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Application of STPA to Subsea Systems
29.3.2018Dr.Kim,Hyungju
Prof.Lundteigen,MaryAnn
Opportunities and Challenges
7
STPAStudiesinRAMSGroup,NTNU
• SubseaGatebox–Masterthesis
• SubseaGatebox–Journalpaper
• IsolaMonofsubseawells–OTC2018
• Subseagascompression–ESREL2018
• TobeconMnued…
• Autonomousship–Masterthesis
• DynamicposiMoningsysteminArcMccondiMon–ESREL2018(withKRISO)
• Securingmaintenancearea–Masterthesis
9
SubseaSystem
Manifold
ReceivingFacility
Riser
Wellhead/X-masTree
Seasurface
Seabed
Reservoir
BoosMngPumpand/or
GasCompressor
10
SystemConfigura@on
Ref:APIRP17V(2015),RecommendedPracMceforAnalysis,Design,InstallaMon,andTesMngofSafetySystemsforSubseaApplicaMons
Gas+Oil+Water
11
STPAProcedure
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis
2)ModeltheControlStructure
3)IdenMfyUnsafeControl
AcMons
4)IdenMfyLoss
Scenarios
STPA
12
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 2)ModeltheControlStructure 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios
a)IdenMfyinglosses
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis
System Losses
SubseaGasCompressionSystem
L-1:Lossoflifeorinjurytopeople
L-2:Environmentalloss
L-3:DamagetovaluableSGCcomponents
L-4:ReducedgasproducMon
13
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 2)ModeltheControlStructure 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios
a)IdenMfyinglosses
b)IdenMfyingsystem-levelhazards
System Losses System-LevelHazards
SubseaGasCompressionSystem
L-1:Lossoflifeorinjurytopeople H-1:SGCsystemconMnuestosupplygaswhengasleakstotheenvironment
L-2:Environmentalloss
L-3:DamagetovaluableSGCcomponents
H-2:SGCsystemoperatesunderabnormalcondiMons
L-4:ReducedgasproducMon H-3:SGCsystemcannotproducegaswithmaximumcapacity
14
System Losses System-LevelHazards System-LevelConstraints
SubseaGasCompressionSystem
L-1:Lossoflifeorinjurytopeople H-1:SGCsystemconMnuestosupplygaswhengasleakstotheenvironment
SC-1:SGCsystemmuststopcompressinggaswhengasleakstotheenvironment
L-2:Environmentalloss
L-3:DamagetovaluableSGCcomponents
H-2:SGCsystemoperatesunderabnormalcondiMons
SC-2:SGCsystemmustbeprotectedfromabnormaloperaMngcondiMonsthatcandamagevaluablecomponents
L-4:ReducedgasproducMon H-3:SGCsystemcannotproducegaswithmaximumcapacity
SC-3:SGCsystemmustalwaysproducegaswithmaximumcapacity
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 2)ModeltheControlStructure 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios
a)IdenMfyinglosses
b)IdenMfyingsystem-levelhazards
c)Definingsystem-levelconstraints
15
System-levelhazard Sub-hazardsderivedfromsystem-levelhazards Sub-constraints
H-2:SGCsystemoperatesunderabnormalcondiMons
H-2.1:Liquidflowsintothegascompressor SC-2.1:Liquidmustneverflowintogascompressor
H-2.2:Gasflowsintotheliquidpump SC-2.2:Gasmustneverflowintoliquidpump
H-3:SGCsystemcannotproducegaswithmaximumcapacity
H-3.1:SGCsystemstopscompressinggaswhencompressionisneeded
SC-2.1:SGCsystemmustneverstopcompressinggaswhengascompressionisneeded
H-3.2:SGCsystemoperatesundernon-opMmaloperaMngcondiMons
SC-2.2:SGCsystemmustbeoperatedunderopMmaloperaMngcondiMons
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 2)ModeltheControlStructure 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios
a)IdenMfyinglosses
b)IdenMfyingsystem-levelhazards
c)Definingsystem-levelconstraints
d)Refiningthesystem-levelhazards
16
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
HumanOperator
ControlSystem OtherSensors
• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
SubseaGasCompressorUnit
• StatusofSGCunit
• Controlcompressor• Controlvalves
• StatusofSGCunit• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• AdjustsetpointsofSGCunit
• Shutdownprocess
Processinputandoutput
Feedback
Controlcommands
Non-pressurizedmixtureofgas,oilandwater
Pressurizedgasandliquid
17
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
• Statusofothertopsidesystems
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Tripcomp.
• StatusofSGCunit• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• AdjustsetpointsofSGCunit
• Shutdownprocess ControlSystem
• Shutdownprocess
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV
• CloseSDVs
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV• CloseSDVs
SDVsposiMon
CloseSDVs
ASVposiMon
Open/closeASV
LDVposiMon
Open/closeLDV
• Compressorinlettemp.• Compressorinletpress.• Compressorinletflow• Compressoroutlettemp.• Compressoroutletpress.• Scrubberlevel
SCM/SEM
SDVs ASV LDV Sensors
HumanOperator
OtherTopsideSensors
• StatusofSGC• SDVs/ASV/LDVposiMon• Compressorinlet/outletflow/temp./press.• Scrubberlevel• Statusofothersubseasystems
• Statusofothersubseasystems OtherSubsea
Sensors
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
SCU
Abbrevia@on
• VSD:VariableSpeedDrive
• PCS:ProcessControlSystem
• PSD:ProcessShutdown
• SCU:SubseaControlUnit
• SCM:SubseaControlModule
• SEM:SubseaElectronicModule
• SGC:SubseaGasCompressor
• SDV:ShutdownValve
• ASV:AnM-SurgeValve
• LDV:LiquidDischargeValve
StatusofSGC
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Comp.speed
SGC
VSD PSDSystem
• Tripcompressor
PCS
Non-pressurizedmixtureofgas,oilandwater
Pressurizedgasandliquid
SubseaGasCompressorUnit
18
HumanOperator
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
• Statusofothertopsidesystems
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Tripcomp.
• StatusofSGCunit• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• AdjustsetpointsofSGCunit
• Shutdownprocess ControlSystem
• Shutdownprocess
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV
• CloseSDVs
SubseaGasCompressorUnit
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV• CloseSDVs
SDVsposiMon
CloseSDVs
ASVposiMon
Open/closeASV
LDVposiMon
Open/closeLDV
• Compressorinlettemp.• Compressorinletpress.• Compressorinletflow• Compressoroutlettemp.• Compressoroutletpress.• Scrubberlevel
SCM/SEM
SDVs ASV LDV Sensors
OtherTopsideSensors
• StatusofSGC• SDVs/ASV/LDVposiMon• Compressorinlet/outletflow/temp./press.• Scrubberlevel• Statusofothersubseasystems
• Statusofothersubseasystems OtherSubsea
Sensors
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
SCU
StatusofSGC
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Comp.speed
SGC
VSD PSDSystem
• Tripcompressor
PCS
HumanOperatorResponsibility ProcessModel Feedback
HO.R-1:AdjustsetpointstomaximizetheefficiencyofSGCunit
HO.P-1SetpointsofsubseagascompressorisnotopMmal
• Compressorinlet/outletpressure
• Compressorinlet/outletflow
HO.R-2ShutdownSGCunitincaseofemergency
HO.P-2Hydrocarbonsleaktotheenvironment
• Statusofsubseasystems(normal/leak)
• Statusoftopsidesystems(normal/leak)
HumanOperator
19
HumanOperator
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
• Statusofothertopsidesystems
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Tripcomp.
• StatusofSGCunit• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• AdjustsetpointsofSGCunit
• Shutdownprocess ControlSystem
• Shutdownprocess
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV
• CloseSDVs
SubseaGasCompressorUnit
• Open/closeLDV• Open/closeASV• CloseSDVs
SDVsposiMon
CloseSDVs
ASVposiMon
Open/closeASV
LDVposiMon
Open/closeLDV
• Compressorinlettemp.• Compressorinletpress.• Compressorinletflow• Compressoroutlettemp.• Compressoroutletpress.• Scrubberlevel
SCM/SEM
SDVs ASV LDV Sensors
OtherTopsideSensors
• StatusofSGC• SDVs/ASV/LDVposiMon• Compressorinlet/outletflow/temp./press.• Scrubberlevel• Statusofothersubseasystems
• Statusofothersubseasystems OtherSubsea
Sensors
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
• StatusofSGCunitandothersubseasystems
SCU
StatusofSGC
• Speedup/downcomp.
• Comp.speed
SGC
VSD PSDSystem
• Tripcompressor PCSResponsibility ProcessModel Feedback
PC.R-1:Adjustcompressorspeedtomeetthesetpoints
HO.P-1Compressorspeedisnotalignedwiththesetpoints
• Compressorinlet/outletpressure• Compressorinlet/outletflow• Compressorspeed
PC.R-2Open/closeLDVtocontrolliquidlevelofscrubber
HO.P-2Scrubberlevelistoohighortoolow
• Liquidlevelofscrubber
PC.R-3Open/closeASVtopreventsurging
HO.P-3Surgingisabouttohappen
• Compressorinlet/outletpressure
PCS
PC.R-2Open/closeLDVtocontrolliquidlevelofscrubber
HO.P-2Scrubberlevelistoohighortoolow
• Liquidlevelofscrubber
20
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
Controller:PCS
No ControlAc@onProcessModel UnsafeControlAc@ons?
Scrubberlevel Notprovided Provided Tooearly Toolate Tooshort Toolong
1 OpenLDV High2 Normal3 Low4 CloseLDV High5 Normal6 Low
OpenLDV
Unsafe Safe Unsafe UnsafeSafe SafeSafe Safe Safe Safe Safe SafeSafe N/A N/A N/A N/AUnsafe
21
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
UCA.PCS.LDV.001:PCSdoesnotprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
UCA.PCS.LDV.002:PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandtoolatewhenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
UCA.PCS.LDV.003:PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandtooshort(beforetheleveldropstonormal)whenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
UCA.PCS.LDV.004:PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelislow[H-2.2]
UCA.PCS.LDV.005:PCSprovidescloseLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1] . . .
Controller:PCS
No ControlAc@onProcessModel UnsafeControlAc@ons?
Scrubberlevel Notprovided Provided Tooearly Toolate Tooshort Toolong
1 OpenLDV High Unsafe[H2] Safe Safe Unsafe[H2] Unsafe[H2] Safe2 Normal Safe Safe Safe Safe Safe Safe3 Low Safe Unsafe[H2] N/A N/A N/A N/A4 CloseLDV High Safe Unsafe[H2] N/A N/A N/A N/A5 Normal Safe Safe Safe Safe Safe Safe6 Low Unsafe[H2] Safe Safe Unsafe[H2] Unsafe[H2] Safe
22
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
UnsafeControlAc@ons ControllerConstraints
UCA.PCS.LDV.001
PCSdoesnotprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubber
levelishigh[H-2.1]
CC.PCS.LDV.001
PCSmustprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh
[UCA.PCS.LDV.001]
UCA.PCS.LDV.002
PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandtoolatewhenscrubber
levelishigh[H-2.1]
CC.PCS.LDV.002
PCSmustprovideopenLDVcommandwithinXXsecondswhenscrubber
levelishigh[UCA.PCS.LDV.002]
UCA.PCS.LDV.003
PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandtooshort(beforethelevel
dropstonormal)whenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
CC.PCS.LDV.003
PCSmustnotstopprovidingopenLDVcommandbeforethescrubber
leveldropstonormalwhenscrubberlevelishigh[UCA.PCS.LDV.003]
UCA.PCS.LDV.004
PCSprovidesopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelislow
[H-2.2]
CC.PCS.LDV.004
PCSmustnotprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelislow
[UCA.PCS.LDV.004]
23
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
a)IdenMfyingscenariosthatleadtoUCAs
UCA.PCS.LDV.001
PCSdoesnotprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
• Scenario1:ThePCSphysicalcontrollerfailswhenscrubberlevelishigh,causingthevalveopencommandnottobeprovided
[UCA.PCS.LDV.001].Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].(physicalcontroller)
• Scenario2:Theliquidinthescrubberreacheshighlevel,butprocessingfailureswithinthePCSresultinthevalveopencommand
beingnotprovided[UCA.PCS.LDV.001].Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].(inadequatecontrolalgorithm)
• Scenario3:Theliquidinthescrubberreacheshighlevel,butthePCSdoesnotprovidethevalveopencommand[UCA.PCS.LDV.001]
becausethePCSincorrectlybelievestheliquidlevelisnormalorlow.Thisflawedprocessmodelwilloccuriftheleveltransmimer
drinsandprovideswrongmeasurement.Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].(inadequateprocessmodels)
• Scenario4:Theliquidinthescrubberreacheshighlevel,butthePCSdoesnotprovidethevalveopencommand[UCA.PCS.LDV.001]
becausethePCSisnotawareofthissituaMon.Thisflawedprocessmodelwilloccuriftheleveltransmimerfails,ifpowerisnot
suppliedtothetransmimer,orifthesignalcablefromthetransmimerisdisconnected.Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegas
compressor[H-2.1].(inadequateprocessmodels)
24
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
a)IdenMfyingscenariosthatleadtoUCAs
UCA.PCS.LDV.001
PCSdoesnotprovideopenLDVcommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh[H-2.1]
• Scenario5:PCSprovidesvalveopencommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh,butthevalveactuatordoesnotreceivethecontrol
commandduetoawiringerrorbetweenPCSandthevalveactuator.Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].
(scenarioinvolvingthecontrolpath)
• Scenario6:PCSprovidesvalveopencommand,andtheactuatorreceivesthecommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh,butthevalve
isnotopenedduenoresponsefromthevalveactuator.Thisflawedresponsewilloccuriftheactuatorfails,ifpowerisnot
suppliedtotheactuator,orifthevalveisstuck.Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].(scenarioinvolving
thecontrolpath)
• Scenario7:PCSprovidesvalveopencommandwhenscrubberlevelishigh,andthevalveisopen,buttheliquidleveldoesnot
dropbecauseliquidsupplyrateislargerthandischargerate.ThisflawedprocesswilloccurifthecalculaMonofsupplyanddischarge
ratewaswronginthedesignphase.Asaresult,liquidmayflowintothegascompressor[H-2.1].(scenariorelatedtothecontrolled
process)
b)IdenMfyingscenariosinwhichcontrolacMonsareimproperlyexecutedornotexecuted
26
SystemDescrip@on
Manifold
ReceivingFacility
Riser
Wellhead/X-masTree
Seasurface
Seabed
Reservoir
BoosMngPumpand/or
GasCompressor
28
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis 3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons 4)Iden@fyLossScenarios2)ModeltheControlStructure
• Statusofothertopsidesystems
• Statusofothersubseasystems
• StatusofESDvalves
Control/PowerSystem
• Bleeddownhydraulicpressure
• Cutoffelec.power
ESDValves
• PressureofDHSV• PressureofPMV• PressureofPWV• PressureofCIV
HumanOperator
OtherTopsideSensors
• Statusofothersubseasystems OtherSubsea
Sensors
Abbrevia@on
• SAS:SafetyAutomaMonSystem
• HPU:HydraulicPowerUnit
• EPU:ElectricPowerUnit• SCM:SubseaControlModule
• DCV:DirecMonControlValve• ESD:EmergencyShutdown
• DHSV:DownHoleSafetyValve
• PMW:ProducMonMasterValve
• PWV:ProducMonWingValve
• CIV:ChemicalInjecMonValve
• SEM:SubseaElectronicModule
HPU
SCM
Hydraulicpressure Electricpower
DumpDCV
DHSVDCV
PMVDCV
PWVDCV
CIVDCV
DHSV PMV PWV CIV Sensors
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• StatusofESDvalves
SEM
• Bleeddownhyd.pressure
• Cutoffelectricalpower
SASESD
EPU
• Emergencyshutdown
Feedback
Controlcommands
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
30
No
UCA.HOP.001SNR.HOP.001.01 HumanOperatorreceiveswrongfeedbackfromSASduetosensorfailureSNR.HOP.001.02 HumanOperatorreceivesnofeedbackfromSASduetosensorfailureSNR.HOP.001.03 HumanOperatorreceivesnofeedbackfromSASduetocommunicationcablefailureSNR.HOP.001.04 HumanOperatorreceivesnofeedbackfromSASduetolossofpowersupplySNR.HOP.001.05 HumanOperatorreceiveswrongfeedbackfromSASduetosoftwareerrorinsideSASSNR.HOP.001.06 HumanOperatorreceivesnofeedbackfromSASduetosoftwareerrorinsideSASSNR.HOP.001.07 HumanOperatorreceivesnofeedbackfromSASduetoHMIfailureSNR.HOP.001.08 HumanOperatorreceivescorrectfeedbackfromSAS,butdoesnotprovidecommand
UCA.HOP.002SNR.HOP.002.01 HumanOperatorreceivesfeedbackfromSAStoolateduetosensorfailureSNR.HOP.002.02 HumanOperatorreceivesfeedbackfromSAStoolateduetosoftwareerrorinsideSASSNR.HOP.002.03 HumanOperatorreceivesfeedbackfromSASintime,butprovidescontrolcommandtoolate
UCA.HOP.003SNR.HOP.003.01 HumanOperatorreceiveswrongfeedbackfromSASduetosensorfailureSNR.HOP.003.02 HumanOperatorreceiveswrongfeedbackfromSASduetosoftwareerrorinsideSASSNR.HOP.003.03 HumanOperatorreceivescorrectfeedbackfromSAS,butprovidescommand
UCA.ESD.001SNR.ESD.001.01 ESDdoesnotreceivecontrolcommandfromHumanOperatorduetocablefailureSNR.ESD.001.02 ESDdoesnotreceivecontrolcommandfromHumanOperatorduetolossofpowersupplySNR.ESD.001.03 ESDreceivescontrolcommandfromHumanOperator,butdoesnotprovidecontrolcommandduetoESDsystemfailure
UCA.ESD.002SNR.ESD.002.01 Nopossiblescenario
UCA.ESD.003SNR.ESD.003.01 Nopossiblescenario
UCA.ESD.004SNR.ESD.004.01 ESDprovidescontrolcommandduetoshortcircuit
UCA.ESD.005SNR.ESD.005.01 ESDdoesnotreceivecontrolcommandfromHumanOperatorduetocablefailureSNR.ESD.005.02 ESDdoesnotreceivecontrolcommandfromHumanOperatorduelossofpowersupplySNR.ESD.005.03 ESDreceivescontrolcommandfromHumanOperator,butdoesnotprovidecontrolcommandduetoESDsystemfailure
UCA.ESD.006SNR.ESD.006.01 Nopossiblescenario
UCA.ESD.007SNR.ESD.007.01 Nopossiblescenario
UCA.ESD.008SNR.ESD.008.01 ESDprovidescontrolcommandduetoshortcircuit
UCA.SAS.001SNR.SAS.001.01 SASreceiveswrongfeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.001.02 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.001.03 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetosignalcablefailureSNR.SAS.001.04 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetolossofpowersupplySNR.SAS.001.05 SASreceivescorrectfeedbackfromsensors,butdoesnotprovidecommandduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.002SNR.SAS.002.01 SASreceivesfeedbackfromsensorstoolateduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.002.02 SASreceivesfeedbackfromsensorsintime,butprovidescontrolcommandtoolateduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.003SNR.SAS.003.01 SASstopsprovidingbleeddowncommendtoosoonduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.004SNR.SAS.004.01 SASreceiveswrongfeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.004.02 SASreceivescorrectfeedbackfromsensors,butprovidescommandduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.005SNR.SAS.005.01 SASreceiveswrongfeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.005.02 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.005.03 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetosignalcablefailureSNR.SAS.005.04 SASreceivesnofeedbackfromsensorsduetolossofpowersupplySNR.SAS.005.05 SASreceivescorrectfeedbackfromsensors,butdoesnotprovidecommandduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.006SNR.SAS.006.01 SASreceivesfeedbackfromsensorstoolateduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.006.02 SASreceivesfeedbackfromsensorsintime,butprovidescontrolcommandtoolateduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.007SNR.SAS.007.01 SASstopsprovidingbleeddowncommendtoosoonduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.SAS.008SNR.SAS.008.01 SASreceiveswrongfeedbackfromsensorsduetosensorfailureSNR.SAS.008.02 SASreceivescorrectfeedbackfromsensors,butprovidescommandduetosoftwareerrorinsideSAS
UCA.HPU.001SNR.HPU.001.01 HPUreceiveswrongcommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailreSNR.HPU.001.02 HPUreceivesnocommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailureSNR.HPU.001.03 HPUreceivesnocommandfromESDorSASduetolossofpowersupplySNR.HPU.001.04 HPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideshydraulicpressureduetosoftwareerrorinsideHPUSNR.HPU.001.05 HPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideshydraulicpressureduetosolenoidvalvefaliure
UCA.HPU.002SNR.HPU.002.01 HPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAStoolateduetocommunicationcablefailureSNR.HPU.002.02 HPUreceivescommandintime,butstopprovidinghydraulicpressuretoolateduetosoftwareerrorinsideHPUSNR.HPU.002.03 HPUreceivescommandintime,butstopprovidinghydraulicpressuretoolateduetosolenoidvalvefailure
UCA.HPU.003SNR.HPU.003.01 HPUstartsprovidinghydraulicpressureagainduetosoftwareerrorinsideHPUSNR.HPU.003.02 HPUstartsprovidinghydraulicpressureagainduetosolenoidvalvefailure
UCA.HPU.004SNR.HPU.004.01 HPUreceiveswrongcommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailreSNR.HPU.004.02 HPUdoesnotreceivecommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideshydraulicpressureduetosoftwareerrorinsideHPUSNR.HPU.004.03 HPUdoesnotreceivecommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideshydraulicpressureduetosolenoidvalvefaliure
UCA.EPU.001SNR.EPU.001.01 EPUreceiveswrongcommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailreSNR.EPU.001.02 EPUreceivesnocommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailureSNR.EPU.001.03 EPUreceivesnocommandfromESDorSASduetolossofpowersupplySNR.EPU.001.04 EPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideselectricpowerduetosoftwareerrorinsideEPUSNR.EPU.001.05 EPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideselectricpowerduetorelayfaliure
UCA.EPU.002SNR.EPU.002.01 EPUreceivescommandfromESDorSAStoolateduetocommunicationcablefailureSNR.EPU.002.02 EPUreceivescommandintime,butstopprovidingelectricpowertoolateduetosoftwareerrorinsideEPUSNR.EPU.002.03 EPUreceivescommandintime,butstopprovidingelectricpowertoolateduetorelayfailure
UCA.EPU.003SNR.EPU.003.01 EPUstartsprovidinghydraulicpressureagainduetosoftwareerrorinsideEPUSNR.EPU.003.02 EPUstartsprovidinghydraulicpressureagainduetorelayfailure
UCA.EPU.004SNR.EPU.004.01 EPUreceiveswrongcommandfromESDorSASduetocommunicationcablefailreSNR.EPU.004.02 EPUdoesnotreceivecommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideselectricpowerduetosoftwareerrorinsideEPUSNR.EPU.004.03 EPUdoesnotreceivecommandfromESDorSAS,butprovideselectricpowerduetorelayfaliure
UCA.SCM.001
SNR.SCM.001.01 HydraulicleakSNR.SCM.001.02 DCVsareclogged
UCA.SCM.002
SNR.SCM.002.01 NopossiblescenarioUCA.SCM.003
SNR.SCM.003.01 DuttolongdistancebetweenHPUandSCM
SCMdoesnotdistributehydraulicpressurewhenhydraulicpressureorelectricpowerissupplied[H3]
SCMdistributeshydraulicpressurewhenhydraulicpressureorelectricpowerisnotsupplied[H1,H2]
SCMdoesnotdistributehydraulicpressuretoolatewhenhydraulicpressureorelectricpowerisnotsupplied[H1,H2]
HPUdoesnotprovidehydraulicpressuretooshortwhenESDorSASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommand[H1,H2]
HPUdoesnotprovidehydraulicpressurewhenESDorSASdoesnotprovidebleeddownhydraulicpressurecommand[H3]
EPUprovideselectricpowerwhenESDorSASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommand[H1,H2]
EPUdoesnotprovideelectricpowertoolatewhenESDorSASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommand[H1,H2]
EPUdoesnotprovideelectricpowertooshortwhenESDorSASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommand[H1,H2]
EPUdoesnotprovideelectricpowerwhenESDorSASdoesnotprovidecutoffelectricalpowercommand[H3]
HPUdoesnotprovidehydraulicpressuretoolatewhenESDorSASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandtooshortwhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandwhenHumanOperatordoesnotprovideemergencyshutdowncommand[H3]
SASdoesnotprovidebleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandtoolatewhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandtooshortwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsarenotdetected[H3]
SASdoesnotprovidecutoffelectricalpowercommandwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandtoolatewhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandtooshortwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsaredetected[H1,H2]
SASprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandwhenpre-definedabnormalconditionsarenotdetected[H3]
HPUprovideshydraulicpressurewhenESDorSASprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidescutoffelectricalpowercommandtoolatewhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
Contents
HumanOperatordoesnotprovideemergencyshutdowncommandwhenanemergencyoccurs[H1,H2]
HumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommandtoolatewhenanemergencyoccurs[H1,H2]
HumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommandwhenanemergencydoesnotoccur[H3]
ESDdoesnotprovidebleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandwhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandtoolatewhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandtooshortwhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
ESDprovidesbleeddownhydraulicpressurecommandwhenHumanOperatordoesnotprovideemergencyshutdowncommand[H3]
ESDdoesnotprovidecutoffelectricalpowercommandwhenHumanOperatorprovidesemergencyshutdowncommand[H1,H2]
[email protected]–Widerscope
• STPAcancoverhumanerrors,sonwareflaws,andphysicalcomponentfailures
Physicalcomponentfailure48(68%)
So_wareerror20(28%)
Humanerror3(4%)
• 71scenarioswereidenMfiedfromIsolaMonofsubseawells
32
[email protected]–Top-downapproach
• Analysiscanberefinedwithmoredetails
Controller:SAS
No ControlAc@on
Processmodel UnsafeControlAc@ons?
Pre-definedemergencycondi@ons Notprovided Provided Tooearly Toolate Tooshort Toolong
1 Bleeddownhydraulicpressure
Occurred Unsafe[H1,H2] Safe N/A Unsafe[H1,H2] Unsafe[H1,H2] N/A
2 Notoccurred Safe Unsafe[H3] N/A N/A N/A N/A
3Cutoffelectricalpower
Occurred Unsafe[H1,H2] Safe N/A Unsafe[H1,H2] Unsafe[H1,H2] N/A
4 Notoccurred Safe Unsafe[H3] N/A N/A N/A N/A
• GasleakatHVACinlet• Gasleakinnon-hazardousarea• Gasleakinhazardousarea• Fireinhazardousarea• Gas/waterheatexchangertube
33
Opportuni@es
Manifold
ReceivingFacility
Riser
Wellhead/X-masTree
Seasurface
Seabed
Reservoir
BoosMngPumpand/or
GasCompressor
Unmannedplaaorm
Inopera@onsince2015
VS
34
Subseasystemsaresuddenlygepngmorecomplexandsonware-intensive
Opportuni@es
TradiMonalhazardidenMficaMonmethods(FMECAorHAZOP)arenotsuitabletoidenMfysonwareflaws,humanerrors,orinteracMonsofcomplexsystemcomponents
STPAcandoit!(withsystemaMcandtop-downapproach)
35
Challenges1.Dynamiccontrolstructure
• Statusofothertopsidesystems
• Statusofothersubseasystems
• StatusofESDvalves
Control/PowerSystem
• Bleeddownhydraulicpressure
• Cutoffelec.power
ESDValves
• PressureofDHSV• PressureofPMV• PressureofPWV• PressureofCIV
HumanOperator
OtherTopsideSensors
• Statusofothersubseasystems OtherSubsea
Sensors
HPU
SCM
Hydraulicpressure Electricpower
DumpDCV
DHSVDCV
PMVDCV
PWVDCV
CIVDCV
DHSV PMV PWV CIV Sensors
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
Hydraulicpressure
• Statusofothersubseaandtopsidesystems
• StatusofESDvalves
SEM
• Bleeddownhyd.pressure
• Cutoffelectricalpower
SASESD
EPU
• Emergencyshutdown
36
Challenges1.Dynamiccontrolstructure
PetroleumSafetyAuthority(PSA)Norway
OilCompanyA OilCompanyB OilCompanyC
OilField1
OilField2
OilField3
OilField4
OilField5
OilField6ESD
37
Challenges
Physicalcomponentfailure48(68%)
So_wareerror20(28%)
Humanerror3(4%)
2.Physicalcomponentplaysanimportantroleinsubseasystems
Hardware-orienteddesignconstraints,like
• Gasleakagedetectormusthaveredundancy(2oo3configuraMon)
• Gasleakagedetectormustbeconnectedtoredundantpower
supplyorUPS
NeedtoclassifyandprioriMzedesignconstraints-Someconstraintsarecheap,easyandveryeffecMve,whileothersareexpensive,difficultandlesseffecMve-Somescenarioscanneverbecompletelyprevented,whileotherscanbe
38
ScreeningandPriori@za@on
1)DefinePurposeoftheAnalysis
3)Iden@fyUnsafeControlAc@ons
4)Iden@fyLossScenarios
2)ModeltheControlStructure DesignConstraints
• UCA1• UCA2• UCA3• UCA4• UCA5• UCA6• UCA7• UCA8...
• Scenario1• Scenario2• Scenario3• Scenario4• Scenario5• Scenario6• Scenario7• Scenario8
...
• UCA1• UCA2• UCA3• UCA4• UCA5• UCA6• UCA7• UCA8...
• DC1• DC2• DC3• DC4• DC5• DC6• DC7• DC8...
• Scenario1• Scenario2• Scenario3• Scenario4• Scenario5• Scenario6• Scenario7• Scenario8
...
ScreeningUCAs(consequence,responseMme,
levelofknowledge,etc.)
ScreeningScenarios(consequence,frequency,
levelofknowledge,etc.)
• DC5
• DC1• DC2• DC3• DC4
• DC6• DC7• DC8
Priori@zeDCs(easiness,cost,
effecMveness,etc.)
UCA.PCS.ASV.001PCSdoesnotprovideopenASVcommandwhencompressoroutletpressureishigherthansurgelimit
UCA.PCS.CMP.003PCSdoesnotprovideCompressorspeedupcommandwheninletflowisbelowopMmalcondiMon
39
Challenges
Physicalcomponentfailure48(68%)
So_wareerror20(28%)
Humanerror3(4%)
3.IteraMonsofSTPA
Hardware-orienteddesignconstraints,like
• Gasleakagedetectormusthaveredundancy(2oo3configuraMon)
• Gasleakagedetectormustbeconnectedtoredundantpower
supplyofUPS
Designconstraintsthatincreasesystemcomplexity,like
• SASmustgenerateanalarmwhennosignalisreceived
fromgasleakagedetector
DoweneedtoconductSTPAagain?-ifnot,whatcanwedoforaddiMonalhazards?-ifso,whencanwestop?
40
FutureWork
• SubseaProcessingSystem
• SubseaSafetySystem
• SubseaProduc@onSystem
• SummarizeoverallSTPAchallengesinsubseaapplica@onandprovidesolu@ons
• ApplySTPAtoSubseasafetystandardsinNorway