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Anti-Ottoman Politics and Transit Rights: The Seventeenth-Century Trade in Silk betweenSafavid Iran and MuscovyAuthor(s): Rudi MattheeReviewed work(s):Source: Cahiers du Monde russe, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1994), pp. 739-761Published by: EHESSStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20170927 .Accessed: 19/01/2012 21:46

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RUDI MATTHEE

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TRADE IN SILK

BETWEEN SAFAVID IRAN AND MUSCOVY

Introduction

Conceiving of Safavid Iran as the hub in a wheel of surrounding states, one

quickly realizes the shallowness of our understanding of the wheel's various spokes. One, moreover, is missing almost completely. Of the Safavids' dealings with the countries that were closely connected with Iran through politics and trade, those with the Muscovite state remain virtually unknown outside of Russian scholarship.

Long separated from Iran as it was by unpacified nomadic peoples, Muscovy was more distant than either the Ottoman or the Mughal Empire, the other two early modern states with similarities in political structure and economic policies. This situation began to change in the sixteenth century, when its southern expansion brought Moscow within the orbit that Safavid Iran claimed as its own. The interaction that followed had nothing of the mutual animosity growing out of rival

interpretations of a common religious heritage that marked the often bellicose Safavid-Ottoman relations. Nor did the two states engage in the kind of cultural

exchange that characterized the relationship between Safavids and Mughals. What

brought Russia and Iran into contact instead were common material interests, political as well as economic, that were intimately linked to the international political configuration and patterns of trade at the turn of the seventeenth century.

The following discussion will take these common interests as the starting point from which to examine the interaction between Iran and the Muscovite state from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, or the period spanned by the active economic involvement of Shah 'Abbas I in Iran and Tsar Peter I in Russia,

respectively. In this I will necessarily pay close attention to the ultimate rationale of the Russo-Iranian axis, the Ottoman threat to both, but I will view their mutual

diplomatic courting through the prism of the study's main object, the relationship's commercial dimension and, more particularly, the trade in silk.1 Attention to the

Cahiers du Monde russe, XXXV (4), octobre-d?cembre 1994, pp. 739-762.

740 RUDI MATTHEE

Safavid silk trade, which still awaits a comprehensive study, thus far has mostly been focused on the maritime Persian Gulf route which in the early seventeenth century

began to be used as an alternative outlet for the Iranian silk that was traditionally exported via the land-based route through the Ottoman Empire. Much less well known in this shift from a latitudinal to a longitudinal axis is the latter's northern

component, the fluvial route which led from Iran via the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan and thence followed the Volga up to Nizhnii-Novgorod, from where goods were

usually carried overland to Moscow.2 It is this third outlet for Iranian silk which I will here explore in an attempt to establish the degree to which it managed to become an alternative to the other itineraries in the course of the seventeenth century. Before doing so, however, an overview of its origins and early development is in order.

L Early relations

Trade relations between Russia and the Middle East, including Iran, go back to

pre-Islamic times. Hoards of coins and silver objects from the Sasanian period in Iran testify to an early exchange of goods, but in the absence of written sources it is

unfortunately impossible to elaborate on this trade.3 In early Islamic times matters

improve with the various Muslim geographers who provide information on

commercial relations between "Rus" and the lands of Islam. In these early days a

direct route to Iran, or rather two routes, existed which crossed the territory between the Black and Caspian Seas. The first one was the maritime route that followed the

western shores of the Caspian Sea until it reached the port towns of Gilan on the southern coast. The second one followed the same trajectory but turned into an

overland route beginning in Darband, traditionally a major gateway through the

Caucasus, from where it continued in the direction of Mesopotamia.4 Due to the

unpacified state of Daghestan, the territory north of Darband, the first descriptions of the overland route along the western shores of the Caspian Sea only date from the twelfth century, while the route itself began to be used with some regularity only in the thirteenth.5

Commercial centers and routes witnessed several shifts over time. Protracted

warfare between Arabs and Khazars was followed in the eighth century by the rise of Itil, the capital of the Khazar state, situated at the mouth of the Volga near the later

city of Astrakhan, as a trade emporium. Together with the Bulgars, the Khazars became the middlemen in a lively trade that linked the Baltic North to the Arab East.6 This Transcaucasian link functioned until the tenth century, when Rus raids into Shirvan and Tabaristan wrought havoc in the area around the Caspian Sea. At the same time unrest in the Caucasus and renewed hostilities between Arabs and

Khazars made the direct route between Iran along the Caspian route impracticable and forced travelers to make huge detours via Khwarazm and the desert between the Aral Sea and the Volga basin.7

The Caucasian link withered after the destruction of Itil and Bulgar by the Rus in the 960's and the fall of the Samanid state in eastern Iran in the same period. Kiev, the capital of a newly emerging state, replaced Itil and Bulgar as the most important trade center in the north-south link. As long as the Kievan state flourished, the

point of gravity of Russian-Middle Eastern trade continued to be located in the

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 741

southwest. However, the decline of Kiev in the twelfth century ? the city was

sacked in 1169 ? and the emergence of the Vladimir-Suzdal' state caused a shift

toward the northeast and made the Volga route, with Suzdal' as its center, the main commercial artery.8

Economic weakness in much of the Middle East prevented the Volga connection from flourishing until the incorporation of Iran by the Khwarazmshahs in the early thirteenth century. The latter restored commercial relations with Bulgar, but the

Mongol invasion preempted a long-term commercial revival.9 Subjugating the

Bulgar state as well as Iran, the Mongols severely interrupted commercial exchange. However, under the successor states, the Ilkhans in Iran and the Golden Horde in south Russia, trade links revived remarkably quickly. In Iran, Tabriz, and to a lesser extent Sultaniyeh, became thriving commercial centers, while in Russia Sarai, the

capital of the Golden Horde, and the Black Sea port city of Kaffa (modem Fedosiya) assumed a similar role.10 In both territories Italian, Genoese and Venetian,

merchants managed to establish strongholds. Thus trade flourished until the mid thirteenth century, when the devastation of the Black Death and the Timurid invasions caused the Golden Horde in Russia to disintegrate and llkhanid rule in Iran to collapse.

Following the Mongol period, it was the rise of Moscow and its liberation from the "Tatar yoke" which were decisive for the revival of the diplomatic and commercial links with the Islamic world. Muscovy established diplomatic relations with the Porte before the end of the fifteenth century. Its commercial links with the Ottomans increased as well. At the same time Muscovy became involved in a tenuous triangular relationship with the khanates of Kazan to the northeast and

Crimea to the southwest. For a long time, Kazan, the dominant commercial market on the route to the Caspian Sea, and the Crimean khanate, vital in the links with the Ottoman Empire, lived in peace with Muscovy. However, as soon as the rationale for mutual good will, the Golden Horde, disappeared, the alliance broke up, to be

replaced with friendly relations between Moscow and Astrakhan.11 More than a good rapport between Moscow and Astrakhan was required to

revitalize the link with Iran which, following llkhanid rule, had lived through the turbulent episode of the Timurid occupation and warfare between various local

dynasties. Another catalyst was the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in the

early 1500's, which ended a long period of dispersed power in Iran. Mutual interest between Safavid Iran and Russia can be traced to these early days and, more

specifically, to the reigns of Shah Ismail I (1502-1524) and Tsar Vasili III (1505 1533). The earliest diplomatic contact recorded in the Russian sources dates from this period and concerns a Safavid envoy who visited Moscow in 1521.12

Relations, including commercial ones, long remained intermittent, however. In the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries few Russian merchants ventured south into a region that was unpacified and lacked the most basic facilities for commercial traffic.13 On the Russian side Tatars acted as the main intermediaries in the Russo-Iranian trade. The Italian traveler Contarini in the later 1400's noted that a caravan left Astrakhan for Moscow every year "accompanied by

a great many Tartar merchants who [...] take with them silk manufactured in Gesdi

[YazdJ and fustian stuffs to exchange for furs, saddles, swords, bridles and other

things which they require."14 On the part of Iran the first to engage in commercial traffic with the north were probably the Armenians from the town of Julfa on the

742 RUDI MATTHEE

river Aras, who enjoyed a preeminent position in the commerce of northern Iran ?

which mostly revolved around silk ? as of the early sixteenth century. They seem

to have traded with Moscow long before Russia controlled the Caspian Sea route.15

They may also have been instrumental in attempts to transport silk from Gilan to

Europe via Russia when the Ottomans struck Iran with a commercial blockade in

1514-1515.16 In the period prior to the extension of Safavid control over northern

Iran, they presumably relied on their political clout with local rulers. Thus in 1544 the beglerbeg of Shirvan asked Ivan IV to renew existing privileges for Armenian

merchants in their trade with Russia.17 The extension of Russian control over the Volga route, which preceded Safavid

control over the southern Caucasus, may be seen as a land-based variant of the maritime expansion undertaken by Europe at the turn of the sixteenth century. While the consequences for the Ottoman Empire and Iran of Europe's maritime

exploration are well known, however, the simultaneous advance by and through Russia remains relatively obscure. Attempts to break the Iberian monopoly over

the sea route to Asia first took the form of efforts to establish an overland alternative, as seen in the endeavor by the Genoese Paolo Centurione in 1522 to open up a route

from the Baltic Sea via the Volga and Astrakhan to Central Asia and India.18 These efforts met with little success as long as the lands lying astride this fluvial route

remained unpacified. Pacification, in turn, had to wait until after the Russian annexation of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), as a result of

which the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea were made accessible via the Volga route.

Among the first to take advantage of improved communications and increased safety were the English so-called Muscovy merchants who, faced with a Portuguese and

Spanish monopoly of the southern, Atlantic and Indian Ocean routes and a strong Venetian presence on the Levant route, attempted to use the northern itinerary in their

quest for the riches of the Indies. Under the auspices of the newly incorporated Russian Company, merchants such as Arthur Edwards, Anthony Jenkinson, and

Thomas Randolph led a number of commercial expeditions through Russia to Iran in

thel560'sandl570's.19 The Russian annexation of Astrakhan proved to be of momentous importance for

commercial relations between the Slavic and the Muslim worlds. Incorporated into the Muscovite realm and rebuilt, the town emerged as the principal crossroads where

merchants from Russia, Iran, Central Asia and India met and exchanged their wares. From Astrakhan Russian merchants began to venture further south. They not only participated in the exchange of silk and other wares in Shamakhi (Shamakha), the

capital of Shirvan and the southern terminus for most northern merchants, but their

presence was noted in cities such as Tabriz, Ardabil, Qazvin, and Kashan as well.20 The wares they brought with them consisted of leather skins, metal objects such as

knives and nails, various furs, such as sable, fox, marten, and squirrel, wax, and

tallow. Arms were very much in demand too, especially chain armors, arrows and

spears. For their part, merchants from Iran made their way up to the cities of Kazan and Nizhnii-Novgorod, which developed into lively trade centers. Aside from

Iranians, Russian cities were visited by merchants from Central Asia and India, sent

by their governments with official merchandise. Moscow itself was not much

frequented by foreign merchants in this early phase.21 In addition, Armenian merchants must have been active in the north-south link, judging by the existence of an Armenian caravanserai in Moscow in the late sixteenth century.22 Iran exported

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 743

mostly precious cloth. The velvets, satins and taffetas woven in Yazd, Kashan, and Isfahan that were taken to Russia often made up seventy or more percent of the total value of goods transported in the late sixteenth century. Besides, Iran supplied Russia with carpets, morocco, saffron, dyes, precious stones and steel arms.23

Silk was among the items that were exchanged in this period. Anthony Jenkinson in 1558 observed that Astrakhan was a meeting place of Tatar merchants

who brought "diners kindes of wares made of cotton wooll, with diuers kinds of

wrought silkes," and merchants from Shamakhi in Iran who carried "sowing silke, which is the coursest that they use in Russeland."24 Nonetheless, the silk supply from Iran appears to have been fairly insignificant in the early and mid-sixteenth

century and only began to expand when the emergence of a demand from western

Europe in the later part of the century opened up the possibility of reexport.25 The Muscovite state soon followed private merchants in extending its ambit to

relations with the lands beyond Astrakhan. Contacts that included trade issues were established with the Central Asian khanates as well as with the Caucasian territories that were subordinated to Iran. Thus Shirvan and Shamakhi in 1562 and 1563 sent envoys to Moscow for trade talks.26 Ivan IV in 1567 dispatched two

agents with royal wares as far south as the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz.27 In this

development, as well as the construction of a number of fortresses along the Volga route in the 1580's, we see a growing official interest in trade relations coupled with a concern about commercial security on the part of Moscow. With the greater role of trade in Russia's political dealings with Iran came an increase in state control over commerce and its practitioners. In a process that recalls similar changes in relations with the Ottoman Empire somewhat earlier, an original dominance of

private merchants after 1570 gave way to a gradual appropriation by the Russian state of the exchange of goods.28 Whereas in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries foreign merchants appear to have had full freedom to trade in cities all over

Russia, foreign commercial activities became severely restricted in the later sixteenth century, and especially after the termination of the Livonian War. In a

mercantilistic effort to limit the activities of foreign merchants, Russia now only allowed them to operate in so-called gosti hostels. The importation of goods also

was made subject to taxation, not just at the borders, but at various points en route as

well.29 Nor were merchants from the east permitted to buy Russian goods directly from producers and manufacturers. Instead they were obliged to use Russian

merchants as intermediaries.30 Foreign merchants, moreover, generally paid two to

three times as much as Russians in tolls. Lastly, the exportation of a whole array of wares became subject to state monopolization. The export of precious metals, gold and silver, was strictly forbidden. Other, so-called "protected goods" had limitations imposed on their export, the terms of which were to be determined by the

Russian state. Arms and a number of metal wares fell in this category. The same was true for sable fur and leather skins. Another example was wax, the export of which may have become restricted in 1588 because of growing foreign demand.31

Moscow's thrust into the Caucasus prepared the way for expanded political and commercial dealings but did not immediately lead to a steady increase in traffic with the southern neighbor. For the time being, the route alongside the Caspian littoral remained far from secure, devoid of facilities and infested with bandits as it was.

As robberies were common, few Russian merchants headed south. And if they did, it was invariably in the form of caravans protected by armed troops. The latter

744 RUDI MATTHEE

could reach up to 1,000 men. Even then, there was no guarantee that the caravan

might not be attacked.32 If anything, conditions worsened in the last third of the sixteenth century. The 1571 burning of Moscow by the Crimean Tatars, the

uprising of the Volga Tatars a year later, and the lack of success the Russians had in their wars with Sweden and Poland threw the north into turmoil. This unsettled state was matched by troubles in the south which developed as a result of the

campaign the Ottomans simultaneously waged against Astrakhan. When they took

Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea littoral between the cities of Baku and Darband, travel between Moscow and Iran along the western side became impossible and

temporarily shifted to the eastern shore. In sum, the 1570's and 1580's were hardly propitious times for commercial

exchange, as was discovered by the voivoda of Astrakhan who unsuccessfully attempted to attract foreign merchants to his town in 1586.33 Things were soon to

change, however. Defeat in the Livonian War blocked the chances of a Russian outlet via the Baltic. A succession crisis in the Crimean khanate was a second

development that forced Moscow to turn its attention to its southern and southeastern borders again. Before long the Russians built a new series of fortifications on the Caucasian frontier. Having forged a broad anti-Ottoman coalition, which included a branch of the Crimean Tatars, Russia was now ready to establish closer relations

with Iran as well as with the Central Asian khanates.34

II. The reign of Shah ' Abbas I

Renewed Russian interest in the lands to the south virtually coincided with the accession of Shah 'Abbas I to the Safavid throne in 1587. Under Shah 'Abbas I

(r. 1587-1629) the Safavid state reached its apogee of political power and military strength.

' Abbas's expansionist policies also brought him into conflict with the

Ottomans. It was the threat from this common neighbor and the resulting anti Ottoman interests shared by Moscow and Iran which provided the rationale for the contacts the two states established. There was nothing new about these shared interests. Fear of the Ottomans went back as far as the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The subsequent expansion of the Ottoman Empire into southeastern Europe

and the area north of the Black Sea had increased concern on the part of European and West-Asian powers alike and was an early ground for Moscow to seek Muslim allies in an anti-Turkish coalition. Russian envoys visited Herat in 1464-1465,

while Ivan III in the same period sent an envoy to Shamakhi.35 Simultaneous contacts between Uzun Hasan, the ruler of the Iranian Aq-Qoyunlu dynasty, and

Moscow were part of the same development. The subsequent emergence in southern Russia of the Crimean Tatars as Ottoman proxies lent even more weight to the shared concerns of Moscow and Qazvin.36

The interest that the Safavids developed in their northern neighbor already before Shah 'Abbas was principally motivated by a lack of success in their wars with the Ottomans. The Ottoman attempt to seize Azerbaijan and Shirvan in the early 1550's prompted Shah Tahmasp I (r. 1524-1576) to send a mission to Moscow in 1552-1553. But it was especially the hapless peace of Amasya of 1555, followed

by Ottoman aggression against Astrakhan in the next decade, which made both

parties eager to intensify their diplomatic relations.37 Amasya cost Iran large parts

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 745

of Azerbaijan and Mesopotamia. The Ottoman occupation of Astrakhan, in turn, eliminated Russian control over a vital commercial center and interrupted the most

important trade route between the south and the north. Matters became even worse

and a coalition between Russia and Iran more plausible in the 1580's, when the Ottomans occupied parts of Georgia and Shirvan, including the city of Tiflis.

Through the first serious Safavid mission to Moscow, Shah Khodabandeh (r. 1578

1587) proposed a coalition and promised Darband and Baku to the Russians

following the liberation of these cities. This mission, which was led by Hadi Beg (called Andi Beg in the Russian sources), appeared bold in its objectives but

inaugurated a pattern in that it did not lead to any concrete results. Iran, it would turn out in subsequent encounters, was keen enough to court Russia as a potential future ally, yet apprehensive enough of the Turks not to engage in a formal alliance

with third parties. The first Hadi Beg mission bore no concrete results but did lead to the regular

and frequent exchange of envoys, beginning with the embassy of Grigorii Boris Vasil'chikov to Qazvin in 1588. None of these missions led to any formal

agreement due to Shah ' Abbas's reluctance to jeopardize his imminent peace accord

with the Ottomans by concluding an anti-Turkish coalition with Moscow. On the other hand, these contacts were not entirely fruitless, for the second Hadi Beg mission, which was dispatched in 1589, did result in closer economic ties, or at least laid the groundwork for such ties in the form of written statements from the Russians

expressing their desire for economic relations. The commitment to free trade for Iranian merchants which the tsar articulated on this occasion was an especially

welcome signal for the separate Gilan embassy accompanying the Iranian delegation whose main concern was the unfair treatment of Gilani merchants in Astrakhan as

well as their free access to the Russian market.38 Shah

' Abbas's diplomatic maneuvers toward the north in these years aimed above

all at securing Iran's position against the Ottomans, but increasingly began to involve trade relations as well. While the so-called Kaya mission sent to Moscow in 1591 had a diplomatic mandate, through it 'Abbas also expressed his desire to establish commercial links with Russia. The Russian acceptance of this proposal in fact was the mission's only concrete result.39 In May 1592, well before the Kaya mission had returned from Russia, 'Abbas dispatched another mission. Led by Hajji Khosrow, its objectives included the establishment of toll-free trade for government goods carried by Iranian merchants. The mission bore no political results, but its commercial success ? the shah was given the right to trade toll-free in Russia ? more than compensated for that. In a logical next step, 'Abbas did not wait for Hajji

Khosrow to return and in 1593 sent yet another delegation. Its leader, Hajji Iskandar, became the first Safavid official merchant sent to Russia in the guise of a diplomatic envoy.40 Hajji Iskandar, who carried a number of royal wares, failed to finalize the

agreement when the Russians refused to agree to his demand of selling the goods he had brought wholesale while being allowed the freedom to choose an assortment of wares in his purchases. He is also said to have overestimated the value of his merchandise and to have demanded too many goods from the Russians in return.41

This first failure to find common ground did not forestall further efforts. In 1594 the shah sent a third embassy under the direction of Hadi Beg. The royal

merchants who accompanied this mission carried, among other things, ca. 200 kg. of

silk, and bought a number of "protected" goods for the shah which included arms,

746 RUDI MATTHEE

metal wares and sable fur. In 1597 Moscow sent a mission to Iran, led by V V. Tiufiakin. This ill-fated mission ? all three of its successive leaders perished before they had reached Iran ? had a commercial dimension inasmuch as one of its task was the signing of a commercial treaty. The same task, designed to normalize trade relations between the two countries, seems to have been assigned to the full

fledged embassy which the new Tsar Boris Godunov dispatched under the direction of Zhirov and Zasekin in 1600.42

For the time being, political objectives continued to overshadow commercial

concerns, even as an asymmetry in these objectives began to mark the relations between Iran and Moscow in the 1590's. Russia continued to be eager to draw Iran into an anti-Ottoman alliance. Shah 'Abbas, however, at this point had different

priorities. Having signed an agreement with the Ottomans in 1589-1590 that left his hands free in return for ceding large parts of the north, he did not seriously intend to resume hostilities and was thus in no position to adopt an active anti-Turkish stance. A war against the ?zbegs and internal reforms, moreover, absorbed all his

energy, as was discovered by the Zvenigorodskii mission which Moscow sent in 1595 in response to the various delegations Iran had previously dispatched. ' Abbas's political acumen, however, told him that, given the volatility of the political climate, he could not afford to alienate the Russian by rebuffing them altogether. The solution which the Safavid ruler adopted was to leave the Russians in the belief that Iran was planning a war while simultaneously holding out an oft repeated

promise that he was keen on concluding an anti-Ottoman treaty with Moscow. The real issue of diplomatic efforts, meanwhile, began to be Transcaucasia, the

area where Russian, Iranian and Ottoman spheres of influence converged and clashed. In the late 1500's Russia mounted a campaign into Daghestan against the Shamkhal of Tarkov and laid claims to Daghestan, Darband and Baku, all tributary to the Safavid crown. When the Russians built a number of fortresses south of the river Terek, Iranian fears about this foray into its northern flank grew into anxiety about the possibility of a military union between Moscow and Georgia. Unlike the

Russians, who cautioned their envoys to be circumspect about the Caucasian issue,

the Iranians evidently had little interest in keeping up appearances, as is seen in the small number of return missions sent by 'Abbas and the bad treatment suffered by the various Russian missions that visited the Safavid court.43 Yet, in effect, Iran

had to move cautiously in its resistance to Moscow's claim on Daghestan, Darband,

and Baku if it wanted to keep the option of having a potential anti-Ottoman ally open. To encourage Moscow to stop further advancing into the Caucasus region thus became a cornerstone of 'Abbas's northern policy.44

After 1598 the geopolitical balance between Russia and Iran changed in the latter's favor. In Russia the period of turmoil known as the Time of Troubles ( 1598

1613) weakened the state and thereby its ability to function as a credible military partner in the anti-Ottoman struggle. But the Time of Troubles period had its most dramatic repercussions on commercial relations, as Ottoman and Crimean Tatar

threats and the destruction caused by peasant rebellions temporarily led to the closure of the route from Moscow to Astrakhan.45 Iran, meanwhile, having concluded the ?zbeg wars and a series of internal military and administrative

reforms, entered a phase of considerable political and military strength. The result of these developments, a growing distance between the two states, was

exacerbated by the continuing Caucasian aspirations of both. While Shah 'Abbas

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 747

in 1603-1604 launched a broad diplomatic initiative toward various west European states which seemed to hold a better promise for assistance against the Ottoman foe, and simultaneously resumed hostilities with the latter, his apparent willingness to solicit Russian help diminished, and what remained could hardly conceal the true nature of his intentions. Never intent on concluding an actual anti-Turkish treaty with Moscow, the Safavid ruler merely wanted to ensure that Russia would not be a

danger to his northern border.46 The Russians, for their part, grew ever more

reluctant to assist Iran as they were making preparations for an offensive in the Caucasus. Indeed, while Shah 'Abbas was waiting for the right moment to move

against the Ottomans, the Russians advanced their Caucasian claims by assisting Alexander, the ruler of the principality of Kakhet'i, in his struggle against the Turks and the Iranians. This prompted Iran to subjugate these regions in 1605. Powerless to intervene militarily, the Russians could do little more than dispatch a

mission to protest Iran's behavior and to try and regain the lost territory. Neither commercial nor diplomatic relations flourished in the following period,

in which Georgia and Shirvan suffered just as much as the western parts of

Azerbaijan as a result of Shah 'Abbas's Caucasian campaigns and his wars against the Ottomans. The trading emporium of Shamakhi lay in ruins in 1607-1608,47 and in the long run is said to have decreased in size as a result of the Ottoman-Safavid

wars.48 Nor were things quiet and stable on the Russian side. Faced with rebellion by Cossack marauders ? who held Astrakhan occupied for a period

? the Muscovite state was unable to continue its former relations with Iran until 1613.

In that year the accession to the throne of Tsar Mikhail Romanov finally laid the basis for the resumption of regular diplomatic contact between the two courts.

A year later Russia sent a mission led by Tikhanov in an attempt to renew

commercial and diplomatic ties. The missions of 1615, 1616, and 1618-1620 which followed all reflected Russia's continued weakness in the tsar's persistent request for monetary assistance and in Russia's reluctance to broach the Georgian question with the Safavids. How much Moscow's clout had diminished with Shah

'Abbas, who was evidently aware of the Russian impotence, is illustrated in the

rough and impolite treatment the various envoys from the north suffered at the Safavid court.49

If the poor reception Russian diplomats enjoyed in Isfahan reflected Moscow's

declining importance in Iran, 'Abbas had good reasons to limit his northern concerns to consolidating the safety of his Caucasian border. Iran's victory in the war against the Turks in 1618 had obviated any direct plea for Russian assistance.

Commercially things were changing as well. While he had earlier looked at Russia as a possible alternative outlet for the silk that traditionally went through the Ottoman Empire, 'Abbas now began to explore a third option, that of the maritime trade route through the Persian Gulf, which had been suggested as early as 1608, as an alternative to the Anatolian and the Caspian trade routes. By engaging in relations with the dominant powers of western Europe, the Safavid ruler expanded his political bargaining power.50 The counterpart of this was a dilution of Russian influence in Iran. Neither commercially nor militarily were the Russians of any use in 'Abbas's Persian Gulf strategy. It was newcomers, beginning with the English and Dutch East India Companies, whose assistance the Safavid ruler now sought in his feud with the Portuguese and the implementation of his commercial plans in the Persian Gulf.

748 RUDI MATTHEE

If all this spelled the end to the idea of Russia as an officially sanctioned third outlet for Iranian silk, none of it put a halt to the commercial exchange between the two countries. The Mohammad Kazem mission that went to Moscow in 1616, for

example, had a commercial dimension. Not only did it include a supply of silk, but it resulted in Russian steps toward greater protection of Iranian merchants in Iran.51

Nor did the changed Iranian priorities deter the Russians from continuing their

activity in the silk trade, either privately or in conjunction with diplomatic traffic. Numerous examples in the 1620's testify to this. A report from 1626 indicates that Russian merchants would come down via the Caspian Sea to exchange their goods for silk in Gilan.52 In 1629, following the death of 'Abbas I and an ensuing rebellion in Gilan, ten Muscovite merchants arrived in Isfahan after being robbed by rebels in Gilan. Claiming that their total cargo had been 500 bales of silk, they were

reimbursed after the defeat of the rebel leader Gharib Shah.53 In 1623, finally, a

total of over 2,000 kg. of silk was shipped from Astrakhan to various Russian cities.54

Most surviving information from the 1620's concerns the continuing exchange of wares at the official level. Griaznom Selivanov, one of the merchants who

accompanied the Korob'in mission of 1621-1623, carried 500 rubles worth of sable fur to Iran with the intent to purchase arms with the proceeds. Ivan Afanasevich, the other high-ranking merchant traveling with the mission, carried merchandise

with the aim of buying silk in Iran.55 Following the Korob'in mission, the Russians sent Fedot Kotov in 1623 as an official merchant (gost') with tsarist merchandise and the task of surveying the route and of gathering information about Iran.56 He

was followed in 1624 by a Russian ambassador who came to Iran in order to

encourage the trade of silk via the Caspian route. Shah 'Abbas, however, who at this point was intent on stimulating the Persian Gulf trade, rejected his proposals.

Accompanying merchants were said to have bought ca. 150 bales of silk before their return to Moscow.57 The Russian ambassador who arrived in Iran two years later

ostensibly was charged with the same task. He, too, seems to have returned

unsuccessfully.58 The low priority which 'Abbas accorded to relations with the Russians in the

latter part of his reign may have accounted for the fact that the status of trade relations and in particular that of privileges and procedures remained unresolved.

That northern merchants suffered from this more than their Iranian counterparts is

suggested by contemporary Russian sources which note the existence of an unequal situation in the extent to which residents of either state were able to operate freely in the territory of the other. Russian merchants are said to have been routinely harassed and obstructed in their movements by the local rulers of Gilan and Ardabil, while their wares were subjected to strict inspections by the same rulers. Yusuf

Khan, the ruler of Shamakhi, refused to grant legal protection of Russian merchants

visiting his territory and even took Russian captives. Iranian merchants

accompanying official embassies, on the other hand, tended to operate in the guise of official merchants and routinely presented their wares as royal ones in order to

enjoy the freedom from taxation granted to official merchandise. The breach of confidence this signified was acknowledged in 'Abbas's promise to the Russian

envoy Korob'in that henceforth the merchants sent by him would have sealed letters

proving their official status, which would entitle them to be exempted from tolls and taxes.59

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 749

III. The period 1629-1667

The death of Shah 'Abbas I in 1629 marked the beginning of considerable change in the relationship between the Safavid and the Romanov states. 'Abbas's

successor, Shah Safi, took much less interest in the silk trade than his grandfather had

done, and under him the royal export monopoly ? which had never been total ?

quickly lapsed, giving greater latitude to private merchants. The pacification of the

north by the Safavids and the regeneration of Iran's northern territory also contributed to a more propitious commercial climate. In the 1630's the German traveler Adam Olearius testified to the revival of Shamakhi by describing the town as a center of commerce with a great bazaar where all kinds of goods changed hands, and several caravanserais for foreign merchants.60 A decade later, the Turkish

traveler Evliya Celebi praised Shamakhi and mentioned the existence of 7,000 well built houses, seventy mosques, forty caravanserais "in each of which many thousand tomans of wares are deposited," and 1,200 shops.61

If all of this seemed to signal opportunities for a commercial revival, war,

disease, and rebellion in Iran's northern regions for the time being prevented an

upsurge in the volume of trade exchanged between Iran and Russia. The 1630's saw renewed hostilities between Iran and the Ottomans and a lack of security in the

Caspian sea region, which was made unsafe by Cossacks.62 Nor did the following period witness much improvement. In the period from 1633 to 1637 a prolonged plague epidemic in northern Iran affected silk production and decimated the ranks of cultivators and merchants. In 1635-1636 a Russian merchant doing business in Iran reportedly took back only 4,000 tomans of goods in return for the 6,500 worth of copper, furs, and cash that he had brought with him. His companions had almost all perished from the plague.63 Few Russian merchants were present in Iran in this

period, and the officially registered amounts of silk exported via the northern route

accordingly were insignificant. Thus in 1634 nothing was transported, and in 1635 out of a reported total of 1,073 bales exported that year only eighty went to Russia. The next year the plague made all traffic impossible.64 The border conflict of 1647-1652 over Georgia and Daghestan, finally, once again brought commercial traffic to a standstill. In 1650-1651 138 bales of Iranian silk lay in storage in

Astrakhan for a lack of buyers.65 How little silk was shipped through Russia in this period is illustrated in the report on the Russian trade that was written for the Swedish king in 1653. Its author, Johan de Rodes, estimated the volume of Iranian silk that was transshipped through Arkhangelsk every three years to be 120 to 150 bales.66

Natural adversity and warfare may have delayed a true expansion of commercial traffic temporarily, but the real and long-term obstacle lay in simultaneous changes in the political sphere. The profound impact politics had on trade in Russia is visible in reactions to the initiatives which various European powers took to open up transit trade through Russia and all the way to Iran. These initiatives all involved silk, a commodity which, used in the clothing of the rich, enjoyed a

growing popularity in baroque Europe. Not only the major mercantile powers of western Europe, England, Holland, France, Sweden, but even smaller ones such as Holstein and Courland, in the course of the seventeenth century equipped commercial missions with the aim of opening up a transit route to the East.67

750 RUDI MATTHEE

The Russian reaction to these overtures was informed by a twofold motive. One was pressure on the part of its own merchants who felt threatened by this foreign competition and as of 1627 petitioned the state to restrict the right of foreigners to

trade in Russia.68 In the other motive, Russia's perennial concern to find allies

against its Ottoman foe, we see the incongruity with the European countries, which were interested in trade relations, not political complications. Moscow made its

granting of privileges to merchants from foreign countries conditional upon the

willingness of the latter to lend active support in this struggle. The European countries, however, were motivated by an interest in getting Russia to grant economic concessions rather than by a desire to engage in actual military treaties. As a result, the numerous attempts to establish transit traffic all foundered. This is as true for the famous Holstein embassy of 1636 as it is for the various Dutch

attempts to gain a foothold in the transit market. The two exceptions were Poland and Austria, both of which bordered on Ottoman territory. Their interest in

approaching Russia was in part commercial, in that they had an eye on Iranian silk and its transit through Russia, in part political, as they were intent on shifting the

military pressure from their own borders to those of Iran.69 While incongruous objectives prevented the establishment of a direct link

between Western Europe and Iran via Moscow, similarly incompatible interests

began to mark Russo-lranian relations. No event was more momentous in this

regard than the peace of Zuhab which the Safavids and the Ottomans concluded in 1639. This formal accord removed the Turkish menace and thus definitively

obviated the pressing need for outside alliances. From that moment until the end of Safavid rule in the early eighteenth century Safavid rulers conducted an extremely cautious policy designed not to antagonize the Ottoman neighbor.

These changing circumstances are reflected in diminishing diplomatic traffic between the Romanovs and the Safavids in the 1640's. The continuous interaction that had marked the reign of Shah 'Abbas I began to level off under Shah Safi, when the known number of Russian envoys is confined to the one who arrived in 1634 with a reported (and clearly exaggerated) dfl. 400,000 worth of cash and fur and English cloth, for which he wished to buy silk.70 The trend was partly reversed under Sail's

successor, Shah 'Abbas II (r. 1642-1666), when the Russians resumed their anti Ottoman foreign policy. The accession of the new ruler was a natural occasion for

the sending of a congratulatory mission on the part of Moscow. However, it took almost five years for such a mission to arrive in Isfahan.71 In response the Iranians in 1648 sent a mission to Russia accompanied by a large amount of silk.72 The

Russians dispatched further embassies-cum trade missions north in 1651 and 1653, while in the latter year an Iranian envoy traveled to Moscow.73 All in all, in the

period from 1647 to 1670 Moscow sent three embassies and a total of six envoys to

Isfahan. Iran, by contrast, is known to have reciprocated with only three missions in the same period, the ones of 1648 and 1651, and the mission of Hadi Khan Soltan in 1657. In the following period, from 1670 to 1692, the imbalance continued.

Russia continued to try and incorporate Iran in an anti-Turkish coalition, expediting three ambassadors and eleven envoys to Isfahan. Isfahan countered with the

dispatch of one mission, in 1671, and waited twelve years before it responded to the Chirkov mission of 1678-1679 by sending Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg to

Moscow.74

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 751

IV. The 1667 and 1673 treaties

Trade between Russia and Iran continued in the mid-seventeenth century but,

despite various, mostly Russian, initiatives in that direction, was still not subject to a formal "bilateral" agreement. It was only in the latter part of the century that serious consideration was given to the regulation of commercial links between the two states. Mainly responsible for the serious attempts to enframe trade links in a

legal context in the 1660's were the same political stimuli that had so long determined relations between the two states. Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran were interested in diverting a portion of the lucrative silk trade for the growing markets in Europe from the transit route through the Ottoman Empire to the northern route via Astrakhan. For Iran this had the advantage of lessening its dependence on

the Ottomans, with whom tensions were again rising after a long period of peace.

Dwindling exports through the Persian Gulf made the Russian alternative seem

attractive as well. Moscow had its eye on the revenue that expanded trade would channel into the state treasury, but had broader aims as well. New Ottoman forays in southeastern Europe sharpened Russia's anti-Turkish instincts and motivated the

Romanovs to renew their attempts to include Safavid Iran in a strong anti-Turkish coalition. The Russian attempt to isolate the Ottoman Empire politically as well as

commercially culminated in 1667 in the signing of the treaty of Androsovo with

Poland, which gave the Poles transit rights through Russia in exchange for

cooperation against the Ottomans. Similar incentives underlay Moscow's overtures toward Iran.75

New Russian efforts to solidify political and commercial links with the Safavids are reflected in the appearance in Iran of a number of ambassadors and envoys in the

1650's and 1660's. In 1654 the Russian ambassador Lobanov-Rostovskii visited Isfahan with a suite of 200 to 300 persons and as many camel loads of furs and other valuable merchandise and gifts. His ostensible goal was to conclude a lasting peace with the Safavids and to negotiate the conditions for silk trade between the two

countries.76 In 1664 F. I. Miloslavskii led a Russian embassy to Iran accompanied by a suite of 350 people and some prominent merchants, who brought with them

sables, cloth, gold, silver, and copper to a total value of 76,749 rubles.77 This mission's principal aim was reportedly to secure free trade and to obtain permission to build a factory on the Caspian Sea.78 The French travelers De Thevenot and

Chardin asserted that the mission was treated badly by Shah 'Abbas II.79 An

initially friendly reception apparently turned sour after the Iranians discovered that the embassy was just a trading mission in diplomatic disguise. The Iranians also seem to have been appalled by the Russians' uncouthness. The mission's request for the cession of Georgia following the marriage between the tsar's son and the

daughter of the ruler of Georgia was rejected by the Safavid authorities, who also refused the proposal for free trade when they learned that the Russian intended to build a military fortress instead of a trading post on the Caspian shores. The Russian ambassador died shortly after he received an audience from the shah, and the second envoy had to return in vain.80

Despite the failure of the 1664 mission as a diplomatic overture, it did serve as a

prelude to a reopening of borders and marked the beginning of a more regulated and active silk trade between Iran and Russia. The most forceful impetus behind this

was semi-private in nature and came from the Armenian merchant community in

752 RUDI MATTHEE

Iran. It was not the convenience or the safety of the Russia route which caused a

change in the Armenian attitude toward the northern trade route in the 1660's.

True, the route was shorter than the maritime itinerary but, as Armenian merchants

noted, it was plagued by high tolls and poor security and therefore hardly preferable over the Ottoman route.81 Yet, similarly high tolls and a growing number of robberies in Ottoman territory as well as the threat of renewed war between the

Ottomans and the Safavids made the Julfans inclined to seek an alternative outlet for their silk trade.82 Trade with Russia also benefited from the negative effect of the

Turco-Venetian conflict known as the Candia wars (1645-1669) on the commerce between Iran and the Levant.83

The Armenians in 1659 sent a delegation representing the Julfa merchant houses to Russia and led by Zakhariya Shahrimanean with the aim of convincing the tsar of the advantage of closer trade links with Iran. While the precise standing of this

mission remains obscure, it appears that its representatives behaved in Russia as

quasi-official merchants, and were treated as such in Moscow. The richness of the

gifts they presented to the tsar reflects the interest among the Julfans in Russia as a

transit route but may also be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Armenians to emphasize the fact that they were not just royal merchants but operated as private entrepreneurs as well.84

Strengthened in their motivation to turn to Russia by the outbreak in 1665 of a new round in the Turco-Venetian war, the Julfa Armenians, led by Stefan Ramadanskii and Grigorii Lusikents, in 1666 engaged in talks with Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich. The 1666 mission resulted a year later in an agreement between Russia and the Julfans, who may have presented themselves as a regular trading company in Moscow in order to gain status and legitimacy.85 The agreement allowed for toll-free trade by Russians in Safavid territory. In return, Armenian

merchants received permission to conduct their trade in all of Russia in addition to

acquiring a monopoly of the transportation of silk to Astrakhan and beyond. Aside from transportation taxes, they were required to pay a 5 percent ad-valorem toll in

Astrakhan, Moscow, and Arkhangelsk.86 The short-term consequences of this agreement were negligible as trade links

were severely disrupted by the turmoil resulting from Cossack raids led by Sten'ka Razin in the period between 1666 and 1668. Many Armenian merchants who had vested interests in the Ottoman trade also did not respond to the plan to redirect the trade. The 1667 treaty thus remained a dead letter for some time. However, interest in the northern route did not disappear on the part of either the Safavids, the

Russians, or the Armenian merchants. In 1670 English agents sent by the Russian court arrived in Isfahan to inquire about the possibility of having all Iranian silk sent

via Russia. The Iranians, who were not disinclined toward the idea, sent the one

surviving member of the mission back to Moscow with the task of enquiring about the precise nature of the Russian requests.87

This contact was followed up in 1672 when the Julfans sent Grigorii Lusikents to Moscow as head of an embassy charged with the confirmation or renewal of the 1667 treaty. The outcome of this mission, a new treaty that was concluded in 1673, showed the effects of pressure exerted by Russian merchants who feared competition in their lucrative transit trade which yielded them profits of up to 50 percent on silk

bought in Astrakhan and sold in Moscow and Arkhangelsk. The Russians used the

frequent incidence of robberies and oppression of Russian merchants in Iran as a

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 753

pretext to curtail the right of Armenians to carry transit goods through Russia.

They were no longer allowed to transport merchandise beyond Astrakhan and Moscow. They could only carry silk in transit if it could not be sold in Russia, and silk transshipped through Russia could only be sold to countries with which Russia

was at peace. They also needed special permission to leave Russian soil. In return for the rights they did receive, the Armenian merchants promised that they

would henceforth transport Iranian silk only via Russia.88

V. The aftermath

Not surprisingly, the 1673 treaty with its new restrictions on Armenian transit trade led to an immediate slump in the transit of silk. Thus only twenty-four puds (ca. 390 kg.) appears to have been transported to Russia in 1673, followed by less than 100 (1,630 kg.) the next year.89

Nevertheless, Moscow had not given up on its efforts to maximize silk deliveries from Iran. Clear proof of that is the fact that in 1675 the tsar created the post of official silk factor, no doubt "in response to what was expected to be a massive

expansion of the silk trade [with Iran] ."90 A year later the Russians followed up on

this by agreeing to restore most of the Armenian transit rights. Once again political considerations contributed to Moscow's decision to revise its commercial policy. The context this time was a Dutch attempt to gain transit rights, but the real motivation was Russia's renewed need for Iranian assistance in the face of Ottoman threats and the loss of Poland as an ally. The Dutch sent an embassy led by

Koenraad van Klenck as ambassador to Moscow. Tsar Alexis rejected the Dutch

request for unrestricted trade in Russia with eastern merchants but, faced with falling commercial receipts, he did heed Van Klenk's solicitations by allowing the Dutch to trade with Armenians in Arkhangelsk in return for the understanding that Russian

merchants and the state treasury would get a share in the turnover and the proceeds. Protest by Russian merchants did not prevail this time: the Armenian merchants

regained their transit rights, even if they were no longer unrestricted.91

Mutual Russo-Armenian interest in strengthening their cooperation did not end there. In 1679 the Armenians, eager to inflate their trading capabilities, committed themselves to an immediate annual export figure of 48,000 puds (ca. 762,500 kg. or

more than 8,000 bales) of Iranian silk.92 The Russians, in turn, in 1689 expressed their continuing support for the Armenian enterprise by prohibiting all Western

merchants from engaging in transit trade that excluded Julfa Armenians. In the

east, Indian, Bukharan, and Iranian merchants, were prohibited from traveling beyond Astrakhan. Here, too, the Armenians were exempted.93 Russia, at this

point ruled by Tsar Peter I, was not only anxious to prevent the Turkish cities from

becoming exclusive entrep?ts for Iranian commerce, but also became increasingly interested in raw materials, as opposed to luxury goods, for its incipient

manufacturing industry.94 While Moscow's inclusion of the Julfa merchant firms in its commercial efforts

suggests a clear desire to support an expanding silk trade with Iran, the

corresponding role of the Iranian authorities is less clear. There are indications that Shah Solayman's grand vizier Shaykh 'Ali Khan in the 1670's conducted a policy of

privileging Russian diplomatic and commercial representatives over those of the

754 RUDI MATTHEE

West European trading nations. Aside from a customary Safavid policy of

balancing various foreign competitors, this policy may have been motivated by a

desire to find an alternative outlet for Iran's silk to the Persian Gulf itinerary. Active support of trade links with Russia is further attested for the period of Shah Soltan Hosayn (r. 1694-1722). The Russian scholar Kukanova has argued that this Safavid ruler was intent on opening up a transit route for Iranian silk in the early eighteenth century.95 Her colleague Bushev, on the other hand, contests this and claims that the shah's only goal was to secure transport rights to Europe in case prices offered in Russia were too low.96 This is indeed what happened to the merchants who accompanied Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg in 1691 -1692. One of them, Aga Karim, who carried forty-five bales of raw silk and a certain volume of manufactured

silk from Tabriz and Shamakhi, requested and obtained the right to transship his wares to Western Europe after the prices offered for them were not to his

satisfaction.97

The restoration of Armenian rights heralded the intensification of the commercial exchange between Iran and Russia. Continuing Russian merchant

opposition notwithstanding, Armenians began to travel to Arkhangelsk on the White Sea and as of 1686 followed the shorter route to Western Europe via

Novgorod.98 A shorter route and safer roads also helped make the Russian transit route to Europe an attractive alternative to the route through Turkey, the eastern

stretch of which was increasingly beset with security problems in the late 1600S. The result of these various factors was a great expansion of trade via the Caspian and

Volga itinerary in the last third of the seventeenth and the early years of the

eighteenth century.99 The growing penetration of Russian and Indian merchants in

Azerbaijan as well as the increasing presence of Armenian merchants in Russian cities on the trade route to the North bear witness to this.100 Armenian merchants,

unhappy with the inconvenient outlet of Arkhangelsk, further explored alternatives to this northern route. In 1692 a delegation of Juif an merchants went from New Julfa to the court of Sweden to open up the trade route through the Baltic ports. This contact and the embassy led by Philip of Zagly in 1696 resulted in a

proclamation by the duke of Livonia, Courland, and Semgalen, establishing trade relations with Iran.101

The wares brought to Russia by Armenian merchants consisted of more than just raw silk; they included large quantities of Indian cloth, taffetas, morocco leather, embroidered silk manufactured in Isfahan and Kashan, and precious stones.102

Silk, however, comprised the bulk of the Armenian trade, as the few available figures illustrate. Grigorii Lusikents' above-mentioned proposal to Tsar Mikhailovich to

transport each year 8,000 bales of silk to Western Europe via Russia may have been based on exaggerated claims ?

given an annual Iranian silk yield of at most

10,000 bales ? but it nevertheless suggests the potential of Iranian silk exports

through Russia. The actual volume continued to be much lower, however, even if it increased over time. Whereas in 1674, the year after restrictions on Armenian traders were issued, less than 1,600 kg. of silk were imported from Iran,103

Armenian merchants in 1676 moved 1,170 puds (ca. 19,000 kg. or 210 bales) of Iranian silk through Arkhangelsk, while in 1690 they transported 1,305 puds (ca. 21,000 kg. or 230 bales), and in 1691 1,107 (ca. 18,000 kg., or 200 bales; via

Novgorod), a volume that doubled to 2,232 puds (ca. 36,300 kg. or 400 bales) in

1695.104

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 755

Despite this incontrovertible expansion, the volume of silk involved should not

be overestimated, at least not when compared to the quantities that continued to be

transported elsewhere. The Armenians naturally took advantage of the

opportunities offered to them, but failed to live up to their earlier commitment to

transport all their silk through Russia. The Russian and Iranian inability to alter this situation became clear in 1692 when Moscow complained about the Armenian behavior to the Safavid ambassador Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg. With the

complaint came a firm request for compliance with the arrangement. However, no

change was ever effected in the direction of the bulk of Armenian silk. In all likelihood the Safavid authorities never pressed the Armenians to follow up on the

arrangement. It may additionally be surmised that, even if the Safavid authorities

had wished to persuade the Armenians to comply, they would not have been able to

do so.105

In purely commercial tenus, it appears that the trade between Iran and Russia was vital neither to Iran or Russia nor, for that matter, to the Armenians.106 The latter in particular were not really interested in completely redirecting their trade from the Levant route, where they enjoyed the advantage of free trade, to the Russian

route, where they continued to be faced with restrictions on their movements and

activities.107 The volume of silk transports via the Volga route continued to be high in the early eighteenth century, and may at times have been higher than the figures given here,108 but the Russians never succeeded in their goal of diverting the bulk of the trade away from the Ottoman route. Whereas the annual volume of silk

transported via the northern itinerary rarely exceeded 400 bales, the quantities carried via the Levant continued to average at least ten times that number.

Conclusion

Relations between Iran and Russia go back to pre-Islamic times, but were

private, informal, and intermittent well beyond the Mongol domination of both realms. It was only with the emergence of the state of Muscovy in Russia and the

establishment of Safavid rule in Iran that the proper conditions emerged for more

regularized and continuous political and commercial interaction. Both were

expansionist states which gradually incorporated the vast territory that separated them. The annexation and pacification of these hitherto savage lands created the environment of security that was indispensable for regular commercial exchange. In addition, the centralizing tendencies of both these early modern states included a

desire to control and regulate commerce. Their attitude toward commerce, fiscal in nature inasmuch as it was inspired by a need for revenue, but not wholly devoid of

mercantilist overtones, favored the managed expansion of commercial links. All this is manifest in the gradual shift in the sixteenth century from what began as a

purely "private" commercial enterprise toward a heavy involvement of the state. The latter S appropriation of the exchange of goods extended as far as a

monopolization of certain politically sensitive and strategically important goods. Although the preponderance of extant sources on state-directed trade is bound to

create a distorted picture, it is nevertheless quite likely that long-distance trade between Iran and Russia was often, if not mostly, conducted in conjunction with

diplomatic traffic. This appears particularly true for the reign of Shah 'Abbas I,

756 RUDI MATTHEE

whose energy in harnessing trade for the benefit of the royal treasury earned him the

sobriquet of being the country's biggest merchant in the country by foreign observers.109 Although silk seems to have played a minor role in the relations, which revolved mostly around the "restricted" wares coveted by both courts, raw silk and manufactured silk goods were not altogether absent from Iran's export list in this

period. It is clear that 'Abbas's interest in establishing trade relations with Russia was

shared by the Russian rulers. It is equally clear, however, that what really brought the two countries together and sustained their relationship was a common interest in

keeping the Ottoman Turks at bay. More than economic imperatives, it was the international political constellation, taking its cue above all from the Ottoman threat

and the resulting fluctuation of the pattern of political and military alliances between

states, which determined the various stages in the official commercial relations between Moscow and Isfahan. In fact, throughout the seventeenth century decisions and agreements were never motivated by purely commercial considerations. While Shah 'Abbas valued trade relations with his northern

neighbor, political motives involving the Ottoman question and the dominance of the Caucasian lands continued to inform his relationship with Moscow ? a relationship which he evidently considered a means rather than an end in his overall political strategy. Moscow was similarly concerned with the Turkish threat and in its

political actions driven by its own Caucasian ambitions, but internal problems caused it to operate from a weaker position. The inequality is reflected in the

greater eagerness of Moscow to continue diplomatic and commercial relations with its southern neighbor, which never seems to have been intent on concluding an actual anti-Turkish treaty with Moscow and could therefore afford to display a degree of indifference bordering on arrogance toward the Russians.

The weight of politics continued to bear on Russo-Iranian economic relations

throughout the seventeenth century. This persisting element notwithstanding, various phases marking important changes can be discerned in the relationship between Russia and Iran. Thus 'Abbas's death in 1629 loosened Safavid state control over external trade and ended a phase of intense political maneuvering and alliance

making that had followed this ruler's search for the most advantageous commercial outlet. The Ottoman-Safavid peace of 1639 further relaxed the political hold over

relations as it removed the Ottoman issue as an urgent issue. Following these events

Isfahan's interest in continuing the momentum of diplomatic and commercial relations

began to fall even further behind that of Moscow. All this is reflected in a diminishing frequency of diplomatic traffic between the courts of Moscow and Isfahan.

As politics waned, the economic and the non-official importance of the

relationship grew. The role of the very same private merchants who had dominated trade before the intrusion of the state, appears to have increased, as is evidenced in the greater numbers of Russian merchants visiting Iran. Henceforth attempts to

redirect trade flows involved joint efforts of state and private enterprise. A formal

"bilateral" trade agreement, a long-standing desideratum of above all the Russians, was never concluded. Instead, the Russians in 1667 granted concessions to the Julfan Armenians who operated ambiguously as private merchants and as semi

official representatives of the Safavid court. Russian mercantilism was clearly visible in this move, which was temporarily rescinded under pressure from Russian

merchants, but reinstated in modified and restricted form shortly thereafter.

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 757

For the Russians the agreement signified managed trade and guaranteed income, and, increasingly in the period of Tsar Peter, a supply of raw material for an emerging domestic manufacturing industry. For their part the Iranian Armenians acquired an alternative outlet for the silk they transported to European markets in great quantities. Having the option of an alternative that lessened their dependence on the Anatolian land route appears to have been more important to them than actually using it to the full. Despite promises to that effect, they never redirected their entire silk trade through Russia, nor do they seem to have been ever intent on doing so.

The quantity of Iranian silk transported via the Russian transit trade greatly increased

following the agreements of 1667 and 1673. The new figures compensated in part for the falling volume shipped via the Persian Gulf, but never even remotely reached the volume that continued to be earned across Anatolia to the ports of the Levant.

University of Delaware, Newark, 1994.

1. For the diplomatic dimension of the relationship, see Rudi Matt li?e, "Anti-Osmaanse allianties en

Kaukasische belangen: diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen Safavidisch Iran en Moscovitisch Rusland

(1550-1639)," Sharqiyy?t, 5 (1994): 1-21.

2. The terms latitudinal and longitudinal are used by W.E.D. Allen, Problems of Turkish power in the sixteenth century (London, 1963): 39.

3. Wilhelm Heyd, Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1879), I: 65ff.; Elisabeth Bennigsen, "Contribution ? l'?tude du commerce des fourrures russes: la route de la Volga avant l'invasion mongole et le royaume des Bulghars," CMRS, XIX, 4 (1978): 385; and Maryta Esp?ronnier, "Les ?changes commerciaux entre le monde musulman et les pays slaves d'apr?s les sources musulmanes

m?di?vales," Cahiers de Civilisation m?di?vale, 89 (1980): 18. 4. Hans Wilhelm Haussig, Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstrasse in islamischer Zeit

(Darmstadt, 1988): 25,170. Two other routes were used to reach the Byzantine Empire. One followed the course of the Kuban river and reached Byzantine territory across the Caucasian passes into Georgia.

The other was the coastal route along the Black Sea from Tamatarkha to Trabzon. 5. Ibid.

6. W. Heyd, op.cit., I: 53-54, 69 ff.; H. A. Manandian, TJte ancient trade and cities of Armenia in relation to the ancient world trade (Lisbon, 1965): 135.

7. ?. Bennigsen, art. cit.: 388. 8. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posolstv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii russkogo i iranskogo gosudarstv v

1586-1612 gg. (Moscow, 1976): 32. 9. Janet Martin, "The land of darkness and the Golden Horde: The fur trade under the Mongols XIII

XlVth centuries," CMRS, XIX, 4 (1978): 403. 10. For this trade, see G.I. Bratianu, Recherches sur le commerce g?nois dans la mer Noire au

xuf si?cle (Paris, 1929) and Robert-Henri Bautier, "Les relations ?conomiques des Occidentaux avec les

pays d'Orient au Moyen ?ge: points de vue et documents," in Michel Mollat, ed., Soci?t?s et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dam l'oc?an Indien (Paris, 1970) : 280-286. Commercial activity in the capital of the Golden Horde is described by John de Plano Carpini, Hie texts and versions of John de Plano

Carpini and William de Rubruquis, ed. C. Raymond Beazley (London, 1903): 153, 194. This last source also notes the existence of traffic in silk from China and Iran to Russia.

11. For details, see J. Martin, "Muscovite relations with the Khanates of Kazan' and the Crimea (1460 to 1521)," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 17 (1983): 435-453.

12. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 36.

13. See the observations of Ambrosio Contarini about the Volga route in the late fifteenth century, in Travels in Tana and Persia byJosafa B?rbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, trans. W. Thomas and S.A. Roy; ed. Lord Stanley of Alderley (London, 1873): 151-154; and Anthony Jenkinson's reference to the utter lack of victuals between Astrakhan and Kazan' about a century later, in Richard Hakluyt, The principal navigations voyages traffiques & discoveries of the English nation, 12 vols (Glasgow, 1903-1905), II: 478.

758 RUDI MATTHEE

14. A.Contarini, op. dr.: 151.

15. E.S. Zevakin, "Persidskii vopros v russko-evropeiskikh otnosheniiakh XVII v.," Istoricheskie

zapiski, 8 (1940): 157.

16. For this commercial blockade, see Halil Inalcik, "Osmanli Imperatorlugunun kurulu? ve inkisafi

devrinde T?rkiye'nin iktisad? vaziyeti ?zerinde bir tektik m?nasebetiyle," Belleten, 15 (1951): 661-676; and Jean-Louis Bacqu?-Grammont, "?tudes safavides I, Notes sur le blocus du commerce iranien par Selim 1er," Turcica, 6 (1975): 66-88; and id., "Notes sur une saisie de soies d'Iran en 1518," ibid., 8

(1976): 237-253.

17. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 40.

18. See Hennann Kellenbenz, "Der nissische Transithandel mit dem Orient im 17. und zu Beginn des

18. Jahrhunderts," Jahrb?cher?r Geschichte Osteuropas, N.S., 12 (1964-1965): 483.

19. See T.S. Willan, Wie Muscovy merchants of 1555 (Manchester, 1959): 30-33, for the overall

endeavor; and E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, Early voyages and travels to Russia and Persia, 2 vols (London, 1886).

20. M.V. Fekliner, Torgovlia russkogo gosudarstva so stranami vostoka v XVIveke (Moscow, 1956):

27; John Cartwright, in Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus posthumus or Purchas His pilgrimes, 20 vols

(Glasgow, 1905-1907),VIII: 507.

21. M.V. Fekhner, op. cit.: 45-46; H. Kellenbenz, "Marchands en Russie aux xvi^-xvin6 si?cles,"

part 1, CMRS, XI, 4 (1970): 585.

22. See Varatan Gregorian, "Minorities in Isfahan: The Armenian community of Isfahan 1587-1722," Iranian Studies, 1 (1974): 662.

23. See M.V. Fekhner, op. cit.: 52ff., and 79-80 for the exchange of goods in both directions.

24. See E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit., I: 59; and R. Hakluyt, op. cit., II: 456.

25. E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit.: 79-80.

26. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 42. See also E. Delmar-Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit., II: 125-126.

27. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 45.

28. J. Martin, "Muscovite travelling merchants: The trade with the Muslim East (15th and 16th

centuries)," Central Asian Survey, 4 (1985): 29, 31, 34-35.

29. M.V Fekhner, op. cit.: 102-104.

30. Ibid.: 110.

31. Ibid.: 61-62.

32. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 61-62.

33. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les routes commerciales et militaires au Caucase du Nord aux

xvie et xviie si?cles," Central Asian Survey, 4 (1985): 4.

34. See Alexandre Bennigsen, "La pouss?e vers les mers chaudes et la barri?re du Caucase. La

rivalit? ottomano-moscovite dans la seconde moiti? du xvie si?cle," Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 (1986): 15-46. For the Russian contacts with the khanate of Bukhara, see M. lu. Iuldasev, K istorii torgovykh i

posol'skikh sviazei Srednei Azii s Rossiei v XVI-XVII w. (Tashkent, 1964): 47ff.

35. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 35.

36. Ibid.: 40. Qazvin was the Safavid capital in the second half of the sixteenth century. 37. Ibid.: 43-44; A. Bennigsen, "L'exp?dition turque contre Astrakhan en 1569," CMRS, VIII, 3

(1967): 427-446; and H?l?ne Carr?re d'Encausse, "Les routes commerciales de l'Asie Centrale et les

tentatives de reconqu?te d'Astrakhan," CMRS, XI, 3 (1970): 391-422.

38. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 136ff., 149ff.

39. Ibid.: 111. Kaya probably does not refer to the name of the envoy who led the mission but rather

to his title. See W.E.D. Allen, ed., and Anthony Manog, trans., Russian embassies to the Georgian kings

(1589-1605), 2 vols (London, 1970), II: 534.

40. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 202.

4L Ibid.: 205-208; and id., "lranskii kuptsina kazim-Bek v Rossii, 1706-1709 gg.," in Iran (sbornik statei) (Moscow, 1973): 167. The Iranian historian Mo'ezzi attributes Hajji Iskandar's inability to agree to the difference in value to a lack of instructions from Shah

* Abbas. See Najaf-qoli Hosayn Mo'ezzi,

TSrikh-e rav?bet-e slyasl-ye Iran b?dony? (Tehran, 1326/1947-1948): 254.

42. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 362ff. Information is lacking about the embassy's dealings in Iran or the

results achieved, but Bushev's hypothesis that the embassy may never have traveled beyond Astrakhan

and was perhaps called back as it was becoming clear that Shah 'Abbas was not going to sign a treaty after

all, has recently been proven wrong. Maria Szuppe, "Un marchand du roi de Pologne en Perse, 1601

1602," Moyen Orient et Oc?an Indien, 3 (1986): 90-91, demonstrates that the Zhirov-Zasekin embassy did reach Isfahan in 1601.

43. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 294-320.

ANTI-OTTOM AN POLITICS AND TRAN SIT RIGHTS 759

44. Ibid.: 217-229.

45. Ibid.: 432-433; P.P. Bushev, art. cit.: 168.

46. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 382-383.

47. A chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the papal mission of the XVHth and XVIIIth centuries, 2 vols (London, 1939)1: 114.

48. Adam Olearius, Vermehrte Newe Beschreibung der Muscowitischen und Persischen Reyse

(Schleswig, 1656; repr. T?bingen, 1971): 443.

49. P. P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii russkogo i iranskogo gosudarstv v

1613-1621 gg. (Moscow, 1987): 44-45, 53.

50. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv ...1586-1612, op. cit.: 339, 349.

51. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv ...1613-1621, op. cit.: 139.

52. Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (hereafter ARA), VOC 852, Batavia to Persia, Aug. 14,1625, fol. 124; H. Dunlop, ed., Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzi? 1611-1638

(The Hague, 1930): 199.

53. Ibid.: 306.

54. Paul Bushkovitch, Tlte merchants of Moscow 1580-1650 (Cambridge, 1980): 96. The quantity is

given as 4,440 ansyrs. The ansyr was a weight from Bukhara, which in the later seventeenth century

equaled one pound. 55. P. P. Bushev, "Posol'stvo V. G. Korob'ina i A. Kuvshinova v Iran v 1621-1624 gg.," in Iran:

Ekonomika. Istoriia. Istoriograflia. Literatura (sbornik statei) (Moscow, 1976): 126-128.

56. See Fedot Kotov, Khozhdenie kuptsa Fedota Kotova v Persiyu, ed. and trans. N.A. Kuznetsova

(Moscow, 1958). 57. H.Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 60.

58. 7/vVy.: 191.

59. See P.P.Bushev, "Iranskii kuptsina...," art. cit.: 169; id., Istoriia posoVstv ...1613-1621, op. cit.:

203-204; id., "Posol'stvo Korob'ina...," art. cit.: 146-150; F. Kotov, op. cit., introduction: 11.

60. A.Olearius, op. cit.:. 444.

61. Evliya Efendi, Narrative of travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the seventeenth century, trans.

Joseph von Hammer, 2 vols (London, 1834; repr. New York-London, 1968), II: 160.

62. H.Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 424.

63. Ibid.: 566.

64. Ibid.: 528, 547, 564, 587, 590, 599, 612.

65. V. A. Baiburtian, Armianskaia koloniia novoi DzhuVfy v XVII veke: roV novoi DzhuVfy v irano

evropeicheskikh politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh sviaziakh (Erevan, 1969): 93-94.

66. "Beskrivning av handelsf?rhallandena i Ryssland, avfattad av Johan de Rodes," doc. 19 in Artur

Attman et al, eds, Ekonomiska f?rbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet. Dokument

ur svenskaarkiv (Stockholm, 1978): 114.

67. See E.S. Zevakin, art. cit. and Heinz Mattiesen, "Die Versuche zur Erschliessung eines

Handelsweges Danzig-Kurland-Moskau-Asien, besonders f?r Seide," Jahrb?cher f?r Geschichte

Osteuropas , 3 (1938): 533-569.

68. E.S. Zevakin, "Persidskii vopros," art. cit.: 132.

69. Ibid.: 153, 155; H. Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 614.

70. Ibid. : 505. This is presumably the same embassy that is mentioned for 1045/1635-1636 by Abu T

Hasan Qazvini, Fav?'idal-sqfav?yah, ed. Maryam Mir Ahmadi (Tehran, 1387/1988): 56. 71. AR A, VOC 1162, Isfahan to Heren XVII, 4 May 1647, fol. 181. The Fav? 'id al-sqfavtyah, op.

cit.: 68 (which is not a contemporary source) implausibly claims that this mission was in Isfahan in

1052/1642, which was the year of 'Abbas II's accession.

72. See William Foster, ed., The English factories in India 1646-1650 (Oxford, 1914): 223.

73. See Comelis Speelman, Journaal der reis van den gezant der O.L Compagnie Joan Cunaeus naar

Perzi? in 1651-1652, ed. A. Hotz (Amsterdam, 1908): 152; and India Office Records (London),

E/3/24/228, 10 Apr. 1654, in W. Foster, ed., The English factories in India 1651-1654 (Oxford, 1915): 271. Speelman in March 1652 noted the presence at the new year's celebration in Isfahan of two Russian

envoys, who had come to Iran "to sell their commodities." During his stay in Mazandaran in early 1654, the EIC agent John Spiller met a Russian ambassador who was "accompanied with 250 or 300 Russians, and had as many camels for carryage of his present and luggage." According to the same source, some of

the merchandise the envoy had brought was sold in Gilan, while the rest was transported to Isfahan. This must have concerned the Lobanov-Rostovskii mission, mentioned in ARA, VOC 1203, Gamron to

Batavia, 16 May 1654. Qazvini, Fav? 'id al-safavfyah, op. cit. : 68, only mentions 1063/1653 as the year in which a Russian envoy was in Iran.

760 RUDI MATTHEE

74. P.P. Bushev, "Piiteshestvie iranskogo posol'stva Mokhammeda Khosein Khan-Beka v Moskvu v

1690-1692 gg," Strany i narody Vostoka, 18 (1976): 135, 136-146.

75. E.S.Zevakin, art. cit.: . 143-144, 147; N.G. Kukanova, "Rol' annianskogo kupechestva v razvitii

russko-iranskoi torgovli v poslednei treti XVII v.," Kratkie soobshcheniia Institu?a narodov Azii, 30

(1961): 23.

76. ARA, VOC 1203, Gamron to Batavia, 16 May 1654; IOR, E/3/24/228,10 Apr. 1654, in W. Foster,

ed., English factories... 1651-1654, op. cit.: 21 i.

11. The goods and their value are noted by A. la. Shpakovskii, "Torgovlia moskovskoi Rusi s Persei v XVI-XVII vv.," quoted in Artur Atmann, The Russian and Polish markets in international trade 1500

1650 (G?teborg, 1973): 190-191.

78. ARA, VOC 1245, Gamron to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fol. 366r.

79. Jean de Th?venot, Suite du Voyage de Levant (Paris, 1674): 202-204; Jean Chardin, Voyages du

chevalier Chardin , en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient, ed. L. Langl?s, 10 vols and atlas (Paris, 1811), X: 112ff. Chardin's claim that the bad treatment was the reason why, upon the shah's death, the tsar

instigated the Cossacks to invade Iran in 1667, may have been based on some mmor that circulated in

Isfahan. The reputation of boorishness the Russians enjoyed among the Persians, mentioned by Chardin, must have been confirmed by the behavior of the envoys for, as the Dutch reported, the Russians refused

to dismount and had to be pulled off their horses when they were met by the shah. See ARA, VOC 1254, Gamron to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fol. 366r quoted.

80. ARA, VOC 1245, Gamron to Heren XVII, 8 Mar. 1665, fol. 468v. Earlier, the Dutch reported that

the diplomatic contact had resulted in the reopening of the borders between Iran and Russia. See ARA, VOC 1242, Gamron to Heren XVII, 20 June 1664, fol. 1090.

81. Parsamiian, Armiano-russkie otnosheniia v XVII veke (Erevan, 1953): 73, report in Armenian,

quoted in Edmund M. Herzig, "The Armenian merchants of New Julfa, Isfahan: A study in pre-modern Asian trade," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1991: 103.

82. N.G.Kukanova, art. cit.: 23; E.S.Zevakin, art. cit.: 158.

83. Maria Francesca Tiepolo, La Persia e la Repubblica di Venezia, (Tehran, 1973): XV

84. N.G.Kukanova, art. cit.: 23-24. See also V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 94-96; R. Gulbenkian,

"Philippe de Zagly, marchand arm?nien de Julfa et r?tablissement du commerce persan en Courlande en

1696," Revue des ?tudes arm?niennes, new ser. 7 (1970): 361-399; and A.A.Rakhmani, Azerbaidzh?n v

kontse XVI i XVII vekov (Baku, 1981): 185; E.M. Herzig, op. cit.: 189-190, notes the ambiguity of the

Annenian position and suggests that their presentation of the so-called Diamond Throne may be seen as

an effort to gain standing as private merchants. That they saw themselves as more than commercial

representatives of the Safavid niler is illustrated in their complaint in 1672 to the tsar that Iranian

merchants were in the habit of bribing the treasurer to have their wares classified as royal wares in order

to avoid having to pay tolls. See P.P. Bushev, "Iranskii kuptsina...," art. cit.: 169.

85. E.M. Herzig, op. cit.: 192.

86. See VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 99-100; K. K?vonian, "Marchands arm?niens au XVIIe si?cle. ?

propos d'un livre arm?nien publi? ? Amsterdam en 1699," CMRS, XVI, 2 (1975): 213, 237.

87. ARA, VOC 1270, Gamron to Heren XVII, Apr. 24, 1670, fol. 693r-v.

88. V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 104-105; E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 159.

89. VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 105.

90. Samuel H. Baron, "Who were the gosti?" California Slavic Studies, 1 (1973): 14.

91. V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 107-108; E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 136, 160. The Dutch embassy is

described in Balthasar Coyet, Historisch Verhael of Beschryving van de Voyagie...van den Heere

Koenraad van Klenk...aan Zyne Zaarsche Majesteyt van Moscovien... (Amsterdam, 1677). 92. M. Kh. Geidarov, Remeslennoe proizvodsdvo v gorodakh Azerbaidzhana v XVII v. (Baku, 1967):

49. The bales in which silk was packed and transported weighed approximately 200 lb. or 90 kg. each.

93. K.A. Antonova et ai, eds, Russko-indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v. (Moscow, 1958): 347 (doc. 242). 94. N. G. Kukanova, "Russkoe-iraaskie torgovye otnosheniia v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII v.,"

Istoricheskie zapiski, 57 (1956): 232.

95. Ibid.: 234.

96. P. P. Bushev, "Iranskoe posol'stvo Fazl Ali-Beka v Rossiiu (1711-1713 gg.)," Kratkie

soobshcheniia Instituto narodov Azii, 39 (1963): 42-43.

97. P.P. Bushev, "Putesliestvie iranskogo posol'stva...," art. cit.: 166-169.

98. E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 161.

99. N.G. Kukanova, "Rol' annianskogo kupechestva...," art. cit.: 27-28.

100. See A.A. Rakhmani, op. cit.: 179, and H.Kellenbenz, "Russische Transithandel...," art. cit.: 491.

A French missionary called late seventeenth-century Shamakhi a great commercial entrepot between Iran

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTS 761

and Moscow, adding that the Indians, the greatest and richest merchants, numbered c. 200. See

"M?moire de la province du Sirvan, en forme de Lettre adress?e au P?re Fleuriau," in Lettres ?difiantes et

curieuses ?crites des Missions ?trang?res. M?moires du Levant (Toulouse, new ed., 1810) 4: 27.

101. See R. Gulbenkian, art. cit.

102. See Archives du minist?re des Affaires ?trang?res, Paris, A.E. Perse 5, "Memorandum on foreign trade in Iran, 1718," fol. 188; and K.K?vonian, art. cit.: 205.

103. VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 105.

104. N.G. Kukanova, "Roi' annianskogo kupechestva...," art. cit.: 27; and id., Ocherki po istorii

russko-iranskikh torgovykh otnoshenii v XVII-pervoi polovine XIX veka (Saransk, 1977): 96.

105. P.P. Bushev, "Puteshestvie iranskogo posol'stvo...," art. cit.: 162; VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 116

119.

106. Ibid.: 93-94.

107. N.G.Kukanova, "Russkoe-iranskie torgovye otnosheniia...," art. cit.: 239.

108. In 1712 Armenian merchants transported 2,660 puds (ca. 43,300 kg. or 475 bales) via Astrakhan.

See N.G.Kukanova, Ocherki po istorii..., op cit.: 110.

109. See R.W. Ferner, "An English view of Persian trade in 1618," Journal of the Economic and Social

History of the Orient, 19 (1976): 194; and Pietro delta Valle, Viaggi di Pietro della Valle, 2 vols (Brighton,

1843), II: 41.