“Artificial Islands” of the Future:

The Seasteading Movement and the International Legal

Regimes Governing Seasteads in EEZs and on the

High Seas

Ryan C. Schmidtke *

I. SEASTEAD DEVELOPMENT AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL

SEA LEVEL RISE ................................................................................... 1 II. SITUATING THE SEASTEAD MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL

MARITIME LAW .................................................................................... 5 III. BACKGROUND ON THE SEASTEADING MOVEMENT AND THE FRENCH

POLYNESIA “FLOATING ISLANDS” PROJECT .......................................... 6 IV. OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF THE PROJECT ................................ 12 V. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE FLOATING ISLANDS PROJECT ............ 13 VI. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES .............................................. 15 VII. SHORT AND LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TSI AND BLUE

FRONTIERS .......................................................................................... 24

I. SEASTEAD DEVELOPMENT AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL

SEA LEVEL RISE

“How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is clearly

Ocean.”

- Arthur C. Clarke, Nature, 1990

The oceans of the world make up 97% of the planet’s water and over

70% of Earth’s entire surface area.1 Throughout history humans have

desired to collect, utilize, and harness water as an essential resource.2

Humans gradually adapted and took advantage of bountiful aquatic

resources, initially as a means of necessity to build and control complex

aqueduct infrastructure, and more recently for economic profit as water has

* Ryan C. Schmidtke is an international law student at Stetson University College of

Law in Saint Petersburg, Florida and is expected to graduate in May 2020. Mr. Schmidtke

is also a graduate of East Carolina University with a background in history and Hispanic

studies.

1 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., How Much Water is in the Ocean?, NAT’L

OCEAN SERV. (last updated June 25, 2018),

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oceanwater.html.

2 A Brief History of Water and Health from Ancient Civilizations to Modern Times,

INT’L WATER ASS’N PUBL’G, https://www.iwapublishing.com/news/brief-history-water-

and-health-ancient-civilizations-modern-times (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).

2 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

become synonymous with luxury. This latter trend is especially evident in

the United States, where oceanfront property is usually reserved for the

wealthy.3 Those throughout history that failed to adapt were left to face the

unyielding power of the world’s oceans, as was true with the Great

Galveston Hurricane of 1900, Typhoon Nina of 1975, and Hurricane Mitch

of 1998.4

As the threats of climate change and sea level rise become more

urgent, humankind has been dealt a new series of water-related problems

requiring creative solutions.5 Once again, humankind must adapt or face

potentially devastating consequences.6 Island nations like Tuvalu and

Kiribati have already undergone geographical and demographical changes

as a result of sea level rise, even as residents of low-lying outer islands

within Kiribati’s national boundary retreat inward.7 Another consequence

of climate change that is likely to be felt, particularly in Hawai‘i, is habitat

degradation to low-lying land masses and the coinciding habitat loss of

various endangered and threatened species.8 One proposed solution is

found in “Seasteading,” a promising alternative to traditional, terrestrial

3 See Christopher Flavelle, Why Coastal Living Is Becoming Affordable for Only the

Rich, INS. J. (Apr. 24, 2018),

https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/04/24/487144.htm.

4 The Galveston Hurricane of 1900, NAT’L OCEAN SERV.

https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/features/sep13/galveston.html (last visited Nov. 4,

2019); Long Yang et al., Typhoon Nina and the August 1975 Flood over Central China, 18

J. HYDROMETEOROLOGY 451, 467 (2017),

https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/JHM-D-16-0152.1; William Smith,

Hurricane Mitch and Honduras: An Illustration of Population Vulnerability, 1 INT’L J.

HEALTH SYS. & DISASTER MGMT. 54, 54 (2013),

http://www.ijhsdm.org/text.asp?2013/1/1/54/122460.

5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C,

39-40, 95 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds, 2018),

https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf

.

6 See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Half Seas Over": The Impact of Sea Level Rise on

International Law and Policy, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 175-81 (1991), for

consequences of global sea level rise on international law. See also William C. Burns,

Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the

Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 147, 147-50, 165-70 (1997),

for more specific consequences to island nations.

7 Justin T. Locke, Climate Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden

Crisis and Long-Term Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171, 171-80 (2009), for the

impact on the Republic of Kiribati and Tuvalu increasing burdens on urban central islands

and their infrastructure.

8 Jason D. Baker et al., Potential Effects of Sea Level Rise on the Terrestrial Habitats

of Endangered and Endemic Megafauna in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, 2

ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 21, 26-28 (2006) (predicting the impact on Hawaiian fauna);

Celine Bellard et al., Potential Impact of Sea Level Rise on French Islands Worldwide, 5

NATURE CONSERVATION 75, 84 (2013).

2019] Schmidtke 3

governance to vulnerable island nations like French Polynesia. According

to the Seasteading Institute (TSI), the organization leading the charge for

the first large-scale Seastead, the concept name “comes from homesteading,

which means making a home for oneself in new, uninhabited places. It

generally has associations with self-sufficiency and a frontier lifestyle.

Seasteading is reminiscent of that idea, but at sea.”9 TSI is pursuing formal

relationships with other coastal nations and has established a working

relationship with the non-governmental organization Blue Frontiers.10

The Seasteading Institute (TSI) and Blue Frontiers are the leading

NGOs behind the first Seastead, named the Floating Islands Project (FIP),

that would be constructed, operated, and tentatively located in the territorial

waters of French Polynesia.11 The short-term goal of the FIP would involve

the habitation of various connected, floating platforms with the capability

to reconfigure modules in the future.12 The plan is for the Seastead to consist

of small residential structures, shops, sustainable energy development

infrastructure, and aquaculture projects all within the project boundaries.13

The short-term goal of TSI and Blue Frontiers is to construct a

Seastead within the relatively calm waters of French Polynesia or an island

nation with similar geographic, climatic, and infrastructural

characteristics.14 In January of 2017, TSI and the French Polynesian

government published a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which

detailed plans to investigate and research the viability of the pilot Seastead

project in the Tahitian reef system.15 Additionally, the MoU laid out a plan

9 Frequently Asked Questions, SEASTEADING INST.,

https://www.seasteading.org/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018)

(describing general background information on the pilot project). The Floating Islands

Project or FIP will be used interchangeably with “Seastead” and “the Seastead project” for

the remainder of the paper.

10 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9; see Welcome to Blue Frontiers, BLUE

FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Blue Frontiers

is an NGO focused on seasteading and other innovations. Other Projects, BLUE FRONTIERS,

https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/otherprojects (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). Blue Frontiers

has collaborated with TSI on environmental and economic studies. Id.

11 See Floating Islands Project in French Polynesia, SEASTEADING INST.,

https://www.seasteading.org/floating-islands-project-in-french-polynesia/ (last visited Oct.

7, 2019) [hereinafter Floating Islands Project]; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.

According to TSI, a seastead is “a community living at sea and largely responsible for

setting its own rules and culture.” Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.

12 Floating Islands Project, supra note 11; see Modular Seastead Design,

SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/modular-seastead-design/ (last visited

Oct. 7, 2019).

13 See Floating Islands Project, supra note 11.

14 Id.

15 Memorandum of Understanding for the Agreement of Intent, French Polynesia-

Seasteading Inst. 6-8 (Jan. 13, 2017); Seasteading in French Polynesia and Beyond, BLUE

4 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

for a “special governing framework” and an “innovative special economic

zone” for the proposed project.16 The MoU addressed the overall issue of

climate change and the specific threat to French Polynesia, as well as the

opportunities to mitigate this threat through the potential development of

the FIP in the region.17 Although this MoU expired in December 2017 and

is no longer on the table, TSI and partners in French Polynesia are

considering the possibility of identifying another potential site for future

construction and development.18 What could have been a fatal blow to the

FIP in French Polynesia has not caused the involved organizations to lose

optimism nor hindered progress in other areas.

For example, TSI and Blue Frontiers finalized the FIP’s initial public

presale funding on July 14, 2018.19 Keeping this in mind, the long-term goal

of TSI and other like-minded NGOs still remains in their sights: the

development of Seasteads on the high seas. Their goal would be to give

Seasteads as much political and legal autonomy as possible, compared to

the amount they would likely have within the territorial sea or Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ) of a particular host nation and its legal regime.20

This paper examines the support for the FIP—including the

potential of TSI’s proposed Seastead project in French Polynesia,

information relating to the concept of Seasteading generally—and the

FRONTIERS (July 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@bluefrontiers/seasteading-in-french-

polynesia-and-beyond-316ae07060c5.

16 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 15 at 6-8.

17 Id. at 6.

18 Media Archive of 2018/10/25: A Plan to Build Islands Off the Coast of Tahiti is on

Hold, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/media (last visited Oct. 7,

2019) [hereinafter A Plan to Build].

19 Varyon: Increasing Variation in Governance, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-

frontiers.com/en/varyon (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see Media Archive of 2018/08/06:

Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million to Build SeaZone Cities for Life on Water, BLUE

FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/media. Blue Frontiers conducted an Initial

Coin Offering (ICO) of their very own cryptocurrency, “Varyon (VAR)”, that will be the

official currency of future associated Seasteads. The ICO raised 3100 ETH (Ether, the

official cryptocurrency of the Ethereum blockchain network) or approximately $1.3

million. Varyon, supra note 19; Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19. Blue

Frontiers has specified that VAR has and will operate with Smart Contract technology on

the Ethereum blockchain that could prove to be an interesting case study for legal, finance,

and political science research in the near future. Following this funding phase, Blue

Frontiers determined that they did not issue the requisite amount of VAR. BF has since

postponed VAR as their primary funding source while refunding some of the VAR token

to early purchasers. Blue Frontiers, What’s Next for Blue Frontiers: Keep Calm and Varyon,

MEDIUM (Oct. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@bluefrontiers/whats-next-for-blue-

frontiers-keep-calm-and-varyon-348f8d619031 (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); see A Plan to

Build, supra note 18.

20 See Vision/Strategy, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/about/vision-

strategy/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).

2019] Schmidtke 5

political, economic, and technological theories involved in initial Seastead

development. This paper also analyzes the hindrances and opposition to the

French Polynesia project and Seasteading in general. Next, this paper

analyzes the international legal regimes guiding the short-term project

within territorial seas and EEZs of coastal nations, comparing and

contrasting the Seastead concept to various artificial island constructions,

vessels, and barges. Lastly, this paper presents recommendations for TSI,

Blue Frontiers, and similar NGOs to ensure compliance with international

law should the organizations realize their long-term goal of moving on to

the high seas. In the alternative, these NGOs might take a more realistic,

nearshore approach by creating a unique legal framework within an existing

nation’s territorial sea or EEZ.21

II. SITUATING THE SEASTEAD MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

LAW

The Seasteading Institute’s proposed initial Seastead project, located

in the territorial waters of French Polynesia, will need to follow the

guidelines of international maritime law.22 Among the relevant treaties and

conventions, Articles 56 and 60-62 of the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will have the most significant impact on the

proposed Seastead project, as these articles regulate the territorial sea or

EEZ of French Polynesia, the likely location of the Floating Islands

Project.23 In the long-term, Seasteading project developers, TSI, and other

organizations will need to comply with the constraints of Article 87 of

UNCLOS and respect relevant international maritime agreements on the

high seas depending on any association they might have with a host or

parent nation.24 Furthermore, the applicability of these laws depends on

whether the structural design and classification of a Seastead is either an

21 See infra Section VII, p. 24. Although it is almost certain that the pilot project will

be constructed nearshore in a location with less risk of storm damage or disruption to

construction, the initial architectural plans explain that the most suitable design would

include a surrounding breakwater device to protect the connected platforms. KARINA

CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., SEASTEADING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 7, 12, 75-77 (2013),

http://seasteadingorg.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/DeltaSync-Final-

Concept-Report.pdf. The question of permanence and fixation to the seabed compared to

possibilities of mobility and propulsion technology and how they relate to international

legal regimes will be analyzed further in Section VII. See infra p. 24.

22 At this point in time, this paper considers French Polynesia to be the most likely

short-term project construction and harboring site because of the relationship established

with the French Polynesian government through the MoU and the development of the

aforementioned Varyon fundraising. See supra pp. 3-4. For Section V of this paper, the

analysis will be limited to international and regional legal regimes to which French

Polynesia or France is a party. See infra Section V, p. 14.

23 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.

397, 418-422 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].

24 See id. at 432.

6 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

artificial island, vessel, or barge.25 A full discussion of how the international

legal framework affects organizations’ decision-making, with regard to the

future of Seasteading, will be explored below.

III. BACKGROUND ON THE SEASTEADING MOVEMENT AND THE FRENCH

POLYNESIA “FLOATING ISLANDS” PROJECT

Global mean sea level rise as a result of the thermal expansion of

seawater and melting land ice is a growing threat with a current projected

increase of between 0.26 meters to 0.77 meters that will specifically impact

the livelihoods of people inhabiting coastal areas.26 For many residents of

coastal and island nations like French Polynesia, coexisting with the power

and unyielding nature of the ocean has been and continues to be an integral

part of their daily lives as a source of cultural and economic importance.27

As the ocean continues to encroach on the limited terrestrial space available

to nations like French Polynesia, people of the world search for creative

solutions to preserve any connection to the geographic areas and cultural

practices with which they are familiar.28

People from island nations, within the Pacific especially, have

already moved to more protected upland and inland countries, fleeing the

flow of ever expanding tides as climate refugees.29 Leaving everything

behind and starting anew in a foreign and geographically or politically

distinct country from one’s own should be the last resort for those facing

the imminent threat of global sea level rise. Considering the potential

consequences of global sea level rise and its drastic nature, it is necessary

to give sincere thought to possible adaptations regardless of their

architectural form or ideological origins.

The proposed solution offered by TSI and Blue Frontiers is the

Floating Islands Project (FIP). According to preliminary plans, the project

25 See id.

26 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE

UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 511 (Jerry Melillo, Terese

Richmond, & Gary Yohe eds., 2014); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL, supra note 5,

at 178.

27 See generally Colin Richards, The Substance of Polynesian Voyaging, 40 WORLD

ARCHAEOLOGY 206, 210 n.2 (2008) (describing the history and culture of the Polynesian

seafaring tradition).

28 SONIA GSIR & ELSA MESCOLI, INTERACT, MAINTAINING NATIONAL CULTURE

ABROAD COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, CULTURE AND DIASPORA 1, 7 (2015),

https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35881/INTERACT-RR-

2015_10_Culture.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

29 See generally Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur, & Privatma Singh, Customary Land

and Climate Change Induced Relocation – A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua

Levu, Fiji, in CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES: FOSTERING

RESILIENCE AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE 19 (2017) (for a specific Melanesian

study of climate refugees).

2019] Schmidtke 7

would have 12 connected platforms holding various housing structures,

restaurants, shops, aquaculture sites, a waste treatment system, utility

connections, and an external breakwater device.30 TSI and Blue Frontiers

have consulted with a Polynesian architect to produce draft designs for the

FIP that minimize any impact on sight lines for the local community and

blend in with the surrounding Pacific waters while maintaining aesthetic

and cultural appeal.31 More relevant to this paper than the appearance,

however, is the overall design including the functional anchoring and/or

propulsion mechanisms of the FIP.32

For the short-term development of the FIP, the construction process

of the Seastead requires: the calmness provided by shallow waters with

depths of less than 300 meters, the lowest likelihood of oceanic storms

possible, moderate temperatures, and the assurance of a low environmental

impact in oceanic areas while anchored to the seabed.33 Following the

complex construction process, it is unlikely that the FIP will be anchored in

any form except temporarily by moored cables to keep breakwater devices

in place.34

Although the exact method of stabilization is yet to be determined,

a study conducted by TSI and the Dutch nautical architecture firm

DeltaSync analyzed what would be the most and least practical designs for

a Seastead.35 Among these options, DeltaSync found that connected, semi-

submersible platforms of a particular size that linked to the semi-permanent

breakwater device would be the most successful method to keep the project

stable within an EEZ that has an atoll or reef system like French Polynesia.36

This would also mean the Seastead would have access to established trade

30 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 7, 12, 15, 26, 31-33, 37-38; Blue Frontiers

(EN), The Floating Island Project in French Polynesia Explained, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15,

2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPIKR8UDDgo (for a visual representation and

explanation of project goals and prospective design plans).

31 Blue Frontiers (EN), supra note 30.

32 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 17, 26. Note that anchoring and/or propulsion

mechanisms help differentiate whether the Floating Islands Project is a vessel, artificial

island or barge. See id.

33 See SHANEE STOPNITZKY ET AL., SEASTEADING LOCATION STUDY: SHIP-BASED AND

LARGE-SCALE CITY SCENARIOS 2, 6 (2011), http://seasteadingorg.wpengine.com/wp-

content/uploads/2015/12/Seasteading_Location_Study.pdf. The authors of this location

study considered the water depth of potential locations around the world for both

“shipstead” and “metropolistead” seastead plans. Id. at 37. For the purposes of this paper,

a “shipstead” is considered to be most similar to the Floating Islands Project due to likely

size and population characteristics.

34 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 12, 15, 20.

35 Id. at 7.

36 Id. at 15, 17-18.

8 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

routes and Internet infrastructure.37 The study considered the reality that

there may be political or natural circumstances that could cause the Seastead

to move out of necessity.38 Under these circumstances and for consideration

in the overall design and construction process, the firm suggested the

possibility of the platforms having the capability to link in a “train

configuration, quite similar to barge tows” where they would be pulled by

tugboats to a more stable environment in the event of a hurricane.39

This method of maneuverability aligns with the FIP design as seen

in the Blue Frontiers video even though it would come at the expense of

increased dependence on external services.40 At least for the short-term,

though, TSI should remain optimistic about their goals as this initial lack of

mobility gives them a viable choice to exist comfortably within a suitable

EEZ of a host nation. This option gives the organizations time to develop

and research new technologies while working out any of the kinks of the

nearshore project before moving onto the less predictable high seas.

Since the current nearshore project will be constructed and operated

within the territorial sea or EEZ of a host nation, TSI has emphasized the

importance of interaction with the host nation through the Anchor Zone

specified in the MoU and otherwise in the initial implementation of the

FIP.41 This would ideally promote friendly relations between the residents

of the Seastead, likely to consist primarily of project funders, and the

citizens of the host nation for the duration of the pilot project. TSI also

analyzed various infrastructure criteria like access to land-based Internet

and active data lines in considering potential viable sites for the project.42

TSI noted the positive characteristics of “Pacific Island atolls” included

established air and water travel routes to major cities.43

37 STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 14-15.

38 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 9, 15.

39 See id. at 10, 52. Following this description, a visualization of the floating platforms

linked together on the high seas as figurative “sitting ducks” comes to mind (albeit

surrounded by a breakwater device). Along with this mental image, one can imagine a

Seastead’s vulnerability to plunder by modern day pirates or collisions with cargo vessels.

See STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 46. These issues have been considered by TSI

and are part of the location site criteria considered in their studies. CZAPIEWSKA ET AL.,

supra note 21, at 21-22. This makes determining future sites complicated and limits the

practical geographical range where a Seastead could operate but leaves many potential

options around the world where a smaller-scale seastead like the Floating Islands Project

and larger-scale project could ideally operate. STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 34.

40 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 10; see Blue Frontiers (EN), supra note 30.

41 Memorandum of Understanding supra note 15, at 7.

42 STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 15.

43 RANDOLPH HENCKEN, SEASTEADING INST., THE FLOATING CITY PROJECT 29 (2014),

http://www.seasteading.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Floating-City-Project-Report-

4_25_2014.pdf.

2019] Schmidtke 9

While total economic self-sufficiency may be an admirable goal, it

is difficult to imagine any community of people or recognized nation-state

maintaining a high standard of living without cooperation or

interdependence between other states and the peaceful exchange of goods

and services across borders. One way the FIP could attain a moderate degree

of autonomy and self-sufficiency is by constructing and developing

aquaculture projects within the boundaries of the project site.44 Just a few

studies referred to by TSI related to aquaculture include the possibility of

developing algae for biodiesel for both “domestic” consumption and export,

the farming of various hydrophilic crops including seaweed and sea

cucumbers, as well as farming various mollusk, fish, and crustacean

species.45 TSI has studied the use of sustainable aquaculture to minimize the

use of synthetic fertilizers and slow adverse environmental impacts caused

by traditional farming like water loss.46

Statements from the involved organizations have emphasized the

environmental benefits of aquaculture as the concept addresses critical

issues of fossil fuel consumption, methane production, synthetic fertilizer

use and runoff, and the ever-increasing issue of water cost and scarcity.47

One study, using similar algae harvesting processes cited by TSI as a

technology to be implemented on a Seastead, analyzed the potential of

vertical focusing for harvesting in comparison to traditional, basic surface

harvesting of algal biomasses in order to mitigate oceanic hypoxia— “dead

zones”—and reduce costs of algal harvesting in the Gulf of Mexico.48 The

study states that “[its] estimates indicate that basic surface harvesting

technology [the current practice] can harvest 1,596 metric tons in three

months and reduce the [current estimated harvesting] net cost of

$93,357,016.”49 “Vertical focusing [for harvesting] potentially could

increase the harvest to 23,313 metric tons over three months and reduce the

net cost [of the harvesting process] to $81,380,937.”50 The algal harvesting

44 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

45 See generally CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40; see also

Sustainability (OASIS), SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/project-oasis/

(last visited Oct. 20, 2018), for more specific information on the sustainability plans, the

project’s OASIS concept (Ocean Aquaculture for Seastead Integrated Solutions) and links

to numerous related studies.

46 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

47 Id.

48 Sustainability (OASIS), supra note 45; see also Chih-Ting Kuo, Harvesting Natural

Algal Blooms for Concurrent Biofuel Production and Hypoxia Mitigation 2 (2010)

(unpublished M.S. thesis, Graduate College of the University of Illinois) (on file with the

Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign),

https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/18541/Kuo_Chih-Ting.pdf.

49 Kuo, supra note 48.

50 Id.

10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

study alone may not provide a perfect solution to solve a problem plaguing

the oceans of the world, but it is one more example of the positive

environmental results TSI hopes to achieve through their project.51

The opportunity to interact and participate in the ever-expanding

global marketplace with an idea as headline-grabbing as the Seasteading

movement is one that is unlikely to be turned down, especially by the

ideological and financial supporters of TSI and Blue Frontiers. The

Seasteading movement is composed of a unique blend of individuals

coming from various philosophical, political, and technological

backgrounds.52 Among the wide variety of founders and figures leading TSI

and Blue Frontiers are a former Google software engineer, a former Pixar

consultant, authors, venture capitalists, a former assistant solicitor general,

a law professor, and more.53 The selection of and interest from the listed

advisors suggests that the involved organizations ended up with a

smorgasbord of valuable skillsets to utilize for their project. A project as

unprecedented as the FIP requires diverse and innovative perspectives if it

wants a fighting chance at long-term success.

In addition to the particular ideological communities finding

common ground in the prospect of Seasteading, the movement has attracted

funding from various outlets. The funding process utilized cutting-edge

financing and fundraising methods that could also impact climate change

mitigation and real estate transactions.54 In 2013, TSI and Blue Frontiers

51 Clean the Atmosphere, video in The Eight Great Moral Imperatives, SEASTEADING

INST., https://www.seasteading.org/videos/the-eight-great-moral-imperatives/ (last visited

Oct. 8, 2019). This particular fact and study is relevant to cases like the “blue-green algae

crisis” affecting Lake Okeechobee, Florida, USA as recently as August of 2018. See Karl

Havens, What is Causing Florida’s Algae Crisis? 5 Questions Answered, CONVERSATION

(Aug. 10, 2018), https://theconversation.com/what-is-causing-floridas-algae-crisis-5-

questions-answered-101305 (for more information on the Florida situation); Donald M.

Anderson et al., The Globally Distributed Genus Alexandrium: Multifaceted Roles in

Marine Ecosystems and Impacts on Human Health, 14 HARMFUL ALGAE 10 (2012),

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/eutils/elink.fcgi?dbfrom=pubmed&

retmode=ref&cmd=prlinks&id=22308102.

52 Staff/Board/Advisors, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/about/staff-

board-advisors/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); Advisors, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-

frontiers.com/en/advisors (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).

53 Staff/Board/Advisors, supra note 52; Advisors, supra note 52; JOE QUIRK & PATRI

FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING NATIONS WILL RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT,

ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND LIBERATE HUMANITY FROM POLITICIANS 348

(2017). These advisors include: Patri Friedman, Joe Quirk, Randolph Hencken, Lelei

TuiSamoa LeLaulu, Susanna Dokupil, Lara Stein, Simon Chuang Liu, Tom W. Bell, and

Robert Viglione, among others.

54 Ricardo Carrasco, How Blockchain Technology Can Help Mitigate Climate Change

and Save the Environment, BITRATES (May 27, 2018),

https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/how-blockchain-technology-can-help-mitigate-climate-

change-and-save-the-environment (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see Ioannis Karamitsos et al.,

Design of the Blockchain Smart Contract: A Use Case for Real Estate, 9 J. INFO. SEC. 177,

2019] Schmidtke 11

conducted an initial “crowd-funding” campaign raising over $27,000 to

fund the program’s engineering study with an additional matching donation

in the same amount coming from the Thiel Foundation.55 The contributions

of both the Thiel Foundation and seed-funding from its namesake Peter

Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, have garnered the most popularity of

fundraising sources to date.56 However, the funds raised from the recent

Varyon Initial Coin Offering (ICO) will likely make the most direct impact

on project development as Varyon will be the monetary device of choice for

the FIP.57

The ICO of the Varyon cryptocurrency token, as mentioned earlier,

raised approximately $1.3 million and will go to the creation of ownership

and residency stakes in the project.58 The cryptocurrency will utilize the

Ethereum blockchain which offers the novel feature of “smart contracts” or

a contract that is “digital, stored within a blockchain and enforces all aspects

of the agreement with cryptographic code. In other words, smart contracts

are simply software programs, and like all programs, they execute exactly

as they are supposed to by their programmers.”59 Cryptocurrency, much like

the Seasteading movement as a whole, has earned its share of criticism from

economists and government officials around the world regarding the

transaction costs and the general instability of the cryptocurrency market.60

189 (2018).

55 Randolph Hencken, Designing the World’s First Floating City, INDIEGOGO,

https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/designing-the-world-s-first-floating-city#/ (last

visited Oct. 21, 2018).

56 Leanna Garfield, A Pilot Project for a New Libertarian Floating City Will Have 300

Homes, Its Own Government, and Its Own Cryptocurrency, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2018),

https://www.businessinsider.com/floating-city-plans-seasteading-institute-peter-thiel-

blue-frontiers-2017-12; Prachi Bhardwaj & Taylor Nicole Rogers, The Life and Rise of

Billionaire Investor Peter Thiel, The PayPal Cofounder Who Called Google 'Seemingly

Treasonous,' Wants to Get Injections of Young People's Blood, and is Trump's Biggest

Silicon Valley Supporter, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2019),

https://www.businessinsider.com/peter-thiel-facebook-trump-biography-2018-2.

57 See Varyon, supra note 19. Again, this has since been postponed as the primary

funding source and the funders were partially refunded for their Varyon investment. See

Blue Frontiers, supra note 19; Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19.

58 Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19.

59 J.R. Gutierrez, What are Smart Contracts and How Do They Work? Examples &

Challenges, CRYPTOVEST, https://cryptovest.com/education/what-are-smart-contracts-

and-how-do-they-work-examples--challenges/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see Varyon,

supra note 19; see also Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology that

will Replace Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/smart-contracts/ (last

visited Oct. 19, 2018).

60 Paul Krugman, Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic, N.Y.

TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/opinion/transaction-costs-

and-tethers-why-im-a-crypto-skeptic.html; see also Janet Yellen, What Bitcoin Critics and

Supporters Around the World Have to Say About Crypto, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017),

12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

IV. OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF THE PROJECT

The French Polynesian government allowed for the expiration of the

2017 MoU specific to the Tahitian reef project at the culmination of local

opposition to the project.61 Local politicians presented arguments against

“tech colonialism”, citing a purported lack of involvement in the

development processes, especially as the importance of the issue was

renewed by French Polynesia during a contentious election season.62 The

local opposition to the FIP pointed out the fact that the MoU was “outdated

and non-binding.”63 Although the project and MoU explicitly stated that TSI

and Blue Frontiers did not need and did not ask for financial contributions

from the French Polynesian government and their citizens, the local citizens

were concerned about their country being used as a tax haven or falling

victim to a large project with no benefit to the local economy.64 It appears

that the initial plan to construct the project within the calm waters of this

specific Tahitian reef system is on hold as a possible construction and

operation site for the foreseeable future.65

In addition to local opposition to the Seasteading movement, there

are other political and moral arguments presented by at least one

international journalist and political theorists. These critics view the

movement with a great deal of skepticism. One critique highlights the

Seasteading movement’s theoretical philosophies of governance and the

arguably idealistic nature of the organizations and some of their funders.66

One journalist argues against the self-regulation espoused by TSI and Blue

Frontiers and predicts that the lack of a firm government-enforced

https://www.bloomberg.com/features/bitcoin-bulls-bears/.

61 Julia Carrie Wong, Seasteading: Tech Leaders’ Plans for Floating City Trouble

French Polynesians, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2017),

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/02/seasteading-peter-thiel-french-

polynesia; see Hettie O’Brien, The Floating City, Long a Libertarian Dream, Faces Rough

Seas, CITY LAB (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/design/2018/04/the-unsinkable-

dream-of-the-floating-city/559058/.

62 O’Brien, supra note 61; Melia Robinson, A Silicon Valley Billionaire’s Dream of a

Floating Libertarian Utopia May Have Finally Been Killed, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2018),

https://www.businessinsider.com/libertarian-peter-thiel-utopia-seasteading-institute-2018-

3; see French Polynesia Sinks Floating Island Project, RADIO N.Z. (Feb. 28, 2018),

https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/351420/french-polynesia-sinks-

floating-island-project.

63 O’Brien, supra note 61.

64 Wong, supra note 61.

65 Robinson, supra note 62.

66 See Conor Lynch, Welcome to “Libertarian Island”: How these One Percenters Are

Creating a Dystopian Nightmare, SALON (Mar. 16, 2015),

https://www.salon.com/2015/03/16/welcome_to_libertarian_island_how_silicon_valley_

billionaires_are_creating_a_capitalist_nightmare/.

2019] Schmidtke 13

regulatory structure within a potential Seastead will cause the project to be

unsuccessful, resulting in various sorts of harm to the residents of the

Seastead.67

It appears that, in theory, the environmental practices and techniques

cited by TSI could have a net positive effect on the global supply-chain for

certain agricultural products—or improve the local environment, at the very

least.68 However, some critiques speculate that a lack of firm governmental

regulation for a project of this size could have an overall negative

environmental impact. Criticism for projects of this size are not

unwarranted. FIPs are novel and have yet to show proof of concept in their

ability to partner with a host country, let alone a Seastead existing on the

high seas as a complex, floating structure with a unique new form of

governance. Although countries and private entities have constructed

numerous artificial island, vessel, or barge projects in the past, none seem

as ambitious and technologically advanced as the FIP.69

V. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE FLOATING ISLANDS PROJECT

This paper analyzes the domestic and international legal regimes

guiding the short-term project within the territorial sea and EEZ of coastal

nations and compares and contrasts the likely regulation of the Seastead to

the legal regimes governing artificial islands, vessels, and barges. This

analysis follows the definitions of these categories as articulated in

international caselaw and analyzes a few relevant examples that garnered

publicity, specifically the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court. At least the

vessel or barge determination depends largely on the engineering

specifications and the purpose to either transport goods/people or to provide

temporary/permanent occupancy.70 This is a difficult determination to make

on the surface as TSI, Blue Frontiers, and other involved parties consistently

identify the project as “The Floating Islands Project” while using similar

nomenclature involving the word “island” or “islands.”71 It is apparent that

the project is not a traditional terrestrial island and will not be attached to

67 Id.

68 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

69 Lucy Wang, This Hand-Built Island is the Start of Copenhagen’s “Parkipelago” of

Floating Public Spaces, INHABITAT (Mar. 14, 2018), https://inhabitat.com/this-hand-built-

island-is-the-start-of-copenhagens-parkipelago-of-floating-public-spaces/. More examples

of artificial island projects created by sovereign states are discussed within note 134. See

Xue and Subramanian, infra note 133. The scale of these projects is generally limited to

artificial land masses and dredged material used to provide living space. Id. Few, if any,

have used complex floating platforms described in the Floating Islands Project design plan

for temporary or permanent residential occupation. Wang, supra note 69; CZAPIEWSKA ET

AL., supra note 21.

70 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121, 142-43 (2013).

71 See Floating Islands Project, supra note 11.

14 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

land or the seabed, excluding the fact that the project may utilize temporary

anchoring mechanisms.72 The determination will help clarify the applicable

legal regulations to the FIP should the project proceed in French Polynesia.

The determination of whether the Seastead in question should be

classified as an artificial island, vessel, or barge depends largely on the

particular jurisdiction that it finds itself in. There is no general definition of

a “vessel” within UNCLOS and the definition varies from country to

country. The term has recently been defined in a United States Supreme

Court opinion.73 A more restricted definition is found in the case Lozman v.

City of Riviera Beach.74

In a 7-2 decision, the Lozman Court determined that an immobile

houseboat with no engine and no functioning steering or navigation system

could not be considered a vessel because it was not designed for

transportation on water.75 The Court also specified that an “artificial

contrivance . . . capable of being used . . . as a means of transportation on

water. . .” would be considered a vessel per statute 1 U.S.C. § 3.76 In

conjunction with this statement, “transportation” is defined as a

“conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.”77

Another category under which the Seastead could be classified and

regulated is an “artificial island.” Artificial islands are not explicitly defined

in UNCLOS; however, a standard “island” is defined as “a naturally formed

area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”78

“Naturally formed” can be interpreted as being formed “by natural

processes, without human intervention, as in the case with dumping of sand

and stones in shallow waters.”79 With these reference points in mind, there

are various sections of UNCLOS wherein artificial islands are referred to

and the exclusive rights to construct, maintain, and protect artificial islands

are recognized.80

Artificial islands may be constructed within internal waters and

archipelagic waters of a coastal nation, within the territorial sea of the nation

72 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9; CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at

17-18, 52.

73 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 118.

74 Id. at 121.

75 Id. at 122.

76 Id. at 121.

77 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121; Transportation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 424 (2d

ed. 1989).

78 U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 121.

79 NIKOS PAPADAKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS 93

(1977).

80 See U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 60.

2019] Schmidtke 15

in question, within the EEZ of the nation in question, and within the

continental shelf of that nation.81 Having these options gives a coastal nation

a great deal of nautical territory to work with and consider in their

construction of artificial islands, installations, or structures pursuant to

Articles 56 and 60 of UNCLOS.82 Particularly relevant to TSI’s long-term

goals of moving onto the high seas, section VI of UNCLOS grants nations

the right to construct artificial islands on the high seas.83

According to these definitions, and taking into account the U.S.

domestic interpretation of the houseboat in Lozman, a Seastead could

arguably fall in either of these categories although it does not seem to fit

comfortably in either one. Further insight regarding how FIPs fit into these

categories can be gleaned from several high-profile examples.

VI. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES

There are several case studies that offer valuable comparisons to the

FIP. These include: (1) the situation in the South China Sea with respect to

the “Nine-Dash Line” and the Chinese government’s desire to expand the

territorial sea and EEZ of the People’s Republic of China through the

development of artificial islands, (2) the Netherlands, which has constructed

the largest artificial island project in the world, (3) the controversial Sealand

located off of the coast of the United Kingdom, (4) the failed Republic of

81 Id. at art. 56(1)(b)(i), 60, 80.

82 Id. at art. 2, 40-41, 46-51, 56, 57, 60, 80. Article 56 states:

(1) In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign

rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and

managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the

waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and

with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and

exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,

currents and winds.

Id. at art. 56.

Article 60 states:

(1) In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the

exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the

construction, operation and use of: (a) artificial islands; (b) installations

and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other

economic purposes; (c) installations and structures which may interfere

with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone. (2) The

coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands,

installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to

customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.

Id. at art. 60.

83 See id. at art. 87(1)(d) (this section of UNCLOS delineates a universal geographical

rule to determine the control coastal nations retain over territory on a continental shelf and

the rights to build, extract resources, and more on the continental shelf).

16 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

Minerva once located in a remote reef system in the Pacific Ocean, (5)

Australia’s now defunct “floating hotel,” and (6) the international

definitions of and laws governing barges.84

First, the “Nine-Dash Line” situation was recently addressed by the

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in a dispute between the Philippines

and the People’s Republic of China over the Spratly Islands in the South

China Sea, where the panel ruled that newly created landmasses did not

expand China’s EEZ.85 The arbitral panel discussed the geological nature of

the “islands,” including some that would be considered rocks and land

masses submerged by the sea except at low-tide.86 The panel also discussed

how the expansion of these existing formations through land reclamation

(Chinese sand-pumping and the movement of other material from the

seabed to the surface, followed by building atop the newly added material)

would not change the nature of the rocks and the once semi-submersed land

into a legally recognized island capable of expanding the Chinese EEZ.87

The Chinese government argued that these and other maritime

features would therefore expand China’s territorial jurisdiction throughout

the South China Sea, adding mileage to their territorial sea and EEZ, thus

conferring them sovereign rights within these boundaries.88 The arbitral

panel ruled against the Chinese land reclamation efforts as expanding their

sovereign territory (although they technically created artificial islands over

time) and determined that the Philippines had a rightful claim to the

contested Spratly Islands.89 Even though the FIP will not be constructed by

84 See generally Ekrem Krokut & Woo Hyun Kang, China’s Nine Dash Line Claim in

Light of the Ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF.

425 (2017); Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea:

History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98 (2013); see cases cited infra n. 86

for background on the Nine-Dash Line. For Flevoland/Flevopolder in the Netherlands see

infra at p. 20-21 and nn. 96-99. For Sealand see infra at pp. 21-22 and nn. 100-105. For the

Republic of Minerva see infra at pp. 22-23 and nn. 106-10. For the “floating hotel” see

infra at pp. 23-25 and nn. 111-18. For the international law governing barges see infra at

pp. 25-28 and nn. 119-31.

85 In re S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-9, 471-77 (2016),

https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086.

86 Id. at 129-32, 278.

87 Id. at 473-74, 476.

88 See id at 130, 195, 290.

89 Id. at 471-77. This decision is yet to be acknowledged by the governments of the

People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. See Shi Jiangtao & Jun Mai, China’s Xi Jinping

Rejects any Action Based on International Court’s South China Sea Ruling, SOUTH CHINA

MORNING POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-

defence/article/1988990/chinas-xi-jinping-rejects-any-action-based. It has also been

determined that coastal nations have the sovereign right to conduct land reclamation efforts

within their territorial waters and EEZ so long as they do not cause marine environmental

damage to the interests of adjoining states as was determined in Straits of Johor (Malay. v.

Sing.). Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor

2019] Schmidtke 17

land reclamation processes, a host nation must recognize that, according to

UNCLOS and the PCA ruling, the construction of a Seastead will not

expand their EEZ or maritime jurisdiction.

A less controversial but relevant example of an artificial island is the

Flevopolder, part of the province of Flevoland, Netherlands, which was

developed in the 1960s and remains as the largest artificial island in the

world.90 The Flevopolder was built in a nation that has dealt with floods,

rising sea levels, and other aquatic threats throughout history.91 The

Netherlands created Flevopolder through land reclamation projects in

response to constant lake flooding in a province that now covers over 955

km2 and has a population of around 396,000 people.92 This artificial island

is less contentious legally because it is within the boundary of Dutch

territorial waters, and the island’s construction is expressly permitted by

UNCLOS because it lies within the Dutch EEZ; the Dutch have not yet

claimed that the land reclamation efforts from the Flevoland construction

process will expand the breadth of their territorial sea or EEZ.93 The case

could also be made that this territory has remained uncontestably Dutch

throughout the recent past, especially upon the signing and ratification of

UNCLOS, so the country has neither gained nor lost any territorial sea/EEZ

territory since UNCLOS was signed. For these reasons, Flevoland is readily

distinguishable from the South China Sea Spratly Island scenario but is still

relevant to the Seastead movement because the FIP will be created within

the recognized maritime jurisdiction of a nation without the intention to add

on to the territorial sea or EEZ it controls.

It seems apparent from the examples examined thus far that many

of the artificial islands recognized in the domestic law of various nations

and defined by UNCLOS are constructed through land reclamation efforts

and have an integral natural element to them, i.e., that they are made with

local geological features such as rocks, sand, and soil. The purpose of

Flevoland could not be more different than the “island-building” in the

(Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, 12, 28,

https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/12_order_081003_en.

pdf.

90 Flevoland, VISIT HOLLAND (last visited Oct. 20, 2018),

http://www.visitholland.nl/flevoland.

91 Flevoland, supra note 90; M. VanKoningsveld et al., Living with Sea-Level Rise and

Climate Change: A Case Study of the Netherlands, 24 J. COASTAL RES. 367, 367, 374

(2008), https://www.jcronline.org/doi/pdf/10.2112/07A-0010.1.

92 See Netherlands: Administrative Division, CITY POPULATION,

https://www.citypopulation.de/en/netherlands/admin/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Note all

municipalities except Noordoostpolder make up the Flevopolder.

93 See U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 56(1)(b)(i); Provincial Councils, GOV’T

NETH., https://www.government.nl/topics/provinces/provincial-councils (last visited Oct.

9, 2019).

18 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

South China Sea. However, both artificial island examples share the feature

that they were constructed with the intention of staying in one place

throughout time or maintaining relative geographic permanence.

A more contentious example of an artificial island is a former British

anti-aircraft gunning platform built during World War II known officially as

“Fort Roughs Tower.”94 This platform exists within the territorial sea of the

United Kingdom or, depending on whom one asks, independent from the

United Kingdom as the Principality of Sealand. This “principality” was

founded in 1967 by Roy Bates; he and his family, among others, have

intermittently occupied the abandoned platform following its military

decommission.95 In 1978, the platform/Sealand was brought into the

international spotlight in German administrative courts.96

A German citizen plaintiff holding the title of “Foreign Secretary

and President of the State Council of the so-called Duchy of Sealand”

challenged a German court to recognize his acquisition of citizenship in

Sealand and his abandonment of German citizenship.97 The German court

rejected his claim on the grounds that, “International law lays down three

essential attributes for Statehood. The State must have a territory, that

territory must be inhabited by a people and that people must be subject to

the authority of a Government . . . . The ‘Duchy of Sealand’ fails to satisfy

even the first condition as it does not possess a State territory within the

meaning of international law.”98 Thus, the court determined that the

platform, although abandoned for military purposes, was not an

independent state; the court denied the existence of the aspiring micro-

nation and the plaintiff’s citizenship claim.99

This peculiar situation is relevant to the FIP as the Principality of

Sealand is a platform fixed to the seabed within United Kingdom’s

territorial sea and differs from the previous examples of artificial islands

developed through land reclamation processes. This is also the only

example thus far among the examined scenarios that included the desire to

found a new nation and eventually receive recognition from the

international community, which is similar to the long-term aspirations of

TSI and Blue Frontiers. Although similar in this regard, the FIP can be

contrasted with the Principality of Sealand in multiple aspects. First, TSI

94About the Principality of Sealand, SEALAND, https://www.sealandgov.org/about (last

visited Oct. 20, 2018).

95 In re Duchy of Sealand, Case No. 9 K 2565/77, 80 I.L.R. 683 (Admin. Ct. of

Cologne 1978), http://www.uniset.ca/naty/80ILR683.htm; About the Principality of

Sealand, supra note 94.

96 In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683.

97 Id.

98 Id.

99 Id.

2019] Schmidtke 19

has openly recognized the importance of a partnership with a host or parent

nation to construct and operate the FIP peacefully within its jurisdiction.

Therefore, the project is not hostile to a parent country like Sealand was to

the United Kingdom. In addition, Sealand is an artificial island that is not

constructed of natural or local materials but is fixed permanently to the

seabed, differing from the proposed design plans of the Seastead. These

facts blur any potential architectural and political similarities to the plans of

the FIP.

Also relevant to the long-term plans of the Seastead is the fact that

any project with a high degree of autonomy would likely exist on the high

seas, outside of the territorial sea or EEZ of a particular country, while at

least temporarily cooperating with an associated country as necessary.

Granting a higher degree of political and economic autonomy might be

more palpable to citizens of a coastal nation if a Seastead distances itself

geographically from the nation, thereby minimizing possible risks of

immediate environmental damage or political strife with the host nation.

The physical distance of a Seastead located on the high seas as opposed to

anchored within a local reef system might symbolize to citizens of island

nations that their local government is not pouring subsidies into a new

project nor that new Seastead residents are requiring government benefits

or attempting to take over historical territory.

Another example to be compared and contrasted to the Seastead is

the unsuccessful Republic of Minerva. In 1970, three friends with

entrepreneurial and investment experience located the Minerva reef system

approximately 260 miles from the mainland of the Polynesian island of

Tonga.100 The three men had the goal of creating a new country atop the reef

system, purchasing expensive dredging equipment that would pump sand

and other material from the seabed in an attempt to build a landmass suitable

to accommodate around 25,000 residents.101 The group laid claim to the

land in a written communication to the U.S. Department of State.102 The

Tongan government intervened about a month after the communication was

sent to the Department of State and put a stop to the dredging and island-

constructing process by announcing their historic ownership of the reefs and

geological fixtures in question.103 The project was abandoned and the

Republic of Minerva was never revisited by the impulsive entrepreneurs.104

Although the Republic of Minerva blatantly failed to become a micro-

100 Mary L.G. Theroux, The Quest for a New Tech Land of the Free, WIRED,

https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/02/quest-new-tech-land-free/ (last visited Oct. 22,

2018).

101 Id.

102 Id.

103 Id.

104 Id.

20 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

nation, there are many lessons to be learned from its attempted

establishment for the Seastead and similar future projects.

First, it is critical for FIP proponents to have a firm understanding

of any prospective site, including all political and historical claims in an

area, as well as the particular geological features of that area. This is an

important aspect to consider for TSI, as a long-term project could move onto

the high seas where it may need to anchor or transport into calmer protected

waters in the event of storms or rough seas. TSI must also avoid any

construction that could damage reef systems claimed by existing nations for

the sake of maintaining peaceful relations with their coastal neighbors and

minimizing the obvious potential environmental impact. This does not seem

a likely problem for TSI, as the Seastead platforms would all be constructed

within the territory of a cooperating nation prior to moving onto the high

seas, and the design of the platforms is not dependent on any natural

element. Although geographically relevant, the FIP will not be constructed

through land reclamation processes and will be built with the knowledge

and approval of a cooperating nation.

Finally, Australia’s floating hotel, discussed below, showcases the

laws that currently govern barges in general and demonstrates the

application of laws to barges on the high seas. The John Brewer Reef

Floating Hotel commenced operation within its namesake reef in Australian

waters in March of 1988.105 The Floating Hotel was only in operation for a

year in these same waters before being transported to Vietnam, where it was

sold and rebranded as the Saigon Floating Hotel, and finally, where it is

currently harbored in the Port of Kumgang at the foot of Mount Kungang,

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).106

The purpose of the Floating Hotel was to provide a one-of-a-kind

vacation experience for visitors from around the world.107 Vacationers could

stay in a floating hotel wading in one of Australia’s world-renowned reefs

without moving around from port to port like a cruise ship (although visitors

needed to ferry to and from the Floating Hotel on speed boats).108 The

specific construction process within the reef system involved the use of

105 THE JOHN BREWER FLOATING HOTEL: A CASE-STUDY IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL

MONITORING 6 (Vicki Harriott & Peter Saenger eds., 1995),

http://elibrary.gbrmpa.gov.au/jspui/bitstream/11017/246/1/John-Brewer-Reef-floating-

hotel-1989.PDF.

106 Carl Smith, The Bizarre Story of Australia’s Floating Hotel and its 14,000km Round

Journey to North Korea, ABC NEWS, https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-06-

14/the-bizarre-story-of-australias-floating-hotel/9849482 (last updated June 13, 2018).

107 Id.

108 Id. According to a former waitress, this was one of the reasons the Floating Hotel

was unsuccessful; visitors would often get seasick on the choppy seas to and from the hotel

or were forced to deal with delays caused by storms. Id. The now defunct Floating Hotel

has a rating of 2.8 stars out of 5 on the travel planning website TripAdvisor.com. Id.

2019] Schmidtke 21

“Bommie cropping” to remove the top layers of the surrounding coral

system and make more space for the Floating Hotel to safely occupy.109

While the death of coral directly caused by the Bommie cropping caused

substantial damage, the environmental impact discovered at the operation

site and the surrounding bay during and after its year-long operation was

limited to a miniscule increase in salinity, copper and sediment presence,

and a minor increase in fish aggregation at the Floating Hotel site likely

caused by fish feeding activities.110

On top of the geographical relevance to the proposed Floating

Islands Project, the construction of the FIP will likely take place within a

reef system should the partnership with French Polynesia come to fruition.

Even if the eventual site exists within the jurisdictional waters of another

coastal nation, there will be a bilateral desire to minimize any environmental

impacts caused by the project construction and operation. The Floating

Hotel is a regional example for what to do and what to avoid in the

construction and operation process, although the FIP will likely be more

technologically advanced and employ more environmentally-friendly

processes as discussed earlier. This can be compared to the Seastead as the

Floating Hotel was immobile by itself.111 In order for the Floating Hotel to

move onto the high seas and make its final moves from Australia to Vietnam

and eventually to North Korea, the hotel likely relied on outside tug services

since it did not have a propulsion mechanism, drawing another similarity to

the Seastead plans.112

The Floating Hotel, much like the current FIP, could not move by

itself and had no transportation capability. This complicates the legal

regulation of both the Floating Hotel and the FIP in comparison to the earlier

examples because the Floating Hotel was owned by an Australian citizen

and operated within the territorial waters or EEZ of Australia, yet it avoided

construction through land reclamation or other dredging processes. For

these reasons, the Floating Hotel could not be considered a vessel or an

artificial island in comparison to any of the examples discussed above.

However, considering its immobility and sole purpose of temporary

occupancy by employees and tourists, it seems more similar legally to the

house boat in Lozman; that is, it will not be considered a vessel or a

traditional artificial island according to UNCLOS and related cases. The

reliance on tug services for transportation solidifies the fact that the Floating

Hotel belongs in a separate category factually and legally as a barge.

After considering artificial islands, structures, installations, and

vessels, the most similar nautical structure to a houseboat in legally

109 JOHN BREWER FLOATING HOTEL, supra note 105, at 1, 9-11.

110 Id. at 37, 40-45.

111 See Smith, supra note 106.

112 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 10, 26. see Smith, supra note 106;

22 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

recognized terms is a quarter barge. Following the definition proscribed in

Lozman, a floating home with no capability to propel itself was not

determined to be a vessel.113 A similar interpretation in the U.S. domestic

case Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co. helps clarify that non-self-

propelled nautical devices like a quarter barge are categorically distinct

from vessels, although this interpretation only applies to non-self-propelled

nautical devices in the 5th Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.114

Analogous to these cases, FIP’s plan does not include steering, propulsion,

or rudder mechanisms, and its primary purpose is to accommodate

temporary and permanent occupants, not to transport goods or cargo from

one place to another.

Although these are all U.S. cases, the common French definition

relevant to TSI’s potential project in French Polynesia for “barge” is

similarly stated.115 This linguistic cognate is translated to what is known to

English speakers as a barge, or roughly translated as a “flat-bottomed boat

with different modes of propulsion (sailing, tug, etc.), used in shallow water

(canal, lake, river, river, estuary), similar to a houseboat.”116 This definition

considers “tug” or “tug boats” as a mode of propulsion, although it is a

realistic possibility for a barge not to be connected to a tug boat or any other

vehicle for a particular period of time like the houseboat in Lozman, the

quarter barge in Gremillion, and the Floating Hotel.117 The FIP matches the

French definition, noting a “different mode of propulsion” like a tug would

be needed for the FIP and would be considered a barge in French Polynesia

following the common-language definition of the term.

While artificial islands within EEZs are guided by UNCLOS and

vessels are guided by numerous international treaties like UNCLOS, barges

stay out of the regulatory limelight and are only mentioned in passing within

one treaty on international pollution prevention from ships.118 While lacking

113 See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121-22 (2013).

114 Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 290 (5th Cir. 1990).

115 Barge, CNRTL, https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/barge//1 (last visited Oct. 15,

2019). Please see reference ‘A’ from the French National Center for textual and reading

resources, tools and resources for optimal treatment of the French language. Id.

116 A direct translation of the French dictionary definition by the author of this paper.

Barge, CAMBRIDGE ENG. DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/barge (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Note

the Cambridge English Dictionary definition “a long boat with a flat bottom, used for

carrying heavy objects on rivers or canals”. Id. The Cambridge French-English dictionary

has a similar French definition, defining the term as “bateau à fond plat” or a boat with a

flat bottom. Barge, CAMBRIDGE FRENCH-ENG. DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/french-english/barge (last visited Nov. 16,

2019).

117 Lozman 568 U.S. at 121-22; Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 290; Smith, supra note 106

(floating hotel).

118 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, art. II, Nov. 2,

2019] Schmidtke 23

specific international guidance, barges are not generally defined within the

domestic law of countries around the world.119

The French Polynesian legal code does not carve out specific

regulations to classify barges distinctly from other maritime subjects.120

French Polynesia does not require barges to be registered like vessels as the

term “barge” is not mentioned in the registry requirements.121 Where no

provision applies to barges, there are codes for vessels.122 The applicability

1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMO-

Conventions%20%28copies%29/MARPOL.pdf.

119 Within the U.S. Code, barges are regulated within Title 46, topically focused on

shipping. See 46 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The author researched the laws of Australia, New

Zealand, Fiji, England, the European Union, and others due to their geographical proximity

to French Polynesia or political and legal relevance to French Polynesia and the author

could not find legal definitions of barges.

120 See generally CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] (Fr.). See also

CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L525-18 (Fr.). The French legal

code is considered for research purposes of this project as some French laws are adopted

in French Polynesia, although with local variations and ordinances due to French

Polynesia’s legal status as an overseas collectivity of France. CODE DE COMMERCE [C.

COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L940-1 (Fr.) (modified by Loi 2016-1547 du novembre

18, 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle [Law 2016-1547 of November 18,

2016 on the Modernization of the Judiciary of the 21st Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 19, 2016); CODE DE

COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. R940-1 (modified by Décret 2017-1163

du 12 juillet 2017 relatif à la déontologie, l’éligibilité et la discipline des juges des

tribunaux de commerce [Decree 2017-1163 of July 12, 2017 Relating to the Ethics,

Eligibility, and Discipline of Judges of Tribunals of Commerce], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 14, 2017); see Nicole

Atwill, French Polynesia: New Law on the Functioning of Government Institutions, LIBR.

CONGRESS (Aug. 16, 2011), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/french-

polynesia-new-law-on-the-functioning-of-governing-institutions/. The researched local

variations and ordinances did not reveal any rules applicable to the Floating Islands Project

scenario.

121 See Loi 2005-412 du 3 mai 2005 relative à la création du registre international

français, art. 2 [Law 2005-412 of May 3, 2005 on the Establishment of the French

International Register, art. 2], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]

[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 5, 2009, p. 14696, repealed by Ordonnance 2010-

1307 du 28 octobre 2010 relative à la partie législative du code des transports [Ordinance

2010-1307 of October 28, 2010 in Relation to the Legislative Section of the Code of

Transportation], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL

GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 3, 2010, p. 19645.

128 The update to the Law establishing the French international registry did not affect

the registry requirements/exceptions to include barges. Id. The assertion that barges are not

included in the requirements is still true even with the code modification since the

modifications and abrogation apply to various types of vessels in Article 1, not Article 2.

Id. at art. 1.

122 See Code De L’Environnement [C. ENVIR.] [CODE OF THE ENVIRONMENT] art.

L218-10 (Fr.) (versions from Aug. 3, 2008-Oct. 23, 2010 and Oct. 23, 2010-Dec. 27, 2015);

Code De L’Environnement [C. ENVIR.] [CODE OF THE ENVIRONMENT] art. L218-11 (Fr.)

24 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

of some laws to vessels is apparent; it is clear that vessels are regulated more

thoroughly within the French legal code due to the absence of the term

“barge” and any coinciding definition. The lack of depth and quantity in

domestic barge regulation should be considered by the French Polynesian

government if the FIP becomes a more likely possibility within its maritime

jurisdiction. In order to assure locals and minimize the costs and confusion

of potential retroactive compliance processes, the involved government

should spare no time in rethinking its maritime barge laws while keeping

the FIP in mind.123

In accordance with the overall analysis in this article, TSI’s FIP is

most similar to a barge in its design, because it lacks a propulsion or steering

mechanism and primarily serves to hold people for temporary or permanent

occupancy. TSI and Blue Frontiers should continue developing their project

for the short-term within the legal framework of a barge, most likely a

quarter barge, a barge for the purpose of providing living quarters, as

opposed to an artificial island or vessel.124 Although no law has yet to single

out a “Seastead” specifically, any involved government should act as

efficiently as possible in order to provide assurance to its citizens and clarity

for the businesses developing this unique maritime project.

VII. SHORT AND LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

TSI AND BLUE FRONTIERS

This paper presents recommendations for TSI, Blue Frontiers, and

other similar NGOs to ensure compliance with international laws should the

organizations realize their long-term goal of moving a Seastead to the high

seas as barges similar to that of short-term, nearshore projects. There are

three options presented for TSI and Blue Frontiers to consider that afford

varying degrees of autonomy, geographic and political protection, and the

security of legal clarity going forward based on the architectural and

engineering specifications of the FIP.

The first option for TSI and Blue Frontiers involves a Seastead

staying within the territorial sea or EEZ of an existing nation that matches

their site designation criteria. This option would mean the Seastead would

operate under the legal regimes of the host or parent nation, ideally through

(version in force as of Dec. 27, 2015).

123 See Anu Lähteenmäki-Uutela et al., What Explains SECA Compliance: Rational

Calculation or Moral Judgment?, 18 WMU J. MAR. AFF. 61, 66 (2019), noting the

possibility of high compliance costs relating to the Sulfur Emission Control Act and rules

taken from MARPOL.

124 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 2:12, 8 (5th ed.

2014); see supra Section VI (Legal Classification Case Studies).

2019] Schmidtke 25

the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) or Special Maritime Zone

(SMZ) under the assumption that the host nation would grant a Seastead a

large degree of political, economic, and legal autonomy. The second option

for TSI and Blue Frontiers places more emphasis on political autonomy

rather than geographic and legal certainty and involves towing and placing

a Seastead in a pre-determined location on the high seas, deploying anchors

or mooring systems for any breakwater device, and allowing the Seastead

to float on its own. In addition, this Seastead would temporarily operate

under the flag and jurisdiction of a less restrictive nation while maintaining

good relations with a local, coastal nation to have a geographic safe haven

in the event of a storm, hazardous eutrophic event, or accident. With this

option, the initial plan would be explicitly stated to gradually transition or

secede from the parent nation and go through the laborious process of

creating a new, seafaring nation.125 The final option for TSI and Blue

Frontiers to consider moving forward contemplates the desire for outright

political and geographic independence. This recommendation entails

towing and placing a Seastead on the high seas, anchoring or mooring a

breakwater device to the seabed, and considering the Seastead a barge

operating outside the authority of any associated nation. Of the three

recommendations, the first option is the most desirable for TSI and Blue

Frontiers.

The first option involves the unique creation of a largely

autonomous SEZ or SMZ in a parent nation that would keep the Seastead

within its boundary and allow for potential future expansion within a parent

nation’s existing territorial sea or EEZ.126 According to a World Bank study,

the term “SEZ” “covers a broad range of zones, such as free trade zones,

export-processing zones, industrial parks, economic and technology

development zones, high-tech zones, science and innovation parks, free

ports, enterprise zones, and others.”127 Additionally, these zones “normally

operat[e] under more liberal economic laws than those typically prevailing

125 This possibility could have a global impact on international laws on secession. The

author is aware of this and is refraining from discussing it at this time.

126 Carly Jackson, Seasteading! What about Regulations?, SEASTEADING INST. (Aug.

22, 2019), https://www.seasteading.org/seasteading-what-about-regulations/. There are

many existing SEZs that demonstrate their accompanying possibilities like economic

development and technology exchange. One notable SEZ to date is Shenzhen, People’s

Republic of China. Gar-On Antony Yeh, Development of the Special Economic Zone in

Shenzhen, The People's Republic of China, 52 EKISTICS 154, 154 (1985),

www.jstor.org/stable/43622838.

127 DOUGLAS ZHIHUA ZENG, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EXPERIENCES WITH SPECIAL

ECONOMIC ZONES: WITH A FOCUS ON CHINA AND AFRICA 3 (2015),

https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Investing%20in%20Af

rica%20Forum/2015/investing-in-africa-forum-global-experiences-with-special-

economic-zones-with-a-focus-on-china-and-africa.pdf.

26 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

in the country.”128 This would be similar to the framework discussed in the

expired MoU between TSI and French Polynesia, although the SEZ would

offer more autonomy to any Seastead involved.129 This would also likely

provide benefits to a host nation that might otherwise disregard the Seastead

concept. States may feel more compelled to partner with a Seastead in order

to offset the economic and technological burdens that could come with

taxpayer/state-funded SEZ development.

Among the specific benefits offered by this recommendation is the

fact that SEZs are legally recognized by countries around the world, with

some located in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.130

Contrary to the elaborate process of writing a declaration of independence,

forming a government from scratch, attempting to gain recognition by

nations of the world, and more, under the SEZ route a Seastead would

effectively exist as a new region within the legal framework of an existing

nation. In order to be generally considered as an SEZ, a Seastead would

need to offer some of the beneficial characteristics mentioned earlier,

including a free trade zone, high-tech zone, or science and innovation

park.131 In order to make this plan more realistic and easy to achieve, a

Seastead SEZ could follow the model of existing SEZs (but seek more

general legal, economic, and political autonomy).

An example that further illustrates the SEZ model is included in the

Zeng World Bank study, which describes that “[i]n China, the first SEZ

legislation was formulated to govern the SEZs at the local level: in August

1980, the SEZ Act for Guangdong Province was passed by the National

Congress at the same time when the Shenzhen SEZ was launched,” thus

giving the project crucial national legal recognition.132 Allowing the

128 Id.

129 See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 15, at 6-8. This concept is

discussed within the MoU through the creation of a “terrestrial Anchor Zone” and the

“Floating Island Zone.” Id. These zones were envisioned to operate jointly in order to

provide a Special Economic Zone for the nation of French Polynesia. This framework

would also facilitate the relationship between the floating Seastead and a terrestrial “base.”

Id.

130 ZENG, supra note 127, at 3. Compared to an unregistered Seastead on the high seas

without any national affiliation, an SEZ is a legal status implemented by national

governments.

131 ZENG, supra note 127, at 3. It is of the author’s opinion that the implementation of

specific characteristics of an SEZ be negotiated beforehand to ensure the Seastead acquires

the desired degree of autonomy. The author believes that an earlier agreement on these

elements will result in clearly delineated responsibilities and fewer conflicts in the

development and operation stages of a Seastead. Jackson, supra note 126; Tim Sandle,

Building Sustainable Floating Islands in Special Economic Zones, DIGITAL J. (May 12,

2018), http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/building-sustainable-floating-

islands-in-special-economic-zones/article/522016.

132 ZENG, supra note 127, at 10.

2019] Schmidtke 27

development of an SEZ through local involvement in combination with

national recognition would give each party motivation to sustain a long-

term positive relationship. The local government would have the consistent

assurance that people, goods, and products could travel to and from this

innovative marketplace without duties, taxes, or strict immigration

concerns. The Seastead would have the protection and legal recognition of

a host nation and a consistent market with which to interact. This option

could be especially attractive to coastal nations at risk from sea level rise or

coastal nations experiencing rapid urbanization.133

Following this line of thought, developing nations have a lot to gain

from a mutually beneficial project of this nature. According to another

World Bank study, developing nations “Vietnam, A.R. Egypt, Mauritania,

Suriname, Guyana, French Guiana, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, The

Bahamas, and Benin” have the population proportions most likely to be

impacted by global sea level rise.134 At least according to comments from

the Chinese Development Bank, “in some regions, industrial parks account

for anywhere between 50% and 80 to 90% of growth in GDP. SEZs have

also aided the increased openness and resource clustering by offering a

vehicle and platform for the entry of capital, technology, talents and R&D

activities from all over the world.”135 Assuming that at least similarly scaled

impacts could be made on the economies in other at-risk developing nations,

a Seastead SEZ or SMZ could gradually transform the financial outlook of

struggling states. Creating greater economic stability and growth through a

Seastead SEZ could encourage coastal citizens to stay in place instead of

becoming climate refugees in unfamiliar nations or cultures.

133 See supra p. 18. This has already been addressed by the Netherlands as seen in

their Flevoland project. Id. Nations like Denmark, Hong Kong, and Singapore also have

already developed extensions of public spaces with floating island structures existing

within their territorial sea or through land reclamation efforts. For Denmark, Wang, supra

note 69, for Hong Kong, Charlie Q. L. Xue et al., An Urban Island Floating on the MTR

Station: A Case Study of the West Kowloon Development in Hong Kong, 15 URB. DESIGN

INT’L 191, 191 (2010), for Singapore, Samantha Subramanian, How Singapore is

Creating More Land for Itself, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 20, 2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/magazine/how-singapore-is-creating-more-land-

for-itself.html. This would allow particularly vulnerable populations the possibility to

transition to a lifestyle on an expanding Seastead. See Daisy Simmons, As Sea Levels

Rise, Are Floating Cities the Future?, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (June 8, 2017),

https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/06/as-sea-levels-rise-are-floating-cities-

the-future/.

134 Susmita Dasgupta et al., The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A

Comparative Analysis 41 fig.6b (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4136,

2007),

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/156401468136816684/pdf/wps4136.pdf.

Furthermore, according to the study, approximately 20% or more of wetlands in Vietnam,

Jamaica, Belize, and Qatar will be impacted by global sea level rise. Id. at 43 fig.6f.

135 See ZENG, supra note 127, at 4 n.1.

28 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

While it is not a goal of TSI specifically, the addition of a Seastead-

type SEZ can offer a developing nation the opportunity to move vulnerable

populations away from land areas threatened by sea level rise while helping

to maintain cultural identity and geographic proximity to familiar land and

oceanic areas. Assuming the SEZ is a viable option for a particular country,

the decision to either leave one’s gradually disappearing homeland to live

in a new state with a different culture or government or staying in one’s

homeland for as long as possible while developing adjacent floating

platforms and a new economic zone (at the expense of opening the country

to imports, new technology, and new workers) seems like an easy one to

make. Partnering with NGOs like TSI and Blue Frontiers would ease much

of the financial burden on host nations and would offer a successful

cooperative model from which the host nation could build to its needs,

modify to accommodate some of its cultural and political practices, and

expand with any local population or economic growth. However, adapting

to a new economic model and dealing with the demands of a new economic

zone may be less desirable to some island nations that might otherwise

prefer to preserve their already established economic systems and

structures. In these situations, a Seastead may be developed without the

involvement of an outside NGO or foreign individuals to attempt to

maximize the self-sufficiency of an existing coastal nation. The balancing

act between the involved parties will not be easy. It is essential for all parties

involved to remember that every nation and every person has been or will

be affected by global sea level rise in some way. Cooperation and innovation

are necessary for humankind to develop solutions and adapt to this complex

environmental phenomenon.

In conclusion, the pilot Seastead project proposed in the waters of

French Polynesia will be regulated as a barge under international law and

the domestic law of French Polynesia. Additionally, should TSI and other

NGOs eventually move the Seastead concept to the high seas, the Seastead

will be regulated as a barge and governed by the laws of whichever nation’s

flag it flies or is associated with. However, following the recommendations

of this paper, the most viable option for a successful Seastead is to exist

within the EEZ of a cooperative host nation through the creation of a unique

maritime SEZ, offering geographic and climatic stability and legal certainty

while affording the project a high degree of political, economic, and legal

autonomy.