missile units onto the existing structure of the Second Artillery.

In late 2015, China’s missile forces underwent another series of changes. The PLA created the Rocket Force to replace the Second Artillery and gave it the status of a full service. Alongside these changes, the PLA established five new Theater Commands. In a way paralleling the United States’ own Goldwater-Nichols Act, the reforms assigned responsibility for training and equipping forces to the military services, while the newly created Theater Commands were given operational control of them.60 Initially, some observers argued that, in the midst of these sweeping changes, China’s missile forces had been characterized more by continuity than by change.61 However, as the reforms have been progressively implemented and deepened, there have been important changes to both the Rocket Force’s internal organization and to its relationship with the Theater Commands. Prior to the recent military reforms, China’s military forces were operated by the respective military services. But the increased emphasis on joint operations has led to a revision of the command and control lines between the forces of the various military services and the newly established Theater Commands. In addition, the size, structure, and composition of the missile forces have changed, with the creation of new units, the reassignment of existing units to different bases, and the introduction of new variants and systems. Having introduced China’s missile forces, I now use the framework introduced earlier to assess China’s nuclear-conventional entanglement across the geographic, operational, and technological dimensions.

Geographic Entanglement: Co-Location

Geographic entanglement within China’s missile forces appears moderate and generated not by the peacetime co-location of conventional and nuclear units but, rather, the possibility of mobile missiles operating near one another in a crisis or conflict. Rocket Force launch units are

57 Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (ed.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 517-518. 58 For more on the Second Artillery’s conventional missions and capabilities, see Michael Chase and Andrew Erickson, ‘The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,’ Asian Security 8/2, 115-137; and Ron Christman, ‘Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps,’ Comparative Strategy 30/3 (2011), 198-228. 59 Kristensen and Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016,’ 2; and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,’ in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason, (ed.), The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2016), 105. 60 Saunders and Wuthnow, ‘China's Goldwater-Nichols?,’ 68-75. 61 Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,’ 57-62.


19

divided among six missile bases, numbered sequentially from Base 61 to Base 66.62 While a base’s forces will be deployed within the same broad geographic area, the term ‘base’ largely refers to an administrative or command structure. Bases control multiple launch brigades, each of which appears to be assigned only one type of missile.63 All bases appear to command both nuclear and conventional brigades.

Figure 5: Location and Command Authorities of Rocket Force Missile Bases and Brigades

Source:Stokes, “PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference,” pp. 2-12; Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” pp. 40-45; Lewis, Paper Tigers, p. 116; Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” pp. 404-405; Decker Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force,’ A Boy and His Blog, 2 July 2020, https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/mapping-the-people-s-liberation-army-rocket-force. Image Credit: Tsering Wangyal Shawa.

62 Mark Stokes, ‘PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference,’ Project 2049 Institute, 9 April 2018. 63 Stokes, ‘PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference,’ 2-12; Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 40-45; Jeffrey G. Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2014), 116; and Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.’

"¶

¶H

H

H

H

H

"

¶

¶ H

H

7 7

"¶

¶¶

H

H

"¶

¶

¶

¶

H

"

¶

H

H

7

"¶¶¶¶

7

64

66

61

65

63

62

WEST

NORTH

CENTRAL

EAST

SOUTH

0 200 400 Miles

0 300 600 Kilometers

LegendConventional BrigadeNuclear BrigadeDual-Use BrigadeBase Headquarters

H

¶

7

"China Province BoundaryTheatre Command Boundary

NORTH


20

Concerns about co-location of home garrisons and launch brigades do not appear substantiated. Open-source analyses have concluded that each brigade for which information is available is garrisoned in a separate location.64 Further, as indicated in Figure 5 (above), there appears to be clustering of conventional and nuclear brigades, with conventional brigades largely located near the southeastern coast and nuclear brigades located toward the center of the country, reflecting different mission sets and operational concerns. Conventional missiles are most likely to be used in a potential conflict over Taiwan and their shorter ranges require that they be deployed closer to target. The longer ranges of nuclear-armed missiles permit deployment farther inland, which enhances their survivability by sheltering them behind China’s air defenses and anti-access/area-denial capabilities.65 Further, the home garrisons of launch brigades are generally at least 100 kilometers apart, suggesting that strikes against the garrisoned units or facilities of a launch brigade are unlikely to implicate the garrisoned units or facilities of another launch brigade.

However, though the home garrisons of launch brigades may not be co-located, the operational geographies for mobile launch brigades may still overlap. This risk stems from the mobility of China’s dual-use mobile missile systems. China’s mobile missiles can disperse to operational areas well beyond their home bases, while trans-regional mobility operations can also bring units from one Theater Command to another.66 Both conventional and nuclear units of the former Second Artillery appear to have taken part in trans-regional mobility operations, some of which involved substantial distances, suggesting that, in a crisis or conflict, mobile missiles could be far from their home garrisons.67 For example, one 2016 report accompanied by a picture of DF-31A missiles, stated that a nuclear launch brigade had undertaken such an exercise.68 Similarly, a 2015 report suggested that a nuclear missile brigade undertook a trans-regional exercise in northeast China. 69 Open source accounts suggest that these mobility exercises can be quite involved and include units at risk for entanglement. For example, past exercises have reportedly included multiple launch brigades, 70 including launch brigades operating different missile

64 Ibid. 65 This deployment pattern exhibits a logic similar to the Third Front Movement, when China located defense factories in the interior to protect them from attack. Barry Naughton, ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,’ The China Quarterly 115 (September 1988), 351-386. 66 Trans-regional mobility operations are believed to require approval from the CMC. 67 Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Mission Action 2010: Three Complex, Transregional, Integrated Joint Operations,’ China Brief 10/22 (2010), 6-9. 68 ‘Second Artillery Has Successfully Initiated Large-Scale Nuclear Missile Trans-Regional Encampment Training [二炮部队曾成功实施大型核导弹跨区驻训],’ Science and Technology Daily [科技日报], 6 July 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-07-06/1116655572.html. 69 Though the article did not identify the brigade or its armament, open-source evidence permits the deduction that it was nuclear. Based on information from the time, only two launch brigades were believed to be based in northeast China, the nuclear-armed 810th Brigade stationed at Dalian, Liaoning and the nuclear-armed 816th Brigade located at Tonghua, Jilin. Here, I use the Second Artillery unit designations from the time. See ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in -30℃ Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30℃寒区锤炼实战能力],’ China National Radio Military Affairs [央广军事], 10 February 2015, http://www.mod.gov.cn/pic/2015-02/10/content_4569718.htm. 70 ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in -30℃ Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30℃寒区锤炼实战能力].’


21

systems,71 and launch brigades operating potentially dual-capable missile systems.72 Media reports of such exercises suggest that they are becoming more common.

Reports further suggest that, during these movements and other operations, nuclear-armed launch brigades may transit quite far from their home garrisons. The mobility portion of one exercise reportedly lasted 36 continuous hours. 73 In a 2015 trans-regional mobility exercise implied a launch brigade had traveled a minimum of 300 kilometers. 74 Other reports have described units involved in trans-regional mobility exercises transiting either 500 kilometers or colloquially ‘a great distance’ (qian li).75 Some open-source researchers have identified mobile missile systems more than 1,000 kilometers from their home garrisons.76 The distances between the home garrisons of most conventional and nuclear launch brigades are well within this range, particularly those operated by Base 61 and Base 63. During such an operation, conventional and nuclear systems, potentially including dual-use systems such as the DF-21 or DF-26, may be deployed far from their home bases, and potentially near each other, further complicating target identification.

The greater emphasis on mobility in the Rocket Force has also increased geographic entanglement. Past research on Second Artillery launch sites suggested that launch sites might be located very near to the garrisons for launch brigades.77 However, the prominence of trans-regional mobility operations in both Second Artillery exercises and authoritative texts implies that China’s mobile ballistic missiles may transit far away from their garrisons during an actual launch operation. This comports with the Second Artillery’s emphasis on concealment, camouflage, and

71 ‘The Eve of the Graduation of Second Artillery Officer Cadets Has Many Missile Types Participate in Trans-Regional Exercises [二炮学员毕业前夕携带多型导弹参加跨区演习],’ PLA Daily [解放军报], 14 June 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2011-06-14/0419651810.html. The source refers to an exercise by a training brigade, not a deployed brigade. Though the exercise is likely representative of the kinds of actions brigades will undertake in a conflict. 72 ‘Multiple Second Artillery Brigades Train Combat Ability in -30℃ Frigid Place [二炮多支导弹劲旅-30℃寒区锤炼实战能力].’ 73 Liu Qiang [刘强], Zhang Zhenxing [张振兴], and Cheng Cheng [程成], ‘High Definition: PLA Artillery Brigade Trans-Regional Movement, Military Vehicles Camouflaged as Postal Trucks [高清:解放军炮兵旅跨区机动军车伪装成邮车],’ People Online [人民网], 8 July 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0708/c1011-27270466.html. 74 At the time, the Tonghua-based launch brigade was over 300 kilometers from the next Military Region and the Dalian-based launch brigade was over 500 kilometers away. See discussion in note 69 above. 75 Wang Yongxiao [王永孝], Cai Ruijin [蔡瑞金], Li Yongfei [李永飞], and Yang Yonggang [杨永刚], ‘Review of the Combat Capability of China’s Strategic Missile Units [中国战略导弹部队战力扫描],’ PLA Daily [解放军报], 1 January 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/2016-01/16/content_6859464.htm; and ‘PLARF Conducts Live-Fire Drill in the Gobi Desert [火箭军西北大漠开展实弹发射演练],’ CCTV [央视网], 28 January 2019, http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C10616/e65c9f10f0004ae8b5620866c83fcf1d. These include live-fire drills. 76 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Chinese DF-26 Missile Launchers Deploy to New Missile Training Area,’ Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 21 January 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/01/df-26/. 77 For more on launch sites, see Sean O’Connor, ‘PLA Second Artillery Corps,’ Air Power Australia, 27 January 2014, https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Federation of American Scientists, 2006), 59-70; and Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Area Discovered in Central China,’ Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 15 May 2008, http://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-area-discovered-in-central-china/.


22

deception. Though positioning launch sites nearby the home garrison facilitates quicker launch, it also increases the likelihood of being spotted by the adversary. The need for multiple dispersed launch sites is even more acute for those delivery systems with a re-load capability, including most of China’s conventionally-armed ballistic missiles.78 The signature of the initial launch would expose the position of the launch brigade, which would then need to transit to another launch site to avoid adversary counter-strikes. In short, the mobility of China’s missile forces, coupled with trends in peacetime activities, suggests Rocket Force missiles may well be located far from their home garrisons and perhaps near other missile units, increasing the geographic entanglement of the force.

Operational Entanglement: Personnel, Command and Control, and Supporting Elements

Operational entanglement in China’s missile forces, while difficult to evaluate, appears both moderate and evolving. Here I review evidence of three forms of operational entanglement: personnel practices, operational signatures, and command and control arrangements. First, I examine personnel policies, which can be important indicators of a military’s operational practices. Previous research found that, at the brigade level and below, China’s missile personnel were exclusively equipped with either nuclear- or conventional-armed missiles, never both, limiting the degree of operational entanglement within the force.79 Further, a recent analysis of career paths within China’s missile forces suggests that, historically, there has been some degree of personnel separation between conventional and nuclear forces. 80 Officers who served in the primary conventional base almost never also served in either of the two ICBM bases.81 References in PLA reporting to a ‘Conventional Missile Force Tactics Faculty’ within the Combined Tactics Department of the Rocket Force Command Academy further implies a division in education and training between conventional and nuclear units, also implying that they follow different operational concepts.82

However, the introduction of dual-capable missile systems (discussed more in the following section on technological entanglement) appears to have somewhat increased operational entanglement by mixing nuclear- and conventional-armed forces at least at the battalion level, and possibly at lower levels.83 One consequence of this new lower-level mixing is the need to train personnel in the operation of both nuclear and conventional forces. According to one Rocket Force battalion commander, ‘Our missile weapon systems are both nuclear- and conventional- capable.

78 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Pentagon Report and Chinese Nuclear Forces,’ Strategic Security (blog), Federation of American Scientists, 18 May 2016, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/05/chinareport2016/. 79 Cunningham and Fravel ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 40-45. 80 David C. Logan, ‘Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell Us,’ Asian Security 14/1 (2018), 1-19. 81 Ibid., 9-11. 82 See, for example, ‘The Rocket Force Focuses on Actual Combat, Organizes a Missile Brigade and Regiment Competition [火箭军聚焦实战, 组织导弹旅团长比武],’ People’s Daily [人民日报], 15 January 2019, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0115/c1011-30537459.html; and ‘Missile Brigade and Regiment Leaders Get a Taste of Actual Combat at Competition, [实战化比武，导弹旅团长们尝到了啥滋味],’ China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 17 January 2019, http://sn.people.com.cn/n2/2019/0117/c378304-32540247.html. 83 Recent reporting quotes battalion commanders explicitly referencing control of both nuclear and conventional forces and some of the accounts used language which may refer to lower command levels.


23

This requires professionalism a sound process. Nuclear must be learned, and conventional also must be learned. This is equivalent to one person doing two jobs.’84 Similarly, a missile launch controller associated with a dual-capable missile troop emphasized the challenges of training soldiers in both nuclear and conventional operations, saying ‘We must grasp the difference between nuclear and conventional, the differences in equipment, the differences in principles, as well as the differences in operations. If you don’t work hard, you will get confused.’85 For now, open-source information suggests that personnel rotation between conventional and nuclear systems may be restricted to truly dual-capable systems like the DF-26, though it represents an important break from past practice.

Second, operational signatures might distinguish conventional missile units from nuclear ones. Declassified U.S. intelligence estimates reveal that analysts often use the presence of ground support equipment to help identify missile systems.86 In China, nuclear and conventional units reportedly feature different sizes and structures, with nuclear brigades historically assigned fewer missiles than conventional ones.87 U.S. government sources also implies that conventional units have more missiles than launchers, implying a reload capability. 88 This also suggests that conventional units may be accompanied with additional missile transport vehicles which might not be present in nuclear units.89 In addition, the presence of certain subordinate elements may vary with the armament and type of missile assigned to a brigade. For example, nuclear units are accompanied by special warhead handling units or security detachments.90 Sources also note that conventional missile brigades may feature technical battalions and communication battalions which are not present in nuclear missile brigades.91

There would be several challenges to using these signatures for unit identification, however. For one, some of these signatures may be concentrated at the brigade-level, meaning it may be difficult to identify an individual missile system if it is already dispersed. The PLA can also adopt countermeasures to reduce the detection and identification of forces by unit size or composition. For example, in one recent Rocket Force exercise, a battalion commander was

84 ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队],’ China Daily [中国日报], 22 July 2017, http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-07/22/content_30212137.htm. 85 Ibid. 86 See, for example, U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, ‘New Mobile Solid-Propellant MRBM Under Development, China,’ (Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency, November 1983), 2, 8; and U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, ‘New-Generation CSS-2 IRBM Ground Support Equipment PRC,’ (Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency, October 1979), 1, 5. 87 David C. Logan, ‘Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,’ in Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, (ed.), Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2019), 403-404; and Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 106. 88 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019), 119 89 Henry Boyd, ‘2019 Pentagon Report: China’s Rocket Force Trajectory,’ Military Balance Blog (blog), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 15 May 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/05/pla-rocket-force-trajectory; and Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 107. 90 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 107. 91 James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein, (ed.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002), 207-208.


24

described as ‘reducing the number of vehicles used by the battalion command post in order to reduce its target exposure.’92 In addition, it’s not clear whether these indicators would vary for truly dual-capable systems such as the DF-26, which is capable of switching between conventional and nuclear armament. One description of a DF-26 brigade exercise describes a unit as executing a precision-strike [conventional] launch before ‘quickly transitioning to implement strategic deterrence operations and conduct preparations for a nuclear counter-strike,’ further suggesting that individual DF-26 brigades may be capable of simultaneously conducting conventional and nuclear missions.93 In short, many nuclear and conventional units may possess distinguishing operational signatures, though it is not clear whether those signatures exist below the brigade level and the introduction of true dual-capable systems may further blur these operational lines.

Finally, I examine command and control structures, which can be a valuable indicator of entanglement and an important variable in its own right as overlapping command and control structures between conventional and nuclear forces would increase the risks of both heightened vulnerability and target ambiguity. It is very difficult to evaluate China’s nuclear command and control arrangements, but available evidence suggests that, while there may be elements of overlap between conventional and nuclear command structures, there is sufficient separation and redundancy between these systems to limit escalation risks. The Science of Campaigns, an authoritative text published by the PLA National Defense University, refers to some campaigns involving the establishment of command and control units at the base-level, meaning that command and control for conventional and nuclear launch brigades attached to the same base may overlap.94 In such instances, strikes against bases in charge of China’s conventional assets might therefore jeopardize elements of the country’s nuclear force.

However, other features of Rocket Force command and control systems may mitigate these risks. Although the missile bases may act as an intermediary between senior military commanders and missile launch units, China reportedly employs a ‘skip-echelon’ command system, permitting Rocket Force Headquarters to communicate directly with missile brigades, battalions, and even companies, even if the intermediate missile base has been rendered inoperable.95 At a macro-level, there is also evidence of separation of command and control lines. Prior to the recent bout of military reforms, China’s missile forces at the brigade level and below were believed to be equipped exclusively with only conventional- or nuclear armed-missiles, never both. In addition, authoritative Chinese texts describe a ‘dual command and control’ system for China’s missile forces.96 For example, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, which is designed as Top

92 Wang Weidong [王卫东] and Sun Fenghao [孙丰皓], ‘Bravely Serving in the Vanguard of Promoting the Good and Eradicating the Bad [破弊立新勇当先],’ PLA Daily [解放军报], 14 February 2019, 1. 93 ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’ 94 Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], (ed.), The Science of Campaigns [战役学], (Beijing, National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006), 618. American researchers have noted that ‘To the best of our knowledge, these are the most authoritative publicly available sources on Chinese military thinking about the campaign.’ See Michael S. Chase, et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 4-5. 95 Cunningham, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China’; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 42-45. 96 Yu Jixun [于际训], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2004), 161. For some discussion in English, see Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 44-45.


25

Secret under China’s security classification system, describes command and control systems in which nuclear forces are commanded directly by the CMC through the respective Rocket Force missile bases, while the conventional forces are typically commanded by joint campaign command organizations.97 In addition, according to the text, ‘Joint campaign command organizations usually will not carry out command of Second Artillery nuclear missile forces.’98 This arrangement has been described by Chinese participants in Track-1.5 dialogues.99 The separation of nuclear and conventional command and control lines should reduce escalation risks.

One significant post-reform trend is evidence that the command and control structures of Rocket Force conventional units are being integrated with the newly established Theater Commands, which could help reduce operational entanglement with nuclear forces. Shortly after the establishment of the Rocket Force and the Theater Commands, initial reporting out of China indicated that the missile forces had remained apart from the command structures of the Theater Commands, with both conventional and nuclear assets appearing to remain under the control of the Rocket Force.100 However, in the few years since the reforms, PLA reporting has described increasing efforts to integrate conventional missile units into the Theater Commands.101 Following the reforms, one report in Rocket Force News observes that a Rocket Force missile base ‘has joined the joint operations chain of command’ and that ‘accelerating [the base’s] integration into the TC joint operations command system … is a top priority.’102 Descriptions of Theater Command joint operations command centers increasingly cite the presence of Rocket Force officers alongside their counterparts from the other services103 and increasingly reference attempts to ‘integrate’ missile forces into the TC joint operations command centers.104 Earlier reports suggested that the task of integrating Rocket Force conventional units with the Theater Commands has not yet been completed but is progressing and will continue.105 Recent research suggests some success in

97 Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 161. 98 Ibid., 160. This text was published prior to the 2015-2016 military reforms but there are no clear indications that this concept has changed. 99 Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VIII Report (Monterey, CA: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, November 2014), 10. 100 For a review of this early evidence, see Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,’ 57-62. 101 See, for example, Logan, ‘Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces.’ 102 ‘A Certain Base for the First Time Undertakes Cluster Command “Winning Iron Fist” [某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 ‘制胜铁拳’],’ Rocket Force News [火箭军报], 25 November 2017, 1. 103 ‘Combat Readiness, Sword Pointed at New Heights [备战, 剑指新高地],’ People’s Navy [人民海军], 21 October 2017, 4; and ‘A Panoramic View of Chinese Military’s New Year Training: Preparing for War from a New Starting Point [中国军队新年开训全景大扫描：备战踏上新起点],’ Xinhua [新华网], 6 January 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/06/c_1122220447.htm. 104 ‘A Certain Base for the First Time Undertakes Cluster Command “Winning Iron Fist” [某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 ‘制胜铁拳’],’ 1; and ‘Command Academy Focuses Intently on Requirements of Winning, Reforms Military Education to Reflect Actual Combat [指挥学院紧盯打赢需要大抓实战化教学改革],’ Rocket Force News [火箭军报], 8 July 2017, 1a; and Guo Yuandan [郭媛丹], ‘How China’s Theater Commands Conduct Operations: By Truly Joining Systems and Fusing Command and Control Entities [中国战区如何打仗:体系深度联合、指挥一体融合],’ Huanqiu Wang [环球网], 8 October 2017; and ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’ 105 ‘Concentrate on Sharpening the Sword, the More the Strategic Iron Fist Is Used, the Harder It Becomes [潜心砺剑, 战略铁拳越练越硬],’ PLA Daily [解放军报], 6 February 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/06/content_198875.htm.


26

constructing the necessary command structures within the Theater Commands.106 Together, these trends suggest that operational entanglement within China’s missile forces is not that extensive, and that ongoing trends may alter the nature and extent of entanglement.

Technological Entanglement: Dual-Use Delivery Systems

Technological entanglement in China’s land-based missile forces appears limited but is likely to increase in the short- and long-term.107 China is believed to have multiple land-based ballistic missile systems that, according to some reports, can be equipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads: the DF-21 and the DF-26 are believed to have actual or planned deployments for both conventional and nuclear missions and therefore pose the greatest potential risks for escalation control and crisis stability.108 Although the DF-21 has dedicated variants for either conventional or nuclear missions, the DF-26 is believed to be truly dual-capable in that the same missile may be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads.109

However, the mere presence of technologically similar forces does not necessarily create significant escalation risks if the nuclear and conventional variants of those forces are distinguishable to the adversary. Land-based missiles may be found and ‘fixed’ (i.e. identified) though several means.110 States may intercept communications to locate and identify adversary forces or geolocate transmissions from mobile missile troops. Here, however, I focus on visual identification, which is likely to be prominent in any effort to locate and identify Chinese systems. A missile may be identified visually by features of the missile, its launcher, or its operations.

In general, most of China’s missile systems possess identifiable visual signatures across all three of the above categories. Table 2 (below) reports key visible features of China’s missiles and their associated launchers and support elements. For each of China’s land-based missile variants, the table reports the armament of the missile (nuclear or conventional), the basing type (mobile, silo, or rollout), and the missile’s estimated length, diameter, number of stages, and fuel type (liquid or solid).111 For mobile missiles, it also reports characteristics of the missile launcher,

106 Roderick Lee, ‘Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations,’ China Brief 20/14 (2020), 24-31. 107 I thank Scott LaFoy for valuable feedback on this section and Table 2. 108 Some estimates have concluded that the DF-11 and DF-15 may have nuclear capable variants, though there is little evidence that China has actually deployed these nuclear variants. See Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ 51; and Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71/4 (2015), 80. For estimates of Chinese nuclear deployments, see Lewis, Paper Tigers, 104; Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 43; and Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.’ 109 I thank Zhao Tong for emphasizing this point. 110 For some examples, see Li Bin, ‘Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,’ Science and Global Security 15/1 (2007), 1-30; and Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1-2 (2015), 38-73. 111 Whether a missile is powered by solid or liquid fuel can affect both its external design features and it’s the supporting infrastructure it requires. Liquid-fueled missiles may be identified by the presence on the missile frame of certain piping or vents. Similarly, liquid-fueled missiles, which generally cannot be stored or transported fueled, must be accompanied with a fleet of fueling trucks.


27

including whether the missile placement atop the transporter erector launcher (TEL)112 features noticeable front overhang of the driver cabin or rear overhang of the TEL body. It also reports the TEL’s number of axles and whether it consists of an integrated TEL or a trailer system. Finally, the table reports whether mobile missiles are generally within a cold launch canister, an environmental control container, or exposed; and the estimated size of prepared launch sites.

112 I use the term TEL to refer to any of the vehicles which transport and launch mobile missiles. For a more detailed examination of these vehicles, see Scott LaFoy, ‘TELs and MELs and TEs! Oh My!,’ Arms Control Wonk (blog), 1 June 2017, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203304/tels-and-mels-and-tes-oh-my/.

Table 2: Visible Identifying Features of China’s Land-Based Missile Systems

Missile Features Launcher Features Operational

Features

System Warhead Basing

Missile Length

(m) Diameter

(m) Stages Fuel Front Hang

Rear Hang Axles

Launcher

Type Storage

Mobile Launch Site Length (m)

DF-11 Conv. Mobile 7.5 0.8 1 Solid Significant Significant 4 Integrated Exposed 15

DF-11A Conv. Mobile 8.5 0.8 1 Solid Significant Significant 4 Integrated Exposed 15

DF-15† Conv. Mobile 9.1 1 1 Solid Significant Significant 4 Integrated Container 26

DF-16† Conv. Mobile 10? 1.2 2 Solid Minimal None 5 Integrated Container 45

DF-21A Nuclear Mobile 11 1.4 2 Solid None None 6 Trailer Canister 45

DF-21C/D Conv. Mobile 11 1.4 2 Solid Significant Significant 5 Integrated Canister 45

DF-26 Dual-Use Mobile 14 1.4 2 Solid Significant Significant 6 Integrated Canister ?

DF-31 Nuclear Mobile 13 2.25 3 Solid None None 8 Trailer Canister ?

DF-31A Nuclear Mobile 16/18 2.25 3 Solid None None 8 Trailer Canister ?

DF-31AG Nuclear Mobile 16/18 2.25 3 Solid Significant Significant 8 Integrated Canister ?

DF-4 Nuclear Rollout 28 2 2 Liquid N/A N/A N/A Integrated N/A N/A

DF-41 Nuclear Mobile‡ 21 2 3 Solid Significant Significant 8 Integrated Canister ? DF-5 Nuclear Silo 33 3 2 Liquid N/A N/A N/A Integrated N/A N/A

Source: Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: NASIC Public Affairs Office, 2017). Defense Project, "Missiles of China," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/; “China Nuclear Forces Guide,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/index.html; O’Connor, “PLA Ballistic Missiles,”; Jeffrey Lewis, “Show and TEL,” Arms Control Wonk, 26 March 2013, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/206385/show-and-tel/; Li Bin, “Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-30; “Design Characteristics of China’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Inventory,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2014, https://media.nti.org/pdfs/design_characteristics_of_chinas_ballistic_cruise_missiles_3.pdf; and various English and Chinese-language online open sources. † The DF-15 and DF-16 systems have multiple variants, but they are all believed to be conventionally armed and with similar technical specifications and so are collapsed here. ‡ Recent DOD reports indicate the PLARF may also be considering a silo-based deployment of the DF-41.


28

The clearest differentiation is between China’s conventional shorter-range missiles, which are likely to feature most heavily in a conflict, and the country’s nuclear-armed ICBMs, which China relies on for its strategic deterrent. All of China’s conventional shorter-range missile systems are mobile, solid-fueled, under 11 meters in length, and carried on transporter erector launchers with five or fewer axles. By contrast, two of the four missile variants which make up ICBM force are silo-based or roll-out, both fixed-site launch modes, meaning they would never be confused for a mobile missile. Even China’s mobile ICBMs, the DF-31 and the DF-41, possess characteristics distinguishing them from their conventional counterparts.113 They are much longer and transported on TELs with eight axles in comparison to the four- or five-axle TELs associated with the shorter-range conventional force. Indeed, independent analysts are regularly able to identify mobile missile variants using open-source information and commercial satellite imagery.114 It seems unlikely that the U.S. military, equipped with advanced ISR assets and knowledge of the technical features and operational practices of China’s land-based missiles, would be unable to distinguish between conventional and strategic nuclear forces, at least during peacetime.

However, although it may be relatively easy to distinguish between China’s shorter-range conventional and strategic nuclear missiles, it may be much more challenging to distinguish between conventional and nuclear variants of the same system, in the case of the DF-21, or between nuclear and conventional deployments of dual-use systems such as the DF-26. This is especially true given the prominence of mobility, concealment, deception, and camouflage tactics in China’s operational doctrine and the obscuring nature of the fog of war.115

Ongoing Trends & Future Entanglement in China’s Missile Forces

In general, open-source evidence suggests that the level of entanglement between China’s nuclear and conventional forces, while non-trivial, is not currently as significant as some analysts have warned. The risks may be grouped across three nuclear systems: silo-based ICBMs, mobile ICBMs, and MRBM/IRBM nuclear forces. The escalation risks presented by silo-based ICBMs is quite high given their significance to China’s strategic deterrent. However, due to their clear geographic and technological separation from the conventional forces, the degree of entanglement is relatively low. Mobile ICBMs present similarly high escalation risks and a moderate degree of entanglement due to their mobility. Finally, nuclear MRBMs and IRBMs present a moderate level of escalation risks given their limited utility as a strategic deterrent but present a high degree of entanglement, especially due to the technological entanglement of DF-21 and DF-26 systems.

One of the key factors influencing escalation risks will be the degree to which China values the survival of its regional nuclear forces, which are those most likely to be (inadvertently) degraded. 116 The more that Beijing believes that the maintenance of its regional nuclear

113 Here, DF-31 refers to all variants of that system, including the DF-31A and DF-31AG. 114 See, for example, Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.’ 115 Chase and Erickson, ‘The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force,’ 128-129. 116 Although if there is an inadvertent strike against a nuclear force, China may be less likely to view it as inadvertent. I thank Phillip C. Saunders for this point.


29

capabilities are essential to national objectives, the higher the escalation risks. Historically, China has believed that the force requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence have been lower than in other nuclear-armed states, which would somewhat mitigate escalatory risks. However, if Beijing believes that its regional nuclear forces are necessary either for deterrence or for securing key national objectives in a conflict, the risks would increase.

While the current degree of entanglement may not be as dire as some have predicted, ongoing trends may raise these risks across the geographic, operational, and technological dimensions. In order to increase the survivability of its missile forces, China has emphasized mobility, which increases the likelihood of geographic entanglement.117 PLA reporting also refers to efforts to move from missiles reliant on pre-prepared launch sites to missiles able to launch from anywhere.118 According to one post-reforms report, ‘Vehicle maneuvers are getting farther and farther and combat radius is getting bigger and bigger. The capabilities of all-road maneuvering, all-round launching, comprehensive control, and all-weather assault are becoming stronger.’119 As China’s strategic nuclear forces rely less on fixed-site ICBMs and more on mobile ones, including those with a potential off-road capability, geographic entanglement will likely become more salient. This would increase the likelihood of strategic nuclear forces operating near conventional forces. There is also tentative evidence of China constructing missile brigade garrisons closer together than in the past.120

Trends in command and control appear to be exerting conflicting pressures on the degree of operational entanglement. On the one hand, authoritative Chinese writings seem to anticipate a further integration of command and control arrangements for China’s conventional and nuclear forces. As early as a decade ago, PLA curricular materials explained that ‘nuclear-conventional integration has already become the Second Artillery’s established pattern.’121 In the section on the country’s land-based missiles, the Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA National Defense University appears to call for a further integration of conventional and nuclear systems: ‘The integration of nuclear and conventional strike capability refers to, in the course of constructing a strategic missile force combat capability, organically integrating nuclear counterattack capabilities and conventional strike capabilities, in order that tactical combat units will be under the command of a unified information platform support and command system’ [emphasis added].122 Similarly, the Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA Academy of Military Science includes a discussion on the importance of ‘adhering to nuclear-conventional

117 Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2017), 380. 118 ‘China’s Military: Both Nuclear and Conventional-Armed Missile Troops [中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队].’ 119 ‘The Rocket Force for the First Time Accepts “Battlefield Troops” [火箭军首次接受’沙场点兵’],’ CCTV, 31 July 2017, http://news.cctv.com/2017/07/31/ARTIfsgZw5mWvVF5XQyk5KpZ170731.shtml. 120 For example, some brigade garrisons under Base 65 may be within 10 kilometers of one another, though the exact locations remain to be determined. See Eveleth, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.’ I thank Gerald C. Brown for raising this point. 121 Huo Xiaoyong [霍小勇], Strategics of the Services [军种战略学], (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2007), 303. 122 Xiao [肖], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 380-381.


30

complex deterrence.’123 On the other hand, efforts to integrate conventional missile forces into the command and control structures of the Theater Commands may help isolate conventional forces from nuclear ones.

The deployment of new weapons systems may also increase technological entanglement. Currently, the relatively clear division between China’s ICBM capabilities and its regional nuclear forces help to insulate the risks of entanglement from rising to the strategic level. But as China retires some of its older silo-based ICBMs and introduces more mobile variants such as the DF-41 and DF-31AG and possibly develops and deploys conventional- and nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles, the risks of escalation to the nuclear threshold could extend beyond the theater to the strategic level.124 Similarly, the continued growth of dual-use DF-26 forces may further blur the lines between nuclear and conventional systems.

Together, this analysis suggests a relatively moderate degree of current entanglement within China’s missile forces, though ongoing trends may increase future entanglement. Of the three escalatory mechanisms discussed earlier—heightened vulnerability, target ambiguity, and warhead ambiguity—the risks from target ambiguity and heightened vulnerability appear to be most pronounced. Though not analyzed in-depth here, the risks of warhead ambiguity driving U.S. actions are likely less severe given that entanglement has not yet reached strategic forces. Further, given the short flight times of Chinese MRBMs and IRBMs to regional targets, the U.S. would have little time in which to detect, misidentify, and react to a Chinese launch. Here again, the extent of these risks may turn on the degree to which Beijing believes its regional nuclear forces are necessary to safeguard key national objectives. Given the non-trivial degree of entanglement in these forces, some target ambiguity and heightened vulnerability is likely.

Facing a potential use-it-or-lose-it dilemma stemming from entanglement, Beijing may be more likely to resort to nuclear use due to the mechanisms outlined earlier in the article.125 Beijing could come to rely on its nuclear forces for intra-conflict signaling or coercive leverage. Indeed, as is detailed in next section, PLA military publications describe signaling operations involving both nuclear demonstration strikes and launches of conventionally-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles for the purposes of reestablishing deterrence. Although China does not envision a warfighting role for nuclear weapons, it could also resort to nuclear use in order to offset perceived

123 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], (Beijing: Academy of Military Science [军事科学出版社], 2013), 152. 124 For more on China’s views of and developments in these areas, see Lora Saalman, ‘China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15 August 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide; Lora Saalman, ‘Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear’ (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2014); and Joshua H. Pollack, ‘Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability,’ Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 155-164. Based on a review of Chinese technical writings on hypersonic-related technology, Saalman (2017) concludes that ‘This suggests that the future uses of China’s hypersonic glide vehicles will extend well beyond a conventional payload and a regional conflict.’ 125 This is not to suggest that China’s no-first-use policy is fraudulent, but, rather, that it may not withstand certain pressures. See, for example, David C. Logan, ‘The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons,’ War On The Rocks, 18 September 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-dangerous-myths-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation.’


31

U.S. conventional superiority.126 If Beijing is confronting serious use-it-or-lose-it pressures, it is likely also suffering significant conventional losses. Chinese leaders could also resort to nuclear use for strictly irrational reasons. A high-intensity conventional conflict between the United States and China is likely to involve issues which Beijing perceives as affecting its sovereignty, such as the status of Taiwan or maritime territorial disputes.127 Faced with the prospect of suffering a humiliating defeat over a core national interest or enduring a disarming strike against its nuclear deterrent, Beijing could also resort to nuclear first use to exact revenge. Domestic nationalism could further exacerbate these pressures.128

Given the moderate degree of entanglement, escalatory pressures stemming from it are neither inevitable nor avoidable. Therefore, key variables affecting the potential for escalation will be Chinese perceptions of U.S. intentions, both generally in the nuclear domain and specifically relating to individual strikes which might (inadvertently) degrade China’s nuclear forces. To the extent that China is anxious about the survivability of its nuclear forces and doubts U.S. intentions, it will be more likely to undertake potentially escalatory actions. Here, perceptions will be key in exacerbating or mitigating the escalation pressures.

Perceptual Factors in Chinese Nuclear-conventional Entanglement

While the military-technical drivers of entanglement in China’s missile forces do not appear acute at the moment, the perceptual factors are cause for more concern. In particular, there is evidence that, while American observers believe that Chinese entanglement of conventional and nuclear forces may be both extensive and intentional, that entanglement is more likely the unintentional byproduct of more parochial bureaucratic and domestic political drivers. As described in the theoretical framework, the interaction of the drivers of Chinese entanglement and American perceptions of those drivers may exacerbate escalatory pressures. Further, once a crisis or a conflict has broken out, signals taken by one country under the limited goals of enhancing the survivability of its nuclear forces and strengthening deterrence may be misperceived as preparations for a nuclear strike. In these ways, expectations and signaling both before and during a conflict can alter escalatory pressures.

Assessing American Perceptions of Chinese Intentions

Contrary to many of their Chinese counterparts, American analyses often believe both that entanglement is extensive and that it is intentional, sometimes describing them as ‘not only real

126 On the obstacles to a Chinese warfighting capability, see David C. Logan, ‘Hard Constraints on a Chinese Nuclear Breakout,’ The Nonproliferation Review 24/1-2 (2017), 13-30. 127 Scott L. Kastner, ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flashpoint? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,’ International Security 40/3 (Winter 2015/16), 54-92. 128 Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy,’ Journal of Contemporary China 28/119, 679-695.


32

but perilous.’129 These concerns are even voiced by elements of the U.S. government.130 A recent U.S. Department of Defense report on the Chinese military warns that ‘China’s comingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces, and ambiguities in China’s NFU [no-first-use] conditions, could complicate deterrence and escalation management during a conflict. Potential adversary attacks against Chinese conventional missile force-associated C2 centers could inadvertently degrade Chinese nuclear C2 and generate nuclear use-or-lose pressures among China’s leadership.’131 Some American experts have suggested that entanglement is an attempt to intentionally manipulate the risk of escalation in an effort to induce caution on the part of U.S. decisionmakers.132 American beliefs that Chinese entanglement is a deliberate strategic choice likely increases escalation risks by implying that Beijing is aware of and prepared for potential escalation risks, perhaps encouraging U.S. decisionmakers to take riskier actions in a crisis or conflict.

Discerning the Drivers of Chinese Entanglement

Although China’s missile forces exhibit a non-trivial degree of entanglement, such entanglement may not be driven by a strategic decision to intentionally manipulate the risk of nuclear war—that is, it is not clear that, when it comes to China’s land-based missiles, Schelling is being read in Beijing.133 This section introduces and evaluates three hypotheses explaining the emergence of Chinese entanglement. The available evidence suggests that Chinese entanglement likely stemmed from domestic operational and political factors and not from deliberate strategic ones.

China might pursue entanglement for at least three reasons. First, and most commonly cited, entanglement might bolster strategic deterrence in the ways described by Schelling. By intentionally manipulating risk through entanglement, China might hope to induce greater American restraint. While the logic of this factor is compelling, there is no direct evidence in Chinese writings to support it.134 Indeed, Chinese writings are notable for their lack of attention to

129 Lewis and Xue ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ 62. 130 Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019, 66; personal communications with U.S. officials 2016 and 2019. 131 Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019, 66. 132 Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VIII Report, 10; personal communications with U.S. officials, 2016 and 2019. Also see P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu, ‘China’s Ambiguous Missile Strategy Is Risky,’ Eastern Arsenal (blog), Popular Science, 11 May 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles/; and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control,’ Foreign Affairs 97/6 (November/December 2018). 133 For an argument that Beijing’s behavior in the maritime domain represents an effort to deliberately manipulate risk, see Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders, Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2012). 134 Though there is some evidence that some Chinese strategists may have come to appreciate the risks of entanglement and its residual deterrent benefits in part as a result of repeated American concerns.


33

the potential risks of entanglement. 135 Chinese experts similarly report that the issue of entanglement has not received significant attention within the Chinese nuclear community.136 In general, Chinese nuclear thinking reportedly envisions a strong firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons.137 Although China may perceive benefits from continuing an ‘organic’ state of entanglement, a deliberate strategy would likely have resulted in a greater degree of entanglement than currently exists. While there are areas for concern, entanglement in China’s missile forces is by no means comprehensive, perhaps suggesting entanglement is the byproduct of other factors.

Second, China might entangle its forces for narrower operational reasons. Though armed with different warheads, conventional and nuclear variants of the same missile system are likely to have similar transportation, maintenance, logistics, and personnel requirements. Basing both variants together may be an attempt to take advantage of economies of scale and operational synergies. The recent history of missile brigades in the PLA bears this out. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Army controlled two brigades armed with short-range ballistic missiles of the type typically controlled by the Second Artillery. In 2010, however, both brigades were transferred away from the Army to the Second Artillery. As one American expert has observed, ‘personnel, logistics, and training requirements for only two SRBM brigades proved unwieldly for the army when most SRBM units are assigned to the Second Artillery.’138 Chinese researchers echo the operational advantages stemming from entanglement. A professor in the Strategy Department of the PLA National Defense University has explicitly noted the ‘resource savings’ that stem from

135 Zhao Tong [赵通], ‘China and the Evolution of the International Nuclear Order [中国与国际核秩序的演化],’ Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy [清华－卡内基全球政策中心], 13 March 2016, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/03/13/zh-63020/iv4d. 136 Interviews with Chinese experts, 2019; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement,’ 51-54. Perhaps ironically, the few open source Chinese-language discussions of the risks of entanglement analyze the risks in the context of possible U.S. deployments of dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles or so-called hypersonic systems. See, for example, Zou Zhibo [邹治波], ‘Implications and Impacts of U.S.’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [美国退出《中导条约》的当代含意与影响], International Economic Review [国际经济评论] 1 (2020), 34; Hu Dongdong [胡冬冬], Song Feng[宋锋], and Ye Lei [叶蕾], ‘Analysis of the Development and Impact of Hypersonic Weapon Nuclear Weaponization[高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响分析], Aerodynamic Missile Journal [飞航导弹] 1 (2020), 54; and Hu, Dongdong [胡冬冬] and Ye Lei [叶蕾], Development and Impact of the Nuclear Weaponization of Hypersonic Weapons: Making the Mechanisms of War More Complicated and More Dangerous [高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响，让战争机制更复杂而危险], 1 April 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1662763034867300903&wfr=spider&for=pc. Zou is Research Fellow and Deputy Director of Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Hu and Ye are affiliated with China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. 137 Liu Chong, ‘The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts,’ in Li Bin and Tong Zhao, (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 149-169. Interviews with Chinese experts, 2018. 138 Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 96. This reasoning is echoed by Chinese sources claiming that the transfer was made ‘because the Second Artillery Force is highly dependent on base support units. A Second Artillery base can support multiple missile brigades, while the Army’s two missile brigades needed to independently develop support forces requiring extensive manpower and resources. The entire time [the missile brigades were with the Army], saw many thorny problems, from personnel training to the command system.’ See Huang Ao [黄翱], ‘Sword Casting｜The Rocket Force’s Assassin’s Mace Dream: Dongfeng-11 Series Tactical Ballistic Missiles [铸剑｜火箭军的杀手锏之梦：东风-11系列战术弹道导弹],’ The Paper [澎湃], 7 January 2016, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1417910#p=32.


34

integrating conventional and nuclear forces.139 Two researchers from the Academy of Military Science, in explaining the motivations of developing the dual-use DF-26, extolled the flexibility such nuclear-conventional dual-use systems provide in selectively augmenting either the nuclear or conventional deterrent.140 Indeed, according to a former Second Artillery deputy commander, the introduction of conventional missiles into the PLA initiated a ‘strong debate’ about which force would control them—the Army or the Second Artillery.141 In the end, PLA leadership decided to vest control of the systems in the Second Artillery given its experience operating missile systems and the perceived benefits of ‘low investment and quick work results.’142

Third, Rocket Force commanders may have viewed entanglement as a political advantage in their organizational battles with other elements of the PLA. The recent spate of military reforms saw the transfer of operational control from the services to the newly established Theater Commands, both in wartime and in peacetime.143 This was largely seen as a loss of institutional power by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, the Rocket Force appears to have (yet) not suffered the same loss of operational control. Although public reports describe increasing efforts to integrate Rocket Force units with the Theater Commands, the highly centralized command and control structure running from the Central Military Commission (CMC) to the Rocket Force and the individual launch brigades appears to still largely be in place.144 Indeed, the Rocket Force appears to be the only service to still possess both force-building and operational responsibilities. 145 Given the Chinese leadership’s views about the limited utility of nuclear weapons, as well as longstanding policies to ensure strict political control of China’s nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that nuclear-armed units would be placed under operational control of the Theater Commands. However, administrative and operational separation of conventional and nuclear forces might have made it even easier to transfer control of conventional units to the Theater Commands. Continued entanglement of nuclear and conventional forces may have been an attempt to strengthen Rocket Force arguments to retain control of all ballistic missile units.

In addition to the lack of evidence that the PLA has deliberately pursued entanglement for strategic reasons, the PLA may also perceive some operational costs to entanglement. The mixing of forces required that conventional forces be placed under the same command and control structures as nuclear forces. For example, despite the PLA’s push for enhancing its ability to conduct joint operations, the Rocket Force’s conventional missile units appear to remain (so far)

139 Sun Kuaiji [孙快吉], ‘The World Looks Upon the Construction of the Rocket Force [放眼世界看火箭军建设],’ PLA Daily [解放军报], 3 May 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/2016-05/03/content_7032475.htm. 140 Wang Zhangqin [王长]勤 and Fang Guangming [方光明], ‘Why We Had to Develop the Dongfeng-26 Ballistic Missile [我们为什么要发展东风-26弹道导弹],’ China Youth Daily [中国青年报], 23 November 2015, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-11/23/nw.D110000zgqnb_20151123_1-09.htm. 141 Lewis and Xue, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ 52. 142 Ge Dongsheng [葛东升], ‘The Birth of a New-Type Missile Force [一支新型导弹部队的诞生]’, in The Second Artillery Political Department [第二炮兵政治部], (ed.), A Glorious Era: Looking Back on the Second Artillery’s Development and Advances in the Period of Reform and Opening [辉煌年代:回顾在改革开放中发展前进的第二炮兵] (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House [中央文献出版社], 2008), 295. 143 Saunders and Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols?,’ 68-75. 144 Logan, ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces.’ 145 The Strategic Support Force may also have both responsibilities. I thank Phillip C. Saunders for highlighting this.


35

apart from the command structures of both the Theater Commands and the other military services. 146 This command and control arrangement, while promoting centralized control of strategic weapons systems, may hamper effective coordination in joint operations. For example, in a discussion of the distinct operational demands of conventional and nuclear missiles, a former instructor at the PLA Rocket Force University of Engineering has argued, somewhat surprisingly, that ‘From a long-term perspective, the Rocket Force should transfer short-range ballistic missiles to the Army.’147

Evidence that China has entangled its missile forces for more parochial bureaucratic reasons is cause to be both pessimistic about escalation dynamics and optimistic about the prospects of addressing the roots of those dynamics. Unawareness of the escalation risks of entanglement coupled with generally sanguine views of escalation control could make the PLA more aggressive in a crisis or conflict.148 The inability to anticipate dangerous escalatory pressures could make the PLA less prepared to cope with surprising escalation dynamics and more inclined to misperceive accidents or inadvertent strikes as intentional efforts to degrade its nuclear deterrent. However, to the extent that entanglement is not driven by strategic motives, China may be more amenable to unilateral or bilateral policies which reduce the risks stemming from entanglement.

U.S.-China Intra-Crisis & Intra-Conflict Signaling

Escalation risks from entanglement may also be influenced by intra-crisis and intra-conflict signaling. In the U.S.-China case, Beijing’s nuclear signaling and measures to increase the survivability of its nuclear deterrent could be misinterpreted as preparations for an actual launch. Authoritative Chinese texts and experts specify that PLA troops should take a number of potentially escalatory steps to demonstrate resolve in a crisis. These include, according to the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns and other documents, raising the alert status of missile systems, dispersing road-mobile missiles toward pre-established launch sites, and conducting ‘test launches of medium and long range strategic missiles armed with conventional warheads for focused live fire intimidation.’149 These texts advocate publicly broadcasting evidence that the

146 As discussed, there is still considerable uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the command and control arrangements of Rocket Force conventional units, especially in joint operations. However, the language of doctrinal guidance provided to conventional units and certain structural features of the relationships between the services suggests that such units would remain under the control of Rocket Force commanders who would then coordinate with Theater Command leadership. Also see Lee, ‘Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations.’ 147 Tu Chenxin [屠晨昕], ‘Why the Second Artillery Is Being Elevated to the Rocket Force, the Fourth Major Military Service [二炮为何要升格为第四大军种火箭军],’ Qianjiang Evening News [钱江晚报], 7 January 2016, http://qjwb.zjol.com.cn/html/2016-01/07/content_3252453.htm?div=-1. 148 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,’ International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019), 61-109. 149 See, for instance, Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 282-296; Cao Zhengrong [曹正荣], Wu Runbo [吴润波], and Sun Jianjun[孙建军], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2008), 260. For some English-language discussion of the risks of certain forms of Chinese signaling, see Michael S. Chase, ‘China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States,’ Asia Policy 16 (July 2013), 98-101; Christopher T. Yeaw,


36

PLA has taken such steps to provide credible signs of resolve.150 Elsewhere, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns says that, in order to signal determination in a conflict, the missile forces may arm an ICBM with a conventional warhead and launch it at the adversary’s homeland.151

American leaders, confronted with Chinese military maneuvers indistinguishable from preparations for an actual nuclear launch and receiving explicit and detailed threats of an imminent Chinese nuclear strike, would face tremendous pressures to act.152 Skepticism of China’s declared No-First-Use policy may intensify these pressures.153 For instance, recent report on China’s military from the Department of Defense notes ‘ambiguities in China’s NFU conditions,’ while the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review envisions situations in which China might conclude ‘that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities.’154

In addition, risks from signaling may be exacerbated by China’s opacity in the nuclear domain.155 Beijing views opacity as a fundamental feature of the survivability of its nuclear force.156 But such practices could raise the risks of misperception stemming from entanglement by confounding the adversary’s attempts to locate, identify, and track missile assets. Indeed, Chinese military texts, including those pertaining to the nuclear forces, discuss the importance of deterring the enemy through uncertainty about China’s response.157 For example, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that ‘The objective is to hide the true and show the false, to create wrong enemy decisions and to impede the enemy’s reconnaissance and strikes.’158

Finally, increasing strategic competition between the U.S. and China, within the nuclear domain and other aspects of the bilateral relationship, threaten to exacerbate these escalation dynamics. Longstanding Chinese concerns about the U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy will increase fears of an American disarming first strike. 159 Chinese experts and officials have expressed concerns about possible U.S. counterforce capabilities, especially new U.S. abilities in the areas

Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, ‘The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,’ in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, (ed.), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Georgetown University Press, 2012), 72-75; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 37-38. 150 Cao [曹], Wu [吴], and Sun [孙], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], 259-260. 151 Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 402. 152 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement,’ 71. 153 Logan, ‘The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons.’ 154 Annual Report to Congress, 2019: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019 , 66; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 32. 155 Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution,’ 483. 156 For more on transparency in China’s nuclear practices, see Wu Riqiang, ‘How China Practices and Thinks About Nuclear Transparency,’ in Li Bin and Tong Zhao, (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 219-243; and Lora Saalman, China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 15-19. 157 See, for example, Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 225-227; Shou [寿], The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 173. 158 Yu [于], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], 225. 159 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,’ International Security 30/4 (Spring 2006), 7-44; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,’ China Security (Winter 2007), 66-89.


37

of conventional precision strike and ballistic missile defense could.160 The U.S. has rejected calls to officially acknowledge a state of mutual nuclear vulnerability with China, which Chinese commentators cite as evidence of possible malign U.S. intent.161 Other indications of nuclear primacy noted by Chinese experts include Congressional directions to U.S. Strategic Command to explore the possibility of neutralizing Chinese underground tunnels and statements by U.S. officials that emerging conventional prompt global strike capabilities could target Chinese asymmetric capabilities.162 A belief that current or future U.S. policy might seek to deny China a survivable second-strike capability could significantly increase Chinese incentives to launch first in a crisis. In addition to competition within the nuclear domain, the growing strategic rivalry and securitization of the U.S.-China relationship will heighten these risks by not only increasing the possibility of a crisis or conflict occurring, but also encouraging the adoption of worst-case scenario perceptions.163

This combination of perceptual factors significantly increases escalation risks. American belief that entanglement is a strategic choice by Beijing may give American officials less pause in executing risky operations targeting potentially entangled conventional and nuclear Chinese forces. At the same time, if entanglement has emerged as a byproduct of more parochial bureaucratic or organizational decisions, this suggests that Chinese leaders are less cognizant of its potential risks and less well prepared to cope with them in the midst of a crisis or a conflict. Finally, intra-crisis and intra-conflict signaling is likely to involve steps which, though intended only to demonstrate resolve or increase the deterrent’s survivability, could nonetheless be misperceived as preparations for an actual nuclear strike, exacerbating threat perceptions and escalatory pressures.

The analysis here, though incorporating additional variables, largely confirms the conclusions of previous analyses, like those by Talmadge and Rovner, which find that perceptual factors will be key in driving entanglement-related escalation dynamics. The current degree of ‘military-technical’ entanglement, while non-trivial, appears lower than generally believed. China’s conventional and nuclear forces appear to be somewhat isolated geographically, operationally, and technologically from one another in important ways. Perhaps most significantly, the country’s strategic ICBM force is separate from its shorter-range conventional assets. However, as discussed above, there are ongoing organizational, operational, and technological trends within the Rocket Force which could increase both the extent of nuclear-conventional

160 Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 15-23; interviews with Chinese experts, 2018 and 2019. 161 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,’ International Security 41/1 (Summer 2016), 49-98. 162 Yao Yunzhu, ‘China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,’ China-U.S. Focus, 22 April 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy/; and Acton, ‘Silver Bullet,’ 29-31. Though Acton demonstrates that there is very little evidence that the U.S. is considering using conventional prompt global strike capabilities to target any nuclear forces, including those of China. 163 See, for example, Phillip C. Saunders, ‘U.S.-China Relations and Chinese Military Modernization,’ in Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle, (ed.), Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming); and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Defense, Military, and Security Issues as Drivers of U.S.-China Strategic Competition,’ in Evan Medeiros, (ed.), Managing Strategic Competition: Rethinking U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming).


38

entanglement in the force and the escalatory risks stemming from that entanglement. Avoiding some of the worst of these risks will require conscious efforts in both Beijing and Washington.

Conclusions & Implications

There are a number of unilateral and bilateral steps that the U.S. and China could undertake to address entanglement risks. In general, these steps focus on planning around entanglement risks, developing a shared understanding of the underlying risks, and establishing and maintaining geographic, command, and operational distinctions between conventional and nuclear systems.

First, the United States should plan and execute crisis and conflict measures with a clear understanding of the escalation risks stemming from entanglement. In particular, U.S. planning should be sensitive to Chinese perceptions and concerns about the survivability of its strategic nuclear deterrent and avoid, to the extent possible, actions which could (be perceived to) undermine that deterrent. Second, China could allow for more selective transparency in its nuclear arsenal to confirm that entanglement is not a concern. To the extent that selective transparency contributes to strategic stability, it should be pursued. Third, both sides can engage in strategic communication and signaling both before and during a crisis or conflict in order to reduce the escalation risks stemming from entanglement. This can include explanation from each side about their perceptions of the drivers of entanglement and the risks such entanglement generates. It can also include clarification of goals in a crisis or conflict which can help to reduce misperception and worst-case thinking on the other side.

Finally, and perhaps most ambitiously, China could ensure geographic and operational separation of its conventional and nuclear forces. Geographic separation would apply not only to peacetime basing facilities, but also to the associated launch sites, operating areas, and supporting units.164 To address challenges of verifying arms control limits involving road-mobile Soviet missiles, START I proscribed unique, non-overlapping operating areas for each missile base.165 A similar approach in China might reduce entanglement risks by, for example, deploying conventional and nuclear missiles on readily distinguishable transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), basing them at geographically separated bases, and assigning them to non-overlapping operating areas and launch sites. China could also employ observable differences to distinguish between its conventional and nuclear systems as the U.S. has done to distinguish between nuclear and conventional bombers.166 It could avoid further mixing conventional- and nuclear-capable missile systems at lower organizational levels within the Rocket Force. As China expands its missile

164 David C. Logan, ‘Drawing a Line Between Conventional and Nuclear Weapons in China,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 May 2015, http://thebulletin.org/drawing-line-between-conventional-and-nuclear-weapons-china8304. 165 For provisions related to verifying restrictions on mobile missiles, see Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), July 31, 1991, Articles III, VI, and X, as well as the Inspection Protocol for the Treaty. Text available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2493. For analysis and discussion of verifying arms control agreements in general and START I in particular, see Amy F. Woolf, ‘Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control,’ Congressional Research Service, 23 December 2011. 166 Oriana Pawlyk, ‘START Lanced the B-1s Nukes, but the Bomber will still get new Bombs,’ Military.com, 12 July 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/07/12/start-lanced-the-b-1s-nukes-but-bomber-will-still-get-new-bombs.html. I thank Justin Anderson for highlighting this point.


39

arsenal, it should also avoid assigning either conventionally-armed ballistic missiles or shorter-range nuclear ballistic missiles to bases that control ICBMs. Insulating ICBMs from the rest of the missile force is one of the strongest ways to avoid escalation risks at the strategic nuclear level.

The deterioration of the U.S.-China relationship will complicate these efforts, particularly those requiring more formal cooperation. But avoiding nuclear use in a crisis or conflict should be a goal shared by both Beijing and Washington. Further, evidence both that entanglement was not a deliberate effort to manipulate risk and that China places greater weight on the survivability of its nuclear deterrent suggests that Beijing might be open to measures addressing entanglement.167

Beyond China and the United States, as technological advancement continues apace and the organizational proclivities of militaries remain unchanged, there may be greater risk of entanglement for other states in the future. This suggests three general principles for addressing the risks of entanglement.

First, in acquisitions, states should pay special attention to the potential impact of developing and deploying dual-capable systems given their potential for increasing technological entanglement. Second, states should guard against inadvertent operational entanglement of their nuclear and conventional forces. As discussed, states may perceive entanglement as a strategic choice enhancing deterrence against the adversary. The escalatory risks stemming from intentional strategic entanglement may well be lower than those stemming from parochial bureaucratic interests as a state is more aware of the risks and potential for misperception. However, states should remain vigilant about the possibility of such risks and misperceptions and avoid conditions of non-strategic entanglement. Finally, in developing war plans against adversaries with potential entanglement, states should take into account the dangers of entanglement. This could perhaps mean exercising a kind of tactical or strategic restraint in crises and conflicts.168

Analysts may also find it fruitful to apply the framework introduced here to other cases. The kind of dynamics described here are more likely to occur in conflicts involving states with smaller, less survivable nuclear forces, such as Pakistan or India. However, there are growing concerns about the degree of operational entanglement of conventional and nuclear systems in the United States and Russia. 169 Arbatov, Dvorkin, and Topychakanov have illustrated how the potential co-location by Russia of tactical nuclear weapon systems with conventional assets, as well as the deployment of Russian dual-capable nuclear-conventional systems could generate escalation risks.170 The framework presented here may prove helpful in assessing how such forces are or not entangled and what risks they may or may not present.

167 If Chinese entanglement is a byproduct of bureaucratic factors, senior political and military officials may not be best positioned to change tactical and operational practices which lead to entanglement, and it may be necessary to involve junior- and mid-level PLA officials. I thank Chris Chyba for this point. 168 For a discussion of strategic restraint in the U.S.-China security context, see David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in the Age of Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011). 169 Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement,’ 56-99. 170 Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov, ‘Entanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective,’ in James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 19-22.


40

More research may be necessary to determine broader trends which promote or inhibit entanglement within military organizations. The Chinese case suggests roles for both technological change and organizational behavior in driving greater nuclear-conventional entanglement and thereby increasing the risks of inadvertent escalation.171

Technological change can promote entanglement in at least two ways. First, as is illustrated by the China case, advanced delivery systems are increasingly capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. It may be difficult or impossible to distinguish the payload of these systems, especially when they are cloaked in the fog of war. Second, advancements in the power and accuracy of conventional weapons have created the possibility of executing counterforce strikes with advanced conventional weapons.172 For decades, nuclear weapons were the only systems capable of generating an overpressure large enough to destroy hardened bunkers or a blast radius wide enough to destroy or disable a mobile missile system. However, recent developments, especially in precision guidance, suggest that nuclear weapons may be jeopardized by conventional weapons, blurring the line between the conventional and the nuclear domains.173 The growing capabilities of conventional systems could also prompt dangerous asymmetric responses from conventionally inferior states such as relying more on tactical nuclear weapons to respond to strategic conventional strikes.174

This technological change may be mediated by organizational behaviors in ways which further promote entanglement. As technology allows the creation of more capable conventional systems, military organizations may facilitate other forms of entanglement. Military organizations may seek to combine new systems with old systems in order to exploit economies of scale or operational synergies. This can lead to greater operational and, potentially, geographic entanglement. Inter-service rivalry can encourage militaries to tightly couple the operations of conventional and nuclear systems to avoid them being carved off to a rival service. In the face of these broader technological trends and organizational proclivities, addressing the unintended risks of entanglement will require concerted effort from state and military leaders.

171 Posen mentions the potential role of technology in bringing conventional and nuclear forces into collision, for example anti-submarine warfare forces able to attack both the adversary’s attack submarines and its ballistic missile submarines or aircraft that can be used to carry out both conventional and nuclear strikes. However, the role of technology is not formally developed and is not presented as a fundamental component of the model. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation, 16. 172 See, for example, Tong Zhao, ‘Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries?,’ Science & Global Security 19/3 (2011), 195-222; Yevgeny Miasnikov, ‘The Counterforce Potential of Precision-Guided Munitions,’ in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), 84-103; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The Nukes We Need,’ Foreign Affairs 88/6 (November/December 2009), 39-51; Acton, ‘Silver Bullet?’ 120-126; and Ronald Kerber and Robert Stein, Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009), 81-84. 173 States can also employ legacy systems in ways that blur the nuclear-conventional separation, for example by launching conventional weapons from delivery systems that had previously been associated exclusively with nuclear weapons. See, for example, Pavel Podvig, ‘Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons: Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72/3 (2016), 145-149. 174 James M. Acton, ‘Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and Responses,’ The Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 146-147.


41

Acknowledgements:

For helpful comments and support, I thank Justin Anderson, Ari C. Anisfeld, Philip Atkinson, Gerald C. Brown, John Chen, Thomas J. Christensen, Christopher F. Chyba, Fiona S. Cunningham, Aaron Friedberg, Sarah Gamberini, Hans M. Kristensen, Scott LaFoy, Lynn Lee, Phillip C. Saunders, Tsering Wangyal Shawa, Eric Snyder, Mark Stokes, Joel Wuthnow, Tong Zhao, members of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, and participants in the Princeton University Security Studies Graduate Research Seminar. Research for this article was conducted, in part, while the author was an expert consultant with the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any of the aforementioned funders.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

Research for the article was supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Center for International Security Studies, and the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program.

Notes on Contributor

David C. Logan is a Ph.D. candidate in security studies at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs.


42

Bibliography Acton, James M., ‘Reclaiming Strategic Stability,’ in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson

(ed.), Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 117-146.

Acton, James M., Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

Acton, James M., ‘Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and Responses’, The Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 141-154. doi:10.1080/10736700.2015.1105434

Acton, James M., (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).

Acton, James M., ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (Summer 2018), 56-99. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00320

Acton, James M., Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).

Acton, James M., Tong Zhao, and Li Bin, ‘Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 September 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236.

Arbatov, Alexey, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Petr Topychkanov, ‘Entanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective’, in James M. Acton (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 11-45.

Blasko, Dennis J., ‘Mission Action 2010: Three Complex, Transregional, Integrated Joint Operations’, China Brief 10/22 (2010), 6-9.

Blasko, Dennis J., The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).

Bunn, M. Elaine, and Vincent A. Manzo, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability?” INSS Strategic Forum 263 (February 2011).

Cao, Zhengrong [曹正荣], Wu Runbo [吴润波], and Sun Jianjun[孙建军], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战], (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2008).

Chase, Michael S., ‘China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States’, Asia Policy 16 (July 2013), 115-137. doi:10.1080/14799855.2012.686253

Chase, Michael S. and Andrew S. Erickson, ‘The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting’, Asian Security 8/2 (2012) 115-137. doi:10.1080/14799855.2012.686253

Chase, Michael S., et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).

“China’s Offensive Missile Forces,” Transcript of Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission, 1 April 2015.

Christensen, Thomas, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/ 4 (August 2012), 447-487. doi:10.1080/01402390.2012.714710


43

Christman, Ron, ‘Conventional Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps’, Comparative Strategy 30/3 (2011), 198-228. doi:10.1080/01495933.2011.587679

Cunningham, Fiona S., ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 18 July 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

Cunningham, Fiona S. and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability’, International Security 40/2 (Fall 2015) , 7-50. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00215

Cunningham, Fiona S. and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019), 61-109. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00359

Eveleth, Decker, ‘Mapping the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force,” A Boy and His Blog, 2 July 2020 https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/mapping-the-people-s-liberation-army-rocket-force.

Fearon, James D., ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997) 68-90. doi:10.1177%2F0022002797041001004

Feiveson, Harold A., ‘The Dilemma of Theater Nuclear Weapons,’ World Politics 33/2 (1981), 282-298. doi:10.2307/2010373

Ge, Dongsheng [葛东升], ‘The Birth of a New-Type Missile Force [一支新型导弹部队的诞生]’, in The Second Artillery Political Department [第二炮兵政治部], (ed.), A Glorious Era: Looking Back on the Second Artillery’s Development and Advances in the Period of Reform and Opening [辉煌年代:回顾在改革开放中发展前进的第二炮兵] (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House [中央文献出版社], 2008).

Gill, Bates, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ‘The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence’, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (ed.), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 510-586.

Glaser, Charles L. and Steve Fetter, ‘Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China’, International Security 41/1 (Summer 2016), 49-98. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00248

Glosny, Michael, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report (Monterey, Calif.: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, May 2013).

Glosny, Michael, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VIII Report (Monterey, CA: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, November 2014).

Goldstein, Avery, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations’, International Security 37/4 (Spring 2013), 49-89. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00114

Gompert, David C. and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in the Age of Vulnerability (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011).

Hu, Dongdong [胡冬冬], Song Feng[宋锋], and Ye Lei [叶蕾], ‘Analysis of the Development and Impact of Hypersonic Weapon Nuclear Weaponization[高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响分析], Aerodynamic Missile Journal [飞航导弹] 1 (2020), 51-55. doi:10.16338/j.issn.1009-1319.20190856


44

Hu, Dongdong [胡冬冬] and Ye Lei [叶蕾], Development and Impact of the Nuclear Weaponization of Hypersonic Weapons: Making the Mechanisms of War More Complicated and More Dangerous [高超声速武器核武化发展态势及影响，让战争机制更复杂而危险], 1 April 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1662763034867300903&wfr=spider&for=pc.

Huo Xiaoyong [霍小勇], (ed.), Strategics of the Services [军种战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2007).

Jervis, Robert, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (January 1978), 167-214. doi:10.2307/2009958

Jervis, Robert, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

Kastner, Scott L., ‘Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flashpoint? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan’, International Security 40/No. 3 (Winter 2015/16), 54-92. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00227

Kerber, Ronald and Robert Stein, Report of the Defense Science Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009).

Kristensen, Hans M., Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, D.C.: The Federation of American Scientists, 2006).

Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71/4 (2015), 77-84. doi:10.1177/0096340215591247

Kristensen, Hans M. and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72/4 (2016), 205-211. doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054

Kristensen Hans M. and Matt Korda, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75/4 (2019), 171-178. doi:10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511

Lee, Roderick ‘Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations’, China Brief 20/14 (2020), 24-31.

Lewis, Jeffrey G., Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2014). Lewis, Jeffrey G., ‘China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs’, in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler,

and Shane Mason (ed.), The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2016).

Lewis, John W., and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5 (September/October 2012), 45-65. doi:10.1177/2F0096340212459155

Li, Bin, ‘Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles’, Science and Global Security 15/1 (2007), 1-30. doi:10.1080/08929880701350197

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy’, International Security 30/4 (Spring 2006), 7-44. doi:10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.7

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press, ‘U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent’, China Security (Winter 2007), 66-89.

Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press, ‘The Nukes We Need’, Foreign Affairs 88/6 (November/December 2009), 39-51.

Liu, Chong, ‘The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts’, in Li Bin and Tong Zhao (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).


45

Logan, David C., ‘Drawing a Line Between Conventional and Nuclear Weapons in China’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 May 2015, http://thebulletin.org/drawing-line-between-conventional-and-nuclear-weapons-china8304.

Logan, David C., ‘PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,’ Joint Force Quarterly 83 (October 2016), 57-62.

Logan, David C., ‘Hard Constraints on a Chinese Nuclear Breakout’, The Nonproliferation Review 24/1-2 (2017), 13-30. doi:10.1080/10736700.2017.1371406

Logan, David C., ‘Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force: What They Tell Us’, Asian Security 14/1 (2018), 1-19. doi:10.1080/14799855.2017.1422089

Logan, David C., ‘Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces’, in Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow (ed.), Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2019).

Logan, David C., ‘The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons’, War On The Rocks, 18 September 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-dangerous-myths-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/.

Long, Austin and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1-2 (2015), 38-73. doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.958150

Löwenheim Oded and Gadi Heimann, ‘Revenge in International Politics’, Security Studies 17/4 (2008), 685-724. doi:10.1080/09636410802508055

McDermott, Rose, Anthony C Lopez, and Peter K Hatemi, ‘“Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It”: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence’, Texas National Security Review 1/1 (2017), 68-88.

Miasnikov, Yevgeny, ‘The Counterforce Potential of Precision-Guided Munitions’, in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), 84-103.

Mulvenon, James and David Finkelstein, (ed.), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002).

Narang, Vipin, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014).

Naughton, Barry, ‘The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior’, The China Quarterly 115 (September 1988), 351-386. doi:10.1017/S030574100002748X

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2017: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017).



Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).


46

Pawlyk, Oriana, ‘START Lanced the B-1s Nukes, but the Bomber will still get new Bombs’, Military.com, 12 July 2017, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/07/12/start-lanced-the-b-1s-nukes-but-bomber-will-still-get-new-bombs.html.

Perry, William J., and Andy Weber, ‘Mr. President, Kill the New Cruise Missile’, The Washington Post, 15 October 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruise-missile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html?utm_term=.7b826f39569a.

Podvig, Pavel, ‘Blurring the Line Between Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons: Increasing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72/3 (2016), 145-149. doi:10.1080/00963402.2016.1170363

Pollack, Joshua H., ‘Boost-Glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability’, The Nonproliferation Review 22/2 (2015), 155-164. doi:10.1080/10736700.2015.1119422

Posen, Barry R., ‘Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank’, International Security 7/2 (Fall 1982), 28-54. doi:10.2307/2538432

Posen, Barry R., Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Escalation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Powell, Robert, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence’, Political Science Quarterly 100/1 (Spring 1985), 75-96. doi:10.2307/2150861

Powell, Robert, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’, American Political Science Review 83/2 (1989), 503-519. doi:10.2307/1962402

Powell, Robert, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Rand, Robin, “The Obama Nuclear Deterrent Modernization Plan and Schedule,” Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 14 July 2016.

Redden, Mark E. and Phillip C. Saunders, Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach, (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2012).

Rovner, Joshua, ‘Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696-730. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1293532

Saalman, Lora, China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

Saalman, Lora, Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2014).

Saalman, Lora, ‘China: Lines Blur Between Nuclear and Conventional Warfighting’, The Interpreter, 19 December 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/19/China-Lines-blur-between-nuclear-and-conventional-warfighting.aspx.

Saalman, Lora, ‘China’s Calculus on Hypersonic Glide’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15 August 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/chinas-calculus-hypersonic-glide.

Sagan, Scott D., ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, International Security 18/4 (1994) 66-107. doi:10.2307/2539178

Sagan, Scott D., The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Saunders, Phillip C., ‘Defense, Military, and Security Issues as Drivers of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, in Evan Medeiros, (ed.), Managing Strategic Competition: Rethinking U.S.-


47

China Relations in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming).

Saunders, Phillip C., ‘U.S.-China Relations and Chinese Military Modernization’, in Avery Goldstein and Jacques deLisle, (ed.), Security and US-China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming).

Saunders, Phillip C. and David C. Logan, ‘China’s Regional Nuclear Capability, Non-Nuclear Strategic Systems, and Integration of Concepts and Operations’, in James Smith and Paul Bolt (ed.), China's Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming).

Saunders, Phillip C., and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China's Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms’, Joint Force Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter, July 2016), 68-75.

Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). Schlosser, Eric, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the

Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin, 2013). Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of

Military Science [军事科学出版社], 2013). Singer, P.W. and Ma Xiu, ‘China’s Ambiguous Missile Strategy Is Risky’, Eastern Arsenal

(blog), Popular Science, May 11, 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles/.

Snyder, Glenn H., Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). Snyder, Jack, ‘Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984’,

International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984), 108-146. doi:10.2307/2538637 Steinbruner, John, ‘Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions’, World

Politics 28/2 (1976), 223-245. doi:10.2307/2009891 Stokes, Mark, ‘PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference’, Project 2049 Institute, 9

April 2018. Talmadge, Caitlin, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation

in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41/4 (Spring 2017), 50-92. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00274

Talmadge, Caitlin, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control’, Foreign Affairs 97/6 (November/December 2018).

Tetlock, Philip E., Charles B. McGuire, and Gregory Mitchell, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence’, Annual Review of Psychology 42/1 (1991), 239-276. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.42.020191.001323

U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council of the National Academies of Science, 2008). doi:10.17226/12061

U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, New-Generation CSS-2 IRBM Ground Support Equipment PRC (Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency, October 1979).

U.S. National Photographic Interpretation Center, New Mobile Solid-Propellant MRBM Under Development, China (Langley, Va.: Central Intelligence Agency, November 1983).

Weiss, Jessica Chen, ‘How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy’, Journal of Contemporary China 28/119, 679-695. doi:10.1080/10670564.2019.1580427


48

Woolf, Amy F., ‘Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control’, Congressional Research Service, 23 December 2011.

Woolf, Amy F., ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 24 February 2016.

Wu, Riqiang, ‘How China Practices and Thinks About Nuclear Transparency’, in Li Bin and Tong Zhao, (ed.), Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 219-243.

Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2017).

Yeaw, Christopher T., Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, ‘The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy’, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, (ed.), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Georgetown University Press, 2012), 53-80.

Yu, Jixun [于际训], (ed.), The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2004).

Zhang, Yuliang [张玉良], (ed.), The Science of Campaigns [战役学], (Beijing, National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006).

Zhao, Tong, ‘Conventional Counterforce Strike: An Option for Damage Limitation in Conflicts with Nuclear-Armed Adversaries?’, Science & Global Security 19/3 (2011), 195-222. doi:10.1080/08929882.2011.616146

Zhao, Tong [赵通], ‘China and the Evolution of the International Nuclear Order [中国与国际核秩序的演化]’, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy [清华－卡内基全球政策中心], 13 March 2016, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2016/03/13/zh-63020/iv4d.

Zhao, Tong and Li Bin, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective’, in James M. Acton (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 47-75.

Zou, Zhibo [邹治波], ‘Implications and Impacts of U.S.’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [美国退出《中导条约》的当代含意与影响], International Economic Review [国际经济评论] 1 (2020), 31-42.

Documents

Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing? The Dimensions