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xiii
Appendix: Part I:
Table 1
xiv
xv
Appendix: Part Ib – Assessment of QoG Data for E.U. states
Complete rankings for each pillar 1.Government
Effectiveness 2. Control of Corruption 3. Rule of Law 4. Voice & Accountability 5. QoG Combined Rank
1 DENMARK 1 FINLAND 1 DENMARK 1 SWEDEN 1 DENMARK
2 SWEDEN 2 DENMARK 2 AUSTRIA 2 NETHERLANDS 2 SWEDEN
3 FINLAND 3 SWEDEN 3 SWEDEN 3 LUXEMBOURG 3 FINLAND
4 NETHERLANDS 4 NETHERLANDS 4 FINLAND 4 DENMARK 4 NETHERLANDS
5 AUSTRIA 5 LUXEMBOURG 5 LUXEMBOURG 5 FINLAND 5 AUSTRIA
6 UNITED KINGDOM 6 AUSTRIA 6 NETHERLANDS 6 IRELAND 6 GERMANY
7 GERMANY 7 GERMANY 7 IRELAND 7 BELGIUM 7 UNITED KINGDOM
8 LUXEMBOURG 8 IRELAND 8 GERMANY 8 AUSTRIA 8 IRELAND
9 FRANCE 9 UNITED KINGDOM 9 UNITED KINGDOM 9 GERMANY 9 LUXEMBOURG
10 IRELAND 10 FRANCE 10 MALTA 10 UNITED KINGDOM 10 FRANCE
11 BELGIUM 11 BELGIUM 11 FRANCE 11 FRANCE 11 BELGIUM
12 MALTA 12 SPAIN 12 BELGIUM 12 MALTA 12 MALTA
13 CYPRUS 13 PORTUGAL 13 SPAIN 13 PORTUGAL 13 SPAIN
14 ESTONIA 14 CYPRUS 14 CYPRUS 14 SPAIN 14 PORTUGAL
15 PORTUGAL 15 MALTA 15 PORTUGAL 15 ESTONIA 15 CYPRUS
16 CZECH REPUBLIC 16 SLOVENIA 16 ESTONIA 16 CZECH REPUBLIC 16 ESTONIA
17 SLOVENIA 17 ESTONIA 17 SLOVENIA 17 SLOVENIA 17 SLOVENIA
18 SPAIN 18 HUNGARY 18 CZECH REPUBLIC 18 HUNGARY 18 CZECH REPUBLIC
19 SLOVAKIA 19 SLOVAKIA 19 HUNGARY 19 CYPRUS 19 LITHUANIA
20 HUNGARY 20 POLAND 20 GREECE 20 ITALY 20 HUNGARY
21 LITHUANIA 21 CZECH REPUBLIC 21 LITHUANIA 21 SLOVAKIA 21 SLOVAKIA
22 LATVIA 22 LATVIA 22 LATVIA 22 GREECE 22 GREECE
23 GREECE 23 LITHUANIA 23 POLAND 23 LATVIA 23 LATVIA
24 POLAND 24 ITALY 24 SLOVAKIA 24 POLAND 24 POLAND
25 ITALY 25 GREECE 25 ITALY 25 LITHUANIA 25 ITALY
26 BULGARIA 26 ROMANIA 26 ROMANIA 26 BULGARIA 26 BULGARIA
27 ROMANIA 27 BULGARIA 27 BULGARIA 27 ROMANIA 27 ROMANIA
List of Underlying Sources of World Bank Governance Data for E.U. Countries
BRI Business Environment Risk Intelligence
DRI Global Insight Global Risk Service
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
PRS Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide
WMO Global Insight Business Condition and Risk Indicators
GCS Global Competitiveness Report
WCY Institute for Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook
GWP Gallup World Poll
EGV Global E-Governance Index
BPS Business Enterprise Environment Survey
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BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
IPD Institutional Profiles Database
FRH Freedom House
GII Global Integrity Index
GCB Global Corruption Barometer Survey
HER Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom
HUM Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database
TPR US State Department Trafficking in People report
OBI International Budget Project Open Budget Index
MSIª International Research & Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index
For a more thorough look at each individual indicators, see:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sources.htm
Factor analyses results
1. Government Effectiveness (GE)
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 27
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 1
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 9
Factor | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 5.40802 4.45461 0.6009 0.6009
Factor2 | 0.95341 0.14380 0.1059 0.7068
Factor3 | 0.80961 0.22995 0.0900 0.7968
Factor4 | 0.57967 0.20968 0.0644 0.8612
Factor5 | 0.36999 0.03855 0.0411 0.9023
Factor6 | 0.33144 0.02272 0.0368 0.9391
Factor7 | 0.30872 0.18238 0.0343 0.9734
Factor8 | 0.12633 0.01352 0.0140 0.9875
Factor9 | 0.11281 . 0.0125 1.0000
GE Weights from FA:
Variable Factor Sq. Factor Weight
BRI 0.7883 0.621417 0.114908
DRI 0.6195 0.38378 0.070966
EIU 0.9144 0.836127 0.154611
PRS 0.8569 0.734278 0.135778
WMO 0.8267 0.683433 0.126376
GCS 0.815 0.664225 0.122824
GWP 0.7854 0.616853 0.114065
WCY 0.836 0.698896 0.129235
EGV 0.411 0.168921 0.031236
xvii
total 5.40793 1
Control of Corruption (CC)
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 27
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 1
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 9
Factor | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 6.96323 6.21165 0.7737 0.7737
Factor2 | 0.75159 0.30907 0.0835 0.8572
Factor3 | 0.44252 0.12392 0.0492 0.9064
Factor4 | 0.31860 0.14586 0.0354 0.9418
Factor5 | 0.17274 0.02671 0.0192 0.9610
Factor6 | 0.14603 0.03386 0.0162 0.9772
Factor7 | 0.11218 0.05332 0.0125 0.9897
Factor8 | 0.05886 0.02460 0.0065 0.9962
Factor9 | 0.03426 . 0.0038 1.0000
Factor weights for CC:
Variable Factor Sq. Factor Weight
BRI 0.825 0.680625 0.095782
DRI 0.648 0.419904 0.059091
EIU 0.927 0.859329 0.12093
GAD 0.967 0.935089 0.131591
PRS 0.918 0.842724 0.118593
WMO 0.901 0.811801 0.114242
GCS 0.943 0.889249 0.125141
GWP 0.897 0.804609 0.11323
WCY 0.929 0.863041 0.121452
total 7.955 7.106371 1.000052
Rule of Law (RL)
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 27
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 23
Factor | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 7.52198 6.10592 0.6268 0.6268
Factor2 | 1.41606 0.46259 0.1180 0.7448
Factor3 | 0.95347 0.22800 0.0795 0.8243
Factor4 | 0.72547 0.35391 0.0605 0.8847
Factor5 | 0.37157 0.03971 0.0310 0.9157
Factor6 | 0.33186 0.12844 0.0277 0.9434
xviii
Factor7 | 0.20342 0.01358 0.0170 0.9603
Factor8 | 0.18984 0.09380 0.0158 0.9761
Factor9 | 0.09604 0.01917 0.0080 0.9841
Factor10 | 0.07687 0.00787 0.0064 0.9905
Factor11 | 0.06900 0.02457 0.0058 0.9963
Factor12 | 0.04443 . 0.0037 1.0000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(66) = 311.36 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Figure 1
.87
.96 .89
.86 .68 .78
WorldBank
ICRG
FraserInst.
FreedomHouse
4 6 8
6
8
10
6 8 10
4
6
8
10
4 6 8 10
7
8
9
10
Correlations among Rule of Law Indicators: 2000-2008
Note: The data is averaged from 2000-2008 and all 27 EU-members states are available for each of the four „rule of
law‟ indicators. Each indicator has been re-scaled (0-10) so that higher scores represent stronger rule of law. The
pairwise correlations are accompanied by Pearson‟s correlation coefficients. The number of total times-series
observations are found in Table 2
Figure 2
xix
.93
.99 .94
.85 .74 .84
WorldBank
ICRG
CPI
FreedomHouse
4 6 8 10
4
6
8
10
4 6 8 10
0
5
10
0 5 10
6
8
10
12
Correlations Among Corruption Indicators
Figure 3
.92
.64 .60
WorldBank
ICRG
WVS
4 6 8 10
0
5
10
0 5 10
2
3
4
Correlations Among Bureaucracy Indicators
Note: data for all EU countries is a cross-sectional average from 1999-2008. Note: missing from the WVS question on
confidence of the civil service is Cyprus
xx
Figure 4
.40
.46 .43
.53 .63
.65
.85 .69
.56 .80
PolityIV
FreedomHouse
(politicalrights)
VanhanenIndex
WorldBank
FreedomHouse/Polity
IV
7 8 9 10
6
6.5
7
6 6.5 7
20
30
40
50
20 30 40 50
6
7
8
6 7 8
8.5
9
9.5
10
Correlations Among Democracy Indicators
Note: Polity IV does not contain states under a certain population threshold, thus Luxembourg and Malta are not
included in these correlation. Running the correlations without Polity IV renders near identical results.
Freedom House Nations in Transit: 10 questions
1. Has the government implemented effective anticorruption initiatives?
2. Is the country's economy free of excessive state involvement?
3. Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration
requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
4. Are there significant limitations on the participation of government officials in
economic life?
5. Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict of
interest?
6. Does the government advertise jobs and contracts?
xxi
7. Does the state enforce an effective legislative or administrative process-particularly
one that is free of prejudice against one's political opponents-to prevent, investigate, and
prosecute the corruption of government officials and civil servants?
8. Do whistle-blowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal
protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and corruption?
9. Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media?
10. Does the public display a high intolerance for official corruption?
xxii
Appendix Part II – Sensitivity test of WGI
Table 2.4: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients between Underlying Data, Pillar
and QoG Index
Pillar Availability Indicator Index Pillar
Correlation Correlation
Government All (9) BRI 0.78*** .76***
Effectiveness DRI 0.57*** .56***
EIU 0.91*** .92***
PRS 0.87*** .88***
WMO 0.81*** .81***
GCS 0.80*** .84***
WCY 0.81*** .84***
GWP 0.74*** 0.71***
EGV 0.42** .39**
Regional (2) BPS -0.2 -0.33
BTI 0.49 0.53
Limited (1) IPD 0.78*** .81***
Control of All (9) BRI 0.83*** 0.83***
Corruption DRI 0.66*** 0.60***
EIU 0.91*** 0.93***
GAD 0.78*** 0.82***
PRS 0.89*** 0.94***
WMO 0.88*** 0.86***
GCS 0.92*** 0.96***
GWP 0.84*** 0.86***
WCY 0.94*** 0.95***
Regional (4) BPS -0.13 -0.21
BTI 0.66** 0.70**
FRH 0.77*** 0.93***
GII -0.45 -0.55
Limited (2) IPD 0.91*** 0.92***
GCB 0.75*** 0.76***
Rule of Law All (12) BRI .89*** .81***
DRI .49*** .46***
EIU .94*** .87***
GAD .43** 0.28
PRS .87*** .73***
WMO .81*** .67***
GCS .92*** .80***
GWP .80*** .68***
WCY .80*** .72***
HER .90*** .78***
HUM .63*** .63***
TPR .40** .38**
xxiii
Regional (4) BPS 0.11 0.02
BTI 0.94*** 0.74**
GII -0.30 -0.51
Limited (1) IPD 0.91 0.82
Voice & All (10) WMO .85*** .90***
Accountability FRH .84*** .85***
PRS .55*** .62***
EIU .84*** .92***
RSF .62*** .65***
HUM 0.27 .38**
WCY .84*** .80***
GCS .92*** .86***
GAD .75*** .77***
GWP .69*** .70***
Regional (3) BTI .86** .81***
GII 0.43 0.45
OBI .71** .69**
Limited (2) IPD .74*** .77***
MSIª 0.99 0.99
ªonly available for Bulgaria & Romania.
Number of sources in parentheses under „availability. For a full list and
description of variable sources, see the Appendix.
*** p<.01, **p<.05
Table 2.5: Nominal & effective weights of the 4 Pillars
of QoG
Pillars Unweighted Effective
Contribution Weight
Government 25% 27%
Effectiveness
Control of 25% 27%
Corruption
Rule of Law 25% 20%
Voice & 25% 26%
Accountability
The total variance of the index score follows the simple formula of the variance of a sum
with underlying weights:
xxiv
Where „a‟ represents the weight and „x‟ the score from each pillar „i‟ to explain the
overall variance of the QoG index.
Figure 2.2
Cluster Means Over the 4 Pillars of QoG
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
QoG(total) CC VA RoL GE
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Rotated (Varimax) Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 27
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) Number of params = 23
Factor | Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 6.59990 4.26177 0.5500 0.5500
Factor2 | 2.33814 . 0.1948 0.7448
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
xxv
Variable | Factor1 Factor2 | Uniqueness
bri08rls | 0.7909 0.4488 | 0.1729
dri08rls | 0.3154 0.4646 | 0.6846
eiu08rls | 0.9135 0.2298 | 0.1128
gad08rls | 0.2422 0.7661 | 0.3545
prs08rls | 0.8601 0.3001 | 0.1702
wmo08rls | 0.7037 0.5702 | 0.1797
gcs08rls | 0.9543 0.0986 | 0.0796
gwp08rls | 0.8277 0.1510 | 0.2920
wcy08rls | 0.8966 0.2431 | 0.1371
her08rls | 0.9360 0.1111 | 0.1115
hum08rls | 0.6769 -0.0148 | 0.5417
tpr08rls | 0.1134 0.8728 | 0.2253
Factor Weights for RL
FA weights - RL (original & squared factor loading)
original FA Sq. FA loading
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 PC weights
Bri 0.8 0.64 0.07532278
Dri 0.65 0.4225 0.06119976
Eiu 0.92 0.8464 0.08662119
Gad 0.87 0.7569 0.15340741
Prs 0.87 0.7569 0.08191352
Wmo 0.71 0.5041 0.06684896
Gcs 0.94 0.8836 0.08850426
Gwp 0.82 0.6724 0.07720585
Wcy 0.94 0.8836 0.08850426
Her 0.93 0.8649 0.08756273
Hum 0.63 0.3969 0.05931669
Tpr 0.60 0.36 0.07296429
TOTAL VAR 7.02 2.07
Explain Total 0.77227723 0.22772277
Voice & Accountability (VA) Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 27
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 19
Factor | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 5.98366 4.80982 0.5984 0.5984
Factor2 | 1.17383 0.24474 0.1174 0.7157
Factor3 | 0.92909 0.23570 0.0929 0.8087
Factor4 | 0.69339 0.27023 0.0693 0.8780
Factor5 | 0.42315 0.11226 0.0423 0.9203
xxvi
Factor6 | 0.31090 0.10473 0.0311 0.9514
Factor7 | 0.20617 0.06583 0.0206 0.9720
Factor8 | 0.14034 0.05859 0.0140 0.9861
Factor9 | 0.08175 0.02402 0.0082 0.9942
Factor10 | 0.05773 . 0.0058 1.0000
Rotated (varimax)
Factor | Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 | 5.02605 2.89462 0.5026 0.5026
Factor2 | 2.13143 . 0.2131 0.7157
Factor weights for VA
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 SquaredF1 SqF2 WeightFA
WMO 0.819 0.670761 0.096991
FRH 0.668 0.446224 0.064523
PRS 0.521 0.271441 0.03925
EIU 0.886 0.784996 0.113509
RSF 0.663 0.439569 0.11477
HUM 0.841 0.707281 0.184669
WCY 0.85 0.7225 0.104472
GCS 0.907 0.822649 0.118954
GAD 0.634 0.401956 0.058122
GWP 0.849 0.720801 0.104227
total Var 5.02 2.13 4.841328 1.14685 0.999486
Factor weights for QoG Index from 4 Pillars:
Factor weights
Pillar factor SqFactor weight rounded
GE08 0.9867 0.973577 0.272779 0.27
CC08 0.9758 0.952186 0.266785 0.27
VA08 0.9682 0.937411 0.262646 0.26
RL08 0.8402 0.705936 0.197791 0.20
Total - 3.56911 1 1
Hierarchical clustering, using Ward’s method & squared Euclidian distancing
xxvii
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
BULGARIA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
ESTONIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
IRELAND
ITALY
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
MALTA
NETHERLANDS
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
UNITED KINGDOM
0.5
11
.52
QoG
facW
1 2 3Cluster Group (Squared Euclidian difference)
Clusters of EU Countries Based on QoG
Full Uncertainty Tests rfom Simulations
Table 2.8: Frequency Matrix of a EU Country's Rankings: Rule of Law
Original Rank Country 1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 11,12 13,14 15,16 17,18 19,20 21,22 23,24,25 26,27
1 Denmark 90 10
2 Austria 81 18
3 Sweden 10 83 5
4 Finland 18 78
5 Lux 65 32
6 Netherlands 5 87
7 Ireland 9 34 56
8 Germany 66 32
9 United Kingdom 23 60 13
10 Malta 13 8 75
11 France 5 94
12 Belgium 79 17
13 Spain 77 23
14 Cyprus 16 16 61 6
15 Portugal 9 77 13
16 Estonia 13 73 12
17 Slovenia 61 23 14
18 Cz. Rep 27 29 40
19 Hungary 25 64 9 12
20 Greece 21 65 13
21 Latvia 13 83
xxviii
22 Lithuania 5 21 71
23 Poland 57 27 14
24 Slovakia 100
25 Italia 54 30 16
26 Romania 100
27 Bulgaria 100
note: Frequencies are calculated from the 78 simulations with alternative aggregation, weighting and removing one indicator at a time
For example, Finland ranks in either the 3rd or 4th position 78% of the time, while 1st or 2nd 18% of the time. Frequencies under 5%
are not shown. All figures rounded to the nearest percent. Bold numbers represent a majority of simulation results equaling a country’s original rank position.
Table 2.10: Frequency Matrix of a EU Country's Rank
Original Rank Country 1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 11,12 13,14 15,16 17,18 19,20 21,22 23,24,25 26,27
1 DENMARK 100
2 SWEDEN 33 25 35 6
3 FINLAND 43 48 8
4 NETHERLANDS 16 75 8
5 AUSTRIA 21 66 8
6 UNITED KINGDOM 45 51
7 GERMANY 25 18 23 28
8 LUXEMBOURG 18 63 15
9 FRANCE 5 58 35
10 IRELAND 5 10 48 33
11 BELGIUM 6 23 16 45 8
12 MALTA 11 63 25
13 CYPRUS 13 31 50 5
14 ESTONIA 15 11 73
15 PORTUGAL 5 75 13
16 CZECH REPUBLIC 6 80 13
17 SLOVENIA 15 65 13 5
18 SPAIN 71 5 18
19 SLOVAKIA 25 8 66
20 HUNGARY 26 3 70
21 LITHUANIA 5 70 25
22 LATVIA 5 26 50 18
23 GREECE 33 23 43
24 POLAND 8 46 26 20
25 ITALY 8 23 15 53
26 BULGARIA 100
27 ROMANIA 100
note: Frequencies are calculated from the 78 simulations with alternative aggregation, weighting and removing one indicator at a time
For example, Finland ranks in either the 3rd or 4th position 75% of the time, while 5th or 6th 24% of the time. Frequencies under 5%
are not shown
Table 2.12 : Frequency Matrix of a EU Country's Corruption Rank
Original Rank Country 1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 11,12 13,14 15,16 17,18 19,20 21,22 23,24,25 26,27
1 FINLAND 97
xxix
2 DENMARK 92 7
3 SWEDEN 9 90
4 NETHERLANDS 99
5 LUXEMBOURG 99
6 AUSTRIA 50 44
7 GERMANY 27 54 10
8 IRELAND 24 72
9 UNITED KINGDOM 18 65 15
10 FRANCE 42 57
11 BELGIUM 60 40
12 SPAIN 88 12
13 PORTUGAL 68 28
14 CYPRUS 35 60
15 MALTA 13 57 30
16 SLOVENIA 10 62 20 5
17 ESTONIA 7 30 62
18 HUNGARY 100
19 SLOVAKIA 95
20 POLAND 15 77 8
21 CZECH REPUBLIC 85 13
22 LATVIA 7 82 5
23 LITHUANIA 99
24 ITALY 100
25 GREECE 17 83
26 ROMANIA 100
27 BULGARIA 100
note: Frequencies are calculated from the 60 simulations with alternative aggregation, weighting and removing one indicator at a time
Frequencies under 5% are not shown. Bold numbers represent a majority of simulation results equaling a country’s original rank position.
Table 2.14: Frequency Matrix of a EU Country's Voice & Accountability Rank
Original Rank Country 1,2 3,4 5,6 7,8 9,10 11,12 13,14 15,16 17,18 19,20 21,22 23,24,25 26,27
1 Sweden 100
2 Netherlands 24 73
3 Lux 21 76
4 Denmark 76 17 5
5 Finland 85 15
6 Ireland 99
7 Belgium 86 14
8 Austria 93 6
9 Germany 9 24 38 23 6
10 United Kingdom 60 33 6
11 France 68 29
12 Malta 5 74 16 5
13 Portugal 14 49 37
14 Spain 59 35
15 Estonia 8 12 67 13
16 Cz. Rep 9 90
17 Slovenia 84 9 6
xxx
18 Hungary 12 17 8 63
19 Cyprus 6 17 6 33 18 11
20 Italia 23 64 12
21 Slovakia 15 84
22 Greece 10 42 42 6
23 Latvia 26 49 24
24 Poland 6 60 18 16
25 Lithuania 25 75
26 Bulgaria 8 92
27 Romania 66 34
note: Frequencies are calculated from the 66 simulations with alternative aggregation, weighting and removing one indicator at a time.
Frequencies under 5% are not shown. Bold numbers represent a majority of simulation results equaling a country’s original rank position.
Full Sensitivity Results from Simulations (from section 5)
Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Assumptions of Weighting, Aggregation and Exclusion of
Single Indicators on Rule of Law
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded Median Max Spearman
Indicator Rank Coefficient
1 Arithmetic Original None 0 0 1.00
2 Arithmetic Original Bri 0 1 0.998
3 Arithmetic Original Dri 0 1 0.999
4 Arithmetic Original Eiu 0 2 0.993
5 Arithmetic Original Gad 0 0 1.00
6 Arithmetic Original Prs 0 2 0.995
7 Arithmetic Original Wmo 0 2 0.992
8 Arithmetic Original Gcs 0 3 0.990
9 Arithmetic Original Gwp 0 1 0.998
10 Arithmetic Original Wcy 0 2 0.993
11 Arithmetic Original Her 0 3 0.993
12 Arithmetic Original Hum 0 0 1.00
13 Arithmetic Original Tpr 0 0 1.00
14 Arithmetic Equal None 1 5 (Italy+) 0.966
15 Arithmetic Equal Bri 2 4 0.964
16 Arithmetic Equal Dri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
17 Arithmetic Equal Eiu 1 5 (Italy+) 0.963
18 Arithmetic Equal Gad 1 5 (Italy+) 0.965
19 Arithmetic Equal Prs 2 5 (Italy+) 0.950
20 Arithmetic Equal Wmo 2 5 (Italy+) 0.961
21 Arithmetic Equal Gcs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.962
22 Arithmetic Equal Gwp 1 5 (Hungary+) 0.954
23 Arithmetic Equal Wcy 2 5 (Italy+) 0.960
24 Arithmetic Equal Her 1 5 (Italy+) 0.956
25 Arithmetic Equal Hum 1 5 (Italy+) 0.963
26 Arithmetic Equal Tpr 1 4 0.979
27 Arithmetic FA None 1 4 0.967
28 Arithmetic FA Bri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.968
xxxi
29 Arithmetic FA Dri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.968
30 Arithmetic FA Eiu 1 6 (Slovenia+) 0.931
31 Arithmetic FA Gad 1 4 0.976
32 Arithmetic FA Prs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
33 Arithmetic FA Wmo 1 5 (Italy+) 0.967
34 Arithmetic FA Gcs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.960
35 Arithmetic FA Gwp 2 5 (Hungary+) 0.958
36 Arithmetic FA Wcy 2 5 (Italy+) 0.957
37 Arithmetic FA Her 1 5 (Italy+) 0.961
38 Arithmetic FA Hum 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
39 Arithmetic FA Tpr 1 4 0.981
40 Geometric Original None 1 5 (Hun+) 0.960
41 Geometric Original Bri 1 4 0.964
42 Geometric Original Dri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
43 Geometric Original Eiu 1 5 (Italy, Hun. +) 0.959
44 Geometric Original Gad 1 5 (Italy, Hun. +) 0.962
45 Geometric Original Prs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.949
46 Geometric Original Wmo 2 5 (Italy, Hun. +) 0.955
47 Geometric Original Gcs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.957
48 Geometric Original Gwp 1 5 (Italy, Hun. +) 0.961
49 Geometric Original Wcy 1 5 (Italy+) 0.956
50 Geometric Original Her 1 5 (Italy, Hun.+) 0.965
51 Geometric Original Hum 1 5 (Hun+) 0.964
52 Geometric Original Tpr 1 5 (Hun+) 0.975
53 Geometric Equal None 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
54 Geometric Equal Bri 1 4 0.951
55 Geometric Equal Dri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
56 Geometric Equal Eiu 1 5 (Italy, Hun+) 0.960
57 Geometric Equal Gad 1 5 (Italy+) 0.955
58 Geometric Equal Prs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.949
59 Geometric Equal Wmo 2 5 (Italy+) 0.955
60 Geometric Equal Gcs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.957
61 Geometric Equal Gwp 1 5 (Hungary+) 0.961
62 Geometric Equal Wcy 1 5 (Italy+) 0.956
63 Geometric Equal Her 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
64 Geometric Equal Hum 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
65 Geometric Equal Tpr 1 4 0.975
66 Geometric FA None 1 5 (Italy+) 0.960
67 Geometric FA Bri 1 4 0.964
68 Geometric FA Dri 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
69 Geometric FA Eiu 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
70 Geometric FA Gad 1 5 (Italy+) 0.962
71 Geometric FA Prs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.943
72 Geometric FA Wmo 2 5 (Italy+) 0.955
73 Geometric FA Gcs 1 5 (Italy+) 0.957
74 Geometric FA Gwp 1 5 (Hungary +) 0.961
75 Geometric FA Wcy 1 5 (Italy+) 0.956
76 Geometric FA Her 1 5 (Italy+) 0.959
77 Geometric FA Hum 1 5 (Italy+) 0.964
78 Geometric FA Tpr 1 4 0.975
xxxii
Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Assumptions of Weighting, Aggregation and
Exclusion of Single Indicators on Corruption
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded Median Max Spearman
Indicator Rank Coefficient
1 Arithmetic Original None 0 0 1
2 Arithmetic Original Bri 0 2 0.996
3 Arithmetic Original Dri 0 0 1
4 Arithmetic Original Eiu 0 2 0.993
5 Arithmetic Original Gad 0 1 0.998
6 Arithmetic Original Prs 0 2 0.993
7 Arithmetic Original Wmo 0 2 0.995
8 Arithmetic Original Gcs 1 3 0.993
9 Arithmetic Original Gwp 0 2 0.998
10 Arithmetic Original Wcy 0 3 0.994
11 Arithmetic Equal None 1 3 0.989
12 Arithmetic Equal Bri 1 4 0.981
13 Arithmetic Equal Dri 0 3 0.991
14 Arithmetic Equal Eiu 1 3 0.984
15 Arithmetic Equal Gad 1 2 0.99
16 Arithmetic Equal Prs 1 4 0.975
17 Arithmetic Equal Wmo 0 3 0.991
18 Arithmetic Equal Gcs 1 3 0.986
19 Arithmetic Equal Gwp 0 2 0.995
20 Arithmetic Equal Wcy 1 3 0.99
21 Arithmetic FA None 1 3 0.989
22 Arithmetic FA Bri 0 4 0.983
23 Arithmetic FA Dri 1 3 0.989
24 Arithmetic FA Eiu 1 3 0.985
25 Arithmetic FA Gad 1 2 0.991
26 Arithmetic FA Prs 1 4 0.974
27 Arithmetic FA Wmo 0 3 0.989
28 Arithmetic FA Gcs 1 3 0.982
29 Arithmetic FA Gwp 1 2 0.995
xxxiii
30 Arithmetic FA Wcy 1 3 0.99
31 Geometric Original None 1 3 0.989
32 Geometric Original Bri 0 4 0.983
33 Geometric Original Dri 1 3 0.989
34 Geometric Original Eiu 1 3 0.982
35 Geometric Original Gad 1 2 0.988
36 Geometric Original Prs 1 4 0.971
37 Geometric Original Wmo 0 3 0.99
38 Geometric Original Gcs 1 3 0.982
39 Geometric Original Gwp 0 2 0.983
40 Geometric Original Wcy 1 3 0.995
41 Geometric Equal None 1 3 0.989
42 Geometric Equal Bri 0 4 0.983
43 Geometric Equal Dri 1 3 0.988
44 Geometric Equal Eiu 1 3 0.982
45 Geometric Equal Gad 1 3 0.986
46 Geometric Equal Prs 1 4 0.972
47 Geometric Equal Wmo 0 3 0.990
48 Geometric Equal Gcs 1 3 0.983
49 Geometric Equal Gwp 0 2 0.995
50 Geometric Equal Wcy 1 3 0.988
51 Geometric FA None 1 3 0.989
52 Geometric FA Bri 1 4 0.988
53 Geometric FA Dri 1 3 0.986
54 Geometric FA Eiu 1 3 0.981
55 Geometric FA Gad 1 2 0.988
56 Geometric FA Prs 1 4 0.983
57 Geometric FA Wmo 0 3 0.988
58 Geometric FA Gcs 1 3 0.971
59 Geometric FA Gwp 0 2 0.997
60 Geometric FA Wcy 1 3 0.988
xxxiv
Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Assumptions of Weighting, Aggregation and
Exclusion of Single Indicators on Government Effectiveness
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded Median Max Spearman
Indicator Rank Coefficient
1 Arithmetic Original None 0 0 1
2 Arithmetic Original Bri 0 2 0.991
3 Arithmetic Original Dri 0 1 0.998
4 Arithmetic Original Eiu 1 3 0.992
5 Arithmetic Original Prs 0 1 0.997
6 Arithmetic Original Wmo 1 3 0.991
7 Arithmetic Original Gcs 1 4 0.987
8 Arithmetic Original Gwp 0 1 0.998
9 Arithmetic Original Wcy 0 2 0.996
10 Arithmetic Original Egv 0 2 0.996
11 Arithmetic Equal None 1 6 (Slovak -) 0.945
12 Arithmetic Equal Bri 2 6 (Slovak -) 0.942
13 Arithmetic Equal Dri 1 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.943
14 Arithmetic Equal Eiu 1 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.934
15 Arithmetic Equal Prs 2 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.937
16 Arithmetic Equal Wmo 2 6 (Slovak -) 0.935
17 Arithmetic Equal Gcs 2 7 (Ireland+) 0.914
18 Arithmetic Equal Gwp 2 5 (Hungary-) 0.942
19 Arithmetic Equal Wcy 2 6 (Slovak -) 0.933
20 Arithmetic Equal Egv 1 5 (Slovak-) 0.956
21 Arithmetic FA None 1 5 (Spain+) 0.959
22 Arithmetic FA Bri 1 4 0.961
23 Arithmetic FA Dri 1 5 (Spain+) 0.961
24 Arithmetic FA Eiu 1 5 (Spain, Bel+) 0.943
25 Arithmetic FA Prs 1 5 (Spain+) 0.953
26 Arithmetic FA Wmo 2 5 (Bel+) 0.952
27 Arithmetic FA Gcs 2 5 (Spain+) 0.951
28 Arithmetic FA Gwp 1 3 0.989
29 Arithmetic FA Wcy 2 5 (Sp, Pol+, Lat-) 0.944
30 Arithmetic FA Egv 1 5 (Spain+) 0.959
31 Geometric Original None 1 6 (Slovak-) 0.948
32 Geometric Original Bri 1 6 (Slovak-) 0.945
33 Geometric Original Dri 1 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.942
34 Geometric Original Eiu 2 7 (Italy+) 0.925
xxxv
35 Geometric Original Prs 2 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.936
36 Geometric Original Wmo 2 6 (Slovak, Pol.+) 0.932
37 Geometric Original Gcs 2 7 (Ireland+) 0.907
38 Geometric Original Gwp 2 8 (Slovenia-) 0.937
39 Geometric Original Wcy 2 7 (Italy+) 0.928
40 Geometric Original Egv 1 5 (Spain+) 0.953
41 Geometric Equal None 1 6 (Slovak -) 0.945
42 Geometric Equal Bri 1 6 (Slovak -) 0.946
43 Geometric Equal Dri 1 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.942
44 Geometric Equal Eiu 2 7 (Italy+) 0.925
45 Geometric Equal Prs 2 6 (Slovak, Italy+)) 0.936
46 Geometric Equal Wmo 2 6 (Poland+) 0.932
47 Geometric Equal Gcs 2 7 Ireland (+) 0.907
48 Geometric Equal Gwp 2 4 0.937
49 Geometric Equal Wcy 2 7 (Italy+) 0.928
50 Geometric Equal Egv 1 5 (Spain+) 0.953
51 Geometric FA None 1 5 (Spain+) 0.953
52 Geometric FA Bri 1 4 0.951
53 Geometric FA Dri 1 5 (Spain+, Slovak-) 0.954
54 Geometric FA Eiu 2 6 (Slovak-) 0.935
55 Geometric FA Prs 2 5 (Spain+) 0.95
56 Geometric FA Wmo 1 5 (Bel+, Slovak-) 0.947
57 Geometric FA Gcs 2 5 (Poland+) 0.945
58 Geometric FA Gwp 2 7 (Italy+) 0.988
59 Geometric FA Wcy 1 5 (Spain+) 0.928
60 Geometric FA Egv 1 4 0.95
xxxvi
Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Assumptions of Weighting, Aggregation and Exclusion
of Single Indicators on Voice & Accountability
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded Median Max Spearman
Indicator Rank Coefficient
1 Arithmetic Original None 0 0 1.00
2 Arithmetic Original WMO 0 1 0.998
3 Arithmetic Original FRH 1 5 (Poland+) 0.982
4 Arithmetic Original PRS 0 3 0.993
5 Arithmetic Original EIU 1 3 0.986
6 Arithmetic Original RSF 0 1 0.998
7 Arithmetic Original HUM 0 3 0.991
8 Arithmetic Original WCY 0 2 0.994
9 Arithmetic Original GCS 0 2 0.995
10 Arithmetic Original GAD 0 3 0.989
11 Arithmetic Original GWP 0 1 0.999
12 Arithmetic Equal None 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.932
13 Arithmetic Equal WMO 2 11 (Cyprus+) 0.920
14 Arithmetic Equal FRH 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.933
15 Arithmetic Equal PRS 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.923
16 Arithmetic Equal EIU 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.922
17 Arithmetic Equal RSF 1 11 (Cyprus+) 0.934
18 Arithmetic Equal HUM 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.919
19 Arithmetic Equal WCY 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.921
20 Arithmetic Equal GCS 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.916
21 Arithmetic Equal GAD 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.928
22 Arithmetic Equal GWP 1 6 (Latvia +) 0.952
23 Arithmetic FA None 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.932
24 Arithmetic FA WMO 2 11 (Cyprus+) 0.921
25 Arithmetic FA FRH 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.932
26 Arithmetic FA PRS 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.932
27 Arithmetic FA EIU 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.922
28 Arithmetic FA RSF 2 9 (Cyprus+) 0.933
29 Arithmetic FA HUM 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.918
30 Arithmetic FA WCY 1 11 (Cyprus+) 0.921
31 Arithmetic FA GCS 2 8 (Cyprus+) 0.916
32 Arithmetic FA GAD 2 10 (Cyprus+) 0.927
33 Arithmetic FA GWP 1 6 (Latvia +) 0.952
34 Geometric Original None 2 5 (Cyprus+) 0.958
35 Geometric Original WMO 2 7 (Cyprus+) 0.952
36 Geometric Original FRH 2 5 (Cyprus+) 0.958
37 Geometric Original PRS 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.955
xxxvii
38 Geometric Original EIU 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.959
39 Geometric Original RSF 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.951
40 Geometric Original HUM 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.958
41 Geometric Original WCY 2 4 0.965
42 Geometric Original GCS 1 6 (Pol. +) 0.961
43 Geometric Original GAD 1 6 (Cyprus+) 0.954
44 Geometric Original GWP 2 4 0.973
45 Geometric Equal None 2 5 (Cyp, Pol.+, Hun-) 0.959
46 Geometric Equal WMO 2 6 (Cyprus +) 0.952
47 Geometric Equal FRH 2 5 (Cyp, Pol.+, Hun-) 0.959
48 Geometric Equal PRS 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.954
49 Geometric Equal EIU 2 5 (Cyp, Pol. +) 0.955
50 Geometric Equal RSF 2 5 (Cyp, Pol.+, Hun-) 0.959
51 Geometric Equal HUM 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.951
52 Geometric Equal WCY 1 4 0.964
53 Geometric Equal GCS 1 6 (Poland+) 0.962
54 Geometric Equal GAD 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.952
55 Geometric Equal GWP 1 4 0.972
56 Geometric FA None 2 5 (Cyprus+) 0.958
57 Geometric FA WMO 2 7 (Cyprus+) 0.952
58 Geometric FA FRH 2 5 (Cyprus+) 0.959
59 Geometric FA PRS 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.954
60 Geometric FA EIU 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.954
61 Geometric FA RSF 2 5 (Cyp, Pol. +) 0.959
62 Geometric FA HUM 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.951
63 Geometric FA WCY 1 4 0.964
64 Geometric FA GCS 1 6 (Poland+) 0.961
65 Geometric FA GAD 2 6 (Cyprus+) 0.954
66 Geometric FA GWP 1 4 0.972
Regressions from part 2.6 – external validity checks (QoG as DV)
1 2 3 4 5
GDP 0.014
(7.86)**
Social Capital 2.646
(5.10)**
Inequality -0.051
(2.25)*
xxxviii
Child Mortality -0.127
(5.50)**
population 0.001
(-0.27)
Constant -0.185 0.32 2.65 2.082 1.099
-1.06 -1.81 (3.86)** (10.98)** (7.78)**
Observations 26 26 27 27 27
R-squared 0.72 0.52 0.17 0.55 0
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
xxxix
Appendix: Part III – Measuring QoG at the Regional Level
List of Regions, Nuts Codes, and Region Code in the E.U. Regional Dataset
Region Nuts Code Number Region Nuts Code Number Region Nuts Code Number
Austria AT 1 Franche-Comte FR43 65 Dolnoslaskie PL51 129
Burgenland AT11 2 Pays de la Loire FR51 66 Opolskie PL52 130
Niederöstrerreich AT12 3 Bretagne FR52 67 Kujawsko-Pomorskie PL61 131
Wien AT13 4 Poitou-Charentes FR53 68 Warminsko-Mazurskie PL62 132
Kärnten AT21 5 Aquitaine FR61 69 Pomorskie PL63 133
Kärnten AT21 6 Midi-Pyrenees FR62 70 Portugal PT 134
Oberösterreich AT31 7 Limousin FR63 71 Norte PT11 135
Salzburg AT32 8 Rhone-Alpes FR71 72 Algarve PT15 136
Tirol AT33 9 Auvergne FR72 73 Centro PT16 137
Voralberg AT34 10 Languedoc-Roussillon FR81 74 Lisboa PT17 138
Belgium BE 11 Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur FR82 75 Alentejo PT18 139
Brussels BE1 12 Corse FR83 76 Região Autónoma dos Açores PT20 140
Vlaams Gewest BE2 13 Guadeloupe FR91 77 Região Autónoma da Madeira PT30 141
Wallonie BE3 14 Martinique FR92 78 Romania RO 142
Bulgaria BG 15 Guyane FR93 79 Nord-Vest RO11 143
Severozapaden BG31 16 Reunion FR94 80 Centru RO12 144
Severen Tsentralen BG32 17 Greece GR 81 Nord-Est RO21 145
Severoiztochen BG33 18 Voreia Ellada GR1 82 Sud-Est RO22 146
Yugoiztochen BG34 19 Kentriki Ellada GR2 83 Sud-Muntenia RO31 147
Yugozapaden BG41 20 Attica GR3 84 Bucuresti-Ilfov RO32 148
Yuzhen Tsentralen BG42 21 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti GR4 85 Sud-Vest Oltenia RO41 149
Czech Rep. CZ 22 Hungary HU 86 Vest RO42 150
Praha CZ01 23 Közép-Magyarország HU1 87 Slovakia SK 151
Stredni Cechy CZ02 24 Dunántúl HU2 88 Bratislavský kraj SK01 152
Jihozapad CZ03 25 Észak és Alföld HU3 89 Západné Slovensko SK02 153
Severozapad CZ04 26 Italy IT 90 Stredné Slovensko SK03 154
Severovychod CZ05 27 Piemonte ITC1 91 Východné Slovensko SK04 155
Jihovychod CZ06 28 Valle d'Acosta ITC2 92 Spain ES 156
Stedni Morava CZ07 29 Ligura ITC3 93 Galicia ES11 157
Moravskoslezsko CZ08 30 Lombardia ITC4 94 Principado de Asturias ES12 158
Denmark DK 31 Bolzano ITD1 95 Cantabria ES13 159
Hovedstaden DK01 32 Trento ITD2 96 Pais Vasco ES21 160
Sjaelland DK02 33 Veneto ITD3 97 Comunidad Foral de Navarra ES22 161
Syddanmark DK03 34 Friuli-Venezia Giulia ITD4 98 La Rioja ES23 162
Midtylland DK04 35 Emilia-Romagna ITD5 99 Aragón ES24 163
Nordjylland DK05 36 Toscana ITE1 100 Comunidad de Madrid ES30 164
Germany DE 37 Umbria ITE2 101 Castilla y León ES41 165
Baden Wuttemberg DE1 38 Marche ITE3 102 Castilla-La Mancha ES42 166
Bavaria DE2 39 Lazio ITE4 103 Extremadura ES43 167
Berlin DE3 40 Abruzzo ITF1 104 Cataluña ES51 168
Brandenburg DE4 41 Molise ITF2 105 Comunidad Valenciana ES52 169
Bremen DE5 42 Campania ITF3 106 Illes Balears ES53 170
Hamburg DE6 43 Puglia ITF4 107 Andalucia ES61 171
Hessen DE7 44 Basilicata ITF5 108 Región de Murcia ES62 172
xl
Mecklenburg-Vorpommen DE8 45 Calabria ITF6 109 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta ES63 173
Lower Saxony DE9 46 Sicilia ITG1 110 Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla ES64 174
North Rhine Westphalia DEA 47 Sardegna ITG2 111 Canarias (ES) ES70 175
Rhineland-Palatinate DEB 48 Netherlands NL 112 Sweden SE 176
Saarland DEC 49 Noord-Nederland NL1 113 Östra Sverige SE1 177
Saxony DED 50 Oost-Nederland NL2 114 Södra Sverige SE2 178
Saxony-Anhalt DEE 51 West-Nederland NL3 115 Norra Sverige SE3 179
Schleswig-Holstein DEF 52 Zuid-Nederland NL4 116 United Kingdom UK 180
Thuringia DEG 53 Poland PL 117 Northeast England UKC 181
France FR 54 Lodzkie PL11 118 Northwest England UKD 182
Ile-de-France FR10 55 Mazowieckie PL12 119 Yorkshire-Humber UKE 183
Champagne-Ardenne FR21 56 Malopolskie PL21 120 East Midland England UKF 184
Picardie FR22 57 Slaskie PL22 121 West Midland England UKG 185
Haute-Normandie FR23 58 Lubelskie PL31 122 East of England UKH 186
Centre FR24 59 Podkarpackie PL32 123 London UKI 187
Basse-Normandie FR25 60 Swietokrzyskie PL33 124 South East England UKJ 188
Bourgogne FR26 61 Podlaskie PL34 125 South West England UKK 189
Nord - Pas-de-Calais FR30 62 Wielkopolskie PL41 126 Wales UKL 190
Lorraine FR41 63 Zachodniopomorskie PL42 127 Scotland UKM 191
Alsace FR42 64 Lubuskie PL43 128 Northern Ireland UKN 192
Table 1: Demographic & Background Data (n= 33,540)
Question Content Proportion of sample
Experience in last 12 months:
Education 0.60
Health care 0.25
Law enforcement 0.78
All 3 0.14
None of the 3 0.09
Income
Low 0.38
Medium 0.37
High 0.14
Education
Secondary or less 0.49
University 0.35
Advanced degree 0.14
xli
Population
10,000 or less 0.39
10,000 - 100,000 0.36
100,000 - 1 million 0.18
1 million + 0.06
Age
18-29 0.19
30-49 0.35
50-64 0.27
65+ 0.19
Religion
Christian 0.56
Secular 0.17
Muslim 0.01
Other 0.26
Gender
Male 0.55
Female 0.45
Language: mother tongue same as official language in region?
yes 0.95
no 0.05
Table 4: Pairwise Person Correlations
Note: significant relationships at the 95% level of confidence are in bold
VARIABLE Ed. Qual.
Hel.
Qual. Law Qual. Ed. Impart1 Hel. Impart1 Law Impart1 Ed. Impart2 Hel. Impart2 Law Impart2
Health Qual. 0.71 1
Law Qual. 0.69 0.65 1
Ed. Impart1 -0.17 0.16 0.21 1
Health Impart1 0.006 0.34 0.19 0.86 1
Law Impart1 -0.002 0.31 0.48 0.86 0.75 1
Ed. Impart2 0.16 0.39 0.41 0.76 0.76 0.74 1
Health Impart2 0.35 0.66 0.36 0.43 0.77 0.55 0.81 1
Law Impart2 0.11 0.34 0.56 0.66 0.61 0.82 0.87 0.67 1
Ed. Cor. 0.3 0.55 0.41 0.54 0.56 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.54
Health Cor. 0.33 0.69 0.39 0.51 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.54
Law Cor. 0.23 0.45 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.84 0.71 0.59 0.82
Others Cor. 0.36 0.57 0.33 0.29 0.5 0.46 0.53 0.75 0.51
Elections 0.35 0.46 0.42 0.17 0.27 0.31 0.42 0.44 0.43
Media 0.28 0.35 0.54 0.26 0.29 0.52 0.23 0.29 0.42
HealthBribe 0.13 0.21 0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.005 0.13 0.05
VARIABLE Ed. Cor. Hel. Cor. Law Cor. Others Cor. Elections Media
xlii
Health Qual.
Law Qual.
Ed. Impart1
Health Impart1
Law Impart1
Ed. Impart2
Health Impart2
Law Impart2
Ed. Cor. 1
Health Cor. 0.88 1
Law Cor. 0.83 0.75 1
Others Cor. 0.71 0.78 0.67 1
Elections 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.45 1
Media 0.32 0.43 0.57 0.42 0.28 1
HealthBribe 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.14
Table 3: Multiple Regression (by Pillar) with Individual Level Data
Quality Impartialiy Corruption QoG Total
Experience
Education -.08*** -.05** -.03* -.04*
Health -.06** .04* 0.02 -.005
Law Enforcement .12** .08** .07** .08**
Income (low = comparison group)
High .22** .09** .16** .12**
Medium .13** .06** .08** .08**
Education (low = comparison group)
High -.14** .04* .17** .05**
Medium -.07** .15** .16** .07**
Age (18-29 = comparison group)
30-49 .04* n.02 .08** .03**
50-64 .05* .08** .15** .09**
65+ .08** .23** .19** .15**
Population (>10,000 = comparison
group)
10,000 - 100,000 -.09** -.05* -.12** -.07**
100,000 - 1 million -.14** 0.003 -.11** -.05**
1 million + -.17** -.24** -.48** -.30**
Other Demographic Indicators
Muslim -.07 -.06 -.01 -.09*
Different mother tongue -.004 .02 -.04 -.04*
Female -.15** .08** .01 -.01
xliii
Satisfaction with the current:
Economy .05** .04** .03** .03**
Government .03** .02** .02** .02**
Constant -.43** -.23** -.31** -.31**
Rsq 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.08
Observations 33540 33540 33540 33540 note: OLS with robust standard errors. All dependent variables are set up such that higher scores equate to better QoG (less
corruption, more impartiality, etc.). ** p < .01, * p < .05
Chronbach‟s Alpha coefficient is defined as the following:
)var(
)var(
11)var(
),cov(
1 o
j
j
o
ji
ji
cx
x
Q
Q
x
xx
Q
Q c = 1,, M; i, j =1;…;Q (1)
The FA model is given by:
QmQmQQQ
mm
eFFFx
eFFFx
...
...
...
2211
112221111
(2)
For the FA, all variables are standardized, so as to have a common mean of „0‟ and a
standard deviation of „1‟. Thus ),...,1( Qixi represents the standardized variables and
imi ,...,1 equate to the factor loadings which relate to the variable mi FFX ,...;; 1 , which
are „m‟ uncorrelated with common factors with a „0‟ mean and unit variance. The ie are
the Q-specific factors, which also has a „0‟ mean, are independently and identically
distributed (OECD 2008).
PC Eigenvalue % of Total Var.
1 8.38 52.42
2 2.41 15.12
3 1.28 10.02
4 0.98 6.40
5 0.81 4.59
6 0.61 3.32
7 0.52 2.26
8 0.34 2.12
xliv
9 0.23 1.43
10 0.13 0.84
11 0.08 0.55
12 0.06 0.38
13 0.04 0.22
14 0.03 0.19
15 0.02 0.14
The formula for Standardization is:
t
cqc
t
cqc
t
qct
qc
xxI
(3)
The formula for min-mx is: )(min)(max
)(mint
qc
t
qc
t
qc
t
qct
qcxx
xxI
(4)
We employ the following formula for aggregation and weigting:
qc
Q
q qc IwCI
1 (5)
Whereby the sum of the weights equals one ( 1q qw ) and the weights are bound
between „0‟ and „1. In later tests of sensitivity, we also aggregate the indicators using
geometric aggregation.
Table 9: Weighting Scheme by Indicator and Pillar
Indicator Pillar
Pillar
weight Equal Weight Factor weight
W/in Pillar weight w/ Pillar of Total
EdQual Quality 33.33% 20% 22.93% 4.89%
HealthQual 20% 12.52% 2.67%
LawQual 20% 38.15% 8.14%
Media 20% 21.62% 4.61%
Election 20% 11.09% 1.64%
EdImpartial1 Impartiality 33.33% 16.67% 21.33% 9.51%
HealthImpartial1 16.67% 15.78% 7.04%
LawImpartial1 16.67% 20.42% 9.10%
EdImpartial2 16.67% 15.38% 6.86%
xlv
HealthImpartial2 16.67% 6.67% 2.97%
LawImpartial2 16.67% 20.41% 9.10%
EdCorrupt Corruption 33.33% 20% 21.46% 8.21%
HealthCorrupt 20% 30.59% 11.70%
LawCorrupt 20% 6.91% 2.64%
OthersCorrupt 20% 27.62% 10.56%
Health Sector Bribe 20% 13.43% 5.14%
Table 10: Complete list of Regional QoG by Rank Order
xlvi
Rank region euqogindex Rank region euqogindex Rank region euqogindex Rank region euqogindex
1 DK04 2.12729 44 DE1 0.67235 87 FR72 -0.003 130 PL42 -0.680371
2 DK02 1.88092 45 DE3 0.672248 88 FR10 -0.02 131 PL21 -0.688487
3 DK03 1.87205 46 DE4 0.670269 89 FR30 -0.023 132 RO21 -0.692354
4 NL1 1.75815 47 ES24 0.664752 90 FR81 -0.031 133 RO22 -0.714053
5 DK05 1.74533 48 AT31 0.65598 91 PT18 -0.052 134 PL31 -0.718985
6 DK01 1.73384 49 DE6 0.652047 92 FR25 -0.066 135 PL43 -0.745017
7 ITD1 1.67796 50 DE5 0.643663 93 FR43 -0.074 136 FR94 -0.756672
8 ITC2 1.53713 51 DE8 0.639711 94 FR26 -0.084 137 PL61 -0.765688
9 SE2 1.43125 52 AT32 0.627298 95 CZ03 -0.092 138 PL34 -0.778405
10 UKM 1.42236 53 ES62 0.627246 96 FR42 -0.094 139 PL12 -0.813732
11 NL3 1.39441 54 DE9 0.627125 97 FR22 -0.098 140 PL41 -0.816543
12 UKF 1.38923 55 ITE2 0.62099 98 ITG2 -0.1 141 PT16 -0.845336
13 ITD2 1.37398 56 ES70 0.615539 99 ITF1 -0.122 142 HU2 -0.852483
14 SE1 1.35118 57 UKI 0.601859 100 RO41 -0.138 143 PL22 -0.936801
15 NL2 1.29653 58 AT22 0.594927 101 ES51 -0.146 144 RO42 -0.936824
16 SE3 1.23133 59 ES23 0.584934 102 FR62 -0.178 145 PL51 -0.93792
17 UKK 1.22948 60 DEE 0.553417 103 CZ05 -0.196 146 HU3 -0.976073
18 UKJ 1.22078 61 ES42 0.548838 104 BE1 -0.199 147 ITF4 -0.977172
19 NL4 1.19154 62 DEB 0.512927 105 FR51 -0.216 148 CZ01 -1.01617
20 UKD 1.17706 63 ES22 0.512439 106 RO12 -0.245 149 CZ04 -1.02243
21 BE2 1.15678 64 FR52 0.49357 107 PT20 -0.286 150 FR92 -1.04661
22 UKN 1.06675 65 ES52 0.492568 108 CZ02 -0.314 151 ITG1 -1.07335
23 UKC 1.05173 66 ES13 0.481796 109 FR41 -0.333 152 GR3 -1.11503
24 DEG 1.03995 67 ITD5 0.464096 110 FR82 -0.363 153 PT11 -1.14822
25 AT11 1.03553 68 ES53 0.446118 111 FR21 -0.394 154 FR93 -1.16155
26 ITD4 1.02304 69 DEA 0.396878 112 PL52 -0.415 155 FR91 -1.20122
27 ES21 1.02171 70 DE2 0.394406 113 RO31 -0.445 156 BG33 -1.25478
28 DEF 0.974562 71 ITE3 0.341037 114 CZ08 -0.456 157 BG42 -1.43321
29 UKL 0.935203 72 ITD3 0.339226 115 FR23 -0.458 158 ITF6 -1.44641
30 UKG 0.928315 73 DE7 0.310058 116 FR83 -0.458 159 HU1 -1.57518
31 ES11 0.927839 74 ITC3 0.293243 117 ITF2 -0.461 160 ITF3 -1.58037
32 AT21 0.91665 75 ES41 0.277327 118 PL62 -0.475 161 RO32 -1.67471
33 AT33 0.894929 76 FR61 0.262441 119 ITF5 -0.485 162 GR4 -1.78893
34 UKH 0.890889 77 ITE1 0.247949 120 ITE4 -0.493 163 SK01 -1.79032
35 ES12 0.863037 78 FR71 0.241694 121 PT30 -0.526 164 GR2 -1.95117
36 AT34 0.823555 79 ES30 0.232515 122 CZ06 -0.538 165 SK03 -1.99129
37 DED 0.791426 80 RO11 0.216512 123 PT15 -0.6 166 SK04 -1.99459
38 UKE 0.775623 81 FR53 0.209139 124 PL33 -0.616 167 SK02 -2.09225
39 AT13 0.766939 82 BE3 0.174984 125 CZ07 -0.635 168 BG41 -2.20094
40 ES43 0.763702 83 FR63 0.166487 126 PL11 -0.659 169 GR1 -2.28209
41 DEC 0.74553 84 ITC4 0.15782 127 PL32 -0.665 170 BG32 -2.43973
42 AT12 0.744059 85 ES61 0.128576 128 PT17 -0.67 171 BG34 -2.52226
43 ITC1 0.69531 86 FR24 0.049156 129 PL63 -0.671 172 BG31 -2.96235 Note: country names inserted into the chart represent the average score of all regions represented in the survey data. The data is standardized so that the mean QoG regional index score is „0‟ with a standard deviation of „1‟
xlvii
Figure 3: Regional Variation in Italy
Margins of Error
1. We begin by assuming a normal distribution of the sample so that we may use the
Central Limit Theorem. We know from basic statistical probability that in a sample „x‟,
95% of the area of a basic normal Bell curve are between our estimate (µ) 1.96+/- the
standard error around µ. We calculate the standard error as: S.E. = n
. The margin of
error for each individual region is based around the QoG estimate:
n/96.1
with N = 16, because there are 16 indicators in the QoG index which have been
aggregated from the survey data. Each region thus has their own individual margin of
error based on the consistency of the estimates for each of the 16 aggregated questions in
xlviii
the survey. We end up with an average margin of error of 0.338, or about one third of a
full standard deviation, with a minimum of 0.166 to a maximum of 0.691. Figure ()
shows the relative confidence intervals around the QoG estimates for the regions in rank
order.
Figure 5
Pais Vasco
Cataluña
Andalucia
-.5
0.5
11
.5
20 40 60 80 100
Region by Rank
Margins of Error and QoG in Spainsh Regions
Figure 6
xlix
Country Mean = .09
Hi = 1.68
Low = -1.58
-2-1
01
2
Reg
iona
l Q
oG
Estim
ate
Bo
lzan
o
Va
lle d
'Ao
sta
Tre
nto
Fri
uli-
V.G
.
Pie
mon
te
Um
bri
a
Em
ilia
-Rom
an
ia
Marc
he
Ve
ne
to
Lig
uri
a
To
scan
a
Lom
ba
rdia
Sa
rde
gn
a
Ab
ruzzo
Molis
e
Ba
sili
ca
ta
Lazio
Pu
glia
Sic
ilia
Ca
labri
a
Ca
mp
an
ia
Margin of Error & QoG in Italian Regions
Figure 7
Country mean = 1.87
0.5
11
.52
2.5
Mid
tjylla
nd
Sjæ
lland
Sydd
an
ma
rk
No
rdjy
llan
d
Ho
ved
sta
den
Margin of Error and QoG in Danish Regions
l
Table 12: Sensitivity Testing of the QoG Regional Index
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded Normalization Median Max Max Spearman
Indicator Method Region Rank Coefficient
Whole Pillars Removed
1 Arithmetic Equal none Standardized 0 0 0 1.000
2 Arithmetic Equal Corruption Standardized 4 42 Moravskoslezsko 0.976
3 Arithmetic Equal Impartiality Standardized 7 55 Attica 0.927
4 Arithmetic Equal Quality Standardized 10 52 Valencia (-) 0.938
5 Arithmetic FA none Standardized 4 27 Madrid 0.985
6 Arithmetic FA Corruption Standardized 8 52 Sud-Vest Oltenia 0.952
7 Arithmetic FA Impartiality Standardized 9 49 Poitou-Charentes 0.926
8 Arithmetic FA Quality Standardized 10 54 Sud-Vest Oltenia (-) 0.928
9 Arithmetic Equal none Min-Max 2 16 Catalunia 0.997
10 Arithmetic Equal Corruption Min-Max 5 42 Yorkshire-Humber (-) 0.975
11 Arithmetic Equal Impartiality Min-Max 7 53 Attica 0.929
12 Arithmetic Equal Quality Min-Max 10 54 Austurias (-) 0.934
13 Arithmetic FA none Min-Max 6 30 Severozapad 0.977
14 Arithmetic FA Corruption Min-Max 14 57 Attica 0.919
15 Arithmetic FA Impartiality Min-Max 8 50 Rhone-Alpes 0.922
16 Arithmetic FA Quality Min-Max 11 52 Madrid 0.923
17 Geometric Equal none Min-Max 3 20 Jihovychod (-) 0.993
18 Geometric Equal Corruption Min-Max 6 51 Attica 0.969
19 Geometric Equal Impartiality Min-Max 8 52 Austurias (-) 0.930
20 Geometric Equal Quality Min-Max 11 56 Severozapad 0.925
Individual Indicators Excluded
21 Arithmetic Equal EdQuality Standardized 5 32 Moravskoslezsko 0.996
22 Arithmetic Equal HealthQuality Standardized 4.5 28 Moravskoslezsko 0.995
23 Arithmetic Equal LawQuality Standardized 6 32 Jihozápad 0.992
24 Arithmetic Equal Media Standardized 4 31 Moravskoslezsko 0.994
25 Arithmetic Equal Election Standardized 4 31 Moravskoslezsko 0.999
26 Arithmetic Equal EdImpart1 Standardized 4.5 24 Moravskoslezsko 0.999
27 Arithmetic Equal HealthImpat1 Standardized 4 33 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
28 Arithmetic Equal LawImpart1 Standardized 5 31 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
29 Arithmetic Equal EdImpart2 Standardized 4.5 29 Moravskoslezsko 0.999
30 Arithmetic Equal HealthImpat2 Standardized 5 36 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
31 Arithmetic Equal LawImpart2 Standardized 6 29 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
32 Arithmetic Equal EdCorrupt Standardized 5 25 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
33 Arithmetic Equal HealthCorrupt Standardized 5 38 Moravskoslezsko 0.998
34 Arithmetic Equal LawCorrupt Standardized 4 28 Moravskoslezsko 0.997
35 Arithmetic Equal OthersCorrupt Standardized 5 29 Moravskoslezsko 0.997
36 Arithmetic Equal Gen. Bribe Standardized 4 31 Moravskoslezsko 0.999
37 Arithmetic FA EdQuality Standardized 4 24 Algarve (-) 0.988
38 Arithmetic FA HealthQuality Standardized 3 29 Réunion 0.991
39 Arithmetic FA LawQuality Standardized 4 22 Réunion 0.980
40 Arithmetic FA Media Standardized 4 21 Alentejo (-) 0.990
41 Arithmetic FA Election Standardized 4 22 Algarve (-) 0.990
42 Arithmetic FA EdImpart1 Standardized 4 18 Algarve (-) 0.992
43 Arithmetic FA HealthImpat1 Standardized 3 24 Alentejo (-) 0.991
li
44 Arithmetic FA LawImpart1 Standardized 4 25 Alentejo (-) 0.986
45 Arithmetic FA EdImpart2 Standardized 3 24 Alentejo (-) 0.991
46 Arithmetic FA HealthImpat2 Standardized 4 23 Algarve (-) 0.989
47 Arithmetic FA LawImpart2 Standardized 4 23 Açores (-) 0.987
48 Arithmetic FA EdCorrupt Standardized 4 22 Alentejo (-) 0.990
49 Arithmetic FA HealthCorrupt Standardized 4 22 Algarve (-) 0.988
50 Arithmetic FA LawCorrupt Standardized 3 21 Algarve (-) 0.989
51 Arithmetic FA OthersCorrupt Standardized 3 21 Algarve (-) 0.984
52 Arithmetic FA Gen. Bribe Standardized 4 23 Región de Murcia 0.990
Stratified Sample
53 Arithmetic Equal 2+ services used Standardized 7 59 Valencia 0.964
54 Arithmetic FA 2+ services used Standardized 8 63 Valencia 0.942
55 Arithmetic Equal Female only Standardized 6 47 Aragón (-) 0.962
56 Arithmetic FA Female only Standardized 8 51 Umbria (-) 0.954
57 Arithmetic Equal No high income Standardized 4 25 Östra Sverige (-) 0.987
58 Arithmetic FA No high income Standardized 6 49 Östra Sverige (-) 0.969
59 Arithmetic Equal 50 + only Standardized 8 60 Nord-Vest 0.958
60 Arithmetic FA 50 + only Standardized 11 63 Nord-Vest 0.937
61 Arithmetic Equal Low Ed. Only Standardized 10 68 Opolskie 0.921
62 Arithmetic FA Low Ed. Only Standardized 8 63 Opolskie 0.943
Full Rank Order - Combined QoG (WGI and Regional Index) with Margins of
Error
Rank region EU QoG Index S.E. min max
1 DK04 1.69493 0.268246 1.426684 1.963176
2 NL1 1.5898 0.398223 1.191576 1.988022
3 SE2 1.5027 0.35416 1.148538 1.856858
4 DK02 1.46039 0.358202 1.102183 1.818587
5 DK03 1.45194 0.248999 1.202942 1.70094
6 SE1 1.42647 0.314589 1.111882 1.74106
7 FINLAND 1.33853 8 DK05 1.3313 0.326877 1.004426 1.65818
9 DK01 1.32036 0.349469 0.9708959 1.669833
10 SE3 1.31237 0.289996 1.022377 1.60237
11 UKM 1.2807 0.379889 0.9008119 1.660591
12 BE2 1.27242 0.467462 0.8049579 1.739882
13 DEG 1.26162 0.376833 0.8847875 1.638453
14 UKF 1.24916 0.325304 0.9238572 1.574466
15 AT11 1.24521 0.184969 1.06024 1.430179
16 NL3 1.24352 0.330826 0.9126915 1.574342
17 FR52 1.20801 0.339386 0.8686273 1.547399
18 DEF 1.19937 0.350467 0.8489038 1.549838
19 NL2 1.15034 0.35875 0.7915856 1.509085
lii
20 AT21 1.13204 0.260895 0.8711402 1.392931
21 LUXEMBOURG 1.12326 22 AT33 1.11136 0.255512 0.8558455 1.366869
23 UKK 1.09708 0.348747 0.7483323 1.445826
24 UKJ 1.0888 0.343859 0.7449377 1.432656
25 NL4 1.05038 0.308493 0.7418913 1.358877
26 UKD 1.04718 0.371567 0.675608 1.418742
27 AT34 1.04341 0.249902 0.7935072 1.293311
28 DED 1.02502 0.287063 0.7379615 1.312088
29 AT13 0.98951 0.24213 0.7473806 1.23164
30 FR61 0.987978 0.30657 0.6814072 1.294548
31 DEC 0.981332 0.326151 0.6551808 1.307482
32 FR71 0.968226 0.288534 0.6796925 1.25676
33 AT12 0.967728 0.210921 0.756808 1.178649
34 UKN 0.94216 0.415778 0.5263812 1.357938
35 FR53 0.937234 0.345534 0.5917001 1.282768
36 UKC 0.92786 0.351728 0.5761324 1.279589
37 DE1 0.911664 0.306463 0.6052015 1.218127
38 DE3 0.911567 0.361154 0.5504135 1.27272
39 DE4 0.909683 0.377331 0.5323524 1.287014
40 FR63 0.896629 0.265082 0.631547 1.161711
41 DE6 0.892336 0.291172 0.6011639 1.183507
42 IRELAND 0.887834 43 DE5 0.884354 0.302349 0.5820053 1.186703
44 AT31 0.883877 0.170733 0.7131436 1.05461
45 DE8 0.880592 0.287196 0.5933958 1.167788
46 DE9 0.86861 0.29522 0.5733898 1.16383
47 AT32 0.856572 0.211227 0.6453443 1.067799
48 AT22 0.825754 0.203061 0.6226935 1.028815
49 UKL 0.816926 0.350293 0.4666334 1.16722
50 UKG 0.810369 0.241009 0.56936 1.051378
51 DEE 0.79844 0.343202 0.4552377 1.141641
52 FR24 0.78493 0.29908 0.4858492 1.08401
53 UKH 0.774739 0.292132 0.4826076 1.066871
54 DEB 0.759893 0.236555 0.5233378 0.9964481
55 FR72 0.735153 0.345592 0.3895617 1.080745
56 FR10 0.7194 0.372864 0.3465368 1.092264
57 FR30 0.716626 0.377446 0.3391806 1.094072
58 FR81 0.709065 0.274919 0.4341463 0.9839847
59 FR25 0.675329 0.297824 0.3775054 0.9731534
60 FR43 0.667755 0.366942 0.3008132 1.034697
61 UKE 0.665006 0.314432 0.3505737 0.9794381
62 FR26 0.658247 0.252689 0.405558 0.9109353
63 DEA 0.649414 0.344624 0.3047904 0.9940374
64 FR42 0.648288 0.337382 0.3109058 0.9856696
65 DE2 0.647061 0.332838 0.3142223 0.979899
66 FR22 0.644364 0.332997 0.3113667 0.9773604
67 PT18 0.634629 0.379736 0.2548935 1.014365
68 FR62 0.569131 0.276197 0.2929332 0.845328
69 ITD1 0.566949 0.231172 0.3357767 0.7981205
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70 DE7 0.566761 0.269973 0.2967877 0.8367344
71 FR51 0.532067 0.366698 0.1653692 0.8987653
72 ES21 0.503343 0.396789 0.1065542 0.9001327
73 UKI 0.499582 0.252649 0.2469333 0.7522308
74 ITC2 0.432878 0.246151 0.1867269 0.6790292
75 FR41 0.42083 0.327582 0.0932472 0.7484118
76 ES11 0.413978 0.523689 -0.1097114 0.9376674
77 PT20 0.411968 0.300869 0.111099 0.7128375
78 FR82 0.392791 0.26841 0.1243811 0.6612011
79 FR21 0.363253 0.339619 0.0236346 0.702872
80 ES12 0.352286 0.482956 -0.1306693 0.8352418
81 BE3 0.337747 0.344849 -0.0071015 0.682596
82 MALTA 0.333871 83 FR23 0.302352 0.306406 -0.004054 0.6087576
84 FR83 0.302125 0.348368 -0.0462427 0.6504931
85 ITD2 0.277559 0.271582 0.0059767 0.5491409
86 ES43 0.257719 0.397725 -0.1400055 0.6554436
87 PT30 0.183354 0.40156 -0.2182058 0.5849143
88 ES24 0.163518 0.418101 -0.2545831 0.5816199
89 ES62 0.127813 0.439706 -0.3118933 0.5675184
90 ES70 0.116667 0.466744 -0.3500766 0.5834115
91 PT15 0.113063 0.499507 -0.3864439 0.6125702
92 ES23 0.087531 0.51451 -0.4269791 0.6020418
93 ES42 0.053168 0.408007 -0.3548395 0.4611753
94 PT17 0.046795 0.386778 -0.3399833 0.4335736
95 CZ03 0.032461 0.34583 -0.3133695 0.3782912
96 ES22 0.018516 0.340154 -0.3216378 0.3586697
97 FR94 0.017779 0.505115 -0.4873356 0.5228938
98 ES52 -0.000401 0.414206 -0.4146074 0.4138049
99 ES13 -0.010656 0.453844 -0.4645002 0.4431877
100 BE1 -0.018374 0.401287 -0.4196615 0.3829132
101 ES53 -0.044622 0.428495 -0.4731168 0.3838732
102 ITD4 -0.056537 0.207372 -0.2639094 0.1508352
103 CZ05 -0.066455 0.309828 -0.3762828 0.2433726
104 CYPRUS -0.067572 105 ESTONIA -0.101101 106 PT16 -0.120377 0.351323 -0.4717 0.2309451
107 CZ02 -0.17927 0.410925 -0.5901955 0.231655
108 GR3 -0.186338 0.540012 -0.7263497 0.3536738
109 SLOVENIA -0.187761 110 ES41 -0.205311 0.462443 -0.6677544 0.2571318
111 ES30 -0.247973 0.475226 -0.7231987 0.2272536
112 HU2 -0.257964 0.233217 -0.4911808 -0.0247468
113 FR92 -0.258243 0.409765 -0.6680079 0.1515225
114 CZ08 -0.314155 0.404391 -0.718546 0.0902364
115 ES61 -0.346923 0.428444 -0.7753667 0.0815213
116 FR93 -0.367666 0.36722 -0.7348862 -0.0004456
117 ITC1 -0.368537 0.24482 -0.6133572 -0.1237168
118 HU3 -0.375622 0.227085 -0.6027073 -0.1485364
119 CZ06 -0.392497 0.331134 -0.7236311 -0.0613629
liv
120 FR91 -0.405432 0.444371 -0.8498033 0.0389395
121 PT11 -0.408724 0.354227 -0.7629511 -0.0544967
122 ITE2 -0.43929 0.301075 -0.740365 -0.1382146
123 CZ07 -0.484559 0.375791 -0.8603498 -0.1087674
124 SK01 -0.567789 0.292796 -0.8605855 -0.2749932
125 ITD5 -0.588653 0.187148 -0.7758017 -0.4015051
126 ES51 -0.608302 0.436637 -1.044939 -0.1716643
127 PL52 -0.610872 0.223744 -0.8346158 -0.3871286
128 PL62 -0.667592 0.216398 -0.8839898 -0.4511934
129 ITE3 -0.705806 0.295703 -1.001509 -0.4101025
130 ITD3 -0.70753 0.257858 -0.9653881 -0.4496719
131 ITC3 -0.751306 0.320646 -1.071952 -0.43066
132 SK03 -0.759113 0.240277 -0.9993902 -0.5188364
133 SK04 -0.762255 0.248696 -1.010951 -0.5135587
134 ITE1 -0.794426 0.244314 -1.03874 -0.5501121
135 LATVIA -0.798874 136 PL33 -0.801872 0.230502 -1.032374 -0.5713692
137 GR4 -0.827893 0.473517 -1.301409 -0.354376
138 BG33 -0.835811 0.255895 -1.091707 -0.5799159
139 PL11 -0.842786 0.238326 -1.081112 -0.6044596
140 CZ01 -0.847407 0.427903 -1.27531 -0.4195037
141 PL32 -0.848802 0.268723 -1.117525 -0.5800796
142 CZ04 -0.853366 0.475445 -1.328811 -0.3779216
143 PL63 -0.854148 0.199281 -1.053429 -0.6548673
144 SK02 -0.855228 0.29755 -1.152777 -0.557678
145 PL42 -0.863354 0.206438 -1.069792 -0.6569154
146 LITHUANIA -0.866395 147 PL21 -0.87108 0.237275 -1.108355 -0.6338055
148 ITC4 -0.880229 0.2162 -1.096429 -0.6640291
149 PL31 -0.900114 0.222066 -1.122181 -0.6780483
150 PL43 -0.924897 0.259652 -1.184549 -0.6652453
151 PL61 -0.944576 0.166524 -1.1111 -0.7780519
152 HU1 -0.945973 0.381707 -1.32768 -0.5642668
153 PL34 -0.956682 0.201208 -1.15789 -0.7554749
154 GR2 -0.982346 0.558249 -1.540594 -0.4240971
155 PL12 -0.990314 0.209256 -1.19957 -0.781058
156 PL41 -0.99299 0.199638 -1.192627 -0.7933524
157 BG42 -1.00568 0.308359 -1.314036 -0.6973182
158 RO11 -1.06156 0.450279 -1.511837 -0.611279
159 PL22 -1.10748 0.184302 -1.291777 -0.9231743
160 PL51 -1.10854 0.244496 -1.353037 -0.8640453
161 ITG2 -1.12578 0.287538 -1.413323 -0.8382466
162 ITF1 -1.147 0.341497 -1.4885 -0.8055063
163 GR1 -1.29738 0.46692 -1.764303 -0.8304621
164 RO41 -1.39932 0.551243 -1.950565 -0.8480803
165 ITF2 -1.46933 0.355858 -1.825192 -1.113477
166 ITF5 -1.49184 0.310627 -1.802464 -1.181209
167 ITE4 -1.5 0.261525 -1.761527 -1.238477
168 RO12 -1.50081 0.449526 -1.950336 -1.051284
169 RO31 -1.69116 0.484932 -2.176092 -1.206228
lv
170 BG41 -1.73656 0.358962 -2.09552 -1.377597
171 RO21 -1.9268 0.549444 -2.476245 -1.377357
172 RO22 -1.94746 0.586293 -2.533751 -1.361166
173 ITF4 -1.96074 0.326568 -2.287313 -1.634176
174 BG32 -1.96389 0.528717 -2.492604 -1.435171
175 BG34 -2.04246 0.380321 -2.422776 -1.662135
176 ITG1 -2.05231 0.332418 -2.384724 -1.719888
177 RO42 -2.15954 0.54126 -2.700798 -1.618277
178 ITF6 -2.40746 0.455613 -2.863074 -1.951847
179 BG31 -2.46142 0.418835 -2.880258 -2.042588
180 ITF3 -2.53499 0.302063 -2.837054 -2.232928
181 RO32 -2.86201 0.691558 -3.553564 -2.170449
-4-3
-2-1
01
2
EUqoqIndex 95% c.i.
E.U. QoG Index with Margins of Error
lvi
Appendix PART IV: Case studies
Part 1. References
Norte (PT 11)
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cs/data/database
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2http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/anonym-mutanmalare-vi-har-ett-stort-problem-
1.1085817
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lxiv
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lxvii
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lxviii
Appendix IV cont.
Part 2. QoG regional Expert Survey translations
English Version
QUESTIONNAIRE: “MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND
SUBNATIONAL VARIATION”
1. Do you agree with where our data places you within your country/E.U. as regards to
QoG? If not, why?
2. Do you think this assessment reflects how foreign investors see your region? SCALED
3. Does your region receive more or less FDI, tourism or other outside capital due to its
perceived QoG?
MEDIA
4. What level of confidence do you have in the following institutions? :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
Almost
none
Extreme
confidence
Police
Media
Government of the region
Political parties
Business owners
Hospitals
5. What level of confidence do you have in the news you get from:
2. Television
3. Radio
4. Newspapers
5. On-line news agencies
6. Do you consider that there are obstacles to the freedom of press in the region? In your
opinion, what are the most important? Is there any specific factor or agent, which hinders
or affects the freedom of press today?
lxix
7. Do you think that the news you read, listen or watch in the local media, truly reflects
what is happening in the region?
8. How independent do you think the media in this Region?
9. Does the media have total freedom to report what is happening in issues of…?:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
No
Freedo
m
Completely
free
7. Corruption
8. Security
9. Economics
10. Politics
11. Public health
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
10. Do you think the media protects or attacks the Government of the Region? Why?
11. Which form of media do you think is more reliable: state-owned, or private-owned?
Why?
12. In your opinion, there is more freedom of press today, or twenty years ago? Why?
RECRUITMENT PROCESS AND WORKING-PLACE
13. Are various types of contacts (personal/ business/ political) important when hiring
new employees? Do you think it differs between this region and other regions in the
country?
14. What is the percentage of employees who have been hired on a
political/personal/business contacts basis?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
None Most of
them
15. How do you perceive the long-term stability of young employees in public service
and their interest in a career within the public institutions?
lxx
16. How do you account for the length of the hiring process in the public institutions? (a
short procedure might point out at possible corruption, insufficient publicity and political
involvement).
17. Could you state the approximate length of the hiring process?
18. What steps could an employee take when discovering that something is wrong on his
or her working-place?
18 (i) Without the fear of repercussions at work?
The following situation occurs, a public employee suspects that another colleague (or a
political superior) is engaging in some corrupt activity or is giving special treatment to
some business/use of the administration at the expense of others. Would he/she report this
to some newspaper/ responsible authorities such as the judicial system?
19. Is there adequate protection to rely on, against any unjustified sanction, for those who
make such disclosure in the public interest to the responsible authorities or media?
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES
A) What strategy is used in your region in order to enforce the compliance and good
conduct of the employees in the public service? Is there any punishment? If so, what?
Who imposes it? Or, on the contrary, is there a system of rewards as incentives, e.g.
reward/bonus schemes?
21. Can you provide any examples of the measures implemented to enforce good
behavior of public authorities?
22. Does the general public (citizens) "voice complaints" when they acknowledge the
occurrence of a corrupt act? Does this public opinion have the potential to act as a
constraint on the authorities. (Is the public pressure present and effective in the
enforcement of good conduct of public officials?)
23. Is corruption investigated in your region by justice courts, the media or NGO‟s? Are
you aware of cases where corruption acts by public officials in your region have been
trialed and prosecuted?
24. Are you aware of any particular corruption monitoring mechanism in your region?
EU IMPACT/ CHANGES IN REGION
lxxi
25. Have you observed a significant change in the quality of public services since EU
accession? If so, please specify the level of change:
26. Do you expect Quality of government to change in the next five years (for better or
for worse)?
27. Please specify the level of improvement of the services provided by the following
public institutions after the EU accession:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
No
improve
ment
High level
of
improveme
nt
a. Schools
b. Universities
c. Hospitals
d. Court of law
e. Police
28. What are some positive and negative aspects regarding the public administration
during the last 10 years in your region?
REGIONAL AUTONOMY
29. Regarding the autonomy in this particular region, to what extent are the following
practices/ elements autonomous from the center?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
No
Autono
my
High level
of
autonomy
a. Recruitment of public staff
b. Design of public structure (organization chart)
c. Elaboration of regional laws
d. Control of regional natural resources
e. Incentives to foreign investment
f. Allocation of foreign investment
30. Is there any autonomy in this particular region in the organization of the public
administration? If so, what particular elements differ?
lxxii
31. To what extent does the regional organization chart (public structure) differ from the
central government?
32. Do you think that the decentralization of public services helps to stimulate
entrepreneurship in the region and its counties? Why and how?
33. To what extent do the county or municipalities in the region have a tax legislation of
their own?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 No
opinion
To no
extent
Large extent
34. To what extent does the regional autonomy increase QoG?
35. In regard to budget planning, using what criteria is the budget split from the central
government? Do the regional distinct district councils have complete or partial autonomy
in deciding how the local budget is used?
IMPARTIALITY WHEN ACQUIRING THE DIFFERENT SERVICES; HEALTH
CARE SERVICES, EDUCATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT.
36. Which of the following factors, do you think could be important when explaining
perception of fairness/bias/impartiality in the three welfare services; Health care
services, Education and Law enforcement in your region?
a) Politic influence - “people with the adequate political connections seem to be able to
chose the best schools not because of skills but because they have influence…”
b) Economic influence (e.g. people with more money seem to be able to chose the best
schools not because of skills but because they have an economic important influence)
c) Cultural differences - people who speak a particular language, who “are from here”, or
who belong to to “right” ethnic group or identity seem to be able to chose the best
schools not because of skills but because they have influence…
d) Languages differences
e) Gender
f) Relatives (close family or friend)
NOTE: In regard to the question below there is a choice depending on what region you
are in. The question with positive connotation is intended for the well performing regions
whereas the question with negative connotation is for the IP of a under performing
region.
lxxiii
37. Can you account for one or more illustrative examples in which one can see how
fairness/bias/impartiality/lack of corruption – preferably, but not exclusively, in any of the
three welfare services pointed out – has prevailed? That is, some example in which you
have said: yes, things work here.
E.g. some partial/corrupt decision was about to be taken (i.e. a child from poor
background not accepted in a school, a hotel about to be built on the coast, a bribe from a
foreign firm that was offered) but was not (maybe because it went into press, or because
other official complained, or because the public official did not accept the bribe).
Can you account for one or more illustrative examples in which one can see how
fairness/bias/impartiality in any of the three welfare services could have been affected
negatively? That is, some example in which you feel things are not working?
38. How would you compare the perceived impartiality in the three welfare services,
health care services, education, and law enforcement to other regions in your country?
39. Are you aware of any particular policy/policies that have been implemented in order
to increase the fairness/bias/impartiality in any of the three welfare services, health care
services, education and law enforcement?
Norte (English-Portuguese version)
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND SUBNATIONAL VARIATION / MEDINDO
A QUALIDADE DE GOVERNO E SUA VARIAÇÃO SUB-NACIONAL
Obs: As you know, the QoG institute has elaborated an index for the QoG in the EU at the regional level.
Portugal lies below the European average at a national level. And this Index tells us that the Norte region is
low situated in what concerns QoG. = - 1.13, the weakest performance in Portugal and one of the weakest
in the EU.
1. Do you agree with where our data places you within your country/E.U. as regards to Quality of
Government? If not, why? (Concorda com como a nossa análise coloca a região Norte em Portugal/EU em
relação a qualidade de governo? Em caso negativo, por favor explique).
2. Do you think this assessment reflects how foreign investors see your region? (Concorda que essa
avaliação reflete como os investidores estrangeiros vêem a sua região?)
3. Does your region receive more or less FDI, tourism or other outside capital due to its perceived Quality
of Government? (A região Norte atrai mais ou menos Investimento Estrangeiro Direto, turismo ou outra
forma de capital estrangeiro devido a sua qualidade de governo?)
MEDIA
4. What level of confidence do you have in the following institutions? (Que nível de confiança o(a) Sr(a)
tem nas seguintes instituições?):
lxxiv
1 2 3 4 5 6
No
confidence
Low confidence Moderate
confidence
High
confidence
Total
confidence
No opinion
Police - Policia
Media - Media
Regional Gevernment - Governo da autarquia
Political parties - Partidos Políticos
Business owners – Donos de empresas
Hospitals - Hospitais
5. What level of confidence do you have in the news you get from:
6. Television - televisão
7. Radio - rádio
8. Newspapers - jornais
9. On-line news agencies – Jornais on-line
6. Do you consider that there are obstacles to the freedom of press in the region? In your opinion, what are
the most important? Is there any specific factor or agent, which hinders or affects the freedom of press
today? (Considera que existem obstáculos à liberdade de imprensa na região com um todo? E nos
municípios? Na sua opinião, quais são os obstáculos mais importantes? Existe algum factor ou agente
específico, o qual impeça ou afecte a liberdade de imprensa hoje em dia?)
7. Do you think that the news you read, listen or watch in the local media, truly reflects what is happening
in the region? (Pensa que as notícias que lê, escuta ou assiste na media local reflete verdadeiramente o que
acontece na região/ município?)
8. How independent do you think the media in this Region? (O quanto independente é a media na região
Norte, em sua opinião?)
9. Does the media have total freedom to report what is happening in issues of…?:(A media tem total
independência para reportar o que acontece nos casos de…?):
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not free Low freedom Moderate free Highly free Completely free No opinion
12. Corruption - Corrupção
13. Security – Segurança
14. Economics - Economia
15. Politics - Política
16. Public health – Saúde Pública
10. Do you think the media protects or attacks the Government of the Region? Why? (Acha que a media
protege ou ataca o governo do município/da região? Por quê?)
lxxv
11. Which form of media do you think is more reliable: state-owned, or private-owned? Why? (Que tipo de
media o(a) Sr(a) pensa que é mais confiável: a estatal/pública ou a privada? Por quê?)
12. In your opinion, there is more freedom of press today, or twenty years ago? Why? (Em sua opinião,
existe mais liberdade de imprensa hoje, ou a vinte anos atrás? Por quê?)
Recruitment process and working-place [Processo de recrutamento e lugar de trabalho]
13. Are various types of contacts (personal/ business/ political) important when hiring new employees? Do
you think it differs between this region and other regions in the country? (São os distintos tipos de
contactos (pessoal/ negócios/ político) importantes quando se contracta novos empregados? O(A) Sr(a)
pensa que isso varia dentro da região Norte e também se comparado com outras regiões do país?)
14. What is the percentage of employees who have been hired on a political/personal/business
contacts basis? (Qual é a porcentagem de empregados que têm sido empregados com base em contactos
políticos/ pessoais/ negócios?)
1 2 3 4 5 6
0-19% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-100% No opinion
15. How do you perceive the long-term stability of young employees in public service and their interest in a
career within the public institutions? (Como o(a) Sr(a) percebe a estabilidade na carreira de jovens
funcionários no serviço público ao longo do tempo? Qual é o interesse dos jovens numa carreira dentro
das instituições públicas?)
16. How do you account for the length of the hiring process in the public institutions? (a short procedure
might point out at possible corruption, insufficient publicity and political involvement). ( Como o(a) Sr(a)
percebe o tempo que toma o processo de contracto de novos funcionários para instituições públicas?É um
processo longo e demorado ou curto?)
17. Could you state the approximate length of the hiring process? (O Sr. poderia dizer qual é o tempo
aproximado do processo de contratação?)
18. What steps could an employee take when discovering that something is wrong on his or her working-
place? 18 (i) Without the fear of repercussions at work? (Quais são as providências que um
funcionário toma quando descobre que algo está errado em seu ambiente de trabalho? (i)Sem que ela ou
ele tenham medo de que isso tenha repercussões em seu trabalho?)
Example: The following situation occurs, a public employee suspects that another colleague (or a political
superior) is engaging in some corrupt activity or is giving special treatment to some business/use of the
administration at the expense of others. Would he/she report this to some newspaper/ responsible authorities
such as the judicial system?
Exemplo: Suponhamos que a seguinte situação ocorre, um funcionário público suspeita que outro colega
(ou seu superior) está engajado em alguma atividade política ou está dando tratamento privilegiado no uso
da administração pública a custas de outros. Ela/ele reportariam essa situação para os jornais/
autoridades responsáveis como o sistema judicial?
lxxvi
19. Is there adequate protection to rely on, against any unjustified sanction, for those who make such
disclosure in the public interest to the responsible authorities or media? (Existe proteção adequada na qual
se possa confiar, contra qualquer sanção não justificada, para aqueles que revelam tal erro cometido
contra o interesse público para autoridade responsável ou media?)
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES [Autoridades Públicas e Serviços]
20. What strategy is used in your region in order to enforce the compliance and good conduct of the
employees in the public service? Is there any punishment? If so, what? Who imposes it? Or, on the
contrary, is there a system of rewards as incentives, e.g. reward/bonus schemes? (Qual estratégia é usada
no seu município/na região Norte para fazer cumprir a conformidade e boa conducta dos empregados no
serviço público? Existe alguma forma de punição? Caso afirmativo, qual? Quem impõe a pena/ punição?
Ou, caso contrário, existe um sistema de recompensa como incentivos, como planos de remuneraçao/
bonus?)
21. Can you provide any examples of the measures implemented to enforce good behavior of public
authorities? (Poderia dar exemplos de que medidas são implementadas para fazer cumprir com o bom
comportamento das autoridades públicas?)
22. Does the general public (citizens) "voice complaints" when they acknowledge the occurrence of a
corrupt act? Does this public opinion have the potential to act as a constraint on the authorities? (Is the
public pressure present and effective in the enforcement of good conduct of public officials?) [O público
em geral (cidadãos) “tornam públicas suas reclamações” quando eles reconhecem a ocorrência de um
acto corrupto? Essa opinião pública tem o potencial de pressionar/ bloquear as autoridades? (A pressão
da opinião pública é presente e efectiva para garantir a boa conducta dos funcionários públicos?)]
23. Is corruption investigated in your region by justice courts, the media or NGO‟s? Are you aware of cases
where corruption acts by public officials in your region have been trialed and prosecuted? (A corrupção na
região Norte/em seu município é investigada por tribunais de justiça, pela media ou ONGs? O(A) Sr.(a)
está ciente de casos onde actos corruptos por parte de funcionários públicos na sua região têm sido
julgados e processados?)
24. Are you aware of any particular corruption monitoring mechanism in your region? (O(A) Sr.(a) está
ciente de algum mecanismo particular de monitoramento da corrupção em sua região/ município?)
EU impact/ changes in region [Impactos da UE na região]
25. Have you observed a significant change in the quality of public services since EU accession? If so,
please specify the level of change. (O(A) Sr.(a) tem observado alguma mudança significativa na qualidade
dos serviços públicos desde que Portugal entrou para a UE? Caso afirmativo, por favor especifique o nível
de mudança.)
lxxvii
26. Do you expect Quality of Government to change in the next five years (for better or for worse)? (O(A)
Sr.(a) espera que a qualidade de governo mude nos próximos 5 anos (para melhor ou para pior)?)
27. Please specify the level of improvement of the services provided by the following public institutions
after the EU accession: (Por favor especifique o nível de melhoria nos seguintes serviços públicos após a
entrada na UE):
1 2 3 4 5 6
No improvement Low improvement Moderate
improvement
High level of
improvement
Totally
improved
No opinion
a) Schools - Escolas
b) Universities - Universidades
c) Hospitals - Hospitais
d) Court of Law – Cortes de Justiça
e) Police - Polícia
28. What are some positive and negative aspects regarding the public administration during the last 10
years in your region? (Quais são alguns aspectos positivos e negativos em relação à administração pública
durante os últimos 10 anos na região Norte/ em seu município?)
Regional Autonomy (Autonomia Regional)
29. Regarding the autonomy in this particular region, to what extent are the following practices/ elements
autonomous from the center? (Considerando o nível de autonomia nessa região particular, qual é o nível
de autonomia dos seguintes elementos/ prácticas com relação ao centro?)
1 2 3 4 5 6
No autonomy Low level of
autonomy
Moderate
level of
autonomy
High level of
autonomy
Total
autonomy
No opinion
a) Recruitment of public staff - Recrutamento de servidores públicos
b) Design of public structure (organization chart) - Desenho da estructura pública (organigrama)
c) Elaboration of regional laws – Elaboração de leis regionais/municipais
d) Control of regional natural resources - Controlo de recursos naturais
e) Incentives to foreign investment – Incentivos ao investimento estrangeiro
f) Allocation of foreign investment – Alocação do investimento estrangeiro
30. Is there any autonomy in this particular region in the organization of the public administration? If so,
what particular elements differ? (Há alguma autonomia nessa região/localidade particular na organização
da administração pública? Caso afirmativo, que elementos particulares diferem?)
31. To what extent does the regional organization chart (public structure) differ from the central
government? (Até que nível a estructura pública (oganograma)regional/local difere do governo central?)
lxxviii
32. Do you think that the decentralization of public services helps to stimulate entrepreneurship in the
region and its counties? Why and how? (O(A) Sr.(a) pensa que a descentralização dos serviços públicos
ajuda a estimular o empreendedorismo na região e nos municípios? Por quê e de que forma?)
33. To what extent do the county or municipalities in the region have a tax legislation of their own? (Até
que ponto os distintos municípios da região Norte possuem uma legislação fiscal própria?)
1 2 3 4 5 6
To no extent To a short
extent
To a moderate
extent
To a large
extent
Completely
independent
No opinion
34. To what extent does the regional autonomy increase Quality of Government? (Até que ponto a
autonomia regional pode aumentar a qualidade de governo?)
35. In regard to budget planning, using what criteria is the budget split from the central government? Do
the regional distinct district councils have complete or partial autonomy in deciding how the local budget is
used? (Com relação ao planejamento orçamentar, qual é o critério de divisão orçamentar desde o governo
central para os governos locais? As autarquias regionais têm autonomia total ou parcial na decisão sobre
como o orçamento será usado?)
Impartiality when acquiring different welfare services (e.g. health care services, education and law
enforcement) [Imparcialidade na aquisição de distintos serviços de bem-estar (e.g. serviços de saúde,
educação e justiça/ aplicação da Lei)]
36. Which of the following factors, do you think could be important when explaining a perception of bias/
partiality in the three welfare services: health care services, education and justiça/ aplicação da Lei in your
region? (You can choose more than one option). [Quais dos seguintes factores o(a) Sr(a) pensa serem
importantes para exlicar que exista parcialidade nos três serviços públicos: saúde, educação e justiça em
sua região/ município? (Pode escolher mais de uma opção)]:
a) Political influence – Influênca política
Example: people with the adequate political connections seem to be able to chose the best schools not
because of skills but because they have influence. (Exemplo: pessoas que possuem conexões políticas
parecem ter maior facilidade de escolher as melhores escolas, não por sua capacidade, mas por que elas
têm influência.)
b) Economic influence – Influência Econômica
Ex.: people with more money seem to be able to chose the best schools not because of skills but because
they have an important economic influence. (Exemplo: pessoas que possuem mais dinheiro parecem ter
maior facilidade de escolher as melhores escolas, não por sua capacidade, mas por que elas têm
influência).
c) Cultural differences – Diferenças culturais
Ex.: people who speak a particular language, who “are from here”, or who belong to the “right” ethnic
group or identity seem to be able to chose the best schools not because of skills but because they have
influence. (Exemplo: pessoas que falam um idioma particular, que “são daqui”, ou que pertecem ao grupo
lxxix
étnico “certo” parecem ter maior facilidade de escolher as melhores escolas, não por sua capacidade, mas
por que elas têm influência.)
d) Languages differences – Diferenças linguísticas
e) Gender – Gênero
f) Relatives (close family or friend) - Laços parentescos (família ou amigo)
37. Can you account for one or more illustrative examples in which one can see that bias/ corruption has
prevailed over impartiality in any of the three welfare services (health care, education, and justiça/
aplicação da Lei)? (O(A) Sr(a) poderia dar um ou mais exemplos que ilustrem onde a imparcialidade/
corrupção prevaleceu sobre a imparcialidade em cada um dos três serviços públicos: saúde, educação e
manutenção da lei?)
38. How would you compare the perceived impartiality in the three welfare services: health care services,
education, and law enforcement to other regions in your country? (Como o(A) Sr(a) compararia a
imparcialidade dos três serviços públicos (saúde, educação e justiça/ aplicação da Lei) da sua região com
os se outras regiões de Portugal?)
39. Are you aware of any particular policy/policies that have been implemented in the region in order to
increase the fairness/ impartiality in any of the three welfare services (health care services, education and
law enforcement)? [O(A) Sr(a) sabe de alguma política/políticas que tem sido implementada (s) na região
com o objectivo de aumentar a igualdade/ imparcialidade em qualquer dos três serviços públicos (saúde,
educação e justiça/ aplicação da Lei)?]
Wallonie (français)
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT AND SUB-NATIONAL
VARIATION
___________________________________________________
Est-ce que vous êtes d'accord avec le classement de votre région, tel qu'il ressort de notre
étude, concernant la qualité des Institutions ("Qualité du Gouvernement") ? Et sinon,
pourquoi ?
Est-ce que vous pensez que cette évaluation reflète la perception qu'ont les investisseurs
étrangers de votre région?
Pensez vous que la perception de la Qualité du Gouvernement dans votre région
influence (négativement ou positivement) le niveau d'investissements directs étrangers,
de tourisme ou d'autres flux de capitaux extérieurs vers votre région?
Media
Quel niveau de confiance avez-vous dans les institutions suivantes?
lxxx
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pas
d‟opinion Très peu
de
confiance
Beaucoup de
confiance
10. La police
11. Les media
12. Le gouvernement régional
13. Les partis politiques
14. Les entrepreneurs
15. Les hôpitaux
17. Quel niveau de confiance avez-vous dans les informations transmises par:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas
d‟opinion Très peu
de
confiance
Beaucoup de
confiance
B) La télévision
C) La radio
D) Les journaux quotidiens
E) Les chaînes d'information sur Internet
6. Considérez-vous qu'il existe des obstacles à la liberté de la presse dans votre région? Si
oui, en votre opinion, lesquels sont les plus importants ? Est-ce qu'il y a des facteurs
qui gênent ou affectent la liberté de la presse aujourd'hui ?
7. Considérez-vous que les informations que vous lisez, écoutez, regardez, dans les
media régionaux reflètent sincèrement la situation de votre région ?
8. Comment jugez vous le niveau d'indépendance des media dans la région de la
Wallonie?
9. Est ce que les media ont la liberté totale de rapporter les informations concernant:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas
d‟opinion
lxxxi
Pas de
liberté Grande liberté
A) La corruption
B) La sécurité
C) L'économie
D) La politique
E) La santé publique
10. Est-ce que vous pensez que les media protègent ou attaquent le gouvernement
régional ? Pourquoi ?
11. Est que vous avez plus de confiance dans les media publics ou dans les media privés?
Pourquoi?
12. Considérez vous qu'il y a plus de liberté dans la presse aujourd'hui qu'il y a 20 ans?
Les processus de recrutement et l'environnement de travail.
13. En recherche d'embauche d'un nouvel employé, pensez vous que le fait d'avoir des
contacts personnels, d'affaires ou politiques est important ? Pensez vous qu'il y a une
différence entre votre région (Wallonie) par rapport aux autres régions de Belgique ?
14. Quel est votre estimation de la proportion de salariés embauchés grâce à un contact
(personnel, d'affaires, politique)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas
d‟opinion Aucun La plupart
d‟entre eux
15. Quelle est votre perception des opportunités d'emploi stables (de longue durée) pour
les jeunes salariés dans le secteur public ? Pensez-vous il y a beaucoup de jeunes qui
souhaitent une carrière dans les institutions publiques régionales ?
16. Comment expliquez vous la longueur de la procédure d'embauche dans les
institutions publiques ? (Une procédure trop courte peut indiquer qu'il y a de la
corruption, qu'il n'y a pas assez de communication, etc.).
17. Pouvez-vous exposer le temps approximatif que prend une procédure d'embauche
dans les institutions publiques ?
18. Quelles mesures peut prendre un salarié qui découvre qu'il y a quelque chose qui ne
va pas sur son lieu de travail, par exemple un cas de corruption ?
lxxxii
(i) Est-ce que le salarié peut alerter sur ce sujet sans crainte de répercussions négatives
pour lui ?
La situation suivante arrive : un employé du service public soupçonne qu'un autre
collègue (ou un supérieur hiérarchique) est engagé dans une activité corrompue (soit il
donne des services spéciaux à un homme d'affaires ou utilise l'administration à des fins
personnelles. Est-ce que vous pensez que ce salarié rapporterait ces faits aux media /ou à
des autorités comme les institutions judiciaires?
19. Pensez vous qu'il existe suffisamment de protection pour ceux qui font des
révélations dans l'intérêt public aux autorités, contre des pressions ou des sanctions?
Autorités et services publics
20. Quelles stratégies sont mises en place dans votre région pour faire respecter la
probité et le respect des règles aux employés du service public ? Existe t‟il un
système de sanctions ? Ou au contraire, existe t'il un système de récompense, de
motivations par exemple bonus/intéressement sur salaires ?
21. Pouvez-vous donner des exemples de mesures appliquées pour que les autorités
publiques travaillent en toute conformité et transparence ?
22. Est que le grand public (citoyens) formulent des réclamations quand ils reconnaissent
la survenance d'un acte de corruption ? Est que l'opinion publique a le potentiel d'agir
comme force de contrainte/ pression sur les autorités ?
23. Existe t'il une enquête sur la corruption dans votre région menée par les tribunaux de
justice, les médias ou des O.N.G. ? Avez-vous connaissance de cas où des actes de
corruption par des agents publics ont été poursuivis en justice et condamnés?
24. Avez-vous connaissance de mécanismes particuliers de surveillance de la corruption
dans votre région?
L'impact de L'Union Européenne / changements dans la région.
25. Avez-vous observé un changement significatif dans la qualité des services publics
depuis l'adhésion de la Belgique à l'U.E.? Si oui, s'il vous plaît précisez le niveau de
changement ?
26. Vous attendez vous à ce que la qualité de gouvernement change au cours des cinq
prochaines années (positivement ou négativement)?
27. S'il vous plaît préciser le niveau d'amélioration des services fournis par les
institutions publiques suivantes après l'adhésion à l'U.E.:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas d‟
lxxxiii
opinion Pas
d‟améliorat
ion
Beaucoup
d‟amélioration
A) Les écoles
B) Les universités
C) Les hôpitaux
D) Le système judiciaire
E) La police
28. Quels sont les aspects positifs et négatifs en ce qui concerne l'administration publique
au cours des 10 dernières années dans votre région?
Autonomie régionale
29. En ce qui concerne l'autonomie de la région Wallonne, dans quelle mesure les
services suivants sont-ils autonomes du centre ?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas
d‟opinion Pas de
l‟autonom
ie
Un niveau de
l‟autonomie
haute
A) Recrutement du personnel public
B) Conception de la structure publique
C) Élaboration des lois régionales
D) Contrôle des ressources naturelles régionales
E) Incitation aux investissements étrangers
F) Répartition des investissements étrangers
30. Est-ce qu'il y a une autonomie dans cette région, notamment dans l'organisation de
l'administration publique ? Si oui, quels éléments particuliers diffèrent par rapport
aux autres régions ?
31. Dans quelle mesure l'organisation régionale (de la structure publique) se distingue-
elle de celle du gouvernement central ?
32. Pensez-vous que la décentralisation des services publics contribue à stimuler
l'entrepreneuriat dans la région et dans ses comtés ? Si oui, pourquoi et comment?
33. Dans quelle mesure le comté ou les municipalités de la région ont-elles une
législation fiscale propre ?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pas
lxxxiv
d‟opinion Très peu Beaucoup
34. Dans quelle mesure l'autonomie régionale améliore t-elle la qualité du gouvernement
dans votre opinion?
35. En ce qui concerne la planification budgétaire, quel critère est-il utilisé pour la
répartition du budget entre le gouvernement central et local ? Les conseils régionaux
de districts distincts ont-ils une autonomie complète ou partielle, afin de décider de
l'utilisation du budget local ?
L'impartialité lors de l'acquisition des différents services, les services de soins de
santé, l'éducation et l'application des lois.
36. Lequel des facteurs suivants pourrait être important selon vous, pour expliquer la
perception de l'équité / le biais / l‟impartialité dans les trois services sociaux : les
services de soins de santé, l'éducation et l'application des lois dans votre région ?
A) L'influence politique
''Les gens avec les connexions adéquates politiques semblent êtres en mesure de choisir
les meilleures écoles non pas du fait de leurs compétences, mais parce qu'ils ont une
influence''
B) L'influence économique
« Les gens avec plus d'argent semblent être en mesure de choisir les meilleures écoles
non pas parce que des compétences, mais parce qu'ils ont une influence économique
importante''
C) Différence culturelle
« Les gens qui parlent une langue spécifique qui sont d'ici, ou qui appartiennent au bon
groupe ethnique ou identitaire, semblent être capable de choisir les meilleures écoles pas
de fait de leurs compétences mais du fait de leurs influence. »
E) Différence linguistique
F) Sexe
G) La famille proche ou des amis.
37. Pouvez-vous donner un ou plusieurs exemples dans lesquels l'équité / le biais /
l'impartialité dans l'un des trois services publics ont pu être affectes négativement /
positivement? Donner un exemple vous ayant donné l'impression que ces services
dysfonctionnent ou au contraire fonctionnent bien.
lxxxv
Ex. Décision partiale/corrompue était sur le point d'être prise par exemple un enfant d'un
milieu social pauvre refuse, d'une école un hôtel devant être construit sur la cote, un pot
de vin verse par une entreprise étrangère a été propose) mais n'a finalement pas été prise
(peut être parce que les media en ont eu connaissance, parce qu'un officiel s'en ai plaint,
ou parce que l'officiel n'a pas accepte le pot de vin).
38. Pouvez-vous comparer le niveau perçu d'impartialité ou au contraire de
corruption dans les trois services publics (santé, éducation, judiciaire) entre les
différentes régions de la Belgique ?
39. Avez-vous connaissance de mécanismes particuliers mis en place afin d'améliorer
le niveau d'impartialité et de diminuer le niveau de corruption/ biais dans les trois
services publics (santé, éducation, judiciaire) de votre région ?
Bolzano & Campania (Italiano)
1. Lei e’ d’accordo che la provincia/ regione di _______ possa considerare fra le meglio/ peggio governante in Europa? 2. Lei pensa che anche gli investitori stanieri vedono la provincia/ regione in questo modo? 3. Lei pensa che la sua ragione/ provincia riceva miggiore/peggiore investimenti stranieri (per essempio - turismo, imprese stanieri, investimento diretto all’estero ) per questo motivo? i media 4. Che livello di sicurezza ha riguardo a una stampa libera nella sua regione (da 1 a 7. 7=la piu alta sicurezza): a. Radio, b. Telegiornale/televisione, c. Giornale, d. Giornale su internet
5. Secondo lei quale di questi media e’ piu attendibile per un’informazione
indipendente?
6. Lei crede che ci siano degli ostacoli nei confronti della liberta’ di stampa nella sua
provincia/ regione? (se la risposta e’ ‘si’) –quali sono gli ostacoli che diminuiscono/
influiscono sulla liberta’ di stampa?
7. Secondo lei, quant’e’ il livello di influenza sulla stampa nell sua ragione da parte
della giunta regionale?
(1-7, 7=completamente indipendente)
lxxxvi
8. Lei pensa che i media locali proteggano la giunta regionale o forniscano un buon
servizio ai cittadini? Perche’?
9. Quale modo di media e’ piu fidato: i media pubblici o quelli privati?
10. Secondo lei la liberta’ di stampa oggi e’ piu forte o debole paragonata a 20 anni
fa? Perche’?
Reclutazione nel settore pubblico 11. Secondo lei, ci sono raccomandazioni(per esempio - politiche, personali,
buisness) importanti quando viene assunto un dipendente nuovo nel settore
pubblico? C’e’ variazione in Italia fra le varie regioni a questo rispetto?
12. Secondo lei, quant’e’ la percentuale di dipendenti pubblici in ______ che hanno
ricevuto un lavoro grazie a raccommendazioni (politiche, personali, buisness)
rispetto a chi e’ stato invece assunto solamente per in base al merito? (1-7, 7= la
maggior parte)
13. Cosa pensa lei riguado a il metodo di ‘dare lavoro’ nel settore pubblico in questa
regione/ provincia? (e’ trasparente o no)?
14. Sa lei come tempo ci vuole questo processo all’interna il settore pubblico?
15. Secondo lei, com’e’ la stabilita’ per i dipendenti giovani nel settore pubblico? Ci
sono problemi per i giovani per ottenere un lavoro nel settore pubblico in questa
regione/ provincia?
16. Considera la situazione seguente: “Un dipendente sospetta che un collega (o il
capo di dipartimento) abbia computo qualcosa di illegale (per esempio, accettando
bustarelle o privilegiando un’ agenzia privata alle spese delle altre”. Lei crede che
questo dipendente segnalerebbe questa violazione all’autorita’ o ai media?
17. Ci sono protezioni su cui i dipendenti possono contare – contro evenutali
ripercussioni in tali circostanze?
Il settore Pubblico e gli Servizi 18. Lei sa se ci sono strategie o regole nella sua regione/provincia per incoraggiare
a/applicare una condotta appropriata dei dipendenti nel settore pubblico? Cosa
sono i provvedimenti diciplinari, e chi ha la responsabilita’ per applicarli?
19. Nella sua esperienza, le regole di cui sopra sono questi regole efficaci? Lei
potrebbe riferire degli esempi a tale riguardo?
20. Secondo lei, in questa regione, ci sono opportunita’ per un cittadino comune di
riportare casi di corruzione nel settore pubblico? Lei crede che si sentirebbe
minacciato?
21. Lei sa se ci sono dei meccanismi per controllare la corruzione nella sua regione?
Per esempio - un ‘agenzia o un'organizzazione anti-corruzione non governativa nella
regione?
lxxxvii
L’Impatto dell’Unione Europea per il regione
22. Dall’adozione dell’Euro, lei si e’ accorto di miglioramenti/progressi riguardo alla
qualita’ dei servizi pubblici?
23. Dall’adozione di Lisbo, lei si e’ accorto di miglioramenti/proggressi come sopra?
24. Lei crede che la sua regione abbia beneficiato del finanziamento da parte del
Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR)?
L’autonomia regionale
25. Per quanto riguarda l’autonomia della sua regione/ provincia, fino a che punto la
ritiene indipendente dal governo nazionale in questi campi. (1-7, 7= un livello alto
di indipendenza)
a. Nel dare un lavoro a qualcuno nel settore pubblico
b. Nel disegno delle istiuzioni pubbliche
c. nella creazione delle leggi regionale
d. nel controllo delle risorse (fiscali, naturai, etc.)
e. nell’elezioni pubbliche
26. C’e’ l’autonomia in questa regione/ provincia per quanto riguarda
l’organizzazione dell’ amministrazione pubblica?
27. Paragonati ai partiti politici nazionali, come sono i partiti nella sua regione? Ci
sono differenze? In che senso?
28. Lei crede che piu decentralizzazione dei servizi pubblici aiuterebbe lo sviluppo
della regione/provincia? Perche’/ perche’ no?
29. Fino a che punto la sua regione ha il potere di raccogliere le tasse
(indipendentemente dal governo nazionale)?
Imparzialita’ dei servizi pubblici
30. Quale dei motivi seguenti e’ importante per spiegare la percezione di
uguaglianza e imparzialita’ o discriminazione nel settore pubblico nella sua
regione? (specificamente, istruzione e servizio sanitario):
a. l’influenza della conoscenza di politici regionali.
b. l’influenza della conoscenza di uomini di affari importanti
c. le differenze culturali – per esempio persone che parlano il dialetto
regionale/locale o appartengono ad un certo gruppo etnico sembrano ottenere le
posizioni migliori nel settore pubblico. Altri motivi in questo senso possono essere
di genere, parentela, religione, ecc.
31. Lei puo’ pensare a degli esempi di favoritismo a tale riguardo successi nella sua
regione?
lxxxviii
32. Ci sono leggi o regole specifiche per impedire tali favoritismi?
33. In confronto alle altre regioni d’Italia, pensa che la sua regione sia migliore o
peggiore rigurado a questo tipo di favoritismi? Perche’?
JIHOZAPAD (Czech)
1. Souhlasite s tím, kde Náš průzkum uspořádal Region Jihozápad?
2. Myslíte, že to reflektuje postoj zahraničních investorů ve Vášem regionu?
3. Váš region dostane vice nebo méně zahraničniho kapitalu kvůli tomu všimanému
urovni QoG – “kvality vlady”?
MEDIA
4. Jakou důvěru mate v nasledujicich instituci? :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nevím
Skoro
žadnou
Hodně důvěry
Policie
Media
Vláda regionu
Politické strany
Majitele firem
Nemocnice
5. Jakou důvěru mate ve zpravach z nasledujicich zdrojů:
16. Televize
17. Radio
18. Tištěný tisk
19. On-line zpravodajiské agentury
6. Myslíte, že exituji nejaké překažky ve svobodě tisku ve Vašem regionu? Které jsou
podle Vas nejdůležitější?
7. Mate pocit, že zpravy které se dočtete nebo slyšite v mistnich mediich opravdu
reflektuji to co se deje ve Vasem regionu?
lxxxix
8. Do jaké miry jsou mistni media nezávislá?
9 Jakou miru svobody si media uživaji, když informuji v souvislostí s..?:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nevím
Žadná
svoboda
Uplná svoboda
18. Korupce
19. Bezpečnost
20. Hospodařství
21. Politika
22. Veřejné zdravotní služby
10. Myslíte, že media chrání nebo utočí na Vladě Regionu? Proč?
11. Jakou formu medii jsou podle Vas nejdůvěryhodné: státní nebo soukromé? Proč?
12. Podle Vas, je tu vyšší svoboda tisku dnes, než před 20 let? Proč?
Zaměstnání
13. Jsou různé druhy kontaktů důležité, když zaměstnavate noví lidé? Myslíte, že se to
nejak lyší od jinich regionů?
14. Jaké procento zaměstnanců bylo přijato na zakladě
politických/osobních/ekonomických kontaktů?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 nevím
žadné většina
15. Co myslíte o stabilitě zaměstnanců ve veřejních službach?
16. Jak dlouho trvá process zaměstnávání ve veřejních instituciích?
17. Můžete sdělit zhruba o jaké délce se jedná?
18. Co muže průměrný zaměstnanec udělat, když objevuje špatné chovaní u jiních
kolegů?
18 (i) Bez žadné nepřijemné důsledky pro něj?
Když nastane situace ve které jeden zaměstnanec podezřívá jednoho kolega (nebo
politický nadřizení) y korupčních aktivit. Informoval by o té situace v tisku nebo
xc
kompetenční autority, jako napřiklad soudy?
19. Je tam dostatečná protekce v takových připadech?
VEŘEJNÉ AUTORITY A SLUŽBY
F) Jaká strategie je použivaná ve Vašem regionu pro zajištění dobreho chovaní
zaměstnanců? Jsou tam tresty? Které? Kdo je sdělí? Naopak, jsou tam použivane bonusy?
10. Můžete Nám sdělit nějaké přiklady?
22. Stěžuji se občané, když se uvědomuji, že se jedná o korupční aféřé? Je tam dostateční
tlak veřejného mínění proti takovým případům?
23. Korupční případy jsou vyšetřované v soudnictví, médiích nebo občanských sdružení?
Znate nejaký přápad vyšetřované a odsouzené korupce?
24. Existuje nějaký protikorupční mechanismus ve spravě regionu?
NÁSLEDKY INTEGRACE DO EVROPSKÉ UNIE
25. Všímal/a jste určitou změnu ve kvalitě veřejních služeb po integrace? Pokud ano, do
jaké míry:
26. Očekaváte změny ve kvalitě sluzeb, v dobrém nebo horším, v nasledujících pět let?
27. Prosím, uvedte míru zlepšovaní služeb v nasledujících sektorech po integraci:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nevím
žadné vysoké
a. školy
b. univerzity
c. nemocnice
d. soudnictví
e. Policie
xci
28. Jaké jsou positivní a negativní strany veřejné administrace za posledních 10 let ve
Vašem regionu?
Regionální autonomie
29. Co se tyče autonomie Vašeho region, do jaké miry jsou nasledujicí části nezávislé od
centra?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nevím
žadná vysoká
a. Zaměstnávání
b. organizační struktura veřejné administrace
c. Zavedení regionalních zakonů
d. Kontrola nad místních zdrojů surovin
e. Přijmání zahraničních investic
f. Uspořadání zahraničních investic
30. Je tam nejaká zvlaštní regionalní autonomie ve Vašem regionu, narozdíl od ostatních?
Pokud ano, v šem se to lyší?
31. Do jaké miry se lyší regionalní struktura administrace od centralní vlády?
32. Myslíte, že decentralizace veřejních služeb pomohlo hospodařskému rozvoji regionu?
33. Do jaké miry mají okresy svoji vlastní danovou legislaci?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nevím
žadná vysoká
34. Do jaké miry myslíte, že regionalní autonomie zlepšuje kvalitu vlády?
35. Co se tyče planování rozpočtu, podle jakých kriterii je to stanoveno centralní vládou?
Nestrannost ve veřejních službách – zdravotnictví, školství, veřejná ochrana
36. Které z nasledujících faktorů jsou nejdůležitejší pro vysvetlování percepce férovosti a
imparciality ve veřejních službach ve Vašem regionu?
xcii
a) Politický vliv - “lidé s politickým kontaktem mohou vzbrat nejlepší skolz ne podle
kompetenciích, ale podle vlivu”
b) Hospodařský vliv – větší majetek, lepší skola pro jejich dětí..
c) Kulturní rozdíly – lidé “odsud” protože mluvíme stejným jazykem…
d) Jazykové rozdíly
e) Pohlaví
f) Příbuzní (rodina nebo přátelé)
37. Můžete Nam sdělit nějaký případ, kde je nejlepe vidět férovost veřejních služeb a řekl
byste – „ano, tady to určitě funguje jak má být“?
38. Kde byste umístil Vaš region v rámci České republiky, co se tyče všímané
imparciality ve zdravotnictví, školství a veřejná ochrana občanů?
39. Znáte nějaké politiky které jsou v platností pro zlepšování férovosti a imparciality ve
veřejných službach Vašeho regionu – zdravotnictví, školství a policejní služby?
Nord Vest (Romanian)
Masurarea calitatii guvernarii si a variatiilor subnationale
G) Sunteti de acord cu locul pe care datele noastre il atribuie regiunii
dumneavoastra in cadrul tarii/UE in ceea ce priveste caliatatea guvernarii? In caz negativ
va rugam sa motivati.
H) Credeti ca aceasta evaluare reflecta cum percep investitorii straini
regiunea dumneavoastra? (optional - scale)
I) Regiunea dumneavoastra primeste mai multe investitii straine, turism sau
capital extern datorita perceptiei asupra calitatii guvernarii?
Media
4. Cata incredere aveti in urmatoarele institutii?
xciii
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
opinie
Aproape
deloc
Incredere
maxima
23. Politie
24. Media
25. Administratia regiunii
26. Partide politice
27. Proprietarii de afaceri
28. Spitale
5. Cata incredere aveti in informatiile pe care vi le furnizeaza:
20. Televiziunea
21. Radio
22. ZIare
23. Agentii de stiri on-line
6. Considerati ca exista obstacole in calea libertatii presei in regiunea
dumneavoastra? In opinia dumneavoastra, care sunt cele mai importante? Exista factori
care limiteaza sau afecteaza libertatea presei in mod current?
7. Credeti ca stirile pe care le cititi, ascultati sau urmariti in presa locala reflecta
cu adevarat ceea ce se intampla in regiunea dumnevoastra?
8. Cat de independenta credeti ca este media/presa in aceasta regiune?
9. Are presa libertate absoluta sa raporteze ceea ce se intampla in urmatoarele
privinte?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
opinie
Nu este deloc
libera
Complet libera
11. Coruptie
12. Siguranta publica
xciv
13. Economie
14. Politica
15. Sanatate publica
10. Credeti ca presa protejeaza sau ataca administratia regiunii? De ce?
11. Care presa este mai de incredere: cea detinuta de stat sau cea privat?
12. In opinia dumneavoastra exista mai multa libertate a presei astazi sau acum 20
ani?
Procesul de recrutare si locul de munca
13. Sunt importante contactele/cunostintele (personale/ in afaceri/politice) in
procesul de angajare a fortei de munca? Credeti ca difera importanta lor in regiunea
dumneavoastra fata de celelalte regiuni din tara?
14. Ati putea estima ce proportie din totalul de nou-angajati a primit slujba pe
baza contactelor personale/politice/de afaceri?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
opinie
Zero Majoritatea
15. Cum percepeti stabilitatea pe termen lung a tinerilor angajati in serviciul
public si interesul lor fata de o cariera in institutii publice?
16. Cum ati aprecia durata procesului de angajare in institutii publice? Aveti
cunostinta de procedurile cuprinse in proceul de angajare?
17. Ce pasi ar putea/trebui sa urmeze un angajat atunci cand descopera ca ceva
este in neregula la locul de munca?
Ce pasi ar putea sa urmeze un angajat atunci cand descopera ca ceva suspect se intampla
la locul de munca, fara a-I fi frica de repercusiuni
Urmatoarea situatie ar putea aparea: un angajat in serviciul public suspecteaza un alt
coleg (sau un superior, spre exemplu implicat in politica) ca participa la un act de
coruptie sau ofera tratament special/preferential unor utilizatori ai serviciilor publice
(spre exemplu unor oameni de afaceri) in detrimental altora. In aceasta situatie, este
probabil ca angajatul sa raporteze acest fapt unui ziar, sau autoritatilor corespunzatoare,
cum ar fi sistemului judiciar?
18. Exista protectie adecvata pe care angajatii se pot baza in caz de sanctiuni
nejustificate, in eventualitatea in care ei fac publice asemenea informatii (le furnizeaza
autoritatilor corespunzatoare sau presei)
Autoritatile publice si serviciile
xcv
19. Ce strategie este folosita in regiunea dumneavoastra pentru a induce
angajatilor din serviciul public un comportament adecvat si in conformitate cu atributiille
lor? Se pun in aplicare sanctiuni? Daca da, care sunt aceste sanctiuni, cine le impune?
Sau, dimpotriva, exista un system de stimulente, cum ar fi scheme de bonusuri si
recompense?
Ati putea da exemple de masuri implementate pentru a induce un comportament
corespunzator al autoritatilor publice?
Publicul larg (cetatenii) dau glas reclamantiilor atunci cand sunt martori la
existent unui act de coruptie? Aceasta opinie publica are potentialul sa actioneze ca o
constrangere asupra autoritatilor? (Este presiunea publica prezenta si eficienta in
inducerea unui comportament adecvat al autoritatilor publice?)
Coruptia in aceasta regiune este investigata de catre curtile de judecata, presa sau
ONG-uri? Aveti cunostinta de cazuri in care actele corupte ale oficialilor publici in
aceasta regiune au fost judecate si condamnate?
Aveti cunostinta de existenta oricaror mecanisme de monitorizare a coruptiei in
regiunea dumneavoastra?
Impactul/ schimbarile aduse de UE in regiune
Ati observant schimbarui semnificative in calitatea serviciilor publice de la
integrarea in UE? Daca da, specificati nivelul schimbarilor
Va asteptati ca nivelul calitatii guvernarii sa se schimbe in urmatorii 5 ani (in rau
sau in bine?)
Precizati care este nivelul imbunatatirii in servicii furnizate de catre urmatoarele
institutii publice survenite dupa integrarea in UE:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
opinie
Nici o
imbunatatire
Imbunatatiri
foarte mari
a. Scoli
b. Universitati
c. Spitale
d. Curti de judecata
e. Politie
xcvi
Care sunt aspectele negative si positive privind administratia publica in ultimii 10
ani in aceasta regiune?
Autonomia regionala
28. In ceea ce priveste autonomia acestei regiuni, cata autonomie au urmatoarele
aspecte/practici fata de centru?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
parere
Zero
autonomie
Un nivel inalt
de autonomie
a. Recrutarea angajatilor publici
b. Organigrama in institutiile publice
c. Elaborarea legilor (eventual regionale)
d. Controlul resurselor naturale din regiune
e. Stimulente pentru investitie straina
f. Alocarea investitiilor straine
29. Exista autonomie in aceasta regiune in organizarea administratiei publice?
Daca da, ce elemente difera de alte regiuni?
30. In ce masura difera organigramele regionale (structura administratiei publice)
de guvernul central?
31. Credeti ca descentralizarea serviciilor publice ar putea stimula antreprenorii in
regiunea dumneavoastra si in judetele aferente? De ce si in ce mod?
32. In ce masura au judetele sau municipalitatile o legislatie fiscal proprie ?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nici o
opinie
Nu au Intr-o mare
masura
33. In ce masura ar putea autonomia regionala sa imbunatateasca calitatea
guvernarii?
34. Cu privire la planificarea bugetului, dupa ce criterii este bugetul de stat
impartit regiunilor? In cadrul regiunii, au consiliile judetelor autonnomie completa sau
partiala in deciziile asupra intrebuintarii bugetului public?
xcvii
Impartialitatea in achizitionarea diverselor servicii publice: sanatate,
educatie, punerea in aplicare a legii
35. Care dintre urmatorii factori credeti ca ar putea fi important in explicarea
perceptiei de corectitudine/echitate/impartialitate in 3 servicii publice: sanatate, educatie
si punerea in aplicare a legii
a) Influenta politica – “oamenilor care au conexiunile politice potrivite le este mai
usor sa aleaga cele mai bune scoli, nu atat datorita abilitatilor, cat datorita influentei ”.
b) Influenta economica - “oamenilor care a venituri considerabil mai mari le este
mai usor sa aleaga cele mai bune scoli, nu atat datorita abilitatilor, cat datorita influentei”.
c) Diferente culturale - oamenilor care vorbesc o anumita limba, “de-ai locului”,
sau care apartin unui anumit grup etnic, sexul, religia etc.
36. Puteti sa oferiti exemple care sa ilustreze cazuri in care au razbatut
corectitudinea/echitatea/lipsa coruptiei/impartialitatea in serviciile sociale mentionate mai
sus (preferabil in toate); cu alte cuvinte, cunoasteti exemple in care lucrurile au functionat
bine?
37. Cum se situeaza impartialitatea perceputa de populatie in cele trei servicii
sociale in regiunea dumneavoastra fata de alte regiuni ale tarii?
38. Aveti cunostinta de orice politici, masuri care au fost implementate pentru a
creste corectitudinea/echitatea/impartialitatea in cele trei servicii sociale: sanatate,
educatie si punerea in aplicare a legii?
Severozapaden, BG 31 (Bulgarian)
1. Съгласни ли сте с мястото на Северозападния район в България/ЕС
при класирането на районите по въпроса на QoG (качество на
правителството/управлението) според нашето изследване? Ако не,
защо?
2. Смятате ли че тази оценка отразява как чуждестранните инвеститори
виждат Вашия район?
3. Получава ли Северозападен район повече или по-малко чуждестранни
инвестиции, туризъм или друг външен капитал поради възприетото
качество на правителството/управлението?
Медии
4. Какво ниво на доверие имате в следните институции?:
xcviii
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Почти няма
доверие
Огромно
доверие
а) Полиция
б) Медии
в) Правителството/управлението на района
г) Политически партии
д) Собственици на фирми
е) Болници
5. Какво ниво на доверие имате в новините от:
а) Телевизия
б) Радио
в) Вестници
г) Онлайн вестници
6. Смятате ли, че има пречки пред свободата на словото в района?
Според Вас, кои са най-важни? Има ли някакъв определен фактор който
пречи или влияе на свободата на словото днес?
7. Смятате ли че новините които четете, чувате или гледате по местните
медии, наистина отразява това, което се случва в района?
8. Колко независими са медиите в региона според Вас?
9. Имат ли медиите пълна свобода да информират какво се случва по
въпросите на...?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Няма свобода Пълна свобода
а) Корупция
б) Сигурност
в) Стопанство
г) Политика
д) Здравеопазване
xcix
10. Смятате ли, че медиите защитават или атакуват управлението на
района? Защо?
11. На кои медии според вас може да се вярва повече: държавни или
частни? Защо?
12. Според Вас, има повече свобода на словото днес или преди 20
години? Защо?
Процес на наемане и работно място
13. Важни ли са връзките (лични, бизнес, политически) при наемането на
нови служители? Смятате ли че това е по-различно в Северозападния
район от другите райони в страната?
14. Какъв е процентът на хора, които са били наети на основа на
политически, бизнес, лични връзки?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Нито един Повечето
15. Как възприемате дългосрочните перспективи на младите служители в
държавния сектор и интереса им към кариера в рамките на държавните
институции?
16. Какво мнение имате за продължителността на процеса на наемане в
държавните институции? (при кратка процедура може да става въпрос за
корупция, недостатъчна публичност или политическо участие)
17. Можете ли да посочите приблизателна продължителност на процеса
на наемане?
18. Какви постъпки могат да предприемат служителите когато откриват че
нещо не е наред на работното място?
18 а. Без страх от последствия?
Следната ситуация се случва, публичен служител се съмнява че друг
колега (или политически старши) участва в някоя корупционна дейност
или има специално третиране към някоя фирма. Би ли информирал за
това в някои медии/отговорни органи, например съдбената власт?
19. Има ли адекватна защита, на която може да се разчита, срещу
всякакви неоправдани санкции за тези които ще извършат подобно
c
публично разкриване в интерес на обществото, на отговорните органи
или медиите?
Публични власти и услуги
20. Каква стратегия се използва във вашия регион за да се наложи
спазване на правилата и добро поведение на служителите в публичната
администрация? Има ли някакво наказание? Ако е така, какво? Кой го
налага? Или напротив, има ли система за награди като стимули,
например reward/bonus schemes?
21. Можете ли да дадете някои примери за мерките, предприети за
прилагане на доброто поведение на държавните органи?
22. Изказва ли недоволство широката общественост (гражданите) когато
забелязва корупционна дейност? Има ли общественото мнение
потенциал да действа като ограничение на властта. (Съществува ли и
ефективен ли е общественият натиск за прилагане на добро поведение
на публичните служители?)
23. Разследвана ли е корупцията в Северозападния район от
правосъдните органи, медиите или НПО? Знаете ли за случаи където
действия на корупция от страна на държавни служители в района са
били преследвани?
24. Знаете ли за някой отделен механизъм за мониторинг на корупцията
във района?
Въздействие на ЕС / промени в района
25. Забелязвате ли значителна промяна в качеството на обществените
услуги след присъединяването към ЕС? Ако е така, моля посочете
размера на промяната.
26. Очаквате ли качеството на управлението да се промени в
следващите пет години (към по-лошо или по-добро)?
27. Моля, посочете нивото на подобрение на услугите от следните
институции след присъединяването към ЕС:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Няма
ci
подобрение
Високо ниво на
подобрение
а) Училища
б) Университети
в) Болници
г) Съд
д) Полиция
28. Посочете някои позитивни или негативни аспекти, свързани с
публичната aдминистрация през последните 10 години във
Северозападния район?
Регионална автономия
29. Във връзка със автономията на Северозападния район, до каква
степен следните практики/елементи са автономни от централната власт?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Няма
автономия
Висока степен
на автономия
a) Наемане на публични служители
б) Проектиране на институционалната структура (структура на
организацията)
в) Разработване на регионалните закони
г) Контрол на регионалните природни ресурси
д) Стимули за чуждестранни инвестиции
е) Разпределение на чуждестранни инвестиции
30. Има ли някаква автономия в района в организацията на публичната
администрация? Ако е така, кои елементи се различават?
31. До каква степен регионалните публични структури се различават от
централното държавно управление?
32. Смятате ли, че децентрализацията на публичните услуги помага за
cii
стимулиране на предприемачеството в района и областите? Защо и как?
33. До коя степен областите или общините на района имат собствено
данъчно законодателство?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Без мнение
Нямат Голяма степен
34. До каква степен регионалната автономия увеличава качеството на
управлението?
35. Що се отнася до планирането на бюджета, какви критерии се
използват за отделянето на бюджетни средства от централната власт за
района?
Безпристрастност при получаването на различни услуги: здравни
услуги, образование, прилагане на закона
36. Кой от следните фактори, мислите че може да бъде важен при
получаването на някои публични услуги?
а) Политически влияния – „хора с адекватни политически връзки
изглежда са в състояние да изберат най-добрите училища, не на основа
на знания, но тъй като те имат влияние”
б) Икономическо влияние – „хора с повече пари могат да изберат по-
добри услуги защото имат икономически важни влияния”
в) Културни разлики – „хора които говорят на определен език, кои „са от
тук”, или принадлежат към „правилната” етническа или друга група
придобиват по-добри услуги”
г) Езикови разлики
д) Пол
е) Роднини, близки на семейството или приятели
37. Можете ли да дадете пример в който може да се види пристрастност
при придобиването на публични услуги и когато вие казахте: тук нещата
не работят както трябва или обратното?
38. Как възприемате безпристрастността в трите обществени услуги:
здравеопазване, образование, полиция в другите райони на България?
39. Знаете ли за определена политика/политики, които са били въведени
ciii
с цел да се увеличи справедливостта/безпристрастността или обратното
в някоя от трите социални услуги?__
Appendix IV cont.
Part 3 – Expert Sources in Case Studies & Acknowledgments
Norte
Acknowledgments: I would like to acknowledge the kind support offered by Dr. Luís de
Sousa – Professor at the Lisbon Institute of Social Sciences; Maria do Pilar Barbosa –
vice-president of the Portuguese Federation of Food Banks in the city of Braga; Dr. Luís
Lobo-Fernandes – Director of the Political Sciences and International Department of
Minho‟s University; Mr. Calado Rodrigues – Director of Mensageiro Notícias
newspaper; and Mr. Manuel Matos ex-president of Vieira do Minho Council.
The Respondents
Mrs. Maria do Pilar Barbosa is expert in the local civil society. She is the Vice-President
of the Braga (capital of Cávado sub-region) unity of the Portuguese Federation of Food
Banks1. She helps coordinating the activities at the Food Bank, a non-governmental
organization responsible for campaigns of food collection. After each campaign the
organization allots the food raised to different social institutions (e.g. charity and
humanitarian) that further distribute the food to the poverty-stricken people. In 2009, the
Bank estimates to have assisted more than 260.000 people. Only in Braga, in the
Campaign of May, the Bank raised 127 tons of alimentary products.
1 www.braga.bancoalimentar.pt/
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Dr. Luís Lobo-Fernandes is expert in the local public administration. He is Director of the
International Relations and Public Administration Department of Minho University, also
located in Braga. He prepared various studies on European questions to the Assembly of
the Republic and worked as the Advisor of International Relations for the Presidency of
the Republic in Lisbon and in the European Commission, in Brussels. Dr. Lobo-
Fernandes has also published various articles and books related to the areas of Political
Science and International Relations. He is a member of the Portuguese Association of
Political Sciences (APCP) and of the American Political Science Association (APSA). He
is also part of the Advisory Council of the International Relations magazine, published by
the Portuguese Institute of International Relations-New University of Lisbon (IPRI-
UNL).
Mr. Calado Rodrigues is expert in the local media and was the Director2 of Mensageiro
Notícias, a local weekly newspaper with head quarters in the Braganca municipality (Alto
Trás-os-Montes subregion). It is one of the oldest weekly newspapers in Portugal,
founded in 1940 by the then Braganca Bishop. Mr. Calado Rodrigues worked in the
newspaper for seven years, enlarging its reach through the foundation of a second
editorial in Vila Real, another municipality in the Norte region.
Mr. Manuel Matos is expert in local politics and was the president of a subdivision3 of
Vieira do Minho municipality, where he governed for 14 years, during which he gained
experience in public administration issues. Nowadays he owns a consulting firm that is
related to energy and sustainable resources with a focus on hydroelectric impacts and
hydro resources in the production of clean energy.
2 By the time of the interview, in the middle of May 2010, he was still the Director of the
newspaper. Nevertheless, there is news related to his resignation of the job in the last
week of the same month.
3 In Portuguese called “junta de freguesia”, is the smallest public administrative structure
in Portugal, being a subdivision of a municipality or council. In this case Vieira do Minho
it is a secondary local administrative unit of the Vieira do Minho municipality. The latter
is part of the Braga district located in the NUTS3 sub-regions of Cávado and Ave.
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Pais Vasco
Primary source of information
Most data and information included in this research paper were collected through a series
of personal interviews with 7 experts in different academic and professional fields. Five
of them were held and recorded in-situ during the second week of May 2010, in the three
main cities of Pais Vasco: Vitoria (1 interview), San Sebastian (2) and Bilbao (2). Due to
the impossibility of synchronizing agendas during that particular week, two other
interviews were held later: one via Skype, and one more in person4, both in June 2010.
The experts interviewed, to whom I express my gratitude for their concepts, time and
patience, were (in strict alphabetical order):
María José Aranguren Querejeta. Orkestra, The Basque Institute of
Competitiveness, ORKESTRA. Deusto University; Deusto Foundation.
José Ignacio Eguizabal. General Manager of ALBOAN (Non-Governmental
Organization in Pais Vasco)
Amagoia Ibarrondo Garai. Director of Quality and Evaluation of the Bilbao
Municipality.
Ma. Teresa Laespada Martínez. Member of the Basque Parliament. Academic
and Researcher.
Mikel Navarro Arancegui. Orkestra, The Basque Institute of Competitiveness,
ORKESTRA. Deusto University; Deusto Foundation.
Ixone Soroa Guenaga. Former intern at the Basque Government Representation
in Brussels.
Oskar Villareal Larrinaga. Professor and Researcher at the Economics and
Business Sciences Faculty. Basque Country University (UPV/EHU).
Secondary sources of information
4 This interview was held in Caracas, Venezuela.
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Other sources of information were also used. Most statistical facts and figures in the
document were collected from Eustat, the official statistical agency of the Basque
Government. Some sections, particularly number 3, required an analysis of the legal
framework of the region, basically the Spanish Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy of
Pais Vasco and the “Economic Concert”, although some other documents were also
consulted regarding the particular competences of autonomous organs like the Basque
Institute of Public Administration, Euskalit, Innobasque, etc.
Many hemerographic sources were also consulted, both physically and via internet,
particularly diaries like El Correo, El Diario Vasco, Noticias de Alava, and Pais Vasco
section of El Pais.
Some televised interviews and debates with public servants were also consulted and
recorded, since on the week of the visit to Pais Vasco the current Lehendakari held his
first anniversary as President of Euskadi.
Västra Götaland
Acknowledgements: The knowledge offered during the creation of this study by the
experts Mr. Alf Ehn - Journalist at the newspaper in Skövde (SLA) and expert on
regional issues, Mrs. Maria Haldesten - Reporter at the Gothenburg Newspaper
(Göteborgs Posten), the Lecturer at Gothenburg University, Mr. Håkan Ahlström -
Director of Skövde municipality, Ms. Klara Martinsson - Nurse at the region and is also a
graduated midwife, Mrs.Khadijah Rosen – AT doctor currently serving at the local
general practioner centre at Toreboda, Mrs. Ulrica Cedervall -chief editor, Senior
Gothenburg, City Council of Gothenburg, Ms Jaquette Liljencrantz – AT doctor in VGR
region.
Without their expertise the development of this report had not been possible.
The Experts
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Observers of Public Services
- Alf Ehn: journalist at the newspaper in Skövde (Skaraborgs Allehanda) is an expert on
regional issues.
- Maria Haldesten, reporter at the Gothenburg Newspaper (Göteborgs Posten) has
extended articles on whistle-blowing in her professional career.
- One of our sources wanted to be anonymous. He is a lecturer at Gothenburg University.
Representatives of Providers of Public Services
- Håkan Ahlström, director of Skövde municipality.
- Klara Martinsson, nurse at the region, graduated midwife and disputant in the Social
democratic party in Gothenburg, which also made her knowledge particular interesting
for the report.
-Khadijah Rosen, AT doctor in the municipality of Skövde, who has been part of the
healthcare provision sector for almost 2 years.
-Jaquette Liljencrantz has recently graduated, new in the Gothenburg healthcare sector.
Her knowledge is interesting as she is new to the system and has yet not been 'affected'
by the way things work.
- Ulrica Cedervall has been part of the Gothenburg City Council since the 1980's and is at
current chief editor of the monthly magazine published at Senior Goteborg.
Wallonie (BE3)
Acknowledgements: The author of the report would like to thank the experts; Geoffrey
Joris, Dr. Jacques Born, Dr. Nizet, Caroline Doppagne, Frédéric Rouxet, Patricia
Grandchamps, Helene Gheur, Valérie Sacchi, Chantal Hébette-Van den Broeke and
Gregory Mathieu for their important information concerning QoG in the Walloon Region.
Jihozapad – CZ03 have involved interviews with:
cviii
24. the Governor of Plzensky Kraj, Mrs. Milada Emmerova, former minister of
healthcare during the last social-democratic government in the Czech Republic;
25. the deputy-director of the regional administration of Plzensky Kraj, Mr. Bohuslav
Borovansky, with a long-term experience in the management of Japanese
investments in the region;
26. Mr. Ladislav Cabada, professor of political science at the West-Bohemia
University in Plzen;
27. Mr. Ladislav Vaindl, journalist at Plzensky Denik, a local newspaper based in the
city of Plzen.
Italy – Bolzano & Campania
The interviews were done in both Italian and English during the 2nd
week of June 2010.
Interviews were conducted in Bolzano, Milano, Rome Naples and Salerno with 7
country/regional experts.
Appendix – The Experts
1. Steffania Baroncelli – a lawyer who has lived in the region for almost 10 years and is
an expert on E.U. and Italian law
2. Signora Massimi – a public school of Italian in a German public school for over 25
years.
3. Professor Paulo Bertacini – an expert in public administration and sociology
4. Maria Teresa Barotolo – Head of Italy‟s Transparency International, based in Milano
Itlay with 15 years experience at the NGO.
5. Dr. Maurizio Bortoletti – Head of the Italian High Commission for Anti-Corruption in
Rome.
6. Maria Rosaria Garofalo – professor of public administration at the University of
Salerno in the region of Campania.
7.Professor Benito Aleni – professor of political science and economic development at
the University of Fredrico II in Naples. An expert on the development strategies in
Campania.
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Nord Vest (RO 11) - Acknowledgements
The author of this report wishes to thank the experts that have agreed to participate in the
interviews conducted as a part of this study in the Nord-Vest region, Romania, in May
2010. The experts are listed here in the chronological order of the interviews: Political
Sciences professor Gabriel Badescu from the Faculty of Political, Administrative and
Communication Sciences, within the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca; Mr. Razvan
Chereches, executive director of the Institute for Social Research, which runs the Center
for Health Policy and Public Health, Cluj-Napoca; the expert from the Nord-Vest
Regional Development Agency; one representative from the institution that is the
delegate of the Government in the county Cluj; Political Sciences lecturer Mihai Radu
Bogdan from the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences,
within the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca; Mr. Adrian Popa, president of the
Association for the Press Professionals from Cluj; the representative from the City Hall
Zalau; doctor Ligia Marincas, coordinating director of the Salaj Public Health Authority
Severozapaden, BG 31 - Acknowledgements:
The author of this report is very grateful to all participants in the interviews conducted as
part of this case study research in Bulgaria in May, 2010 listed here in the chronological
order of the interviews: Mr. Ivan Kanevchev, program director of Radio Pleven and
regional coordinator of the “Bulgarian Association of journalists” for Northwest
Bulgaria, Ms. Debora Petrova, Ms. Anelia Kostadinova and Ms. Denitsa Aleksandrova,
journalists of TV “Pleven Sprint”, Ms. Paulina Kirova, head of the Department for local
self-government at the Municipality of Pleven, Doc. Dr. Magdalena Ivanova from the
Department of Public Administration at the New Bulgarian University in Sofia, European
funds and projects and Project management lecturer, Ms. Nina Dankolova, secretary
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(head of the administration) of the Municipality of Mezdra, Mr. Petar Borislavov
Mindizov, medical doctor in the village of Stavertsi, Municipality of Dolna Mitropolia,
Mr. Naiden Zelenogorski, mayor of the Municipality of Pleven and Dr. Juliana
Galabinova from the Department of Public Administration at the New Bulgarian
University in Sofia, regional development lecturer.
Special thanks to Mr. Proycho Karaivanov, deputy chairman of the “Bulgarian
Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights” National Association in Pleven and Ms.
Valentina Spasova from the “Open Society” Club in Pleven for organizing a broader
discussion, in which except for them, the following discussants took part: Ms. Emilia
Nikolova, regional coordinator of the General directorate "Structural funds and
International Educational programmes" at the Ministry of Education, Youth and Science,
Pleven, Mr. Georgi Georgiev, representative of the Ministry of Interior- Pleven, Mr.
Liubcho Lakov, Province Healthcare Centre of Pleven, Mr. Dikran Ovanesian,
representative of the Municipality of Pleven, Mr. Evgeni Petkov, representative of the
Pleven Province administration, Ms.Yana Damianova, journalist of Darik Radio, Mr.
Hristo Hinov, BAFECR National Association in Pleven, Mr. Ivan Raichev, NGO “Eko-
posoki 21”- Pleven and Ms. Ivanka Vateva, head editor of the local newspaper
“Posrednik”.
Thanks to Mr. Ivan Popov for the assistance during the stay in Pleven.
Estonia
METHODOLOGY: COMPREHENSIVE STUDY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To reinforce the quantitative outcomes on the Estonian QoG that were included in the
main part of this study “Measuring the Quality of Government and Sub-National
Variation”, an additional qualitative component was incorporated in the study. This
report draws on various sources, from recent primary and secondary literature, like
academic articles, analyses, international organizations and civil society reports, as well
cxi
as statistical information gathered from the World Bank, Statistics Estonia and Eurostat.
Furthermore, a questionnaire designed to address specific issues pertaining to QoG, is
applied to further underline Estonia‟s QoG performance (see annex 2). Specifically it is
comprised of the consultation of six specialists in Estonia (see below in annex 1), whose
expertise and perceptions on the QoG Index country ranking, as well as insights and
knowledge on practices, rules and institutions contributed to this study.
The specialists were contacted via email, and the individual interviews were scheduled in
Tallinn. The questionnaire served as a framework and guideline for the interviews.
However in some cases the content and questions divert according to the relevance and
match with the area of expertise of the interviewee, and in other cases a more open
discussion seemed appropriate. Four out of six interviews were recorded, and notes were
taken for the remaining two.
INFORMATION ON THE SPECIALISTS INTERVIEWED
To cover a wide range of issues in the study, the interviewees were chosen from different
expertise areas: two professors from the Department of Public Administration at the
Faculty of Social Science at Tallinn University of Technology, Professor Rainer Kattel,
Director of the Department of Public Administration, and Chair of Innovation Policy and
Technology of the Government, and Professor Tiina Randma-Liiv, the Chair of Public
Management and Administration Policy;5 Klas Klaas, the Deputy Strategy Director at the
Strategy Office of the Estonian Government Office (State Chancellery), whose areas of
expertise include public finance and macroeconomic issues, raising administrative
capacity in the public sector, and management of the EU funds;6 Mailis Pukonen, Deputy
Director of the EU Secretariat at the State Chancellery;7 Marek Helm, Deputy Secretary-
General for Public Governance Policy in the Ministry of Finance;8 and civil society
5 http://www.ttu.ee/department-of-public-administration/ retrieved 20 June 2010
6 http://www.riigikantselei.ee/ retrieved 20 June 2010
7 http://www.riigikantselei.ee/ retrieved 20 June 2010
8 http://www.fin.ee/ retrieved 20 June 2010
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representative Aso Prii, the Executive Director of Transparency International Estonia
(henceforth TI Estonia).9
9 http://www.transparency.ee/ retrieved 20 June 2010
