Anxiety in Heideggers Being and Time_ the Harbinger of Authentic

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College of DuPage

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Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy

4-1-2006

"Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time: eHarbinger of Authenticity

James MagriniCollege of DuPage, [email protected]

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Recommended CitationMagrini, James, ""Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time: e Harbinger of Authenticity" (2006).Philosophy Scholarship. Paper 15.hp://dc.cod.edu/philosophypub/15
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DIALOGUE April, 2006"Anxiety" in Heidegger's Being and Time:The Harbinger of Authenticity

J M. MagriniDePaul UniversityABSTRACT: Analyzing the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Martin Heidegger'sBeing and Time, this essay details the essential relationship between the mood of"anxiety" (Angst) and Dasein 's authentic comportment to existence. Although a highlydisturbing experience, anxiety holds the potential for enlightenment, as it opens Daseinto the fundamental characteristics of its temporal authenticity. Dasein assents to itsSelfhood and enacts its freedom in a "resolute," authentic manner only when it grasps thedifficult and burdensome aspects of life revealed by way of Angst's attunement. Thus,I argue that anxiety is the single most important mode of human attunement thatHeidegger describes.This essay examines the relationship

between the mood of anxiety (Angst) andDasein's authentic comportment toexistence. It will be shown that anxiety isa potentially enlightening experience,which brings Dasein before the mostfundamental characteristics of authenticity,including Dasein's awareness of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which itprojects while bearing the full weight ofits primordial guilt, thereby owning up tothe "nothingness" at the root of its Being,and further , facing the uttermost, insurmountable "certainty" of its possiblenon-existence, or death. As a far-reaching primordial possibility of disclosure,anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its"Being towards its ownmost potentialityfor-Being - that is , its Being}ree for thefreedom of choosing itself and takinghold of itself' (Being and Time ,232/188). To choose and take hold ofoneself, as Heidegger conceives, is toassent to one's own most potentiality-forBeing and exist in an authentic manner.This includes Being-in-the-world in sucha way that one is beholden to the pastand accountable for the future .For the most part, Dasein exists inan inauthentic manner (everydayness),which amounts to choosing not to chooseitse(f, and is characterized by the perpetual movement of falling. This mode ofexistence for Heidegger denotes "an

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understanding in which the existentDasein does not understand itself primarily by that apprehended possibility ofitself which is most peculiarly its own"(Basic Problems of Phenomenology,279). In the inauthentic mode, Dasein'sunderstanding and discourse are expressedwithin the idle talk and curiosity of the"they-self," disclosing existence in asuperficial and ambiguous manner.Tranquilized by what seems a completeunderstanding of things, Dasein neversets out to acquire an authentic understanding of existence and is unconcernedwith the clear-sighted projection of itsownmost possibilities. Lost in the "theyself," Dasein does not enact its ownBeing and either avoids, or remainsoblivious to, the uniqueness and"peculiarity" of its Being and its genuinepossibilities.This lack of authentic self-understandingis a problem for Heidegger, who is concerned with bringing Dasein . back toitself to face its own Being with honestyand integrity. Asking how Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being is to begrasped and enacted, Heidegger offers asolution that spans nearly the entirety ofDivision II of Being and Time. WhenDasein exists authentically, he concludes, "Dasein is itself in and from itsown most peculiar possibility , a possibility that has been seized on and chosen by


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DIALOGUEthe Dasein itself' (BP, 287). Authenticexistence constitutes Dasein's mostextreme possibility of existing, whichprimarily determines its Being. Asopposed to moving along passively withthe ebb and flow of things, Dasein, forthe first time, is emphatically choosing tochoose itself and its own way in theworld. It is for this reason that Heideggerconsiders authentic existence an extremepossibility for Dasein. 1 However, beforeDasein comports itself authentically, itmust be brought back from falling andthe "they-self' to instead face itself andthe ultimate conditions of existence. Thisis accomplished by way of the revelatorymood (Stimmung) of anxiety, which forHeidegger represents the harbinger ofauthenticity.Moods are fundamental states ofattunement that color Dasein 's dispositionand awareness, out of which it uncovers,or discloses, things that matter. Prior tocomporting itself to any situation, Daseinis already immersed within a mood ofsome kind, as attunement is always atwork influencing its worldly orientation.Heidegger describes attunement as a primordial way of Being that precedes "allcognition and volition, and [is] beyondtheir range of disclosure" (BT, ]75/136).However, not all moods are equallyrevealing. For example, everyday moodssuch as love, happiness, boredom, irritability, and fear do not provide fundamental existential insight into Dasein' sBeing as a whole,


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DIALOGUEanxiety is a generalized, highly disturbing dread arising from Dasein, whichinduces a crisis of meaning. Anxietyprovokes a shattering breakdown in theeveryday, familiar ways in which Daseinconducts its life and most dramaticallyillustrates the principle of breakdownand revelation within Heidegger'sphilosophy. For example, in Division I,Section i l l, Chapter 16 (Being andTime), Heidegger analyzes the breakdown of "ready-to-hand" equipment andthe subsequent revelation of "world"through the phenomenon of the "unready-to-hand." When a tool functionsproperly, its authentic "readiness-tohand" remains inconspicuous. On thecontrary, when a tool ceases to functionproperly, or becomes unusable, it quicklydraws the attention of the user to thesystem of relations of which it is a partas it is directed toward a specific task. Atthe instant of breakdown, Dasein catchessight of everything connected to thework; the totality of the "workshop," soto speak, is lit up. The nature of "equipmentality" and the referential totality ofthe "ready-to-hand" are simultaneouslymade explicit, disclosing the overallpurpose of the project (towards-this) andthe manner in which the project mustproceed in order to reach fruition (il1-.order-to). Anxiety induces a similar phenomenon, albeit on a larger scale, for inthe moment of Angst's attunement, theentirety of Dasein's existence is disrupted ,its life no longer "works," or functionswith meaning. A breakdown occurs, andthe phenomenon of the world announcesits presence, disclosing the complexsystem of reference relations withinwhich Dasein is immersed.When the world announces its presence in anxiety, Dasein' s everyday existence (inauthentic) falls into a state ofconfusion; meanings and interrelationsare lost, and a slipping away of beingsoccurs. At the moment anxiety swells,Dasein no longer feels at home withinthe comfort and safety of its inauthenticBeing-in-the-world, as the thoughts andinterpretations of the "they-self' lose

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April, 2006meaning, force, and significance. Thingsthat were once familiar and comprehendible show themselves in problematicways. Dasein is momentarily "lefthanging" as a homeless, thrown being.Alienated, in the mode of the "not-athome" (Unheimlichkeit), Dasein is forcedbefore the "nothingness" of existence.4This primordial, " uncanny" existentialmode of the "not-at-home" represents forHeidegger the most fundamental way ofexistence, acting to individualize Daseinfor its own Being, revealing the unique,individual possibilities, which it alonehas the potential to enact as Being-inthe-world.However, the individualization (existential solipsism) that occurs in anxietyis the exact opposite of solipsism as traditionally conceived, i.e., as a retreat intothe secluded interiority of the consciousness, and is instead Dasein's boldreclaiming of its world and Being.Anxiety works on Dasein so as to bring itout of the world of the "they-self' to faceits own "world as world, and thus bringit face to face with itself as Being-in-theworld" (ST, 233/188). Anxiety freesDasein to take hold of its existence bythrowing it back upon that which it ismost anxious about - its own potentialityfor-Being-in-the-world provokingDasein to reflect upon that which mattersmost in its existence. Heidegger claimsthat anxiety arises out of Being-in-theworld as a whole, and when Dasein isanxious, its Being as "care" is disclosed."Thus the entire phenomenon of anxietyshows Dasein as factically existingBeing-in-the-world. The fundamentalontological characteristics of this entityare existentiality, facti city, and Beingfallen " (ST , 2351191).

The ontological understanding of careprovides important insight into Dasein'sexistence, as the three modes (ecstases)of temporality are implicit within itsdefinition as "ahead-of-itself-as-alreadyin-the-world" and "Being-alongside" inthe world.5 Heidegger views primordialtemporality, the ontological meaning ofthe care-structure, as a finite phenomenon.


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DIALOGUE"Care itself, in its very essence," arguesHeidegger, "is permeated with nullity(nothingness) through and through" (BT,331/285). Hence, due to the nature of itsbeing, Dasein endures a finite existenceand inevitably faces insurmountableobstacles, which restrict and shape itspossibilities and the enactment thereof. Itis anxiety that discloses the limitations ofDasein's existence by revealing the threeways in which "nothingness" manifestsitself existentially within the care-structure: (1) Death (2) thrown ness and facticity, and (3) the impossibi I ty of enactingall possibilities. These delimiting factorsrepresent the primordial "nothingness"with which Dasein, enduring a finiteexistence, must come to terms in order toexist authentically.

"The Nothing with which anxietybrings us face to face," writes Heidegger,"unveils the nullity by which Dasein, inits very basis, is defined; and this basisitself is as thrownness into death" (BT,356/308). Anxiety is about death.Inauthentic Dasein interprets death as ifit were only a biological truism, signifyingnothing more than the physical cessationof the organism. Falling within theeveryday mode of existence, Daseinmisses the existential significance ofdeath and treats it as a present-at-handthing or occurrence. For example, viewingdeath as an event that happens to others,or as a quasi-established , abstractedtruth, which occurs at some point inDasein's distant future, characterizes a"fleeing in the face 0f death," which isultimately a fleeing from anxiety,described by Heidegger as a "fleeing ofDasein in the face of itself - of itself asan authentic potentiality-for-Beingits-Self' (BT, 2291184). Living in aninauthentic way, in the midst of the"they-self," Dasein allows denial anddeception to shield it from the pressingimpact and monumental import of itsmortality. Conversely, authentic Daseininterprets the oppressive void of -anxietyand the ultimate nothingness of death asthe single most integral aspect of authenticcomportment. When Dasein, uncanny

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April,2006and individuated, with its worldly relations severed, is brought before the utterpossibility of its no-Ionger-being-able-tobe, its ownmost authentic potentialityfor-Being is revealed as Being-towardsdeath. It not only attunes itself to theinevitability of mortality, but also projects the "uncanniness" of anxiety intoits futural existence. This, for Heidegger,represents the existential understandingof death as a "Being-certain of death,"or mortality, and when Dasein takes onthis possibi Iity as its own possibility, itis anticipating and "running ahead"(vorlaufen) towards or up to its death,with the dual recognition of itsinevitability and indeterminate nature, asdeath, the uttermost possibility of nonbeing, can occur at any moment.

Dasein is free for the possibility ofdeath when it accepts its mortality, andthis is what Heidegger calls the "freedomtowards death." At the moment Dasein isfree for death, open for what is possibleat any moment, all of its possibilities aresubordinated to the uttermost possibilityof death and thus become provisional.In its "running ahead" to death in antici-pation, Dasein is liberated from itsabsorption in the "they" of everydayexistence and understands its existencein terms of its factical possibilities,which are constrained and shaped bymortality. As Heidegger indicates, anticipation is something other than merelyBeing-certain of death's inevitability;more importantly, it is the freedom forpossibilities within which Dasein holdsand maintains itself. Being-certain fordeath is only disclosed when Daseinenacts the "not-yet" that is always a partof its "Being-ahead-of-itself." In anticipation, Dasein recognizes death as a constant and legitimate threat arising fromanxiety's latent presence, which holdsDasein open to "the utter and constantthreat to itself arising from [its] ownmostindividualized Being" (BT, 310/266).Thus, anticipation is also about anxiety,as "running ahead" to death is Dasein'sauthentic comportment to death andincludes maintaining, or holding, oneself


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DIALOGUEHeidegger argues that guilt, in theeveryday sense, emerges when Daseinendeavors to cover over, or flee from, theagitation it experiences by way of Angst.Attempting to quell its unsettledness,Dasein passively adopts the ethicalmores of the "they-self" as rigid criteriafor its behavior. When the voice of the"they-self' is erroneously protracted anduniversalized, it forms that whichHeidegger refers to as the "worldconscience." To envisage the conscienceas an objective, formalized phenomenon,with content supplied by the venerableobligation to religious beliefs, principles

of reason, or societal mores, is torespond in an inauthentic manner to thecall of the existential conscience.Although the voice of the conscience isthe call of care (Dasein's own call), inauthentic Dasein judges the caller "after themanner of the world," i.e., the collectivevoice of the "they-self," and interpretsconscience as a power that it can "comeacross Objectively" (BT, 323/278).Heidegger contends that the traditionalconception of conscience and guilt, asexpressed within psychology andreligion, for example, originate from themisunderstanding of the existentialconSClence.Unlike the everyday idea of guilt,existential guilt is a form of obligationcharacterized by an emptiness, a lack ofcontent, which Heidegger expresses inthe following terms: "Being-the-basis fora being that is defined by a 'not' - that isto say, as Being-the-c2sis of a nullity"(BT, 329/283). Dasein is guilty becauseits possibilities for the future , past, andpresent are all influenced and constrainedby the primordial "nothingness" thatresides in the care-structure. To enact its

authentic existence, Dasein must own upto its guilt. It must acknowledge andaccept that the possibilities that it seeksto project itself upon are limited by"nothingness," which manifests itself inthrown-Being, death, and the fact that inchoosing one possibility it is thereforeprecluding a host of other equally viableoptions. "Freedom," writes Heidegger,

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April,2006" is only in the choice of one possibility -that is , in tolerating one's not havingchosen the others and one's not beingable to choose them" (BT, 331/285).

It has been the aim of this work toanalyze anxiety as the harbinger ofauthenticity, but as a neutral mode ofattunement, Angst is the forerunner toboth Dasein' s authentic and inauthenticmodes of comportment. Thus, to merelystand courageously before anxiety doesnot amount to "choosing" an authenticexistence based on what anxiety reveals,for Angst "merely brings one into themood for a possible resolution" (BT,394/344). I f anxiety is to be consideredand acknowledged as the harbinger ofauthenticity, an active move in whichDasein chooses to choose itse(f isrequired (recall the contrast betweenDasein ' s authentic choosing to chooseitse(f and the inauthentic choosing not tochoose itse(f). Dasein must thereforeincorporate the insight gained in anxietyand actively take on the responsibility ofits death and the guilt-ridden "nothingness" of its existence. Heidegger locatesthe means by which to open Dasein tothe enactment of its authentic potentialityfor-Being within the phenomenon of"resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit), whichis to say, positively incorporatinganxiety's seemingly negative influence:

lA]nxiety can mount authenticallyonly in a Dasein which is resolute.He who is resolute knows no fear;but he understands the possibility ofanxiety as the possibility of the verymood which neither inhibits norbewilders him. Anxiety liberateshim .from possibilities which "countfor nothing", and lets him becomefree for those which are authentic(BT,394/344).

To initiate authentic Being-in-theworld, a transformation of inauthenticexistence is required. Dasein must submitto the .disturbing revelations of anxietyby way of "wanting-to-have-a-conscience,"i.e., choosing to own up to its being-the-


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DIALOGUEbasis of a nullity as thrown-projection.This blameworthy attitude, or authentichearing of the call of conscience, isDasein's ownmost Self taking action "initself on its own accord in its Beingguilty , and represents phenomenally thatauthentic potentiality-for-Being whichDasein itself attests" (RT, 342/295). Theauthentic understanding of conscience,which signifies a readiness for anxiety, iswhat Heidegger terms "resoluteness,"which is the authentic "disclosedness"of Dasein. This distinctive mode of"disclosedness" holds within itselfDasein's authentic Being-towards-death"as the possible existential modality forits own authenticity," which it enacts inthe existentiell (RT, 353/305). Heideggerlinks resoluteness, as disclosedness, or"uncovering," to the authentic truth(aletheia) of existence, "the most primordial, and indeed the most authenticdisclosedness," in which Dasein is itspotentiality-for-Being (RT, 264/221).In the moment of resolute openness,which is nothing other than wanting tohave a conscience, throwing itself downupon its Being-guilty in readiness foranxiety, Dasein opens itself to whatHeidegger terms the "Situation," or theauthentic way of "Being-there" (RT,347/300). As previously stated, Dasein'sauthentic existence represents anemphatic "choosing to choose" itself.However, to understand Heidegger'sconception of Dasein in the moment ofresoluteness, the traditional notion ofvolition as the "deliberate choice of asubject" must be reconsidered. , This isbecause resolute Dasein is not willfullychoosing between the competingalternatives of inauthentic and authenticexistence. Rather, Dasein is openingitself up to Being; its "choice," so tospeak., is already made when it allowsitself to be called by conscience to ownup to guilt and accept the "nothingness"of existence. Therefore, Dasein is not somuch "choosing" authenticity and theSituation as it is choosing its actionswithin specific situations. In resoluteness, Dasein, released from the oppressive

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April, 2006influence of the "they-self," pushes forward authentically into its possibilitieswith the existential understanding ofwhat is factically possible at each andevery moment. 7The authentic Situation of Dasein isnot an axiomatic guide to authenticbehavior, presenting a theoretical schemafor human existence. Instead, it is anauthentic way of inhabiting the presentmoment, which modifies and clarifiesDasein ' s relationships, i.e., its concerneddealings with entities and its solicitousBeing-with-Others. The Situation is theauthentic clearing of Being, an openingfor the enactment of Dasein's authentically owned possibilities. Seizing uponthe existential understanding of thrownness and death, Dasein makes its choicesin light of its uncertain future andthrown-past. It is within the Situationthat Dasein' s freedom is born of therelationship between its choices and theconstraints that shape its possibilities. Toerroneously conceive resoluteness as adeliberate choice, which estab1ishes thepermanent transformation of Dasein, isto truncate freedom and eradicate thepossibility of ethics, and thus deny toexistence "nothing less than the verypossibility of taking action in a particularSituation" (RT, 345/298).When "resolute" Dasein comportsitself, anxiety has extinguished intrinsicmeaning from its life, and the reasons foracting and making choices hinge uponthe "disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at thetime" (RT, 345/298). Authenticity doesnot provide life with a new content, forauthentic existence is in fact devoid ofcontent, nor does it alienate Dasein fromthe world. Rather, authenticity "bringsthe Self right into its current concernfulbeing alongside what is ready-to-hand,and pushes it into solicitous Being-withothers" (RT, 344/298). Authenticity isa shift in the framework of Dasein' sexistence, transforming the "context" inwhich it enacts its approaching possibilities.Authentic Being-in-the-world is a spontaneous way of living in which Dasein is


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DIALOGUEopen and receptive to the approach ofBeing. The radical, authentic transformation to authenticity occurs when Daseinowns up to the disclosed "nothingness,"or nullity, of its Being, which firstmanifests itself through the primordialattunement of Angst.Conceived as a temporal phenomenon , the Situation is Dasein ' s "momentof vision" (Augenblick) , or "instant," ofauthenticity. "In the instant as an ecstasis,"writes Heidegger, "the existent Dasein iscarried away, as resolved, into the factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation ofaction" (BP, 287). This is the moment ofenpresenting (the authentic "present" ofecstatic temporality) when Dasein, accessible and free, projects itself into itspossibilities within the factical anddistinct circumstances of its own uniquelife. Such an authentic "resolute" openness to worldly encounters is onlypossible because Dasein is a temporalbeing that temporalizes, and thus is atonce its future, past, and present asthrown-projecting Being-in-the-world. Thepresent, which is held within authentictemporality , is the sustaining form ofDasein's authentic choices, the "resoluterapture with which Dasein is carriedaway to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in theSituation as possible objects of concern"(BP, 287).The authentic temporalizing of Daseinoccurs as it projects its finite possibilities, initiating a forward movementtowards itself as resolute Being-towardsdeath in its ownmost potentiality-forBeing. This movement secures a "repetition" of the authentic nullity, or"nothingness," characterizing Dasein' sauthentic response to the call of conscience. Thrown before the revelations ofanxiety, this future-oriented act ofretrieval is the authentic appropriation ofDasein's "having-been." In coming toitself (future) from out of its ownthrown-Being (past), Dasein disclosesthe meaning of authentic Being withinthe "instant," or enpresenting (present),

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April,2006of the Situation. This "ecstatic" temporalprocess represents the letting be ofBeing, which has been defined as theauthentic truth of existence. Thus, whenDasein exists authentically, it experiences the world in its basic "unconcealment" - allowing that which shows itse(ffrom itse(f to be seen - now not disclosing beings, but the phenomenon of worldas such, i.e., the overarching matrix ofmeaning and purpose structuringDasein's Being-in-the-world.The concluding remarks focus onDasein's authentic response to anxiety asan insightful and philosophical way toencounter Angst. The ultimate situationsof human existence, which manifestthemselves by way of anxiety, representthe very conditions that hold thepotential to make human life genuinelymeaningful. Death , nothingness, andthrown ness, disclosed through anxiety,are precisely what Dasein must accept inorder to exist authentically as its future(free-for-death), past and inheritance(its having-been), and present, the"there," or enpresenting, of existence. Itis of benefit, at this point, to inquire intothe mind-set of the authentic, resoluteDasein as perceived by Heidegger. Is itlikely that while preparing his extensiveanalysis of authenticity, Heidegger wasdrawing inspiration from his own existence as a philosopher? Such an assumptionis reasonable, if we envisage the philosopher as one who is attuned and open tolife's most difficult situations.Of assistance in understanding thephilosopher's mind-set is to recall thetwo perspectives from which this essayhas considered anxiety 'S influence. If , onthe one hand, Angst is interpreted in aninauthentic manner, as a constant threatto one's healthful existence, Dasein fleesin fear from anxiety's disturbing effectsto the safety and familiarity of theinterpretations of the status quo. If , onthe other hand, Angst is perceived as thebridge to a unique form of understanding,which connects Dasein to the finite realitiesof its Being-in-the-world, then as opposedto prefiguring horror and passivity, anxiety


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DIALOGUEannounces itself as the harbinger ofDasein ' s authentic enactment of freedom for its possibilities. As anxiety isdisclosing the insignificance of the world,authentic Dasein is reinterpreting themeaninglessness and impossibility ofexistence as revelatory. This radicalconversion of the inauthentic view"signifies that one is letting the possibilityof an authentic potentiality-for-Being belit up," i.e., one is behaving philosophically, awakened by the sense of wonder(BT,393/343) .The philosopher therefore embraces ,through resolute openness, the limitedand ephemeral nature of the world thatanxiety discloses. To abandon the notionof a finite worldly existence in search ofmeaningful consolation elsewhere (e.g.,inauthentic worldly projection or otherworldly projection by way of religion) isto degrade our vast potential, as such

April,2006incoherent aspirations work to tear downour genuine earthly relations. Philosophyis ultimately concerned with enactingways of life that embrace finitude , for"existence is truly philosophical onlywhen its knowledge is appropriatelyattuned to that which cannot be known,to a destiny that exceeds oneself."RPhilosophy must take up and challengethe ultimate uncertainties that compriseBeing-in-the-world . Heidegger accuratelyconcludes that outside of the single fatalityof death, that uttermost certainty, whichis non-relational and insurmountable, Daseinis a wealth of potential. Considering thedepth and breadth of his treatment ofauthenticity, Heidegger may well be askingthe reader of Being and Time to considerseriously the life of the philosopher asrepresenting an "anxious" obligation todeath, which frees herlhim for the joyousand challenging activity of living.*

* I thank Professor William McNeiII , author of The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger,Aristotle, and the Ends of Th eory. His comments and suggestions helped to improvethis essay.Notes

1 Heidegger, Martin, The Concept oj Time. Trans., W. McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell:Oxford), L992 , p. IOE. Heidegger's exact quotation concerning Dasein 's authenticity runs thus: "Theauthenticity oj Dasein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of Being. Da


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DIALOGUE April,20066 , "On the Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans.,

A. Hofstadter (Harper & Row: New York), 1971, p. 67. Reflecting on the phenomenon of authentic"resoluteness" within "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger writes the following: "Theresoluteness intended in Being and Time, is not the deliberate choice of a subject, but the openingup of human being, out of its capacity in that which is, to the openness of being."7 Heidegger describes the immediacy of Dasein 's action-taking when resolute for its ownPotentiality-for-Being in the following terms: "Resoluteness does not take cognizance of aSituation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into the Situation already. As resolute,Dasein is already taking action." (BT, 347/300).8 McNeill, William, "Care for the Self," Philosophy Today (Spring Issue), p. 62.

Works Cited

Heidegger, Martin, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. , A. Hofstadter (IndianaUniversity Press: Bloomington), 1982.__ Being and Time. Trans., 1. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Harper & Row: New York), 1962.__ The Concept of Time. Trans . William McNeill, bilingual edition (Blackwell: Oxford), J992.__ "On the Origin of the Work of Art," Poetry , Language, and Thought. Trans.,A Hofstadter (Harper & Row : New York), 197 1.__ "What is Metaphysics?" Basic Writings. Trans. , David F. Krell (Harper & Row: SanFrancisco), 1993.

McNeill , William, "Care for the Self," Philosophy Today (Spring Issue).

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Anxiety in Heideggers Being and Time_ the Harbinger of Authentic