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1 B. G. Goodrich, Ph.D., University of Colorado at Denver, 2009 “Timely Thinking: A Philosopher Salutes Buzsáki, Llinás, and Merleau-Ponty” Summary and Introduction Two distinguished and pioneering neurophysiologists have recently described consciousness and its substrates in terms of time. “Timeness is Consciousness” 1 is one of the headings in Rodolfo Llinás’s I of the Vortex. György Buszáki begins his recent Rhythms of the Brain 2 with the anticipatory punch‐line that brains are predicting devices, in virtue of the rhythms they generate throughout time. I agree with these scientists – against many of my philosophical colleagues – that empirical biological research must be the main means of exploring how consciousness is generated by the brain. And I am nonetheless entering the discussion because there are a few inherited philosophical presuppositions in these two works that might interfere with applying their insights fully, and that can be usefully tweaked into greater consistency with their approaches. In one instance, that of subjective time experience, I suggest that the standard account taken for granted as common sense since the Enlightenment should be entirely replaced by a more accurate description given by early 20 th century French psychologist and philosopher Maurice Merleau‐Ponty. 3 The results lead directly to suggestions for future studies by neurophysiologists. 4 A Place for Philosophers? Topics such as the mind/body “problem,” the free will/determinism “question,” and the source of moral impulses were until recent decades regarded as exclusively the territory of philosophy. Now, these topics are rapidly being adopted by the physical and social sciences, themselves originally categorized as “natural philosophy” or “moral philosophy.” I applaud the greater accuracy and progress that this shift has frequently made possible. After all, the boundaries between western disciplines have always been fluid 5 and occasionally arbitrary and overlapping. Currently, there is an increasing need for interdisciplinary cooperation in certain areas, 6 including neuroscience, which benefits from fields such as complex systems theory, physics, 1 Rodolfo R. Llinás, I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self (The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA), 2001, p. 120. 2 György Buszáki, Rhythms of the Brain (Oxford University Press), 2006, p. vii. 3 In my reading of Merleau‐Ponty I am deeply indebted to Forrest Williams, Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado at Boulder, whose lectures on Spinoza and Merleau‐Ponty are still spoken of with awe. Some of the content of this paper is drawn from my doctoral dissertation, directed by Williams and defended in 1994. Any errors, of course, are my own. 4 Because this paper is addressed to scientists and philosophers both, I am not assuming any special knowledge of either. If what I am describing in any paragraph or section is familiar to you, please feel free to skip that paragraph or section. I am also reluctantly abbreviating many philosophical points, aiming to include only what is absolutely required for this discussion. 5 E.g. molecular biology departments sometimes exist separately from organismic and environmental biology departments, and biochemistry has been gradually converging in content with molecular biology. Chemistry’s roots are in alchemy. And Aristotle is claimed by both philosophers and scientists as our founding patriarch. 6 Besides neuroscience, another field which requires interdisciplinary collaboration, including contributions from philosophers, is ethical psychology/anthropology, as exemplified in Frans de Waal’s Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved.

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B.G.Goodrich,Ph.D.,UniversityofColoradoatDenver,2009

“TimelyThinking:APhilosopherSalutesBuzsáki,Llinás,andMerleau­Ponty”SummaryandIntroduction

Twodistinguishedandpioneeringneurophysiologistshaverecentlydescribed

consciousnessanditssubstratesintermsoftime.“TimenessisConsciousness”1isoneoftheheadingsinRodolfoLlinás’sIoftheVortex.GyörgyBuszákibeginshisrecentRhythmsoftheBrain2withtheanticipatorypunch‐linethatbrainsarepredictingdevices,invirtueoftherhythmstheygeneratethroughouttime.

Iagreewiththesescientists–againstmanyofmyphilosophicalcolleagues–thatempiricalbiologicalresearchmustbethemainmeansofexploringhowconsciousnessisgeneratedbythebrain.AndIamnonethelessenteringthediscussionbecausethereareafewinheritedphilosophicalpresuppositionsinthesetwoworksthatmightinterferewithapplyingtheirinsightsfully,andthatcanbeusefullytweakedintogreaterconsistencywiththeirapproaches.Inoneinstance,thatofsubjectivetimeexperience,IsuggestthatthestandardaccounttakenforgrantedascommonsensesincetheEnlightenmentshouldbeentirelyreplacedbyamoreaccuratedescriptiongivenbyearly20thcenturyFrenchpsychologistandphilosopherMauriceMerleau‐Ponty.3Theresultsleaddirectlytosuggestionsforfuturestudiesbyneurophysiologists.4APlaceforPhilosophers?

Topicssuchasthemind/body“problem,”thefreewill/determinism“question,”andthesourceofmoralimpulseswereuntilrecentdecadesregardedasexclusivelytheterritoryofphilosophy.Now,thesetopicsarerapidlybeingadoptedbythephysicalandsocialsciences,themselvesoriginallycategorizedas“naturalphilosophy”or“moralphilosophy.”Iapplaudthegreateraccuracyandprogressthatthisshifthasfrequentlymadepossible.Afterall,theboundariesbetweenwesterndisciplineshavealwaysbeenfluid5andoccasionallyarbitraryandoverlapping.

Currently,thereisanincreasingneedforinterdisciplinarycooperationincertainareas,6includingneuroscience,whichbenefitsfromfieldssuchascomplexsystemstheory,physics,

1RodolfoR.Llinás,IoftheVortex:FromNeuronstoSelf(TheMITPress:Cambridge,MA),2001,p.120.2GyörgyBuszáki,RhythmsoftheBrain(OxfordUniversityPress),2006,p.vii.

3InmyreadingofMerleau‐PontyIamdeeplyindebtedtoForrestWilliams,ProfessorEmeritusattheUniversityofColoradoatBoulder,whoselecturesonSpinozaandMerleau‐Pontyarestillspokenofwithawe.Someofthecontentofthispaperisdrawnfrommydoctoraldissertation,directedbyWilliamsanddefendedin1994.Anyerrors,ofcourse,aremyown.4Becausethispaperisaddressedtoscientistsandphilosophersboth,Iamnotassuminganyspecialknowledgeofeither.IfwhatIamdescribinginanyparagraphorsectionisfamiliartoyou,pleasefeelfreetoskipthatparagraphorsection.Iamalsoreluctantlyabbreviatingmanyphilosophicalpoints,aimingtoincludeonlywhatisabsolutelyrequiredforthisdiscussion.

5E.g.molecularbiologydepartmentssometimesexistseparatelyfromorganismicandenvironmentalbiologydepartments,andbiochemistryhasbeengraduallyconvergingincontentwithmolecularbiology.Chemistry’srootsareinalchemy.AndAristotleisclaimedbybothphilosophersandscientistsasourfoundingpatriarch.6Besidesneuroscience,anotherfieldwhichrequiresinterdisciplinarycollaboration,includingcontributionsfromphilosophers,isethicalpsychology/anthropology,asexemplifiedinFransdeWaal’sPrimatesandPhilosophers:HowMoralityEvolved.

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psychology,A.I.‐relatedcognitivescience,andmore.Insomecases,philosopherscanbeofserviceaswell.Withregardtoneuroscience,philosopherscansometimeshelpthemostbyidentifyingtacitbutquestionableassumptions.Often,thesearepresuppositionsintroducedbyourownphilosophicalpredecessorsandhandedonasheirloomswhenthebiologists,chemists,orpsychologists(especiallypsychologists)movedouttoformtheirowndisciplines.7

BothBuszákiandLlinásarephilosophicallysophisticated,BuzsákifromtheEuropeanContinent’sschoolsofphilosophy,andLlinásfromtheAnglo‐Americanschoolsofphilosophy;Llinás’sspouse,GillianKimber,isaphilosopher.Iwouldliketothinkthatthishascontributedtotheirinsightsandoriginality.Certainlytheyhaveavoidedorconfrontedandcorrectedmanyconceptualdifficultiesinheritedbytheirdiscipline‐‐ashasanotherneurophysiologist,AntonioDamasio,bychallengingexistingassumptionsremainingfromDescartesandothers,andfindinginspirationinsteadinDescartes’hithertounder‐appreciatedopponent,BaruchSpinoza.8

Thesuggestionsthataremadeinthispapercomefromahandfulofphilosophers,includingSpinoza,whocouldcollectivelybesaidtoconstituteaninformal,attenuatedcounter‐tradition.9TheyarelesswellknownthantheusualcanonofPlato,Descartes,Kant,(orHegel,)etc.;theirideaswerelessacceptableorconvenienttoprevioussocieties,buttheyoftenapplybeautifullytothemodernbiologicalsciences–betterthansomeideasfromthestandardphilosophicalcanondo.Thesefiguresareespeciallyusefulforprovidingalternativeconceptsforforminghypothesesforneuroscience,etc.,whenthatisneeded.These“counter‐tradition”philosophersincludethepre‐SocraticGreekHeraclitus,theEnlightenment‐eraSpinoza,Nietzsche10andhispredecessorArthurSchopenhauer,andespeciallyMerleau‐Ponty,whoassimilatesandrefinesmuchofwhatisbestinalloftheearlierfigures.Theirtimehascome.

7E.g.SemirZekidescribeshowresearchersassuminganerroneousKantianapproach(thatthesensespassivelyreceivedatawhichisthen,inadiscretestep,interpreted)sloweddowntheirresearchgreatly,inhis“TheVisualImageinMindandBrain.”8AntonioDamasio,e.g.LookingforSpinoza:Joy,Sorrow,andtheFeelingBrain.9Theterm“counter‐tradition”hascaveatsbecausetheearlierfiguresdidnotinfluenceoneanother,ordidnotadmittoit.Early19‐centuryGermanphilosopherSchopenhauer,irascibleasusual,seemstohavetakenSpinozaalmostasa200‐year‐olderrival,opposingSpinoza’ssereneimpersonalpantheism‐‐godisnature,andweareadverbsofgod‐‐withanalmostByronicpan‐demonism‐‐natureisone,andithasseriousinnerconflicts.(SchopenhauerdidanticipateDarwin’sbasicideas,andwasthefirstwesternphilosopherseriouslytoconsiderhumansasrelatedtonon‐humans,andtoacknowledgetheimportanceofvolition,drives,andsubconsciousfactorsinsubjectiveexperience.)NietzschedidexplicitlyespouseHeraclitus,Spinoza,andSchopenhaueratvariouspointsinhisintellectuallife,andespousedonlythosethree,outofallextantphilosophy,withcharacteristiclackofhumility.Merleau‐Ponty,inthestyleofhiscontemporaries,tippedhishatmostovertlytohismostrecentinfluencessuchasEdmundHusserlandtheoriginalGestaltpsychologists,andtosomeextenttoSpinoza,whileassumingadeepfamiliarityamonghiscontemporaryFrenchacademicaudiencewith19thcenturyandearlierEuropeanintellectualhistory.10Thatistosay,thelesserknownaspectsofNietzschesuchashisperspectivaltheoryofknowledgeandhispsychologyofendlesslymultipleinteracting“willings.”N.B.:Theterm“will”inSchopenhauerandNietzchedoesnotmeanthesortofconscious,unitary,“top‐down”forceofpreviousphilosopherssuchasThomasAquinas,the"freewill"attributedonlytohumans.Instead,SchopenhauerandNietzscheunderstandwillasasortofgeneralpurposivenesswhichcanbeentirelynon‐consciousorsub‐conscious,pre‐conscious,orfullyconscious,andaboutwhichone'sconsciousmindcanbemistaken.(JackGlaserandJohnF.Kihlstromhaverecentlypresentedevidenceforunconsciousvolition:"CompensatoryAutomaticity:UnconsciousVolitionIsNotanOxymoron,"inTheNewUnconscious,2005.)Nietzscheemphasizesthattherearemanydifferentwillingsinasingleperson,andtheyarenotalwayspossibletoharmonize.

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Buzsáki,Llinás,andMerleau­Ponty:SharedAxioms

IoftheVortexandRhythmsoftheBrainarebooksthatsomeonelikeme,studyingMerleau‐Pontyintheearly1990s,couldonlyhopefor.IhadencounteredthephilosophiesofwhatIamcallingthe“counter‐tradition,”andfoundthemcompelling.Icouldnotalignmyselftostandardapproachesofphilosophyofmind(orpsychology)thatflatlyignoredtheobviousimplicationsofDarwininfavorofadisembodied,atemporal,passive,isolatedthinkingthing,beittermedsoul,software,holderofpropositionalattitudes,radicallyfreenothingness,orfunctionalistorbehavioristblackbox.Damasio’swidelyreadreintroductionsofSpinozainthecontextofneurologicalhypothesesofemotionsandbodymaps,OliverSacks’smovingclinicaltales,andTempleGrandin’sengrossingoverviewsofcomparativeethology11alertedmanyofusscientificallyliteratenon‐scientiststotheimmensecreativitynowactiveintheneurosciences.ReadingBuzsáki’sandLlinás’sstunningbookshasbeenimmenselyexcitingforme.Iaddressthemtogether,sincetheirworkismostlyverycompatibleandevencomplementary:Llinásfocuseshisresearchandhisbookonthepropertiesofsingleneuronsaswellasinteractinggroupsofthem,andBuzsákiemphasizeslarge‐scaleneuronalsystems,thewholemammalianbrainasapproachedbycomplexsystemstheory.Inthesetworesearchers,especially,Ithinkthattherigorous,scholarly,andhumaneapproachbegunandexemplifiedinMerleau‐Ponty’searlywork12hasbeenrevived.

BuzsákiandLlinásshareseveralkeypositionswhich,whiledivergingstronglyfrommanyassumptionsinthenaturalscientificEnglish‐speakingworldandphilosophicalworldofthepastcenturyormore,areplausibleandfruitful,andwhichultimatelyprovidethemoststreamlinedpictureofhumanexperienceandmammalianneurophysiology.13Theseinclude:

Startingpoints:• Consciousnessasemergingfromthephysicalorganism,ratherthanseparateorseparable

fromit.BothBuzsákiandLlináspresupposemonismofmindandbody.Sincethatistheconsensuspositionamongneuroscientists,ifnotamongphilosophers,Ipresupposeithereaswell,forthepurposesofthisessay.14

• Consciousness(usedhereinthesenseofsubjectiveexperience)asinvolvingadevelopmentalbackgroundandanexperientialbackgroundofaspectsthatarenotfullyaccessibletoconsciousness,sothatcognitiveintrospectionalonemaynotbeasufficientorevenareliablemethodforstudyingitsnatureororigins.

• Thehumanbrainasproducedbyevolutionandthusasrelatedtoothermammalianandespeciallyprimatebrains.

Perception,motility,andcontext:

• Perceptionasactive,notpassive,i.e.notamerereceivingofstimuliandmechanical,linearprocessingofthem.

• Perceptionasdevelopmentallyandlogicallypriortoabstractself‐awareness.

11E.gTempleGrandin,AnimalsinTranslation,2005.12EspeciallyMerleau‐Ponty’smagnumopus,hisearlyPhenomenologyofPerception,originallypublishedinFrenchin1945.Hislaterworksbecamelessempiricallyoriented,dealingmorewithvariouspoliticalandaesthetictopics.13LinguistGeorgeLakoffandphilosopherMarkJohnsonalsosharesomeofthesepositionsregardingtheimportanceofthebody,ofperception,andofhumanity'splaceinevolution,e.g.intheirco‐authoredPhilosophyintheFlesh.InthisbooktheyacknowledgetheirdebttoMerleau‐PontyaswellasJohnDewey,describingthemas"modelsofwhatwewillrefertoas'empiricallyresponsiblephilosophers'"(p.xi).14Iamnottherebybeggingthewholequestion.Instead,Iamassuming,alongwithneuroscientistsandmanyphilosophers,thatconsciousnessemergesfromthebrain’sactivity.Fromthisaxiomwehopeeventuallytounderstandhowconsciousnessemergesfromthebrain.

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• Motility,alsoknownasmotricity,aspriortoperception,thoughintimatelyinvolvedwithit.• Bothperceptionandmotilityasgoal‐directedactivitiesfortheorganism,whichareinvolved

inthekeysurvivalskillsofpredictionanddecision‐making,bothofwhicharefuture‐directed.

• Perceptions,actions,thoughts,plans,andmemoriesasalloccurringinoneormorecontextsofgoals,comparisons,meaning,etc.,ultimatelyinacontextinvolvingtheorganism’spredictionsanddecision‐making.

• Theorganismasitselfinanenvironmentalcontext,interactingwithsurroundingsviaperceptionsandmotility.

Consciousnessandtime:• Consciousness,oratleasttheprobablesubstratesofconsciousness,asoccurringthrough

timeandinvolvingtemporalpatternsofevents,whosetemporalityiskeytoconsciousnessasweknowit.

Merleau‐Pontyalsoespouseseachoftheseclaims,developingthemasfarasthenowsixty‐year‐olddataavailabletohimpermitted.AndideasbehindtheseclaimscanfrequentlybetracedbackhistoricallytoSpinoza,Schopenhauer,orNietzsche,aswellastootherthinkerssuchasHegel.Occasionallytheseideasweredevelopedinovertoppositiontothe“standard”ideasfrome.g.Plato,Aristotle,Descartes,andKant.Thus,shouldBuzsáki,Llinás,orsimilarscientistsrequirefurtherhistoricalorconceptualsupportfortheseclaims,therearevaluableresourcesattheirservice.

Letusgothroughthesesharedaxioms.IntrospectionAloneWillNotSuffice

Forexample,inChapter10ofIoftheVortex,“QualiafromaNeuronalPointofView,”LlinásconfrontsphilosopherDavidChalmersonChalmers’sapproachtoconsciousnessviaintrospectionandanalysis.Thisdebateinvolvesthenotionof“qualia,”andthusashortexcursusonthisnotionishelpful.

OntheNotionofQualia:

Theterm“qualia”(neuterplural)originatesfromtheLatinadjectivequalis(singularmasculineorfeminine,withqualeasthesingularneuter),meaningroughly“whatsortof,”“ofsuchakind,”“asforexample,”“thelikesofwhich.”(E.g.“qualiserat!”“Whatamanhewas!”or“inhocbello,quale...”“Inthisway,thelikesofwhich...”)Through20thCenturyBritish‐U.S.philosophy,theterm“quale”(theneuterending,with“qualia”asthepluralneuter)begantobeusedtodenotewhathavevariouslybeendescribedas“rawfeels,”“thesubjectiveaspectofsensation,”“thefeelingaspectofconsciousness,”“thewaythingsseemtous,”“thecolorandsmellofarose,”etc..(Thesensationofcolorisaclearerexampleofsubjectiveexperiencethan,forexample,measuredwavelengthsoflight,becausethecolorsensationiswhatJohnLockecalleda“secondaryquality,”i.e.aqualitynotexistingintheredorblueobjectitself,butintheperceiver’seyeandmind.)Inthepastfewdecades,variousAnglo‐Americanphilosophershavedebatedfiercelywhetherthenotionof“qualia”isausefulonewithadistinctmeaningwhichcanwithholdscrutiny,orissufficientlyunknowableorotherwiseproblematicthatweshouldavoidit.

E.g.variousphilosophershaveattemptedtoprovethatqualiaexistbycomplicatedthoughtexperimentsinvolvingsciencefictionscenarios.Somephilosophersaimtoshowinaddition,bysimilarthoughtexperiments,thatqualiacouldnotbeidenticaltophysicalobjectsorevents.Otherphilosophersusesimilarthoughtexperimentstopointoutdifficultiesinthenotionofqualia.Forexample,DanielDennettproposesasciencefictionscenarioinwhichsomeoneundergoesbrainsurgeryandasaresulthashiscolorperception“inverted,”withtheskyappearingorange,andsoon.Dennettholdsthatthechangeinqualiawouldnotnecessarilybeclearlyapparenttothepatient;hecouldwonderinsteadwhetherhismemoriesoftheoldqualiahadbeenalteredbythesurgery.Andsincethereis

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nowaytoverifywhetherinfactitwasthequaliaaltered,notthememories,qualiaisnotausefulnotion.

Dennettopposesthenotionofqualiainotherways,aswell;forexample,hearguesthatitpresupposesaproblematicoldmodelofthemindinheritedfromDescartesasprivateself,ahomunculus,insidea“theatre”ofthemind,viewingthequaliaasiftheywereonascreenofrepresentationsofthe“outsideworld.”(WeshallseebelowthatMerleau‐PontyoffersanapproachwhichaccommodatesdescriptionsofsomethingsimilartoqualiawithoutDescartes’troublesome“representationparadigm.”)

Forthepurposesofthispaper,Iamassertingthatthenotionofsubjectivesensationisindubitablyausefulnotionfordescribingexperiences.Itmaynotturnouttobeusefulforexplaininganythingordetermininganythingbeyonditself(e.g.whetherconsciousnessisfundamentallyaphysicaleventornot).Instead,wecansimplynotefornowthattheterm“qualia”canbelegitimatelyusedasadescriptiveterm,eventhoughitmayresistbeingproperlydefinedintermsof,say,itsnecessaryandsufficientconditions,oritsclassanddistinguishingcharacteristic.15

Now,Chalmersisoneofthedefendersofthenotionofqualiaasacoherentandusefulnotion

whichcanbefruitfullyanalyzedfornewinsightsintothenatureofconsciousness.AndChalmers16attemptsanunusualsortoftaxonomyofthought,separatingoutconsciousnessfromvariouskindsof“cognition”actingon“qualia”:e.g.categorizingandreactingtostimuli,focusingattentiononsomething,beingawakeratherthanasleep,accessingone’sowninternalstates,controllingone’sbehavior.(Hedescribesthecognitiveactivitiesasinvolving“awareness,”yetstipulatesthatthisisnotthesameasconsciousness;heisdefining“awareness”purelyintermsofitsfunctions,notitssubjectiveexperience.)Chalmersholdsthatexplainingthevariouscognitiveactivitiesare“easyproblems”sincehebelievesthatthesecapacitiesareeachexplainableintermsofcomputationalmechanisms.Theseeasyproblemsarecontrastedtowhathetermsthe“hardproblem”involvingsheerconsciousexperience.Hethenexplorestherelationbetweenconsciousnessandthecognitioninvolvedinthevariouscognitivetasks,e.g.“Ingeneral,anyinformationthatisconsciouslyexperiencedwillalsobecognitivelyrepresented...consciousnessandcognitiondonotfloatfreeofoneanotherbutcohereinanintimateway.”

Llináspointsoutthatwhilethelinkagebetweenconsciousnessandcognitionmaybecorrect,itdoesn’treallytellusanything,andinfactobscuresotherlinesofquestioning.Forexample,

15Incidentally,thisclass/distinguishingcharacteristicwayofformingdefinitions,alsoknownashypernymandhyponym,isinheritedfromAristotle,andassumesthattherewillbeasingledefining,uniquecharacteristicofaspecieswhichwillalsobethemostimportantofitscharacteristics,themostcentralor“essential”tothatspecies.Thus,Aristotledefineshumanityasthe“animal”(classorhypernym)“thathasreason/language”(theGreekwordlogosthatreferstobothreasonandlanguage;sapiensisitsroughsynonyminLatin).Othershavereplacedthishyponymof“reason/language”withwhattheyregardedasmoreuniqueandmorecentraltohumanity.Thushumanityhasbeenvariouslydefinedas“theanimalthatusestools,”ThomasAquinas's"theanimalthatlaughs"(thesainthadagoodsenseofhumor),as"theanimalthatmakesanalogies,"orasJohanHuizinga’s“theanimalthatplays.”Bynow,oneormoremorenon‐humanspecieshavebeenfoundwhichshare–atleasttosomedegree‐‐alltheseotherpurportedlyuniquehumancharacteristics.Thus,IherebyoffermyowncandidateforHomosapiens’shyponym,whichmayhavemoreanatomicalandevolutionarybasisthananyoftheothers:“theanimalwithbuttocks,”thatis,atdifferenttimes,Homosedens,Homosaltans,orHomoobstinatus.(Itiseitherthatdistinguishingcharacteristicormenopause,whichIsuspectwouldbeevenlesswelcome,thoughthenotionof“theanimalwithgrannies”isdelightful.)

Alternateapproachestodefinitionsincludemakinguseofsuchadmirablyclearnotionsaslogic’s“necessaryconditions”and“sufficientconditions”relatedtoconditionalstatements(“ifxtheny”),whichcanbeappliedtocandidatesformembershipofadefinedgroup.

16DavidJ.Chalmers,1995,paraphrasedbyLlinásonop.cit.,p.210,andquotedbyhimonp.211.

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theconnectionbetweenconsciousnessandthe“cognitive”capacitiesmightbedue‐‐nottotheirowncharacteristicsasintrospectionseemstorevealthem‐‐butto,e.g.,relationsintheirsubstrate(s).

LlinásoffersaplausiblealternativescenariothatChalmers’smethodofintrospectionhassimplyandprematurelyprecluded:“qualia”maygraduallyarisefromthelivingbrainalongwithconsciousness,beforethemoreadvancedcognitivecapacitiesevolve.Indeed,aspartofthisalternativescenarioLlinásoffersanintriguingalternativegenealogyofthe“self”:itdevelopsasausefulcentralizationforprediction,forintegratingperceptionsandmovements,ratherthanarisingfromsomerealmofpre‐existingconsciousness.Thus,the“self”wouldoriginallyexistpriortoitsawarenessofitsownexistence,priortoself‐awareness(whichwouldofcourserequireconsciousnessinsomerobustdegree17).

BuzsákitooraisesdoubtsaboutChalmers‐typeintrospectivestrategies.Hepointsoutthatwecannotassumethatthebrainisorganizedinthedivisionswehappentomakefordescribingourmentalfaculties.Forinstance,therehasbeenasearchfordecadesforasingleword,asinglefaculty,thatwouldcapturethebehaviorassociatedwiththedistinct4‐10Hz(“theta”)oscillationsarisingfromthemammalianhippocampus.Hewrylycitessomeofthemanyvariouscandidates:attention,arousal,informationprocessing,decision‐making,volition,seeking,andhisownsuggestion,therelativelyconnotation‐free“navigation.”18

Iwouldaddthatthedescriptive,informalcategorieswesortthemindbyarechangingandinconsistent,aswell.Forexample,theremaymorethanonekindofpain;Llináselucidatesthesurprising,counterintuitivedistinctionbetweenatleastonekindofphysicalpainandtheusuallyaccompanyingunpleasantnessthatmaybefarmoredistressing,andwhichiscausedbystimulatingthecingulatecortex.Thecingulatecortexisalsoinvolvedinthepainofseeingalovedonesuffer,inthenon‐physicalbutterrible“deeppain”ofsomepsychiatricpatients,andinthedistressofmakingerrors!19Asanotherexample,IwouldpointoutthattheancientGreekshadnonotionofaseparatecapacityofvolition;ourmodernconceptofwill,asinfreewill,derivesfromRome,specificallytheRomanlegalsystem.Thevenerableconceptofreasonitselfhasbeendefinedinmanydifferentandevenincompatibleways,fromAristotle’s“activeintellect”andHegel’sall‐encompassingorderlyevolutionofspiritinhistory,tomereself‐consistency,orenlightenedself‐interest,orBertrandRussell’sdismissivedefinition:“theabilitytodosums.”Givenallthis,itwouldbeasurprisewereourcurrentlymostpopularwayofdividinguppsychologicalexperiencetoendupreflectingthebrain’sownfunctionaldivisions.

BuzsákihasafurthercriticismofChalmers‐typeintrospectiveapproaches:neither“consciousness”nor“awareness”hasevenbeendefined.Indeed,Buzsákireferstotheterm“consciousness”as“thecrutchofcognitiveneuroscience”becauseitisnonethelessusedto“explain”distinctions(e.g.betweenvoluntaryandautomaticmovements).Thushesuggestsanindirectapproachforstudyinghowthebrainproducesconsciousness:lookatbehaviorsthataretakenassignifyingconsciousness,identifywhichbrainstructuresandfunctionsareassociatedwiththesebehaviors,andexplorehowtheydifferfromotherbrainstructuresandfunctions.20(Llinás,exploringthequalitiesofindividualneurons,wouldprobablyregardBuzsáki’ssuggestionasausefulapproachbutonewhichisinitselfincomplete,anetwhoseweaveistoolarge,sinceheholdsthatsimplerorganismsthanvertebratesmaybeexperiencing“proto‐qualia.”)Further,themajorquestionisnothowqualiaaredistinguishedfromtheself,butthesourceofthefeeling–beitsimplyconsciousnessorconsciousnessofaquale‐‐tobeginwith.2117Llinás,op.cit.,p.23.18Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.21.19Llinás,op.cit.,p.159.20Thisindirectapproachwould,forexample,permitustoinferthatnon‐humananimalsfeelpainwhentheyseekpain‐relievers(only)ifinjured,ashasbeendemonstratedinavarietyofstudies.21BuzsákiandLlinásbothrejectthefrequentmetaphorofmind/brain::software/hardwareasmisleading:Llináspointsoutthatneuronsareanalog,withnon‐linearresponsepropertiesandchallengessuchquestionsas“whatisactuallybeingcomputedwhenaneuronfiresanactionpotential”asimplyingunderlyingassumptionsthatmaynotfitthebrainand“mayencouragemisguidedenquiry”(p.114).

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TheintrospectiveapproachexemplifiedbyChalmersandmanyotherphilosophersoriginatedwiththeEnlightenmentphilosopherandmathematicianRenéDescartes(creatoroftheCartesiancoordinatesystem),inathoughtexperimentwidelyknownasthe“cogito.”Descartesine.g.hisMeditationsisplayingwithanarmchairexperiment;hewilltrytodoubt,toreject,everythinghebelieves.Bydoingso,hehopestoascertainwhetheranythinghebelievesisbeyonddoubtandthusabsolutelycertain.Theonethingthatpasseshisdoubtingtestisthatheisdoubting,thathehimself,asadoubter,athinker,exists–becausethatisself‐evidentbytheveryfactofhisdoubting!“Cogito,ergosum,”“Ithink,thereforeIam.”Hecandoubtthathehasabody,orthathisperceptionsareatallaccurate,orallofhismemories,butnotthatheisdoubting,i.e.thinking,atthistime.Andhewillthenbuildhisknowledgeonthatindubitablefoundation.

ThisisadmittedlyavirtuosicconceptualriffonthepartofDescartes.Unfortunately,however,bymakinghisstartingpointandfoundationaconceptionoftheselfasextensionless,timeless,disembodied,andprivate,hecanneverreallyescapethenotionoftheselfasextensionless,etc..Fromhisstartingpoint,itisprettymuchimpossibleeventoconsiderseriouslyamind‐bodymonism;dualismisalreadybuiltinasthepreferredattitude.Similarly,sincehehastacitlydefinedconsciousnessasabstractandself‐reflective,andaspre­sensory,hecanonlytrusthissensesreliablytorepresentthe“outsideworld”tohimbyrelyingonakindGodwhowouldn’tbewillingtodeceivehimbysuchsystematic,Matrix‐likedissembling.(Thisisthe“Cartesiantheatre”criticizedbyDennett.Itisalsoknownas“therepresentationparadigm”ofthemind,i.e.aconsciousprivateSubject,theoutsideworldorObject,andasortofscreenofrepresentationsinthemindthatwecanonlyhopecorrelatehomomorphicallytotherealitiesoutside.22)

Many,thoughcertainlynotall,currentandrecentphilosophersregardtheCartesianmoveasaturnintoablindalleyfromwhichtheyaretryingtoexit.(Descartes’contemporarySpinozawasthefirsttoconfrontit.)

TheiconoclasticNietzsche,oneofthepioneersofthesubconscious,preconscious,andsemi‐conscious,givespossiblythemostdevastatingcritiqueofthecogito.HepointsoutthatDescartes’projectfailsinitsownterms.

WhenIanalyzetheprocessthatisexpressedinthesentence“Ithink,”Ifindawholeseriesofdaringassumptionsthatwouldbedifficult,perhapsimpossible,toprove;forexample,thatitisIwhothink,thattheremustnecessarilybesomethingthatthinks,thatthinkingisanactivityandoperationonthepartofabeingwhoisthoughtofasacause,thatthereisan“ego,”and,finally,thatitisalreadydeterminedwhatistobedesignatedbythinking–thatIknowwhatthinkingis...23

Alloftheseassumptionscouldbedoubtedinvariousdegrees,andDescartesoverlookedthem;theyescapedhisdoubtingtest.Infact,thedoubtingtestitselfisnotnecessarilyreliable.ElsewhereNietzschenotesthat“Hithertoonebelieved...thatin‘Ithink’therewassomethingofanimmediatecertainty...[But]Howeverhabitualandindispensablethisfictionmayhavebecomebynow–thatinitselfprovesnothingagainstitsimaginaryorigin:abeliefcanbeaconditionoflifeandnonethelessbefalse.”24

Theextensionless,timeless,disembodied,pre‐sensorythinkingego–whichcannonethelessalreadyreflectonitself–thisisnotagenuinestartingpoint.Itisahighlyderivedconstructwhichis

Buzsákiidentifiesas“thefallacyoftheTuringProgram”itsfailuretodistinguishbetweentheabstractconceptsassumedtobethevariablesofthoughtandtheactualsubstrate‐dependentmechanismsthatwouldbeoperatinginagivenmedium(p.23,ftnote44).WhileBuzsákiwelcomestheinsightsthatcomputer‐modelinghasgiventoe.g.complexsystemstheory,heisnothopefulaboutany“top‐down”approachsuchasattemptingtounderstandthebrainsimplybystudyingcomputersanddrawinganalogies.

22SociologistNorbertEliashasdescribedthehighlyformalmannersandsocialconditionsforaristocratsin17thcenturyFranceduetowhichDescartes’near‐solipsisticapproachwouldhavemadesenseinhisTheCourtSociety.23FriedrichNietzsche,BeyondGoodandEvil,1966,#16.24FriedrichNietzsche,TheWilltoPower,1968,#483.

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subtlysmuggledinbyDescartes’method.EventhoughDescartes’contentdoescarefullystartfromscratch,hismethoddoesn’t,andthepresuppositionsimplicitinthatmethodwillbeprematurelylimitinghiscontent.Thecogitoisnottherawdataitpurportstobe;itishypothesisand/orinstrumentreadintothedata.

WithoutgoingtoofarintothenotoriouslyelusiveMerleau‐Pontyhere,itisworthsummarizinghereoneofthekeypointsofhisPhenomenologyofPerception:thatphilosopherssuchasDescartes,Leibniz,evenKanthadskippedthewholefirstlayerofactualsensoryexperienceintheirintrospecting.Inasense,theyhadallfailedbytheirownstandardsofintrospection.Merleau‐Pontyoffersmorethanacritique,though;heoffersanalternative.Hedoesbelievethatthereisaplaceinpsychologyforcarefulphenomenologicalscrutinyofourexperience‐‐asdescriptions,notasexplanationsinthemselves,andnotasdirectlyindicatingthefunctionaltopographyofthebrain."Consciousnessmustbefacedwithitsownunreflectivelifeinthingsandawakenedtoitsownhistorywhichitwasforgetting:suchisthetruepartthatphilosophicalreflectionhastoplay."25Soweneedboththethird‐personperspectiveofempirical,repeatableresearch,andthefirst‐personperspective.(ThishasbeenreferredtoasMerleau‐Ponty’s“pincerstrategy,”usingmultipleperspectives,suchasfirst‐andthird‐person.Itisextremelyuseful,thoughitreliesonaveryhighstandardofcautionandself‐honesty.)However,ifwearegoingtogatherdataabouthumanconsciousnessfromwithin,wemustsetasideasmanyofourderivednotionsandideologiesaspossible.Otherwisewemaymerelyseethoseideologies,andmistakethemandtheirinterrelationsasgenuineexplanations,asDescartesandChalmersseemtodo.Instead,wemustbepreparedtoacknowledgetherolenotonlyofperceptions,butalsoofourownactionsanddrives,ourown“intentionality,”oroutward‐directedattention.And,possiblythemostdifficulttask,wemustacknowledgepreconsciousinfluencesandevenpreconsciousintentionality.(Itisworthemphasizingthatbyexaminingourfirst‐person,“concrete”experience,Merleau‐Pontyisnotattempting,ase.g.DescartesandChalmersdo,todiscover“objective”factsortopursuehypothesesfromintrospection.Instead,heissimplytryingtogainaccuraterawdataaboutwhatsubjectiveexperienceislikebeforeitisinterpretedbyhypotheses.)

Descartes,Leibniz,andKanthadmissedthebodily‐basedperceptionsandmotionsthatwerepriortothederivedabstractionstheyerroneouslyregardedasfoundational.Theyhadoverlookedthecomplicatedprocessbywhichourperceivingisalsosimultaneouslyanactiveorganizing–notapassivereceptionfromthemere“sensorymanifold”whichthen,asaseparatestep,hasorderimposedonitbytheUnderstanding,asKantthought.Theyhadassumedthatwesimplyexperiencedthree‐dimensionalspace,eitherasagiven(sinceweadultstakeitforgranted)orasanaprioriformofSensibility,asKantcontended,ratherthannoticingthatwegainournotionofdepth,thethirddimension,fromourmotoractivities,especiallymovingourhandsasinfants.

ButMerleau‐Ponty’sapproachmakesroomforallofthesecomplicated,fascinatinglearningexperiencesofwhatheterms“thelivedbody.”AndbydoingsohealsomakesroomforthepossibilityLlinásmentionsofaprimitive“self”innon‐humananimalsthatpredatesself‐awarenessandperhapsevenconsciousnessproper,thatinsteadisthecentralizationofprediction,andwhichcoordinatesperceptionandmovement.2625Merleau‐Ponty,op.cit.,translatedColinSmith,1962,p.31.26PhilosopherAnthonyChemero'srecentbook,RadicalEmbodiedCognitiveScience,2009,isaboldattemptatdevelopinganon‐representationaltheoryofthemindfromtheAnglo‐AmericanAnalyticalschoolofphilosophy,whichhassomesimilaritieswithwhatIamsuggesting.ChemerodrawsfromU.S.psychologistJamesGibson,influencedbyAmericanpragmatistsWilliamJamesandJohnDeweyandtosomedegreebyMerleau‐Ponty,indescribinghowanimalscaninteractwiththeirenvironmentsthrough"directperception"oftheenvironment's"affordances,"opportunitiesforthoseanimalstobehaveadaptively(e.g.amouseseesunobstructedpathwayssuitableforitsescape,givenitseyelevel).Chemero'sworkisimpressive,thoughIpartcompanywithhimon"directperception"asnotinvolvinganyprocessingofsensoryinformation.Asweshallseebelow,onecanrejecttheCartesianrepresentationparadigmwithcommittingoneselftosuch"directperception."Merleau‐Ponty'snotionoftheGestaltinvolvescomparisons,memories,anticipations,evenintheapparentlysimplestofsensoryexperience,withoutanythingsuchasaninternalscreenof

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TheHumanBraininitsEvolutionaryContext

Llinásholdsthathumansarenotuniqueinhavingsubjectiveexperiences:Someinthisfieldpointoutthatbecausewecannotdeterminethatanimalsdohavesubjectivefeelings(qualia),wecansaythatinfacttheydon’tuntilitisdemonstratedotherwise.Itmaybeargued,however,thattheburdenofproofisonthosewhodenysubjectivityinanimals.Formyself,Isuspectthatsubjectivityiswhatthenervoussystemisallabout,evenatthemostprimitivelevelsofevolution.27Buzsákiholdsthatacomplexneocortexorsomethingequivalent,generatinginteracting

oscillationsofthestatistical1/ftype(seebelow),isnecessarytosupportconsciousness.Thusheremainsskepticalofwhetherwecanattributeconsciousnesstosharksandearlyprematurehumanbabies,whosebrainwavesarenot(yet)evencontinuous.Hedoesinferthatadultmammalsandotheranimalsofsimilarbrainwavecomplexitywouldhavevaryingdegreesofconsciousness,andhedoescitestudiesindicatingthatsomeprimatesarecapableofself‐recognitioninamirror. AsprimatologistdeWaalputs,withalltheknowledgewenowhave,researcherswhocontinuetodenythatnon‐humananimalshavesubjectiveexperiencesarechoosingwhatdeWaalwouldterm“cognitiveparsimony”overthemoredata‐informed“evolutionaryparsimony,”28whichtakesphylogenyandtheageofspecies’differencesintoaccount.29(Incidentally,paraphrasingdeWaalswouldallowustoarticulateevenmoreclearlythewrongturntakenbythinkerssuchasChalmers:theyarechoosingwhattheyregardasconceptualparsimonyoverevolutionaryparsimony.)

Whatpreciselyweretheadvantagesthatledtothevertebratenervoussystem’sevolution,andwhatmighttheytellusabouthumanconsciousness?

Llináscitestheexampleoftheseasquirt’slifecycletoindicatevividlytheoriginalevolutionaryuseofthenervoussystem:tomove.Theseasquirtinadulthoodisasessilecreaturewithoutacentralizedbrain,butasayounglarvaithasatadpole‐likeanatomycompletewithproto‐brain(aganglionortwo)andprimitive“eye”whichallowittoswimuntilitfindsagoodplacetosettledownandattachitself,atwhichpointitsincipientbrainisdigestedfromwithin(adescriptionguaranteedtotriggersquirminginanymiddle‐agedhumanfacedwiththeprospectofastableresidenceandlivelihood).

Llinásalsogivesexamplesofwhatmightbecalledpre‐neuronsandproto‐neuronsaswellasneuronsproperatvariousstagesofevolution,fromtheprotozoanciliateEpidinium,whichcanmove

representationsofanexternalworld.Thefigure/backgroundstructureoftheperceptualGestaltisapparentlyduetoseveraldifferentareasofthebrainbeingsynchronizedbybrainwaves.Soperceptiondoesinvolveprocessing,butthere'snoneedtoclaimthatCartesianrepresentationsarebeingconstructedthereby.Chemero,whoseownresearchisincomputer‐simulatedneuralnetworks,wouldnothavebeenfamiliarwiththeGestaltnotion.Happily,hehimselfmentionsaninterestininterdisciplinarydiscussionswithbiologists.27Llinás,op.cit.,pp.112‐113.28Cognitiveparsimony,ofthetraditionalAmericanBehavioristschool,

tellsusnottoinvokehighermentalcapacitiesifwecanexplainaphenomenonwithonesloweronthescale.Thisfavorsasimpleexplanation,suchasconditionedbehavior,overamorecomplexone,suchasintentionaldeception.Evolutionaryparsimony,ontheotherhand,considerssharedphylogeny.Itpositsthatifcloselyrelatedspeciesactthesame,theunderlyingmentalprocessesareprobablythesame,too.Thealternativewouldbetoassumetheevolutionofdivergentprocessesthatproducesimilarbehavior,whichseemsawildlyuneconomicassumptionfororganismswithonlyafewmillionyearsofseparateevolution.(deWaal,op.cit.,p.62)

29ThisapproachincidentallywouldhavebeensupportedbySchopenhauerevenintheearly1800s,beforeDarwinboardedtheBeagle.

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itsretractilefiberstotakefoodintoitssingle‐celledbody;tosponges,whosemotorcellsdodouble‐dutyaspressure‐sensitive“sensory”cells,contractingatatouch;toseaanemones,whichassignsensingandmotiontotwodifferentkindsofcells;tothespecializedvertebrateseriesofmusclecells,themotorneuronsthatactivatethem,sensorycells,andneuronsconnectingtootherneurons.30

Similarly,Buzsákimentionsthatmotilitypredatessensation;someprimitiveseaanimalsarecapableonlyofarhythmicmovementtobringnutrients,withnoperceptualabilitiesatall.31

Llinásalsomentionsthebizarrecaseofthegrowingsharkembryo.Here,theembryorequiresthatcertainmusclesmoveevenbeforetheyareenervated,toensurewaterflowandoxygenintaketothegrowingcellsalongtheembryo’slength.Thesemusclesdocontract,ontheirown,withoutnerves,andinunisonwitheachothercausedbytheirunusualelectrotonicconnectionofgapjunctions(mostfamouslyknownfromtheheart’spacemakercells),untilthemotorneuronsgrowtoformsynapseswiththem.

OneofLlinás’ssectionheadingssumsuphisview:“NeuronsArosewithintheSpacebetweenSensingandMoving:ThisSpaceMushroomedtoBecometheBrain.”32Andsensingandmovingsharethatspacetogetherinforming“sensorimotorimages,”experiencesinvolvingallsensorymodalitiesandafuture‐orientedattitudeleadingtoadesireforaction,e.g.scratchinganitch.33Ultimately,Llinásholdsthattheseexperiences(“qualia”)andactionsarecentralizedby“theself,”whichisnotsomuchanentityasasymbolofcentralizationanalogoustotheU.S.’s“UncleSam.”Thisselfrepresents“somethingakinto‘Ifeel’thatactstomediatedecisionmaking”andprediction.They“representthecriticallyimportantspacebetweeninputandoutput,fortheyareneither,yetareaproductofoneandthedrivefortheother.”34

Merleau‐Pontydescribesbasichumanexperienceinsimilarways.Forhim,“Consciousnessisinthefirstplacenotamatterof‘Ithinkthat’butof‘Ican.’”Itinvolvesapre­reflective“intentionality”(inthetechnicalphilosophysenseof“outward‐directed,”ratherthaninthesenseof“intendingtodosomething”).“Mybodyappearstomeasanattitudedirectedtowardsacertainexistingorpossibletask.”35

ForLlinás,motilityunderliesevenourknowledge.Perceptionalone,evenperceptioninvolvingactivecategorizations,isnotsufficient.“WhatImuststresshereisthatthebrain’s

30PerhapsLlinás’smostcontroversialclaim,andoneofhismostintriguing,iswithregardtoinvertebrates.Evensingle‐celledorganisms,hewrites,

arecapableofirritability,thatis,theyrespondtoexternalstimuliwithorganized,goal‐directedbehavior.Itisdifficulttoignorethatsuchcellularpropertyisprobablytheancestryfortheirritabilityandmotricitydisplayedbysensoryandmusclecells,respectively.Andsoweareleftwiththenaggingfeelingthatirritabilityandsubjectivity,inaveryprimitivesense,arepropertiesoriginallybelongingtosinglecells.(p.113)

(Later,“Indeed,ifasinglecellisnotcapableofhavingamodicumofqualia,howthencanagroupofcellsgeneratesomethingthatdoesnotbelongtoagivenindividual?”(p.218).Hereheistechnicallycommittingafallacyofcomposition,i.e.notconsideringthepossibilityofemergentproperties.Forexample,Buzsákibelievessubjectivity‐‐inthesenseofconsciousness‐‐ispreciselyanemergentproperty.Ontheotherhand,thatfallacyinitselfdoesnotweakenLlinás’sproposal;itmerelyremovesthatonelinefromsupportingit.AndwhatIamcallingLlinás’salternativegenealogyoftheselfdoesstatethattheselfneedn’tbeawareofitsownexistence.Instead,itseemstoreflectsomethingclosertoSpinoza’s“conatus,”orageneralizeddrivetoliveandthrive,orperhapsSchopenhauerorNietzsche’sgeneralizedwill.)

31Buzsáki,op.cit.,pp.ix,30.32Llinás,op.cit.,p.78.Theexamplesherearefromhischaptersthreeandfour.33Ibid.,eloquentlypresentedonp.3.This“space”ismadepossiblebyLlinás’sadoptionofGrahamBrown’sviewofthespinalcordas“self‐referential,“ratherthanWilliamJames’s“reflexological”viewofsensationlinearlydrivingmovement.The“self‐referential”spaceultimately,forLlinás,constitutesaninternalworld,aprivateor”closed”systemwhichallowsforsubjectivity,semantics,andsuch.34Llinás,op.cit.,pp.221‐222.35Merleau‐Ponty,op.cit.,pp.137,110.

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understandingofanything,whetherfactualorabstract,arisesfromourmanipulationsoftheexternalworld,byourmovingwithintheworldandthusfromoursensory‐derivedexperienceofit.”36

Buzsákiagrees.Indeed,oneofthemainclaimsofRhythmsoftheBrainishismentorEndreGrastyán’sastonishingclaimthatthebrain’soutputs,movements,cognition,actuallycontrolitsinputs,perception–acompletereversaloftheusualorder:stimulusperceivedandleadingtoareflex.37

Forallthree,forBuzsáki,Llinás,andMerleau‐Ponty,itismovement–whichisalwaysfuture‐oriented–whichisattheheartofallneuronalfunctioninginallspecieshavingneurons,andofhuman(andothervertebrate)consciousness.PerhapsAristotle’sapproachtodefinitionsiscompletelywrong.Perhapsourmostimportantcharacteristicisn’tonethatdistinguishesourspeciesfromallotherspecies;perhapsitisonethatwehaveincommonwithotherenervatedanimals.LlinásonMindandMovement

Themotricityormotilitythatiskeyforourexperience,Llinásargues,isorganizedbyneurons’synchronousoscillation.Forexample,thereisaconstant“physiologicaltremor”inourskeletalmusclesat8‐12Hz,andevenvoluntarymusclemovementisinevitablytimedtobeginatthestartofthetremor’scycles.(Thistremorcannotbeexplainedbyreflexactionsorbythepropertiesofmuscletissue.)Llináshypothesizesthatthistremoriscausedbytheintrinsicoscillationat8‐12HzoftheInferiorOlivaryNucleusaxons.Theseneuronsareconnectedtoeachotherelectrotonically,bythesameunusuallydirectchannels,gapjunctions,thatembryonicsharkmusclecellshave.Thesechannelsallowdepolarizationtoflowacrossneuronswithoutthedelaysoftheusualsynapticconnectionanditstranslationfromelectricaltochemicalsignalingandbackagain.Asaresultofthegapjunctions,theseneuronscommunicatewithunusualspeed,whichhelpsthemoscillatewithprecision.

Whatmightbetheadvantagesofthisperiodicity,thissynchronousoscillationofneuronsandvoluntarymuscles,thatwouldcauseittobeselectedforinevolution?Llinásgiveawholelistofpossiblebenefits:itwouldbeenergeticallyefficient,itwouldhelpcueupneuronstoactsynchronously,itmightgivealittleaccelerationtobreakthroughanyinertiainmusclefibers,itcouldhelpbindsensoryinputsandmotoroutputsintimetointegratethem,anditwouldbringneuronsclosertothreshold.36Llinás,,op.cit.,pp.58‐59.37JohnDeweymakesasimilarbutslightlydifferentclaiminhisfamous"TheReflexArcConceptinPsychology":

[W]ebeginnotwithasensorystimulus,butwithasensori‐motorcoordination...inacertainsenseitisthemovementwhichisprimary,andthesensationwhichissecondary,themovementofbody,headandeyemusclesdeterminingthequalityofwhatisexperienced.Inotherwords,therealbeginningiswiththeactofseeing;itislooking,andnotasensationoflight.(pp.358‐359)

AndDeweyemphasizesthatsensationandmovementareunitedinacontext;theycan'tbefullyunderstoodastheseparateelementsofstimulusandresponse.AsAnthonyChemeroparaphrasesDeweyinhisRadicalEmbodiedCognitiveScience:

Somethingcanonlybeidentifiedasastimulusafteroneidentifiestheresponse.Inotherwords,inanorganiccircuit,whattheresponseisdeterminesthenatureofthestimulus.Thatis,avisualstimulusneverresultsinmereseeing;ratheritleadstoseeing‐in‐order‐to‐grasp‐and‐bring‐to‐the‐mouthorseeing‐in‐order‐to‐grasp‐and‐swing.(p.19)

AndBuzsákiwouldagree:"Perceptionisnotsimplyafeedforwardprocessofsensoryinputsbutratherisaninteractionbetweenexploratory/motor‐output‐dependentactivityandthesensorystream.Itissomethingwedo."(p.228)

BuzsákiandGrastyán,ontheotherhand,regardactivityasnotonlyinterwovenwithperceptionbutpriortoperception,priorbothintermsofevolutionandintermsofinitiatingprocesseswithinandoutsidetheorganismthatresultintheorganism'sperceiving.

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Now,Llinásdescribesanothermethodofkeepingmovementasefficientaspossible:motor“FixedActionPatterns”(FAPs),distinctandcomplicated“habits”ofmovementbuiltfromreflexes,habitsthatwedeveloptostreamlinebothneuralactionandmusclemovement.Thesearenotentirelyfixed,despitetheirname;theyareconstantlyundergoingmodification,adaptation,refinement,andtheyoverlapeachother,sothatwehaveanover‐completepoolofmovements,alargerepertoireatourdisposal.Hence,walking,running,dancing,recoveringafterastumble,areallpossibleatasecond’snotice,andnoneneedstobereinventedwitheverystep.LlinásevenarguesthattheextraordinarilyprecisemotorcontrolofJaschaHeifitzplayingaMozartviolinconcertoiscomposedofhighlyelaboratedandrefinedFAPs,adescriptionmostinstrumentalistswouldfindabsolutelyplausible.Inotherwords,playingmusic‐‐oneofthemostcognitivelyandemotionallydemandingofallhumanactivities,arguablyoneofthemostdefinitively“human”ofallactivities‐‐isfoundedincarefully,creativelyguidedmovement–notthoughtalone.38

IfthesesortsofmotionsaremotorFAPs,Llináshypothesizesthatemotionssuchasfearandragemaybe,analogously,premotorFAPs.I.e.activatingtherhinencephalon,theamydala,andthehypothalamusmaybethesettingupofpremotorpostures,preparingformovement,therunningawayortheturningandfighting.

Mostintriguingly,Llináscarriesthisanalogyonestepfurther:“qualia”(usedherebyLlinássimplyassynonymousto“subjectiveexperience”)maybesensoryFAPs,sothatindeed,ashehadwrittenearlier,thinkingwouldbeexactly“internalizedmovement.”Notethatqualiaasconceivedherewouldbeacomplicatedpatternthatthenervoussystemperformsinrelationtosensoryinput(perhapsroughlyanalogoustoreadingmusic),andthatitwouldbeapatternextendedthroughtime,likeplayingamusicalpassage.Butwithperceptions,wefaceanotherpuzzlenotfoundinemotionsandmovement.Thisissometimesreferredtoas“thebindingproblem”:Howisitthatwecanreceivesensoryinputinbitsandpieces,say,differentvisualimagesofe.g.one’sgrandmother,differentsoundsofhervoiceovertheyears,herperfume,etc.,andintegratethemintoasingleconstructor“percept”?Anddothisaccuratelyindifferentcontextsofmeaning,eachgivingitadifferentinternalsignificance?Thisismuchmorecomplicatedthancoordinatingadifficultjumpoveraboulder,orrespondingwithnecessaryadrenalintoadrunkendriver.

Accordingtotheusualviewofthebrain’scapacities,withitsenormousneuronalnetworks,itsspatialinterconnectedness,evenitcouldnotbeexpectedtodothisenormousjob.ComputingallGrannie’svisual,auditory,etc.,sensoryaspects,inallrelevantsituations,inallpossibleemotionalandattentionalcontexts(whichwedoeverydaywithmanydifferentpeople)wouldrequiremanytimesmorespace,moreconnectionsthanahumanbrainhas.However,Llinásexpandstheusualviewofthebraintoexplainhowitisthatwecandowhatwedo.Ifthebrain’svastspatialconnectednessisstilltoolimitedtoaccountforthis,itmayhavepatternsofconnectednessintimesuperimposedonthosespatialconnections.“Bymakingdifferenttime‐interlockingpatterns,neuronscanrepresentaunityofrealitybycombiningtheindividual,fractionalizedaspectsofrealitythateachneuroncarries.”Wholemodulesofneuronswouldbeelectricallyoscillatinginphase,andthiswouldformaglobalactivitypatternwhich“shouldhaveallofthecomponentsnecessaryforatransientlyuseful,internalconstructoftheexternalworldinthegiven,presentmoment.”39Sothistemporalcoherencecouldbetheneurologicalmechanismunderlyingperceptualunity,underlying“cognitivebinding.”

Andindeed,empiricalstudiesbearthisout.Thedifferentcomponentsofavisualstimulusthatarerelatedtoasingularcognitiveobjectdoresultintemporallycoherent,synchronous,gammaoscillations(ofabout40Hz),evenwhenthoseoscillationsareoccurringinbrainlocationsasmuchas7mmapart.(Thesegammaoscillationsmayarisefromthethalamocorticalsystem’sintrinsic40Hzoscillation.)ThisappearstobethemechanismforformingoursensationsofGrannieintoasingleperceptofGrannie,orinthetermsofGestalttheory,forforminga“figure”ofGranniedistinctfromthe“ground”oftherestofoursensoryfield.(Gammaoscillationsassolvingthe“bindingproblem”arealsocoveredextensivelybyBuzsáki.)38Forasimilarlyevolution‐centeredviewofsinging,ratherthaninstrumentalmusic,seee.g.StevenMithen’sinsightfulTheSingingNeanderthal:TheOriginsofMusic,Language,Mind,andBody.39Llinás,op.cit.,pp.120‐121.

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ItisworthtakingamomentheretoreviewtheoriginalGestalttheory,asdevelopedbyK.KoffkaandWolfgangKöhler,andasextendedbyMerleau‐Ponty.Theoriginalideawasthatwedonotperceiveinisolatedunits,inasingle“datum”similartoapixel,butalwaysinpatternsofatleasttwoparts:figure(thatwhichwefocusonorgiveattentionto)againstaground(whichmayneverrisefrompreconsciousstatus,butwhichwillnonethelessinfluencehowweperceivethefigure).AGestaltcanoccurthroughtimeaswellasinspace;ifwearelisteningtoorchestralmusicandfocuson,say,theoboemelody,ithasbecomeafigureagainstthebackgroundoftheotherparts.Weexperienceourown“livedbodies”asGestalten;ifwemakeagesture,itisafigureagainstthegroundoftherestofourbody.Andourwholebodiesareexperiencedasfiguresagainstthegroundofoursurroundings.Oneimplicationofthisbasic"structureofperception"isthatthereisalwaysanimplicitcomparisoninanyperception:movementversusnon‐movement,lightversusdark,expectedsurroundingsversusunexpectedabsenceofparent/packleader/mateorunexpectedpresenceofnewcomer,andsoon.40

LlinásseemstobeimplicitlyusingsomethinglikethistraditionalnotionofaGestaltwhenhedescribesthecontextofattention:whenoneistryingtolistentoaspeakerwithsomeonetalkingbehindone,“[e]ventuallyyouphasethemoutandonlygiveinternalsignificancetothewordsyouwishtohear.”41(pp.118‐119).Thecontextofattentionallowsustofocusonsomesensoryinputsratherthanothers.

Thus,Llinásevocativelydescribesthisdynamicnervoussystemasonethat“addressestheexternalworldnotasaslumberingmachinetobeawokenbytheentryofsensoryinformation,butratherasacontinuouslyhummingbrain."42

Now,thereisonemorewayinwhichsubjectiveexperienceassensoryFAPswouldseemtobeverydifferentfromemotionalpremotorFAPsordirectmotorFAPs.Subjectiveexperiencesseemtoinvolvean“internal”world,involving“representations”oftheoutsideworld.CouldsensoryFAPspossiblyaccountforallthis?

Aswesawearlier,Llinásdescribesthe“internalworld”asthe“space”betweensensingandmoving,madepossiblebythe”self‐referential“set‐upofthenervoussystem,thefactthatwedon’tmerelygetinputfromsensesdirectlyfromthe“outsideworld,”butalsofromourownneuralprocessing,sotospeak.(InBuzsáki’sCycle/chapter7,hegivesanexampleofthis,the“higherorder”thalamocorticalnucleiwhichreceiveinputsnot(only)fromsensoryreceptors“below,”butalsofrom40ThisGestaltviewofperceptionisthenotionIwouldlovetoseeChemeroadoptinplaceof"directperception,"sinceitisamoreeffectivealternativetotheCartesianrepresentationparadigm,andwouldservehisworkbetter.TheusualapproachbyAnglophonephilosophersistosaythatanykindofcomparison,say,pasttopresent,requiresacomplicated,self‐awaresettingupofnotonebuttwolittleimagesinthemind'seye,andthenacross‐checkbetweenthemfordifferences.Thisapproachcan'texplainwhyevendomesticchickens–notnature'sfinestthinkers,despitetheirendearingpersonalities–aresowelladaptedtonoticinganythingoutoftheordinaryintheirsurroundings,anythingunexpectedornew.Evendiffusedwhitelight,asseeninadeepfogorbythenear‐blind,involvestheimplicitcomparisontonon‐light,andisthusinformative;thusseainvertebratesfinditusefultoevolvelight‐sensitivepatchesofcells,theforerunnersofeyes,whichcandirecttheirmovementuptowardsthesun.

ButtherelativelycomplicatedGestaltprocessingthatevenchickensareconstantlycarryingoutisnoseparatescreenofimagesthatmediatesbetweenthemandtheirsurroundings.Itisaprocessthatoccursintheirrelationtotheirsurroundings.(The"representation"advocatesareguiltyofhypostatizingthisprocessandthisrelationinthesamewaythatthephlogistonadvocatesofpreviouscenturieswereguiltyofhypostatizingtheprocessofflames.Phlogistonwasthehypothesizedsubstancereleasedbycombustion,beforeitwasrecognizedthatcombustionisnotathingandcertainlynotasinglething,evenasinglemovingthing,butaprocess,aneventthatcanoccurwithdifferentsubstrates.)

41Llinás,op.cit.,pp.118‐119.42Ibid.,pp.123‐124.

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corticalareas“above.”)Andwithregardto“outputs,”weactnotonlyontheoutsideworld,butalsoonourownneuronalsystems.This“space”ofself‐referenceiswhatgivesusthesenseofan“inside”andan“outside,”withthe“inside”beingthemetaphoricaloriginofthe“vector”ofthefirst‐personperspective.SensoryFAPsthusmightbeabletoaccountforthisaspectofsubjectiveexperience.

Regardingrepresentations,Llinásdescribestheunified“percepts”asrepresentationsofthe“outerworld”intermsthatinvokeKant,whoseepistemologicalapproachcouldbedescribed,veryroughly,asamuchmoresophisticated,qualified,andusefulversionoftheoriginalrepresentationparadigmor“Cartesiantheatre.”Llináswrites:

Butwhatisanimage?Animageisasimplificationofreality...asimplifiedrepresentationoftheexternalworldwritteninastrangeform...ThebrainisquiteKantianintheessenceofitsoperation.Itmakesrepresentationsofaspectsoftheexternalworld,fractionalizedaspects,bymakingausefulgeometry...withinternalmeaningthathasnothingtodowiththe‘geometry’oftheexternalworldthatgaverisetoit...Considercolors,whicharejusttheparticularwaywetransduceenergyataparticularfrequency.Asnakeseesinfrared,whichisactuallyheat.Itisveryclearthattheimagesinourheadareonlyarepresentationoftheworld.43YetunlikeKant‐‐whoheldthatwecouldneverhaveaccesstorealityitselfbutonlyour

mediatingrepresentationsofit,andthuswecouldnoteveninferinformationaboutrealityindirectlybycomparingdifferentresponsestoit‐‐LlinásseemstobeimplicitlyusingsomethingverylikeMerleau‐Ponty’sperspectival44“pincerstrategy”:makinguseofempiricalscientificresearchandourownsubjectiveexperiences.Heisincorporatingboth“theimagesinourheads”andtheknowledgethatsnakesapparentlyseeinfrared,whichisinvisibletous.45Llinásseemstousebothperspectivesinthepracticalwaythatmostofuswouldwant–wehaveourownimages,andwehavedataandhypothesesfromscientificobservation,basedoncommonelementsfromtheperspectivesofmanyindividuals,andaiming,intheory,atelementsthatwouldbecommontoanypossibleindividual.Bothsourcesofknowledgeareuseful,andthetwoareentirelydifferentandmustbedealtwithaccordingtoverydifferentrules,andthetwocansupplementeachother.

Merleau‐Pontygivesatheoreticalsupportforthis:hedescribesthefirst‐personperspectiveofsubjectiveexperienceasconcreteknowledge,andthethird‐personperspectiveofscientificdataandhypothesesasabstractknowledge.The“concrete”and“abstract”termsdoaccuratelydescribetheirorigins.The“impersonal”scientificperspectiveachievesasortofimpersonalitysimplybybeingtheabstractedcommonalitiesofmanyindividuals’experience.

ThisapproachisverydifferentfromtheCartesianortheKantianuseof“representations.”Instead,Merleau‐Pontywouldclaimthatthereisnomysterious,incorrigible“screen”ofstaticrepresentationsthatmediateourexperiencesofthe“outsideworld.”Instead,ourbrainsconstructmanydifferentpossiblemapsoftheworldinwhichweexistandwithwhichweinteract,includingthemoreconcretepercepts,andthemoreabstractscientifichypotheses.Andtheviewofsubjective43Ibid.,pp.108‐109.44Nietzscheisthephilosopherwhointroducedtheterm“perspectivism,”asanalternativetotheCartesian,Lockean,andKantianapproachwhichassumedanimpossibleeye,“aneyeturnedinnoparticulardirection”(OntheGenealogyofMorals,1969,PartIII,section12).YetMerleau‐Ponty’srefinedversionofperspectivismismuchmoreusefulandplausibleandavoidstherelativisminherentinNietzsche’sapproach.SeeDavidSchenk’ssuperblylucidandconcise“Merleau‐PontyonPerspectivism,withReferencestoNietzsche,”1985.45Atruly,superhumanlyconsistentadherenttotherepresentationparadigmwouldhavetoframeevidenceofsnakevisionasjustanother“imageinourheads,”nodifferentfromanyotherexceptbybeingmorecomplicated,andthussubjecttothesamelimitationsasanyothersubjectiveimagewehave.Thus,itcouldnotbeusedtosupplementourowndirectlyperceived“imagesinourheads.”Ontheotherhand,ifweacknowledgeourowndirect,falliblebutcorrigibleexperience,andthemeansbywhichweactuallycorrectitviamoreimpersonalknowledge,e.g.thescientificunderstandingthatthesunisnottinyanddoesnotrevolvearoundtheEarth,andthatapaddlehalfwayinwaterisnotbroken,weareacknowledgingthatwerelyonbothapproachesasakindoftriangulation,tounderstandandinteractwithoursurroundingsmoreaccurately.

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experiencesassensoryFAPsmightwellaccountforthesedifferentmaps,theseperspectives,thesecontexts. Indeed,the"subjectivity"involvedinqualia,evenwhenhypothesizedassensoryFAPs,wouldalsobefound,inslightlydifferentforms,inemotionsashypothesizedaspremotorFAPsandevenvoluntarymotionsthoughtofasmotorFAPs.Theepinephrinefloodwepromptourselvestomakewhenwebecomeawareofdangerisarguablyoneofthemostintenseandimmediatesubjectiveexperienceswecanhave.Andcoordinatedmotilityforanyvertebratealwaysinvolvesexactlythekindofdifferentpossiblemapsofthespacearoundus,eloquentlydescribedbyLlinásastheoriginalmotorFAPs,thatMerleau‐Pontyaimedtoarticulateinourperceptualstrategiesandhabits. Llináswrites:“IsaythatIamaclosedsystembutnotasolipsist.Ican’tbe,becauseofthewayIwasbuiltbyevolutionbyinternalizingthepropertiesoftheoutsideworld.”46Here,heisembodyingtheMerleau‐Pontian“pincerstrategy,”withthebenefitofbothperspectives,whiletacitlykeepingthemcleanlydistinct.Heacknowledgesthat,fromthefirst‐personpointofview,hecan’ttakeonasolipsisticattitude,andhetheorizesfromthird‐personscientificknowledgethatthatmakessenseconsideringevolutionsincegreaterinteractionwithone’ssurroundingsareneededforsurvival.BuzsákionBrains,Systems,andActivity

ImustsummarizeBuzsáki’sbookwithruthlessbrevityhere.Itislengthyandtechnical,addressingmainlyanaudienceoffellowscientists.Therearetworecurringthemesinitthatshouldbementioned,however.Oneisthepowerresidinginopposingforces47,includingthecontrastbetweenpredictabilityandunpredictability.Theotheristhepatternofcyclicalthoughchanginginteractionswithinandamongsystems.Buzsákititleshischaptersas“cycles”tohelpleadhisreadersintothiswayofthinking.TheseareHeracliteanthemes,andindeedBuzsákiquotesHeraclitus–anexcellentinspirationforascientist,sinceHeraclituswasaproto‐empiricistifthereeverwasone,48andanastuteenoughobserverofnaturetoperceiveitintermsofactionsandinteractionsthroughtime.

Briefly,Buzsákicontendsthatthemammalian,notonlyhuman,brainisspontaneouslyactiveinmultipleways.

First,itcangenerateagreatdealofactivityonitsown,fromwithin,andorganizethatactivity.Forinstance,certainkeynucleigenerateintrinsicelectricalactivity,e.g.thethalamocorticalneuronswhichcanbepromptedtofireactionpotentialsnotonlywhendepolarizedbelowthreshold,butalsowhensuddenlyreleasedfromhyperpolarization.Theseunusualneuronsalsocontaincertainrarevoltage‐gatedchannelswhichleadthemtoberepolarized–channelsfoundintheheart’s

46Llinás,op.cit.,p.109.47Afterall,lifeasweknowitreliesonopposingforces.Atthemostbasiclevel,electronsinteractingwithprotonsgiveusthecharacteristicsoftheperiodictable,leadingtomolecularandionicbonding.Theinteractionsofwater’spolarmolecules,involvinghydrogenbonding,resultinwater’sunusuallife‐supportingcharacteristics,fromitsbeingagoodsolventforotherpolarmolecules,toitssurfacetension,itsresistancetorapidtemperaturechanges,anditsexpandingwhenfrozensothatlakebottomsareprotectedfromfreezing.Theinteractionsbetweenpolarandnon‐polarmoleculescausetheformationoflipidbilayerswhichmakescellspossible,andchainsofmoreorlesspolarpeptideswithinalongproteinarrangeforthatproteintothreadoutwardsthroughaneuron’slipidbilayercellmembraneandarrangeitselfcorrectlywithinthemembranetoformachannelfore.g.ions.48HeraclitusofEphesus,e.g.“Mostmendonotthinkthingsinthewaytheyencounterthem,nordotheyrecognizewhattheyexperience,butbelievetheirownopinions.”(trans.byCharlesH.Kahnonp.29ofhisTheArtandThoughtofHeraclitus,1979)“Whatevercomesfromsight,hearing,learningfromexperience:thisIprefer”(p.35).“Eyesaresurerwitnessesthanears”(ibid.).

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“pace‐maker”cells.Thesetwoopposingandbalancingforcesinteracttogenerateaconstantrhythmofspikebursts,anongoingoscillationat0.5‐4Hz,deltawaves.

Allneuronshavethecapacitytooscillate,withavarietyoftriggersandregulators.Neuronsoscillatingatoneparticularfrequencywillfrequentlybeatleasttransientlysynchronizedwithotherneurons’oscillations,whethertheyareindirectphysicalcontactviasynapsesorgapjunctionsornot,aswesawintheexampleofthe40Hz(gamma)oscillationsofcorticalneuronsthattemporally“bind”fragmentedsensoryinputintoasinglepercept,orfigureagainstagroundinGestaltterms.Neuronscan“entrain”eachothertooscillateexactlywiththesamefrequencyandmatchingthephases,insynchronous“coherence.”Ortheycanentraineachothertooscillatesimultaneouslybutatdifferentintegers,“phase‐locked.”(E.g.adrummarkingonlythedownbeatofeachmeasureinawaltz,thougheachmeasurehasthreebeats.)Ortheycanretardor“precess”eachother,iftheiroscillationsareverysimilar.Ortheycanhavefarmorecomplicatedpatternsofinterference.Theycanenhanceorneutralizeeachother(p.354).49Oscillationinitselftendstobeverypredictable,agoodtime‐keeper–hencethependulumclock.

Neuronscanalsoaltereachothers’functioninginotherways.Therearethreeknownmethodsofbrainplasticity:a)byreplacingneuronsvianeurogenesis,b)bydendriticspinesslowlygrowingeveninadults(Buzsákidesribesthisas“wiring‐basedplasticity”50),andc)bythemorewell‐knownsynapticplasticity,strengtheningorweakeningsynapseswitheachother.(E.g.synapticplasticityoccursviaapost‐synapticneuron’sNMDAglutamatereceptors,which,whenfullyactivated,allowcalciumionstoenter;thecalciumionstheni)indirectlyallowmoresodiumionsin,loweringthatcell’srestingmembranepotentialandthussensitizingittofuturesynapticdischarges,andii)indirectlysendnitricoxidetothepresynapticcellasa“retrogrademessenger”tostrengthensynapticfunctionfromthatsideofthesynapse.)51

Neurons’behaviorisdeterminedbythenumber,location,andstrengthoftheirsynapticconnections,andbythenumber,location,andtypeofreceptorsandchannels.Becauseofthis,oneneuroncanradicallychangeanotherneuron’sbehaviorbyalteringitsfunctionalmorphology,byshuttingdownevenawholedendrite.(Iamexpectingjokesabouttheanalogyofwhattodowithone’sjazzband’sproblematicoroverlybrawlingdrummer:puthisleftarminacastuntilafterthebiggig.)

Neuronsdonotinteractonlybyexcitingeachotherorrefrainingfromdoingso,as,e.g.,thezerosandonesincomputers’binarycode.Onlyasystemofallexcitatoryneuronswouldworkinthatway,andanysuchsystemwouldbeextremelylimitedandleadtorepeatedneuronalavalanches.Instead,therearealsoinhibitoryneurons,whichfollowdifferentrules.Ifthereisachainofinhibitoryneurons,theyinhibiteachother’sinhibitions,in“disinhibition,”leadingatargetedexcitatoryneurontobemorelikelytofireanactionpotential.(I.e.theyoperateasadoublenegativedoesinEnglish,notasitdoesinSpanish,whereasecondnegativeonlyemphasizestheoriginalnegative.)Lateralinhibitionisanextensionofdisinhibition:here,whenanexcitatoryneuronisactivated,itrecruitsaninhibitoryneurontosuppresstheactivityofsurroundingexcitatoryneuronsina“winner‐takeall”mechanism.Thishelpstoexplainhowneuronscouldentraineachother’soscillations.Iftheyarefiringrandomly,somewillhappentofiretogether.Notonlywilltheybefiringtogether,theywillalsobesuppressingthenon‐synchronousonesatthattime.Thesuppressedoneswillstillbereadytodischarge,andthiswillraisetheprobabilityofmoreandmoreofthemdischargingtogetheratthenextpulse,andsoon.Theoscillationwouldcontinueaslongasacertainnumberkeptfiringtogether,exercisingadominanceorattractoreffect.AndtheresonatingneuronswouldgiveustheadvantagesmentionedbyLlinás,includingbeingveryenergyefficient.Theneuronswouldbekeptcloseenoughtothresholdforfiringtobesensitive,butwithoutfiring

49Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.354.50Ibid.,p.247.51Learningofthisself‐sculptingofthelivedbrainwouldhavethrilledNietzsche,whoinvariousbookscelebratesthehumanabilitytocreateoneselfasaworkofartorasanembodimentofone’svalues.E.g.TheGayScience,#290,1974,andTheGenealogyofMorals,1969.

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prematurely.Theonlylimitationisthatthereareonlyshort“windowsofopportunity”ratherthancontinuousreadiness,whichwouldbeenergeticallytooexpensive.52

Becauseinhibitoryneuronscanactasanopposingforcetoexcitatoryneurons,theybestowseveralimportantbenefitsonneuronalsystems.First,theycan“balance”theexcitatoryneurons,sothattheseareneithertrappedinexcitatoryavalanches,norkeptstifledandunabletoreacttoinputswhenneeded.Rather,theexcitatoryneuronsarekeptina“metastable”orcriticalstate,withthesafetycatchoff,sotospeak,sothatevenaweakinputcangenerateastrongresponse.(Notethatthissensitivitycontraststothepredictableoscillationof,say,thethalamocorticalneuronsmentionedabove.)Andinterestingly,despitethefactthatinhibitoryneuronsareonlyaboutone‐fifthoftheneuronsinthecortex,theirgreatnumberofconnectionsandtheirfrequentactivityresultintheirbalancingoutthenumberofexcitatorypost‐synapticpotentialswithalmostexactlythesamenumberofinhibitoryones.Second,theinhibitoryneuronsallowfortheseparationandfunctionalautonomyofcellassemblieswithinthebrain,whichinturnallowsforgreatercomplexityoverall.Andthird,whenexcitatoryandinhibitoryneuronsarecombinedinchains,theresultscaninvolvesomuchinteractionatsomanylevelsthattheybecomenon‐linear;theiroverallconsequencesareimpossibletopredict.Tounderstandthem,wemusthaverecoursetoneuronalsystemstheory,which,asBuzsákiwrites,“isanoffspringofgeneralsystemstheory,asortofmodernizedGestaltconceptinaquantitativedisguise.”Systemstheoryismorethanahighlycomplicated,statistics‐informedversionofthetraditionalGestaltimage,however.Bykeepingtrackofhowpasteventsaffectasystem’scurrentstate,includingitsresponsestostimuli,systemstheoryaimstounderstandhowsystemschangethroughtime,and“learn.”“Insteadoflookingatdiscretemomentsintime,thesystemsmethodologyallowsustoseechangeasacontinuousprocess,embeddedinatemporalcontext.”53

Buzsákinotestheinadequacyofthestandard“stimulus‐brain‐response”approachhere.Suchanapproach,inheritedfromtheBehavioristmovement,regardsthebrain‐statebeforethestimulusasmererandomnoise,andthebrain‐stateresponsetothestimulusasnoise‐plus‐response‐signal.Yetstudiesdonotbearthisout.Instead,thepre‐stimulusbrain‐stateinfluencestheresponse,andevenwhethertherewillbeoneatall.Thetimingofthestimulusrelativetophasesofoscillationsisamajorfactor,aswell.“Evokedactivitymayrevealmoreaboutthestateofthebrainthanaboutthephysicalattributesofthestimulus.”54NotethatBuzsákiischallengingtheBehavioristapproachinanunusuallyparsimoniousway,here.Heisnotpositingsome“inner”hiddenentity,orsomesoulormindwithfreewillorSpirit.Heispointingoutthepreviouslyoverlookedtemporaldimensionofthebrain,withitsnatural‐selection‐chosenbenefitsoflearning,prediction,andaboveall,movement.

Itisworthrepeatingthelessonheisgivingusphilosophers.Inordertoacknowledgetherealityofmammaliansubjectiveexperiences,initiative,agency,emotions,wedonotneedtoresorttopositingan“inner”Cartesian­typespace,oradisembodiedmind.Instead,wemakeroomfortheseexperiencesandattributesbynoticinghowwechangethroughtime,incorporatingandevensedimentingoldbrainstates,andhowourmotilityhasgrantedusakindofpurposiveness,andhowinthemorecomplicatedmammals,wecanevenarrange,tosomedegree,tocombinetheseaspectsinorderpurposefullytochangeourselves,ase.g.Spinoza55recommends.Noneofthisrequiresbelievingthatwehavesouls,freewill,oranykindof“reason”beyondwhatnaturalselectionwouldbeexpectedtogiveprimatessuchasweare.Itdoescomewithaprice,though.Thepriceisthatweabdicatesome

52Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.74.53Ibid.,p.15.54Ibid.,p.263.55Damasio'ssummaryofSpinoza'sEthicsinhisLookingforSpinozaisexcellentandbeautiful.

NotethatSpinozahimselfwouldhaveresistedtheemphasisIamplacingontemporality;thescienceofhistimedidnotlenditselftothatkindofthinking.Thefamousexampleoferroneoushypostasisbyscientists,thetheoryoffireasthereleaseofa(nonexistent)substancecalled"phlogiston,"wasinventedbyacontemporaryofhis.Enlightenmentthinkerstendedtofocusmoreonthephysicsofspacethanoftime,andcalculuswasonlyintheprocessofbeinginvented.

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oftheprivilegesweasaspecieshavearrogatedtoourselvesandlearnmorerespectforothermammalspecies.Andthistaskpromisestobeextremelyarduous.56

Second,neuronaloscillationsinteractingwitheachothercancreateemergentproperties,whichthecomponentneuronsdonothave.(E.g.thespeedofmyoldcarcannotbefoundinanyofitscomponentswhendisassembled:wheels,engine,gears,gastank,steeringwheel,etc..However,thecardoesmove,andspeedily,whentheyareproperlyassembledandfueled.Thecar’smotionisanemergentproperty.)Andtheemergentpropertiesresultingfromthecomponents’combinationand/orinteractioncanthen,inturn,reciprocallyaltertheircomponents.(Thetiresandgearsgetworn,thechemicalenergyinthegasolineistransformedintoheatandmotion,etc..)57

AnexamplethatBuzsákiusesisanaudience’sapplause.(Sothedrummer’scastrestrainedhisexuberancejustenoughforadisciplinedyetinspiredperformance.)Applausebeginswithrandomclappings,someofwhichhappentooccursimultaneously.Asthishappens,moreandmorepeopletendtojoinin,atleastforawhile,i.e.their“degreesoffreedom”constrictduetotheinfluenceofthese“dominant”or“attractor”rhythms,andtheybecomepartofthewhole.Theemergentrhythmisinturninfluencingtheindividualclappers.Also,whenclappinginsynchrony,ahigherlevelofvolumeisreachedatthosepeaks(notcontinuously,ofcourse)thanwasreachedbytherandomclapping,eventhough,asitturnsout,thesynchronizedclappersareclappingatabouthalftheirusualspeed.Withsynchronizedclapping,ahighervolumeisreachedevenwithabouthalfthework.Theenergyefficiencyofsynchronizedneuronaloscillationsisanalogous.

Someoftheemergentpropertiesofinteractingneuronaloscillationsarefairlywellknownandverywellaccepted,suchastheoscillationsinvolvingmusclemovementandthoseinvolvingthebindingofperceptssuchasGrannieasafigureagainstground.Othersareonlybeginningtobeexplored.

Buzsákiandacolleague,MarkkuPenttonen,recentlyexaminedhowdifferentneuronaloscillationfrequenciesinasinglemammal’shippocampusarerelated.Theyfoundthreeindependentlygeneratedfrequenciesintherathippocampus:oneat4‐10Hz,oneat30‐80Hz,andoneat140‐200Hz.Ultimately,theywereastonishedtofindthatinawidevarietyofmammals,thereare“bands”offrequencies,from0.02Hzto600Hz,generatedbyavarietyofmechanismsacrossdifferentstructuresinthebrain,whicharerelatednotbyanintegerrelation(asinourdrumpoundingthedownbeatforawaltz)butinaratioofthenaturallogarithm’sbasee,thatis,2.71828...(thesameratiofamouslyfoundinanautilusshell),withnogapsinthisseriesoffrequencies!Perhapsmostimportantly,eisanirrationalnumber,meaningthatnofrequencyintheserieswillbe

56IhavesometimesconjecturedwhethertheunusualpopularityofcreationisminTexasandKansasmaybeconnectedtothesetwocattle‐ranchingstates’havingsomeoftheworstanimal‐welfarehistoriesforslaughterhouses,beforeGrandin’sreforms.Frequentlyeconomicforcesdoindeedshapeideology,asKarlMarxargued.57Contrastthistotheexampleof,say,copperwiring.Becauseofcopper’satomicproperties,itselectronshells,thefactthatitcangiveuptwoofitselectrons,itisbothagoodconductorofelectricityanditisductile,canbebentandstretchedtoformwires.Thesearenotinthemselvesemergentproperties,onlythemanifestationata“macro”levelof“micro‐level”properties.Ifwearrangesuchwiresintoahouse’selectricalnetwork,thewholehouse,includinginsulatingwires,breakers,etc.,doesnowhavetheemergentpropertyofsupplyingelectricitytooutletsandsoon.Itisnota“system”inthetechnical“complexsystems”sense,however;theemergentpropertiesdonotinturninfluencethecomponents.Itismerelyabuildingwithveryvaluableemergentproperties.However,wecanarrangeforthisbuildingtoachievethestatusof“system”verytemporarilybyconfiguringthewiresimproperlysothattheelectricalcurrentcannotflowadequatelyandbuildsupheattotheextentofmeltingthecopperandignitingthehouse.Or,morehappily,wecanmakeourselvespartofthesystemandusethehouse’soutletstopowerthetools(drills,etc.)weneedtorepairthewiring.Inthiscase,weareasystemembeddedinanothersystem.

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ableto“phase‐lock”anyotherfrequency.Inotherwords,thewholesystemofthebrainiscooperatingsoastopermitthedifferentfrequenciesnottoentraineachother.Thisisunderstandablewhenweconsiderthanacompletelyordered,predictablesystemcannotitselfpredictorreactorchangeverywell.

Anotherkeycharacteristicofthemammalianbrain’soscillationspectrumisthatifthelogoffrequencyisplottedagainstthelogofamplitude,astraightlineresults(downtotheright,indicatinganinverserelationship).Thisisknownasa“oneoverf”spectrum,sinceitmeansthatamplitudeAincreasesasfrequencyfdecreases,asintheequation:A~1/f.Thislinearplotcontrasts,forexample,withabellcurve.Instead,itreflectsthe“power‐law”“scale‐invariant”relationshipsbetweentheoscillations(“themathematicaltelltalesignofself‐organization”p.121).Itiscausedlargelybythedelaysinsignaltransmission,whichmeanthatoscillatorswithlower,slowerfrequenciesaremoreabletorecruitmoreneurons,furtheraway,andthusproducebiggeramplitudes,thanoscillatorswithfasterfrequencies(whicharemorelikelytobeontothenextphaseofthecyclebythetimetheirsignalsreachdistantneurons).WhatisofinteresttoBuzsákiisthat,whenconsideredas“noise”(beitsound,light,orbrainfrequencies),this1/fspectrumrefersto“pinknoise,”whichisthemeanbetweenrandom,unpredictable,buthighinformation“whitenoise”(withnorelationshipamongthefrequencies,aconstantpowerdensity,andaflatspectrumdescribedasA~1/f0)andthemorepredictableandorganized(atshortintervals,atleast),lowinformation“brownnoise”(withaspectrumdescribedbyA~1/f2).58

Itappearsthatthissysteminvolvesaveryfinebalancebetweenunpredictabilityandpredictability,betweencomplexdynamics(whichBuzsákidescribesashalfwaybetweenorderanddisorder)andtransientorderfromthepredictable,deterministicoscillations.

Orderinthebraindoesnotemergefromdisorder.Instead,transientorderemergesfromhalfwaybetweenorderanddisorderfromtheterritoryofcomplexity.Thedynamicsinthecerebralcortexconstantlyalternatebetweenthemostcomplexmetastablestateandthehighlypredictableoscillatorystate:thedynamicstatetransitionsofthebrainareofthecomplexity‐ordertype.Whenneeded,neuronalnetworkscanshiftquicklyfromahighlycomplexstatetoactaspredictivecoherentunitsduetothedeterministicnatureofoscillatoryorder.59Third,accordingtoBuzsáki,thebrainisalsoactiveinthatitisprimarilythesourceofmotor

outputs,andonlysecondarilytothisisittherecipientofsensoryinputs.ThisisGrastyán’scontroversialchangeofperspective,andneedssupport.Buzsákigivesit.

Perceptionissecondarytomotilitychronologicallybothinevolutionarydevelopment,aswesawearlier,andintheindividualorganism’sdevelopment.Buzsakievendefines“experience”fordevelopinganimalsas“accumulationofknowledgeorskillthatresultfromdirectaction.”60“[P]erceptionislearnedthroughtheactionofthemotorsystem.Perceptionisnotsimplyafeedforwardprocessofsensoryinputsbutratherisaninteractionbetweenexploratory/motor‐output‐dependentactivityandthesensorystream.Itissomethingwedo.”6158Buzsákicomparesthis“golden”meanofpredictabilityandunpredictabilitytomusic.

Perhapswhatmakesmusicfundamentallydifferentfrom(white)noisefortheobserveristhatmusichastemporalpatternsthataretunedtothebrain’sabilitytodetectthem,becauseitisanotherbrainthatgeneratesthesepatterns.Thelong‐timeandlarge‐scalenotestructureofBach’sFirstBrandenburgConcertoisquitesimilartothelatesthitplayedbyarockstationortoScottJoplin’sPianoRags.Ontheotherhand,bothhightemporalpredictability,suchasthesoundofdrippingwater,andtotallackofpredictability,suchasJohnCage’sstochastic“music”(essentiallywhitenoise)arequiteannoyingtomostofus.(p.123)

Amusingly,inafootnotetothispassageBuzsákicitesstudiesshowingthatmonkeys,dogs,andotherspeciesrespondsimilarlytothepredictabilityofsounds,completewith“thepleasantness‐annoyancedimension[which]canbebehaviorallymeasured.”Someaudiencesmakeforareallytoughgig.59Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.135.60Ibid.,p.221,hisitalics.61Ibid.,p.228,hisitalics.

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“Thebasisofallspatialmetricsinthebrainderivesfrommuscularaction.Withoutthesupervisormotorsystem,onecannotverifydistance,depth,oranyspatialrelationship.”62Thesomatosensoryrepresentation“getsanchoredtothereal‐worldmetricrelationshipsoftheskeletalmuscles”sinceithastobecustom‐sizedandupdatedforeverybody.63Similarly,Merleau‐Pontyhadarguedthatwelearnthethirddimensionofspace,depth,fromourmovinginit.

Motilityisprimarytoperceptionalsointhesenseoftheactivitywemusttakeinorganizingourperceptions.TheoriginalGestalttheoryofperceptionmadethatclear;weareactivelyconstructingtheobjectswesee.Newdatatakethisfurther:whenlookingatanambiguousfigure,onestudyfoundthatneuralactivityalonecouldn’texplainthebrain’sverdict;continualsurveillancebyeyemovementswasrequired.64

Butultimately,BuzsákiisdefendingGrastyán’ssequenceofbrainoutputs,asactionsorthoughts,controllingitsinputs,perceptions,ratherthanviceversa.Thus,themeaningwegivetooursensationsislargelyinfluencedbyour(ultimatelymotor)goals.

Similartothe“space”forsubjectivitythatLlináswrotehadevolvedbetweensensingandmoving,Buzsákidescribesa“gap”inacircuitthatis“closed”byouraction.Yetitisnotagapbetweensensingandmoving,butbetweenfirstmovingandthensensingtheresults.

[T]hereisa‘gap’betweentheneuronalconnectionscontrollingtheoutputsandinputsthattransmitinformationfromthesensors.Thegapmaybeclosedbyactionsexertedbythebrainonthebodyandtheenvironment,aprocessthat‘calibrates’neuronalcircuitstothemetricofthephysicalworldsandallowsthebraintolearntosee.65Notethatbecauseofhissystemsapproach,Buzsákidoesnotmaketheconventional

distinctionbetween“internal”and“external”thatLlinásandothertheoristsdo.Instead,“Itisnotalwayseasytodistinguishbetween‘internal’and‘external’operators.Thebrain,thebody,andtheenvironmentformahighlycoupleddynamicalsystem.Theyaremutuallyembeddedratherthaninternallyandexternallylocatedwithrespecttooneanother.”66

Ratherthanthetraditionalimageoftheselforsubjectiveconsciousnessasnotjustinternalbutisolated(usuallytreatedascommonsensebutinfactanideologytraceablebacktoDescartes),Buzsákiisimplicitlydifferentiatingtheselforlivedorganismfromitssurroundingsbyitsaspectsactingtogetherasasystem,andbythatsysteminitiatingactivity,andbyitsrelative(andonlyrelative)autonomywithinitscontext.67

Buzsákiregardssleep–non‐REMsleepaswellasdreaming,REM,sleep–asafertileactivity,notmerelyareactiontotheday’sstimulioratemporaryswitchingoff.Newevidenceshowsthatnon‐REMsleep,morethanREMsleep,isnecessarytoformmemoriesandtohelpsolveproblems.Onehypothesisisthatinsleepthebraincould"hold"theinformationlongenoughfortheslowermolecularmechanismstoencodeit.Onecouldevendescribesleepasthe"default"stateofthebraininthatitisthebrain'sself‐organizationwithoutcurrentexternalinputs,similartotheapparentbrain‐stateoffetusesofacertainage.68Buzsákiasks,rhetorically,whetherourdaytimeexperiencesdetermineoursleep“trajectories,”“ordoestheself‐organizedprocessofsleepdeterminehowthe

62Ibid.,p.221.63Ibid.,p.225.64Ibid.,p.228.65Ibid.,p..32‐33.ButBuzsákicautions“Spontaneousactivityalonedoesnotgiverisetoconsciousness,however.Abraingrowninvitro…withoutanabilitytomove[its]sensorscannotbecomeconscious,inthesensethattheneuronalresponsesevokedbythesensoryinputswouldnotacquireorreflectmeaning”(pp.370‐371).

66Ibid.,p.11,footnote19.67ThisishowSpinozadefinesbodilyintegrityaswell:“Bodiesaredistinguishedfromoneanotherinrespectofmotionandrest,quicknessandslowness,andnotinrespectofsubstance.”(BaruchorBenedictSpinoza,trans.Ethics,1982,BookII,Prop.13,Lemma1.

68Ibid.,p.229.

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wakingbrainreactstoenvironmentalperturbations?”69Andheanswers:whilethepatternsofsleepcanbeperturbedbytheday’swakingexperience,“[a]ftereachday’sexperience,however,thebrainfallsbacktothedefaultpatterntorerunandintertwinetheimmediateandpastexperiencesofthebrain’sowner.”70AsLlinássuggestsaswell,ratherthanthinkingofourselvesasinherentlyawakeanddisturbedunaccountablyevery24hoursbyalengthyinterruption,weshouldperhapsthinkofdifferentsequentialbrain‐stateswithdifferentfunctionsforsupportingeachother,includingwaking,dreamlesssleep,REMsleep,andsoon.

Similarly,inwakinglifeanabsenceofinputdoesnotcauseabsenceofbrainwaves.Instead,ifonedisengagesone’svisionfromthesurroundingsbyclosingeyesandnotmovingthem,onewillelicitthevisualsystem’s“idling”frequencies,alphawaves,fromtwoindependentsources,theoccipitalvisualareandthefrontaleyefields.Thesealphawavesarepromptlyblockedsimplybyopeningone’seyes.Andanabsenceofmusclemovementalsoelicitsaparticular“idling”frequency,the“murhythm,”whichisnotinfluencedbyeyebehavior,butwhichisblockedbyevenmovingafingerortoe.

Insummary,Buzsákiviewsthemammalianorganismasthemostcomplexsystemofnature’sdevising,onewhichisbuiltfromelementsrelyingonopposingforces,includingopposingsodiumandpotassiumionflows,inhibitoryversusexcitatoryneurons,andthepredictabilityofindividualoscillationfrequenciesinteractingwiththenon‐predictabilityofnon‐linearinteractionsamongneuronskeptinametastablecondition.Mammals’brainscanchangetheirowncorticalneurons’interactionsviasynapticplasticityandviainhibitorypatterns.Andmammals(andpresumablyothervertebratesandintelligentnon‐vertebrates)initiateinteractionswiththeirsurroundingswhileusingtheirperceptionsasfeedbackfortheiractions,embeddingthemselvesassystemswithinthegreatersystemsoftheirsurroundings.71ImplicationsforPhilosophy:ANewParadigmoftheSelfasanOngoingCircuitofAgencyandPerception

TheimplicationsofthischangeofperspectivebasedonGrastyán’scircuit,forphilosophyaswellasforscience,arevast.

Forexample,accordingtothisview,itisnotsomuchthathumansarethespeciesthatseestheuniverse,themeansoftheuniverse’sself‐consciousness,ase.g.HegelandSchopenhauerthought.Rather,mammalsingeneralandhumansespeciallycanchangeandinfluencetheworld,deliberately,i.e.withinformedconsent,informedvolition.(Contrastthistotheusualtraditionalnotionof"freewill"divorcedfromanycontext,anycausalrelations,anysub‐consciouselements,anynon‐humanspecies.)

Thisshiftfromthemodelofpassiveperceptiontraditionalinmostwesternphilosophy(e.g.Descartes’cogito)toamodelofagencyandperceptionascontinuingcircuithasprofoundimplicationsforspecificphilosophicalquestions,aswell.E.g.eventotheobsession‐producingquestionof“theproblemofevil”:whydoesevil(e.g.“injustice”causedbynon‐humanaccidents,aswellasinter‐humaninjustice,ande.g.sufferingingeneralofallorganismscapableofsuffering,sentientanimals,fromwhatevercause)exist?Theusualattemptedreplywillbeformulatedasananswer,abitoffurtherknowledge,ahypothesis,perhapsametaphorintendedtopromptachangeofperspective.YetthebestreplyI’vefoundcamefromcolleague(andspouse)WilliamSimpson,whosuggestedthat

69Ibid.,p.206.70Ibid.,p.208.71Ironically,Grastyán’scircuitof“youmoveandthenyougetperceptualfeedback”cyclecouldbesaidexactlytodescribetheactionsoftraditional20thCenturyAmericanBehavioristscientistsinstudyingthesimplestimulus‐reflexresponseoftheirexperimentalsubjects,I.e.theywerelookingatthewrongend,sotospeak,ofthefeedbackcircuit,whilethemselvesconstitutingtherightendtostudy.Theyweretheirownexamples,anddidnotrealizeit.ThereisaNewYorkercartoonherewaitingtobedrawn.

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the“question”beansweredbyanAristotelianpracticalsyllogism,whoseconclusionisnotastatement,butaninjunctiontoaction.(E.g.

1.Drinkingbrackishwatercanmakeoneill.2.Thiswaterisbrackish.Therefore,3.Avoiddrinkingthiswater!

Theconclusiontoanargumentregardingthe“problemofevil”wouldlikewisebesomethingsuchas:Therefore,helpthisperson!)Simpson’snovelandcompellingreplytothe“problemofevil”strikesmeasofapiecewiththeparadigmshifttowardsagency,originatingwithHeraclitusanddevelopedmostbyBuzsáki,Llinás,andMerleau‐Ponty.

Iwouldliketothinkthatthisshiftwouldalsobeanaturalfitwithandbenefittheenvironmentalist,animalwelfare,andanti‐corporate‐globalizationmovements,aswell.Wewouldthenbecoordinatingouractivities,asthemostsophisticatedmammalsembeddedinourbiosphere’ssystem,towardstheendofimprovinglivesthroughoutthesentientworld.

Suchaparadigmisnew,butdoeshavevenerablerootsinphilosophicaltradition.The

notionofconatus(effort,endeavor,impulse,inclination)iscentralforSpinoza,whodescribestheconatustopersistastheessenceofallbeings.(VolitionforSpinozaisconatusinaffirmingordenyingbeliefs;appetiteisalsoconatus.)72AndSchopenhauerregardedtheexperienceofwillingassoprimal,sobasic,thatallhumanswouldfinditatthecoreoftheirexperience,prioreventoperceptionandcognition,priortotheusualsenseofself,arisingfromthedepthsofthesubconscious.(Schopenhauerevenpositedthatthereisacosmicwill,sotospeak,whichistheunderlyingforceoftheuniverse,whichwecancontactincarefulintrospectionandmysticexperiences.)NietzscheadoptedSchopenhauer'sgeneralphilosophyandsimplyexcisedthemysticism,andinsistedthat,farfromasingleuniversal"force,"therearemanydifferent"willlings"eveninanysingleanimalatanymoment,thoughfewarefullyaccessibletoconsciousreflection.ThedescriptionsofSchopenhauerandNietzschehaveresonatedwithmanypeople,includingsomeofthemostinfluentialfiguresofthe19thand20thcenturies:Tolstoy,Freud,Darwin,AlbertSchweitzer,MahatmaGandhi,RichardWagner,JackLondon,ThomasMann...73

Itmaywellbethatthatprimalexperienceofwillingisactuallyareflectionofhowcentralmotilityistoourexperience,andtowhoweare.Motilityis,afterall,whatunderliesananimal'sagency,itspurposiveness.Motilityiswhatpermittednaturalselectiontofavortheevolutionofappetite,desire,belief,andsoon.

72Incidentally,Spinozadidnotbelievein"freewill"asitisusuallyconceived,asfullyconsciousandundeterminedbyanycauses.Instead,hecontendedthatwecanachieveagreaterdegreeofautonomy,self‐determinism,byunderstandingourlivesandwhatinfluencesus.Wecantherebyperformmoreactionswhichexpressourownnatures,ratherthansimplyreactingtooursurroundingssothatourbehaviorisexpressingthenatureofoursurroundingsinstead.

73Theycertainlyresonatewithme.Irememberasagraduatestudentbeingdisappointedby

aphilosophyarticleattemptingtoelicitreaders'intuitionsaboutwhichtheyidentifiedthemselveswith:theirbodiesortheirmemories.Itinvolvedanimaginarychoicetodowithmemorytransplantsandtorture–yes,academicphilosophyhasmanysucharticles,somewithzombies,too‐‐andleftmeunexpectedlybored,sinceIfoundbothalternativesaspresented,memoryandbody,depressinglypassiveanddepersonalized.Volition,now,orempatheticdrivetoaction,orlethalannoyancewithapopsong,oracravingforchocolateoradesireforaLaphroaig:ThoseIcouldidentifywith.Isuspect(andhope)thatmanyotherswouldrespondsimilarly.

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LlinásandBuzsákiontheBrain/MindasTemporal

Thereareseveraldifferentwaysthatconsciousnessinvolvestime,accordingtoBuzsákiandLlinás.

First,letusbeginwithaquotefromLlinásthateloquentlyexpressestheviewofbothhimandBuzsáki:

Canyourecognizethesenseoffutureinherenttosensorimotorimages,thepullingtowardtheactiontobeperformed?Thisisveryimportant,andaveryoldpartofmindness...itwasthisgoverning,thisleading,thispullingbypredictivedrive,intention,thatbroughtsensorimotorimages–indeed,theminditself–tousinthefirstplace...Iproposethatthismindnessstate,whichmayormaynotrepresentexternalreality(thelatteraswithimaginingordreaming),hasevolvedasagoal‐orienteddevicethatimplementspredictive/intentionalinteractionsbetweenalivingorganismanditsenvironment...Underlyingtheworkingsofperceptionisprediction,thatis,theusefulexpectationofeventsyettocome.Prediction,withitsgoal‐orientedessence,soverydifferentfromreflex,istheverycoreofbrainfunction.74

Consciousness,subjectivity,theself,thepossessorandorganizerofqualia,whateverwewanttocallit,isdirectedtowardsthefutureevenatitsmostprimitiveoriginsinmovement.(SimilartoLlinás,Merleau‐Pontywritesaboutmovementasfuture‐oriented:“Iamalreadyattheimpendingpresentasmygestureisalreadyatitsgoal,Iammyselftime...”75)

Bythetimethenervoussystemdevelopsenoughininvertebratestoadapttochange,italsoreliesonpastexperience.Inthatsense,consciousnessdoesnotreallyexistintheformofanisolatedextensionlesspresent,ase.g.Descartesthoughtitcould(sothathecoulddoubthismemoriesandincludeonlyenoughofthe“present”tofollowhisargumentsouttotheirend).Instead,consciousnessisgearedtowardsthefutureandpast.Ourmemoriesaffectourpresentexperiencesandfuturegoals,bothconsideredfromthethird‐personpointofviewasnon‐linearcomplexsystemsandconsideredfromthefirst‐personpointofviewasourconstantlygrowingandreinterpretingviewofourownpasts,our“historicity”tousethephraseoftheHeidegger‐Gadamerschoolofthought(influencedbyNietzsche’sperspectivismandemphasisonchange).

Second,consciousnessisalsodependentonthefutureandthepast,inthat,asLlinásandBuzsákibothargue,itssubstrateseemstobetheongoingprocessesofneuronaloscillations,whichoccurnecessarilythroughtime.(Aparticle,forinstance,canbeconsideredasitexistsinahypotheticalextensionlessmoment.Awavecannot.)AsNietzsche’sphilosophysuggests,wearemoreverbthannoun.Thus,ifitwerepossibletoarrangeforanextensionlessmomentofconsciousness,theresultwouldnotbeconsciousnessasweknowit,anymorethanawavelessinstantofmusicwouldbemusic.

Yetwhileoscillationsmustextendthroughtime,asoscillations,theyarenothomogeneous,buthave“beats.”Andthesecycles,withtheirbeginningsandendscausedbyneuronsfiringandrecovering,canserveascuesforstartingandstopping.Buzsákiwrites:“[e]achoscillatorycycleisatemporalprocessingwindow...Inotherwords,thebraindoesnotoperatecontinuouslybutdiscontinuously,usingtemporalpackagesorquanta.”76Thus,thebrain“‘chunks’orsegregatesperceivedeventsaccordingtoitsabilitytopackageinformationintime”usingneuronaloscillation.77

Third,becauseofitsoscillatingsubstrate,consciousnessdoeshaveparticularlimitsregardingtimeandparticulartime‐basedcapacities.BuzsákinotesthatBenjaminLibet’sfascinatingstudiesofexperiencedtimerevealthat“thesomatosensorycortexhadtobestimulatedfor200‐500millisecondsforevokingaconscioussensationoftouch.”Quickereventsmaygiveusunconscious

74Llinás,op.cit.,p.3.75Merleau‐Ponty,op.cit.,p.421.76Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.115.77Ibid.,p.10.

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information,i.e.contributetoourresponding,buttheywillnotappeartotheconsciousmind.78Forexample,whenwearedrivingandadeerjumpsoutinfrontofusandweinstantlybraketoavoidhittingit,ourbrainsprocessthereactiontobrakebeforeweareconsciousevenofthedeerappearing.Inretrospect,weconstructtheinternalstorylineofseeingthedeerandthusbraking,butourconsciousmindsdidnotactuallyexperiencetheeventsinthatsequence.

Andourthinking,aswellastheoscillationscomprisingit,requirestemporalduration.“Recognizingsomebody’sfaceandrecallingherfirstandlastnames,herprofession,ourlastmeeting,andourcommonfriendsareeventsthatdonotoccursimultaneouslybutareprotractedintime,sincelargerandlargerneuronalloopsmustbecomeengagedintheprocess.”79Thetempoisalsokey.“Ourbesttemporalresolutionisinthesubsecondrange,correspondingtothedurationofourtypicalmotoractions,thetempoofmusicandspeech,”writesBuzsaki.80Foralllanguages,theaveragelengthofspokensyllablesis0.25seconds.Andnotsurprisingly,thetemporalrangeofourexperiencecorresponds,asBuzsákinotes,tothetemporalrangeofthebrain’soscillators.

Theseoscillatorsprovideadvantagesaswellaslimitations.Inparticular,gammaoscillationstimethesendingofmessagesinanefficientway:

neuronalassembliesinthewakingbrainself‐organizethemselvesintotemporalpackagesof15‐30milliseconds[about30‐60Hz].Theydosobecausepresynapticdischargewithinthistimewindowappearstobemosteffectiveindischargingtheirdownstreamtargetsduetothetemporalintegrationabilitiesofindividualpyramidalcells.81

Thisfrequencyrangeoverlapswithanotherkeylimit:thegammaoscillationsbynetworksofinhibitoryneuronsvarybetween40and100Hz,duetothedecaytimeoftheirinhibitorypostsynapticpotentials,mediatedbyGABAreceptors.

Evenmoreimportant,learningandmemory,viasynapticplasticity,seemtodependonthiscrucialtimingaswell,sincesynapticstrengtheningrequiresthatthepostsynapticneuronbestronglydepolarized,anditsfiringmustbecoordinatedwiththepresynapticneuron’scycle,andsincetheseinturnrelyongamma‐oscillation‐mediatedsynchronization.Thus,“thecriticaltemporalwindowof[synaptic]plasticitycorrespondstothelengthofthegammacycle.”82

LlinásandBuzsákibothseemtoassumethatthe“beats”oftheoscillations,thequantizedcycles,sotospeak,arereflectedincertaindiscontinuitiesinourexperienceoftime.Llináswritesthat“consciousnessisanon‐continuouseventdeterminedbysimultaneityofactivityinthethalamocorticalsystem.”83Buzsákiwritesofa“segmentationofexperience”thatseemstocorrespondtothesegmentationofoscillations,andattributesthisideaofsegmentationtoWilliamJames,whomhequotesatlength:

Theunitofcompositionofourperceptionoftimeisaduration,withabowandastern,asitwere–arearward‐andaforward‐lookingend.Itisonlyaspartsofthisduration‐blockthat

78BenjaminLibet,MindTime:TheTemporalFactorinConsciousness,2004,paraphrasedbyBuzsákionp.116.Ironically,asBuzsakiadds,“[t]hedelaybetweenLibet’s‘mindtime’relativetophysicaltimeisafavoriteargumentofphilosopherstoquestiontheunityofthemindandbrain.”(Ibid.)NietzscheunderstoodthelimitsofconsciousnessmoreacenturybeforeLibetpublishedhisbook.Hewrites:

“Innerexperience”entersourconsciousnessonlyafterithasformedalanguagetheindividualunderstands–i.e.,atranslationofaconditionintoaconditionfamiliartohim...E.g.,“Ifeelunwell”–suchajudgmentpresupposesagreatandlateneutralityoftheobserver–thesimplemanalwayssays:thisorthatmakesmefeelunwell–hemakesuphismindaboutfeelingunwellonlywhenhehasseenareasonforfeelingunwell.(TheWilltoPower,1968,#479.

79Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.115.80Ibid.,p.8.81Ibid.,p.246.82Ibid.,p.247.83Llinás,op.cit.,p.124.

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therelationofsuccessionofoneendtotheotherisperceived.Wedonotfirstfeeloneendandthenfeeltheotherafterit,andfromtheperceptionofthesuccessioninferanintervaloftimebetween,butweseemtofeeltheintervaloftimeasawhole,withitstwoendsembeddedinit.84

Buzsákicommentsonthisquote:“James’sobserverisataninstantbutembeddedinthestretchedtimeofthemind.”85ThepresentinstantisaGestalt’sfigureagainstthegroundoftheduration’sbow‐endandstern‐end.Thus,despitethesegmentation,“[p]assageoftime,thatis,itsduration,isfeltasalinearevent,slippingfromonemomenttoanother.”86Theobserver‐at‐instantmayskipfromsegmenttosegment,butthebackgroundofpastandfutureprovidesanongoingcontext.

Itisthisbeliefthattimeisoriginallyandfundamentallyexperiencedasa“line”thatIwouldliketochallenge.IbelievethatanalternatemodelofexperiencedtimebasedonMerleau‐PontywouldfitbetterwiththerestofLlinás’sandBuzsáki’sapproachtoconsciousnessastemporal.

Merleau­PontyonExperiencedTime

Itisalmostplainobviouscommonsensethatweexperiencetimeasalinearevent.Thatisoneofthemostcommonwaysofrepresentingtheflowoftimeonpaper,asintheusualxaxisofanygraphinvolvingchange:tfortime.Thatisalsothenotionoftimeasalinearsingle‐dimensionanalogoustothree‐dimensionalspace.Perhapspartlybecauseofthis,mostwesterners,atleast,dousealineasanoftensemi‐consciousmetaphorfortimeintheirownlives,whetherstretchingfromtheirleftforthepasttotheirrightforthefuture(asmostwesternlanguagesareread),orstretchingfrombehindthem(“putthepastbehindyou”)throughandinfrontofthem.87Infact,manypeopleseemunconsciouslytocodetheirmemories’sequencebytheirplacementinsuchanimaginarydimension,howeverthatdimensionisoriented,back‐to‐front,left‐to‐right,circular(oneacquaintancedidreportthis!Unsurprisingly,heisnotoriousfornotkeepingtoschedules),etc..88

Yetthisnotionoftimeasastraightlineisnotinnate,butahistoricalinventionfoundedapparentlybytheancientHebrews,andinheritedandpropagatedbytheAbrahamicreligions.Manyotherculturesusethemetaphorofaspiralorwheel,basedonthecyclicalseasons,ratherthanpositingthattheEarthhasacreationandafutureending,withprogressinbetween.Itmaybethatsomeculturesdonotviewtimeasalineatall,straightorspiral.89

84WilliamJames,1890,p.609,quotedbyBuzsákionp.115,ftnote.9.85Buzsáki,op.cit.,p.115.86Ibid.,p.8.87PsychologistsConniraeAndreasandSteveAndreas,HeartoftheMind,1989,TadJamesandWyattWoodsmall,TimeLineTherapyandtheBasisofPersonality,1988.GeorgeLakoffandMarkJohnsoncitetheAymaralanguageofChileasputtingthepastin"front"andthefuture"behind."Theywritethatthisspatialmetaphorreflects"theexperienceofbeingabletoseetheresultsofwhatyouhavejustdoneinfrontofyou."(p.141).Amusingly,inoneofhisfantasysatiresBritishnovelistTerryPratchetthaddescribedthetrollconceptoftimeasrunninginthesamedirection,fromfronttoback,sincewecan't"see"thefuture,thoughwecanseethepast.SofortrollsonPratchett'sdiscworld,onewouldbackone'swayawkwardlyintothefuture,carryingone'sclubattheready(ReaperMan,1991).88Toelicithowaclientmaycodehis“timeline,”Andreasandhercolleaguessuggestaskinghimtoimagine,say,brushinghisteethyesterday,andthenaskhimtogesturewherehe“sees”thatmemory.Brushinghisteethlastweek,tomorrow,andnextweekwill“plot”severalpointsandgiveageneralideaaboutthatindividual’smetaphorical“timeline.”89BenjaminLeeWhorfandEkkehartMalotkidisagreeabouttheHopinotionoftime,withWhorfstatingthattheHopishavenodistinctnotionoftime,butregarditascombinedwithspaceintothetwoformsofthe"manifest"(theknownpastandlocalpresent)andthe"unmanifest"(thefutureandtheunknownduetodistance),similartoSpinoza'sandMerleau‐Ponty'snaturanaturansandnaturata.MalotkidisputesmanyofWhorf'srelatedclaims(sometimesmisrepresentingWhorf)in

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AndbyassumingthatpeopleoriginallyexperiencetimeasalinebecausethatisourusualimageofitinNewtonianphysics,wewouldbecommittingthesameerrorthatscientistsinpreviousgenerationsdidwhentheyassumedthatpeopleoriginallyexperiencespaceasthree‐dimensional,ratherthanexploringitandachievingthatexperiencebymotility,asBuzsákiandMerleau‐Pontyargue.InMerleau‐Ponty’sterms,wewouldbereadingour“abstract”knowledge,fromNewtonianphysics‐become‐common‐sense,backintoour“concrete”immediateexperience.Wewouldbeconfusingoursubjectiveexperienceoftimewithclocktime.

Isitthatourtimeexperiencesreallyarediscontinuous,andfitmoreintimatelywithsomeofthebrain’selectricaloscillations?Thatdiscontinuitycertainlyisn’tdiscernibletonormalconsciousness,whatevermaybeoccurringinthesubconsciousmind.WhenIreachpurposefullyfortheScotchbottleoveraperiodofhalfasecondormore,Iexperienceitasasingle,ongoing,fluidmotion,despitethephysiologicaltremorof8‐12Hzthathelpstoconstitutethatmotion.Itisn’tthattimeisalinebutjustadashedoneratherthanasolidone.

Instead,thereseemstobesomethingelsegoingon,somethingthatresistsarticulationinlanguage.

Toclarifyhowweexperiencetime,Merleau‐Pontysuggeststhatweavoidthemetaphorsofclocktimeandreturn,asimmediatelyaswecan,tooursubjective,pre‐hypothesized,“concrete”experience.Andwhathefindsisunexpected,eventhoughwereaditwithashockofrecognition.Experienceitself,sheerconsciousnessitself(andallofitsunderpinningsofpre‐consciousknowledge,habit,andaction),isacomplex,notanindivisible,homogeneousunity.Further,theexperiencedpresentisalsoacomplex.90Ifthisaccountseemscounter‐intuitiveatfirstglance,weneedonlyanalyzethepurestpossibleinstantofself‐reflection.

Thefactthatevenourpurestreflectionappearstousasretrospectiveintime,andthatourreflectiononthefluxisactuallyinsertedintothatflux,showsthatthemostpreciseconsciousnessofwhichwearecapableisalways,asitwere,affectedbyitselforgiventoitself,andthatthewordconsciousnesshasnomeaningindependentlyofthisduality.91

Merleau‐PontyisdrawinghereonSpinoza’ssenseofnaturehavingtwoaspects:Naturenaturing(naturanaturans)andnaturenatured(naturanaturata),anactiveaspectandapassiveorreceptiveaspect.Andconsciousnessisasortofintersectionofthesetwoaspectsinasingleorganism.Toexperiencethis,wecansimplytouchoneofourhandswiththeotherhand:wewillalwaysexperienceoneofourhandsasthetouchingandtheotherasthetouched.(Andourperceptionwillbestructuredaccordingtothemore"active"touchinghand'ssensingofthetouchedhand.)Wecanmakethemchangerolesinourminds,butwecannevermakethemcoincide;wecanneverbeperfectlyself‐reflectiveorself‐referring.92

Merleau‐Pontycontendsthatourmostbasic,private,personalexperienceisalwaysofthepersonalemergingfromtheimpersonal.Thisisevidentinourparadoxicalexperienceofourownbodies,assimultaneouslybeingimpersonalweight(thefootinthewrongplacethatdoesn’tmovein

hisextensiveHopitime:alinguisticanalysisofthetemporalconceptsintheHopilanguage,yetMalotkiaswellseemstoacceptthebasicnotionoftunatya,theverbofhoping/comingtrue,thatunderliesWhorf'sdescriptionoftheHopisenseoftime.PennyLeehasrecentlycriticizedsomeofMalotki'scriticismsofWhorfinTheWhorfTheoryComplex:ACriticalReconstruction;thematterisnotyetresolved.90HereIamusing“complex”notinthetechnicalsenseof“complexsystems,”butmerelyasthecontrasttoasimpleunit.Nietzscheseemstohavehadthesameinsight,though;inTheUseandAbuseofHistoryhefamouslyreferstoexistenceas"animperfecttensethatneverbecomesapresent."91Merleau‐Ponty,op.cit.,p.426.92Schopenhaueranticipatedthisthoughtacenturyearlier,usingthemetaphorofeyeanatomy:

ButtheIortheegoisthedarkpointinconsciousness,justasontheretinatheprecisepointofentryoftheopticnerveisblind,andthebrainitselfiswhollyinsensible,thebodyofthesunisdark,andtheeyeseeseverythingexceptitself.Ourfacultyofknowledgeisdirectedentirelyoutwardsinaccordingwiththefactthatitistheproductofabrain‐functionthathasarisenforthepurposeofmereself‐maintenance,andhenceofthesearchfornourishmentandtheseizingofprey.(TheWorldasWillandRepresentation,Vol.II,1966)

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time),andamore"personal"circuitofmotilityandperception:wesetabouthangingapaintingthatwelike,andwefeelourtoegettinghitbythefallinghammerwhenwemisjudgetheangleofthenailandforcerequiredtoputitin(thecircuitisn'talwaysperfect).Thisexperienceofourselvesasirreduciblycomplicatedispreciselywhatmadebeliefinmind‐bodydualismpossible,butdualismmisrepresentstheexperienceasofaghostinacadaver,whereasitisofalivedbodyinwhichthepersonalemergesfromtheimpersonal.93

Weexperiencethepersonalemergingfromtheimpersonalthroughtime,aswell.Merleau‐PontydescribesaverydifferentGestaltofexperiencedtimefromBuzsáki’s(orWilliamJames’s).Itisnotthepresentinstantasafigureagainstthebackgroundofpastandfuture.Instead,thepersonal,presentbutfuture‐directed,initiatingaspectofourselves,asnaturenaturing,isthe“figure”againstthebackgroundofthe“impersonal”factsofthepastandpresent,andassumptionsaboutfuturesurroundings.ExcerptsfromoneofMerleau‐Ponty’smostnotoriouslydensepassagesfollow.Ifthispassageisrecognizedassimplyarticulatingexperiencesthataresobasic,sopre‐linguistic,thatweneverusuallyarticulatethemeventoourselves,itmakessurprisinglyclearsense:

Butthepresent...isthezoneinwhichbeingandconsciousnesscoincide...Timeis‘theaffectingofselfbyself’;whatexertstheeffectistimeasathrustandapassingtowardsafuture:whatisaffectedistimeasanunfoldedseriesofpresents:theaffectingagentandaffectedrecipientareone,becausethethrustoftimeisnothingbutthetransitionfromonepresenttoanother...theexplosionordehiscenceofthepresenttowardsafutureisthearchetypeoftherelationshipofselftoself...[Ourtemporality]isthebasisbothofouractivityorindividuality,andourpassivityorgenerality–thatinnerweaknesswhichpreventsusfromeverachievingthedensityofanabsoluteindividual.Wearenotinsomeincomprehensiblewayanactivityjoinedtoapassivity,anautomatismsurmountedbyawill,aperceptionsurmountedbyajudgement[referringtoKant’stheoryhere,sic],butwhollyactiveandwhollypassive,becausewearetheupsurgeoftime.94IfweweretocomeupwithametaphorofthisGestaltofexperiencedtime,itwouldnotbea

line,butanintersection.Oneaxiscouldrepresentthemoreimpersonalbackgroundofthepast:one’spersonalhistory,physiology,sedimentedhabitsandtendenciesofthought,theworldatlargewithsocialandnaturalrulesgoverningwhattoexpect,andsoon;weconstantlyaddtothisbackgroundthroughourperception.Thisisthe“affected”aspectoftime,“timeasanunfoldedseriesofpresents.”(Wemightthinkofitasextendinglaterallyfromourselves.)Theotheraxis,crossingthefirst,couldrepresentourvariousandoverlappingandconcentricgoalsand“projects”intothefuture,ultimatelygroundedinthefactthatweevolvedtobemotilecreatures.Thisisthe“affecting”aspectoftime,

93Schopenhauer’swholephilosophyturnsonasimilardistinction.Ratherthanthetraditionalmind‐bodydualism,hesuggeststhatweexperiencethe“outside”worldandourownbodiesandmostofourthoughtsand“innerlife”viatheindirectKantianstructureof“representations.”However,heclaimsthatweeachalsohavedirectaccesstowhatheconsiderstheunderlyinginitiatingforceofallofus,theuniversal“will,”whicheachofuscanrecognizeasadeeperidentitywithinourselvesthanourownindividualselvesare.Weeachexperienceourselvessimultaneouslyasboth“will”and“representation.”AndthushecircumventsKant’sclaimthatwecanneverknowtruerealitybeyondourowncategoriesofthinking,byrespondingthatwecannot“know”itinthesetermssimplybecauseweexperienceittoodirectlyforthecategoriesofeverydayknowledgetoapply.Butthisunusuallydirectknowledgeofthecosmicwillismediatedbyone’sbodilyexperience:“theknowledgeIhaveofmywill,althoughanimmediateknowledge,cannotbeseparatedfromthatofmybody.Iknowmywillnotasawhole,notasaunity,notcompletelyaccordingtoitsnature,butonlyinitsindividualacts,andhenceintime...”(WWRI,p.101),eventhoughhetheninsiststhat,onametaphysicallevel,timeasweknowitdoesnotexist.OnecouldarguethatinsomerespectsMerleau‐PontyresemblesanaturalizedSchopenhauer,aSchopenhauerwhohaseschewedmetaphysicalclaims,andisinsteadarguingthatthesemetaphysicaldescriptionsareinfactvaluableinsightsintohowourmammalian“livedbodies”experienceliving.94Merleau‐Ponty,op.cit.,pp.424‐428.

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“timeasathrustandapassingtowardsafuture.”95(Wemightthinkofthisasextendingfrombehindtoinfrontofourselves.)Wecanimaginethatthemetaphoricalintersectionwould“move”forwardastimeprogresses,asweimaginethestandardmetaphoroflineartimedoing.However,thelateralaxis(representingthepast,theimpersonal“given”world)markingthemomentofthepresentwouldbemorethanamarker.Itwouldbeareminderthatalsorepresentedthecumulativebrainstatesthatwehadexperienceduptothatmoment,alongwiththepredispositions,expectations,habits,etc.,thatwehadgainedfromthem.Andtheanterior‐posterioraxiswouldnotbethestandardmetaphorofabstractbidirectionalclocktime,butwouldfacetowardsthefuture,representingourfuture‐orientedmotilityandpurposiveness.Somepredictionswouldexistasimaginedpossibilitiesintheimpersonalbackground.Otherswouldbeassociatedwithourowndesires,goals,andmotions.Others,suchastheimplicitpredictioninvolvedinaccompanyingothermusicians,orindancingtogether,seemtobeanunusualversionofthisintersectionwithsuchconstantanticipationandadaptationthatGrastyán’scircuitofmotionandsensoryfeedbackwouldnothavediscretecyclesbutwouldconstituteanongoingdialogue.Butinanycase,the"friction"betweenthetwometaphoricalaxesreflectsoursenseoftimepassing.96

DistinguishingthesetwometaphoricalaxesalsohelpsusclarifythemetaphorsoftimedescribedbyGeorgeLakoffandMarkJohnson.LakoffandJohnsonassumethatmostpeopleexperiencetimemetaphoricallyasalinefrombehindgoingthroughandinfrontofthem,whichisthepositionthatpsychologistConniraeAndreasandhercolleaguesdescribeas"intime."ButAndreashasencounteredaboutasmanyclientswhoexperiencetimeasextendinginsteadfromtheirleftouttowardstheirright.Thisposition,interestingly,isassociatedwithamoredetached,reflectiveattitude.Forinstance,peoplewhoexperiencetimeprimarilyinthiswaywilltendtoexperiencememoriesfroma"dissociated"third‐personpointofview;theywillimagineseeingthemselvesinthememory.Andreasandhercolleaguesrefertothisasthe"throughtime"position.(Peoplewhotendtoexperiencetimeasaback‐to‐frontline,instead,willtendtoexperiencememoriesastheylivedthem,fromtheirown"associated"pointofview.Thisparticularpositionseemstoenhancespontaneity,being"in"themoment.However,itislessbeneficialforschedulingthantheleft‐to‐rightmetaphorfortime.)

Now,LakoffandJohnsonhavefoundtwodifferentkindsofmetaphorsofthepassingoftime.Insomecases,wethinkofourselvesasstationaryobserversfacingasequenceofeventsmovingtowardsus.Hencewespeakof"Thetimewillcomewhen...Thetimehaslongsincegonewhenyoucouldmailaletterforthreecents.Thetimeforactionhasarrived...Thesummerjustzoomedby."97

Inothercases,wethinkofourselvesasmovingobservers,travellingthroughdifferentlocations,eachofwhichisthepresentwhenwearethere.Thus,wetalkintermsof"troubledowntheroad....Whatwillbethelengthofhisvisit...WearecominguponChristmas...Wepassedthedeadline."98LakoffandJohnsonpointoutthatthesetwodifferentmetaphorsareactuallyextremelysimilar;"theyarefigure­groundreversalsofoneanother."99Whatiskeyineachmetaphorisnotwhichaspectisimaginedasmovinginrelationtowhichotheraspect.Whatiskey,theywrite,isthedualityoftwoaspectsmovinginrelationtoeachother.AndIwouldemphasizethatweeachparticipateinbothaspects.Consciousnessseemsirreduciblefromtheinteractionbetweenour

95Thismaybewhytheabstractnotionoftimeasafourthdimensionofspacejustdoesnotmakesensetomanypeople.Ourbrainsaresimplynotconstructedsothatwecouldexperiencetimeasatallanalogoustoanydimensionofspace–wedonot“occupy”itinthewaythatwedospace.(Ofcourse,wearenothereaddressingobjectivetime,clocktime,butonlysubjectivetime.Thephysicsoftimeisanothertopicentirely,andagainstsomeotherphilosophers,Iamskepticalwhetheroursubjectiveexperiencesoftimecangiveusanyinsightintothat.)

96PhilosopherCandiceShelby(personalcommunication,August21,2009)notesthatchildrenlearnthenotionsoftimedurationsfromhavingtowait.The"tension"betweenone'sowngoalsandtherestoftheworld'sfactscanbeametaphorforthetensionofimpatienceaswell!97LakoffandJohnson,p.143,theiritalics.98Ibid.,p.146.99Ibid.,p.149.

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capacityformotionandourpurposiveness,ontheonehand,andourmemories,habitsofmotionandthought,and"impersonal"physicallimitations,ontheotherhand.(Wheredoesperceptionfitin?Itisanessentialpartofthecircuitofmotionandperception,anditistranslatedandsedimentedintothe"given"backgroundworld.Itiswhatallowsmovementtobeputintothecontextofthemovingorganismanditssurroundings.)

Now,Iwouldsuggestthatamongwesternersthe"stationaryobserver"metaphoristypicalofpeoplewhopredominantlyexperiencetimeinwhatAndreasreferstoasthe"throughtime"position.Perhapswethinkintermsofourselvesasstationaryinamovingtimewhenweareidentifyingmorewiththereceptive,reflective,detachednaturanaturataaspectofourselves.Andweexperienceourselvesamovingthroughasequenceofstationaryeventswhenweareidentifyingmorewiththeactive,future‐orientednaturanaturansaspect.

Themetaphorofa90degreeintersectionoftwoaxesisofcoursearbitrary,asare,ultimately,themetaphorsoftimelines.Thenotionofafeedbackcircuitisalsoanabstractmetaphor.Perhapsothersmightpreferthemetaphorofanairplane,whosethrustresultsinairflowwhichfunctionsnotonlyasdrag,butalsoaslift.Orperhapsotherscancreatemorecompellingmetaphors.ThemainideathatIhopetoconveyisthecomplexityandtemporalityofeventhebriefestmomentofconsciousnessasweexperienceit,andthatthisfirst‐personaccountmayreflect,toasurprisingdegree,thethird‐personaccountsofbrainactivitybyBuzsákiandLlinás.100

WeshouldalsonoteoneimportantimplicationofMerleau‐Ponty'sapproachto

experiencedtime,whichisconsistentwithBuzsáki'sandLlinás'shypotheses.Non‐humanmammals(andperhapsothervertebratestovaryingdegrees)wouldappeartohavethesamebasicexperienceoftimeaswehumansdo,invirtueoftheirbeingmotile,perceivingcreatures,oftheirhavingaverysimilarbrainandnervoussystemtoours.Theymaynothaveabstractconceptsof"day,""year,"etc..Theymaynotevenhaveanabstractsenseof"thefutureBinky,"whichwouldallowthem,forexample,deliberatelytodelaysomekindsofgratificationforlongperiods.Yettheydoclearlyhavesomesenseofthefuture,inthattheyhavepurposesandtheydesireoutcomes.101Andthismayimpactourapproachtoanimalwelfare.

ApplicationsofThisModelofSubjectiveTimeExperience

The“commonsense”conceptualmodelofexperiencedtime,thestandard“linearduration,”isbasedontheoldernotionofconsciousnessasapassive,perceivingthinker–Descartes’cogitocognitivelyapprehendsthepassageofmomentsasiftheywereboxcarsinatrain.

Thesuggestedalternativemodel,developedfromMerleau‐Ponty,allowsformotilityandgrowingmemoryaswellasperception–themotilitythatBuzsákiandLlináshaveworkedsohardto

100Someindividualsclaimthatconsciousnessasweknowitisnonethelessatemporal,sincewecanhaveexperiencesofapparenttimelessness.However,theseexperiencescanfrequentlybeanalyzedbyourapproach.E.g.asDavidHoekemahaseloquentlydescribed("MusicasNaturalandSupernatural,"Oct.22,2009,atthe67thannualmeetingoftheAmericanSocietyofAestheticsinDenver,CO),themiddlesectionofOlivierMessiaen's"QuartetfortheEndofTime"canelicitasenseoftimelessnessinlisteners,paradoxicallyforapieceofmusic.Thissectioninvolvessimple,softpianochordstimedlikeapulseandaslowcellomelody.Ifweperceivesubjectivetimethroughtheinteractionofagencyandperception,theillusionoftimelessnessheremightbeexplicable:Werelatetothepulses,possiblybeing"entrained"bythem,andthecellomelodyisjustenoughtoseizeourattention,sothatthereisnocontrasttothemelody'sslowprogressiontogiveusasenseoftimepassing.101MyplumptortoiseshelltabbyDr.Phibesisunderstandablyfood‐oriented,sinceshewasaskeletalsix‐week‐oldkittenwhenshewasfoundinabusystreet.Whenherfoodbowlbeginstogetlow,withonlyafewdays'worthofkibbleleft,shestartsleadingmetoit,sittingexpectantly,andstaringatme.ThelowerIletitget,themoreinsistentshebecomes.Sheisn'tsatisfiedwithmerelyhavingenoughfoodeveryday;shewantsagoodreliablesurvivalisthoard.Dr.Phibesisnogeniusevenbycatstandards,butshedoesclearlyhaveavividsenseofthenearfuture,intermsofafewdays.

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convinceusistheultimatebasisofconsciousnessandthusofwhoweare.Anditallowstheaspectofperceptiontobedistinguishedfromtheimpetusofmotility.Bysodoing,itpermitsamorefine‐graineddescriptionoftheexperienceoftemporaldistortions,whichhavefrequentlybeenillservedbystandardaccountssuchas”cognitivedeficitsinapprehendingtherateoftimepassage.”Itoffershelponlyinformingdescriptions,notexplanations,ofcourse.Nonetheless,moreaccuratedescriptionsmayhelppromptnewhypothesesandstudies.

Timefamouslyseemstospeedupduringpleasantandengagingtimes,whenweareinteractingfullywithoursurroundings.Itseemstoslowdownwhenoneisfeelingthwartedorboredoroverwhelmedby,ordisconnectedfromone’ssurroundings.Accordingtotheintersectionmetaphor,thiswouldbedescribedasoneofthetwoaxesdominatingtheother.Iamcuriousastowhetherthenormal“speed‐up”oftimeduringengagementwithsurroundingsorataskmightcorrelatewithparticularbrainwavefrequenciesandareas,suchastheintriguinghippocampalthetawaveswhichfascinatedGrastyán,orwithactivationofthedopaminecircuitsarisingfromthemid‐brainnuclei,associatedbyJaakPankseppwithwhathetermsSEEKINGbehaviorinanimals.102

Intwounusualcases,theintersectionseemstodisappear.Intheeuphoricstateof“flow,”whenone’scapacitiesareperfectlymatchedtoatasksothatoneisabsorbedinit,peoplereporteitherextremespeedingupoftime,oradramaticslowingoftime,whilemaintainingasenseofdynamism.103Apparentlythesenseofoneselfasfuture‐orientedandmotileisexpandedtoincorporatemanyaspectsthatarenormallyexperiencedas“given”background,as“drag”onthe“thrust,”sotospeak.Otherbackgrounddatasimplydropoutofperception,sothattheusualfeelingofacontrolledchangeislost.Onlythechangeisfelt.

Inthecaseofsevereemotionalorphysicalshock,thewholeperceptualGestalttemporarilycollapses.Soldiersinbattleorsurvivorsofacrashmayfindthemselvesfixatingonfindingashoe.Here,thetemporalGestaltseemstocollapsealongwiththeperceptualfield’sstructure.PerhapsthisstatecouldbebetterunderstoodintermsofLlinás’sideaofemotionsaspremotorFAPs,andqualiaassensoryFAPs.JustasasuddenshockmayevaporateamotileFAP(e.g.aharpistplayingadifficultpiecehasitblownoutofherheadbyadroppedteatrayorbythesuddenrealizationthatshehaslockedherkeysinhercar),ashockmayalsodisruptthenormalpatternsofemotional,cognitive,andperceptualexpectationandconcentrationthatwenormallyhavetheluxuryoftakingforgranted.

FrederickMelges,professorofpsychiatryatDukeUniversityuntilshortlybeforehisdeath,studiedcorrelationsofvariouspsychopathologieswithvariousdistortionsofexperiencedtime,especiallyinregardtohowthepatientsviewedtheirfutures.104Henotesthatpatientswithclinicaldepressionreportedtimetoslowitspacedramaticallyandpainfully,usingsuchdescriptionsas“walkinginmolasses.”Theyfrequentlyhadnosenseofafuture,thoughanormalsenseofthepast.Whentheirsemi‐conscious“timelines”areelicited,theywillreportthesenseofa“line”forthepast,butnotforthefuture;the“timeline”willbetruncated.Themetaphorofsubjectivetimeasanintersectionallowsustoexaminethiswithmoredetail.Itisnotthattheyhaveacognitivedeficitwithregardtoapprehendingfutureclocktime,butthatthereisadysfunctionofagencyorpurposivenessorinitiativeofsomekind.IamcuriouswhetherGrastyán’sversionoftheusualcircuit,motilitycausingperceptualfeedback,mightbereversedorfragmentedinthesecases,orinsimilarcasesoflearnedhelplessness.Thestandardmodelofnormalstimulus‐and‐response,inotherwords,mightactuallyturnouttobeagooddescriptionofapathologicalstateoflearnedpassivity.

102JaakPanksepp,AffectiveNeuroscience:TheFoundationsofHumanandAnimalEmotions(OxfordUniversityPress),1998,quotedbyTempleGrandin.103MihalyCsikszentmihalyiandIsabellaSelegaCsikszentmihalyi,Eds.,OptimalExperience:PsychologicalStudiesofFlowinConsciousness,1988.104FrederickMelges,TimeandtheInnerFuture:ATemporalApproachtoPsychiatricDisorders1982.Inasimilarvein,psychologistSuchoonS.Mohasexploredsomereversalsoftemporalfunctioninginpsychosis,withschizophrenicclaimsofpre‐cognitionhypothesizedtooriginateinareversalofthe“about”posture,normallydirectedtofutureevents,withthe“from”and“about”posture,normallydirectedtopastevents.“TimeReversalinHumanCognition:SearchforaTemporalTheoryofInsanity,”1990.

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Forpeopleinphysicalpain,timealsoseemstodrag.Normally,thepainitselfmaybetheperceivedfigure,thefocusofthewholeperceptualorsensorimotorfield,butthelargertemporalGestaltisintact,andfunctionsasitdoesinfrustration.Butinseverecases,anunusualtemporaldistortionseemstohappen.Twofriendswhosufferfrommigraineshaveindependentlydescribedthisexperienceinsimilarterms:“Ican’tgetpastthemoment,”“It’sasifthemomentwillneverend.”Itisasthoughtheaxisofthegivenimpersonalworldisalmostsuppressingtheother,future‐orientedaxis.Mightthecingulatecortexbeinvolvedsomewhereinsuchtimedistortions?

Schizophrenics,Melgeswrites,seemtoprogressthroughfourstagesoffragmentationoftimeexperience,beginningwiththepresentseemingtolengthen,possiblyfromincipientfragmentation;throughdifficultyinsequentialthinking–duenotonlytointellectualdifficultiesbuttosomeunusualdisturbanceof“purpose”;throughthepast,present,andfuturebecomingdiscontinuous,andtheselffeelingunfamiliar;tothefragmentedsenseoftimecollapsingsothattheindividualcannolongerdistinguishthem.Thishasbeenverypoorlyunderstoodbythe“cognitivedeficitingaugingtemporalprogressionandsequencing”approach.However,thenotionthatfuture‐directednessisassociatedwithpurposivenessandmotilitymayopenupnewpossibilitiesforexploringhowstructuralandphysiologicalbrainproblemsmightunderliethetragicexperiencesoftheseindividuals.

BuzsákidiscussesalphawavefrequenciesbeingboostedbybothYogaandZenmeditation,aswellasbytechnologicallymediatedneurofeedback.Somemysticshavereportedexperiencesoftimelessness,inwhichtheindividualseemstobecomeimmersedintheNaturenaturingaxiswithoutanyexternally‐direct“project,”sothattheindividualseemstohavebeentranscended,andthesenseofpurposivenessisreflectedbackonitself,asitwere,ratherthanreceivingtheusualperceptualfeedback.Theirbrainwavefrequenciesduringtheseexperienceswouldbefascinatingtoexplore.Conclusion

BuzsákiandLlinásaredevelopingnewconvergingapproachestothemammalianbrainbasedonbrainfunctioning,includingconsciousness,asinvolvingbrainwaveoscillations,andthusasinherentlytemporal.Bothbeginwithresearchconnectingelectricalbrainactivitywithmotility,andextendthisconnectionbeyondmotilitytoconsciousness,andperception,aswell.Bothalsoarguethatmotilityisthefoundationofconsciousness,givingevolutionaryandembryonic/fetaldevelopmentalevidence.

Botharedevelopingnewconceptualmodelsofwhatphilosopherswouldcallthe“self,”consciousness,orsubjectivity:modelswhichincludenotonlyperceptionandawareness–astraditionalphilosophicalmodelsdo–butalsoagencyandinitiative,whichonlyafew“counter‐tradition”philosophershavedone.Thus,LlináshypothesizesthatemotionsandsensationscanbethoughtofasanalogstomotilityinthatallmightbeFixedActionPatterns.AndthusBuzsákidevelopsanddefendsGrastyán’sreversaloftheusualreflexcircuit,sothatourbrainsactonourbodiestoproducemovement,andourperceptionsfollowasfeedback.

WhatIamcallingthecounter‐traditionofHeraclitus,Spinoza,Schopenhauer,Nietzsche,andMerleau‐PontyisavaluableresourceforBuzsákiandLlinásinthisenterprise.Thesethinkers,duetotheiranticipationofaspectsofBuzsáki’sandLlinás’swork,canhelpthemtorebuttheobjectionsofwriterssuchasChalmers,todefinethelegitimateandillegitimaterolesofpsychologicalintrospection,tore‐categorizehumanityasthemostcomplicatedmammalratherthanaqualitativelydifferentkindofentity,toarticulatesubjectivehumanexperienceasbothreceptiveandactiveandthusasirreduciblycomplicated,toelaboratethewaysinwhichhumansaswellasothermammalsare,fundamentally,sourcesofagencyandinhabitantsofchange,andtoformanewsimpleconceptualmodelofexperiencedtimewhichallowsformorefine‐grainedandaccuratedescriptionsofexperienceddistortionsoftime,bothpathologicalandhealthy,whichmightleadtonewhypothesesandstudies.

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