APPENDIX A Abbreviations and Acronymsvocasupport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ambidji-classd-app-a-j.pdfAPPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ... NOTAM Notice to Airmen ... United

Civil Aviation Safety Authority Study of the Airspace of 10 Class D Towers

THE AAMMBBIIDDJJ GROUP

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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix A

APPENDIX A

Abbreviations and Acronyms



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APPENDIX A

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAPS Australian Airspace Policy Statement

A320 Airbus A320 aircraft

AC Advisory Circular

AS Alice Springs

AY Albury

ACAS Airborne Collision and Advisory System

Act Airspace Act 2007

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

A/G/A Air Ground Air

AGL Above Ground Level

AIP Aeronautical Information Publication

AIRPROX Air Proximity Event

Airservices Airservices Australia

ALARP As Low as Reasonably Possible

Ambidji The Ambidji Group Pty Ltd

AMSL Above Mean Sea Level

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider

APP Approach

APP (R) Radar Approach Control

APP (P) Procedural Approach Control

ARM Airspace Risk Model

ASIR Air Safety Incident Report

ASD Air Situation Display

ATS Air Traffic Service



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ATC Air Traffic Control

ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau

B717 Boeing B717 aircraft

B737 Boeing B737 aircraft

BOS Breakdown of Separation

BUR Burnett Sector

CH Coffs Harbour

CAR Civil Aviation Regulation

CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulations

CBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CEN Centre

CPA Closest Point of Approach

CTA Controlled Airspace

CTAF Common Traffic Advisory Frequency

CTR Control Zone

DAP Departure and Approach Procedures

DAH Designated Airspace Handbook

DHC-8 de Havilland Canada (Bombardier) DHC-8 aircraft

DME Distance Measuring Equipment

DTI Directed Traffic Information

E-170/190 Embraer E-170 or E-190 aircraft

ENR En-route

ERSA En-Route Supplement

ESIR Electronic Submitted Incident Report (Airservices)

FAA Federal Aviation Authority (United States)

FN Frequency Number



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FIR Flight Information Region

FIS Flight Information Service

FL Flight Level

FT Feet

FTC Failure to Comply

GA General Aviation

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GP Glide Path (component of Instrument Landing System)

GPS Global Positioning System

GRN Grafton Sector

HB Hobart

HM Hamilton Island

HUO Huon Sector

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

IFR Instrument Flight Rules

INS Inertial Reference System

J41 British Aerospace Jetstream J41 aircraft

LL Lower Limit

LLZ Localizer (component of Instrument Landing System)

LMA Alms Sector

LOSA Loss of Separation Assurance

LT Launceston

MK Mackay

MATS Manual of Air Traffic Services

Metro Fairchild SW4 Metroliner aircraft

MIL Military

MLJ Military Low Jet



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MSA Minimum Safe Altitude

MSL Mean Sea Level

NAS National Airspace System

NM Nautical Mile

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

OVN Ovens Sector

OAR Office of Airspace Regulation

PC Personal Computer

PHA Preliminary Hazard Identification

PSR Primary Surveillance Radar

PT Passenger Transport

PTO Passenger Transport Operations

RI Runway Incursion

RK Rockhampton

RIS Radar Information Service

RNAV Area Navigation

RNP Required Navigation Performance

RPT Regular Public Transport

RWY Runway

SU Sunshine Coast

SDE Service Delivery Environment

SF340 Saab 340 aircraft

SFC Surface

SMC Surface Movement Control

SME Subject Matter Expert

SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar

SWM Swearingen/Fairchild Metroliner



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SWY Swampy Sector

TAAATS The Australian Advanced Air Traffic Service

TAAM Total Airspace and Airport Modeller

TCAS Traffic and Collision Advisory System

TCU Terminal Control Unit

TMA Terminal Area

TOR Terms of Reference

TSAD Tower Situational Awareness Display

TW Tamworth

TWR Tower

UK United Kingdom

UL Upper Limit

USA United States of America

UTS Unit Tower Supervisor

VCA Violation of Controlled Airspace

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VHF Very High Frequency

VOR Very High Frequency Omni Range navigation aid

WAM Wide Area Multilateration

YBAS Alice Springs

YBHM Hamilton Island

YBMK Mackay

YBSU Sunshine Coast

YBRK Rockhampton

YCFS Coffs Harbour

YMAY Albury

YMHB Hobart



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YMLT Launceston

YSTW Tamworth



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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix B

APPENDIX B

Bibliography

APPENDIX B BIBLIOGRAPHY

Airservices Australia (2010), Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) set. Airservices Australia (2010), Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS). Airservices Australia (2008), Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers. Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2010. Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2007. Australia and New Zealand Standards Association, AS/NZ 4360-2004 Risk Management Standard. Civil Aviation Authority, New Zealand (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication. Civil Aviation Authority, New Zealand (2010), Civil Aviation Rules (CAR) Part 71. Civil Aviation Authority, United Kingdom, (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Commonwealth of Australia (2007), Airspace Act 2007. Commonwealth of Australia (2007, Airspace Regulations 2007. Commonwealth of Australia (2005), Air Services Act 1995. Commonwealth of Australia (2009), Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2010. Commonwealth of Australia (1947), Air Navigation Regulations 1947. Commonwealth of Australia (2007), Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Report AR-2007-057 Trends in immediately reportable matters involving Charter Operations 2001-05. Commonwealth of Australia, (1988), Civil Aviation Act 1988. Commonwealth of Australia, (1988), Civil Aviation Regulations 1988. Commonwealth of Australia, (1998), Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. Commonwealth of Australia (2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Change Manual. Commonwealth of Australia (2010), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Planning Manual, Sect 9.3. Commonwealth of Australia (2010), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR), Airspace Planning Manual, Sect 9.3.


Commonwealth of Australia (2002-2010), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Risk Management Framework. Commonwealth of Australia ((2009), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, National Airspace System Implementation Group (NASIG), Characteristics Version 5.0. Commonwealth of Australia (2001), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 0108AS, Regulatory Standards for Airspace. Commonwealth of Australia ((2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), 0809S, Passenger Transport Services and Cargo Operations – Large Aeroplanes. Commonwealth of Australia ((2008), Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Notice for Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), 0808S, Passenger Transport Services and International Cargo Operations – Smaller Aeroplanes. Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR Draft AC 2-5-1(0), Jan 2010, (Guidance for Controlled Airspace Design). Commonwealth of Australia (2008-2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR aeronautical studies:

Albury; Alice Springs Coffs Harbour; Hamilton Island; Hobart; Launceston; Mackay; Maroochydore (Sunshine Coast); Rockhampton; and Tamworth.

Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR, Report on the Safety Benefit of Surveillance in Airspace – Draft, MJG Aviation. Commonwealth of Australia (2010) Civil Aviation Safety Authority, OAR, Request for Tender, RFT 09/373. Commonwealth of Australia (2009), Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, Aviation White Paper –2009. Commonwealth of Australia (2007) Department of Transport and Regional Services, Common Risk Management Framework 2007. Det Norske Veritas, (2001), Airspace Risk Quantitative Consultative Methods. German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU) AX 001-1-2/02. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Safety Management Manual, DOC 9859, Chapter 9, Safety Analysis and Safety Studies. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Annex 2, Rules of the Air.


International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Annex 11, Air Traffic Services. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 4444 Air Traffic Management. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9426, Air Traffic Services Planning Manual. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9689, Manual on Airspace Planning. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 9683 Human Factors Manual. International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), Doc 8168 -2(Volume II, Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures). International Civil Aviation Organisation [ICAO], (2010), website: www.icao.int/NGAP Ministerial Direction 2004-4. Nav Canada, (2010), Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Nav Canada, (2010), Canadian Flight Supplement (CFS). Report providing advice to Government on Ministerial Direction 2004-4. Transport Canada, (2010), TP14371, Aeronautical Information Manual, (AIM). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], (2010), Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], ATC Handbook JO 7110.65T. United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], ATC Handbook JO 7400. United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Terminal Procedures Publications. United States, Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], Office of Aviation Policy and Plans - Establishment and discontinuance criteria for Air Traffic Control Towers.


http://www.icao.int/NGAP



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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix C

APPENDIX C

Consultation

APPENDIX C

CONSULTATION

Consultations and workshops Meetings: 10 June 2010 CASA Canberra Opening meeting 10 June 2010 CASA Airways & Aerodromes – Project briefing 10 June 2010. Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Canberra – Project

Briefing 10 June 2010 Dept of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and

Local Government, Canberra - Project Briefing 15 June 2010. Airservices Australia, Canberra – Project Briefing 15 June 2010. Regional Aviation Association of Australia, Canberra - Liaison

meeting 16 June 2010 Aircraft Owners’ and Pilots’ Association, Bankstown – Liaison

meeting 24 June 2010 Airservices Australia Melbourne Centre - Data gathering 5 July 2010 Airservices Australia Hobart Tower - Observations 8 July 2010 Airservices Australia Brisbane Centre – briefing and data

gathering 8 July 2010 Airservices Australia Sunshine Coast Tower - Observations 9 July 2010 Airservices Australia Mackay Tower - observations 18/19 July 2010 Airservices Australia Alice Springs Tower - observations 19 August 2010 CASA CBR

Liaison, Correspondence and Questionnaires sent to:

Chartair Cobham Aviation Pel-Air Aviation Qantas Airways Qantaslink (Eastern Australia Airlines & Sunstate Airlines) Regional Express Airlines Virgin Blue Airlines Aircraft Owners’ and Pilots’ Association Australian Federation of Air Pilots Australian and International Pilots Association GAPAN Regional Aviation Association of Australia

o All RAAA members Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia Albury ATC Alice Springs ATC Coffs Harbour ATC Launceston ATC



Rockhampton ATC Tamworth ATC

Telephone Interviews

Direct Air Pel-Air Aviation Qantaslink Virgin


Responses to Questionnaire by Industry

Question RPT Operator 1 RPT Operator 2 RPT Operator 3 Passenger Transport Operator

1

Industry Body Representative

General Aviation Industry

Representative

Do you only operate flights into Class D Airports during ATC hours of operation?

No Yes No No No No

If you operate outside ATC published hours of operation, how often do you do so?

Daily n/a Less than 5% of movements

Daily Frequently Frequently

Does the existing level of service for accessibility to the airport(s) meet your needs?

No – prefer Tower available for arrivals

and departures

Yes Yes Yes Yes, but availability of ATC reduces pilot

workload in the vicinity of the aerodrome.

Provision of ATC also is important for current

meteorological information.

Yes

Does the existing level of service for aircraft separation at the airport(s) meet your needs?

Conditional – TSAD should be available for

radar separation

Yes No. The operator does not believe that see and avoid is an acceptable level of

safety for fare paying passengers in

terminal areas with the traffic level and

mix of the 10 specified Class D

airports. The use of Class E in the areas

is problematic without

Yes Yes Yes


other mitigators.

Do you think the size of the existing control zones is: Satisfactory the way it is? Too large? Too small?

Satisfactory the way it is, but must have

Class C steps to and from the aerodrome.

Satisfactory the way it is.

Too small for the descent profile of this operator’s particular

type of aircraft.

Too small. Prefer to operate in a controlled

environment; less experienced private

pilots avoid such airspace.

Satisfactory the way it is; it would be

undesirable for anything smaller.

Should be standard FAA dimensions

Would the introduction of Class E airspace down to say, 700ft outside tower hours of operation be beneficial to your operations?

Only if Class E remains a

Transponder environment and is

supported by radar or ADS-B surveillance.

No, however it is considered that

unsurveilled low level Class E airspace

provides no benefit to IFR.

Does not solve the problem of VFR

aircraft. IFR aircraft are already known in G airspace. See and avoid is required. Not beneficial to collision

avoidance.

Yes, but with surveillance

Class E airspace should not be used, particularly below

10,000ft, unless it has electronic surveillance.

Not necessarily; VFR aircraft in Class E

airspace should not be obliged to have

Transponder or to make any radio calls; rather just listen out.

Would the introduction of Class E airspace corridors benefit your operations?

It would be better than Class G as long as it

is a Transponder environment and there

is radar or ADS-B surveillance.

No – many routes flown are subject to diversions due to weather during

summer; corridors increase workload for

aircrew and controllers.

Unsurveilled Class E airspace provides no

benefit to IFR.

As above. Yes, but only with surveillance.

Class E airspace should not be used, particularly below

10,000ft, unless it has electronic surveillance.

Not necessarily; VFR aircraft in Class E

airspace should not be obliged to have

Transponder or to make any radio calls; rather just listen out.

Do you have any other comments on any of the above?

Class D should be a Transponder only

environment. Class D Towers should be

equipped with electronic surveillance and controllers trained to use it. VFR should be subject to control.

All approaches and holding patterns

should be contained within Class C or D

airspace.

Use of unsurveilled Class E airspace in

Asia, Pacific and New Zealand for RPT jet

operations.

Our observation is the lack of education on airspace matters

by pilots. There should be

substantial training for all pilots on

airspace boundaries and procedures.

No Any changes should result in a

standardised model for all Class D towers.

“keep it simple” is the best policy



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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix D

APPENDIX D

Hamilton Island

APPENDIX D

1 Hamilton Island

1.1 Tower airspace

Hamilton Island Tower airspace consists of the Control Zone (CTR) from the surface (SFC) to 1,000ft Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL), and four Class D steps out to 22 nautical miles (nm) and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft AMSL to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation.

Figure D.1: Hamilton Island airspace

1.2 Electronic surveillance

Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) coverage is available from the Brisbane ATC Centre above 2,500 feet (ft) within the CTR. The tower has a Tower Situational Awareness Display (TSAD), which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500’ and provides radar service above that level.

1.3 Aerodrome Traffic profiles

Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Hamilton Island were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


CY 2007 CY 2008 CY 2009 12 months prior to March 2010

GA 11275 7824 6725 7156

Military 23 54 29 28

Non-Scheduled 644 133 150 130

Scheduled 4552 4101 3981 4118

TOTAL 16,494 12,112 10,885 11,432

Passengers 468,270 444,589 456,572 470,320

Table D.1: Hamilton Island Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure D.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure D.3: Hamilton Island scheduled movements by aircraft type

Regular Public Transport (RPT) services are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Virgin Blue B737 and Jetstar A320. There are two scheduled RPT operations outside tower hours each day. There are frequent charter and private aeroplanes and helicopters flying to and from Hamilton Island, as well as transiting flights to Barrier Reef islands that operate outside published tower hours.

Tower Hours of

Operation Out of hours movements

Arrivals Out of hours movements

Departures

0900 - 1515 (L) Daily QFA2503 Q-Link DH8 0830 QFA2504 Q-Link DH8 0855

Table D.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours

1.4 Tower Hours

ATC is provided for jet RPT flights but not for all turbo-prop flights. Current hours of operation are from 0900 – 1515 local, and can be varied by Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). The hours of operation are also dependent on the ferry to and from the mainland as there is no accommodation for air traffic controllers on the island.

1.5 ATC staffing

There are currently two controllers who based at the unit, which is in accordance with the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan. There are also Air Traffic Control (ATC) staff rated at Hamilton Island Tower who are based in Mackay Tower to provide management, check functions and leave relief.


1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.017 and with the addition of radar as 0.016 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment result concerned preventing infringements of the undershoot area for Runway 14.

The CASA Airspace Review of Hamilton Island (July 2009) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as “approximately 0.006549 fatalities per annum can be expected. In addition it is estimated that Hamilton Island has a likelihood of having one mid air collision approximately every 10,707 years with an estimate of 70 fatalities”.

The Ambidji Study team reviewed the Air Safety Incident Report (ASIR) and Electronic Submitted Incident Report (ESIR) documents submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR). Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary.

Hamilton Island ASIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

AIRPROX

Breakdow n of Coordination

Breakdow n of Separation

Failure to Comply

Go Around

Loss of Separation Assurance

Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA

Violation of Controlled Airspace

Figure D.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010


Hamilton Island ESIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure D.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

1.7 Airspace Discussion

1.7.1 Potential changes to division of airspace responsibilities

Hamilton Island Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from the Surface (SFC) to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Aircraft of 3,900ft is currently contained within Hamilton Island Tower’s airspace where procedural standards apply. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to 2,500ft.

If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft and Centre managed the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 3,900ft by the Centre.


Figure D.6: Hamilton Island CTR profile

1.7.2 Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC – 2,500ft.

The Hamilton Island Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 7nm by Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) to the northwest and 9nm to the south east, (in order to encompass Lindeman Island traffic).

The potential effects of altering the Class D CTR vertically from the current 1,000ft AMSL to a suggested altitude of 2,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

There were no major impediments identified for Hamilton Island if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.

1.7.3 Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR

This proposal mimics the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft.

The National Airspace System (NAS) stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (Lower Limit [LL] 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Hamilton Island there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,500ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME.


The implication of replacing the current Class C and D steps has been qualitatively assessed and is discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

1.7.4 Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside Tower hours

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E Terminal Airspace (surveillance) down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation at certain locations.

The implications of introducing Class E terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 2,500ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.

1.7.5 Potential introduction of low level Class E corridors where necessary

There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Hamilton Island is 8,500ft.

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E En-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations.

The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report. The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 2,500ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging




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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix E

APPENDIX E

Mackay

APPENDIX E

1 Mackay Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Mackay tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft AMSL and 3 Class D steps out to 22DME. The base of Class C airspace is at 4,500ft AMSL. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation.

Figure E.1: Mackay airspace


The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as adequate to the surface at the aerodrome and south; however there is a radar shadow to the north of the aerodrome limiting low level coverage to around 1,000ft north of Mackay.

The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level.



Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Mackay aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 38,918 34,808 36,217 36,367

Military 168 117 167 144

Non-Scheduled 2640 3876 4597 4129

Scheduled 9788 10,638 11,300 11,758

TOTAL 51,514 49,438 52,281 52,398

Passengers 850,020 987,618 984,409 970,740

Table E.1: Mackay Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure E.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure E.3: Mackay scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8, Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190, Jetstar A320 and Tiger Airways A320. There are at least 3 Passenger Transport flights scheduled prior to published Tower hours involving Embraer E170/190 and DHC-8 aircraft. Cargo flights, training flights, charter flights to the Barrier Reef and passenger and cargo flights to the Bowen Basin are known to operate outside the tower hours of operation.

Tower Hours of



Departures 0725 - 2100 (L) Sunday to

Friday DJ 600 VB E190 0640

QF 2511 Q Link DHC-8 0645


0725 - 2015 (L) Saturday DJ 600 VB E190 0640



Table E.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours

1.4 Tower Hours

ATC hours of operation are from 0725 – 2100 local Sunday to Friday and until 2015 on Saturday. One jet and two turbo-prop RPT flights depart from Mackay at or just after 0630 and therefore prior to the tower opening. All scheduled RPT flights are planned to arrive prior to tower closure.

1.5 ATC staffing

There are currently six controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor (UTS), at


Mackay and a seventh controller is expected to arrive in the near future, which will bring the complement in line with the Resource Management Plan. The UTS is also responsible for the supervisory functions at Hamilton Island tower. The current ATC roster contains some shifts of 10 hours, which is the maximum duty limitation time. ATC staff expect that by mid-2011 it will be possible to amend the roster to allow for 7 hour shifts that can be extended to 10 hours if required.

1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.024 and with the addition of radar as 0.023 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment result concerned the control area steps to the southwest of Mackay not providing inclusive Control Area (CTA) protection for RPT aircraft flying inbound from Sydney; and also taxiway/runway limitations.

The CASA Aeronautical Study of Mackay (June 2010) reported “The qualitative risk assessment indicates that the risk curve is at a relative low level. Societal risk levels, which consider severity and frequency, are therefore considered at an acceptable level. The risk assessment, generative interviews, ESIRs and ASIRs including the quantitative modelling results suggest that all reasonable precautionary measures are in place to ensure that operations can continue at present levels”.

The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices Australia and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary.

Mackay ASIR

0 20 40 60 80 100

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA



Figure E.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

Mackay ESIR

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


TCAS RA

Runw ay Incursion


Figure E.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010



Mackay Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 4,700ft is currently outside Mackay Tower’s airspace. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to the surface at the airport and south; however there is a radar shadow to the north of the aerodrome limiting low level coverage to around 1,000ft north of Mackay.

If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft and Centre managed the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 4,700ft by the Centre.


Figure E.6: Mackay CTR profile

1.7.2 Amend Class D CTR from SFC - 1,500ft to SFC – 2,500ft. The Mackay Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 6 DME.


There were no major impediments identified for Mackay if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.

1.7.3 Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR.

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E (surveillance) airspace and steps surrounding Class D airspace at a non-radar tower up to 4,500ft.

NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Mackay there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME.

The implications of replacing the current Class C and D steps have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.





The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the surface overhead the aerodrome and at higher altitudes to the north, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Mackay is 8,500ft AMSL.

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E En-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations.

The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the SFC overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging




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6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix F

APPENDIX F

Rockhampton

APPENDIX F

1 Rockhampton Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Rockhampton Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft and 3 Class D steps out to 22nm and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation.

Figure F.1: Rockhampton airspace


The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as adequate to the surface.

The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level.



Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Rockhampton aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 25,899 23,627 25,209 23,576 Military 1191 1253 1299 1217 Non-Scheduled 3109 2624 3145 3119 Scheduled 10,817 10,800 11,889 12,118 TOTAL 41,016 38,304 41,542 40,030 Passengers 708,927 760,003 783,401 789,212

Table F.1: Rockhampton Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure F.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure F.3: Rockhampton scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT flights are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Tiger Airways A320 and Virgin Blue Embraer E170/190 type aircraft.

There are no RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours. There are known cargo flights by Toll Aviation and Pel-Air that operate Monday to Saturday outside tower hours and ad-hoc charter flights by Peace Aviation, Australasian Jet and Central Airlines. The Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) has a base at Rockhampton and operates at any time, as required.

1.4 Tower Hours

Tower hours of operation are from 0630 – 2035 local Monday to Saturday and from 0730 on Sunday. All RPT flights are scheduled to arrive or depart with the published tower hours of operation.

1.5 ATC staffing

Rockhampton has an establishment for five controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also required to undertake administrative duties. At present there are only four controllers at the Unit whereas the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan indicates a requirement of 5.5 controllers.

1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.015 and with the addition of radar as also 0.015 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment result concerned the requirement to ensure that the new Control Tower is located appropriately to ensure visibility of the runways taking into account any potential runway extensions.

The Rockhampton Aeronautical Study (February 2010) commissioned by CASA, reported that “The results of the fast time simulation of the airspace around Rockhampton lead to the conclusion that the Class D airspace with the relevant procedures applied will provide sufficient defences against the closest potential conflict pairs identified. The fast time simulation did not show any conflict pairs for operations


outside the tower hours. This can partially be explained by the fact that the only data available for this time period were the Airservices EUROCAT records”.

The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently, the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary.

Rockhampton ASIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

AIRPROX

Breakdown of Coordination

Breakdown of Separation

Failure to Com ply

Go Around


Runway Incurs ion

TCAS RA


Figure F.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010


Rockhampton ESIR

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure F.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010



Rockhampton Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane ATC Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 3,500ft is currently inside Rockhampton Tower’s airspace. The SSR coverage within the entire CTR was reported as suitable down to the surface at the aerodrome.

If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft AMSL and Centre owned the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established because arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 3,500ft by the Centre.


Figure F.6: Rockhampton CTR profile


The Rockhampton Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 6 DME.


There were no major impediments identified for Rockhampton if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.



NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL4500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Rockhampton there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME.






The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the surface overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Rockhampton is 8,500ft.

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1,200ft AGL at certain locations.

The implication of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to the SFC overhead the aerodrome, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.




II

6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix G

APPENDIX G

Sunshine Coast

APPENDIX G

1 Sunshine Coast Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Sunshine Coast Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,500ft and 3 Class D steps out to 20DME and to the base of Class C airspace at 4,500ft from north through east to the south of the airport. The tower is responsible for the Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation.

Figure G.1: Sunshine Coast airspace


The SSR coverage within the CTR was reported as adequate to approximately 1,000ft.The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and provides radar service above that level.



Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Sunshine Coast aerodrome (ex Maroochydore) were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 78,961 79,863 72,064 72,578

Military 434 219 265 247 Non-Scheduled 1306 1573 1147 1190 Scheduled 6095 6712 5780 5671

TOTAL 86,796 88,375 79,256 79,686

Passengers 868,299 953,804 859,007 823,205

Table G.1: Sunshine Coast Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure G.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure G.3: Sunshine Coast scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT services are operated by Jetstar A320, Tiger Airways A320 and Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190 aircraft. There is one RPT operation scheduled after Tower hours involving an A320 aircraft. Ad hoc charter, private and training flights are known to operate outside tower hours.

Tower Hours of



Departures

0800 - 1920 (L) Daily JQ791 Jetstar A320 1945 daily

Table G.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours

1.4 Tower Hours

ATC hours of operation are from 0800 – 1920 local. All RPT flights are scheduled to arrive or depart within the published tower hours of operation, with the exception of an evening A320 departing to Sydney.

1.5 ATC staffing

There are six controllers at Sunshine Coast, including a Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also required to undertake administrative functions. There are 6.5 controllers required under the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan.


1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.037 and with the addition of radar as 0.035 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment resulted in two recommendations that were ‘common’ to all Class D locations, being:

Recommendation 3 – Airservices, CASA (OAR) and industry stakeholders jointly conduct a review of airspace in the vicinity of Class D locations with a focus on providing positive and appropriate control area protection for RPT operations; and

Recommendation 4 – Airservices, CASA (OAR) and industry stakeholders jointly review airspace configuration in the vicinity of the Class D locations outside the hours of the towers. This is to include, where possible, a standardised base of CTA above the Class D locations. Furthermore, the base of CTA should provide sufficient airspace for all operators (i.e.: IFR and Visual Flight Rules [VFR]) to fly above MSA without the need for an ATC clearance (e.g. Class G).

The Maroochydore Airspace Review (April 2009), commissioned by CASA, reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as “The current base case is the current Class D Tower with a residual risk of 5,410 years between mid air collision. This is more optimistic than the 1 in 3,866 years given in Table 18, but significantly more pessimistic than the figure of 0.037 fatalities per 100 years quoted in the Airservices 2008 Class D towers study”.



Sunshine Coast ASIR

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

AIRPROX

Breakdow n of Coordiination


Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure G.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

Sunshine Coast ESIR

0 10 20 30 40 50

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA

Violation of Controlled A irspace

Figure G.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010




Sunshine Coast Tower presently controls the Class D airspace from SFC to 4,500ft AMSL. Brisbane Centre controls the Class C airspace above this level and provides radar services. The MSA of 4,100ft is currently inside Sunshine Coast Tower’s airspace. The 4,100ft MSA to the west has been used as the most conservative height. The SSR coverage within the CTR was reported as suitable down to around 1,000ft AMSL.

If the airspace responsibility was changed so that the Tower only controlled the Class D CTR up to 2,500ft AMSL and Centre owned the airspace and applied radar services above this level, then a radar approach control service would need to be established as arriving IFR aircraft would be controlled below the MSA of 4,100ft by the Centre.

Figure G.6: Sunshine Coast CTR profile


The Sunshine Coast Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,500ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 8 DME except to the west.


There were no major impediments identified for Sunshine Coast if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were


extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.



NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL4500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Sunshine Coast there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,500ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 20 DME.


1.7.4 Potential introduction of Class E within CTR outside TWR hours



The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 1,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors in Queensland. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Sunshine Coast is 8,500ft.


The implications of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed in and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. Although there is SSR surveillance to 1,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.




II

6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix H

APPENDIX H

Coffs Harbour

APPENDIX H

1 Coffs Harbour Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Coffs Harbour Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 1,000ft and 3 Class D steps out to 22nm and to the base of Class C at 4,500ft to the north and south of the airport. The tower is responsible for Class D airspace, which reverts to Class G airspace outside the tower hours of operation.

Figure H.1: Coffs Harbour airspace


Radar coverage is only available above 6,000ft from the Brisbane Centre. A TSAD provides Coffs Tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in Coffs Tower airspace. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 4,500ft and can provide radar services above 6,000ft.



Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Coffs Harbour aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 17,531 18,337 20,501 19,314

Military 292 243 327 305

Non-Scheduled 2020 1884 1454 1286

Scheduled 8687 8659 6991 7028

TOTAL 28,530 29,123 29,273 27,933

Passengers 343,246 306,719 308,379 310,116

Table H.1: Coffs Harbour Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure H.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure H.3: Coffs Harbour scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8, Virgin Blue B737 and Embraer E170/190, and Brindabella Airlines Jetstream J41 and Metro aircraft. There are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving Embraer E170/190; Jetstream J41 and DHC-8 aircraft. Training, ad-hoc charter, aeromedical and private flights are also known to operate outside tower hours.

Of particular note is parachute jumping activity, which is conducted onto three landing zones: two on the aerodrome and one just south of the aerodrome, towards Sawtell. Whilst the activity can be controlled during tower hours, it continues outside tower hours and has caused concern to be expressed by other operators on the aerodrome. Some operators have queried why such activity is permitted whilst there are scheduled arriving and departing aircraft still pending.

Tower Hours of



Departures 0645 - 1730 (L) Monday

to Saturday FQ 504 Brindabella J41

1830 Mon-Fri QFA 2101 Q Link DHC-8 0630

QFA 2118 Q-link DHC-8 1950 Mon - Fri

FQ 504 Brindabella J41 1855 Mon - Fri

0935 - 1700 (L) Sunday DJ 1161 VB E190 0725 DJ 1161 VB E190 0755

FQ 504 Brindabella J41 1950 QFA 2117 Q Link DHC-8 1700

QFA 2118 Q-link DHC-8 1950 FQ 504 Brindabella J41 2015

Table H.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours


1.4 Tower Hours

ATC hours of operation are from 0645 – 1730 local Monday to Saturday and from 0935 to 1700 Sunday. Scheduled RPT flights depart each morning and evening outside tower hours.

1.5 ATC staffing

There are four controllers, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, located at Coffs Harbour. Due to upcoming staff transfers, it is envisaged that there will be only three controllers available from September until new staff are trained and rated. There are 3.5 controllers required under the Resource Management Plan. Airservices Australia intends to combine the Unit Tower Supervisor (UTS) positions at Coffs Harbour and Tamworth in the near future, hence doubling the administrative functions and leaving little time for rostered ATC duties. The new UTS will be stationed at Coffs Harbour however his or her time is expected to be shared between both locations, which in turn could put strain on short term leave relief and potentially cause reduced hours for Coffs Harbour for short periods.

1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.212 and with the addition of radar as 0.211 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment reported a concern about aircraft leaving CTA protection when conducting a Runway (RWY) 21 VOR approach. It also contained a recommendation for monitoring passenger numbers to ensure an Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) service is provided when the CASR 139H passenger number criterion is met.

The CASA Aeronautical Study of Coffs Harbour (March 2010) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as “the following scenarios were analysed: Base case Class D tower with annual movements 30,560 and 426.8 conflict pairs; traffic envelope with 30,560 +/- 10%”. A Frequency Number (FN) curve diagram was produced that indicated the 10% confidence envelope was situated near the middle As Low as Reasonably Possible (ALARP) line and well below the Scrutiny line.

The Ambidji Study Team reviewed the ASIR and ESIR reports submitted from June 2008 to May 2010 and the analysis revealed that most relevant incidents were consistent with those reported by Airservices and the ATSB. Consequently the Study Team determined that there were no significant air safety incident trends emerging at any of the 10 Class D aerodromes, and that further analysis of incident data was not necessary.


Coffs Harbour ASIR

0 10 20 30 40 50

AIRPROX



Failure to Com ply

Go Around


Runway Incurs ion

TCAS RA

Violoation of Controlled Airspace

Figure H.3: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

Coffs Harbour ESIR

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure H.4: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010




Changes to the vertical dimensions of the CTR would not affect the current tower area of responsibility.

Figure H.6: Coffs Harbour CTR profile


The Coffs Harbour Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 1,000ft AMSL and lateral dimensions of 7 DME except to the west where it is truncated.


There were no major impediments identified for Coffs Harbour if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 2,500ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.



NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps


(LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Coffs Harbour there are 3 Class D steps with LL of 1,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft respectively out to 22 DME.





The major issues regarding this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. There is inadequate SSR coverage within the CTR below 6,000ft, and the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors near Coffs Harbour. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Coffs Harbour is 8,500ft.


The implication of introducing low level Class E corridors at certain locations down to 1,200ft AGL or 8,500ft AMSL have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. As there is inadequate SSR surveillance below 6,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.




II

6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix I

APPENDIX I

Tamworth

APPENDIX I

1 Tamworth Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Tamworth Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface to 3,500ft AMSL and one Class D step to 23nm south up to 4,500ft AMSL. The two Class C steps which extend to 36nm south east are also under the control of Tamworth tower up to 8,500ft AMSL. Outside the tower hours of operation the Class D and Class C airspace below 8,500ft reverts to Class G airspace.

Figure I.1: Tamworth airspace


SSR coverage is only available above 6,000ft from the Brisbane Centre. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and receives radar coverage above 6,000ft.



Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Tamworth aerodrome were obtained for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 79,934 80,574 80,310 77,740

Military 750 585 790 668

Non-Scheduled 2075 1979 1672 1522

Scheduled 3267 3150 3388 3709

TOTAL 86,026 86,288 86,160 83,639

Passengers 102,630 112,458 123,332 127,392

Table I.1: Tamworth Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure I.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure I.3: Tamworth scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DHC-8 and Brindabella Airlines Metro and Jetstream J41 aircraft. There are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving DHC-8, SW4 Metro and Jetstream J41 aircraft. The aerodrome has parallel runways and a single Instrument Landing System (ILS) that cater for the BAe Systems Flight Training Organisation, which conducts training for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Republic of Singapore Air Force and the Royal Brunei Air Force. Other training, charter, cargo, private and aeromedical flights are known to operate outside tower hours.

Tower Hours of



Departures 0700 - 2015 (L) Monday

to Friday QFA 2008 Q Link DH8

2015 QFA 2001Q Link DH8 0630

0800 - 1530 (L) Saturday QFA 2006 Q Link DH8 1635 QFA 2001Q Link DH8 0630

QFA 2007 Q Link DH8 1700

0800 -1530 Sunday FQ 607 Brindabella SWM / J41 1610

FQ 608 Brindabella SWM / J41 1650

QFA 2006 Q Link DC8 1645 QFA 2007 Q Link DH8 1705

QFA 2008 Q Link DC8

2015

Table I.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours


1.4 Tower Hours

ATC hours of operation are from 0700 – 2015 local Monday to Friday and from 0800 – 1530 local on weekends. Scheduled RPT turbo-prop flights depart each morning prior to the opening of the tower and at weekends, turbo-prop arrivals and departures occur outside the tower hours of operation.

1.5 ATC staffing

There are eight controllers at Tamworth, including the Unit Tower Supervisor. It is envisaged that the UTS position will be combined with that from Coffs Harbour in the near future. The UTS will be responsible for administrative functions as well as maintaining a valid tower rating. There are 7.5 controllers required under the Airservices Australia Resource Management Plan.

1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.008 and with the addition of radar as 0.008 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment had no significant issues to report.

CASA had commissioned an “Airspace study to collect collision pairs for assessment” (November 2009). This study reported “During simulated operations in the (RWY) 12 direction, 14 conflicts were observed involving at least one IFR aircraft in the 75 minute period after the nominal cessation of the ATC Aerodrome control service.” Two of these conflicts involved a Closest Point of Approach (CPA) within 2nm and 500ft. For operations in the RWY 30 direction, 11 conflicts involving at least one IFR aircraft were observed in the 45 minutes after normal cessation of the ATC service. Again, two of these conflicts involved a CPA within 2nm and 500ft.



Tamworth ASIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

AIRPROX

Breakdown of Coordinaton


Failure to Com ply

Go Around


Runway Incurs ion

TCAS RA


Figure I.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

Tamworth ESIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure I.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010




SSR coverage is only available above 6,000ft from Brisbane Centre. A TSAD provides the tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in tower airspace. Brisbane Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and can receive SSR information above 6,000ft. The MSA is at 5,600ft which is inside Tamworth’s airspace and below radar coverage.

Figure I.6: Tamworth CTR profile


The Tamworth Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 3,500ft AMSL as the aerodrome elevation is 1,334ft AMSL, and lateral dimensions of 9 DME to the west and 11 DME to the south.


There were no major impediments identified for Tamworth if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 3,800ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.




NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into Towered aerodromes, and a Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL 4,500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Tamworth there is one Class D CTA step with LL of 3,500ft from the CTR to 15 DME north and west and 23 DME southeast.





The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. There is inadequate SSR surveillance within the CTR below 6,000ft and the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors near Tamworth. The LL of Class E airspace adjacent to Tamworth is 8,500ft to the east and FL 180 to the west. It is understood that these LL of Class E were selected in order to provide radar surveillance within that particular area of Class E airspace.

This proposal mimics the FAA airspace model of Class E en-route airspace (surveillance) down to 1200ft AGL at certain locations.


The major issues in this proposal relate to Brisbane ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. As there is inadequate SSR surveillance below 6,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.




II

6 October 2010 v1.8 Appendix J

APPENDIX J

Albury

APPENDIX J

1 Albury Tower

1.1 Tower airspace

Albury Tower airspace consists of a CTR from the surface up to 2,000ft AMSL and three Class D steps to 20DME and up to 4,500ft. The three Class C steps, which extend to 30DME to the southwest and northeast, are also under the control of Albury tower up to 8,500ft. Outside the tower hours of operation the Class D and Class C airspace up to 8,500ft reverts to Class G airspace.

Figure J.1: Albury Tower airspace


SSR coverage is only available above 8,000ft from the Melbourne Centre. The tower has a TSAD, which is not permitted to be used for approach control services. Melbourne Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500ft and has radar coverage above 8,000ft.


Airservices Australia Data Validation Reports on Albury aerodrome were obtained for


calendar years 2007, 2008, 2008 and 12 months leading up to March 2010.


GA 19,306 18,936 17,189 16,698

Military 285 293 231 208

Non-Scheduled 2501 2076 2195 2106

Scheduled 8936 9814 9371 9269

TOTAL 31,028 31,119 29,986 28,281

Passengers 221,928 279,120 282,597 283,109

Table J.1: Albury Aircraft and Passenger Movements

Figure J.2: Arrivals by hour 12 months to March 2010


Figure J.3: Albury scheduled movements by aircraft type

RPT services are operated by Qantaslink DH8, Regional Express Saab 340, Virgin Blue Embraer E170 and Brindabella Airlines SW4 Metro aircraft. On weekends, there are a number of RPT operations scheduled outside Tower hours involving DH8, SF340 and E170 aircraft.

Tower Hours of



Departures 0615 - 2030 (L) Monday -

Friday

0900 - 1700 (L) Saturday Rex ZL 3186 SF34 1720 Q Link QFA 2202 DH8 0630

Rex ZL 3188 SF34 2010 Rex ZL 762 SF340 0630

Rex ZL 783 SF34 2015 Rex ZL 3151 SF340 0650

Virgin Blue DJ 1181EJ170 1715

Rex ZL 3187 SF340 1755

0900 - 2030 (L) Sunday Rex ZL 762 SF340 0630

Rex ZL 3151 SF340 0650

Table J.2: Scheduled Passenger Transport movements outside Tower Hours

1.4 Tower Hours

ATC hours of operation are from 0615 – 2030 local Monday to Friday, 0900 – 1700 local Saturday and 0900 – 2030 local Sunday. Scheduled RPT services operate within the published tower hours of operation, although on weekends both jet and turbo-prop aircraft arrive and depart outside tower hours of operation.


1.5 ATC staffing

There are five controllers at Albury, including the Unit Tower Supervisor, who is also responsible for administrative functions. There are 5.5 controllers required under the Resource Management Plan.

1.6 Risk Assessment

The Airservices Australia 2008 Preliminary Risk Assessment of 10 Class D Towers reported the quantitative risk assessment results for this location as “Current fatality risk (per 100 years) as 0.023 and with the addition of radar as 0.020 (per 100 years)”. The qualitative risk assessment reported a concern about aircraft holding for RWY25 RNAV approach entering Class G airspace, and also an issue with the location of Restricted Area R368.

The CASA Airspace Review of Albury (July 2009) reported the results of the quantitative risk assessment as “approximately 0.00897 fatalities per annum can be expected. In addition it is estimated that Albury has a likelihood of having one mid air collision approximately every 2,664 years with an estimate of 24 fatalities”.



Albury ASIR

0 5 10 15 20

AIRPROX



Failure to Com ply

Go Around


Runway Incurs ion

TCAS RA


Figure J.4: ASIR by category June 2008 to June 2010

Albury ESIR

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

AIRPROX



Failure to Comply

Go Around


Runw ay Incursion

TCAS RA


Figure J.5: ESIR by category June 2008 to June 2010




SSR coverage is only available above 8,000ft from Melbourne Centre. A TSAD provides the tower with early information about inbound aircraft not yet in tower airspace. Melbourne Centre is responsible for airspace above 8,500 ft and can receive SSR information above 8,000ft. The MSA is at 5,500ft which is inside Albury Tower’s airspace and below radar coverage.

Figure 7.6: Albury CTR profile


The Albury Class D CTR has a vertical dimension of SFC to 2,000ft AMSL as the aerodrome elevation is 539ft AMSL with lateral dimensions of 8 NM and truncated to the northwest and southeast.


There were no major impediments identified for Albury if the Class D CTR lateral dimensions remained unaltered and the CTR vertical dimensions were extended to 3,000ft AMSL provided all the current Class D and Class C CTA steps remain in place.


1.7.3 Amend Class D CTR and introduce Class E airspace above and/or laterally around the Class D CTR


NAS stage 2b was rolled back from Class E steps into towered aerodromes, and Class C CTA steps were re-introduced. At Class D locations the Class C CTA steps (LL4500ft) are enhanced with a number of Class D CTA steps underneath.

At Albury there are 3 Class D CTA steps with LL of 2,000ft; 2,500ft and 3,500ft from the CTR to 20 DME northeast and southwest.




The implications of introducing Class E Terminal Airspace down to 700ft above aerodrome elevation have been qualitatively assessed and are discussed in the Risk section of Part A of this report.

The major issues in this proposal relate to the Melbourne ATC Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. There is inadequate SSR surveillance within the CTR below 8,000ft and the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging.


There are currently no ‘low level’ Class E corridors near Albury. The LL of Class E airspace surrounding Albury is 8,500ft.



The major issues in this proposal relate to Melbourne Centre regarding infrastructure, people and procedures. As there is inadequate SSR surveillance below 8,000ft within the CTR, the introduction of additional surveillance, processing and display systems in the short term would be technically and operationally challenging


Documents

APPENDIX A Abbreviations and Acronymsvocasupport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ambidji-classd-app-a-j.pdfAPPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ... NOTAM Notice to Airmen ... United