AP1000 Response to Request for Additional Information … · SRP3.10-EMB-01 ,-02,-03,-05,-08,-09 and RAI-SRP3.10-EMB/EEB-04 was submitted under Westinghouse letter DCP/NRC2144 dated

Weslingho e Westinghouse Electric CompanyNuclear Power PlantsP.O. Box 355Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355USA

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Direct tel: 412-374-6206ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Direct fax: 412-374-5005Washington, D.C. 20555 e-mail: [email protected]

Your ref: Docket No. 52-006Our ref: DCP/NRC2235

August 21, 2008

Subject: AP1000 Response to Request for Additional Information (SRP3.10)

Westinghouse is submitting a revised response to the NRC request for additional information (RAI) onSRP Section 3.10. This RAI response is submitted in support of the AP1000 Design CertificationAmendment Application (Docket No. 52-006). The information included in the response is generic and isexpected to apply to all COL applications referencing the AP 1000 Design Certification and the AP 1000Design Certification Amendment Application.

A revised response is provided for RAI-SRP3.1 0-EMB-0 1,-03,-05,-08 and RAI-SRP3.1 0-EMB/EEB-04.This response completes all requests received to date for SRP Section 3.10. A response to RAI-SRP3.10-EMB-06 and -07 was submitted under letter DCP/NRC2152 dated August 21, 2008. A response to RAI-SRP3.10-EMB-01 ,-02,-03,-05,-08,-09 and RAI-SRP3.10-EMB/EEB-04 was submitted underWestinghouse letter DCP/NRC2144 dated May 28, 2008.

Questions or requests for additional information related to the content and preparation of this responseshould be directed to Westinghouse. Please send copies of such questions or requests to the prospectiveapplicants for combined licenses referencing the AP1000 Design Certification. A representative for eachapplicant is included on the cc: list of this letter.

Very truly yours,

Robert Sisk, ManagerLicensing and Customer InterfaceRegulatory Affairs and Standardization

/Enclosure

1. Response to Request for Additional Information on SRP Section 3.10

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I)A74 -1-

DCP/NRC2235August 21, 2008

Page 2 of 2

cc: D. JaffeE. McKennaM. MiemickiP. RayP. HastingsR. KitchenA. MonroeJ. WilkinsonC. PierceE. SchmiechG. ZinkeR. GrumbirJ. Parello

- U.S. NRC- U.S. NRC- U.S. NRC- TVA- Duke Power- Progress Energy- SCANA- Florida Power & Light- Southern Company- Westinghouse- NuStart/Entergy- NuStart- Westinghouse

1E1E1E1E1E1E1EIE1EIE1E1E1E

0474psa.doc

DCP/NRC2235August 21, 2008

ENCLOSURE 1

Response to Request for Additional Information on SRP Section 3.10

00474psa.doc

AP1000 TECHNICAL REPORT REVIEW

Response to Request For Additional Information (RAI)

RAI Response Number: RAI-SRP3.10-EMB-01Revision: 1

Question:

What is your specific screening process for potential high frequency sensitive mechanical andelectrical equipment and components, in addition to what was described in Section 6.4.5 of TR-115? Your description should be at a level of detail such that the staff can understand the basisfor screening in or out each piece of equipment and component. Staff expects a list ofequipment including the justification for screening in or out. For example, AP1000 DCD Tables3.2-3 and 3.11-1 could be used to reflect that the equipment was screened out with ajustification. For those screened-in equipment/components, provide methods of resolutionand/or justifications. For electrical/electronic equipment/components, justify how fasteners,connections, mountings, and interfaces are taken into account. Equipment/components mustbe qualified to IEEE 344-1987.

Westinghouse Response:

The AP1000 screening process for potential high frequency sensitive equipment isconsistent with the US NRC requirements in Section 4.0 (Identification andEvaluation of HF Sensitive Mechanical and Electrical Equipment/Components) ofCOL/DC-ISG-1, "Interim Staff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High FrequencyGround Motion" and guidelines identified in the EPRI White Paper, "Considerationsfor NPP Equipment and Structures Subjected to Response Levels Caused by HighFrequency Ground Motions," transmitted to the NRC on March 16, 2007.

The goal of the AP1000 Hard Rock High Frequency (HRHF) screening program is toidentify those potential safety-related equipment and components that areHRHF-sensitive and show them to be acceptable for their specific application(screened-out). The AP1000 HRHF screening program is a two step process; thefirst step is a HRHF susceptibility review to identify potential high frequencysensitive safety-related equipment. The second step is the screened-out equipmentprocess to demonstrate its acceptability for the HRHF seismic excitation. Evaluationof screened-in equipment as defined in COL/DC-ISG-1 is not performed because allsafety-related equipment that is screened-in will be eliminated or show to beacceptable through a design change process.

For the AP1000 HRHF screening program the following conditions must exist:

1. Plant specific HRHF Ground Motion Response Spectra (GMRS) exceeds theAP1 000 CSDRS in the high frequency region at 5% critical damping.

2. The safety-related equipment has potential failure modes involving change ofstate, chatter, signal change/drift, and connection problems.

RAI-SRP3.10-EMB-01 Rev.1Page 1 of 8



Table 6.4.5-1 in AP1000 Standard Technical Report TR-1 15 provides a list of typesof equipment that may be potentially vulnerable. Table A-1 of Westinghousedocument APP-GW-GLN-144, "AP1000 Design Control Document High FrequencySeismic Tier 1 Changes," dated December 2007 also provides a list of AP1000safety-related equipment with the potential of being high frequency sensitive or havehigh frequency sensitive components. This list was developed from Table 3.11-1 ofAP1000 Design Control Document (DCD) Rev. 16. None of the equipment in Table3.2-3 of AP1000 DCD Section 3.2 equipment is considered to be HRHF sensitive.Mechanical and fluid systems components and equipment listed in Table 3.2-3 ofthe DCD will not be impacted by the high frequency excitation.

The HRHF susceptibility review of AP1000 safety-related equipment is notperformed for potential failure modes associated with mounting, connections,fasteners, joints, and structural interface. These failure modes are addressedthrough the seismic qualification of the safety-related equipment to the AP1000In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) developed from AP1000 Certified DesignSeismic Response Spectra (CSDRS) performed in compliance withIEEE Std 344-1987.

From a dynamic perspective HRHF susceptibility is a concern for potentialHRHF-sensitive equipment with natural frequencies within the HRHF exceedanceregion. For HRHF-sensitive equipment with dominant natural frequencies below orabove the exceedance region structural integrity is demonstrated by the seismicqualification performed to the AP1000 ISRS to IEEE Std 344-1987 requirements.Structural integrity of the equipment is acceptable because the seismic testing toAP1000 ISRS requirements will produce larger seismic loadings (displacements,velocities and accelerations) than that experienced by the equipment under theHRHF seismic excitation. The HRHF seismic excitation will not impact dynamicresponse and structural integrity of the equipment since there are no equipmentfrequencies in this HRHF exceedance region. From equipment operabilityperspective, functionality was demonstrated under the AP1 000 ISRS loading. Thequestion that needs to be addressed is "Does the test data contain sufficient HRHFexcitation content?"

The AP1 000 ISRS qualification testing generates higher displacements andvelocities then those resulting from HRHF seismic excitation since the AP1000 ISRSare controlled by the lower frequency range. The higher displacement, velocities,and accelerations will detect these equipment structural failure modes if they exist.Therefore, seismic loadings associated with the HRHF exceedance area is not aconcern because the stresses produced will be no more severe than produced bythe AP1 000 ISRS except when the fundamental natural frequency of the equipmentis in the HRHF exceedance area.




For HRHF evaluations performed by Westinghouse it is noted that the majority ofthe seismic test programs performed in recent years had HF content of greater thanor equal to 2g at 5% critical damping. This spectral magnitude for a randomvibration input lends itself to very low background vibration of test with a peakdisplacement less than 0.01 inches. It is Westinghouse's position that if the HRHFseismic excitation is 2g or less in the HRHF exceedance region then nosupplemental HRHF supplemental evaluation is required.

For HRHF evaluation of replacement components the same process would befollowed except the HRHF SSE test input would be determined from in-equipmentresponse spectra (IERS) generated from the HRHF test program or a test would beperformed at 15g peak spectral acceleration at 5% critical damping in the 25 Hz to50 Hz frequency range.

The AP1000 HRHF screening program is based on a HF evaluation study reportedin APP-GW-GLR-115 (TR-115). The HF evaluation study concluded that AP1000ISRS developed from the AP1000 CSDRS would, in the majority of cases, produceequipment stress results of the same magnitude or higher than the stress resultsproduced from HRHF seismic excitation. The exception to this condition is when thedominant natural frequency of the equipment is in the HRHF exceedance range andthere can be significantly more response because the frequency coincides with theinput driving force. Under this condition, forces/stresses generated in the equipmentcould be due to the acceleration exceedance; therefore, the equipment will besubjected to HRHF seismic evaluation/testing to screen-out equipment by verifyingits performance and acceptability under HRHF excitation. Review of seismic testdata for electrical and microprocessor based cabinets performed to generic and highfrequency excitation concluded that seismic testing that peaks in the lowerfrequency range will produce larger displacements and velocities and results inhigher stresses in the equipment.

High Frequency Screening Process - Step 1

The potential failure modes of high frequency sensitive component types andassemblies are important considerations in the high frequency program. Thefollowing are potential failure modes of high frequency sensitivecomponents/equipment:

" Inadvertent change of state" Chatter" Change in accuracy and drift in output signal or set-point" Electrical connection failure or intermediacy (e.g., poor quality solder joints)• Mechanical connection failure

RAI-SRP3.1o-EMB-O1 Rev.1Page 3 of 8



* Mechanical misalignment/binding (e.g., latches, plungers)• Fatigue failure (e.g., solder joints, ceramics, self-taping screws, spot welds)* Improperly and unrestrained mounted components* Inadequately secured/locked mechanical fasteners and connections

Components and equipment determined to have potential failure modes involvechange of state, chatter, signal change/drift, and connection problems will bedemonstrated to be acceptable through the performance of supplemental highfrequency screening test. Those high frequency sensitive components having failuremodes associated with mounting, connections, fasteners, joints, and interface areconsidered to be acceptable as a result of the AP1000 In-Structure ResponseSpectra (ISRS) qualification testing per IEEE Std 344-1987 and/or required qualityassurance inspection and process/design controls.

High Frequency Screening Process - Step 2

The HRHF susceptibility review is to verify that the subject equipment is capable ofperforming its safety-related function under HRHF seismic excitation. All AP1000safety-related equipment will be qualified to the AP1 000 ISRS, and the dominantnatural frequencies of the equipment will be determined. The AP1000 HRHFscreening program is also consistent with the guidelines developed as part of anindustry review document in the EPRI White Paper, "Seismic Screening ofComponents Sensitive to High Frequency Vibratory Motions," transmitted to theNRC on June 28, 2007 for determining those safety-related equipment andcomponents that may be HRHF sensitive and screening procedures to assure thatany safety-related equipment and components that are sensitive to HRHF seismicexcitation are screened-out. The EPRI White Paper identifies the following threeevaluation methods to demonstrate that potential HRHF-sensitive safety-relatedequipment is not HRHF vulnerable.

1. Existing seismic qualification test data for potential high frequency sensitiveequipment should be reviewed for applicability and adequacy of the testmethod to demonstrate sufficient high frequency content.

2. Systems/circuits containing potentially sensitive items should be reviewed forinappropriate/unacceptable system actions due to assumed change of state,contact chatter/intermittency, set point drifts, or loss of calibration.

3. HRHF vibration screening test should be conducted to identify any HRHFsensitivities/abnormalities of the components. Several conventional testmethods are recommended.

The first and third evaluation methods are part of the AP1000 HRHF, screeningprogram and are further detailed below.




Method 1: Review of Seismic Test Data

The first method can be used for AP1000 HRHF plant applications when previousseismic testing of potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related equipment is qualified forthe certified design AP1 000 ISRS and the test inputs had sufficient energy contentin the HRHF region to verify the safety-related equipment is not vulnerable to HRHFseismic excitation. This is shown by reviewing the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)seismic test data from test programs performed in compliance with IEEE Std344-1987 and demonstrating that the safety-related functional requirements havebeen met under the HRHF excitation associated with the mounting location of theequipment. No additional seismic testing is required for safety-related equipmentpreviously tested and whose qualification level envelops the HRHF requiredresponse spectra (RRS).

To verify acceptability of previous SSE seismic test data for HRHF seismic content itis necessary to demonstrate there was sufficient acceleration amplitude, timeduration and frequency content in the seismic test in the HRHF-exceedance regionto verify its acceptability. Methods of demonstrating acceptability are documented inIEEE Std 344-1987. To demonstrate acceptability for frequency content, it isnecessary to show that the frequency content of the test waveform is at least asbroad as the frequency content of the amplified region of the RRS except at the lowfrequencies where non-enveloping is permitted under certain conditions (see IEEEStandard 344-1987 sub-clauses 7.6.3.1(10) and 7.6.3.1(13)). An evaluation of thetest input waveform should be conducted per IEEE Std 344-1987 Annex B to verifythe test data has sufficient content over the frequency range of interest throughoutthe input time history. If an evaluation of the test input is performed and the datademonstrate sufficient frequency content in the high frequency range throughout thetime history then the data is acceptable. Techniques for demonstrating adequatefrequency content include:

1. The enveloping of the RRS by the TRS is obtained with similar spectrumshapes so that similar amplifications at significant spectral peaks in theamplified regions of the spectra result.

2. The frequency content of the Fourier transform of the test waveform iscompatible with the amplified portion of the RRS

3. The frequency content of the test waveform PSD is compatible with theamplified portion of the RRS.

No additional seismic testing is required for safety-related equipment previouslytested and whose qualification level envelops the HRHF required response spectra(RRS).

RAI-SRP3.1W-EMB-n1 Rev.1Page 5 of 8



Method 2: Review of Equipment Specific System Actions

The second method involves review of circuits containing potentially sensitive itemsfor inappropriate system actions due to assumed change of state, contactchatter/intermittency, set point drifts or loss of calibration can be a viable alternative.Circuit evaluation is one of the high frequency screening procedures identified in theEPRI White Paper "Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to High FrequencyVibratory Motions," dated June 2007. This paper outlines circuit evaluation as arecommended process for assuring that safety-related components that aresensitive to high frequency seismic excitation are screened out or shown to beacceptable for their specific application.

For the AP1 000 plant application this method is only beneficial for potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related equipment which does not meet the criteria in the firstmethod. This method would require a detailed review of the functional logic ofequipment and the safety system to demonstrate that the potential HRHF-sensitiveequipment would not perform in a manner causing an inappropriate action or lackthereof leading to a malfunction or inappropriate plant operation for an accidentscenario previously considered. The circuit evaluation screening procedure is onlyacceptable when it can be demonstrated that inappropriate system actions or setpoint drifts will not impact the safety-related performance of the system. Theamount of equipment which could be shown to be acceptable using this process isextremely small.

This method would require a detailed review of the hardware and functional logic ofequipment to determine if there are potential HRHF sensitive components that maycause an inappropriate action or lack thereof that would lead to an inappropriateplant operation for an accident scenario previously considered. If no HRHFsensitive components are identified, then the equipment is acceptable. Forequipment that has HRHF sensitive components, the safety-related control/logiccircuits down stream of the equipment would be reviewed to determine ifinappropriate system actions or set point drifts could occur. If the equipmentcontains potential high frequency sensitive components which can impact theperformance of the safety system then a screening test is required to demonstrateacceptability.

Method 3: HRHF Vibration Screeninq Tests

The HRHF screening test is a supplemental test to the required seismic qualificationmethods performed in accordance with IEEE Std 344-1987 for those plants thathave high frequency exceedance of the AP1000 CSDRS. The purpose of the HRHFscreening test is to demonstrate that the potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related




equipment will perform their safety-related function as required under HRHF seismicexcitation. The HRHF screening test is performed in conjunction with the AP1000ISRS seismic qualification testing, or it is performed as a supplemental testperformed after completion of the AP1 000 ISRS seismic qualification testing. TheAP1000 ISRS and HRHF test input time histories have 30 second durations withfrequency content up to the cutoff frequency developed in accordance withsub-clause 7.6.3 (Multiple-Frequency Tests) and Annex B (Frequency Content andStationarity) of IEEE Std 344-1987. During the AP1000 ISRS and HRHF testing, theequipment will be functional and monitored to verify the safety-related function wasdemonstrated. Screening testing will be performed using HRHF response spectraas defined in the EPRI White Paper (Reference 1.5) when AP1000 HRHF inputs arenot available. The HRHF response spectra will be generated based on the 5g and15g peak spectral acceleration at 5% critical damping in the 25 Hz to 50 Hzfrequency range. If the HRHF screening test cannot demonstrate the equipment tobe acceptable, then the safety-related equipment will be removed or modified andadditional testing or justification will be required.

One HRHF screening test is sufficient to demonstrate functional operability ofsafety-related equipment in its most sensitive electrical operability state which hasbeen qualified to the requirements of IEEE Std 344-1987. The AP1 000 safety-related equipment will be seismic qualified to the AP1 000 ISRS associated with themounting location of the equipment as a minimum. Seismic qualification testing willconsist of five AP1 000 ISRS operating basis earthquakes (OBEs) followed by oneSSE as a minimum. The OBE level will be at least one-half the SSE level. TheOBE testing is used to vibration age and address low-cycle fatigue of equipmentprior to SSE testing. Cyclic fatiguing of equipment for HRHF exceedance area isadequately addressed by performing five OBE (one-half the SSE) and a minimum ofone SSE seismic test runs in compliance with IEEE Std 344-1987 prior toperforming the supplemental HRHF screening test. Additional OBE testing in thehigh frequency exceedance range is adequately addressed since cyclic fatigue isnot an issue with the very small displacements (mils) associated with the spectralaccelerations in this region.

The test results of AP1 000 seismic qualification programs with multiple operationalstates (e.g. relays have three possible operational states; de-energized, energized,and change of state) will be used to determine the most sensitive equipmentelectrical operational state. The HRHF test run is performed on the equipment in itsmost sensitive electrical operational state to demonstrate its safety-related functionunder HRHF seismic excitation. In the majority of seismic qualification testprograms one SSE is sufficient to demonstrate functional operability. More than oneSSE is required when the equipment has more than one operational state or mustdemonstrate change of state. Additional tests are required because the equipmentcould respond differently to seismic accelerations for each operational state.

RAI-SRP3.1W-EMB-h1 Rev.1Page 7 of 8



These responses will be incorporated into Appendix 31, "Evaluation for HighFrequency Seismic Input" of Revision 17 of the DCD. The mark-up of Appendix 31 isattached to this response.

Design Control Document (DCD) Revision:

See attached revision to Appendix 31

PRA Revision:

None

Technical Report (TR) Revision:

None

O WestinghouseRAI-SRP3.10-EMB-01 Rev.1

Page 8 of 8

3. Design of Structures, Components,Equipment and Systems AP1000 Design Control Document

APPENDIX 31 EVALUATION FOR HIGH FREQUENCY SEISMIC INPUT

31.6.4 Electrical and Electro-Mechanical Equipment Qualila'ion

The groups of safety-related equipment considered for evaluation are those that may be sensitiveto the high frequency input. This includes those cabinet mounted equipment, field sensors andappurtenants ,whieh-that may be sensitive to high frequency seismic inputs identified in Table31.6-1.

Sample safety-related cabinets have been identified that are typically sensitive to seismic input.Evaluations wi,4lwere-be performed to verify these cabinets do not have excessive seismicdeffladexcitation on their mounted equipment, the cabinet designs do not require changes due tothe high frequency input, and the cabinets will maintain their structural integrity during the highfrequency input. Time history analyses of these cabinets ar-ewere performed for both theRegulatory Guide 1.60 (modified) and the high frequency inputs so that comparisons can bemade to their seismic response from both seismic inputs. This analytical study reported inAP 1000 Technical Report APP-GW-GLR- 115 (Reference 1.2) is-o-concluded that safety-relatedequipment may be screened _ ... -..

The AP1000 Hard Rock High Frequency (HRHF) screening program for determination andevaluation of potential high frequency sensitive equipment is in compliance with the NRCrequirements in Section 4.0 (Identification and Evaluation of HF Sensitive Mechanical andElectrical Equipment/Components) of COL/DC-ISG-1 (Reference 1.4). The AP1000 HRHFscreening program is also consistent with the guidelines developed as part of an industry reviewdocument in the EPRI White Paper, "Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to HighFrequency Vibratory Motions" (Reference 1.5), transmitted to the NRC on June 28, 2007, fordetermining the safety-related equipment and components that may be HRHF sensitive, andscreening procedures to ensure that any safety-related equipment and components sensitive toHRHF seismic excitation are screened out. This industry review of HF exceedance and furtherevaluations of SSCs performed by Westinghouse concluded that HRHF Ground MotionResponse Spectra (GMRS) is less harmful than the CSDRS except for the functionality ofpotential HRHF-sensitive components.

The AP1000 HRHF screening program is based on an HF evaluation study reported inAPP-GW-GLR-115 (Reference 1.2). The HF evaluation study concluded that AP1000In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) developed from the AP1000 CSDRS would, in themajority of cases, produce equipment stress results of the same magnitude or higher than thestress results produced from HRHF seismic excitation. The exception to this condition is whenthe dominant natural frequency of the equipment is in the HRHF exceedance range and there canbe significantly more response because the frequency coincides with the input driving force.Under this condition, forces/stresses generated in the equipment could be due to the accelerationexceedance; therefore, the equipment will be subjected to HRHF seismic evaluation/testing toscreen out equipment by verifying its performance and acceptability under HRHF excitation.Review of seismic test data for electrical and microprocessor based cabinets performed to genericand high frequency excitation concluded that seismic testing that peaks in the lower frequencyrange will produce larger displacements and velocities, and results in higher stresses in theequipment.

Tier 2 Material 31-1 Revision 41617


The goal of the AP 1000 HRHF screening program is to identify those potential safety-relatedequipment and components that have the potential to be HRHF-sensitive and show them to beacceptable for their specific application (screened-out). The AP1000 HRHF screening programis a two step process; the first step is an HRHF susceptibility review to identify potential highfrequency sensitive safety-related equipment. The second step is the screened-out equipmentprocess to demonstrate its acceptability for the HR1HF seismic excitation. Evaluation ofscreened-in equipment as defined in COL/DC-ISG- 1 (Reference 1.4) is not performed because allsafety-related equipment that is screened-in will be eliminated or shown to be acceptable througha design change process.

For the AP1000 HRHF screening program the following conditions must exist:

1. Plant specific HRHF GMRS exceeds the AP1OOO CSDRS in the high frequency range at 5%critical damping.

2. Safety-related equipment has potential failure modes involving change of state, chatter,signal change/drift, and connection problems.

Table 31.6-2 is a list of potential HRHF-sensitive AP 1000 safety-related equipment developedbased on Table 3.11-1 of AP1000 DCD Section 3.11 (Environmental Qualification ofMechanical and Electrical Equipment). The equipment in Table 3.2-3 ofAP1000 DCD Section3.2 (Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems) and Table 31.6-3 is not HRHF-sensitive. The structural integrity and operability of equipment in Table 3.2-3 and Table 31.6-3will not be impacted by the high frequency excitation.

The HRHF susceptibility review of AP1000 safety-related equipment is not performed forpotential failure modes associated with mounting, connections, fasteners, joints, and structuralinterface. These potential failure modes are addressed through the seismic qualification of thesafety-related equipment to the AP 1000 ISRS testing performed in compliance with IEEE Std344-1987. The AP 1000 ISRS qualification testing generates higher displacements and velocitiesthan those resulting from HRHF seismic excitation since the AP 1000 ISRS is controlled by thelower frequency range. The higher displacement, velocities, and accelerations will detect theseequipment structural failure modes if they exist.

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Tier 2 Material 31-2 Revision 4-617


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component types and assemblies are important considerations in the high frequencv progra.The following are potential failure modes of high frequency sensitive components/equipment:io

p Inadvertent change of state* Chatter" Change in accuracy and drift in output signal or set-pointh Electrical connection failure or intermediacy (e.g., poor quality solder joints)" Mechanical connection failure* Mechanical misalignment/binding (e.g., latches, plungers)* Fatigue failure (e.g., solder joints, ceramics, self-taping screws, spot welds)* Improperly and unrestrained mounted components* Inadequately secured/locked mechanical fasteners and connections

Components and equipment determined to be exposed to and are high fr-equencey sensitive withh~ave potential failure modes involve change of state, chatter, signal change/drift., and connectionproblems shel-will be demonstrated to be acceptable through the performance of supplementalhigh frequency q*aiteeioscreening testing. Those high frequency sensitive componentshaving failure modes associated with mounting, connections and fasteners, joints, and interfaceare considered to be acceptable as a result of the l•iafied-AP1000 In-Structure Response Spectra



(ISRS) b; traditienal low frequency qualification testing per IEEE Std 344-1987 and/or required

quality assurance inspection and process/design controls.

HiMh Frequency Screenina Process - Step 2

The HRI{F susceptibility review is to verify that the subject equipment is capable of performingits safety-related function under HIRHIF seismic excitation. All AP 1000 safety-related equipmentwill be qualified to the AP 1000 ISRS, and the dominant natural frequencies of the equipmentwill be determined. The EPRI White Paper (Reference 1.5) identifies the following threeevaluation methods to demonstrate that potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related equipment is notHRHF vulnerable:

1. Existing seismic qualification test data for potential high frequency sensitive equipmentshould be reviewed for applicability and adequacy of the test method to demonstratesufficient high frequency content.

2. Systems/circuits containing potentially sensitive items should be reviewed forinappropriate/unacceptable system actions due to assumed change of state, contactchatter/intermittency. set point drifts, or loss of calibration.

3. HRHF vibration screening test is conducted to identif any HRHFsensitivities/abnormalities of the components. Several conventional test methods arerecommended.

The first and third evaluation methods are part of the AP 1000 HRHF screening program and are

further detailed below.

Method 1: Review of Seismic Test Data

Available seismic test data can be used for AP 1000 HRHF plant applications when:

* Seismic qualification testing performed on potential HRHF-sensitive safety-relatedequipment meets as a minimum the AP1000 ISRS in compliance with IEEE Std 344-1987.

" Safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) test had sufficient energy content in the HRHF region toverify the safety-related equipment is not vulnerable to HRHF seismic excitation.

No additional seismic testing is required for safety-related equipment previously tested andwhose qualification level envelops the HRHF required response spectra (RRS).

IEEE Std 344-1987 provides guidance to ensure that the seismic test input is generated and incompliance with the frequency range of interest. To demonstrate acceptability for frequencycontent, it is necessary to show that the frequency content of the test waveform is at least as



broad as the frequency content of the amplified region of the RRS except at the low frequencieswhere non-enveloping is permitted under certain conditions (see IEEE Std 344-1987 sub-clauses7.6.3.1 (10) and 7.6.3.1(13)). An evaluation of the test input waveform should be conducted perIEEE Std 344-1987 Annex B to verify the test data has sufficient content over the frequencyrange of interest throughout the input time history. If an evaluation of the test input is performed,and the data demonstrates sufficient frequency content in the high frequency range throughoutthe time history, then the data is acceptable.

Method 3: HRHF Screening Test

The HRHF screening test is a supplemental test to the required seismic qualification methodsperformed in accordance with IEEE Std 344-1987 for those plants that have high frequencyexceedance of the AP1000 CSDRS. The purpose of the HRHF screening test is to demonstratethat the potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related equipment will perform its safety-relatedfunction as required under HRHF seismic excitation. The HRHF screening test is performed inconjunction with the AP1000 ISRS seismic qualification testing, or it is performed as asupplemental test after completion of the AP1000 ISRS seismic qualification testing. TheAP1000 ISRS and HRHF test input time histories have 30 second durations with frequencycontent up to the cutoff frequency developed in accordance with sub-clause 7.6.3 (Multiple-Frequency Tests) and Annex B (Frequency Content and Stationarity) of IEEE Std 344-1987.During the AP 1000 ISRS and HRHF testing, the equipment will be functional and monitored toverify the safety-related function was demonstrated. Screening testing will be performed usingHRHF response spectra as defined in the EPRI White Paper (Reference 1.5) when AP1000HRHF inputs are not available. The HRHF response spectra will be generated based ori the 5gand 15g peak spectral acceleration at 5% critical damping in the 25 Hz to 50 Hz frequency range.If the HRHF screening test cannot demonstrate the equipment to be acceptable, then the

safety-related equipment will be removed or modified and additional testing or justification willbe required.

The AP 1000 safety-related equipment will be seismic qualified to the AP 1000 ISRS associatedwith the mounting location of the equipment as a minimum. Seismic qualification testing willconsist of five AP1000 ISRS operating basis earthquakes (OBEs) followed by one SSE as aminimum. The OBE level will be at least one-half the SSE level. The OBE testing is used tovibration age and address low-cycle fatigue of equipment prior to SSE testing. Cyclic fatiguingof equipment for HR-HF exceedance area is adequately addressed by performing five OBE (one-half the SSE) and a minimum of one SSE seismic test runs in compliance with IEEE Std 344-1987 prior to performing the supplemental HRHF screening test. Additional OBE testing in thehigh frequency exceedance range is adequately addressed since cyclic fatigue is not an issue withthe very small displacements (mils) associated with the spectral accelerations in this region.

The test results of AP1000 seismic qualification programs with multiple operational states(e.g. relays have three possible operational states: de-energized, energized, and change of state)will be used to determine the most sensitive equipment electrical operational state. The HRHFtest run is performed on the equipment in its most sensitive electrical operational state todemonstrate its safety-related function under HRHF seismic excitation. If this is not possible,addition HRHF screening tests will be performed as needed to address the other most sensitiveelectrical operation states.

Tier 2 Material 31-5 Revision -I61.7.


When hieh f0equeneiv swismie, testing is fier-foFmed foliowine a low ffeaueney seismie tt RhAll hp ga-ho-knA in thp hieh f0equenev SSE testine afteF eomeletion ofthe.

seismie testine. Low level eveline fatieue effeet t shafl be Oustified Feor-ese

ffeauene. * * ' - 4. No additional low level testine for hieh ffeauenev exeitation is r-ectuiFed. Onee

SSE high f0equenev seismie test wfl! be BeFfOFined to demOHStFate fUBeflOH0_1__'1_- Of 'e-a-u-1--ment in its

most sensfetfive elleet-Fiefil e0MIEUFOU .

Aeeefitanee and quafifi-ation to the h.ieh fr-equenev inf)ut is dete ined based on the eofflIwIson ofth-e

test levels the eomoonents h"e I - . . 1 or- tested to. FoF these eauh)men

dete-r-minedd to have. alr-eadv been tested to high 1;p.*.I;Map lp-Wels in the hiah ffeauenev

addetefinfal testine oF 0 fifleations wiH be neeessaFv. A review of seismie testine date is f)e fAr-mpd tch,

iveFi& that th-Pe tPeRst-Pedd SP6Q.-Make 1_PVP__1.Q_.enyeIoB the hieh ffegueney swismae deffland. if these en-a-w-awnre-MB

e-n-n-not -he shown to b based OB this Feview. additional testine or-

reauked to show aualifleation.

31.7 References

1. EPRI Draft White Paper, "Considerations for NPP Equipment and Structures Subjected toResponse Levels Caused by High Frequency Ground Motions," Transmitted to NRCMarch 19, 2007.

2. APP-GW-GLR-1 15, "Effect of High Frequency Seismic Content on SSCs," Westinghouse

Electric Company LLC.

3. Personal correspondence related to approved incoherence function, Abramson - April 2007.

4. COL/DC-ISG-1, "Interim Staff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency GroundMotion," May 19, 2008.

-EPRI White Paper, "Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to High FrequencyVibratory Motions," June 2007.

5.

Tier 2 Material 31-6

Revision 4617

Tier 2 Material 31-6 Revision t-617


Table 31.6-1

POTENTIAL HIGH FREOUENCY SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT LIST

" Equipment or components with moving parts and required to perform a switching function during the seismicevent (e.g., circuit breakers, contactors, auxiliary switches, molded case circuit breakers, motor control centerstarters, and pneumatic control assemblies)

" Components with moving parts that may bounce or chatter such as relays and actuation devices (e.g., shunttrips)

" Unrestrained components

" Potentiometers

" Process switches and sensors (e.g., pressure/differential pressure, temperature, level, limit/position, and flow)

" Components with accuracy requirements that may drift due to seismic loading

" Interfaces such as secondary contacts

- Connectors and connections (including circuit board connections for digital and analog equipment)



Table 31.6-2

LIST OF POTENTIAL HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVEAP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND

ELECTRO-MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT

AP1OOODescription Tag Number

BATTERIES

IDSA 125V 60 Cell Battery 1A IDSA-DB-1A

IDSA 125V 60 Cell Battery lB IDSA-DB-IB

IDSB 125V 60 Cell Battery IA IDSB-DB-IA

IDSB 125V 60 Cell Batter IB IDSB-DB-1B

IDSB 125V 60 Cell Battery 2A IDSB-DB-2A

IDSB 125V 60 Cell Battery 2B IDSB-DB-2BIDSC 125V 60 Cell Battery IA IDSC-DB-1A

IDSC 125V 60 Cell Battery IB IDSC-DB-1B

IDSC 125V 60 Cell Battery 2A IDSC-DB-2A

IDSC 125V 60 Cell Battery 2B IDSC-DB-2B

IDSD 125V 60 Cell Battery IA IDSD-DB-IA

IDSD 125V 60 Cell Battery lB IDSD-DB-1B

Spare 125V 60 Cell Battery 1A IDSS-DB-1A

Spare 125V 60 Cell Battery lB IDSS-DB-IB

BATTERY CHARGERS

IDSA Battery Charger IDSA-DC- 1

IDSB Battery Charger IDSB-DC-1

IDSB Batten Charger 2 IDSB-DC-2

IDSC Battery Charger I IDSC-DC-1

IDSC Battery Charger 2 IDSC-DC-2

IDSD Batten Charger IDSD-DC-1

Spare Batter Charger IDSS-DC-1

DISTRIBUTION PANELS

IDSA 125 Vdc Dist Panel IDSA-DD-1

IDSB 125 Vdc Dist Panel IDSB-DD-1

IDSC 125 Vdc Dist Panel IDSC-DD-1

IDSD 125 Vdc Dist Panel IDSD-DD-1

IDSA 120 Vac Dist Panel I IDSA-EA-I

IDSA 120 Vac Dist Panel 2 IDSA-EA-2

IDSB 120 Vac Dist Panel 1 IDSB-EA-I

IDSB 120 Vac Dist Panel 2 IDSB-EA-2IDSB 120 Vac Dist Panel 3 IDSB-EA-3

IDSC 120 Vac Dist Panel I IDSC-EA-1

IDSC 120 Vac Dist Panel 2 IDSC-EA-2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-2

LIST OF POTENTIAL HIGH FREOUENCY SENSITIVEAP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND

ELECTRO-MECHANICAL EOUIPMENT

AP1000Descrintion Tac Number

IDSC 120 Vac Dist Panel 3 IDSC-EA-3

IDSD 120 Vac Dist Panel 1 IDSD-EA-1

IDSD 120 Vac Dist Panel 2 IDSD-EA-2

FUSE PANELS

IDSA Fuse Panel IDSA-EA-4

IDSB Fuse Panel IDSB-EA-4



IDSC Fuse Panel IDSC-EA-4



IDSD Fuse Panel IDSD-EA-4

TRANSFER SWITCHES

IDSA Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSA-DF-1

IDSB Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSB-DF-1

IDSB Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSB-DF-2

IDSC Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSC-DF-1

IDSC Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSC-DF-2

IDSD Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSD-DF-1

IDSS Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSS-DF-1

IDSS Spare Termination Box IDSS-DF-2





MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

IDSA 125 Vdc MCC IDSA-DK-1

IDSB 125 Vdc MCC IDSB-DK-1

IDSC 125 Vdc MCC IDSC-DK-1

IDSD 125 Vdc MCC IDSD-DK-1

SWITCHBOARDS

IDSA 125 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSA-DS-1

IDSB 125 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSB-DS-1

IDSB 125 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSB-DS-2

IDSC 125 Vdc Switchboard I IDSC-DS-1

IDSC 125 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSC-DS-2

IDSD 125 Vdc Switchboard I IDSD-DS-1


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-2



AP1OOODescription Ta2 Number

TRANSFORMERS

IDSA Regulating Transformer 1 IDSA-DT-1

IDSB Regulating Transformer 1 IDSB-DT-1

IDSC Regulating Transformer 1 IDSC-DT-1

IDSD Regulating Transformer 1 IDSD-DT-1

INVERTERS

IDSA Inverter IDSA-DU-1

IDSB Inverter 1 IDSB-DU-1

TDSB Inverter 2 IDSB-DU-2

IDSC Inverter 1 IDSC-DU-1

IDSC Inverter 2 IDSC-DU-2

IDSD Inverter IDSD-DU- I

SWITCHGEAR

RCP IA 6900V Switchgear 31 ECS-ES-31

RCP I A 6900V Switchbear 32 ECS-ES-32

RCP 2A 6900V Switchgear 51 ECS-ES-51

RCP 2A 6900V Switchgear 52 ECS-ES-52

RCP IB 6900V Switchgear 41 ECS-ES-41

RCP lB 6900V Switchgear 42 ECS-ES-42

RCP 2B 6900V Switchgear 61 ECS-ES-61

RCP 2B 6900V Switchgear 62 ECS-ES-62

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSAO1

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSA02

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSBO1

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSB02

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSCO1

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSC02

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSDO1

Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTSD02

LEVEL SWITCHES

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LSO 11 A

Core Makeun Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LSO1 lB

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LSOI IC

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LSO1 ID

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS012A

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS012B


Revision 4417



Table 31.6-2



AP1000Description Tag Number

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS012C

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS012D

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS013A

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS013B

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS013C

Core Makeup Tank A Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS013D

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS014A

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS014B

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS014C

Core Makeup Tank B Narrow Range PXS-JE-LS014D

Containment Floodup Level PXS-JE-LS050



NEUTRON DETECTORS

Source Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NEOO1A

Source Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NEOOIB

Source Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NEOO1C

Source Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NEOO1D

Intermediate Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NE002A

Intermediate Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NE002B

Intermediate Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NE002C

Intermediate Range Neutron Detector RXS-JE-NE002D

Power Range Neutron Detector (Lower) RXS-JE-NE003A

Power Range Neutron Detector (Lower) RXS-JE-NE003B

Power Range Neutron Detector (Lower) RXS-JE-NE003C

Power Range Neutron Detector (Lower) RXS-JE-NE003D

Power Range Neutron Detector (Upper) RXS-JE-NE004A

Power Range Neutron Detector (Upper) RXS-JE-NE004B

Power Range Neutron Detector (Upper) RXS-JE-NE004C

Power Range Neutron Detector (Upper) RXS-JE-NE004D

RADIATION MONITORS

Containment High Range Area Monitor PXS-JE-RE160

Containment High Range Area Monitor PXS-JE-REl 61




Revision 4-617

Tier 2 Material 3IM1I Revision t-617


Table 31.6-2


ELECTRO-MECHANICAL EOUIPMENT


Control Room Supply Air Area Monitor VBS-JE-REO0IA

Control Room Supply Air Area Monitor VBS-JE-REOOIB

SPEED SENSORS

RCP 1A Pump Speed RCS-JE-ST28 1

RCP lB Pump Speed RCS-JE-ST282

RCP 2A Pump Speed RCS-JE-ST283

RCP 2B Pump Speed RCS-JE-ST284

TRANSMITTERS

PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-JE-FTOO0

PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-JE-FT002



PCS Storage Tank Water Level PCS-JE-LTO0O

PCS Storage Tank Water Level PCS-JE-LTO I1

PRHR HX Flow PXS-JE-FT049A

PRHR HX Flow PXS-JE-FT049B

RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow RCS-JE-FTI01A

RCS Hot Leg I Flow RCS-JE-FTI01B

RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow RCS-JE-FT01 C

RCS Hot Leg I Flow RCS-JE-FTIOlD

RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow RCS-JE-FT102A

RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow RCS-JE-FT1 02B

RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow RCS-JE-FT1 02C

RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow RCS-JE-FT1 02D

SGI Startup Feedwater Flow SGS-JE-FT055A

SG1 Startup Feedwater Flow SGS-JE-FT055B

SG2 Startup Feedwater Flow SGS-JE-FT-056A

SG2 Startup Feedwater Flow SGS-JE-FT056B

MCR Air Delivery Line Flow Rate - A VES-JE-FT003A

MCR Air Delivery Line Flow Rate - B VES-JE-FT003B

Plant Vent Flow VFS-JE-FT 101

IRWST Level PXS-JE-LT045






Table 31.6-2



AP1O00Description Tag Number

RCS Hot Leg Water Level RCS-JE-LT1 60A

RCS Hot Leg Water Level RCS-JE-LT1 60B

PZR Level RCS-JE-LT1 95A

PZR Level RCS-JE-LT195B

PZR Level RCS-JE-LT195C

PZR Level RCS-JE-LT195DSG 1 Narrow Range Level SGS-JE-LTOOISG1 Narrow Range Level SGS-JE-LT002

SG I Narrow Range Level SGS-JE-LT003

SG I Narrow Range Level SGS-JE-LT004

SG2 Narrow Range Level SGS-JE-LT005




SG1 Wide Range Level SGS-JE-LT001


SG1 Wide Range Level SGS-JE-LTO I5






Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-JE-LT019A

Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-JE-LT019B

Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-JE-LT019C

Air Storage Tank Pressure - A VES-JE-PTOOA

Air Storage Tank Pressure - B VES-JE-PTOOB

Containment Pressure Normal Range PCS-JE-PT005




Containment Pressure Extended Range PCS-JE-PT012



RCS Wide Range Pressure RCS-JE-PT140A

RCS Wide Range Pressure RCS-JE-PT140B


Revision 4-617

Tier 2 Material 3T-13 Revision 4-617


Table 31.6-2



AP1000Description TaB Number

RCS Wide Range Pressure RCS-JE-PT140C

RCS Wide Range Pressure RCS-JE-PT140DPZR Pressure RCS-JE-PT191A

PZR Pressure RCS-JE-PT191BPZR Pressure RCS-JE-PT191C

PZR Pressure RCS-JE-PT191DMain Steamline SG1 Pressure SGS-JE-PT030Main Steamline SG 1 Pressure SGS-JE-PT031

Main Steamline SG I Pressure SGS-JE-PT032

Main Steamline SG I Pressure SGS-JE-PT033Main Steamline SG2 Pressure SGS-JE-PT034Main Steamline SG2 Pressure SGS-JE-PT035

Main Steamline SG2 Pressure SGS-JE-PT036

Main Steamline SG2 Pressure SGS-JE-PT037Main Control Room Differential Pressure VES-JE-PDT004A

Main Control Room Differential Pressure VES-JE-PDT004B

PROTECTION AND SAFETY MONITORING SYSTEMSProtection and Safety Monitoring System Cabinets Multiple

QDPS Thermocouple Reference Panel I PMS-JW-003B

QDPS Thermocouple Reference Panel 2 PMS-JW-003CMCR/RSW Transfer Switch Panel A PMS-JW-004A

MCR/RSW Transfer Switch Panel B PMS-JW-004B

MCR/RSW Transfer Switch Panel C PMS-JW-004C

MCR/RSW Transfer Switch Panel D PMS-JW-004DSource Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel A PMS-JW-005ASource Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel B PMS-JW-005B

Source Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel C PMS-JW-005C

Source Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel D PMS-JW-005DIntermediate Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel A PMS-JW-006AIntermediate Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel B PMS-JW-006B

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel C PMS-JW-006C

Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Preamplifier Panel D PMS-JW-006D

Power Range Neutron Flux High Voltage Distribution Box A PMS-JW-007APower Range Neutron Flux High Voltage Distribution Box B PMS-JW-007BPower Range Neutron Flux High Voltage Distribution Box C PMS-JW-007C

Power Range Neutron Flux High Voltage Distribution Box D PMS-JW-007D


Revisioa 4-617



Table 31.6-2

LIST OF POTENTIAL HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVEAP1OOO SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND


AP1000Description Ta2 Number

MAIN CONTROL ROOM

Operator Workstation A N/A

Operator Workstation B N/A

Supervisor Workstation N/A

Switch Station(Including Switches) N/A

ODPS MCR Display Unit PMS-JY-OOB

ODPS MCR Display Unit PMS-JY-OOIC

ACTIVE VALVES

Containment Isolation - Air OutSolenoid Valve CAS-PL-V014-SLimit Switch CAS-PL-V014-L

Containment Isolation - Inlet

Limit Switch CCS-PL-V200-LMotor Operator CCS-PL-V200-M

Containment Isolation - OutletLimit Switch CCS-PL-V207-LMotor Operator CCS-PL-V207-M

Containment Isolation - OutletLimit Switch CCS-PL-V208-LMotor Operator CCS-PL-V208-M

RCS Purification Stop ValveLimit Switch CVS-PL-VOO I-LMotor Operator CVS-PL-VOO1-M

RCS Purification Stop ValveLimit Switch CVS-PL-V002-LMotor Operator CVS-PL-V002-M

RCS Letdown Stop ValveLimit Switch CVS-PL-V003-LMotor Operator CVS-PL-V003-M

WLS Letdown IRC IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V045-LSolenoid Valve CVS-PL-V045-S I

Letdown Flow ORC IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V047-L

Solenoid Valve CVS-PL-V047-S 1

Auxiliary PZR Spray Isolation

Limit Switch CVS-PL-V084-L


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-2

LIST OF POTENTIAL HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVEAP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICALAND



Solenoid Valve CVS-PL-V084-S

Makeup Line Containment IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V090-L

Motor Operator CVS-PL-V090-M

Makeup Line Containment IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V091-LMotor Operator CVS-PL-V091 -M

Hydrogen Addition Containment IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V092-LSolenoid Valve CVS-PL-V092-S

Demineralizer Water System IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V136A-L

Solenoid Valve CVS-PL-V136A-S

Demineralized Water System IsolationLimit Switch CVS-PL-V136B-L

Solenoid Valve CVS-PL-V136B-S

PCCWST Isolation Valve

Limit Switch PCS-PL-VOOIA-LSolenoid Valve PCS-PL-VOOlA-SI

PCCWST Isolation ValveLimit Switch PCS-PL-VOOB-L

Solenoid Valve PCS-PL-VOOlB-S 1

PCCWST Isolation ValveLimit Switch PCS-PL-VOOIC-LMotor Operator PCS-PL-VOOIC-M

PCCWST Isolation ValveLimit Switch PCS-PL-VO02A-L

Motor Operator PCS-PL-VO02A-M

PCCWST Isolation ValveLimit Switch PCS-PL-VO02B-LMotor Operator PCS-PL-VO02B-M

PCCWST Isolation Valve

Limit Switch PCS-PL-VO02C-LMotor Operator PCS-PL-VO02C-M

Tier 2 Material 31-16 Revision -1-617


Table 31.6-2




Containment Isolation - Air Sample LineLimit Switch PSS-PL-V008-LSolenoid Operator PSS-PL-V008-S

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample LineLimit Switch PSS-PL-VOIOA-LSolenoid Operator PSS-PL-V010A-S

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample LineLimit Switch PSS-PL-V010B-LSolenoid Operator PSS-PL-VOlOB-S

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample LineLimit Switch PSS-PL-VO 11-LSolenoid Valve PSS-PL-VO I1-S

Containment Isolation - Sample Return Line

Limit Switch PSS-PL-V023-LSolenoid Valve PSS-PL-V023-S

Containment Isolation - Air Sample Line

Limit Switch PSS-PL-V046-LSolenoid Valve PSS-PL-V046-S

Core Makeup Tank A Discharge Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-VO14A-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-VO14A-S 1

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-VO14B-L

Solenoid Valve PXS-PL-VO14B-S 1

Core Makeup Tank A Discharge IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-VO15A-L

Solenoid Valve PXS-PL-VO15A-S 1

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-VO15B-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-VO15B-S 1

Nitrogen Supply Outside Containment IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-V042-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-V042-S

PRHR HX Discharge IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-VI 08A-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-Vl 08A-S 1


Revision 4.617



Table 31.6-2




PRHR HX Discharge Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-VI 08B-L

Solenoid Valve PXS-PL-V 108B-S 1

Recirc Sump A Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V I 17A-L

Motor Qperator PXS-PL-VI 17A-M

Recirc Sump B Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V 117B-L

Motor Operator PXS-PL-V1 17B-M

Recirc Sump A Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V 18A-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-VI 118A-T

Recirc Sump B Isolation

Limit Switch PXS-PL-VI 18B-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-VI 11B-T

Recirc Sump A

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V120A-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-V120A-T

Recirc Sump B

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V] 20B-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-V120B-T

IRWST Iniection A

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V123A-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-V1 23A-T

IRWST Iniection B

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V123B-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-V 123B-T

IRWST Injection A

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V 125A-L

Squib Operator PXS-PL-V125A-T

Tier 2 Material 31-18 Revision -161_7


Table 31.6-2




IRWST Injection BLimit Switch PXS-PL-V 125B-LSquib Operator PXS-PL-V 125B-T

IRWST Gutter Drain Isolation ALimit Switch PXS-PL-V 130A-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-V130A-SI

IRWST Gutter Drain Isolation B

Limit Switch PXS-PL-V130B-LSolenoid Valve PXS-PL-V130B-S1

First Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VOOIA-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VOOIA-M

First Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VOO1B-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VOOIB-M

Second Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO02A-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO02A-M

Second Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO02B-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO02B-M

Third Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO03A-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO03A-M

Third Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO03B-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO03B-M

Fourth Stage ADS

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO04A-LSquib Operator RCS-PL-VO04A-T

Fourth Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO04B-L

Squib Operator RCS-PL-VO04B-T

Fourth Stage ADSLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO04C-LSquib Operator RCS-PL-VO04C-T


Revision 4-617

Tier 2 Material 31-19 Revision -1617


Table 31.6-2



AP1OOODescription Tag Number

Fourth Stage ADS

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO04D-L

Squib Operator RCS-PL-VO04D-T

First Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO1I1A-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO1I1A-M

First Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO1IB-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO I1B-M

Second Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO12A-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO12A-M

Second Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO12B-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO12B-M

Third Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO13A-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO13A-M

Third Stage ADS Isolation

Limit Switch RCS-PL-VO13B-L

Motor Operator RCS-PL-VO13B-M

Reactor Vessel Head Vent

Limit Switch RCS-PL-V150A-L

Solenoid Operator RCS-PV-V150A-S


Limit Switch RCS-PL-V150B-L

Solenoid Operator RCS-PL-V150B-S


Limit Switch RCS-PL-V150C-L

Solenoid Operator RCS-PL-V150C-S


Limit Switch RCS-PL-V150D-L

Solenoid Operator RCS-PL-V150D-S

RCS Inner Suction Isolation

Limit Switch RNS-PL-VOOA-L

Motor Operator RNS-PL-VO01A-M

RCS Inner Suction IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-VO01B-L



Table 31.6-2



AP1000Description TaI Number

Motor Operator RNS-PL-VOOB-M

RCS Outer Suction IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-VO02A-L

Motor Operator RNS-PL-VO02A-M

RCS Outer Suction IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-VO02B-LMotor Operator RNS-PL-VO02B-M

RHk Control/Isolation ValveLimit Switch RNS-PL-VO 11-L

Motor Operator RNS-PL-VOII-M

RHR Pump Suction Header IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-V022-L

Motor Operator RNS-PL-V022-M

IRWST Suction Line IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-V023-L

Motor Operator RNS-PL-V023-M

RNS - CVS Containment IsolationLimit Switch RNS-PL-V061-LMotor Operator RNS-PL-V061-M

Containment IsolationLimit Switch SFS-PL-V034-LMotor Operator SFS-PL-V034-M

Containment IsolationLimit Switch SFS-PL-V035-LMotor Operator SFS- PL-V035-M

Containment IsolationLimit Switch SFS-PL-V038-LMotor Operator SFS-PL-V038-M

PORV Block ValveLimit Switch SGS-PL-V027A-LMotor Operator SGS-PL-V027A-M

PORV Block ValveLimit Switch SGS-PL-V027B-L

Motor Operator SGS-PL-V027B-M

Steam Safety Valve SGO1 Limit Switch SGS-PL-V030A-L

Steam Safety Valve SG02 Limit Switch SGS-PL-V030B-L

Steam Safety Valve SGO 1 Limit Switch SGS-PL-V031A-L


Revision 1617



Table 31.6-2

LIST OF POTENTIAL HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVEAP1OOO SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND




Steam Safety Valve SGOI Limit Switch SGS-PL-V032A-L


Steam Safety Valve SGOI Limit Switch SGS-PL-V033A-L


Steam Safety Valve SGO 1 Limit Switch SGS-PL-V034A-L


Steam Safety Valve SGO1 Limit Switch SGS-PL-V035A-L


Steamline Condensate Drain Isolation

Limit Switch SGS-PL-V036A-L

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V036A-S

Steamline Condensate Isolation

Limit Switch SGS-PL-V036B-L

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V036B-S

Main Steamline Isolation

Limit Switch SGS-PL-VO40A-L

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V040A-S I

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V040A-S2



Main Steamline Isolation


Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V040B-S 1

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V040B-S2



Main Feedwater Isolation


Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V057A-S 1




Main Feedwater Isolation

Limit SwitchSolenoid ValveSolenoid Valve

Solenoid Valve

SGS-PL-V057B-LSGS-PL-V057B-S ISGS-PL-V057B-S2SGS-PL-V057B-S3


Revision 4417



Table 31.6-2





Startup Feedwater IsolationLimit Switch SGS-PL-V067A-L

Motor Operator SGS-PL-V067A-M

Startup Feedwater Isolation

Limit Switch SGS-PL-V067B-LMotor Operator SGS-PL-V067B-M

SG Blowdown IsolationLimit Switch SGS-PL-V074A-L


SG Blowdown IsolationLimit Switch SGS-PL-V074B-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V074B-S

SG Series Blowdown IsolationLimit Switch SGS-PL-V075A-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V075A-S

SG Series Blowdown IsolationLimit Switch SGS-PL-V075B-L


Steamline Condensate Drain Isolation Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V086A-S

Steamline Condensate Drain Isolation Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V086B-SPower Operated Relief Valve

Limit Switch SGS-PL-V233A-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V233A-S

Power Operated Relief Valve



MSIV Bypass Isolation ValveLimit Switch SGS- PL-V240A-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V240A-S 1Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V240A-S2

MSIV Bypass Isolation ValveLimit Switch SGS-PL-V240B-L

Solenoid Valve SGS-PL-V240B-SISolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V240B-S2

Main Feedwater Control ValveLimit Switch SGS-PL-V250A-L



Revision 4617

Tier 2 Material 3T-23 Revision 4617


Table 31.6-2



AP1000Description TaI Number

Main Feedwater Control Valve

Limit Switch SGS-PL-V250B-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V250B-S

Startup Feedwater Control Valve



Startup Feedwater Control ValveLimit Switch SGS-PL-V255B-LSolenoid Valve SGS-PL-V255B-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-V186-LSolenoid Valve VBS-PL-V1 86-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-V187-L

Solenoid Valve VBS-PL-V187-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-V188-L

Solenoid Valve VBS-PL-V 188-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-VI89-LSolenoid Valve VBS-PL-VI89-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-V1 90-LSolenoid Valve VBS-PL-V1 90-S

MCR Isolation ValveLimit Switch VBS-PL-V1 91-LSolenoid Valve VBS-PL-V 191-S

Actuation Valve ALimit Switch VES-PL-VO05A-L

Solenoid Operator VES-PL-VO05A-S

Actuation Valve BLimit Switch VES-PL-VO05B-L

Solenoid Operator VES-PL-VO05B-S

Relief Isolation Valve ALimit Switch VES-PL-V022A-LSolenoid Valve VES-PL-V022A-S



Table 31.6-2




Relief Isolation Valve BLimit Switch VES-PL-V022B-LSolenoid Valve VES-PL-V022B-S

Containment Purge Inlet IsolationLimit Switch VFS-PL-V003-LSolenoid Valve VFS-PL-V003-S1

Containment Purge Inlet IsolationLimit Switch VFS-PL-V004-LSolenoid Valve VFS-PL-V004-S 1

Containment Purge Discharge IsolationLimit Switch VFS-PL-V009-L

Solenoid Valve VFS-PL-V009-S1

Containment Purge Discharge IsolationLimit Switch VFS-PL-VO1O-LSolenoid Valve VFS-PL-V01-S1

Fan Cooler Supplv Isolation

Limit Switch VWS-PL-V058-LSolenoid Valve VWS-PL-V058-S

Fan Cooler Return IsolationLimit Switch VWS-PL-V082-LSolenoid Valve VWS-PL-V082-S

Fan Cooler Return IsolationLimit Switch VWS-PL-V086-L

Solenoid Valve VWS-PL-V086-S

Sump Containment Isolation IRCLimit Switch WLS-PL-V055-LSolenoid Valve WLS-PL-V055-S1

Sum= Containment Isolation ORCLimit Switch WLS-PL-V057-L

Solenoid Valve WLS-PL-V057-S 1

RCDT Gas Containment Isolation

Limit Switch WLS-PL-V067-L

Solenoid Valve WLS-PL-V067-S

RCDT Gas Containment IsolationLimit Switch WLS-PL-V068-LSolenoid Valve WLS-PL-V068-S


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-2




Hot Leg 1 Sample IsolationLimit Switch PSS-PL-V001A-L

Hot Leg 2 Sample IsolationLimit Switch PSS-PL-VOOIB-L

Core Makeup Tank A CL Inlet IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-VO02A-L

Motor Onerator PXS-PL-VO02A-M

Core Makeup Tank B CL Inlet IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-V002B-LMotor Operator PXS-PL-V002B-M

PRHR HX Inlet IsolationLimit Switch PXS-PL-V 101-LMotor Operator PXS-PL-V 101-M

Fourth Stage ADS IsolationLimit Switch RCS-PL-V014A-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-V014A-M

Fourth Stage ADS IsolationLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO14B-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO14B-M

Fourth Stage ADS IsolationLimit Switch RCS-PL-VO14C-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-V014C-M

Fourth Stage ADS IsolationLimit Switch RCS-PL-V014D-LMotor Operator RCS-PL-VO14D-M


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3

LIST OF AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICALEQUIPMENT NOT HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVE

AP1000

Description Tag Number Comment

RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTORS

PRHR HX Outlet Temperature RCS-JE-TE161 I

RCS Cold Leg 1A Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE121A 1

RCS Cold Lea 1A Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE121D I

RCS Cold Leg I B Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE 121B

RCS Cold Leg lB Narrow Ranee Temperature RCS-JE-TE121C I

RCS Cold Lee 2A Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE122B

RCS Cold Lee 2A Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE122C

RCS Cold Lee 2B Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE122A

RCS Cold Lee 2B Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE122D

RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE1 31A

RCS Hot Lee 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE 31 C

RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE132A 1

RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE 132C

RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE133C

RCS Hot Lee 1 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE133A I

RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE 131B B

RCS Hot Lee 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE131D 1

RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE132B 1

RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE132D I_

RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE133B

RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE133D 1

RCS Cold Leg 1A Dual Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE125A I

RCS Cold Le 11B Dual Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE125C 1

RCS Cold Leg 2A Dual Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE125B I

RCS Cold Leg 2B Dual Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE125D I

RCS Hot Leg I Wide Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE135A 1

RCS Hot Lee 2 Wide Range Temperature RCS-JE-TE135B 1

PZR Reference Lee Level Temperature RCS-JE-TE1 93A I

PZR Reference Lee Level Temperature RCS-JE-TE1 93B I1

PZR Reference Leg Level Temperature RCS-JE-TE193C I

PZR Reference Lee Level Temperature RCS-JE-TE1 93D 1

THERMOCOUPLES 1

Incore Thermocouples IIS-JE-TE00 I -TE042 I

RCP IA Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE21IA I

RCP 1 A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE2 I1B



Table 31.6-3


API000Description Tag Number Comment

RCP 1 A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE211C C

RCP IA Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE21 ID 1RCP lB Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE212A IRCP lB Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE212B I

RCP lB Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE212C IRCP IB Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE212D I

RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE213A I

RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE213B I

RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE213C IRCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE213D I

RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE214A IRCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE214B I

RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE214C I

RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature RCS-JE-TE214D 1

PENETRATIONS

Penetrations (Mechanical) IPenetrations (Electrical) 1

ACTIVE VALVESContainment Isolation - Air Out CAS-PL-V014 2Containment Isolation - Air In CAS-PL-V015 2

Containment Isolation - Inlet CCS-PL-V200 2

Containment Isolation - Inlet CCS-PL-V201 2Containment Isolation - Outlet CCS-PL-V207 2

Containment Isolation - Outlet CCS-PL-V208 2

RCS Purification Stop Valve CVS-PL-VOO 2

RCS Purification Stop Valve CVS-PL-V002 2RCS Letdown Stop Valve CVS-PL-V003 2

Demineralizer Flush Line Relief Valve CVS-PL-V042 2

WLS Letdown IRC Isolation CVS-PL-V045 2

Letdown Flow ORC Isolation CVS-PL-V047 2RCS Purification Check Valve CVS-PL-V080 2RCS Purification Stop Valve CVS-PL-VO81 2

RCS Purification Check Valve CVS-PL-V082 2

Auxiliary PZR Spray Isolation CVS-PL-V084 2Auxiliary PZR Spray Isolation CVS-PL-V085 2

Makeup Line Containment Isolation CVS-PL-V090 2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3


AP1000Description Tag Number Comment

Makeup Line Containment Isolation CVS-PL-V091 2Hydrogen Addition Containment Isolation CVS-PL-V092 2

Hydrogen Addition Containment Isolation CVS-PL-V094 2Makeup Containment Isolation CVS-PL-VI 00 2

Demineralizer Water System Isolation CVS-PL-V136A 2

Demineralized Water System Isolation CVS-PL-V136B 2Fuel Transfer Tube Gate Valve FHS-PL-VOOl 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VOOA 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VOOB 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VOOC 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VO02A 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VO02B 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-VO02C 2PCCWST Fire Protection Isolation PCS-PL-V005 2

PCCWST Emergency Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Isolation PCS-PL-V009 2

Water Bucket Makeup Line Drain Valve PCS-PL-V015 2Water Bucket Makeup Line Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V020 2

PCS Recirculation Isolation PCS-PL-V023 2

PCCWST Long-Term Makeup Check Valve PCS-PL-V039 2

PCCWST Long Term Makeup Isolation Drain Valve PCS-PL-V042 2

PCCWST Long Term Makeup Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V044 2Emergency Makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V045 2

PCCWST Recirculation Return Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V046 2

Emergency Makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool Drain Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V049 2

Spent Fuel Pool Long Term Makeup Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V050 2

Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Makeup Lower Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V051 2

Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Makeup Isolation PCS-PL-V052 2

Containment Isolation - Air Sample Line PSS-PL-V008 2

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL-VO0OA 2

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL-VO0OB 2

Containment Isolation - Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL-VO0 1 2Containment Isolation - Sample Return Line PSS-PL-V023 2Containment Isolation Sample Return PSS-PL-V024 2

Containment Isolation - Air Sample Line PSS-PL-V046 2

Core Makeup Tank A Discharee Isolation PXS-PL-VO14A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-VO14B 2



Table 31.6-3


AP1000


Core Makeup Tank A Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-VO15A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-VO15B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Discharge PXS-PL-VO16A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge PXS-PL-VO16B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Discharge PXS-PL-VO17A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge PXS-PL-VO17B 2

Accumulator A Pressure Relief PXS-PL-V022A 2

Accumulator B Pressure Relief PXS-PL-V022B 2

Accumulator A Discharge PXS-PL-V028A 2

Accumulator B Discharge PXS-PL-V028B 2

Accumulator A Discharge PXS-PL-V029A 2

Accumulator B Discharge PXS-PL-V029B 2

Nitrogen Supply Outside Containment Isolation PXS-PL-V042 2

IRC Nitrogen Supply Inside Containment Isolation PXS-PL-V043 2

PRHR HX Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-VI08A 2

PRHR HX Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-VI08B 2

Recirc Sump A Isolation PXS-PL-VI 17A 2

Recirc Sump B Isolation PXS-PL-VI17B 2

Recirc Sump A Isolation PXS-PL-V 18A 2

Recirc Sump B Isolation PXS-PL-V 18B 2

Recirc Sump A Isolation PXS-PL-VI 19A 2

Recirc Sump B Isolation PXS-PL-V 19B 2

Recirc Sump, A Isolation PXS-PL-V120A 2

Recirc Sump B Isolation PXS- PL-V120B 2

IRWST Iniection A PXS-PL-V122A 2

IRWST Iniection B PXS-PL-V122B 2

IRWST Injection A PXS-PL-V123A 2

IRWST Injection B PXS-PL-V123B 2


IRWST Injection B PXS-PL-V1 24B 2


IRWST Injection B PXS-PL-V125B 2

IRWST Gutter Drain Isolation A PXS-PL-V130A 2

IRWST Gutter Drain Isolation B PXS-PL-V130B 2

First Stage ADS RCS-PL-VOO1A 2

First Stage ADS RCS-PL-VOOlB 2


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3



Second Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO02A 2

Second Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO02B 2

Third Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO03A 2Third Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO03B 2Fourth Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO04A 2

Fourth Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO04B 2Fourth Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO04C 2Fourth Stage ADS RCS-PL-VO04D 2

PZR Safety Valve RCS-PL-VO05A 2PZR Safety Valve RCS-PL-VO05B 2

ADS Discharge Header A Relief RCS-PL-VOIOA 2ADS Discharge Header B Relief RCS-PL-V01OB 2

First Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VOIA 2

First Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO0IB 2Second Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO12A 2

Second Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO12B 2Third Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO13A 2

Third Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO13B 2

Reactor Vessel Head Vent RCS-PL-V150A 2Reactor Vessel Head Vent RCS-PL-V150B 2

Reactor Vessel Head Vent RCS-PL-V150C 2Reactor Vessel Head Vent RCS-PL-V1 50D 2

RCS Inner Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VOOIA 2RCS Inner Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VOOB 2RCS Outer Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VO02A 2

RCS Outer Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VO02B 2RCS Thermal Relief RNS-PL-VO03A 2

RCS Thermal Relief RNS-PL-VO03B 2

RHR Control/Isolation Valve RNS-PL-VO 11 2

RNS Discharge Containment Isolation RNS-PL-VO 13 2RNS Discharge RCP B Isolation RNS-PL-VO15A 2

RNS Discharge RCP B Isolation RNS-PL-VO 1 5B 2RNS Discharge RCP B Isolation RNS-PL-VO 1 7A 2RNS Discharge RCP B Isolation RNS-PL-VO 1 7B 2

RNS Hot Leg Suction Relief RNS-PL-V021 2

RHR Pump Suction Header Isolation RNS-PL-V022 2



Table 31.6-3

LIST OF AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICALEOUIPMENT NOT HIGH FREOUENCY SENSITIVE

AP1000


IRWST Suction Line Isolation RNS-PL-V023 2

RNS HX A Channel Head Drain RNS-PL-V046A 2

RNS - CVS Containment Isolation RNS-PL-V061 2

Containment Isolation SFS-PL-V034 2


SFS Discharge Containment Isolation SFS-PL-V037 2


Spent Fuel Pool to Cask Washdown Pit Isolation SFS-PL-V066 2

Cask Washdown Pit Drain Isolation SFS-PL-V068 2

Refueling Cavity to SG Compartment SFS-PL-V071 2

Refueling Cavity to SG Compartment SFS-PL-V072 2

PORV Block Valve SGS-PL-V027A 2

PORV Block Valve SGS-PL-V027B 2

Steam Safety Valve SGO1 SGS-PL-V030A 2

Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V030B 2

Steam Safety Valve SGO1 SGS-PL-V031A 2


Steam Safely Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V032A 2


Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V033A 2


Steam Safety Valve SGO 1 SGS-PL-V034A 2


Steam Safety Valve SGOI SGS-PL-V035A 2

Steam Safety Valve SG02 Steamline Condensate SGS-PL-V035B 2

Drain Isolation SGS-PL-V036A 2

Steamline Condensate Isolation SGS-PL-V036B 2

Main Steamline Isolation SGS-PL-V040A 2

Main Steamline Isolation SGS-PL-V040B 2

Main Feedwater Isolation SGS-PL-V057A 2

Main Feedwater Isolation SGS-PL-V057B 2

Startup Feedwater Isolation SGS-PL-V067A 2

Startup Feedwater Isolation SGS-PL-V067B 2

SG Blowdown Isolation SGS-PL-V074A 2

SG Blowdown Isolation SGS-PL-V074B 2


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3



SG Series Blowdown Isolation SGS-PL-V075A 2

SG Series Blowdown Isolation SGS-PL-V075B 2

Steamline Condensate Drain Isolation SGS-PL-V086A 2

Steamline Condensate Drain Isolation SGS-PL-V086B 2

Power Operated Relief Valve SGS-PL-V233A 2

Power Operated Relief Valve SGS-PL-V233B 2

MSIV Bypass Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V240A 2

MSIV Bypass Isolation Valve SGSPL-V240B 2

Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250A 2

Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250B 2

Startup Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V255A 2

Startup Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V255B 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-VI 86 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-VI 87 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V 188 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V 189 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V190 2

MCR Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V191 2

Air Delivery Isolation Valve VES-PL-VOO 2

Pressure Regulator Valve A VES-PL-VO02A 2

Pressure Regulator Valve B VES-PL-VO02B 2

Actuation Valve A VES-PL-VO05A 2

Actuation Valve B VES-PL-VO05B 2

Relief Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V022A 2

Relief Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V022B 2

Air Tank Relief A VES-PL-V040A 2

Air Tank Relief B VES-PL-V040B 2

Air Tank Relief A VES-PL-V041A 2

Air Tank Relief B VES-PL-V041B 2

Containment Purge Inlet Isolation VFS-PL-V003 2

Containment Purge Inlet Isolation VFS-PL-V004 2

Containment Purge Discharge Isolation VFS-PL-V009 2

Containment Purge Discharge Isolation VFS-PL-V010 2

Fan Cooler Supply Isolation VWS-PL-V058 2

Fan Cooler Supply Isolation VWS-PL-V062 2

Fan Cooler Return Isolation VWS-PL-V082 2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3


AP1000


Fan Cooler Return Isolation VWS-PL-V086 2

Sump Containment Isolation IRC WLS-PL-V055 2

Sump Containment Isolation ORC WLS-PL-V057 2

RCDT Gas Containment Isolation WLS-PL-V067 2

RCDT Gas Containment Isolation WLS-PL-V068 2

CVS To Sump WLS-PL-V071 A 2

PXS A To SumRp WLS-PL-V071 B 2

PXS B To Sump WLS-PL-V071 C 2

CVS To Sump WLS-PL-V072 A 2

PXS A To Sump WLS-PL-V072 B 2

PXS B To Sump WLS-PL-V072 C 2

MISCELLANEOUS

Non-Active Valves

Containment Penetration Test Connection Isolation CAS-PL-V027 2

Service Air Supply Outside Containment Isolation CAS-PL-V204 2

Service Air Supply Inside Containment Isolation CAS-PL-V205 2

Containment Penetration Test Connection Isolation CAS-PL-V219 2

Containment Isolation Valve Test Connection - Outlet Line CCS-PL-V209 2

Containment Isolation Valve Test Connection - Inlet Line CCS-PL-V257 2

Resin Flush IRC Isolation CVS-PL-V040 2

Resin Flush ORC Isolation CVS-PL-V041 2

Letdown PZR Instrument Root CVS-PL-V046 2

H2 Mkup Containment Isolation Thermal Relief Valve CVS-PL-V065 2

Hydrogen Add Cont Isolation Test Connection CVS-PL-V095 2

Hydrogen Addition Containment Isolation Test Connection CVS-PL-V096 2

Demin Water Supply Containment Isolation - Outside DWS-PL-V244 2

Demin Water Supply Containment Isolation - Inside DWS-PL-V245 2

Containment Penetration Test Connection Isolation DWS-PL-V248 2

Fire Water Containment Test Connection Isolation FPS-PL-V049 2

Fire Water Containment Supply Isolation FPS-PL-V050 2

Fire Water Containment Test Connection Isolation FPS-PL-V051 2

Fire Water Containment Supply Isolation - Inside FPS-PL-V052 2

Flow Transmitter FTOO Root Valve PCS-PL-VO0OA 2

Flow Transmitter FTOO Root Valve PCS-PL-VO0OB 2

Flow Transmitter FT002 Root Valve PCS-PL-V011A 2

Flow Transmitter FTOO Root Valve PCS-PL-VO0 lB 2



Table 31.6-3

LIST OF AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL

EQUIPMENT NOT HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVE


Flow Transmitter FT003 Root Valve PCS-PL-VO12A 2

Flow Transmitter FT003 Root Valve PCS-PL-VO12B 2

Flow Transmitter FT004 Root Valve PCS-PL-VO13A 2

Flow Transmitter FT004 Root Valve PCS-PL-VO13B 2

PCCWST Drain Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V016 2

PCCWST Isolation Valve Leakage Detection Drain PCS-PL-V029 2PCCWST Isolation Valve Leakage Detection Crossconn PCS-PL-V030 2

PCCWST Level Instrument Root Valve PCS-PL-V031A 2

PCCWST Level Instrument Root Valve PCS-PL-V031B 2

Recirculation Pump Suction from Long Term Makeup Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V033 2

Hot Leg I Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VOO1A 2Hot Leg 2 Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VOOB 2

Pressurizer Sample Isolation PSS-PL-V003 2

PXS Accumulator Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO04A 2

PXS Accumulator Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO04B 2

PXS CMT A Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO05A 2

PXS CMT B Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO05B 2

PXS CMT A Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO05C 2

PXS CMT B Sample Isolation PSS-PL-VO05D 2Liquid Sample Check Valve PSS-PL-VO12A 2

Liquid Sample Check Valve PSS-PL-VO12B 2

Containment Testing Boundary Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V076A 2

Containment Testing Boundary Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V076B 2

Containment Isolation Test Connection Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V082 2




MCR Potable Water Inlet Check Valve PWS-PL-V418 2

PWS MCR Isolation Valve PWS-PL-V420 2Core Makeup Tank A CL Inlet Isolation PXS-PL-VO02A 2

Core Makeup Tank B CL Inlet Isolation PXS-PL-VO02B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Upper Sample PXS-PL-V010A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Upper Sample PXS-PL-VOlOB 2

Core Makeup Tank A Lower Sample PXS-PL-V011A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Lower Sample PXS-PL-V011B 2



Table 31.6-3


API000

Description Tam Number Comment

Core Makeup Tank A Drain PXS-PL-V012A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Drain PXS-PL-VO12B 2

Core Makeup Tank Discharge Manual Isolation PXS-PL-VO13A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Discharge Manual Isolation PXS-PL-VO13B 2

Accumulator A N2 Vent PXS-PL-V021A 2

Accumulator B N, Vent PXS-PL-V021B 2

Accumulator A PZR Transmitter Isolation PXS-PL-V023A 2

Accumulator B PZR Transmitter Isolation PXS-PL-V023B 2

Accumulator A PZR Transmitter Isolation PXS-PL-V024A 2

Accumulator B PZR Transmitter Isolation PXS-PL-V024B 2

Accumulator A Sample PXS-PL-V025A 2

Accumulator B Sample PXS-PL-V025B 2

Accumulator A Drain PXS-PL-V026A 2

Accumulator B Drain PXS-PL-V026B 2

Accumulator A Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V027A 2

Accumulator B Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V027B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V030A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V030B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V031A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V031B 2

Accumulator A Check Valve Drain PXS-PL-V033A 2

Accumulator B Check Valve Drain PXS-PL-V033B 2

Accumulator N, Containment Penetration Test Connection PXS-PL-V052 2

CMT A Wide Level Upper Root PXS-PL-VO80A 2

CMT B Wide Level Upper Root PXS-PL-VO80B 2

CMT A Wide Level Lower Root PXS-PL-V081A 2

CMT B Wide Level Lower Root PXS-PL-V081B 2

CMT A Upper Level A Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V082A 2

CMT B Upper Level A Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V082B 2

CMT A Upper Level A Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V083A 2

CMT B Upper Level A Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V083B 2

CMT A Upper Level A Vent PXS-PL-V084A 2

CMT B Upper Level A Vent PXS-PL-V084B 2

CMT A Upper Level A Drain PXS-PL-VO85A 2

CMT B Upper Level A Drain PXS-PL-V085B 2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3

LIST OF AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICALEOUIPMENT NOT HIGH FREOUENCY SENSITIVE


CMT A Upper Level B Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V086A 2

CMT B Upper Level B Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V086B 2

CMT A Upper Level B Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V087A 2

CMT B Upper Level B Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V087B 2

CMT A Upper Level B Vent PXS-PL-V088A 2

CMT B Upper Level B Vent PXS-PL-V088B 2

CMT A Upper Level B Drain PXS-PL-V089A 2

CMT B Upper Level B Drain PXS-PL-V089B 2

CMT A Lower Level A Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V092A 2

CMT B Lower Level A Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V092B 2

CMT A Lower Level A Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V093A 2

CMT B Lower Level A Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V093B 2

CMT A Lower Level A Vent PXS-PL-V094A 2

CMT B Lower Level A Vent PXS-PL-V094B 2

CMT A Lower Level A Drain PXS-PL-V095A 2

CMT B Lower Level A Drain PXS-PL-V095B 2

CMT A Lower Level B Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V096A 2

CMT B Lower Level B Isolation 1 PXS-PL-V096B 2

CMT A Lower Level B Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V097A 2

CMT B Lower Level B Isolation 2 PXS-PL-V097B 2

CMT A Lower Level B Vent PXS-PL-V098A 2

CMT B Lower Level B Vent PXS-PL-V098B 2

CMT A Lower Level B Drain PXS-PL-V099A 2

CMT B Lower Level B Drain PXS-PL-V099B 2

PRHR HX Inlet Isolation PXS-PL-V101 2

PRHR HX Inlet Head Vent PXS-PL-VI02A 2

PRHR HX Inlet Head Drain PXS-PL-VI02B 2

PRHR HX Outlet Head Vent PXS-PL-VI03A 2

PRHR HX Outlet Head Drain PXS-PL-VI03B 2

PRI-IR HX Flow Transmitter A Isolation PXS-PL-VI04A 2

PRHR HNX Flow Transmitter B Isolation PXS-PL-V104B 2

PRHR HIX Flow Transmitter A Isolation PXS-PL-VI05A 2

PRHR HX Flow Transmitter B Isolation PXS-PL-VI05B 2

PRHR HX/RCS Return Isolation PXS-PL-V109 2

PRHR HX Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V1IIA 2

PRHR HIX Highpoint Vent PXS-PL-V 11lB 2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3


AP1000


PRHR HIX PZR Transmitter Isolation PXS-PL-Vl 13 2

IRWST Line A Isolation PXS-PL-V121A 2

IRWST Line B Isolation PXS-PL-V121B 2

IRWST Iniection Check Test PXS-PL-V126A 2

IRWST Iniection Check Test PXS-PL-V126B 2





IRWST Level Transmitter A Isolation PXS-PL-VI 50A 2

IRWST Level Transmitter B Isolation PXS-PL-VI 50B 2

IRWST Level Transmitter C Isolation PXS-PL-V 150C 2

IRWST Level Transmitter D Isolation PXS-PL-V150D 2

IRWST Level Transmitter A Isolation PXS-PL-V151A 2

IRWST Level Transmitter B Isolation PXS-PL-VI 51B 2

IRWST Level Transmitter C Isolation PXS-PL-V 151C 2

IRWST Level Transmitter D Isolation PXS-PL-V 151 D 2

Accumulator A Leak Test PXS-PL-V201A 2

Accumulator B Leak Test PXS-PL-V201B 2

Accumulator A Leak Test PXS-PL-V202A 2

Accumulator B Leak Test PXS-PL-V202B 2

RNS Discharge Leak Test PXS-PL-V205A 2

RNS Discharge Leak Test PXS-PL-V205B 2

RNS Discharge Leak Test PXS-PL-V206 2

RNS Suction Leak Test PXS-PL-V207A 2

RNS Suction Leak Test PXS-PL-V207B 2

RNS Suction Leak Test PXS-PL-V208A 2

Core Makeup Tank A Fill Isolation PXS-PL-V230A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Fill Isolation PXS-PL-V230B 2

Core Makeup Tank A Fill Check PXS-PL-V231A 2

Core Makeup Tank B Fill Check PXS-PL-V231B 2

Accumulator A Fill/Drain Isolation PXS-PL-V232A 2

Accumulator B Fill/Drain Isolation PXS-PL-V232B 2

ADS Test Valve RCS-PL-VO07A 2

ADS Test Valve RCS-PL-VO07B 2



Table 31.6-3



Fourth Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO14A 2Fourth Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO14B 2

Fourth Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO14C 2Fourth Stage ADS Isolation RCS-PL-VO14D 2Hot Leg 2 Level Instrument Root RCS-PL-V095 2

Hot Lee 2 Level Instrument Root RCS-PL-V096 2

Hot Lee 1 Level Instrument Root RCS-PL-V097 2

Hot Leg 1 Level Instrument Root RCS-PL-V098 2

Hot Leg I Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VIO0A 2Hot Leg 1 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VIO1B 2

Hot Leg 1 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VIOIC 2Hot Leg 1 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-V1OID 2

Hot Leg 1 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-V1O0E 2Hot Leg 1 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-V1O0F 2

Hot Leg 2 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02A 2Hot Leg 2 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02B 2Hot Leg 2 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02C 2

Hot Leg 2Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02D 2Hot Leg 2 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02E 2Hot Leg 2 Flow Instrument Root RCS-PL-VI02F 2

Hot Leg 1 Sample Isolation RCS-PL-V108A 2

Hot Leg 2 Sample Isolation RCS-PL-VI08B 2PZR Spray Valve RCS-PL-V I10A 2PZR Sprav Valve RCS-PL-V11OB 2PZR Sprav Block Valve RCS-PL-V 11 A 2

PZR Spray Block Valve RCS-PL-V11B 2Cold Leg 1A Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V171A 2

Cold Leg 1A Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V171B 2

Cold Leg lB Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V172A 2Cold Leg lB Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V172B 2

Cold Leg 2A Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V173A 2

Cold Leg 2A Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V173B 2Cold Leg 2B Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V174A 2

Cold Leg 2B Bend Instrument Root RCS-PL-V174B 2

PZR Manual Vent RCS-PL-V204 2

PZR Manual Vent RCS-PL-V205 2


Revision 4-617



Table 31.6-3



PZR Spray Bypass RCS-PL-V210A 2PZR Spray Bypass RCS-PL-V210B 2

PZR Level Steam Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V225A 2PZR Level Steam Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V225B 2PZR Level Steam Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V225C 2PZR Level Steam Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V225D 2

PZR Level Liquid Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V226A 2PZR Level Liquid Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V226B 2PZR Level Liquid Space Instrtment Root RCS-PL-V226C 2PZR Level Liquid Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V226D 2Wide Range PZR Level Steam Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V228 2Wide Range PZR Level Liquid Space Instrument Root RCS-PL-V229 2Manual Head Vent RCS-PL-V232 2Head Vent Isolation RCS-PL-V233 2ADS Valve Discharge Header Drain Isolation RCS-PL-V241 2RCP 1A Flush RCS-PL-V260A 2RCP lB Flush RCS-PL-V260B 2RCP 2A Flush RCS-PL-V260C 2RCP 2B Flush RCS-PL-V260D 2RCP 1A Drain RCS-PL-V261A 2RCP lB Drain RCS-PL-V261B 2RCP 2A Drain RCS-PL-V261 C 2RCP 2B Drain RCS-PL-V261D 2RCS Pressure Boundary Valve Thermal Relief Isolation RNS-PL-VO04A 2RCS Pressure Boundary Valve Thermal Relief Isolation RNS-PL-VO04B 2RNS Pump A Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VO05A 2RNS Pump B Suction Isolation RNS-PL-VO05B 2RNS HX A Outlet Flow Control RNS-PL-VO06A 2RNS HX B Outlet Flow Control RNS-PL-VO06B 2RNS Pump A Discharge Isolation RNS-PL-VO07A 2RNS Pump B Discharge Isolation RNS-PL-VO07B 2RNS HX A Bypass Flow Control RNS-PL-V008A 2RNS HX B Bypass Flow Control RNS-PL-VO08B 2RNS Discharge Containment Isolation Valve Test RNS-PL-VO 10 2RNS Discharge Containment Isolation Valve Test Connection, ORC RNS-PL-VO12 2RNS Discharge Containment Isolation Valve Test Connection RNS-PL-VO14 2



Table 31.6-3


AP1000

Description TaE Number Comment

RNS Discharge Containment Penetration Isolation Valves Test RNS-PL-V016 2

RNS Discharge to IRWST Isolation RNS-PL-V024 2

RNS Discharge to CVS RNS-PL-V029 2

RNS Train A Discharge Flow Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V03 1A 2

RNS Train B Discharge Flow Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V03 lB 2

RNS Train A Discharge Flow Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V032A 2

RNS Train B Discharge Flow Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V032B 2

RNS Pump A Suction Pressure Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V033A 2

RNS Pump B Suction Pressure Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V033B 2

RNS Pump A Discharge Pressure Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V034A 2

RNS Pump B Discharge Pressure Instrument Isolation RNS-PL-V034B 2

RNS Pump A Suction Piping Drain Isolation RNS-PL-V036A 2

RNS Pump B Suction Piping Drain Isolation RNS-PL-V036B 2

RNS Pump Discharge Relief RNS-PL-V045 2

RNS HX B Channel Head Drain Isolation RNS-PL-V046B 2

RNS Pump A Casing Drain Isolation RNS-PL-V050 2

RNS Pump B Casing Drain Isolation RNS-PL-V051 2

RNS Suction from SFP Isolation RNS-PL-V052 2

RNS Discharge to SFP Isolation RNS-PL-V053 2

RNS Suction from Cask Loading Pit Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V055 2

RNS Pump Suction to Cask Loading Pit Isolation RNS-PL-V056 2

RNS Train A Miniflow Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V057A 2

RNS Train B Miniflow Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V057B 2

RNS Pump Suction Containment Isolation Test Connection RNS-PL-V059 2

LTO 1 9A Root Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V024A 2

LTO 1 9B Root Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V024B 2

LTO 1 9C Root Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V024C 2

LT020 Root Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V028 2

SFS Refueling Cavity Drain To SGS Compartment Isolation SFS-PL-V031 2

SFS Refueling Cavity Suction Isolation SFS-PL-V032 2

SFS Refueling Cavity Drain to Containment Sump Isolation SFS-PL-V033 2

SFS Suction Line from IRWST Isolation SFS-PL-V039 2

SFS Fuel Transfer Canal Suction Isolation SFS-PL-V040 2

SFS Cask Loading Pit Suction Isolation SFS-PL-V041 2

SFS Cask Loading Pit to Pumps Suction Isolation SFS-PL-V042 2

SFS CVS Makeup Reverse Flow Prevention SFS-PL-V043 2


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3

LIST OF AP1000 SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICALEOUIPMENT NOT HIGH FREQUENCY SENSITIVE

AP1000


SFS Discharge Line to Cask Loading Pit Isolation SFS-PL-V045 2

SFS Containment Penetration Test Connection SFS-PL-V048 2

SFS Cask Loading Pit Drain to WLS Isolation SFS-PL-V049 2

SFS Containment Penetration Test Connection Isolation SFS-PL-V056 2

SFS Containment Isolation Valve V034 Test SFS-PL-V058 2

LT001 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V001A 2

LT005 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VOOB 2

LT001 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO02A 2

LT005 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO02B 2













LTOI I Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V010A 2

LTO13 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V010B 2

LTOI I Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V011A 2

LTO013 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO 11B 2

LTO12 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO12A 2

LTO14 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO12B 2

LTO 12 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO13A 2

LTO14 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO13B 2

FT021 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO15A 2

FT023 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-VO15B 2








Revision 4.617



Table 31.6-3


AP1000


Main Steamline Vent Isolation SGS-PL-VO19A 2

Main Steamline Vent Isolation SGS-PL-VO19B 2

PT030 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V022A 2

PT034 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V022B 2







Steamline 1 Nitrogen Supply Isolation SGS-PL-V038A 2

Steamline 2 Nitrogen Sugply Isolation SGS-PL-V038B 2

MSIV Bypass Control Isolation SGS-PL-V042A 2

MSIV Bypass Control Isolation SGS-PL-V042B 2

MSIV Bypass Control Isolation SGS-PL-V043A 2

MSIV Bypass Control Isolation SGS-PL-V043B 2

SG I Condensate Pipe Drain Valve SGS-PL-V045A 2

SG2 Condensate Pipe Drain Valve SGS-PL-V045B 2

LTO 15 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V046A 2

LTO 17 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V046B 2

LTO 15 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V047A 2


LTO16 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V048A 2


LTO16 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V049A 2

LTO18 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V049B 2


LT046 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V050B 2


LT046 Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V05 1B 2








Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3



Main Feedwater Check SGS-PL-V058A 2

Main Feedwater Check SGS-PL-V058B 2

FT055A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V062A 2

FT056A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V062B 2

FT055A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V063A 2


FT055A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V064A 2FT056A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V064B 2FT055A Root Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V065A 2


SGI Nitrogen Sparging Isolation SGS-PL-V084A 2SG2 Nitrogen Sparging Isolation SGS-PL-V084B 2

Orifice Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V093A 2

Orifice Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V093B 2

Orifice Cleanout Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V094A 2

Orifice Cleanout Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V094B 2

Orifice Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V095A 2

Orifice Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V095B 2Steamline Condensate Drain Level Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V096A 2

Steamline Condensate Drain Level Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V096B 2

Steamline Condensate Drain Level Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V097A 2

Steamline Condensate Drain Level Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V097B 2Startup Feedwater Check Valve SGS-PL-V256A 2

Startup Feedwater Check Valve SGS-PL-V256B 2

Test Connection Shutoff for MCR Inlet Isolation Valve V 186 VBS-PL-V164 2

Test Connection Shutoff for MCR Inlet Isolation Valve V 187 VBS-PL-V 165 2

Test Connection Shutoff for MCR Inlet Isolation Valve V188 VBS-PL-V166 2



Test Connection Shutoff for MCR Inlet Isolation Valve V 191 VBS-PL-V169 2

Air Delivery Line Pressure Instrument Isolation Valve A VES-PL-VO06A 2

Air Delivery Line Pressure Instrument Isolation Valve B VES-PL-VO06B 2Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V016 2

Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve A VES-PL-VO18 2

Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V019 2Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V020 2


Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3



Air Tank Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V024A 2

Air Tank Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V024B 2

Air Tank Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V025A 2

Air Tank Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V025B 2

Refill Line Isolation Valve VES-PL-V038 2

DP Instrument Line Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V043A 2DP Instrument Line Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V043B 2

Main Air Flow Path Isolation Valve VES-PL-V044 2

Containment Isolation Test Connection VFS-PL-V001 2





Containment Isolation Test Connection VFS-PL-VO12 2

Containment Isolation Test Connection VFS-PL-V0 15 2

Main Equipment Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V0 15 2

Maintenance Equipment Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V016 2Personnel Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V017 2

Personnel Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V018 2

Personnel Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V019 2Personnel Hatch Test Connection VUS-PL-V020 2



Fuel Transfer Tube Test Connection VUS-PL-V023 2

Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-VI 01 2

Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-V102 2




Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-V106 2Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-V1 07 2

Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-V 108 2

Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-V1 09 2







Table 31.6-3


API000Description Tae Number Comment


Electrical Penetration Test Isolation Valve VUS-PL-Vl 15 2










Spare Penetration Test Connection VUS-PL-V140 2



VWS Supply Containment Penetration IRC Test Connection/Vent VWS-PL-V424 2

VWS Return Containment Penetration ORC Test Connection/Vent VWS-PL-V425 2

Heat Exchangers

Normal Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger A RNS-ME-O1A 3

Normal Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger B RNS-ME-01B 3

Tanks

Spent Fuel Pool FHS-MT-01 3

Fuel Transfer Canal FHS-MT-02 3

Spent Fuel Cask Loading Pit FHS-MT-05 3

Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank PCS-MT-01 3

Water Distribution Bucket PCS-MT-03 3

Water Collection Troughs PCS-MT-04 3

Passive RHR Heat Exchanger PXS-ME-01 3

Accumulator Tank A PXS-MT-01A 3

Accumulator Tank B PXS-MT-O0B 3

Core Makeup Tank A PXS-MT-02A 3

Core Makeup Tank B PXS-MT-02B 3

In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank PXS-MT-03 3

Emergency Air Storage Tank 01 VES-MT-01 3





Revision 4617



Table 31.6-3


AP1000








Emergency Air Storage Tank 11 VES-MT- 11 3






















Main Feed Pump A Status ECS-ES-3-XXX 4

Main Feed Pump B Status ECS-ES-4-XXX 4

Main Feed Pump C Status ECS-ES-5-XXX 4

Comment Notes:

1. Rugged AP 1000 safety-related equipment with no moving parts required in demonstrating functionaloperability during a seismic event is considered to be not sensitive to HRHF seismic loadings. Seismicqualification is based on the seismic loads associated with the mounting location of the safety-relatedequipment as a minimum. APOOO Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS) seismic loadsat the mounting location of the safety-related equipment produces comparable or higher equipmentstresses and deflections than the Hard Rock High Frequency (HRHF) seismic loadings based on the



work reported in APP-GW-GLR-1 15, "Effect of High Frequency Seismic Content on SSCs." Forrugged safety-related line-mounted equipment being qualified by test, seismic testing will be performedin compliance with IEEE Std 382-1996 with a required input motion (RIM) curve extended to 64 Hztypically to a peak acceleration of 6g.

2. AP1000 safety-related valves are seismic qualified in accordance with ASME code for structuralintegrity to a maximum acceleration of 6g in all three principal orthogonal axes. API 000 CSDRSseismic loads at the mounting location of the safety-related equipment produce comparable or higherequipment stresses and deflections than the HRHF seismic loadings based on the work reported in APP-GW-GLR-1 15, "Effect of High Frequency Seismic Content on SSCs." For rugged safety-related line-mounted equipment being qualified by test, seismic testing will be performed in compliance with IEEEStd 382-1996 with a required input motion (RIM) curve extended to 64 Hz typically to a peakacceleration of 6g.

3. Seismic qualification is based on structural integrity alone to the seismic loadings associated with themounting location of the safety-related equipment as a minimum. AP1OOO CSDRS seismic loads at themounting location of the safety-related equipment produce comparable or higher equipment stresses anddeflections than the HRHF seismic loadings based on the work reported in APP-GW-GLR-115, "Effectof High Frequency Seismic Content on SSCs."

4. Seismic qualification is not required.


3. Design of Structures, Components,Equipment and Systems API000 Design Control Document

API000 Horizontal Spectra Comparison

04-1.

*15

1.00

0.90

0.80

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

0.00 -

0.1 1.0 10.0

Frequency (Hz)

100.0

Figure 31.1-1

Comparison of Horizontal AP1000 CSDRS and Bellefonte GMRS


Revision 4417


3. Design of Structures, Components,Equipment and Systems API000 Design Control Document

APIOOO Vertical Spectra Comparison

C

0

4)

00U

1.00

0.90

0.80

0.70

0.60

0.50

0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

0.00

0.1 1.0 10.0

Frequency (Hz)

100.0

Figure 31.1-2

Comparison of Vertical AP1000 CSDRS and Bellefonte GMRS


Revision 4.617





Question:

Why is no additional low level testing (5 OBEs) for high frequency sensitiveequipment/components being conducted? Justifications for not doing this testing is required forstaff to complete the Safety Evaluation for equipment/components identified as sensitive to highfrequency motion that is located in an area with potential for high frequency seismic inputmotions. OBE testing requirements of IEEE Std 344-1987 and SRP 3.10 must be satisfied.The NRC Commission's Policy and staff's technical positions related to OBE issues are clearlydelineated in SECY-93-087.


The HRHF screening test is a supplemental test to the required seismic qualificationmethods performed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1987 for those plants whichhave high frequency exceedance of the AP1000 Certified Seismic Design ResponseSpectra (CSDRS). The purpose of the HRHF screening test is to demonstrate thatthe potential HRHF-sensitive safety-related equipment will perform their safety-related function as required under HRHF seismic excitation. The HRHF seismic testis performed in conjunction with the AP1 000 ISRS seismic qualification testing or it asupplemental test performed after completion of the AP1 000 ISRS seismicqualification testing.

Potential HRHF sensitive equipment will be subjected to one HRHF test run aftercompletion of the CSDRS qualification testing (five OBEs and a minimum of oneSSE) to confirm the acceptable performance of the safety-related equipment prior tothe HRHF seismic excitation. This test run will demonstrate that the safely-relatedequipment will not adversely affect the equipment's safety function performance norcause any condition to exist that, if undetected, would cause failure of suchperformance during a subsequent HRHF screening test. The Westinghouse HRHFscreening test will be in compliance with the seismic test input requirements in IEEEStd 344-1987 and Interim Staff Guidance defined in COL/DC-ISG-1, "Interim StaffGuidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency Ground Motion."

The five OBE (one-half SSE) and a minimum of one SSE AP1 000 ISRS test runspreceding the HRHF screening test are performed in compliance with IEEE Std344-1987. All of these test runs can be used to address seismic aging (fatigue) ofthe safety-related equipment in the high frequency exceedance region. Each testrun will produce a number of peak stress magnitudes, which will have fatiguedamage potential. OBE testing in the HF exceedance region less not significantbecause the cyclic fatigue of equipment (ten peak stress cycles per event) for

RAI-SRP3.1o-EMB-03 Rev.1Page 1 of 2



equipment is more damaging in the frequency range below the HF exceedanceregion. The acceleration response in the HF exceedance region will produce verysmall displacements and lower number of high-stress cycles resulting in the overallequipment accumulative fatigue being less than or equal to that experienced duringqualification testing.


None

PRA Revision:

None


None

OWestinghouseRAI-SRP3.10-EMB-03 Rev.1

Page 2 of 2



RAI Response Number: RAI-SRP3.1 O-EMB/EEB-04Revision: 1

Question:

Why doesn't Table 6.4.5-1 include such equipment as battery chargers and inverters?Technologies and designs of certain electronic components (relay and microprocessor-basedcomponents) have undergone significant changes and new reactor designs will have a moreprevalent use of digital components in place of the traditional analog components. This shouldbe taken into account in the screening process. Type testing is a preferred method todemonstrate seismic qualification for those electrical equipment/components determined to behigh frequency sensitive.


Electronic components such as those found in battery chargers, inverters, solidstate and microprocessor-based components are currently listed in Table 6.4.5-1,"Potential Sensitive Equipment List."

Table 3.11-1 of AP1000 DCD Rev. 16 was reviewed to verify that all potential highfrequency (HF) sensitive AP1000 safety-related equipment were captured inAPP-GW-GLN-144 (TR-144) Table A-i, "Potential High Frequency SensitiveAP1000 Safety-Related Equipment." As a result of the review, additionalequipment was identified that may be potentially HF-sensitive. Table A-1 hasbeen updated to include the following additional equipment types: batteries,neutron detectors, radiation monitors and Hot Leg sample isolation limit switches.The remaining AP1 000 safety-related equipment not high frequency sensitive willbe defined in APP-GW-GLN-144 Table A-2, "List of AP1 000 Safety-RelatedElectrical and Mechanical Equipment Not High Frequency Sensitive." Table A-2will also include the justification for classifying the equipment as not HF-sensitive.These Tables are to be incorporated intoTier 2 Section 3 Appendix 31 of AP1 000DCD Revision 17. The mark-up of the DCD Appendix 31 is included in theresponse to RAI-SRP3.10-EMB-01.

Design Control Document (DCD) Revision:None

PRA Revision:None

Technical Report (TR) Revision:None

RAW-SRP3.10-EMB/EEB-04 Rev.1Page 1 of 1




Question:

What are the justifications for the conclusion addressing use of existing test data in Sections6.4.1 and 6.4.7 (Summary and Conclusion)? Most of the existing qualification test data wereobtained using frequency inputs to the shake table up to 33 Hz. The test response accelerationof 2.Og (zero period acceleration at 5 percent critical damping) shown in the existing test dataobtained from the low frequency (less than 33 Hz) seismic tests may not represent the actualresponse acceleration of the electrical/electronic equipment/components with naturalfrequencies higher than 33 Hz, when the RRS contains the required frequency input higher than33 Hz. In order for the existing data to be valid for resolving HF concerns, the adequacy of thetime history or the adequacy of the frequency contents and the stationarity of the frequencycontents of the synthesized waveform used for the shake table tests must be shown to becompatible with the amplified region of the RRS at high frequencies. IEEE 344-1987requirements must be met.


The conclusions reached were based the information presented in APP-GW-GLR-115 (TR-1 15), Section 6.4.4 (Review of Existing Seismic Test Data). We believethis test data conservatively demonstrates that multiple frequency seismic testingin accordance with IEEE Std 344-1987 requirements to a spectral level of 2.0 g's(at 5% critical damping) in the 25 Hz to 50 Hz frequency range will not impact thestructural integrity and functional operability of the equipment where it has beenshown to be acceptable through seismic testing up to 33 Hz. The 2.0g level isconsidered an upper bound base input for functionality of equipment withoutfurther testing or evaluation. The test inputs typically included energy content up to100 Hz.

The AP1000 Hard Rock High Frequency (HRHF) screening test is used todemonstrate that potential HRHF-sensitive equipment is acceptable for the HRHFexceedance region. The peak of exceedance region is in the 25 Hz to 50 Hzrange. The AP1000 ISRS and HRHF test input time histories are thirty seconddurations with frequency content up to the cutoff frequency developed inaccordance with sub-clause 7.6.3 (Multiple-Frequency Tests) and Annex B(Frequency Content and Stationarity) of IEEE Std 344-1987.

IEEE Std 344-1987 provides the guidance to ensure that the seismic test input isgenerated and in compliance with the frequency range of interest. An evaluationof the test input waveform should be conducted per IEEE Std 344-1987 Annex Bto verify the test data has sufficient content over the frequency range of interest




throughout the input time history. If an evaluation of the test input is performedand the data demonstrate sufficient frequency content in the high-frequency rangethroughout the time history then the data will be acceptable.

Power Spectral Density (PSD) and other acceptable evaluation methods asdefined IEEE Std 344-1987 are ways of determining energy content within aseismic test run. When available, PSD plots were used to evaluate seismic testdata reported in Section 6.4.4 of AP1 000 APP-GW-GLR-115 (TR-115). For thetest data reported, energy content in the 25 Hz to 50 Hz frequency range wasdemonstrated by meeting at least one of the following criteria:

1. Test report stated that the seismic time history inputs were developed withcontent in the frequency range up to 50 Hz as a minimum.

2. The test response spectra (TRS) were shown to be amplified in the 25 Hz to50 Hz frequency and were not caused by impact or test unit rattling.

3. PSD plots indicate energy content in the high frequency region.

Figures 1 through 6 provide examples of test data which demonstrate frequencycontent in the 25 Hz to 50 Hz range.

PSD plots were generated by the test facility at the time of testing. The PSD plotsrepresent a time segment analysis of the seismic test excitation. This data is notbeing used to demonstrate HRHF acceptability for the AP1 000 safety-relatedequipment defined in APP-GW-GLN-144 (TR-144) Table A-1. The test data inTR-1 15 represents existing Westinghouse seismic test data reviewed as part ofthe study to confirm that seismic qualification to the AP1000 certified design ISRSenvelops the HRHF seismic inputs for most applications.

Test Report 53753-1 Test Run 27 and Test Report 6328 Test Run SSE-2 are twoexamples of test programs that included HRHF content. TR-1 15 test data andconclusion reached were not based solely on these two test reports, but numeroustest reports that were completed over a 14 year period. This test data is notdirectly apply to any of the safety-related equipment defined in TR-144 Table A-1.

The HRHF test data to be used for AP1000 safety-related'equipment to addressHRHF exceedance issues will be generated in the future during the AP1 000safety-related equipment qualification program.

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Question:

In Subsection 3.10.2.2, a rigid valve is defined as the valve with natural frequency equaling orexceeding 33 hertz (Hz). The use of Figure 1 (not Figure 6 as stated) of IEEE 382-1996 as theRIM (up to 32 Hz) for qualification of valve is adequate for Certified Seismic Design ResponseSpectra (CSDRS). However, the definition of rigid valve, the determination of the equivalentstatic load from the dynamic analysis of the valve, and the use of Figure 1 (not Figure 6 asstated) of IEEE 382-1996 might not be adequate for HRHF required response spectra (RRS)with exceedance. For HRHF spectra, the definition of rigid valve depends on the frequency atthe beginning of zero period acceleration (ZPA) of the RRS for the valve. The applicant isrequested to explain why the use of Figure 1 (frequency ends at 32 Hz) of IEEE 382-1996 is stilladequate for qualification of valves, and provide methodologies that would be acceptable for thecase of HRHF RRS with exceedance.


Please note that Figure 6 of IEEE Std 382-1996 is the "Seismic qualification required inputmotion (RIM)." Figure 1 of IEEE Std 382-1996 is the "Qualification type test parameters insideBWR..." AP1000 safety-related equipment will be seismically qualified to in-structure responsespectra (ISRS) based on AP1 000 Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS). Thecutoff frequency (zero period acceleration (ZPA)) for the AP1 000 CSDRS is 33Hz based onRegulatory Guide 1.60, Revision 1 entitled "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants."

Westinghouse is performing seismic qualification of safety-related structures, systems andcomponents (SSCs) based on AP1000 CSDRS. The HRHF screening is a functionalverification test in compliance with Interim Staff Guidance defined in COL/DC-ISG-1, "InterimStaff Guidance on Seismic Issues of High Frequency Ground Motion." to verify potential highfrequency sensitive safety-related equipment will be perform as required under Hard Rock HighFrequency (HRHF) seismic demand response spectra.

The HF screening is a supplemental evaluation to the required seismic qualification methodsperformed in accordance with IEEE Std. 344-1987 for those plants which have high frequencyexceedance of their CSDRS and potentially high frequency sensitive equipment andcomponents. The industry review of HRHF and further evaluations of SSCs performed byWestinghouse concluded that evaluations employing HRHF Ground Motion Response Spectra(GMRS) are less harmful than the CSDRS demand except for the functionality of potentialHRHF-sensitive components. For potential HRHF-sensitive components an additionalevaluation would be performed by Westinghouse using the HF screening process defined inAP1 000 Technical Report APP-GW-GLR-1 15, Revision 0, "Effect of High Frequency Seismic

RAI-SRP3.1P-EMB-08 Rev.1

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Content on SSCs." The purpose of the HF screening is to demonstrate that the potential HRHF-sensitive equipment is acceptable for the application. In those instances where the seismicqualification of line-mounted equipment (e.g. valve appurtenances) are potential HRHF-sensitive components, seismic testing performed in compliance with IEEE Std 382-1996 Figure6 RIM curve will be extended out for one additional octave to 64 Hz.

AP1000 DCD Tier 2 document, Section 3.7.3.5.1 defines rigid components such as rigid valvesas the following: "A rigid component (fundamental frequency 2! 33 hertz), whose support can berepresented by a flexible spring, can be modelled as a single degree of freedom model in thedirection of excitation (horizontal or vertical directions)." When dealing with HRHF sites weshould refrain from using the wording rigid equipment or rigid components because it can differbetween the AP1 000 CSRDS and HRHF sites. Seismic qualification of safety-relatedequipment by analysis will be addressed over the range of interest up to the cutoff frequency ofthe AP1000 certified design ISRS. In most instances a dynamic analysis or a static coefficientanalysis using the peak of the applicable response spectra at the mounting location of theequipment will be used.


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Documents

AP1000 Response to Request for Additional Information … · SRP3.10-EMB-01 ,-02,-03,-05,-08,-09 and RAI-SRP3.10-EMB/EEB-04 was submitted under Westinghouse letter DCP/NRC2144 dated