Appellate Brief Sp16 1114

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ))

Plaintiff and Respondent ) Court of Appeal) No. G234578

v. ) )

MICHAEL NORTH, ) San Diego County) No. SDC567034

Defendant and Appellant. )_________________________________________________ )

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY

Honorable Jonathan R. Proud1

____________________________

APPELLANT’S BRIEF____________________________

Student 1114

Attorney for Appellant

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Under the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, did the trial court err by

using the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of evidence when law

enforcement searched the incorrect residence with an insufficient warrant?

APPELLANT’S BRIEF ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW……………………..…………...……………ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………..……………………iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..………………………………………..……………………iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...……………………………………..……………………1

STANDARD OF REVIEW...……….………………………………..……………………4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.………………………………..……………………5

ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………………6

I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE 4TH AMENDMENT BY PERMITTING

EVIDENCE SEIZED VIA AN INVALID WARRANT AND INCORRECTLY EVALUATED

WHERE THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIES.…………………..………………7

A. The Officer’s Reliance, Before the Search, on the Warrant Lacking Particularity

Did Not Conform to the Standards of the Good Faith.Exception to the Exclusionary

Rule………………………...…….………………………………………………….8

B. The Unreasonable Actions of the Police Officers Should Be Deterred by

Prohibiting Seized Evidence During the Search.………………………………….11

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………15

APPELLANT’S BRIEF iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) ………………………………...…………1, 2, 3, 5

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) ……………………...…………………3, 5

Higgason v. Sup. Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985)…………………………………2, 8

Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2000)…………………….……6, 7, 9

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) ……………………………..……2, 4, 7, 8

People v. Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. 1983)……………………………….2, 3, 4, 5

People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal. App. 3d 746, 758 (1984) 1………..……………………..7, 8

United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976)……………………………………7

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ……………….……………….……1, 2, 6, 7

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971)………………………………. ………....4

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ………………….…………….………1

Constitutional Provisions or Statutes

U.S. Const. Amend IV……………………………………………………….……1, 2, 7, 8

California Penal Code 1538.5 ………………………………….……………………......18

1 The California Reporter for People v. MacAvoy began at page 34, with the opinion beginning at 37, however no further page numbers were provided for that particular reporter, so all cites are listed as one continuous page: 37.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged, in count one, with possession of methamphetamine for

purposes of sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378; in count two, with

possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377,

subdivision (a); in count three, with possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in

violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364; and in count four, with being under

the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor, in violation of Health and Safety

Code section 11550, subdivision (a). (C.T. 57-58.)

The defense filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section

1538.5. (C.T. 63-98.) The court denied the motion after hearing. (C.T. 107.)

Appellant pled nolo contendere to count one and the remaining charges were

dismissed by the prosecution. (C.T. 110-111.) The court sentenced appellant to the

midterm of two years on the single count. (C.T. 127, 201.)

A notice of appeal was filed on February 4, 2016. (C.T. 131.)

This case before the California Court of Appeal involves Mr. North, the Defendant

and Appellant, and the People of the State of California, the Respondent. Mr. North made

a motion to suppress evidence used against him in a drug conviction. It was denied after

determining that although the warrant was invalid for lack of particularity, the

exclusionary did not apply because the officers acted in good faith when they searched

Mr. North’s home. R. at 79:8-15. This was then a case of a warranted search, as opposed

to warrantless. R. at 2:23-24. Mr. North requests a review of the trial court’s decision.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF 1

The facts are undisputed that Officer Blant obtained a warrant to search “400

Washington Ave., No. A”. R. at 4:16-17. The warrant was signed by the judge for both

the warrant and affidavit. R. at 5: 15-16 When Mr. North’s brother, Ronald, arrived to the

residence, the officers were already there, and apparently already searching through the

property. R. at 55:1-5. They then asked Ronald if they could make a protective sweep of

the residence only of things in their line of sight, to which Ronald consented. R. 55:16-

21. Detective Brown informed Officer Brian that Ronald had consented to search the

upstairs unit. R. at 69:8. The location has two separate units, each with its own approach,

lock, and doorway. R. at 9 1-17, 10:1-7. Ronald told the officers at that time that he lived

“upstairs” (R. at 46:25-26; R. at 12:1-12), and Mr. North told the officers he lived in the

“downstairs” unit. R. at 67:16. Mr. North’s unit had two entryways, one from outside,

and one from a common hallway. R. at 9 10-12. There is however, no way to go from Mr.

North’s apartment to Ronald’s. R. at 11:20-22. Although two units are billed together

under “400 Washington Ave.,” they are billed as two units for water, gas, and electric

services. R. at 57:5-13. Ron’s is marked “A”, while Mr. North’s is marked “B”. R. at

14:27, 15:1-8. Mr. North’s address on official identification does not include the “B”. R.

at 48:16-23. Ronald’s apartment also has the letter “A” painted on the glass. R. at 12:12.

Each unit independently has its own set of amenities that distinguish it as its own place of

residence, such as a bedroom, bathroom, living, and kitchen. R. at 11:1-19. Officers were

aware of this at the time they conducted the search. R. at 63:5-21. It is settled that the

warrant did not cover Mr. North’s apartment, but the discrepancy arose because the

exterior door, before climbing the stairs to “A” or going around the hall to “B”, was


marked with an “A.” R. at 19:24-27, 20:1-17. Exterior to that door however is are two

doorbells, one labeled “A” and one labeled “B”. R. at 13:7-12; 14:23-26. Once you pass

the front door and enter the common hallway, there are two separate doors marked “B” to

get to Mr. North’s apartment. R. at 19:12-14; 43:5-6. There are no common areas other

than a laundry room for the two units. R. at 13-14. Mr. North has his own entrance into

this area with a locked door marked “B.” R. at 25:2-4, 39:10-11. Both were in use. R. at

23: 18-20. He also has a separate, back-door entrance apart from the exterior “A” door.

R. at 43:1-19.

Mr. North is requesting review of the trial court decision denying his motion to

suppress evidence obtained with an invalid warrant. According to these facts, the officers

would have reasonably been aware they were searching beyond the scope of the warrant.


STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the California Constitution, the federal exclusionary rule governs claims

regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f), para. (2); People v. Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 950, 979, n.5

(1993)(noting that a “defendant’s state and federal claims are reviewed under the same

standard” in post-Proposition 8 cases); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985) (discussing

the effect of Prop. 8 on state exclusionary rules).

In ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court must: (1) find the

historical facts; (2) select the applicable rule of law; and (3) apply the law to the facts to

determine whether the rule of law was violated under the particular facts of the case.

People v. Ayala, 24 Cal. 4th 243, 279 (2000).

On appeal, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s rulings involving questions

of fact under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. Id. The appellate court

independently reviews rulings concerning pure questions of law. Id. Finally, rulings that

concern mixed questions of fact and law, such as the reasonableness of any challenged

search or seizure, are also subject to independent review. Id.; see People v. Camacho, 23

Cal. 4th 824, 830 (2000). All issues in the present appeal are subject to independent

review.


SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The 4th Amendment guarantees every person safety from invasion of privacy, by

insuring that unreasonable searches and seizures do not occur. Any protection however, is

worthless if it is not enforced. As a remedy, a person may not be prosecuted with

evidence that originated from an unwarranted search. By excluding any fruit from

unwarranted invasions of privacy, police misconduct can effectively be deterred. One

exception to the rule however, is if the officers rely in good faith on a flawed warrant,

considering no misconduct has occurred on the part of the officers. United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897 (1984).

Reasonableness of the search separates into two parts. The first is the officer’s

reliance on the warrant itself, and the effort made to insure the warrant would be

sufficient. Officers have a duty to do preliminary investigations to ensure a warrant is

adequate, and cannot execute a warrant they discover is deficient. Maryland v. Garrison,

480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). The officers had reason to believe the warrant was for only a part

of the building, and failed to fulfill their duty to make reasonable efforts to discover that.

Secondly, the officers must discontinue any ongoing search if it becomes clear

they have gone beyond the scope of the warrant. In order to preserve the right to privacy,

any police misconduct voids incriminating evidence taken into possession. Jacobs v. City

of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2000). From the outset, Mr. North’s residence

contained ample indications indicated to any reasonable officer that it was a separate and

private unit.


The good faith reliance of police officers is not applicable where the officers

should have reasonably known the warrant was insufficient for the search they were

conducting. The exclusionary rule deters unreasonable behavior and ensures law

enforcement follows the Fourth Amendment right regarding warrants. Ultimately, the

reckless investigation of the facility, acquisition of the warrant, invasion of privacy,

search of the wrong residence, and misconduct from law enforcement outweigh any

benefit that could come from permitting the seized evidence.


ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE 4TH AMENDMENT BY PERMITTING EVIDENCE SEIZED VIA AN INVALID WARRANT AND INCORRECTLY APPLICATED THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION.

The State of California violated Mr. North’s rights of protection against

warrantless searches and seizures when they used evidence against him obtained under an

invalid warrant. The police officer’s unreasonable behavior both before and during the

search preclude them from acting in good faith on a bad warrant. The evidence obtained

against him should be excluded in order to deter police misconduct.

The 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states “The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. If that right is violated, this

Court adheres to the exclusionary rule as a remedy in search and seizure violations,

where any “fruits from that poisonous tree” must be set aside. Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). The Court allowed for a narrow exception to

exclude unwarranted evidence when the good faith of an officer reasonably carries out a

facially valid warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 912 (1984). The good faith

exception operates under two key doctrines: (A) The officers must reasonably believe the

warrant they are operating under is complete before conducting the search, and nothing in

the search reveals to them otherwise. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004). (B)

The aim of the exclusionary rule must still be accomplished, which is to deter police

misconduct during a search Higgason v. Sup. Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 817, 827 (1985)


A. The Officer’s Reliance, Before the Search, on the Warrant Lacking Particularity Did Not Conform to the Standards of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule.

The right outlined in the Fourth Amendment is the unlawful search and seizure

itself. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The remedy for evidence from an unlawful search is

outlined by case law in the exclusionary rule. Id. An officer can only execute a warrant if

he has a reasonable belief that the warrant does not violate the 4th Amendment. Maryland

v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). Police officers may not simply rely on an invalid

warrant and seize evidence. People v. Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Cal. 1983). They

carry the burden to ensure it authorizes them to search a specific place for specific things.

Groh, 540 U.S. at 564. Only then, is his reliance in good faith. Id. at 909.

A warrant’s validity is not assessed on the facts of the search, but on the basis of

the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover. Garrison, 480 U.S.

at 85. In Garrison, the officer who obtained the warrant conducted an investigation,

verifying the information obtained by a reliable informant, examining the exterior of the

building, and questioning the utility company. Id. at 81. The officers received a warrant

to search “the premises known as “2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” Id. at 80.

The Court held that an overly broad warrant does not invalidate evidence, as long as the

search is not reckless. Id. at 85. It reasoned that the officers had done all due diligence to

and reasonable steps to understand what needed to be in the warrant. Id. It was not

reckless to then rely on the warrant indicating there was only one residence on the third

floor. Id.


It is the responsibility of the officer executing a search to ensure that it

conforms to constitutional requirements. Groh, 540 U.S. at 563. In Groh, Agent Groh

searched Mr. Ramirez’s home after a tip that he had a stockpile of high powered

weaponry. Id. at 563. After the failed search, the warrant was found to lack particularity

for what and where they were to search. Id. The Court held it unreasonable for the

officers to believe the warrant they were using was specific enough, and the search could

not be in good faith. Id. at 563. The officers leading the search must make sure their

warrant authorizes the search they are to conduct. Id. Additionally, they determined that

the rule against warrantless searches had equal force in cases where the warrant lacked

particularity, and that the particularity requirement does not just prevent general searches,

it also established the lawful authority of the officer, his need to search, and the limits of

his power to do so. Id. at 561.

It is not reasonable for officers to rely on any errors made by prior authorities.

Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 456. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 143. In Ramirez, an officer

detained two suspicious men and had their records ran. Id. at 455. Ramirez had an

outstanding warrant for possession of PCP. Id. The officer searched his belongings and

found PCP. Id. at 456. The officer believed the warrant was valid, but it was revealed that

it was revoked 6 months earlier. Id. The Court held that good faith reliance on

information provided through “official channels” does not validate the arrest and search.

Id. See also, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971). The Court reasoned “an

otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the

instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.” Id. In other words, it


would be unjust to allow negligent officers to create invalid warrants, relying on other

officers to carry them out in good faith. Id.

The officers had reason to believe there were multiple units before ever searching

the building. In Garrison, the officers were sure to exercise due diligence when

identifying the “third floor apartment”. With corroboration from third parties, such as

utilities, it was reasonable for officers to believe there was one apartment on the third

floor. When the officers obtained the warrant for Ronald’s apartment, it said “400

Washington Ave., No. A.” The warrant itself distinguished, as every multi-unit building

must, No. A form other subsequent units. “A” suggests that it is, at least, followed by a

400 Washington Ave., No. B, yet the officers did not investigate the matter. The officers

in Garrison also spoke with the utilities to see how many units were on the third floor.

Had the officers done the same here, they would have discovered that water, gas, and

electric were all billing two units at that address.

The officers did not fulfill their duties to confirm the constitutionality of the

warrant. The warrant was for 400 Washington Ave #A. This means that the warrant was

not incorrect or overly vague in some way, for example if it had only said 400

Washington Ave. In fact, what it lacked in particularity was that it did not include what

not to search. In Groh, the executing officers were looking for things left out of the

warrant, and it was not sensible to rely on vagueness as grounds for good faith. To say

that the warrant was relied on in good faith is to say “The officers could search apartment

B in good faith, because the warrant did not tell them they could not.” For this same

reason no inference can be made from Mr. North’s driver’s license not including the “B”.


As is made clear by Groh, the policy implication of allowing good faith exceptions by

being able to blame the warrant writer would create a devastating loophole to the entire

requirement of a warrant.

Officer Blant’s warrant was not a clerical error, thus he could not rely on it in good

faith. In both Herring and Ramirez, the officers took the necessary steps to discover if the

warrant was sufficient, and they would have been but for clerical mistakes other

authorities made. The substance of the warrant was sufficient, so it was reasonable for the

officers to carry out the particularities of the warrant. Officer Blant’s warrant lacked

particularity, meaning the search limits needed to be corrected by the executing officer.

The warrant was correct by saying to search No. A, but it required the reasonability of the

officers to ensure that it was sufficiently particular, not some computer database error.

The failure to proactively confirm the search parameters are undesired behaviors of law

enforcement. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can not infringe on an

officer’s duty to discover any problems with the warrant.

The good faith exception requires that preliminary research be complete and

thorough to ensure the warrant is sufficient, and that reliance on the warrant must be

reasonable when presented with the facts of Mr. North’s residence. It was not reasonable

to ignore the indications of multiple units and simply rely on a vague warrant.

B. The Unreasonable Actions of the Police Officers During the Search Should Be Deterred by Prohibiting Seized Evidence.

The officers who searched Mr. North’s apartment recklessly ignored all of the

physical evidence that told them they were beyond the scope of the warrant while


searching. This misconduct needs to be discouraged by excluding any evidence gained

outside of the warrant.

The exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct. Jacobs v. City of

Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 783 (7th Cir. 2000). Additionally, a balancing test of the good

coming from suppressing the evidence must outweigh the damage that would come from

the same. Id. at 909. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909.The standard of reasonability is during the

search is recklessness. Id. at 914. A good faith search still must not infringe on a person’s

expectation of privacy. People v. MacAvoy, 209 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37 (1984). See United

States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976).

Where the harm from seizing invalid evidence outweighs the good coming from it,

it must be excluded. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. In Garrison, the

officers correctly executed the warrant according to its parameters, but discovered there

were two units after entering both. Id. Because there was a common atrium, and both

units were open to that area, the officers entered the opposing doors. Id. at 81. It was not

until after they had seized drug paraphernalia that they noticed the error and discontinued

searching Garrison’s apartment. Id. at 81, 88. The majority opinion determined that the

conduct of the officers followed protocol and they ceased the search as soon as the error

was identified. Id. Excluding the evidence would not bring about any additional good,

and for this reason, the Court determined to allow the evidence they possessed. Id.

The good faith exception does not extend as far as the expectation of privacy

MacAvoy, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 37. In MacAvoy, a college student ordered a drug shipment,

and in transit, a drug dog picked up on the scent. Id. at 37. The officer coordinated a


controlled delivery and produced an affidavit for a warrant to search the addressee’s

fraternity house at the college. Id. The student had been assigned his own room, but the

rest of the amenities were used in common. Id. at 37. The officers searched the apartment

the next day, where they found various drug paraphernalia. Id. The court held that there is

no expectation of privacy in a public housing setting, and therefore no violation of the 4th

Amendment. Id. at 769. The fraternity house remained open to the public, and there was

no check in desk at the front. Id. at 768. Considering the layout, the tenant had little

expectation of privacy until the officers arrived at his door. Id.

Where the exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct, evidence should

always be suppressed if it comes from such behavior. Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d

at 783. In Jacobs officers searched a first floor apartment for a drug dealer, but when he

wasn’t found, they continued searching an upstairs unit where the residents were detained

during a search. The court held that the officer lacked good faith immunity during the

search. Id. Under the 4th Amendment, the officers knew it was unreasonable to search

multiple units of an apartment building. Id. See Higgason, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (Crosby,

J., concurring).

There is no benefit coming from Mr. North’s drug conviction that outweighs the

4th Amendment violation. In Garrison, the officers stopped the search as soon as they

recognized that the two spaces were individual units. They then only focused on the

residence the named party possessed. Even after seeing all repeating amenities, the

officers never stopped their search of No. B. Also the officers communicated to the party

searching the opposing apartment in Garrison. Officer Morris and Officer Blant discussed


that one would search the upstairs unit, and the other the downstairs unit, without

somehow realizing they were searching separate units. In Garrison it would be unjust to

dismiss the evidence that would shut down the operation based on a technicality, but here

the only benefit that came from the search was the precise evidence that was the fruit of

these grievous violations.

The officers met the standards of recklessness needed suppress any evidence they

obtained. In Garrison, the officers entered through a preliminary door to an indoor

common area open to both units. The officers, reasonably assumed it was one location.

Mr. North’s and his brother’s apartments are entirely separated. They have no common

atrium. You must go to the second floor to get to Ronald’s apartment. Mr. North’s door is

down a hall and around a corner, created no line of sight, and they were locked, meaning

there was no interrupted line of travel either.

Mr. North’s unimpeded expectation of privacy prevents the good faith exception

from allowing the evidence. In MacAvoy, the tenant lived in the dorm room of a frat

house. Nearly all elements of the living quarters were in common. Mr. North had entirely

the opposite. Every aspect of his home was separated and independent. There was no

reason for Mr. North to believe that anyone could enter his apartment without his prior

consent. Every door entering his home was locked, and one would have to ring a distant

doorbell for him to come open it. The complete absence of access shows Mr. North

expected privacy within the confines of his home.

Police misconduct would be better deterred by excluding the drug evidence against

Mr. North. In Jacobs, the officers recklessly expanded the scope of their warrant and


began searching another unit, upstairs from the one they were searching. Identically, Mr.

North’s unit was never a part of the warrant, and the officer ignored that the units were

not only on different floors, but had no connections other than an outside gate. Just like

the units in Jacobs, the units were individually marked, each having their own doorbell at

the gate, their own locks, entryways, and their own rights. The law cannot tolerate

misconduct by law enforcement.

When balanced, suppressing the evidence will further law enforcement policies

and guarantee more reasonable searches, thereby preserving a citizen’s right to privacy.

CONCLUSION

In order to maintain the integrity of the 4th Amendment, the good faith exception

must not extend to the level of recklessness this search and seizure demonstrated. For the

foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court of the State of California denying

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence filed pursuant to California Penal Code § 1538.5

should be reversed.

Dated: 2/26/16 Respectfully submitted,

1114

Student ID 1114Counsel for Appellant


CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d), I certify that the Argument section

of Appellant’s Final Appellate Brief complies with the word count requirement and

contains 2500 words total (including its headers) according to the word count feature of

Microsoft Word, the computer program used to prepare the brief.

Respectfully submitted,

1114

Student ID 1114Counsel for Appellant


Documents

Appellate Brief Sp16 1114