APPEASEMENT AND THE SPIRAL MODEL

Topics #17-18

Two Theories of War & Peace• There are, roughly speaking, two distinct theories as to why

wars break out, despite their often devastating effects on both sides.– Both theories pertain primarily to the nature of the

international system, • i.e., both are primarily “third image” theories in the sense of

Waltz, Man, the State, and War.

• The two theories are:– The Appeasement / Deterrence Failure Theory of War ,

• which proposes essentially that international relations is a big Game of Chicken

– The Spiral Model Theory of War(“Security Dilemma” plus “Excitation”)• which proposes essentially that international relations is a big

Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.

Appeasement• For nation D to (try to) appease nation A in order to avoid

armed conflict may be a sensible strategy, – if the value of the prize to D is relatively small, and (especially)– if giving A the prize will actually appease A.

• Domestic democratic politics is in large measure the politics of appeasement– of interest groups, voting blocs, etc.

• But even here there is an argument against “appeasement.”– A strategic analysis of the proverb: “The squeaky wheel gets the

grease.”• In a game against nature, the proverb provides good advise.• But in a game against rational self-interested players,

– greasing squeaky wheels may cause more wheels to squeak, – so maybe you shouldn’t grease squeaky wheels in the first

place.• Or disciplining a five-year old child?

Appeasement (cont.)• In Britain in the mid-1930s, “appeasement” (of Hitler’s

Germany) was widely (though not universally) regarded as a high-minded, praiseworthy, and peace-preserving policy.

• “Appeasement” of Germany was widely discredited only after Hitler violated the Munich agreement in March 1939,– when it became reasonably clear that he could not be

appeased.• Of course, the earlier appeasement of Hitler may have made

him less appeasable later.

The Appeasement Theory of War• The risk of war arises when

– an aggressor nation A (that wants to change the status quo) believes that – status quo nation D is weak in

• military capability or (especially) • willingness to use that capability.

– A tests D’s resolve with respect to some minor prize.– If D gives in,

• especially if D threatens to fight to deny the prize to A but does not carry out its deterrent threat when it fails,

• D loses not only the prize but reputation and future credibility,• which encourages A to press other claims against D (and perhaps other nations) even

more boldly.– At some point, D recognizes this pattern and resolves to stand firm the next

time.• But D’s threat is no longer credible to A,• so A attacks once again, so• A may be surprised when D actually carries out its threat and • war breaks out as a result of deterrence failure.

– The implication is that D should have carried out its deterrent threat in the first instance.

The Appeasement Theory of War (cont.)• The story of the origins of WWII in Europe is pretty much a

poster-child for the appeasement theory of war.• The US (and its allies) have experienced several more recent

instances of costly deterrence failure.– Would North Korea invaded have invaded South Korea (or

been permitted to do by the SU and/or China) in 1950 if the US had made a specific threat to respond in the way it actually did respond?• Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s speech regarding the US’s “defense

perimeter” in East Asia.

– Would Iraq have invaded Kuwait in 1990 if the US had made a credible deterrent threat to respond in the way that it actually did respond?

The “Security Dilemma”• The “Spiral Model” theory begins with the “security dilemma”

(John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age).• There are two nations A and B,

– of roughly equal military and economic strength.• Neither has aggressive intentions against the other, but

– each has a prudent regard for its own national security.– Each nation undertakes some defensive measures,

– because neither can be sure about the peaceful intentions of the other,

• Some of defensive measures are pretty clearly not threatening to the other nation,• e.g., fortifications and other static defenses,

• Other defensive measures may be (inadvertently) threatening to the other country,• in that they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (“dual use”)

purposes,• e.g., building up the size of an army.

– Such measures undertaken by each side generates some fear on the other side,• prompting a further military build-up on each side.

“Security Dilemma” (cont.)

• In general, as each nation tries to enhance its national security, it also tends inadvertantly to threaten the national security of the other nation.

• So we get – something of an arms race between A and B– rising tensions between A and B, and – the possibility of actual war breaking out between A and B.

• This results, not from aggressive intentions on either side, but from a reasonable regard for national security in an anarchic international system.

• The severity of a security dilemma between A and B depends on:– the degree of equality (of potential military capacity) between A and B;

– the state of technology, which determines • the balance between offensive capabilities• the degree to which offensive and defensive capabilities are distinguishable, and

– the geographical proximity of the two nations.

“Security Dilemma” (cont.)– The US was fortunate to be hardly confronted by a security

dilemma throughout much of its history,– due to its geographical isolation (before bombers and missiles) from other

great powers.– [Canada and Mexico are not great powers]

• European powers, jammed close together in a small continent, have historically faced severe security dilemmas;– that is, their military capabilities posed threats to each other even if they were

defensively motivated.

• Israel, about ten miles wide at its narrowest and most densely populated area, faces an exceptionally severe security dilemma, that is– military preparations that may truly be defensive nevertheless threaten

Israel’s neighbors, because– Israel wants to assure that, if fighting comes, it will occur outside rather than

inside Israel.

The Spiral Model• The Spiral Model starts with the Security Dilemma and carries

the story forward to actual or imminently threatened general war between A and B.

• This typically entails another relationship between A and B commonly referred to as

• the incentive to pre-empt, or• the reciprocal fear of surprise attack (T. Schelling, The Strategy of

Conflict), or• the dynamics of mutual alarm (T. Schelling, Arms and Influence,

Chapter 6),– that results when a great or even decisive advantage in actual fighting

goes to whichever side gets in the first blow,

• The severity of the incentive to pre-empt, as of the spiral model itself, depends largely on military technology and geographical proximity.

TheStag Hunt

Game

• Analysis of the Stag Hunt Game

• Simultaneous Choice:– Dominant strategies?– Are their Nash equilibria?– What will be the outcome?– A “softer” Prisoner’s Dilemma

(exchanging payoff of 4 and 3)

Payoff Dominancevs.

Risk Dominance(Maximin)

The Stag Hunt

(cont.)

• Sequential Choice Version of Stag Hunt.

• P1 looks ahead and reasons back?

• Can P2 make any commitment that changes the outcome in a way that benefits P2?

• Once P2 is assured that P1 will “cooperate,” P2 will “cooperate” also.– Stag Hunt is sometimes called

the Assurance Game.

The Pre-emption

Game

• The “On-Going” Pre-emption Game– Wait/Wait is the current State

of affairs.– Wait/Wait is an equilibrium,– but perhaps not a stable one.

• Each player prefers the Wait/Wait “no pre-emption” outcome;– but P1 is fearful that P2 may

will switch to “pre-empt,”– if only because P1 understands

that P2 is equally fearful that P1 will switch to “pre-empt,”

– and vice versa.• Who switches first loses only a little

while the other player loses a lot.

The Spiral Model and Pre-emptive War• The story of the origins of WWI in Europe is pretty much a

poster-child for the spiral model theory of war.– European powers had many interlocking security alliances.– They had large armies that were costly to mobilize and difficult to

demobilize.– The widely held view that there was a great advantage to mobilizing

first constituted an incentive to pre-empt.

• The Six Day War: Israel’s pre-emptive attack against the Egyptian Air Force.

• There was an “incentive to pre-empt” at various points in the evolution of the nuclear balance between the US and SU in the Cold War.

• The Bush Doctrine: pre-empting terrorist attacks.– However, such attempts would really be in large measure preventive,

rather than pre-emptive.

Preventive vs. Pre-emptive War• The incentives for pre-emptive war are reciprocal and reinforcing.• The incentives for preventive war are unilateral, i.e.,

– at most only one side has the incentive to launch a preventive war, • while the other side has an incentive to conciliate.

• A has an incentive to wage preventive war against B if A believes that – the balance of military capabilities between them is at present fairly favorable

to A, – but it will become much less favorable to A in the not too distant future.

• Examples:– Some people (famously including the British philosopher Bertrand Russell)

advocated a US preventive war (probably preceded by an attempted compellent threat) against the SU in the late 1940s (while the US held its “nuclear monopoly”).

– Some people advocated preventive war against (Communist) China a couple of decades later (when Chinese leaders were expressing frightening equanimity about the prospect of general nuclear war).

– Compellent threat plus preventive war against Iran?

The Origins of the Cold War• The contested diagnosis of the origins of the Cold War.• “Appeasement Theory” of the Cold War:– The SU had evident more or less aggressive intentions,

• though they probably were not in a hurry to realize them,• as they believed that the laws of history were on their side.

– The US/West acted on the basis of the appeasement theory of war (so painfully learned in the run-up to WWII),• and by acting in accord with its prescriptions

– successfully deterred and “contained” the SU and– maintained a “cold peace”– until it evolved into a less aggressive nation.

– Of course, a “mirror image” narrative was provided by the SU • and by some “strongly revision” (Western) historians.

The Origins of the Cold War (cont.)• “Security Dilemma”/ “Spiral Model” Theory of the Cold War:

– A Security Dilemma existed between East and West, • created by the new technology of nuclear weapons and long range

delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles).– But while the SU had great ideological differences with the West, it

did not have hostile or aggressive goals vis-a-vis the US/West,• but the US/West thought it did (or at least feared it might),

– and it acted accordingly.• That is, the US/West acted in accordance with the appeasement

theory of war, – but it should not have.

• The SU likewise acted in accordance with appeasement theory,– but it should not have either.

– This led to a Spiral Model effect (manifested more consistently in an arms race than in a persistent incentive to pre-empt),• so the spiral model did not led to general “hot” war.

Appeasement vs. Spiral Model• Note that these two accounts of the origins of the Cold war

are not mutually exclusive, i.e., both could be substantially true.

• Nevertheless the Appeasement Theory and Spiral Model Theory have rather contrary implication for foreign policy.– Appeasement Theory: be tough, don’t give in, even on small stuff, etc.– Spiral Model Theory: be conciliatory, especially on small stuff, take

care not to do things that look threatening to the other side, etc.

• Which approach to follow?– Really depends on the assessment of the intentions of the other

nation,• which often are extremely difficult to assess.

– Moreover its intentions may change over time,• and do so in response to one’s own behavior.

Origins of Cold War• No doubt a full account of the origins and persistence of the

Cold War includes some mix of both theories.• But 45 years onward, we got something of an empirical test.• According to Spiral Model, ideological differences (or

similarities) between nations don’t matter.• So the collapse of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union

20 years ago per se should not make a difference,– as whatever security dilemma previously existed would

persist.• But Cold War pretty much ended with that collapse?– Clearly there were other factors at work,

• particularly the evolving Soviet/Russian economic weakness.

Escalation