1 of 32

2 of 32

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PASTOR DANIEL L. MEIER

Case No. 14-1584

Plaintiff, Lower Ct. No. 13-cv-11921

v.

WILLIAM M. MEGGS STATE ATTORNEY, FL. ET. AL.

Defendant(S).

_________________________________/

PRO SE APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff, Pastor Daniel L. Meier, files this Pro Se Appellant's

Brief on appeal, as support the plaintiff states:

1. This brief is offered as additional pages to the PRO SE

APPELLANT'S BRIEF form attached to the revised briefing schedule dated June

19, 2014 (see schedule). The plaintiff also filed other motions, first of which was

considered the appeal itself. Motion to quash motion for recusal and objection

to order dated 4.21.2014, next was plaintiff's motion for default judgment

which contains proof of service on defendants by U.S. Marshall's service as exhibits

5.30.2014, additionally, the plaintiff's motion for extension of filing time and notice

of retaliatory action by defendants which contains the marital settlement agreement

showing plaintiff has always had "sole custody", an extortion letter dated 4.05.2014

illegally showing the plaintiff as a "non custodial parent" and a follow up

investigation letter showing ex wife's attorney and police "in writing conspiring" to

3 of 32

commit a completely illegal abduction and kidnapping and fabricate fraudulent

charges to facilitate an illegal change in custody by staking out the plaintiff's house,

spying on the plaintiff, accessing charge card information illegally, then illegally

concocting "some sort of felony warrant for the suspect to "avoid any problems"

as they illegally abducted the child, and falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned, and

kidnapped the plaintiff. After all of this, charges were dropped by nolle process as

shown by document of state attorney Meggs. Finally a child abuse investigation

document showing the Mother (Mandy Luttenton) and child's aunt (Amy Olk)

attempting to get the child to take pornographic pictures and displaying lesbian

porn the aunt took of her friend "Michelle" to the child enticing her. This last filing

was dated June 14, 2014. This is just a small sample of the 400 pages of exhibits

that are included to support the facts in the original complaint.

2. Although the court is well aware of many of the definitions, rules,

law and procedure in this case. The plaintiff, for historical documentation and to

make what is happening here entirely clear to any rational person, will address

the judge's order in very specific detail due to the fact there are thousands of

deeply concerned ordinary citizens who are watching this case transpire and want

to understand the outrageous atrocities which are being inflicted on an innocent

child and a father who is a pastor.

DID THE COURT INCORRECTLY DESCRIBE THE FACTS?

Yes.

IF SO, WHAT FACTS?

4 of 32

3. We will begin by defining what a legal fact actually is: Fact

A thing done; an action performed or an Incident transpiring; an event or

circumstance; an actual occurrence. Black's Law Dictionary

4. Order states that the complaint was filed April 2013; the suit

was filed February 2013. Although he states " Plaintiff also filed a motion

requesting the United States Marshall's Service serve process" the fact is that

motion was granted and 10 defendant's and 2 others were served by Marshall's

service March 27, 2014 but, none the less, he attempts to make it appear as a

motion that has not yet been granted by stating he will "deny his motion for

service as moot".

5. The reason for this intentional misrepresentation was that as

judge Carr was drafting the order the defendants clock was ticking on their time

to file a response which they were obligated to do by law within 20 days from

service. Problem is, the motion and service had already been granted and completed.

So, his denial of the motion after being granted as moot after service is itself moot;

and his behavior is an intentional obstruction to allowing the case to proceed in

the normal mode.

6. Although 28 U.S. Code § 1915 - Proceedings in forma pauperis

states e(2) court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

He never states that the facts alleged by the plaintiff, and flagged by the D.C. court

5 of 32

as stating a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim(s), were incorrect or untrue. There is no true

reasoned opinion from Judge Carr, because the order itself is a complete outrageous

fraud and obstruction of justice. He never states with supporting reference that

the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S. Code § 1915 (d) states…same remedies shall be available as are

provided for by law in other cases. But this order is denying full and fair access.

'7. Judge Carr intentionally misstates the facts stating it "appears that

….plaintiff was arrested in Michigan". This is factually misleading as the plaintiff

was "illegally" arrested on "fraudulent" charges. Plaintiff's exhibits offer irrefutable

supporting documents to support this fact and a written "meeting of the minds".

of the conspirators in so perfecting the proof of the fact.

Supporting Factual Positions.

Rule 56 C(1) (A) (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers, or other materials…..

8. Did the plaintiff provide evidence in support of factual positions

as a matter of law by providing exhibits of documents with declarations:

(law) "unsworn statement that can be admitted in evidence in a legal transaction",

stipulations : (law) an agreement or concession made by parties in a judicial

proceeding (or by their attorneys) relating to the business before the court and

admissions: (law) An acknowledgment of the truth of something? The answer to

anyone of a reasonable mind is yes, the exhibits and facts do provide such evidence.

6 of 32

9. Then Carr states "plaintiff "alleges" that his arrest was a byproduct

of a "conspiracy" between numerous local, state, and federal law enforcement

officials". Lets look at the definition of allege: (Make an accusation or assertion

without any proof). Did the plaintiff provide any "proof" of defendants conspiring?

This is a clip of a portion of one exhibit 5 showing Leon county, Oakland county

Florida, and Michigan authorities conspiring to "take the child" illegally.

10. So, the child was "not in any danger" and they wanted to secure

"some type of felony warrant" although no felony was committed and the father

has "sole custody". The definition of conspiring is (Act in unison or agreement and

in secret towards a deceitful or illegal purpose). This is precisely per se what any

reasonable mind would agree was happening here is conspiring to commit a

completely illegal abduction and fraud upon the court. Below is a clip from exhibit

1 in the complaint for the custody order and final ratification.

7 of 32

4 COA2d 517

PRIMA FACIE CASE (As it seems at first sight)

• In order to establish a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must prove:

1. an association of two or more persons

2. an unlawful objective

3. an agreement or understanding with regard to the objective and

the manner in which it was to be achieved

4. commission of an unlawful, overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy and

5. injury as a result of the overt act (taking child is malice per se)

(also see abuse of process 20 Causes of Action 223 (2006))

11. Statute of limitations 6.1 exceptions: Fraud upon the Court

In the United States, when an officer of the court is found to have fraudulently

presented facts to court so that the court is impaired in the impartial performance

of its legal task, the act, known as "fraud upon the court", is a crime deemed so

severe and fundamentally opposed to the operation of justice that it is not subject

to any statute of limitation.

12. What is Fraud upon the court? In Bulloch v. United States, the

court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial

machinery itself .. It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or

influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function—

thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.

A fraud on the court must constitute egregious misconduct such as bribery of a

judge or jury or fabrication of evidence by counsel. We have fabrication right here,

8 of 32

in the conspiring to create what ultimately became the illegal grand theft warrant.

13. Is a court(s) conspiring to commit an illegal kidnapping, abduction,

press false felony charges on fraudulently presented facts while influencing other

jurisdictions to where the judge does not perform his judicial function fraud? Any

reasonable mind would say yes by definition. In that, for a court to commit an illegal

act, it can only be accomplished through a fraud against the judicial machinery

designed to prevent illegal acts. Otherwise the courts would be a RICO criminal

enterprise (Carry on illegal business activities involving crime), which is true here.

14. So what is needed to present a fraud? To satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b),

a plaintiff must allege the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation

on which he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the

defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud. The rule requires that the

circumstances of the fraud, and not the evidence of the case, be pleaded with

particularity. The reliance is for a court to be just and not commit illegal acts and

the rest is abundantly clear and even above the requirements. The circumstances

and evidence are plead with particularity (pertaining to a specific case or instance)

continuing to this day. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) does not require a plaintiff to be

omniscient (all knowing). The main purpose behind Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) is to provide

the defendant with notice of the plaintiff's claim so that the defendant may prepare

an informed responsive pleading. It appears all requirements have been met.

15. Statute of limitations exception 6.2 Crimes against humanity part

either of a government policy (although the perpetrators need not identify

themselves with this policy) or of a wide practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned

9 of 32

by a government or a de facto authority. This is another exception applicable here.

It is grotesquely inhuman to take a person's child illegally subject that child to

sexual abuse, cover up the abuse, deny a father his ability to protect his child,

extort tens of thousands of dollars from him, then block him from ever seeing her

again in conjunction with extreme alienation and defamation tactics, without any

kind of hearing and completely out of political motives. It is in fact a murderous

undertaking of illegal oppression and the most cruel and unusual punishment;

all without legal cause.

16. Judge Carr states there were "irregularities in the assessment and

collection of plaintiff's child support payments", This is an intentional trivializing

of the outrageous extortion (Unjust exaction as by the misuse of authority) of

someone who by law had sole custody, and did not even require the ex- wife to pay

child support. It is illegal for a father with sole legal custody to be forced to pay

child support to those who kidnapped his child illegally. She is over 21 years old,

and derives no benefit from the illegal extortion and insane illegal alienation.

A section of the exhibit 1 is attached showing the MSA agreement.

17. This extortion is continuing to this day, even though it is completely

illegal. There is no end to the illegal acts of extortion even while the plaintiff

is illegally denied contact. The daughter is afraid of the Mother and what she has

10 of 32

been allowed to get away with and lives in fear of seeing her own father to this day.

There are arbitrary and illegal garnishment and income tax intercepts which were

never before the court, plaintiff was never provided a hearing, and they continue

to this day. Attached is a clip from a recent extortion letter (ex C on mot. for ext.)

6.14.2014 which illegally shows the father as "non custodial" by complete fraud.

18. Judge car then states "Florida officials permitted ex wife and her

mother to abuse his daughter" This is partially correct, but again misleading, it

is the Mother, her aunt (Amy), and the Grandmother. But, one legal offense is

obstruction of justice by Florida authorities in arbitrarily ignoring child abuse.

Below is an excerpt from the police interview with plaintiff's daughter

(ex G on mot. for ext., 15 on complaint)

19. The plaintiff had a personal meeting with Defendant Willie Meggs

(Florida State Attorney) about this incident and the specifics are cited in the

11 of 32

complaint, as well as Meggs admissions of his illegal wrongdoing in the original

abduction and kidnapping which set the stage for this criminal act to happen to

the child. You can see that the interviewing officer considered it serious enough

to call the child abuse hotline; so the obstruction was with Meggs. So, again,

the plaintiff is not making "allegations" but stating "facts" supported by irrefutable

documentary evidence and "proof".

20. Carr then states " Florida officials conspired with his ex wife to goad

plaintiff into physically attacking her and others". This is again intentionally

misleading as the plaintiff was attacked several times by the ex wife and others

and threatened by Sheriff Campbell who admitted he was behind it. Ex wife was on

probation for the same kind of thing when they conspired with her to abduct the

child illegally. Assistant State attorney then also denies plaintiff equal protection.

12 of 32

21. Documented here is the intentional lying by defendant about a court

order not being followed; and proof by the police report and again the Assistant

state attorney allowing the plaintiff to be attacked. Then the ASA illegally playing

judge an jury by making conclusionary judgments on what a jury might find

"compelling" and arbitrarily and illegally granting immunity for criminal acts.

22. Judge then completely misrepresents DHS actions and admissions

of knowledge by plaintiff's supervisor. See complaint paragraphs 39-41

23. For obviously dubious reasons judge Carr never once mentions the

illegal attack on the plaintiff at his home by Southfield Police in retaliation of filing

the original suit which was also composed of another attack, beating, attempted

murder, false arrest, false imprisonment, and fraudulent felony charges on February

29, 2008 which went to jury trial. The prosecutor lost, and this was only a few years

ago. The police officer admitted he was arresting the plaintiff for "nothing" Comp.

par. 179, 188. Illegal bond set at 150,000 dollars and after the jury states "not

guilty" the prosecutor yells at the jury " but he's suing the FBI" and that is a fact not

an allegation. To any rational person this represents proof to make inference to the

13 of 32

basis for the insane, illegal, arbitrary attack and ridiculous and unconstitutional

bond.

24. Next , and no less directly in conflict with reality, is the Judges

statement that "Plaintiff has also filed a series of lawsuits against Detroit Diesel,

none of these has been successful". That statement is a complete falsity. The

defendant, Bill Altman, early on admitted that the plaintiff won. The one claim

by "default" Altman stated, they would "probably give you that one" on appeal.

25. The plaintiff's statements must be taken as true and the plaintiff

filed a complaint with a demand for jury trial. The plaintiff stated in the complaint

"The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to 2.116(C)(10) and

won as a matter of law, but was denied a decision in his favor." Taken as true, this

states a claim on which relief can be granted, a proper decision. This is resolved

through an examination of the court record for fraud. There are 24 counts of

violations on the complaint none of which the Judge denies with specificity.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may granted, a court must accept the facts

pled by the plaintiff as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int'l

Telecomms. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.1992).

26. We must also consider the continuing acts which are occurring right

now as this case is being obstructed by Judge Carr and as defendant Judge Cleland

has again tried to have the case assigned to him but was stopped by the appeal.

DO YOU THINK THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE WRONG LAW?

Yes.

27. The first citing that the Judge uses as support, without reasoning,

14 of 32

is "I may also dismiss clearly unfounded complaints" Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468

,470 (6th Cir.2010); as applied to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Is this a full and fair citing to be

reasonably applied in the instant case? This citing is conclusionary and only leaves

one to guess at the application. What does unfounded mean? It means "without

basis in reason or fact." The Judge does not state any of the alleged facts or

documented factual evidence which he is disputing, or which of the 400 pages of

exhibits and personal admissions in writing he considers relevant to the citing.

28. The statement used by the judge to refer to the case being cited

"I may also dismiss clearly unfounded complaints" does not show up in the citing

at all. As a matter of fact, the final disposition is "The court reversed the decision to

dismiss the prisoner's complaint, vacated the judgment entered in favor of the

officials, and remanded for further proceedings." Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468

29. There is one component we can guess he is referring to and it is this:

The prisoner also alleged two adverse actions regarding the segregation and transfer

recommendation by the officials, even though the district court was correct in

disregarding one factually frivolous allegation that the lock-down staff would have

assaulted him. However, that frivolous claim did not affect the remaining

nonfrivolous allegations . This shows each claim reviewed separately, why not here?.

30. Plaintiff has no such allegations of possible future events and frame

of mind assumptions but we do have facts and irrefutable evidence in writing. Court

states: The allegations in Hill's complaint sufficiently state a First Amendment

retaliation claim , especially in light of the "indulgent treatment" that "[c]ourts are

15 of 32

instructed to give . . . to the 'inartfully [**8] pleaded' allegations of pro se

litigants." Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App'x 981, 986 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972)). In Pasley, this

court concluded that the facts alleged in the prisoner's complaint contained the

"elements" of a First Amendment retaliation claim even though the prisoner did not

make an effective argument for that claim in his original complaint or in his

appellate brief. Id. Hill similarly fails to explicitly state that he is making a First

Amendment retaliation claim, but he alleges that the prison staff at McCreary

placed him in segregated housing and recommended that he be transferred to

the lock-down unit at Lewisburg in for the grievances that he filed against

the prison staff. These facts contain the "essential elements" of a First Amendment

retaliation claim.

31. Although Hill, a pro se plaintiff, did not explicitly state he was

making a first amendment retaliation claim the court sua sponte held "facts contain

the essential elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim". This is how pro

se plaintiff's are supposed to be treated based on the facts if taken as true even

if he is not, in the courts opinion, "making an effective argument". In other

words, the court established that even if a pro se plaintiff did not explicitly state

a claim on which relief could be granted, if the facts alleged in that complaint

taken as true state a claim on which relief can be granted the court will recognize

that claim. This is a logical conclusion, if the primary goal is the preservation

and recognition of the rights of citizens based on the facts and applying the law

to those facts. Plaintiff requests this doctrine be applied in the instant case also

16 of 32

which may provide recognition of the elements of the offenses even if not explicitly

stated, rather than oppressing the plaintiff with obstructionary antics like Carr.

32. This is precisely why the plaintiff is filing this case pro se, to

demonstrate to the citizens of this country what a fraud upon the court looks

like when a judge, like judge Carr, conspires to conceal illegal acts in the most

obvious and extreme case of government corruption. Judge Carr has chosen

to go down in history along with Cleland as the poster children for federal

judicial corruption and tyranny. This is a text book example of how it is done.

33. The Judge then cites " a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face" Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). Again, this another bald application and one is

left only to guess how the citing is relevant to dismiss the instant case since there is

no reasoned opinion. We again have to examine the case to see if there is any

relevance at all. We find only support for the instant complaint stating a valid claim.

34. in paragraphs 7-11 we established the definition of facts and

the irrefutable evidence by the plaintiff that even show, beyond question, a

"meeting of the minds" of the defendants while, by definition, "conspiring" by fact.

So, taken as true are these plausible? What is the definition of plausible?

Plausible: Apparently reasonable and valid, and truthful. So is a truth that has

been proven by fact plausible? By definition, it is impossible for it not to be.

35. The Court in Iqbal reiterated that "the pleading standard Rule 8

announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than

17 of 32

'an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.'" (52) Thus, .

Iqbal established the most current precedent for courts to follow when making the

determination as to whether a plaintiffs allegations in the complaint are able to

survive a motion to dismiss. However, many courts have implied the plausibility

standard is not strictly adhered to when ruling on a pro se complaint's ability to

survive a motion to dismiss. So why then is this pro se plaintiff being arbitrarily

treated with misrepresentations, hypercritical conclusionary statements, and

deliberate indifference without a proper reasoned opinion by judge Carr?

36. Unlike the plaintiff, Iqbal had no written document admissions

of the specific acts upon which he was basing his claims, he had no personal

meetings with the defendants in which admissions were made as to illegal

behavior as the plaintiff does here. This supports factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim that is more than plausible. There is no case law to the contrary.

37. The judge cites "Although Rule 8 does not require detailed

factual allegations, it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff

armed with nothing more than conclusions" Porche Cars N. Am., Inc., 880 F.

Supp 2d 801,814(S.D. Ohio 2012). Is this a fair citing to allege the 119 page

complaint with 400 pages of "exhibits" has only conclusions? It is unprecedented

and outrageous to even propose such a ridiculous application without specificity.

It is simply unbelievable and maliciously deceptive as this complaint has nothing

to do with PCNA coolant tubes, or safety of those left stranded on the road by a

defective automotive warranty component.

38. We have already established the factual allegation component has

18 of 32

been satisfied, so therefore any conclusions made are based on facts and evidence

and are "more than conclusions"; "proof" of which is the detailed "factual findings".

There is no specific item referenced by the judge to support his citing leaving

the plaintiff to guess at the misapplied reasoning since none is given.

39. He then goes on to cite, again completely without specificity,

application, or reasoning. Plaintiff's obligation "to provide the grounds to his

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulistic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley

550 U.S. 544,555 (2007). There is no reasoned opinion because there is "no reason"

and it, like the other citings, does not apply any. This is why a proper opinion has

a "reasoned opinion" so it is not deceptive or misleading in a material way as Carr's.

40. Twombly suggested that wholly conclusionary complaints, devoid of

factual allegations, were insufficient. See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955

1964–65 & n.3 (2007) (indicating that a modicum of facts is required to ensure

adequate notice, if nothing else). Likewise, under Twombly, a plaintiff cannot turn

inadequate factual allegations (parallel business conduct) into a valid claim by

coupling them with an assertion of wrongdoing (agreement, but resting entirely

on the allegations of parallel conduct). The complaint has this covered by exhibits.

41. In Twombly we have the proposition of something happening or

a "meeting of the minds" which is purely conclusionary; in conjunction with what,

in the environment, could be part of normal business operations. The assertion of

wrongdoing is undocumented, the proof of which would rest on discovery. In

19 of 32

the instant case, we need no discovery, we already have irrefutable evidence and

proof in writing. In many cases, the documents are actually notarized and or signed,

or there are entire courts cases hinging on fraud with a record to examine as proof.

42. Par. 21 (exhibit clip) shows through the police officer's own check

of the court record, that there was no history of the plaintiff kidnapping the

daughter violating a court order as alleged by defendant and found to be a "lie"

in support of the initial (and continuing) fraud upon the court. She and other

defendants were the ones who did the illegal kidnapping. No judge in their right

mind would even consider a statute of limitations to support an ongoing kidnapping

and extortion, and if they do, they are every bit a party to the illegal ongoing acts.

43. We must clarify the concept of "conclusionary" as cited by the court

which is coming to a "conclusion" without sufficient factual allegations. This does

not allow the perversion of the term to include all conclusions are "wrong" just

because they are by the plaintiff. If this was the case, there would never be a

complaint because no one would be allowed to come to the conclusion that they

had been wronged and entitled to relief as a matter of law. While legal conclusions

can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual

allegations….a court should assume their veracity (quality of being correct or true)

Twombly., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. If factual allegations alone

are to be taken as true, in the instant case, isn't the requirement of assumption

of truth even more fully reinforced with the factual, documentary, undeniable,

evidence presented in the original complaint?

44. If the plaintiff's allegation is considered to be general, yet the

20 of 32

evidence shown in a complaint as an exhibit supports the allegation and elaborates

and expounds on the allegation with very intricate and specific details, is that not

also to be considered a part of the plausibility or reasonable inference of pleading

as a whole? Must the obvious be restated twice in order not to be ignored?

Court...should view each allegation in the context of the entire

complaint to determine whether a plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to support his or her claim. See In re Polyurethane Foam

Antitrust Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (N.D. Ohio 2011)

45. Pro se plaintiff's complaint's, if construed liberally, prevent a judge

from using hyper critical misrepresentations and ignoring the facts to punish

pro se plaintiff's arbitrarily by hinging their rights or the denial of them on the

pleading alone rather that the facts. This is so common sense, rather than

prejudice, prevails. Also, in the interest of justice, the judge has the flexibility to

request more facts or evidence or a more definite statement before making

an arbitrary adverse judgment without context and devoid of common sense such

as judge Carr's improper order.

PLEADING §103

Importantly, said the Court, plausibility is not an invitation for

judges to engage in probabilistic reasoning to weed out improbable,

but well-pleaded complaints..Determining whether a claim is

plausible is a “contextspecific task” requiring the exercise of

“judicial experience and common sense".

46. To provide an example of a "label", it is precisely to prevent what

judge Carr did when he "certified" that the appeal was taken in "bad faith".

This is again done through fraud upon the court. It is the process of certification,

which if denied, is no real certification but a "label". Just as if you buy a certified

21 of 32

used car; if they put the certification sticker on it without the requisite inspection,

which is a component of the certification, it is just a label and not entitled to be

a representation of the actual reality. Judge Carr's certification is not valid

because the process was not accomplished, nor intended to be, and is only a "label"

intended to be used for an ulterior motive, to deny the plaintiff's due process rights

regardless of the facts or evidence. A fraud cannot be given full faith and credit.

47. Judge Carr then states "plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy these

standards, and none of his allegations suggests he has a plausible claim against

any of the defendants". Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. Of Educ, 76F. 3d 716

(6th cir. 1996). Still, he never states what the unwarranted legal conclusions

may be and the application of the ones which are supposedly warranted.

48. Lillard case was a high school gym teacher who was accused of

sexual harassment and verbal abuse in the context of coaching girls soccer.

Outcome: The court reversed and remanded the portion of the district court's

order which dismissed the claims filed by plaintiffs…

49. Although a part of the overall context of illegal behavior, in addition

to that, each defendant(s) in the instant case can be held independently and wholly

accountable for their own illegal actions, which would be irrelevant to the school

boards possible vicarious liabilities. If that is where he was attempting to go with it,

we can only guess unless he is alluding to an inappropriate COA course he was

recommending to misinterpret.

50. Also cited was Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.25,32 (1992) as

"case subject to summary dismissal "when facts alleged rise to the level of the

22 of 32

irrational or wholly incredible"". Again, we are left with no notice of how to apply

citing except to deny its application as irrelevant as a negative citing. But, also

as supporting the complaint by other reference to requirements that are supported

in stating a claim which it satisfies; because it is not irrational or wholly incredible

to provide documentary exhibits and "proof" of illegal acts in support of the

complaint; which is what we have here, as the judge never denies the evidence.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)

("Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief

of a complaint's factual allegations"). "The sole exception to this rule lies with

allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about

little green men, or the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time

travel. That is not what we have here."

51. The Denton case, the inmate had filed five civil rights suits in forma

pauperis claiming that he was drugged and raped by inmates and the prison

officials at various institutions. Outcome: remanded the case for application of the

proper standard of review. It was remanded even without documentary evidence.

52. The judge then states "despite the general allegation there is an

ongoing conspiracy….the events recounted by plaintiff occurred well beyond

applicable statute of limitations". The mail fraud and extortion in this case are

immediately current, just to cite two, documented with proof to the COA in

the motion with notice of retaliatory action. Plaintiff's allegations throughout the

complaint are very specific and precise with dates, times, violations, names, and

23 of 32

in many cases written proof. We are only left to guess what is being considered

"general".

53. Despite the judges general allegations that events are beyond

applicable statute of limitations, he makes no denial of the continuing acts, or

his and other fraud upon the court, which are exceptions to the statutes. He

provides no reasoning why these doctrines exist (and are cited in complaint) only

to be arbitrarily, and unfairly, ignored in their application and provided as remedies

to others and not the plaintiff on a full, fair, and equal basis.

54. Next the judge goes on to state "even if the plaintiff had stated

a plausible claim….that was not obviously barred by judicial immunity, sovereign

immunity, res judicata, and the Rooker Feldman-doctrine, his claims are clearly

untimely."

55. So, here we are again, left only to guess at the application of law

to the 119 page complaint with 400 pages of exhibits. He may be referring to

what the complaint itself already addressed and his indiscretion is in facts not

being taken as true as is required. Plaintiff allegation of fraud upon the court must

be taken as true; although the legal conclusions may or may not, but that is for a

jury to decide upon examination of the record.

56. Does judicial, sovereign, or any immunity allow someone, a judge,

a lawyer, or a prosecutor immunity to kill or kidnap someone and the just proclaim

"immunity" as they go on a rampage? Would the people say, "oh just let him go

he's a judge you know ….they do that sometimes". Would this make sense to a

reasonable person that a judge be immune to being held responsible for illegal,

24 of 32

criminal acts? Of course that lacks common sense. Would then another judge who

intentionally blocks the case holding the first accountable be any less a criminal?

In addition to the prosecutor who initiates criminal proceedings,

a person who "procures" a criminal proceeding may be liable for

malicious prosecution. In fact, those who procure malicious

prosecutions are usually the only potential defendants because

as a general rule prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity.

Moore v. U.S., 213 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

male deputy jailer did not have official immunity from female

inmate claim that he committed assault and battery upon her;

guard alleged conduct, placing finger in inmate vagina, allowed

inference that guard was acting with actual malice or intent to

cause harm, precluding immunity. Hammond v. Gordon County,

316 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (N.D. Ga. 2002)

Allegations that prison nurse knew sent prisoner back to cell

without providing treatment were sufficient to state a claim for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, for purpose of

determining whether nurse was entitled to qualified immunity

from § 1983 liability. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006)

Inmate negligence action against various employees of the State

Department of Corrections, after he went to prison facility first-aid

room complaining of a cough and was given what appeared to be

cough syrup, but which in fact contained chemical substance

generally found in cleaning fluid, was not barred by doctrine of

sovereign immunity. Bandfield v. Wood, 421 Mich. 774, 364 N.W.

2d 280 (1985)

Denial of a qualified-immunity claim can fall within the narrow

class of prejudgment orders reviewable under the collateral-order

doctrine [*663] so long as the order "turns on an issue of law.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L.

Ed. 2d 411.

57. In a similar situation plaintiff states in complaint he was poisoned

by jail employees who forced plaintiff to eat food he was allergic to or starve

causing a severe and life threatening allergic reaction. This is actually far worse

25 of 32

than the case law that overcomes sovereign immunity. In addition to the x rays, and

injection of allergens Doc. Par. 220, 224,227, 235. This was done with intentional,

willful or wanton negligence or performed with deliberate indifference or

reckless disregard for the plaintiff, or malicious intent. Why else would situations

like this even occur they are so outrageous and unusual. Is it a fact that the

plaintiff was beaten, choked, tasered, and nearly killed by the Southfield police

as the plaintiff states in his complaint; then found not to have been guilty of any

of the felonies they fabricated illegally? It is a matter of court record and is far

worse than what the prison guard did as referenced above which supported "actual

malice with intent to cause harm, precluding immunity" (make impossible).

CJS JUDGMENTS § 782 XXI. Res Judicata

§ 782. Considerations of fairness and justice

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, being an equitable

doctrine, as discussed supra § 779, will generally be applied

only where no unfairness or injustice results.[FN45] So, even if

the elements of the doctrine are otherwise met, a court may still

deny application of the doctrine where such application would

be fundamentally unfair.

58. Generally a judgment may be subject to collateral attack

only on specified grounds, such as that the judgment is void due to the court's

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties; or that the court

lacks the inherent power to make or enter the judgment or order involved,

such that the judgment is absolutely null and not res judicata; or that the

court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. 47 Am. Jur. 2d

Judgments § 750

59. Now lets address the res judicata and see if it is fair to be applied

26 of 32

here. It is neither statutorily nor constitutionally mandated that this doctrine be

applied and is discretionary to not apply this doctrine. Is it "fair" that the same

identical acts found to state a claim for others are not allowed the same

consideration for this plaintiff as a pastor and father?

60. Is it fair to allow a people working in the government to kidnap

the plaintiff's child and never let him see her again when he always had legal

sole custody or to beat him nearly to death? It says that the doctrine is to be

applied "only where no unfairness or injustice results" or else it would be an abuse

of discretion. Isn't this abuse of discretion with manifest injustice? This goes to

the core civil rights of all citizens not just the plaintiff or his abused daughter.

61. Next he cites the Rooker Feldman doctrine, in another non specific

general assertion. None the less we will examine the doctrine for relevancy.

First we will consider that any state court action which is void by fraud upon the

court as was mentioned before is 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶

60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the

court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." A court

cannot have a defacto federal review of a state court decision if the decision

is not "in essence a decision at all and never becomes final". Which is

precisely what happened as none of the prior decisions are valid due to fraud

upon the court, therefore; Rooker Feldman has no teeth in the instant case.

62. Lastly, the judge attempts to deny justice by citing Castillo v.

Grogan,52 F. App'x 750,751 96th Cir 2002). One can only guess at what the

intended application is, as this case was not one of fraud upon the court or

27 of 32

continuing acts but of application of proper venue to an assault and battery.

63. Castillo alleged that on June 27, 2000, the defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights when they beat him, sprayed him with pepper spray,

and threatened to shoot him while transporting him from a jail in Nevada to one

in California. The alleged attack took place in Oregon. In the instant case, the

plaintiff was also tasered twice with 400,000 volts, choked and nearly killed, was

not a prisoner, and was found not guilty of resisting the illegal arrest by a jury

even though the sergeant lied to the jury by fraud. Who has the stronger claim

if both plaintiff's were beat up illegally?

64. Moreover, in Castillo the court cites an exception to the statute of

limitations and found: "Upon review, we conclude that the district court erred by

sua sponte dismissing Castillo's action as barred by Tennessee's statute of

limitations" and found in favor of the plaintiff. Since the incident happened in

Oregon the statute of limitations of that state was the one to be applied.

65. The court held: " Sua sponte dismissal of Castillo's complaint

as frivolous was not appropriate because the statute of limitations defense is not

obvious from the face of the complaint." This is also true of the plaintiff's

case now. They applied Oregon law as the exception to time barred and we apply

clear, and continuing acts and fraud upon the court to overcome any time bar.

66. Even if a statute of limitations did apply in the instant case, given

the allegations of fraud upon the court, its application was "not sufficiently obvious

to merit sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915", just as in Castillo.

28 of 32

67. OUTCOME: The court vacated the district court's order and

remanded the case for further proceedings. Should this plaintiff have the same

rights?

68. It is only fair that we provide the court a foundation in which to

hold fast to the doctrine of fraud upon the court as an exception to any time

bar. As such, we cite the following: Herrington v. United States 424 F.3d 384; 2005.

Plaintiff widow and the heirs of two other widows filed an action to set aside

a 57-year-old "settlement agreement" on the grounds that it was procured

by fraud upon the court. That is correct, a "57 year old settlement agreement"

69. Did the court throw this case out as time barred? No, they

examined the case to see if there was in fact a "fraud upon the court" 57 years

ago, which may have denied them their rights. What was the alleged fraud

that rose to the level of consideration 57 years later? It was simply the allegation

that the government fraudulently misrepresented the nature of the reason for

not providing enough information in 1948. This allegation stated a claim for relief

sufficient for the court to investigate the fraud for a "settlement agreement" but,

according to Carr, an illegal and continuing felony kidnapping and extortion

by the government is not a claim? What kind of an psychopath would deny the

more obvious complaint of the governments egregious violations of human rights?

70. The court examined the case to see if there was a fraud upon the

court and did not dismiss it as res judicata, or sovereign immunity but reviewed

the case stating: "The court rejected the Government's argument that an abuse

of discretion standard of review was appropriate and instead reviewed de novo."

29 of 32

The fraud is the main focus in seeking justice, not the passage of time to cover it

up, it is axiomatic. The potential for "sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming"

discovery, Twombly, at 560, n 6, 167 L. Ed. 2d, at 943, is no reason to throw the

baby out with the bathwater.

71. In order to meet the necessarily demanding standard for proof of

fraud upon the court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

concludes that there must be: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the

court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.

The Third Circuit further concludes that a determination of fraud on the court

may be justified only by the most egregious misconduct directed to the court

itself, and that it must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.

72. In this brief alone, we have proof of a prima facie case of fraud

upon the court: We have a father with sole custody, proof of illegal charges, proof

of conspiring to concoct these charges illegally by an officer of the court, deception

of the court in another jurisdiction with the fraudulent charges, and the police

officer stating there was no violation of court order by the father. Which is worse,

an alleged lie about specifications of a plane, or a proven (with written

documentation) conspired illegal kidnapping, abduction, extortion, false arrest,

false imprisonment, and fraud upon the court which continues to this day? (See

paragraphs 9-21 in this appellate brief). This is only a fraction of the proof available

referenced in the original complaint with 400 pages of exhibits. Is the plaintiff

entitled to relief from illegal judgments as everyone else is? Would a reasonable

30 of 32

person conclude that defendants should be held liable for the illegal continuing

insane acts which shock the conscience of everyone who hears of them?

IF SO, WHAT LAW DO YOU WANT APPLIED?

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Herrington v. United States 424 F.3d 384; 2005.

Castillo v. Grogan,52 F. App'x 750,751 96th Cir 2002)

47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 750

7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23

CJS JUDGMENTS § 782 XXI. Res Judicata § 782. Con.of fairness and justice

Bandfield v. Wood, 421 Mich. 774, 364 N.W.2d 280 (1985)

Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006)

Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (N.D. Ohio 2011)

Hammond v. Gordon County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (N.D. Ga. 2002)

Moore v. U.S., 213 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 1964–65 & n.3 (2007)

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d (6th Cir.2010);

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int'l Telec. Sat Org., 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.1992).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

Rule 56 C(1) (A) (A)

RICO 18 U.S.C. ch. 96 §§ 1961-1968

Levine v. United States, 362 U.S.610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960),

Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972)

Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App'x 981, 986 (6th Cir. 2009)

PLEADING §103

Outlaw v. U.S., C.C.A.5 (Tex.) 1936, 81 F.2d 805 (omnibus)

89 A.L.R.2d 1258

4 COA2d 517

Brown v Johnston, 675 FSupp 287 (WD Pa 1987)

20 Causes of Action 223 (2006)

Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 2003)

Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Kan. 2001)

Phillips v. Ingham County, 371 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Mich. 2005)

Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 416 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

Jensen v. Barlas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Iowa 2006)

Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398.

Millbrook v. United States, 11-10362. (2013)

Tullis v. UMB Bank, N.A., 515 F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2008)

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)

RAJ Partners, Ltd. v. Darco Const. Corp., 217 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2006).

Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 2004).

Truax v. Corrigan (1921) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)

31 of 32

DO YOU FEEL THERE ARE ANY OTHER REASONS WHY

THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT IS WRONG?

Yes.

IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY?

Specified above, space limits further elaboration.

WHAT SPECIFIC ISSUES DO YOU WISH TO RAISE ON APPEAL?

Fraud upon the court, abuse of discretion and others above.

WHAT ACTION DO YOU WANT THE COURT OF APPEALS

TO TAKE IN THIS CASE?

Plaintiff requests of the honorable court that the case be

remanded for further proceedings of complaint's, and the above referenced

offenses, and for review of prior proceedings for fraud upon the court and Judge

Carr be recused for abuse of discretion, fraud upon the court, and conflict of

interest (see motion for default). Many feel Carr should be disbarred immediately

for this outrageous intentional cover up of on-going illegal activity.

July 14, 2014 Respectfully Submitted,

Pastor Daniel L. Meier

31505 Grand River Ave.

Suite 9E

Farmington, Michigan

48336

(313)303-6093

32 of 32