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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCYSTRENGTHENING INITIATIVEASSESSMENT OF THE BANGLADESHANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 2016
Transparency International BangladeshMIDAS Centre (Level 4 & 5)House # 5, Road # 16 (New) 27 (Old)Dhanmondi, Dhaka 1209
Phone: +880 2 9124788, 9124789, 9124951Fax: +880 2 9124915
ti-bangladesh.org/blogfacebook.com/TIBangladeshtwitter.com/tib1971bd
ISBN: 978-984-34-2167-8
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCYSTRENGTHENING INITIATIVEASSESSMENT OF THE BANGLADESHANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 2016
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) is an independent, non-government, non-partisan and non-profit organisation with a vision of Bangladesh in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of the citizens shall be free from corruption. In the context of the international movement against corruption, as the fully accredited national chapter in Bangladesh of the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), TIB partners and cooperates with TI and its chapters worldwide. Its mission is to catalyze and strengthen a participatory social movement to raise and strengthen peoples’ voices and intensify public demand for accountability through strengthening institutions, laws and practices for establishing an efficient and transparent system of governance, politics and business.
Published in February 2017
www.ti-bangladesh.org
Author: Salahuddin M Aminuzzaman, Shahzada M Akram, Shammi Laila Islam
Contributions: Iftekharuzzaman, Sumaiya Khair
Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of July 2016. Nevertheless, Transparency International Bangladesh cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.
TIB would like to thank the Anti-Corruption Commission, Bangladesh for their cooperation and support in conducting this assessment. This publication reflects the views of the author and contributors only, and the Anti-Corruption Commission, Bangladesh cannot be held responsible for the views expressed or for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
ISBN: 978-984-34-2167-8
© Transparency International Bangladesh. All rights reserved.
Table of Contents
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 4
PREFACE ............................................................................................................... 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 7
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 17
1. BANGLADESH’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION ......... 19
ECONOMY ...................................................................................................................... 19
POLITICS ........................................................................................................................ 21
SOCIETY ......................................................................................................................... 23
LEVELS OF CORRUPTION ........................................................................................ 25
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF THE ACC ....................... 28
RESOURCES ................................................................................................................. 29
HUMAN RESOURCE ................................................................................................... 30
STRUCTURE .................................................................................................................. 32
ENQUIRY, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION ............................................. 34
PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH .................................................... 35
3. KEY FINDINGS .............................................................................................................. 37
LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND STATUS ................................................................. 41
FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES ................................................................ 45
DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION ........................................................................ 47
PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH .................................................... 50
COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS .............................................. 51
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT .................................................................... 52
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF ACC’S EFFECTIVENESS ...................................... 53
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................... 71
RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................ 73
ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT ............................................................ 75
ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES ............................................................................................... 76
ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED ................................................................... 77
ANNEX 4: REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 78
Abbreviations
ACA Anti-Corruption AgencyACC Anti-Corruption CommissionADB Asian Development BankADP Annual Development ProgramAG Attorney GeneralBAC Bureau of Anti-corruptionBBS Bangladesh Bureau of StatisticsBEI Bangladesh Enterprise InstituteBFIU Bangladesh Financial Intelligence UnitBIGD Bangladesh Institute of Governance and DevelopmentBNP Bangladesh Nationalist PartyBTRC Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory CommissionCAG Office of the Comptroller and Auditor GeneralCCC Committee of Concerned CitizensCPC Corruption Prevention CommitteeCPI Corruption Perceptions IndexCSO Civil Society OrganisationDFID Department for International DevelopmentGCB Global Corruption BarometerGDP Gross Domestic ProductGIZ German International Cooperation AgencyIDO Integrated District OfficeIO Investigation OfficerJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyMDG Millennium Development GoalMIC Middle-income countryMLPA Money Laundering Prevention ActMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMP Member of the ParliamentMRDI Management and Resources Development InitiativeNBR National Board of RevenueNGO Non-government OrganisationTIB Transparency International BangladeshUNCAC UN Convention against CorruptionUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNODC UN Office on Drug and CrimeWB World Bank
5
Preface
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) has been working with the mission of catalysing an effective and sustained social movement against corruption in Bangladesh. As part of this, TIB has been conducting research and undertaking advocacy initiatives on selected sectors and institutions of public interest with the objective of contributing towards improving their governance and anti-corruption capacity through policy and institutional reforms based on research findings and recommendations.
Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) are specialized institutions within the national integrity system mandated to control and prevent corruption. It is imperative that ACAs operate independently, transparently, accessibly, accountably and effectively and enjoy public trust. They must have the legal mandate and institutional strength to operate with the reputation of efficiency, impartiality, objectivity and professionalism.
Transparency International (TI) undertook an initiative to engage with anti-corruption agencies in a process of conducting evidence based research to examine their performance and identify the challenges in selected jurisdictions. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. The tool took into consideration such dimensions of assessment as legal independence of the ACA, financial and human resources, investigative capacity, prevention, education and outreach functions, cooperation with other related organisations, ACA’s accountability and oversight and finally the level of public trust.
Using the same tool TIB carried out an assessment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh through a process of intense engagement with the ACC. This was a comprehensive study of its performance, using as many as 50 indicators within the above-mentioned dimensions. The assessment was aimed at providing the Bangladesh ACC an objective analysis of its potentials and performance as well as opportunities for improvement. Under each dimension it also provides a set recommendations consistent with the analyses.
We are extremely happy that the ACC not only extended all necessary cooperation in course of conducting the research, but also fully agreed with our findings and recommendations. As we remain committed to engage with the ACC as much as possible within our mandate and resources, we believe that the study will be helpful for the strengthening of its effectiveness. We also trust that the study will be useful for other stakeholders interested in understanding the strengths and weaknesses as well as challenges and opportunities of ACC of Bangladesh.
6
The research was led by Professor Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman of the Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka and TIB’s researchers, Shahzada Md. Akram and Shammi Laila Islam. TI’s Asia Pacific Department provided technical support. Professor Sumaiya Khair, Deputy Executive Director of TIB, coordinated the research, supervised the whole process and significantly contributed to finalising the report.
We are grateful to the Chairman, Commissioners and concerned officials of the ACC and a large number of key informants, many distinguished individuals and organisations, whose insights enriched the study immensely.
Iftekharuzzaman
Executive Director
7
Executive Summary
The UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) prescribes the existence of independent bodies established through national legal systems to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any country context. Meanwhile, the 2012 Jakarta Principles, developed in consultation with Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, represent a widely accepted standard to which ACAs can be held accountable. Transparency International has responded to this opportunity by developing an initiative aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia Pacific Region. The ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. Under this initiative, Transparency International has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between TI, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) carried out an assessment of the ACA of Bangladesh, i.e., the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The objectives of this assessment were:
1. To provide the ACC with up-to-date information regarding its performance and opportunities for improvement; and
2. To provide all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the country a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACC’s performance and efficacy.
Methodology The following methods were followed for conducting this study.
1. Document analysis – This included review of laws, existing literature and media pieces, and websites.
2. Semi-structured interviews – Interviews with present and former ACC commissioners, ACC officials, legal experts, civil society members, journalists were conducted.
3. Focus Group Discussions – Two FGDs with journalists, members of Corruption Prevention Committees (CPC) and Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) were organised in February and March 2016.
4. Validation meeting – A validation meeting was held in June 2016with the Chairperson, Commissioners and other high officials of the ACC.
8
The reference period for all assessments on the ACC was three years (2013-2015). The data was collected during November 2015 – April 2016.
Table: Dimensions of Assessment
DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT NUMBER OF INDICATORS
1. ACA’s Legal Independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94. ACA’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organisations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47. Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7
Total 50
Scoring MethodThe main findings of the assessment are based on a set of 50 indicators divided into seven different dimensions (see above Table). These indicators are designed to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the ACC, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators. In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were converted from the 1-3 scale to a 0-2 scale. Thus, all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). For a clear understanding of the dimensions as well as the overall score, it has been classified into three categories – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% and 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% – 66%, and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0% - 33%.
Key FindingsAccording to the assessment of this study, the overall score for Bangladesh ACC is 61.22%, which falls in Moderate category. It is noteworthy that the score is 5.78 points short of the ‘High’ category, which indicates that the institution needs to improve only a few indicators to be elevated to the high category. Among the 50 indicators, 21 indicators (42.86%)scored ‘high’, 19 (38.78%)scored ‘moderate’ and nine (18.37%)scored ‘low’.
9
Figure: ACC’s Score by Dimension
We observe that the dimension on the ACC’s Legal Independence and Status scored the highest (78.57%), of which four got high and three got moderate scores. The second highest (72.22%) score has been received for the dimension on ACC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions, of which five indicators got high, three got moderate and one got low scores. ACC’s cooperation with other organisations (70%) is another dimension falling to the ‘high’ category. The two dimensions of ACC’s Financial and Human Resources (61.11%) and ACC’s Accountability and Oversight (62.5%) are slightly better than the overall score. These indicate that the resource allocation and oversight mechanism need to be enhanced. ACC’s Detection and Investigation Function (55.56%) got below the overall score, indicating attention required in the fields of accessibility to corruption complainants, low conviction rate and the absence of gender identified in compiling corruption information. The lowest score (28.57%) is for the dimension on the Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance, where among seven indicators two got low and four got moderate scores, indicating that ACC’s performance for developing a positive public perception needs immediate attention.
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Tabl
e: A
sses
smen
t Sum
mar
y: In
dica
tors
by
Dim
ensi
on
DIM
ENSI
ONIN
DICA
TORS
ACC’
s Le
gal
Inde
pend
ence
an
d St
atus
(7)
Lega
l in
depe
nden
ceM
anda
teLe
gal p
ower
sAp
poin
tmen
t of
ACC
Com
miss
ione
r(s)
ACC
Com
miss
ione
r(s)’
term
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
ACC’
s op
erat
iona
l au
tono
my
and
impa
rtial
ity
Gov
ernm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
AC
C to
use
co
rrupt
ion
as a
wea
pon
agai
nst
politi
cal
oppo
nent
s
ACC’
s Fi
nanc
ial
and
Hum
an
Reso
urce
s (9
)
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
AC
C’s
budg
et
Suffi
cienc
y of
bu
dget
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
ACC’
s bu
dget
ACC
pers
onne
l’s
sala
ry a
nd
bene
fits
Sele
ctio
n cr
iteria
for A
CC
Pers
onne
l
Expe
rtise
of
ACC
’s pe
rson
nel in
co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
n
Expe
rtise
of
ACC
’s pe
rson
nel in
co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n an
d ed
ucat
ion
Trai
ning
of
pers
onne
lSt
abilit
y of
pe
rson
nel
ACC’
s De
tect
ion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n Fu
nctio
n (9
)
Acce
ssib
ility
to c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aina
nts/
in
form
ants
, in
cludi
ng p
ublic
an
d wh
istle
-bl
ower
s
Resp
onsiv
enes
s to
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
Willi
ngne
ss
to in
itiate
co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
Aver
age
num
ber o
f cas
es
inve
stig
ated
per
ye
ar
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
siona
lism
of
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
Aver
age
conv
ictio
n ra
te
of c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses
Willi
ngne
ss
to in
vest
igat
e in
fluen
tial
pers
ons
for
corru
ptio
n
Role
in
rest
itutio
n,
asse
t rec
over
y,
freez
ing
and
conf
iscat
ion
Does
the
ACC
iden
tify
gend
er
in c
ompi
ling
corru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s
ACC’
s Pr
even
tion,
Ed
ucat
ion
and
Out
reac
h Fu
nctio
ns (9
)
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
al
loca
ted
to
publ
ic ou
treac
h an
d pr
even
tion
Corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initia
tives
Num
ber o
f re
views
of
orga
nisa
tiona
l pr
oced
ures
, sy
stem
s &
capa
biliti
es
Freq
uenc
y of
inclu
ding
co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
datio
ns
in in
vest
igat
ion
repo
rts
Plan
for
prev
entio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h an
d im
plem
enta
tion
Colla
bora
tion
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
in
pre
vent
ion,
ed
ucat
ion
and
outre
ach
activ
ities
Rese
arch
and
ex
plor
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
risks
, con
text
an
d co
nditio
ns
Diss
emin
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d us
e of
ca
mpa
igns
Use
of w
ebsit
e an
d so
cial m
edia
fo
r diss
emin
atin
g in
form
atio
n on
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n
11
DIM
ENSI
ONIN
DICA
TORS
AC
A’s
Coop
erat
ion
with
oth
er
Org
anis
atio
ns
(5)
Gov
ernm
ent
supp
ort t
o AC
C fo
r pro
secu
tion
of c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACC
and
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
encie
s
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACC
and
non-
gove
rnm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
Parti
cipat
ion
in in
tern
atio
nal
netw
orks
Coop
erat
ion
with
AC
As in
oth
er
coun
tries
ACA’
s Ac
coun
tabi
lity
and
Ove
rsig
ht
(4)
Info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
in a
nd
acce
ssib
ility
of
ACC’
s an
nual
re
port
and
webs
ite
Ove
rsig
ht
mec
hani
sms
Proc
edur
e fo
r de
alin
g wi
th
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CC
pers
onne
l
Out
com
es o
f co
mpl
aint
s ag
ains
t ACC
or i
ts
pers
onne
l
Publ
ic
Perc
eptio
ns
of th
e AC
A’s
Perfo
rman
ce
(7)
Publ
ic co
nfid
ence
that
go
vern
men
t ha
s gi
ven
ACC
the
requ
ired
powe
rs a
nd
reso
urce
s fo
r cur
bing
co
rrupt
ion
Publ
ic co
nfid
ence
in
ACC
’s ad
here
nce
to
due
proc
ess,
im
parti
ality
, and
fa
irnes
s in
usin
g its
pow
ers
Conf
iden
ce
in A
CC’s
adhe
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
amon
g pe
rson
s wh
o ha
d di
rect
co
ntac
t with
AC
C
Conf
iden
ce in
AC
C’s
dign
ified
and
resp
ectfu
l tre
atm
ent o
f pe
rson
s un
der
inve
stig
atio
n
Publ
ic pe
rcep
tion
of A
CC’s
effe
ctive
ness
in
corru
ptio
n co
ntro
l
Perc
eptio
n of
ACC
’s ef
fect
ivene
ss
in c
orru
ptio
n co
ntro
l am
ong
pers
ons
with
di
rect
con
tact
wi
th A
CC
Perc
eptio
n of
ACC
’s ef
fect
ivene
ss
in d
ealin
g wi
th
com
plai
nts
amon
g fe
mal
e cit
izens
who
ha
d di
rect
co
ntac
t with
AC
C
12
In sum, the strengths of the ACC includes legal independence and status with adequate legal powers and mandate; stability of budget which is gradually increased over years; staff stability with low turnover; willingness to investigate complaints, as it is responsive to complaints, willing to and has capacity to investigate influential persons, and high number of cases; corruption prevention initiatives with organisational reviews, engagement of stakeholders in prevention; collaboration with other stakeholders such as civil society, development partners; and participation in international networks.
The summary of dimension-wise findings is given below emphasizing the weak areas of the ACC.
Legal Independence and StatusThe law provides ACC with substantial formal legal independence with little dependency on the government for its budget. The law also describes the mandate of ACC elaborately. Among 11 functions of ACC, five (5) are of punitive and six (6) are of preventive nature. These functions include investigation and filing cases, prevention, education, and research and integrity advice for mainstreaming good practices in the work of government agencies. The Chairman and Commissioners of the ACC are appointed for five years, and they are well protected from any forceful and undue removal.
However, ACC’s full independence and impartiality have been questioned due to its (in) effectiveness and autonomous exercise of power. The experts expressed that ACC’s independence is more dependent on the personal capacity of the office bearers rather than the authority provided by the law. This is also reflected in the way the Chairman and the Commissioners are appointed. It has been argued by the experts that although the Chairman and Commissioners are appointed through an apparently fair process, the process could have been more transparent. The names and profiles of the selected people are not made public before their appointments. Concern was also raised that ACC’s operational autonomy is somewhat limited and its activities are not ‘completely’ impartial.
It is also perceived that ACC is not politically neutral as it has not been able to show impartial behavior in handling corruption cases. Experts alleged that it played a partisan role and did not take action against all accused equally. There is a common perception among informants that the government has been using the ACC and the issue of corruption as a weapon against political opponents or people with different views. It is observed that most of the people with partisan affiliation against whom investigation is going on belong to the political opposition, while only a few belong to the party in power.
Financial and Human ResourcesIt is observed that the average proportion of ACC’s budget to total government budget has been about 0.025% on average in the last three years. However, the
13
actual monetary allocation for the ACC demonstrates an increasing trend. The main challenge is that the allocation is given according to the existing human resource, which is inadequate. Key informants from both within and outside ACC mentioned that the absence of ACC offices with necessary human and other resources in most of the districts jeopardizes the anti-corruption activities on many fronts.
Skills and expertise of ACC’s personnel is another concern. There is lack of understanding of investigation processes among the new staff, while the older staff are not always updated with the latest forms and techniques of corruption such as money laundering and use of cyber technology. Similarly the relevant personnel engaged in corruption prevention and education are also not adequately skilled, and mostly rely on the local committees (CPCs and Integrity Units).Training is another area that needs adequate attention. In the last three years 47 training programs were organized for the ACC staff where 53% of the total staff took part, and where only the trainings (25) were on issues pertinent for ACC activities.
Detection and InvestigationWith regard to ACC’s detection and investigation, three areas demand immediate attention, while two other areas raise moderate concern.
Firstly, the accessibility to ACC by complainants is quite low considering the country’s population. Given the low proportion of corruption complaints received relative to population and high perceived level of corruption, and low proportion of complainants confident to identify themselves, the ACC cannot be termed as accessible to corruption complaints. The conviction rate of ACC’s cases of corruption in the last few years has been below 40% on an average. For an effective ACC, this rate has to be much higher. Besides, ACC does not identify gender in compiling corruption complaints and monitoring corruption trends.
Efficiency and professionalism in corruption investigations is a moderate concern. Usually it takes more than the stipulated time mentioned in the law to complete an investigation of a corruption case. Another area of moderate concern for the ACC is the minimal amount (a total amount equivalent to BDT 728.12 million) of assets recovered, confiscated or frozen compared to the volume of capital flight from Bangladesh and estimated loss due to corruption.
Prevention, Education and OutreachThe major concern here is the dearth of research exploring corruption risks, context and conditions prevailing in the country. Around 2.65% of the ACC budget is allocated for prevention, education and outreach activities. The ACC does not have any budget allocation for research. While the ACC initiated a number of activities during the past three years – both at the central level as well as local level through the CPCs and Integrity Units, it lacks comprehensive plan for its outreach and prevention activities. Moreover, by reviewing the prevention and outreach activities of the local level CPCs and Integrity Units it is observed that
14
these are largely occasion-based (such as observing International Anti-corruption Day and Anti-corruption Week) and rather ceremonial in nature. Weaknesses in the ACC’s dissemination of corruption prevention information and use of website and social media for such dissemination are other concerns. The website requires modernisation and be made user friendly with updated information and a repository of literature and research/scholarly papers.
Cooperation with other OrganisationsCooperation of the ACC with ACAs in other countries is virtually non-existent. Although ACC actively participates in the international network such as the Conferences of State Parties regarding UNCAC, the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and Initiative for Asia-Pacific, it is yet to develop active cooperation with the ACAs of other countries. Cooperation with other integrity agencies of the country is another moderate concern for the ACC. ACC’s coordination with other government organisations such as NBR, banking institutions, CAG, and AG office is not adequate and effective.
Accountability and OversightThe major concern with regard to ACC’s accountability and oversight is the lack of any external oversight mechanism. Although ACC has a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Branch for evaluating inspection reports regularly, there is no public representation in the structure. Although the annual report of ACC is submitted to the President, no discussion has taken place in the Parliament on this report. Another area of concern is that other public agencies are not regularly involved in investigation of ACC personnel to avoid conflict of interest.
Public Perceptions of ACC’S EffectivenessThe most critical role of the ACC is to create a positive impression of its effectiveness among the common people. According to many, the ACC is not effective till now. According to a cross country survey conducted by Transparency International, 16.7% are aware of activities of the ACC and only 9.1% of the respondents (of those who know about the ACC) stated that the ACC is doing well in fighting corruption in Bangladesh (unpublished data, the GCB survey 2015).People have no idea and information on different laws and mechanisms that are important for preventing corruption. People’s perception on ACC’s impartiality in handling similar kinds of cases is also not very positive. According to ACC officials, there is lack of trust on the ACC. According to experts, CSO leaders and journalists, the ACC is entrusted with the required powers for curbing corruption, but the resources are not adequate.
15
RecommendationsFinancial and Human Resources
1. Enhanced budget for ACC: The budget of the ACC should be enhanced for:
a. Logistical support for enquiry and investigation (such as transportation, equipment, restoration of confiscated goods etc.);
b. Prevention activities (such as public hearing, research etc.);
c. Recruitment of highly skilled and efficient lawyers; and
d. Training of ACC staff.
2. Review of ACC’s organogram and increase staff strength: ACC should have its offices in all 64 districts with necessary staff and logistical support. The number of staff engaged in enquiry and investigation and prevention should be increased.
3. Increased transparency in appointment of Commissioners: The appointment process of the Chairman and Commissioners should be made more transparent. It should publicly disclose the names and profiles of the selected candidates before appointing the Commissioners. Participation from the political opponents and civil society in the process should be considered.
Detection and Investigation Function
4. Digitalization of the complaint system: The system of handling corruption complaints, investigation and case management should be digitalized. The system should be easy and user-friendly, and ensure anonymity. The ACC should also develop a proper structure for protecting whistle blowers.
5. Measures to increase the conviction rate: In order to increase the conviction rate of corruption cases the ACC should take measures such as consulting with lawyers before filing corruption cases and pursuing with the panel lawyers.
6. Enhanced drive for asset recovery: The ACC should take measures to recover, confiscate and freeze more assets out of corruption cases.
Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions
7. Long-term comprehensive strategic plan: The ACC should develop a long-term comprehensive strategic plan for preventing corruption through education and outreach programmes. It should also develop a mechanism to evaluate its activities.
8. Improved website: The ACC should have an improved website with the following features:
� Should be more interactive;
� Social media should be introduced;
16
� Should be made user friendly with a repository of literature and research scholarly papers [Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, Section 17 (f)];
� Information should be regularly updated, and information on ACC’s budget, public hearing and other activities, activity plan, investigation and prosecution statistics should be provided; and
� Amended Acts and Rules should be uploaded.
Cooperation with other Organisations
9. Increased cooperation with other integrity agencies: The ACC should take measures to increase collaboration and cooperation with other integrity agencies, particularly in terms of avoiding potential ‘Conflict of Interest’ while conducting investigation into alleged corruption of its personnel.
Accountability and Oversight
10. Independent oversight mechanism: An independent committee consisting of public representatives, present/ former bureaucrats and civil society members of high integrity, credibility and acceptability should be formed to advise, monitor and evaluate key aspects of ACC’s work.
Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance
11. Enhance public confidence: The following measures should be taken to enhance public confidence.
� Publicise its activities on a larger scale, so that common people are aware of its achievements;
� Publish and regularly update detailed statements on income, assets and liabilities of Commissioners and senior officials;
� Take steps against corrupt public representatives & high officials, and people from other groups of the society; and
� Ensure effective and timely investigation and quick disposal of corruption cases.
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INTRODUCTION
The UN Convention against Corruption prescribes the existence of independent bodies established through national legal systems to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any country context. Meanwhile, the 2012 Jakarta Principles1, developed in consultation with Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) heads, practitioners and experts from around the world, represent a widely accepted standard for an accountable ACA.
In practice, assessment against these standards is sporadic, due in part to the lack of political will by governments to scrutinize their own oversight mechanisms. Another reason is the absence of a coherent and practicable way in which to measure performance. Transparency International (TI) has responded to this opportunity by developing an initiative aimed at strengthening ACAs in the Asia Pacific Region. The proposed ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative’ combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels.
Under this initiative, TI has developed a practical and comprehensive benchmarking tool aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment tool was developed between 2013 and 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between Transparency International, interested staff from ACAs in the Asia Pacific region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International.
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) carried out an assessment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh. The assessment was aimed at providing the Bangladesh ACC with up-to-date information regarding its current performances and opportunities for future improvement and to provide a better understanding of the enabling and disabling factors which affect the ACA’s efficacy to all stakeholders committed to tackling corruption in the country. With this in mind, TIB conducted an independent assessment of the ACC and has produced this report as a result. In addition to a comprehensive evaluation of performance in relation to a set of comprehensive indicators, the report provides some suggested approaches to address the key challenges. This report therefore serves as a guide for both the ACC as well as other interested stakeholders to strengthen and expand the impact of anti-corruption efforts in Bangladesh.
About the assessmentTIB carried out an assessment of the ACC between November 2015 and April 2016. The research was led by independent consultant, Professor Salah Uddin Aminuzzaman and TIB’s research team, in collaboration with TI’s Asia Pacific Department.
1 The principles can be found in UN Office on Drug and Crime, Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies, 26–27 November 2012, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_6_Preventive_anti-corruption_bodies/JAKARTA_STATEMENT_en.pdf.
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The assessment process comprised a document analysis, including review of laws and media reports, followed by semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders -primarily within the government but also with non-state actors. Fieldwork took place from December 2015 to March 2016 in Dhaka. A draft report outlining key findings and recommendations have been reviewed by the ACC for accuracy and completeness. The draft report has been presented to relevant stakeholders for feedback, and to initiate dialogue on key issues. A number of consultations and validation meetings took place from December 2015 to March 2016 in Dhaka (see Annexes 2 and 3 for a list of people interviewed and consulted).
The assessment tool is designed to capture internal and external factors affecting the ACC as well getting a sense of the ACC’s reputation and actual performance. With this in mind a comprehensive indicator framework, made up of a total of 50 indicators (see Table 10), has been developed in consultation with experts (see Annex 1 for more information). These indicators were formulated to develop a broad platform to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the ACC, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity.
The indicators inquire into seven different dimensions:
DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENTNUMBER OF INDICATORS
1. ACA’s Legal Independence and Status 72. ACA’s Financial and Human Resources 93. ACA’s Detection and Investigation Function 94. ACA’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions 95. ACA’s Cooperation with other Organisations 56. ACA’s Accountability and Oversight 47. Public Perceptions of the ACA’s Performance 7
Total 50
Each indicator has three possible scores – high, moderate and low – and three defined levels of value for each indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator the research team identified the specific source of information, where necessary, from the ACC’s legal basis of support and reports, and further substantiated each score with in-depth interviews with the ACC’s staff and management, as well as interviews with other government agencies, branches of government, media and civil society organisations.
This report is divided into four sections. Section 1 presents Bangladesh’s basic economic, social and political characteristics, in addition to its perceived level of corruption. Section 2 explores the legal and institutional conditions in which the ACC operates. Section 3 presents key findings and a detailed assessment of each indicator, with comments on key issues and specific gaps have also been identified. Section 4 presents a brief set of conclusions, and TIB’s recommendations for strengthening the ACC.
19
EconomyBangladesh is a lower middle-income country with a promising and stable economy. Bangladesh has been listed in the ‘Next 11’ economies by Goldman Sachs, with high potential to become one of the world’s largest economies in the 21st century.2 The Government of Bangladesh has taken up multifarious initiatives to elevate Bangladesh to a knowledge-based and technology-driven middle-income country by 2021.3
In spite of the challenges emerging from the slow pace of global economic recovery and the destabilizing factors prevalent in the domestic front, the Bangladesh economy continues to maintain its sustainable growth momentum with a healthy 6%-plus growth rate in recent years.4 According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), the GDP at constant price grew by 6.51 percent in Fiscal Year 2015 which was reasonably higher than 6.06 percent growth in Fiscal Year 2014. The per capita national income reached US$ 1,314, an increase of US$ 130 from the previous year. Headcount poverty based on PPP US$ 1.25 per day is projected to have declined from 43.5 percent in 2010 to 38.4 percent in 2015.5 Inflation gradually came down to 6.32 percent in April 2015 from 7.04 percent in July 2014. The inflow of remittances increased 7.05% compared to the previous year–the flow of remittance was US$ 12,552.04 million during July – April 2015.6 The foreign exchange reserve shows a steady increase and the exchange rate of US dollar remains stable.7 Although the growth momentum is largely concentrated in the industry and service sectors, other sectors show positive growth as well. It is expected that the progress of transforming the economy from a rural-based agrarian economy towards a more modern urban-based manufacturing and services based economy provides a sound basis for further transformation.8
The country’s remarkably steady growth was possible due to a number of factors including population control, macroeconomic stability, and openness in the
2 DFID, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389036/Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2015).
3 Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan: 2016-2020 - Accelerating Growth and empowering citizens, Government of Bangladesh, 11 November 2015.http://www.plancomm.gov.bd/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7FYP_after-NEC_11_11_2015.pdf (accessed on 9 December 2015).
4 Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2015, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of People’s Republic of Bangladesh, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/15_16/ber/bn/Chapter-1%20(Bangla-2015)%20final.pdf (accessed on 24 December 2015).
5 World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update: Growth stable but external competitiveness eroding, October 2015 ehttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/20/bangladesh-development-update-growth-stable-but-eroding-external-competitiveness (accessed on 2 December 2015).
6 Finance Division, op. cit.7 World Bank, op. cit.8 Planning Commission, op. cit.
1 . BANGLADESH’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
20
economy. Building on its social-economic progress so far, Bangladesh now aims at becoming a middle-income country (MIC) by 2021.9
However, despite economic progress, economic inequalities still persist, poverty remains quite high, and the number of people living below the poverty line remains at about 63 million.10 The most startling consequence of widespread poverty is that a quarter of the country’s population cannot afford an adequate diet. The unemployment rate, traditionally defined, has increased modestly up to about 5 percent of the total labour force.11 Moreover, the implementation of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) is poor, partly due to implementation failure, which is related to some extent with governance failures, among other reasons. The institutional challenges result in corruption and poor quality of public service delivery such as education, health, and infrastructure.12
A major concern for Bangladesh’s economy is the issue of illegal capital flight from the country. According to a recent study by the Global Financial Integrity, in 2013 an amount of US$ 9.66 billion was channeled out of the country through trade misinvoicing and other means. Political instability, corruption and a weak domestic investment climate are identified as main contributory factors.13 Moreover, different aspects of the economic sector and its performance, according to analyses done by Bangladesh Institute of Governance and Development, are mixed for keys sectors, such as infrastructure (including roads and electricity), macroeconomic stability, external sector management, tax collection, deficit management, and ADP utilisation.14
Table 1: Policy Context of Bangladesh
DIMENSION DATA DATA SOURCE(S)
Land area (in sq km)147,570 sq. km. (land: 133,910 sq km, water: 10,090 sq km)
National Web Portal15
Size of population 159,731,037Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics16
GDP per capita (US$) $1,314 (per capita in 2015) National Web PortalType of government Parliamentary Democracy
9 World Bank, Towards Accelerated, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2012.10 UNDP, http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed on 6 December
2015).11 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (accessed on 2 December
2015).12 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013.13 Rejaul Karim Byron and Md Fazlur Rahman, ‘Illegal capital flight hits decade high’, The Daily Star, 10
December 2015.14 BIGD, 2015, the State of Governance Bangladesh 2014-2015: Institutions, Outcomes,
Accountability, Dhaka, p. 84.15 http://www.bangladesh.gov.bd/site/page/812d94a8-0376-4579-a8f1-a1f66fa5df5d/%E0%A6%AC%
E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%95%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A8 (Accessed on 7 December, 2015).
16 http://www.bbs.gov.bd/Census.aspx?MenuKey=89 (Accessed on 7 December, 2015).
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DIMENSION DATA DATA SOURCE(S)Voice & accountability 32.5 (Percentile rank 2014)
World Bank17
Political stability 18.0 (Percentile rank 2014)Government effectiveness 21.6 (Percentile rank 2014)
Rule of law26.0 (Percentile rank 2014)0.42 (Global rank 93 out of 102 countries)18
Regulatory quality 18.3 (Percentile rank 2014)
PoliticsThe People’s Republic of Bangladesh was founded as a constitutional, secular, democratic, multiparty, parliamentary republic. After independence, Bangladesh endured periods of poverty and famine, as well as political turmoil and military coups.19 Democracy was restored in 1991 that was followed by economic progress and relative political calm up to 2006.20 Following a two-year military backed “caretaker regime” from 2007-2008 the most recent democratic era began in 2009.21 Tensions in the country again escalated in the wake of the 2014 parliamentary elections, beginning with the amendment of the Constitution in July 2011 by the government stating that general elections were no longer required to be managed by a non-party caretaker government, a system that had been effective since 1996.22 In accordance with the amended constitution Parliamentary elections were held in January 2014 where the 18-Party Alliance led by BNP did not participate and in which over half of the constituencies went uncontested.23 This resulted in the formation of government with more than 83% of the Members of the Parliament (MPs) belonging to the 14-party alliance led by Awami League. Members from the main opposition were also included in the cabinet.24
17 World Ba World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Bangladesh, 1996-2014, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports (accessed on 2 December 2015).
18 World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2015, http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-law-around-world (accessed on 27 December 2015).
19 http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed on 6 December 2015).20 UNDP, http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed on 6 December
2015).21 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (accessed on 2 December
2015).22 Human Rights Watch, Democracy in the Crossfire: Opposition Violence and Government Abuses in
the 2014 Pre- and Post-Election Period in Bangladesh, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0414_ForUpload.pdf (accessed on 13 December 2015).
23 DFID Bangladesh, Operational Plan 2011-2016, Updated December 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389036/Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2015).It may be noted that Freedom House rated the status of freedom in Bangladesh as “partly free” in 2015 as national elections were marred by an opposition boycott, as well as widespread violence and intimidation by a range of political parties. For details see Freedom House, Freedom in the Worlds 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf. (accessed on 14 December 2015).
24 TIB, Parliament Watch: 10th Parliament (1st Session), July 2014, http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/2014/fr_pw_nis_10_parliament_s1_14_bn.pdf (accessed on 24 December 2015).
22
Although the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees civil and political rights of citizens and also sets out fundamental principles of state policy that are fundamental to the governance of the country, the rule of law is often undermined by the executive branch of the government and political forces.25 This is reflected in the gross abuse of human rights through, inter alia, political violence, enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings by the law enforcement agencies seemingly in police encounters and cross-fires.26
The political scenario in Bangladesh has largely been dominated by a two party polity, which, while introducing some measure of stability in that the elected party has a fixed tenure of five years, has in effect, instigated the practice of confrontational politics that is an antithesis to sustained democracy.27
A culture of confrontational politics between the country’s two main parties has weakened the rule of law and led to the politicisation of state institutions, including the judiciary and bureaucracy. At the same time, political parties and parliament are increasingly being taken over by powerful business interests. Politicisation affects key institutions of governance, weakening trust in the very institutions that are meant to protect and promote the interests of the general public.28 The existing system, however, has eroded the pluralism within the political system resulting in the weakening of the parties as well as reducing the choices of the electorate.29
Despite the restoration of parliamentary democracy, there is still a considerable degree of centralised executive power. Article 55 of the constitution vests all executive authority in the prime minister rather than the cabinet; many legal experts consequently describe the form of government as “prime ministerial” rather than parliamentary.30
Bangladesh is increasingly moving away from what is considered a ‘minimalist democracy’ (transfer of power through regular, free and contested elections, fundamental freedoms, civilian control over policy and institutions) to an ‘illiberal democracy’, characterised by misuse of state power for partisan and personal
25 Md. Rajib Hasnat Shakil and Kaniz Marzia, “Political Parties and Good Governance: Bangladesh Perspective”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), Volume 8, Issue 5 (Mar. - Apr. 2013), pp. 37-45, at p. 41, cited in TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013, p. 17.
26 International Crisis Group, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, Asia Report N°264 | 9 February 2015,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/264-mapping-bangladesh-s-political-crisis.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2015).
27 Sumaiya Khair, “Challenges to Democratization: perspectives of structural malgovernance in Bangladesh” in Panandiker, V.A. Pai and Tripathi, Rahul (eds.), Towards Freedom in South Asia. Democratization, Peace and Regional Cooperation, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 2008, pp. 47-64, at p. 49, cited in TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013, p. 17.
28 The Asia Foundation, op.cit. p.9.29 Rehman Sobhan, “Structural Dimensions in of Malgovernnace in Bangladesh”, Economic and
Political Weekly, 4 September 2004, pp.4101-08, at p. 4103, cited in TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013, p. 17-18.
30 International Crisis Group, op. cit.
23
gain and politicisation of key state institutions.31 Political parties are known to be self-serving and rarely articulate broader public interests, except during pre-election campaigns32 when party manifestos bulge with rich promises for the common people, only to be forgotten once the elections are over.33 Political parties in Bangladesh are also known for having party leadership in the hands of single leaders for decades, non-functioning internal democracy, dominance of money and muscle power, lacking proper representation, and lack of transparency (in party funding).34
SocietyBangladesh, with about 160 million inhabitants on a landmass of 147,570 square kilometers, is among the most densely-populated countries in the world.35 Bangladesh is religiously, ethnically and linguistically homogenous as Muslims account for 89.1% of the total population and 98% are Bengalis who speak in Bangla.36 It has been estimated that there are about 75 ethnic groups having diverse identities, cultures and languages.37 Bangladesh is portrayed as a moderate Muslim country where people of different religions have lived in peaceful co-existence for generations, each respecting the religious and cultural beliefs of the other and very often partaking in the same.38 Notwithstanding, isolated incidents of hate campaign and violence against religious and ethnic minorities have time to time challenged the “moderate” image of Bangladesh.39 The relationship between ethnic minority groups and the dominant Bengali communities is characterised by tension and conflict mostly over land ownership and use of natural resources.40
In the past two decades, Bangladesh has experienced profound social transformation with the increased participation of women in economy, administration and politics. There has been widespread entry of girls into the education system and women
31 Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008, Dhaka, 2009, p. xv.
32 Khair, op.cit, p. 48. 33 Ibid, p. 63.34 RounaqJahan, Political Parties in Bangladesh: Challenges of Democratization, 2015,
ProthomaProkashan, Dhaka.35 http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed on 6 December 2015).36 Hindus are the largest minority religion, accounting for 10% while other minority groups comprising
Christians, Buddhists and animists constitute less than 1% of the total population. For details see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (accessed on 2 December 2015).
37 However, the Government under the Cultural Institution for Small Anthropological Groups Act 2010 recognises 27 ethnic groups.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html (accessed on 2 December 2015).
38 TaiaburRahman, Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Bangladesh: A Cultural Explanation, paper presented at the Network of Asia-Pacific Schools and Institutes of Public Administration and Governance (NAPSIPAG) Annual Conference, Beijing, PRC, 5-7 December, 2005, p. 5.
39 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013, p. 20-21.40 Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh: Failing to Fulfill Its Commitments, http://www.askbd.org/ask/
wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ANNI_Report_2015-Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2015).
24
into the labour force. Women consist of 80% of workforce of Bangladesh’s garment industry.41 Despite this progress, women in Bangladesh continue to face legal, social, and economic challenges.42
Bangladesh has a vibrant civil society that comprises both organised professional groups at the national level as well as unorganized citizen’s groups at the local level. Broadly comprising of NGOs, CSOs, media, research think tanks, and various pressure groups (for example, women, human rights, minorities), the civil society has historically played a critical role in the democratisation process of the country since its independence.43 Despite reservations on issues of power, the government has generally been receptive to demands of the civil society in respect of human rights protection and democratic governance.44 Likewise, it is the civil society that today exerts pressure on political parties to conform to democratic norms and practice and more importantly, ethics of fair play.45
Bangladesh is ranked 142nd of 187 countries in the 2014 UNDP Human Development Index.46 Significant progress has been made on rights to health and education: child mortality fell by half between 1998 and 2011 and primary school enrolment has reached 98%. Bangladesh remains off-track on indicators for nutrition, water and sanitation under the MDGs.47 Challenges also remain in relation to the quality of healthcare and education.48
In spite of significant progress on different aspects, the state of human rights is still a concern. Violations of human rights are still taking place in the form of harassment, killings and extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances and kidnapping, torture, sexual violence against women and children, violence against minorities, land dispossession and so on.49 Furthermore, impunity of law enforcement forces, oppression of the political opponents by using state apparatus, and poor work conditions continues to be a serious problem.50
41 World Bank, ‘Bangladesh Development Update: Growth Stable, but External Competitiveness Eroding’, October 20, 2015,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/10/20/bangladesh-development-update-growth-stable-but-eroding-external-competitiveness (accessed on 2 December 2015).
42 The Asia Foundation, Strengthening Democracy in Bangladesh, Occasional Paper No. 13, June 2012, p. 10.
43 Md Mostafizur Rahaman, ‘Towards democracy: role of civil society’, New Age, September 14, 2014;Harry Blair, “Civil Society, Democratic Development and International Donors” in RounaqJahan (ed.), Bangladesh. Promise and Performance, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2002 (second impression), pp. 181-217, and pp. 192-193, cited in TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013, p. 22.
44 ADB, ‘Overview of NGOs and civil society: Bangladesh’, August 2008, http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28964/csb-ban.pdf (accessed on 5 May 2016); Hossain Zillur Rahman, “Bangladesh 2015: Crossing miles”, The Daily Star, 6 March, 2006.
45 ATM Shamsul Huda, (undated), ‘Role of Civil Society in strengthening Electoral Democracy’.http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/dj/internationalconf/Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 5 May 2016).
46 http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BGD (accessed on 19 September 2016).47 Ibid.48 DFID Bangladesh, Operational Plan 2011-2016, Updated December 2014, https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389036/Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2015).
49 Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh: Failing to Fulfill Its Commitments, http://www.askbd.org/ask/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ANNI_Report_2015-Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2015).
50 Human Rights Watch, 2014, op cit.
25
Levels of CorruptionThe Bangladesh Constitution affirms that the State will create conditions in which individuals will not be able to enjoy ‘unearned incomes’.51 By acceding to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) the State enters into an international commitment to resist corruption effectively. The Convention envisages both taking preventive measures against corruption and creating an enabling environment for ensuring integrity in conducting public affairs and managing public property in the member-countries. The National Integrity Strategy paper also emphasizes the importance of preventing corruption and promoting integrity. In the election manifesto of the present ruling party (Bangladesh Awami League) and other political parties that participated in the national election of 2014, commitments were expressed for taking all possible steps to stop corruption and to ensure the highest integrity in all affairs of the state and society.52 Numerous initiatives have been undertaken by the government so far including legal and policy reforms, the strengthening of the Anti-Corruption Commission etc. for preventing corruption.
In Bangladesh issues around corruption are central to everyday discussions and concerns of general people, and occupy much of the spaces in mass media.53 It is widely recognised that corruption and its negative impacts are a major obstacle to poverty reduction and national development in Bangladesh.54 Corruption stands as a barrier to economic development, poverty alleviation, infrastructural development, and employment growth of the country.55
However, in spite of lots of efforts, corruption exists extensively in the country.56
In Bangladesh corruption occur at various levels of national and socio-economic activities in the form of illegal transactions of money, and abuse of power through the network of the influential.57 According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2015, Bangladesh scored 25 out of 100 points and ranked 139th from the top among 168 countries.58 Bangladesh’s score remained well below global average of 43, and
51 Bangladesh Constitution, Article 20 (2).52 Cabinet Division, Commitment for Golden Bengal: National Integrity Strategy of Bangladesh,
Government of Bangladesh, October 2012.53 Mahfuz Anam, 2002, ‘The Media and Development in Bangladesh’, in The World Bank Institute, The
Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, Washington, pp. 268-269.54 DFID, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389036/
Bangladesh.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2015); TIB, Corruption in Service Sectors: National Household Survey 2012, http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/max_file/HHSurvey-ExecSum-Eng-fin.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2015).
55 Anti-corruption Commission (ACC), Annual Report 2014. http://acc.org.bd/assets/acc_annual_report_-_2014.pdf (accessed on 14 December 2015).
56 International Republican Institute (IRI), Bangladesh Survey: Support for Government Growing; Corruption a Dominant Concern, 2 September 2015,http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-bangladesh-survey-support-government-growing-corruption-dominant-concern (accessed on 7 December 2015).
57 TIB, Corruption in Service Sectors, op. cit.58 TIB, https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/activities/4870-bangladesh-retains-last-year-
s-score-slips-one-position-from-bottom-tib-calls-for-challenging-impunity-and-bring-the-corrupt-to-justice(accessed on 19 September 2016).
26
was ranked as the second worst performer in South Asia. In the Global Corruption Barometer Survey 2013 the maximum percentage (34%) of people opined that the level of corruption has increased a lot.59
Two other indicators, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption and the World Economic Forum’s assessment of Irregular Payments and Bribes, paint a similar picture. The World Bank scores Bangladesh 18.8 for Control of Corruption.60 According to the Global Competitiveness Ranking, irregular payments and bribes indicator scores Bangladesh 2.3, and ranks it 140 out of 144 countries for 2014.61 According to a report by the US Department of State corruption still remains a serious impediment to investment and economic growth in Bangladesh.62 According to an estimate made by Finance Minister, Bangladesh loses as much as 2-3 percent of the GDP every year, while on the other hand the World Economic Forum estimates show that the costs of corruption equal 5 percent of the GDP.63
The National Household Survey 2015 by TIB showed that 67.8% households in Bangladesh experienced corruption while receiving services from different public and private sectors or institutions.64 According to the estimate the households paid BDT 88.218 billion, which is 0.6% of 2014-15’s GDP and 3.7% of the national (supplementary) budget.65 It was also observed that although the rate of becoming victims of corruption is relatively lower among poorer households, the burden of corruption on them is relatively higher. The ratio of the unauthorized money paid to household income/expenditure is higher for the poor households; hence they bear greater burden of corruption.66
The impact of corruption is often manifested through political intolerance, lack of accountability and transparency, low level of democratic culture, absence of consultation, dialogue and participation, rent seeking and patronage.67 There are many factors that instigate corruption in the country. The partisan political
59 TI, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, TI, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=bangladesh
60 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Bangladesh, 1996-2014,http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports (accessed on 2 December 2015).
61 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/economies/#indexId=GCI&economy=BGD(accessed on 2 December 2015).
62 US Department of State, Investment Climate Statement 2015.http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/241687.pdf (accessed on 28 December 2015).
63 The Daily Star, ‘Graft takes 2-3pc off the economy: Muhith says punitive measures are not enough to deal with the problem’, 10 July 2015.
64 TIB, Corruption in Service Sectors: National Household Survey 2015, https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/media-release/4985-corruption-in-service-sectors-national-household-survey-2015-68-households-are-victims-of-corruption-six-percentage-point-rise-in-bribery-compared-to-2012-english
65 Ibid.66 Ibid.67 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013.
27
considerations often seem to influence the anti-corruption agenda, which appears to target political opponents, and in turn sustains corruption and promotes a culture of impunity. Political and electoral commitments to fight corruption are not always followed up with enforcement without fear or favour. In many instances, laws apparently have been used against political opponents. The judicial process is often bypassed in corruption cases. All of these undermine the effectiveness of domestic law.68
Table 2: Corruption Status of Bangladesh in Three Global Indicators
INDICATOR RANK AND SCORECPI (Transparency International) 139 and 2569
Control of Corruption (World Bank) 18.870
Irregular Payments & Bribes (World Economic Forum) 139 and 2.171
68 TIB, Implementation Review Mechanism of the UNCAC: Civil Society Organisation Report, Bangladesh, UNCAC Review Process 1st Year Review of UNCAC Chapters III & IV, 2012.
69 TI, Corruption Perception Index 2015, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/results (accessed on 11 July 2016).
70 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: Bangladesh, 1996-2014, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports (accessed on 2 December 2015).
71 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2015-16, op. cit. (accessed on 2 December 2015).
28
The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is a statutory independent corruption prevention and corruption detecting body of the state, operating under the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004. Previously there was the Bureau of Anti-corruption (BAC) which was formed in 1957 under the Anti-Corruption Act, 1957 to conduct anti-corruption activities. Though initially it started as a temporary office, the BAC started its operation on permanent basis in 1967. The BAC did not have legal scope to enquire and investigate into allegations of corruption independently, and thus could not meet the expectation for preventing corruption effectively.72 With an aim for establishing an independent and effective anti-corruption body, the ACC was established on November 21, 2004by abolishing the BAC.73
The ACC’s vision is to create a strong anti-corruption culture that permeates throughout the whole society and its mission is to relentlessly combat and prevent corruption.74 The ACC’s strategic objectives include combating corruption through punitive actions, pre-empting corruption through system review, and preventing corruption through education and advocacy.75
According to ACC Act, 2004, the Commission is responsible for several important functions such as:76
1. Conducting enquiry and investigation into the scheduled offences of the Anti-Corruption Commission Acton any allegations of corruption on own initiative or upon an aggrieved person;
2. Approval to lodge cases (FIR) and sanction to submit Charge Sheets/ Final Report on the basis of enquiry and investigation;
3. Conducting enquiry/ investigation and cases according to the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA), 2012 on money laundering issues;
72 Iftekharuzzaman, ‘The Anti-Corruption Commission: How Can It Be Made Effective?’, paper presented at the Roundtable Discussion organized jointly by TIB and Reporters Against Corruption, Dhaka, September 17, 2006; See also Syeda Naushin Parnini, 2011, ‘Governance Reforms and Anti-Corruption Commission in Bangladesh’, Romanian Journal of Political Sciences, issue: 01 / 2011, pp. 50-70 on www.ceeol.com (10 April 2016).
73 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 19.Also see Institute of Governance Studies (IGS) and BRAC University, 2007, ‘Institutions of Accountability: Anti-Corruption Commission’.
74 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 19.75 Ibid, p. 21.76 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 17.
2 . INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF THE ACC
29
4. Recommending to the President about the following topics:
� reviewing recognized systems under any Act for prevention of corruption;
� preparing research plan for effective implementation of corruption prevention;
� determine a ‘to do list’ on the basis of research findings; and
� Identifying the sources of corruption existing in Bangladesh in the context of socio-economic conditions and taking necessary measures accordingly.
5. Creating honesty and integrity to prevent corruption, building mass awareness against corruption and organizing seminars, symposium, workshops etc. on issues within the jurisdiction of Commission’s functions;
6. Performing any other duties imposed upon Commission under the law to combat corruption.
ResourcesThe ACC has its annual budget. The ACC proposes its own budget to the government. The budget proposal of ACC is subject to normal scrutiny of the Finance Ministry and in general approved by the Ministry of Finance unless any demand under a head is considered on the high side or too exaggerated. In such a situation the Finance Ministry holds meetings with the ACC. The agreed budget estimate is placed in the Parliament as part of the national budget.77 The Government allocates a certain sum in favor of the Commission for its expenditure, which is increasing every year (see Figure 1).78
Once the budget is approved, the Commission does not need to obtain any permission in advance from the government in order to spend the allocated money without prejudice to the rights of the Controller and Auditor General to audit the accounts of the ACC.79 The Finance & Accounts Branch of the Administration, Establishment and Finance Wing supervise the functions relating to finance and internal audits; and conduct purchase of the Commission as per public procurement regulations.80
77 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013. 78 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 99.79 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 25.80 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 99.
30
Figure 1: Trend in Allocations for ACC during FY 2008-09 to 2013-1481 (Tk)
The budget of the ACC has so far been found to be sufficient and the Commission has not faced any impediment for want of budgetary resources.82 The financial resources are enhanced regularly accommodating the increase in operational costs of the Commission. From the budget allocation of the last seven years (from 2008-09 to 2015-16), it is observed that the allocation has been increasing over the years in consideration of increase in expenditure.83 Moreover, it may be noted that the total budget was significantly increased since FY 2014-15, while the development budget has only recently been increased to a higher proportion.
There is no formal guarantee of fiscal stability over time but by and large the Commission enjoys the stability in practice as much of its budget is fixed by the Ministry of Finance in consultation with the ACC as part of the national budget. Once the budget is tabled in the Parliament, very rarely the budget estimate is reduced or refused by the Parliament.
Human ResourceThe ACC has a government approved organogram for 1,264 staff including 191 supernumerary posts. In Dhaka office the number of all level staff is 638 whereas the number in the divisional and district level offices outside Dhaka stands at 626.84 However, at present the existing human resource is 960 (895 males and 65 females).85
81 Prepared from the data collected from ACC Annual Report 2013, 2014.82 Interviews with present and former Commissioners of ACC, and DG, Administration, Establishment
and Finance, ACC (16 March 2016).83 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013.84 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 93.85 Data collected from Finance and Accounts wing of ACC (March 2016).
31
The Commission is empowered by the ACC Act, 2004 to appoint the necessary number of officers and personnel to carry out its work efficiently.86 Necessary rules have been formulated to address the issue of determining the appointment and terms and conditions of the Secretary and other personnel of the Commission by administrative order until the formulation of such rules. By applying this statutory authority, the Commission pronounced Anti-Corruption Commission (Personnel) Employment Rules, 2008 in order to determine the appointment and terms and conditions of its personnel. The Rules provides four methods of recruitment to fill ACC’s vacant posts – (1) direct recruitment, (2) recruitment through promotion, (3) recruitment through transfer on deputation, and (4) contract-based recruitment. Rule 4 stipulates the Commission to form a recruitment and promotion committee for making recommendations on direct recruitment or recruitment through promotion. 60% of the recruitment for the positions of Deputy Assistant Director takes place through direct recruitment and 40% through promotion.87 In the last three years, 147 staff were recruited directly to the vacant posts.88 At the time of data collection, there were a few high level officials on deputation from other government functionaries – four (out of six) Director Generals and two (out of 13) Directors. Such deputation takes place following the Anti-Corruption Commission (Personnel) Employment Rules, 2008 (Rule 8).
The ACC follows merit-based recruitment procedures. Before appointment police verification is conducted on the selected candidates to ascertain their antecedents, particularly whether they were involved in any political or criminal activities. The recruitment is based on competitive examinations, subject to various regional, gender and ethnic quotas prescribed by the government which is applicable to all recruitments in the country. The new staff members are provided with theoretical and practical training after joining the service.89 The Commission has emphasis on the enhancement of competence of its officers and staff and has taken several measures to enhance the efficiency of its officials and employees by arranging necessary training, seminar, symposium, etc. In the last three years 47 training programs were organized for the ACC staff in which 956 officials/staff took part.90
Table 3: Staff recruitment, retirement, resignation and termination (2013 – 2015)
Year Recruitment Retirement Resignation Termination2013 73 7 9 12014 73 22 10 32015 1 21 2 3Total 147 50 21 7
Source: ACC, 7 April 2016.
86 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 16 (3).87 Anti-Corruption Commission (Personnel) Employment Rules, 2008.88 Data collected from ACC, 7 April 2016.89 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013.90 DG, Administration, Establishment and Finance, ACC (7 April 2016).
32
The turnover rate of ACC is low (2.71% per year during the last three years). Such turnover has been due to retirement, resignation and termination of the concerned staff.91 Termination took place in the wake of departmental prosecution based on allegation raised against them and duly investigated and proven. Moreover, around 14% of the staff recruited in the last three years left ACC in the last few years for better career opportunities.
Table 4 shows that according to law the ACC has jurisdiction over all public (legislators, judiciary, law enforcing agencies and other public services) and non-government (government owned corporations, public contractors, charities/ NGOs and business) sectors,92 which potentially equips it with a strong leverage to effectively prevent corruption in the country.
Table 4: ACC Profile
Jurisdiction
Functions/ mandate/ powers
Public sector Non-government
Legislators JudiciaryPolice, military
etc.
Other public service
Govt-owned
corpora-tions
Public contrac-
tors
Charities / NGOs
All business
/ some business
1. Research, intelligence, risk assessment & detection
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2. Corruption investigation – in response to complaints
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
3. Corruption investigation – own motion powers
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
4. Prosecution powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
5. Asset recovery / confiscation / restitution powers
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6. Prevention powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y7. Education and
outreach powers Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Y = Yes, N = No.
StructureThe Anti-Corruption Commission comprises three Commissioners of whom one is the Chairman.93 All are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Selection Committee94 on a full-time basis for a period of five years95 from
91 Moreover, another 5-6 died of natural death while in service during this period. Source: Interview with Md. Rafiqul Islam, Deputy Director, ACC (7 April 2016).
92 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 1 (2).93 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 5(1).94 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 7.95 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 6.
33
the date of their appointment. The Chairman serves as the chief executive of the Commission.96 The Commissioners are not eligible for appointment in any profitable post of the Republic after completion of their tenure. No Commissioner shall be removed from office except on similar causes and manners as apply to the removal of a judge of the Supreme Court.97
Operational activities of the ACC are carried out by six Director Generals with the rank and status of Joint Secretary, overseeing six units: (1) Legal and Prosecution, (2) Administration and Finance, (3) Investigation and Inquiry, (4) Special Investigation, (5) Research, Prevention and Public Awareness, and (6) Incomplete Cases and Inspection. All these units are run by both deputed staff of the Government as well as internal staff members of the ACC. All DGs report to the Secretary of the ACC, who is a deputed staff from the government with the rank and status of a Secretary. There is also a Director for Monitoring and Evaluation, who directly reports to the Chairman of the ACC.98 Apart from the head office in Dhaka, the ACC has six divisional offices and 22 integrated district offices (IDOs) all over the country.
Figure 2: Organisational Structure of Anti Corruption Commission99
96 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section (1).97 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 10.98 TI and TIB, National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh, 2013.99 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 23.
34
Figure3: Organisational Structure of Anti Corruption Commission’s Field offices100
Enquiry, Investigation and ProsecutionThe principal statutory functions of the Commissionaire to conduct enquiries into and investigate corruption offences.101 Enquiries and investigations become the bases of prosecuting corruption offences. The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004 confers special powers on the Commission in respect of enquiry or investigation.102 The Commission takes legal measures only against specific allegations under the scheduled offences of The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004. ACC’s prioritized issues for conducting enquiry are money laundering; land, land revenue and lease; bribes (finance, assets and services); illegal attainment of movable or immovable assets; corruption in construction works and communication sector; implementation of development projects and corruption in private sector; duty and tax, revenue, businessmen/business organisations; public procurement, issuance of license; criminal breach of trust and misuse of power; and other offences mentioned in the schedule of The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004.103
The Enquiry and Investigation Wing and Special Enquiry and Investigation Wing look after the enquiry and investigation issues. Branches and Sections of these Wings oversee enquiries and investigations carried out by the divisional and integrated district offices at the field level.
The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004 allows the Commission to have its own prosecution unit consisting of the required number of prosecutors in order to conduct the cases before the Special Judge.104 At present, the Commission appoints separate panel of lawyers105 on contractual basis to conduct corruption
100 Ibid, p. 25.101 The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 17(a).102 The Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 19 and 20.103 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 27.104 Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, Section 33 (a).105 A thirteen-member lawyers’ panel called as ‘Public Prosecutors’ is working in the thirteen Special
Judge Courts of Dhaka. Besides, 59 lawyers are working in Dhaka Division, 34 lawyers in Chittagong, 49 lawyers in Rajshahi, 26 lawyers in Khulna, 19 lawyers in Barisal, and 19 lawyers in Sylhet Source: ACC Annual Report 2014, p. 71.
35
cases on behalf of the Commission in the Special Judge Courts and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The appointment is, however, revoked in accordance to the decision of the Commission, if questions are raised about the performance.
There have been backlogs of corruption cases lodged by the abolished BAC (for details see Table 9). The total number of cases filed by the Commission in 2015 which were under trial was 3,097, among which ongoing cases were2, 660, and the number of cases stayed by the higher court was 437. On the other hand, the total number of pending cases filed by the Bureau was 1,080 in 2015, among which the number of ongoing cases was 697, and the number of cases that had been stayed was 389.
Prevention, Education and OutreachPromotion of values of honesty and integrity to prevent corruption and taking measures to build mass awareness against corruption in the country are key mandates of the Commission. ACC adopted corruption prevention initiatives in order to expedite a national social movement to prevent corruption with spontaneous participation of people from all walks of social life. As a part of these initiatives Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs) have been formed at the upazila, district and metropolitan levels with an aim to create mass awareness about corruption prevention. There are a total of 493 CPCs all over the country. Moreover, in order to engage the future generation of the nation in creating mass awareness against corruption and to help them take a stand against corruption on the basis of ideology, ethics and values, ACC has formed 21,744 ‘Integrity Units’ across the country.106 Events organized by the CPCs and Integrity Units include discussions, debates, essay competitions, human chains and rallies, seminars, drama, and speech by distinguished persons (see Table 5 and 6).
Table 5: Events Organized by CPCs (2012-2014)
Year Discussions Debate Essay competitions
Human Chain Rally Seminar Drama
Speech by distinguished
personsOthers
2014 2,171 509 432 939 1,008 87 187 1,013 1,8372013 2,519 429 386 672 705 184 172 756 8082012 2,069 400 422 648 684 214 185 576 761Total 6,759 1,338 1,240 2,259 2,397 485 544 2,345 3,406
Source: Prepared from ACC Annual Reports 2014, 2013.
Table 6: Events Organized by Integrity Units (2014)
Year Discussions Debate Essay competitions
Human Chain Rally Seminar Drama
Speech by distinguished
personsOthers
2014 1378 398 347 644 744 20 122 413 681
Source: ACC Annual Report 2014.
106 For the mandate and formation of the CPCs and Integrity Units please see the District/ Upazila/ City Corporation Corruption Prevention Committee and Supporting Organisations: Constitution and Working Guideline (May 2010), and Integrity Unit Constitution and Working Guideline 2015 by ACC.
36
ACC observes Corruption Prevention Week, International Anti-Corruption Day and its foundation anniversary through human chain, meeting, rally, and information fair every year. Apart from these, the ACC has initiated new activities such as public hearings in government and semi-government offices, with a view to raising awareness about preventing corruption.107
The ACC has a quarterly newsletter titled DudokDarpan. It republished a booklet of religious sermons in 2014 titled Dire Consequences of Corruption for the Imams and religious leaders. The ACC also publishes advertisements against corruption in the leading national dailies. With the help of Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC), the mobile phone users are sent text messages to refrain from corruption. On the occasion of Corruption Prevention Week and International Anti-Corruption Day, T-shirts inscribed with slogans against corruption were distributed among participants.
ACC has joint collaboration with different stakeholders including other government organisations, NGOs and development partners as well. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ACC and Bangladesh Bank on mutual assistance was signed in May 2014. ACC collaborates with other stakeholders such as the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), Management and Resources Development Initiative (MRDI), Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), and TIB in different prevention, education and outreach activities. Such collaborations have been project-based and short-term need-based, and most of them were initiated by the ACC. The ACC is implementing a project with the WB on the implementation of the National Strategy, which started in July 2015 and will continue up to 2018. ACC has implemented four projects with ADB under which the CPCs and Integrity Units have been formed. One pilot project is being implemented by GIZ under the JRCP project in five districts. This started in 2014 and will continue up to 2019. The ACC worked with MRDI on implementation of the Right to Information Act in 2012, and with BEI on the capacity building of stakeholders. The ACC signed Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) with TIB in May 2015 for a year for collaborative campaign and research, and with the BFIU of Bangladesh Bank for capacity building.108
The ACC has developed a draft ‘Anti-Corruption Commission Communication Strategy’ for five years, from 2015 to 2019, with the financial and technical help of the World Bank, Dhaka Office in 2014. It is an outline of activities of the commitment made by various development partners and for implementing those in anticorruption campaigns. Efforts are underway to prepare an ‘Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan of the ACC’ with the technical assistance of GIZ. The draft report will be disseminated through workshop with key stakeholders, and will officially be launched when the report is finalized.
107 ACC Annual report 2014, p. 81.108 Interview with Director, Prevention, Education and Outreach, ACC (10 March 2016); ACC Annual
Report 2014; MoU signed between ACC and TIB (http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/index.php/en/media-release/4625-acc-and-tib-join-hands-to-augment-corruption-prevention-activities-bangla).
37
The main findings of the assessment are based on a set of 50 indicators divided into seven different dimensions. These indicators are designed to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the ACC, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators.109 For a clear understanding of the dimensions as well as the overall score, it has been classified into three categories – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% and 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% – 66%, and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0% - 33%.
In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were first converted from the 1-3 scale to a 0-2 scale. Thus, all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). This was done because when aggregating the scores and converting them to percentages the bottom of the scale must always be 0. If we were to use the 1-3 scale then the lowest possible score for any dimension would be 33% (i.e. 1/3). Once the scores were converted from the 1-3 scale to the 0-2 scale, scores obtained by each of the indicators of a dimension were added up and then divided by total of maximum possible scores for all indicators under that dimension and then multiplied by 100. For example, the sum of the indicators under the first dimension (legal basis, independence and mandate) was 11 (4 indicators received the maximum score of 2 and 3 indicators received a score of 1). The maximum total possible score for that dimension is 14 (i.e. 7 indicators X the maximum possible score of 2 for each). Thus the final aggregate score (percentage) for that dimension was: 11/14 X 100 = 78.57%.
According to this assessment, Bangladesh ACC has achieved a ‘moderate’ score. The ACC has an overall score of 61% (Figure 3.1). Moreover, 42.86% of the indicators scored ‘high’ (21), 38.78% indicators scored ‘moderate’ (19) and 18.37% indicators scored ‘low’ (9) (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Scores for Dimensions and Overall Score
109 See Table 7 on details of the standards.
3 . KEY FINDINGS
38
As evident from Figure 4, ACC scored the highest (78.57%) under the Legal Independence and Status dimension under which four indicators got high while three indicators got moderate scores. The second highest (72.22%) score has been received on ACC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions dimension under which five indicators got high, three got moderate and one got low scores. ACC’s Cooperation with Other Organisations (70%) is another dimension that falls in the ‘high’ category.
Scores for Financial and Human Resources (61.11%) and Accountability and Oversight (62.5%) dimensions are slightly better than the overall score. These indicate that the resource allocation and oversight mechanism need to be enhanced.
ACC’s Detection and Investigation Function (55.56%) dimension has received a score that is lower than the overall score, indicating that serious attention required in the fields of budget allocation compared to the national budget, accessibility to corruption complainants, low conviction rate and the absence of gender segregated corruption information.
The lowest score (28.57%) has been attributed to the Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance dimension, where two indicators got low and four got moderate scores among seven indicators, indicating that ACC’s performance with regard to this field needs special and immediate attention.
Figure 5: Scores by Indicators
Scoring Key: Indicators rated high are coloured green, indicators rated medium are coloured yellow, and indicators rated low are coloured red. Un-scored indicators have been coloured grey.
HIGH SCORE Green
MODERATE SCORE YellowLOW SCORE RedScoring Not Possible Grey
39
Tabl
e 7:
Ass
essm
ent S
umm
ary:
Indi
cato
rs b
y D
imen
sion
(mor
e de
tail
prov
ided
in s
ectio
n 3)
DIM
ENSI
ON
IND
ICA
TOR
S
AC
C’s
Leg
al
Inde
pend
ence
an
d St
atus
(7)
ACC
’s le
gal
inde
pend
ence
ACC
’s m
anda
teAC
C’s
lega
l po
wer
s
Appo
intm
ent o
f AC
CC
omm
issi
oner
(s)
ACC
C
omm
issi
oner
(s)’
term
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
ACC
’s
oper
atio
nal
auto
nom
y an
d im
parti
ality
Gov
ernm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
AC
C to
use
co
rrupt
ion
as a
wea
pon
agai
nst p
oliti
cal
oppo
nent
s
AC
C’s
Fin
anci
al
and
Hum
an
Res
ourc
es (9
)
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
AC
C’s
bud
get t
o to
tal g
over
nmen
t bu
dget
for p
ast
3 ye
ars
Suffi
cien
cy o
f AC
C’s
bud
get
for p
erfo
rmin
g its
func
tions
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
ACC
’s b
udge
t du
ring
past
3
year
s
ACC
per
sonn
el’s
sa
lary
and
be
nefit
s
ACC
’s s
elec
tion
crite
ria fo
r Pe
rson
nel
Expe
rtise
of
AC
C’s
pe
rson
nel i
n co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
n
Expe
rtise
of
AC
C’s
pe
rson
nel i
n co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n an
d ed
ucat
ion
Trai
ning
of
AC
C’s
pe
rson
nel
Stab
ility
of A
CC
’s
pers
onne
l
AC
C’s
D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n Fu
nctio
n (9
)
ACC
’s
acce
ssib
ility
to c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aina
nts/
in
form
ants
, in
clud
ing
publ
ic
and
whi
stle
-bl
ower
s du
ring
past
3 y
ears
ACC
’s
resp
onsi
vene
ss
to c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s du
ring
past
3
year
s
ACC
’s
willi
ngne
ss
to in
itiat
e co
rrupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
durin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
Aver
age
num
ber o
f cas
es
inve
stig
ated
by
the
ACC
per
yea
r du
ring
past
3
year
s
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
sion
alis
m
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
by
ACC
dur
ing
past
3
year
s
Aver
age
conv
ictio
n ra
te o
f co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed
by A
CC
in
past
3 y
ears
ACC
’s
willi
ngne
ss
to in
vest
igat
e in
fluen
tial
pers
ons
for
corru
ptio
n w
ithou
t fea
r or
favo
ur d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
ACC
’s ro
le
in re
stitu
tion,
as
set
reco
very
, fre
ezin
g an
d co
nfis
catio
n du
ring
past
3
year
s
Doe
s th
e AC
C
iden
tify
gend
er
in c
ompi
ling
corru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s an
d m
onito
ring
corru
ptio
n tre
nds?
AC
C’s
Pr
even
tion,
Ed
ucat
ion
and
Out
reac
h Fu
nctio
ns (9
)
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
AC
C’s
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
al
loca
ted
to
publ
ic o
utre
ach
and
prev
entio
n du
ring
past
3
year
s
ACC
’s
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initi
ativ
es d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Num
ber o
f re
view
s of
or
gani
satio
nal
proc
edur
es,
syst
ems
& ca
pabi
litie
s co
nduc
ted
by
ACC
to p
reve
nt
corru
ptio
n du
ring
past
3
year
s
Freq
uenc
y of
incl
udin
g co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
datio
ns
in A
CC
’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
ports
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
ACC
’s p
lan
for p
reve
ntio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h an
d its
im
plem
enta
tion
ACC
’s
colla
bora
tion
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
in
pre
vent
ion,
ed
ucat
ion
and
outre
ach
activ
ities
ACC
’s re
sear
ch
and
expl
orat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n ris
ks, c
onte
xt
and
cond
ition
s
ACC
’s
diss
emin
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d us
e of
ca
mpa
igns
ACC
’s u
se
of it
s w
ebsi
te
and
soci
al
med
ia fo
r di
ssem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
40
DIM
ENSI
ON
IND
ICA
TOR
S
AC
C’s
C
oope
ratio
n w
ith o
ther
O
rgan
isat
ions
(5
)
Gov
ernm
ent
supp
ort (
e.g.
At
torn
ey-
Gen
eral
’s
Offi
ce, D
irect
or
of P
ublic
Pr
osec
utio
ns)
to A
CC
for
pros
ecut
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
Coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACC
and
ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
(in
clud
ing
othe
r AC
As
if th
ere
are
mul
tiple
AC
As in
co
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in u
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its
pow
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cont
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cont
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ith
ACC
41
The key findings on the indicators have been broken down by dimensions in the following section.
Legal Independence and StatusThe Legal Independence and Status dimension of ACC scored the highest (78.57%), of which four indicators got high and three got moderate scores. Legal independence, mandate, legal powers and ACC Commissioners’ terms of office and removal are the indicators that got high scores.
The law provides ACC with substantial legal independence with dependency on the government for its budget.110 The law also describes the mandate of ACC elaborately. Among 11 functions of ACC, five (5) are of punitive and six (6) are of preventive nature. These functions include investigation, prevention, education, and research and integrity advice for mainstreaming good practices in the work of government agencies.111 Moreover, the ACC is entrusted with a wide range of legal authority to undertake inquiry or investigation, arrest, hear the accused, ask for declaration of properties, confiscate property in excess of known sources of income, prosecution, formulate rules etc.112 It is not accountable to any other authority except the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General for reviewing its financial operations. The Chairman and Commissioners of the ACC are appointed for five years,113 and they are well protected from any forceful and undue removal.114
However, ACC’s full independence and impartiality have been questioned due to its (in) effectiveness and exercise of power. The experts expressed that ACC’s independence is more dependent on the personal capacity of the office bearers rather than the authority provided by the law. Questions have been raised to what extent the Chairman and Commissioners are willing to enjoy their independence. This is also related to the way the Chairman and the Commissioners are appointed. Experts maintained that although the Chairman and Commissioners are appointed through an apparently fair and transparent process, the very formation of the selection committee is not above question, and there is ample scope for selection on political grounds. There is an allegation that political consideration and loyalty often get priority in case of these appointments. Moreover, the list and credentials of the selected candidates are not made public.
110 Section 3(2) & (3) of Ant-Corruption Commission Act 2004 state that the Commission will be a independent, impartial and self-governed commission. According to Section 24 of Ant-Corruption Commission Act 2004, “The commissioners shall be free to discharge their duties under this Act subject to its terms”. Section 25(1) of Ant-Corruption Commission Act 2004 says that the government shall allocate a certain sum in favor of the commission for expenditure. It shall not be necessary for the Commission to obtain any permission in advance from the government in order spend the allocated money.
111 Ant-Corruption Commission Act 2004, Section 17.112 Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 34 & 36.113 Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, Section 6(3).114 Section 10(3) of Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004, provides that no Commissioner shall be
removed from office except on similar grounds and in accordance with the similar procedures as applied to the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court.
42
Experts also expressed that ACC cannot exercise its full legal power. Like independence, the exercise of legal power depends on the strong and independent mentality of the commissioners. It is alleged that ACC lodged very few cases against powerful persons of current ruling party out of fear. ACC takes action against staff at lower tiers whereas the main culprits remain untouched or go scot free. There is also allegation of political interference and influence in exercising its authority.
Another concern with regard to ACC’s independence and status revolves around its limited operational autonomy and impartiality. The ACC has to depend on Finance Ministry for its budget and has to be accountable for the additional expenses. It needs approval from the government before increasing the number of its human resource and district offices. The ACC faces many bureaucratic procedures. In some cases they confront hassles in getting necessary documents or cooperation from other institutions like banks, NBR etc.
In 2013, ACC’s operational autonomy was endangered by the government initiative to amend the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004. The amendment, passed in the Parliament on November 10, among other things,115 made it mandatory for the ACC to secure prior government permission before filing any case against public officials including judges, magistrates or public servants for alleged corruption.116 This was termed a clear violation of the constitution, and aimed to curtail the power of the ACC. The then Chairman (in charge) questioned the process, and said that the move to give government officials impunity and protection would not see the light of the day. He also said that “An unholy alliance has been instrumental in making the bill into a law”.117 However, on 30 January 2014, the High Court declared this provision unconstitutional and void.118
It is also alleged that ACC is not politically neutral as it has not been able to demonstrate impartiality in handling corruption cases. In some cases, as alleged by some experts, ACC played a partisan role and did not take action against all accused equally indicating selective treatment of the accused. For instance, in spite of having sufficient evidence from Bangladesh Bank, the MD of Basic Bank was not included in the charge sheet, which raised questions (see case study 1). The Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance Ministry, stated with regard to irregularities at the BASIC Bank, “Huge corruption and irregularities took place in BASIC Bank between 2010 and 2014. But we are very surprised to see that
115 A few provisions were made in the amended version of the law that was termed positive. These include mandatory disclosure of corruption related information by such bodies as NBR, law enforcement agencies, CAG and Bangladesh Bank upon ACC’s request; retaining the appointment of the secretary in ACC’s jurisdiction; and confidentiality of information provider.
116 ‘ACC’s authority curtailed’, Prothom Alo, 11 November 2013. The bill was originally raised in February 2011, but was halted due to large scale protest from different sections of the society especially the watchdog NGOs and civil society. The concerned Parliamentary Standing Committee also recommended for not including such provision in the amendment. Only three MPs discussed on the amendments of the bill.
117 ‘ACC law to spark mass protests’, The Daily Star, 22 November 2013; Iftekharuzzaman, ‘Anti-corruption Commission (Amendment) Bill: Unconstitutional, discriminatory, self-defeating’, The Daily Star, 14 November 2013.
118 ‘Provision for prior permission illegal: HC observes change to law undermines ACC’s independence’, The Daily Star, 31 January 2014.
43
the ACC is yet to find the involvement of the then chairman of the bank [Bacchu] in those incidents”.119 He further said, “The committee has all the evidence about the irregularities committed by Abdul HyeBacchu, but the ACC failed to take any action against him”. ACC commissioners have the power of approval to decide against whom the corruption cases would be filed, and thus there are chances of influence or partiality. For instance, in Petro Bangla case an Investigation Officer
119 For details see Rashidul Hasan, ‘ACC slated for failure to find Bacchu’s role’, The Daily Star, 29 January 2016.
Case Study 1: Basic Bank ScamBasic Bank Limited, a state-owned scheduled bank of Bangladesh, was one of the best-run banks until a former MP from the Jatiya Party was made the Chairman of the bank in 2009, who was re-appointed in 2012. The audit reports from Bangladesh Bank and the external audit firms hired by BASIC Bank found the Chairman involved in abnormalities around the granting of loan, appointment of jobs and promotions.
In 2012-13, Bangladesh Bank found his complicity in the embezzlement. The irregularities included no verification of loan-seekers’ creditworthiness, absence of the KYC (Know Your Customer) procedures and approving loans to defaulters. On 14 July 2014 Bangladesh Bank sent a report on the BASIC Bank scam to the ACC, detailing how borrowers embezzled money from the bank through fake companies and suspected accounts. The report mentioned that the Dilkhus ha Branch doled out Tk 683 crore in loans to 16 borrowers, all of whom took the money through illegal means. In Gulshan branch, 12 clients took out Tk 297 crore through pay orders or in cash. The report also contained a list of 40 pay orders that were transferred from a number of loan accounts at Shantinagar Branch to suspected accounts in the same branch in 2012. Each pay order transferred funds between Tk 50 lakh and Tk 1 crore. The ACC began investigating massive loans granted between 2009 and 2012 by the state-owned bank’s Gulshan, Dilkusha, and Shantinagar branches. However, most of the loans remained unpaid because many of the borrowers were untraceable.
After long investigations of four years, in September 2015, the ACC filed a total of 18 cases against several BASIC officials. Former MD of the bank was accused in most of the cases filed for swindling of over Tk 650 crores. Besides, the Chairmen and MDs of 18 companies and several officials of the bank were accused in the cases. However, ACC filed 56 cases last year accusing a total of 110 people and organisations for gross loan irregularities worth over Tk 4,500 crore but neither the former Chairman of the bank, who is believed to be at the centre of the scam, nor any of the then board members responsible for the scam were accused in any of the cases.
In November 2015, in response to a writ petition, the High Court issued a rule asking the authorities concerned to explain within four weeks why the ACC chief should not be directed to implicate BASIC Bank’s former Chairman and its former board members in a Tk 154 crore loan scam case. The ACC and the central bank have been ordered to submit their findings about BASIC Bank to High Court on 9 February 2016. Besides, being unsatisfied by the ACC’s investigation, the Parliamentary Committee on the Finance Ministry launched its own investigation.
In August 2016, at least three investigators out of seven completed their investigations and found direct involvement of the former Chairman.Source: ‘Evidence of scam found against BASIC Bank ex-chairman Bacchu, says Muhith’, bdnews24.com, http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2016/02/23/evidence-of-scam-found-against-basic-bank-ex-chairman-bacchu-says-muhith; ‘27 individuals involved in BASIC bank loan scam: Muhith’, Daily Samakal, http://www.samakal.net/2016/02/23/3557 (accessed on 17 November 2016).
44
(IO) submitted the investigation report where there was the name of the Chairman (see case study 2). The commission shifted this case to another IO who also included Chairman’s name in the report. However, finally ACC approved the case without the name of the chairman. Thus the effort of IOs went in vain. Sometimes panel lawyers are asked to go slow in progressing with some cases.120
Case Study 2: Petrobangla ScamBangladesh Oil, Gas and Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla) is the flagship organisation in the country’s primary energy sector with the responsibilities of exploring, developing, producing and marketing natural gas as well as extracting the country’s coal resources. In 2014 the ACC launched an enquiry against the Chairman of Petrobangla and 13 Managing Directors (MD) of its associate companies. The Chairman was alleged to acquiring wealth through irregular appointments and corruption. It was also alleged that the Chairman and 13 MDs of Petrobangla’s associate companies swindled over Tk 2 billion (US$ 25.9 million) over the last four years. Moreover, allegations of ignoring rules and regulations in recruitment and taking bribes from job seekers were also raised against the Chairman and his ‘associates’. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Power and Energy also found irregularities in appointing officials to the 13 companies.
However, it was alleged that the ACC was dilly-dallying over inquiring into the afore-mentioned allegations. The move to file cases against the top officials was thwarted, despite proofs of corruption against them. The ACC was disrupting the inquiry by changing officials concerned repeatedly, and the ACC official recommending registration of lawsuits was also relieved of his duties as an investigation officer.
In March 2014, although a Deputy Director of the ACC presented concrete proofs against the accused and recommended that they should be sued, he was removed from his position and the commission appointed his successor to begin a fresh inquiry into the crime. He was sent on forced retirement on charges of indiscipline in the wake of disagreement with the commission over a number of issues, including the Petrobangla inquiry. The commission also did not approve the move to file cases against the accused. In April 2014, an Assistant Director took charge of the inquiry and submitted a report on the appointment irregularities after six months. Based on evidence of accepting bribes for appointing 42 employees at Karnaphuli Gas Distribution Company in the report, he recommended 11 officials, including the Petrobangla Chairman and former MD of Karnaphuli Gas Distribution Company be sued. It was said in the report that the accused officials engaged in the corrupt act by abusing power in compliance with the Petrobangla Chairman’s directive. The commission, however, did not accept the recommendation and directed the inquiry officer on September 24, 2014 to review the report. On 30 September 2014 the commission removed the AD and appointed another Deputy Director to carry out the inquiry, thus changing three officials in the inquiry phase in less than six months.
Finally, the ACC acquitted the then Chairman from the allegations, and approved lodging cases against six officials of Petrobanglaon 2 June 2015.Source:http://www.petrobangla.org.bd/ (accessed on 17 November 2016); https://bangladeshcorruption.wordpress.com/tag/petrobangla-recruitment-scam/ (accessed on 17 November 2016).
120 Interview with a panel lawyer (9 February 2016).
45
There is a common perception among key informants of this study that the government has been using the issue of corruption as a weapon against political opponents or people with different views, and for which it relies on the ACC. According to newspaper analyses, there is a trend to give ‘final reports’ after investigation against people (leaders and political workers) belonging to the ruling party, stating that sufficient evidence of corruption had not been found, while the political opponents are given charge sheets.121 In the last three years it is alleged that some cases were withdrawn under political consideration. ACC filed very few corruption cases against leaders of the ruling party in spite of information of amassing huge wealth as disclosed in the affidavits during the 2014 election.122 For instance, an analysis of the data on ongoing investigations against 36 influential persons, it was found that among them 16 were against the persons belonging to the opponent political parties, whereas only three belonged to the ruling party.123 This has seriously raised questions regarding ACC’s credibility in objectively trying corruption cases. Notwithstanding such instances, ACC officials claim that they are not in any way exploited or influenced by the government.
There are evidences of filing corruption cases, investigations and convictions of top level political leaders of the ruling party in the past three years. For instance, recently in a corruption case against the Minister for Food, Relief and Disaster Management, the Appellate Division repealed the High Court judgment of acquittal, and sustained the punishment awarded by the lower court.124
Financial and Human ResourcesACC received 61.11% score for the dimension on ACC’s Financial and Human Resources, with three indicators getting high, six indicators at the moderate level, while one scored low.The indicators that received high scores are in respect of sufficiency of budget, security and stability of budget, and stability of ACC’s personnel.
It is observed that the average proportion of ACC’s budget has not been more than 0.025% of the total government budget in the last three years, and is consistently decreasing over the years, despite the fact that the monetary allocation for the ACC is increasing (Table 8).This is due to the fact that the national budget has increased exponentially. Although ACC receives the budget it asks from the government, the amount allocated for the ACC is not sufficient, as higher allocation is required to effectively undertake a number of activities (for instance, investigation, prevention,
121 See for instance, ‘The ACC does not find corruption information against pro-government people’, Prothom Alo, 9 December 2015; ‘ACC sets record in giving clean chits’, The Daily Star, 1 January 2016.
122 ‘The ACC does not find corruption information against pro-government people’, Prothom Alo, 9 December 2015.
123 Based on the data collected from the ACC (March 2016).124 Daily AmaderShomoy.com: http://www.amadershomoys.com/newsite/2016/04/10/566748.htm#.
VxxqzDFq_IV (accessed on 24 April 2016)
46
and development). The development budget is required for the construction of a new building for training institute, ACC’s own office buildings in different districts and for automation. In order to cater to the needs (such as training, capacity building, events) ACC seeks the financial support from other agencies (national and international bilateral development partners). However, there is a big leap with regard to allocating development budget for the ACC in the fiscal year 2015-16.
Table 8: Average proportion of ACC’s budget to total government budget for past 3 years
Fiscal Year
Non-development
Budget(million Tk)
Development Budget
(million Tk)
Total (million Tk)
Total Government
Budget(million Tk)
Proportion of government budget (%)
2015-16 565.2 70.7 635.9 2,951,000 0.0222014-15 568.7 21 589.7 2,396,680 0.0252013-14 471.48 12 483.48 1,882,080 0.025
Source: Ministry of Finance website: http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/15_16/brief/en/at_a_glance.pdf (accessed on 21 March 2016);ACC Annual report 2014.
The main challenge is that the allocation is given according to the existing human resource, which is inadequate. Key informants from both within and outside ACC mentioned that the absence of ACC offices with necessary human and other resources in most of the districts jeopardizes the anti-corruption activities on many fronts. For instance, the staff of the investigation wing faces huge workload, which eventually decreases their efficiency and effectiveness.125 A new organogram was proposed to the Ministry of Public Administration in September 2015, and is awaiting approval from the government. In this new organogram 2,569 staff have been proposed for offices in 64 districts.126
ACC also faces some bottlenecks with regard to the allocation from the Ministry of Finance. Although according to the law, the ACC is financially independent, it has to take prior permission from the Ministry to shift head-wise budget according to the needs, with detailed clarification. The ACC is not allowed to use unspent money of one head under another without such permission.127 Clarifications are also soughtby the Ministry on development budgets.128
Inadequacy in the skills and expertise of ACC’s personnel is another major concern. The level of skill of ACC staff in corruption investigation is particularly criticised, which is also evident in the low rate of conviction in the ACC cases. There is a lack of understanding of investigation processes and techniques among the new staff, while the older staff are not always abreast with the latest developments in corruption investigation, for example, investigating money laundering or using cyber technology. Similarly the relevant personnel engaged in corruption prevention
125 Interview with DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (3 March 2016).126 Interview with DG, Administration, Establishment and Finance, ACC (16 March 2016).127 Interview with a former Commissioner, ACC (22 March 2016).128 Interview with DG, Administration, Establishment and Finance, ACC (16 March 2016).
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and education are also not adequately skilled, as they mostly rely on the local committees (‘Corruption Prevention Committee’ and ‘Integrity Unit’) created for preventing corruption and promoting integrity at the grassroots. The research wing is also under-staffed.129
Training is another area that needs more attention. The ACC officials are sent to short training courses sponsored by government departments, non-government organisations and development partners. In the last three years 47 training programs were organized for the ACC staff in which 956 staff took part.Twenty-five (25) of these trainings covered technical aspects such as anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism and asset recovery, Public Procurement Act 2006 and Public Procurement Rules 2008, land management; some 510 staff took part in these trainings. Other trainings focused on non-technical issues, such as basic training on computer, English language, orientation on ACC and related laws including The Right to Information Act, and other relevant issues.130
Detection and InvestigationACC’s Detection and Investigation Function got below the overall score(55.56%), with four indicators receiving high scores, while three areas demand immediate attention (low score), and two areas obtained moderate score. The indicators that received high scores are ACC’s responsiveness to corruption complaints, its willingness to initiate corruption investigations, average number of cases investigated, and willingness to investigate influential persons.
The accessibility of complainants to the ACC is quite low considering the country’s population. In the last three years,a total 29,430 complaints (9,810 complaints on average per year which accounts for about 0.006% of the country’s population) were received by the ACC. Complaints are received in all district and divisional offices of ACC along with the head office located in Dhaka. However, almost all the complaints were anonymous and thus the profile or gender of the complainants could not be revealed. The ACC does not have any mechanism for protecting the whistle-blowers, although protection was provided to 5-6 persons during the last three years. They helped in identifyingcorrupt officials through ‘trap cases’.131 The low proportion of corruption complaints received relative to the population and high perceived level of corruption (according to TIB’s Household Survey of 2015, 67.8% of the service recipient households experienced corruption while receiving services),132 and low proportion of complainants who are confident to identify themselves raise questions regarding accessibility of the ACC in terms of lodging corruption complaints.
129 Interview with DG, Administration, Establishment and Finance, ACC (16 March 2016); DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (3 March 2016), DG, Legal and Prosecution, ACC (2 March 2016); former Commissioner, ACC (22 March 2016).
130 Interview with DG, Administration, Establishment and Finance, ACC (16 March, 7 April 2016); ACC Annual Report 2014.
131 Interview with DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (3 March 2016).132 TIB, Household Survey 2015, op. cit.
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The conviction rate of ACC’s cases of corruption during 2012-2015 have been below 40% on an average (In 2014 the conviction rate was the highest in four years – 46%) (For details see Table 9). For an effective ACC, this rate has to be much higher. According to the key informants (including experts, concerned ACC officials, panel lawyers and journalists) the reasons of such a low conviction rate are manifold. First, this is an indication of lack of capacity and skill of the investigation officials. Second, procedures are not properly followed while filing a case in the court. Third, due to the lengthy process of disposal of cases, there is a low turnout of witnesses.
One of the reasons behind the problem of lengthy trial is lack of commitment from panel lawyers. It has been alleged that they are poorly paid by the ACC, and thus they do not actively pursue cases.133 Their presence is also not visible in the court. Moreover, there are procedural flaws in filing cases. For instance, the court notice is sent but the concerned party is not aware of it. Moreover, in many cases the defendants/ accused file a writ petition in the higher court and get stay order against legal action.
Table 9: Total number of cases under trial, ongoing trial, cases pending due to writ/ petition, convictions, acquittal (2012 – 2015)
Commission/ Bureau
Year Number of cases
under trial
Number of
ongoing trial
Cases pending in the higher courts due
to writ/ revision
Convictions Acquittal Total disposal of case
Percentage of
conviction to total cases
disposedCommission 2012 2016 1,605 411 42 90 132 32
2013 2380 2,030 350 67 116 183 372014 2724 2,310 414 73 86 159 462015 3097 2660 437 69 119 188 37 Total 251 411 662 38
Bureau 2012 1364 971 393 15 71 86 172013 1292 888 404 24 48 72 332014 1223 821 402 28 56 84 332015 1080 697 389 30 88 118 25 Total 97 263 360 27
Source: DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC; DG, Legal and Prosecution, ACC.
The ACC does not identify gender in compiling corruption complaints and monitoring corruption trends. This is because most of the complaints are lodged anonymously. There has not been any attempt so far by the ACC to identify different needs of the citizens especially women and other marginalized groups.134
During the past three years the ACC initiated enquiry and investigation into more than 30 influential persons. They included former Ministers and State Ministers,
133 FGDs with CPC and CCC members and journalists (10 February and 23 March 2016); interview with a panel lawyer (9 February 2016).
134 Interview with DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (3 March 2016).
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former MPs, former Mayors, former Government high officials (former secretary, former Director General/ Director of different government agencies), and influential business persons. A number of them were issued charge sheets, some were arrested while others were convicted in the court.135 However, newspaper analyses reveals a trend of giving ‘final reports’ after investigation against people (leaders and workers) belonging to the ruling party, stating that sufficient evidence of corruption had not been found, while the political opponents are given charge sheets.136 In the last three years it is alleged that some cases were withdrawn under political considerations. ACC filed very few corruption cases against leaders of the ruling party in spite of information of amassing huge wealth beyond known sources of income as disclosed in the affidavits during the 2014 election.137
Efficiency and professionalism in corruption investigations raise moderate concern. Usually it takes not more than three years to complete an investigation but it is not possible to measure the average time taken by the ACC officials to complete the investigation of a corruption case. The duration depends on the nature of the offences, although a guideline has been given with regard to the timeline in the Anti-Corruption Commission Act2004. According to the high officials of ACC, the officers involved in corruption investigation are by and large efficient and professional but some personnel lack of the necessary expertise in some areas of corruption investigation. For instance, the concerned official of ACC did not go through the relevant documents before filing a corruption case, and later reprimanded by the judge.138
Another area of moderate concern for the ACC is the minimal amount of assets recovered, confiscated or frozen compared to the volume of capital flight from Bangladesh and estimated loss due to corruption. During the past three years, the ACC froze and confiscated a total amount equivalent to BDT 728.12 million through court.139 Apart from this around BDT 245.3 million was confiscated in money laundering and other cases (excluding immovable property confiscated in 2015). Considering the volume of capital flight from Bangladesh (estimated US$ 5.6 billion during 2004-2013; US$ 430 million per year),140 and the estimated loss due to corruption (at least 2-3% of the GDP),141 the amount recovered by the ACC is not significant. Moreover, there are challenges in the recovery and maintenance of the attached assets.
135 Interview with former Commissioner, ACC (22 March 2016); DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (3 March 2016); DG, Legal and Prosecution, ACC (2 March 2016).
136 See for instance, ‘The ACC does not find corruption information against pro-government people’, Prothom Alo, 9 December 2015; ‘ACC sets record in giving clean chits’, The Daily Star, 1 January 2016.
137 ‘The ACC does not find corruption information against pro-government people’, Prothom Alo, 9 December 2015.
138 ‘ACC case against MP Bodi: case filed without scrutinizing documents, court not satisfied with the plaintiff’, Prothom Alo, 24 December 2015.
139 Interview with DG, Detection and Investigation, ACC (25 April 2016).140 Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013. Global
Financial Integrity, December 2015; http://bdnews24.com/economy/2015/07/09/2-3-percent-of-gdp-lost-to-corruption-muhith (accessed on 25 April 2016).
141 The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) puts Bangladesh’s current GDP at around Tk 15.14 trillion, so a 3 percent loss of GDP would be as high as Tk 450 billion. For details, see: http://bdnews24.com/economy/2015/07/09/2-3-percent-of-gdp-lost-to-corruption-muhith (accessed on 25 April 2016).
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Prevention, Education and OutreachACC’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions dimension received the second highest score of 72.22%. Five indicators got high scores, three got moderate and one got low scores. The indicators that received high scores are the average proportion of ACC’s operating expenditure allocated to public outreach and prevention, its corruption prevention initiatives, reviews of organisational procedures, systems & capabilities conducted by ACC, frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in investigation reports, and collaboration with other stakeholders in prevention, education and outreach activities.
The major concern is the vacuum in research activities for exploring corruption risks, context and conditions prevailing in the country. Despite the fact that around 2.65% of the ACC budget was allocated for prevention, education and outreach activities in the past three years,142 the ACC does not have any budget allocation for research.
Although the ACC has initiated a number of activities during the past three years – both at the central level as well as local level through the CPCs and Integrity Units – it does not have its own comprehensive plan for its outreach and prevention activities.143 The CPCs are largely own-financed, and the annual allocation for the CPCs and Integrity Units are quite insufficient (BDT 21,000 per district level CPC per year) to implement year-round programs that are prescribed in a guideline. There is no office or staff for the CPCs. The role of CPCs as watchdogs is also not strong. It is alleged that many integrity units are not active. It is also alleged that cooperation is not always provided to these units from the concerned officials of the ACC.144
By reviewing ACC’s prevention and outreach activities it is observed that these are mainly occasion-based (such as observing International Anti-Corruption Day and Anti-Corruption Week) and rather ceremonial in nature.145 To what extent these events are communicative and effective in raising awareness among the common people has not been evaluated. Although the ACC has developed a draft Anti-Corruption Commission Communication Strategy for five years (from 2015 to 2019) in 2014, the draft has not been finalized.
142 Interview with Director, Prevention, Education and Outreach, ACC (10 March 2016); ACC Annual report 2014: http://www.acc.org.bd/assets/budget_allocation_2015-2016.pdf (accessed on 28 March 2016).
143 Interview with Director, Prevention, Education and Outreach, ACC (10 March 2016).144 FGD with CPC and CCC members, journalists (23 March 2016).145 The CPCs organized discussions (6,759), debates (1,338), essay competitions (1,240), human
chains (2,259), rallies (2,397), seminars (485), dramas (544), speech by distinguished persons (2,345), and other events (3,406) throughout the year during 2012 – 2014, while the Integrity Units organized similar events in 2014. Apart from the local events, ACC has been observing Corruption Prevention Week from March 26 to April 1 every year since 2011 and the ‘International Anti Corruption Day’ on December 9 every year. Programs organized under this week-long events include anti-corruption message circulated through SMS over mobile phone, a weeklong exhibition of satirical cartoons and posters at the ACC Head Office, forming human chain and rally with banners and posters against corruption, anti-corruption posters and art competition, anti-corruption sermons delivered during Jummaprayer, and conference of Integrity Units at Dhaka.
51
The ACC’s dissemination of corruption prevention information and use of website and social media for such dissemination are other areas of concerns. According to high officials of ACC, the messages through text sms to mobile phones, short films, posters, and banners, have some impact, although they are not always reader or audience friendly, and to what extent they are effective has not been measured. The ACC has a website, but it has not started to use the social media yet. Moreover, although there is a lot of information on ACC activities, some information including information on budget, public hearing and other activities are not provided, and the activity plan, annual reports, investigation and prosecution statistics are not updated. The website requires modernisation and be made user friendly with a repository of literature and research/scholarly papers.146
Cooperation with other OrganisationsACC’s cooperation with other organisations is another dimension that received a ‘high’ score of 70%, with three indicators receiving high, one moderate and one low score. The indicators that received high scores are government’s support to ACC for prosecution of corruption cases, cooperation with non-government organisations, and ACC’s participation in international networks.
Lack of cooperation with ACAs in other countries is a major concern under this dimension. Although ACC actively participates in the international network such as the Conferences of State Parties regarding UNCAC, the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and Initiative for Asia-Pacific, it is yet to develop active and formal cooperation with the ACAs of other countries. ACC’s cooperation and network with other ACAs such as Malaysia, India and Bhutan are at a very initial stage. A number of Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) is expected to be signed with these agencies in the coming days.147
Cooperation with other integrity agencies of the country raises moderate concern for the ACC. It is singularly mandated for dealing with corruption in the country. While discharging its functions, although it has been noted that the ACC gets necessary cooperation from organisations such as NBR, Banking Institutions, Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), and AG office, ACC’s coordination with other government organisations is not adequate and effective.148 According to an independent review done by the Cabinet Division, the ACC still lacks strong initiatives for building institutional partnership with other national integrity agencies and establishing ample links with other commissions.149
146 Interview with Director, Prevention, Education and Outreach, ACC (10 March 2016); review of ACC website by the research team.
147 Interviews with ACC officials.148 For details see The Independent, ‘3 independent bodies face lack of coordination’, 7 February 2014,
http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=203640:3-independent-bodies-face-lack-of-coordination&catid=129:frontpage&Itemid=121 (accessed on 30 May 2016).
149 Cabinet Division, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, An Independent Review of National Integrity Strategy (NIS), May 2013, p. 40.
52
ACC finds it difficult to get appropriate and necessary information like Bank Account details of accused individual. Banks tend to slow down the process by referring to The Banker’s Book Evidence Act 1890. It faces similar difficulties when it seeks wealth and related information from National Board of Revenue. Complications arise due to the provisions of The Income Tax Ordinance 1984 which does not allow release of any personal wealth data without the permission of the court. Although the ACC Act clearly states that the Act shall prevail over other laws currently in force when the ACC investigates a corruption case, lack of knowledge and understanding of the laws raises ambiguities.150
Accountability and OversightThe dimension on ACC’s Accountability and Oversight received a moderate score of 62.5%, with two indicators scoring high, one moderate and one low. The indicators on information provided in ACC’s annual report, and outcomes of complaints against ACC personnel scored high, while the indicator on external oversight mechanism got low and the indicator of involvement of other public agencies in investigation got moderate score.
The major concern with regard to ACC’s accountability and oversight is the lack of any external oversight mechanism. Despite the fact that the ACC has a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Branch for evaluating inspection reports regularly, there is no public representation in the structure. There is no independent committee for oversight as such. The ACC submits the annual report to the President who, in turn, sends it to the Parliament.151 The Parliament has a mandate to look after it and may discuss and debate on this report. However, there are instances when the concerned Parliamentary Committee summoned the ACC, but it refused to attend.152
Another area of concern is that other public agencies are not regularly involved in investigation against ACC personnel to avoid conflict of interest. The Commission has constituted a permanent Internal Anti Corruption Committee, headed by its Chairman, to consistently monitor, supervise, enquire, and investigate into any corruption allegations against the ACC officials and to make recommendations for taking legal and departmental actions against the corrupt staff.153 Although there are instances where the Commission assigned another government agency to investigate into corruption allegation against one of its officials in 2011, and based on the investigation, charge-sheet against the officer was submitted, it is not a regular practice.154 However, the internal procedure for dealing with complaints against the ACC personnel is quite strong, and the outcomes are visible, and made public through the annual report.
150 Interviews with ACC officials, experts and CSO leaders.151 ACC Act 2004, Section 29.152 ‘ACC did not show up in the meeting: the Standing Committee will call again’, Prothom Alo, 29
January 2016.153 Under Rule 19 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Commission Rules 2007.154 Interview with Commissioner, ACC (15 March 2016); ACC website: http://www.acc.org.bd/about-acc/
monitoring-evaluation-cell (accessed on 27 March 2016).
53
Public Perceptions of ACC’s EffectivenessThe lowest score (28.57%) is attributed to the dimension on the Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance, where two indicators got low and four got moderate scores among seven indicators.
It appears that the ACC has not been able to create a positive impression of its effectiveness on the common people. The ACC has neither conducted nor commissioned any public perception survey on its performance. Many doubt ACC’s effectiveness. According to a cross country survey conducted by Transparency International, 16.7% are aware of activities of the ACC and only 9.1% of the respondents (of those who know about the ACC) stated that the ACC is doing well in fighting corruption in Bangladesh.155 Corrupt people are still out there – mainly in service sectors (health, land). ACC has to reach people, as they are not aware about ACC’s activities. People have no idea and information on different laws and mechanisms that are important for preventing corruption.156
People’s perception on ACC’s impartiality in handling similar kinds ofcorruption cases is also not very positive. According to some informants who had direct contact with the ACC stated that some of the ACC officials treat people according to their social status and network. In a few cases the concerned investigating officer treated the accused as if they are already convicted, when taken to ACC on remand. In some cases, the concerned person is misguided or influenced to give a statement. This is due to lack of information available to the concerned, lengthy procedure of ACC cases, and lack of integrity of some investigation officials. Another perception is that ACC is part and parcel of the government, as it is not beyond government’s control.157
According to ACC officials, the ACC lacks people’s trust. The common people have little idea about the activities of ACC or the anti-corruption laws. According to experts, CSO leaders and journalists, the ACC is entrusted with the required powers for curbing corruption, but the resources are not adequate.158
155 Transparency International, GCB Survey 2015 (unpublished).156 FGDs with CPC and CCC members, journalists (10 February and 23 March 2016); Interviews with
key informants.157 FGDs with CPC and CCC members, journalists (10 February and 23 March 2016); Interviews with
key informants.158 Interview with Commissioner, ACC (15 March 2016); FGDs with CPC and CCC members, journalists
(10 February and 23 March 2016); Interviews with key informants.
54
Tabl
e 10
: Det
aile
d In
dica
tor S
core
s, w
ith S
ourc
es a
nd C
omm
ents
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
1.
ACA
’s L
egal
Inde
pend
ence
and
Sta
tus
(7 in
dica
tors
)
1.
ACA’
s le
gal
inde
pend
ence
In
depe
nden
t
agen
cySe
para
te a
genc
y ou
tsid
e m
inist
ryW
ithin
pol
ice o
r m
inist
ryAc
cord
ing
to T
he A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t 200
4, th
e AC
C wi
ll be
an in
depe
nden
t, im
parti
al
and
self-
gove
rned
Com
miss
ion
[Sec
tion
3(2)
, (3
)], a
nd t
he C
omm
issio
ners
will
inde
pend
ently
di
scha
rge
thei
r dut
ies
[Sec
tion
24].
The
Com
miss
ion
is al
so fi
nanc
ially
inde
pend
ent a
s it
gets
its
annu
al b
udge
t fro
m th
e go
vern
men
t and
can
spe
nd a
ccor
ding
to th
eir n
eeds
with
out a
ny p
erm
issio
n as
per
law.
159
Sour
ce:
The
Anti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t 20
04,
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith A
CC s
taff,
For
mer
ACC
Ch
airm
an,
Com
miss
ione
r, CS
O l
eade
rs,
acad
emici
ans,
leg
al e
xper
t, po
litica
l le
ader
s, f
orm
er
gove
rnm
ent o
fficia
ls, jo
urna
lists
.
2.
ACA’
s m
anda
teFo
cus o
n inv
estig
ation
, ed
ucat
ion a
nd
prev
entio
n (a
nd
pros
ecut
ion if
appli
cable
)
Prim
ary
focu
s on
in
vest
igat
ion
Educ
atio
n an
d pr
even
tion
with
out
inve
stig
atio
n
The
Anti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t 200
4 de
scrib
es th
e m
anda
te o
f ACC
ela
bora
tely
[Pre
ambl
e an
d Se
ctio
n 17
]. Am
ong
11 fu
nctio
ns o
f ACC
, 5 a
re o
f pun
itive
and
6 ar
e of
pre
vent
ive n
atur
e. T
he
maj
or fu
nctio
ns in
clude
enq
uiry
and
inve
stig
atio
n, p
rose
cutio
n, p
reve
ntio
n, e
duca
tion,
and
rese
arch
.So
urce
: Th
e An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act
2004
; In
terv
iews
with
ACC
sta
ff, C
SO l
eade
rs,
Acad
emici
ans,
Leg
al e
xper
t, Po
litica
l lead
ers,
For
mer
Gov
t. O
fficia
ls, jo
urna
lists
.
3.
ACA’
s le
gal p
ower
sEx
tens
ive p
ower
s (e
.g.,
arre
st a
nd
sear
ch o
f arre
sted
pe
rson
s; e
xam
inin
g su
spec
t’s b
ank
acco
unts
, saf
e-de
posit
box
es,
inco
me
tax
reco
rds
and
prop
erty
; se
arch
and
ent
ry o
f pr
emise
s, e
tc.)
Som
e po
wers
Few
or n
one
Acco
rdin
g to
The
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act
2004
, su
bjec
t to
pro
visio
ns o
f th
is la
w, a
ny
com
miss
ione
r or a
ny o
ffice
r of t
he co
mm
issio
ner c
an e
xerc
ise su
ch p
ower
s as a
nd fu
nctio
ns a
s may
be
ass
igne
d to
him
/her
by
the
com
miss
ion
[Sec
tion
18].
Acco
rdin
g to
The
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act 2
004
the
Com
miss
ion
has
the
powe
r of i
nqui
ry
or in
vest
igat
ion
(sum
mon
witn
esse
s, e
nsur
e th
eir a
ppea
ranc
e an
d in
terro
gate
, disc
over
and
pre
sent
an
y do
cum
ent,
take
evid
ence
, cal
l for
pub
lic re
cord
s or
its
certi
fied
copi
es fr
om a
ny c
ourt
offic
e,
issue
war
rant
s fo
r th
e in
terro
gatio
n of
witn
esse
s an
d th
e ex
amin
atio
n of
doc
umen
ts, a
ny o
ther
m
atte
r req
uire
d fo
r rea
lizin
g an
d fu
lfillin
g th
e ai
ms
and
obje
ctive
s of
this
law)
[Sec
tion
19],
powe
r of
inve
stig
atio
n [S
ectio
n 20
], po
wer o
f arre
st [S
ectio
n 21
], po
wer o
f hea
ring
the
accu
sed
[Sec
tion
22],
powe
r of a
skin
g fo
r dec
lara
tion
of p
rope
rties
[Sec
tion
26],
powe
r of c
onfis
catin
g pr
oper
ty in
ex
cess
of k
nown
sou
rces
of i
ncom
e [S
ectio
n 27
], po
wer o
f filin
g ca
ses
[Sec
tion
32],
and
form
ulat
e ru
les
[Sec
tion
34].
Mor
eove
r, th
e Co
mm
issio
n m
ay c
all f
or a
ny in
form
atio
n fro
m th
e go
vern
men
t or
from
any
aut
horit
y or
org
anisa
tion
unde
r the
gov
ernm
ent d
urin
g an
y in
quiry
or i
nves
tigat
ion
into
al
lega
tions
of c
orru
ptio
n [S
ectio
n 23
(1)].
Sour
ce: T
he A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t 200
4.
159
Sect
ion
25(1
) of A
nt-C
orru
ptio
n C
omm
issi
on A
ct 2
004
says
that
the
gove
rnm
ent s
hall
allo
cate
a c
erta
in s
um in
favo
ur o
f the
com
mis
sion
for e
xpen
ditu
re. I
t sha
ll no
t be
nece
ssar
y fo
r the
Com
mis
sion
to o
btai
n an
y pe
rmis
sion
in a
dvan
ce fr
om th
e go
vern
men
t in
orde
r spe
nd th
e al
loca
ted
mon
ey.
55
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
4.
Appo
intm
ent o
f ACA
Co
mm
issio
ner(s
)In
depe
nden
t co
mm
ittee
usin
g ob
ject
ive c
riter
ia
and
proc
edur
e is
trans
pare
nt
Min
ister
ial c
omm
ittee
us
ing
obje
ctive
cr
iteria
but
pro
cedu
re
is no
t tra
nspa
rent
Prim
e M
inist
er/
Pres
iden
t/ He
ad o
f St
ate
mak
es th
e de
cisio
n an
d th
e pr
oced
ure
is no
t tra
nspa
rent
The
sele
ctio
n pr
oces
s an
d cr
iteria
are
spe
cifica
lly s
pelle
d ou
t in
The
Anti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t200
4. T
he C
hairm
an a
nd C
omm
issio
ners
are
app
oint
ed b
y th
e Pr
esid
ent u
pon
reco
mm
enda
tion
of a
sel
ectio
n co
mm
ittee
[Sec
tion
6(1)
]. Th
e Se
lect
ion
Com
mitt
ee is
by
law
inde
pend
ent i
n na
ture
, an
d is
com
prise
d of
a J
udge
of t
he A
ppel
late
Divi
sion
and
a Ju
dge
of th
e Hi
gh C
ourt
Divis
ion,
bot
h no
min
ated
by
the
Chie
f Jus
tice,
the
Com
ptro
ller a
nd A
udito
r Gen
eral
of B
angl
ades
h, th
e Ch
airm
an
of th
e Pu
blic
Serv
ice C
omm
issio
n, a
nd th
e la
test
retir
ed C
abin
et S
ecre
tary
. By
law
the
sele
ctio
n is
mad
e fro
m a
mon
g an
y pe
rson
hav
ing
“20
year
s of
exp
erie
nces
in la
w, e
duca
tion,
adm
inist
ratio
n,
judi
ciary
, or a
disc
iplin
ed fo
rce”
are
the
elig
ible
can
dida
tes
for t
he p
ost [
Sect
ion
8].
In t
he p
roce
ss,
the
sele
ctio
n co
mm
ittee
is s
uppo
sed
to a
sses
s in
divid
ual’s
per
ceive
d in
tegr
ity,
repu
tatio
n, a
dmin
istra
tive
or e
xper
ienc
e. T
he S
elec
tion
Com
mitt
ee m
akes
a p
ropo
sal b
ased
on
thei
r pr
efer
ence
s an
d kn
owle
dge
thro
ugh
a he
ad h
untin
g pr
oces
s. T
he S
elec
tion
Com
mitt
ee o
n th
e ba
sis
of th
e de
cisio
n of
at le
ast t
hree
mem
bers
pre
sent
shal
l mak
e a
list o
f two
nam
es fo
r eac
h va
cant
pos
t of
com
miss
ione
r and
sha
ll sen
d th
e lis
t to
the
Pres
iden
t for
app
oint
men
t [Se
ctio
n 7
(4)].
Howe
ver,
the
law
does
not
ens
ure
trans
pare
ncy
in th
e pr
oces
s, a
nd th
us “c
onfid
entia
lity” i
s st
rictly
m
aint
aine
d. T
he n
ames
and
the
prof
iles o
f the
sele
cted
are
not
disc
lose
d be
fore
hand
. Inf
orm
ants
not
ed
that
pol
itical
pro
ximity
, loy
alty
, and
pre
fere
nces
ofte
n su
bdue
oth
er v
irtue
s ne
eded
for t
he s
elec
tion.
Sour
ce: T
he A
nti-C
orru
ption
Com
miss
ion A
ct 20
04; I
nter
views
with
ACC
sta
ff, fo
rmer
ACC
Cha
irman
, Co
mm
ission
er, C
SO le
ader
s, ac
adem
ician
s, leg
al ex
pert,
politi
cal le
ader
s, fo
rmer
Gov
t. offic
ials,
journ
alists
.
5.
ACA
Com
miss
ione
r(s)’
term
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
Fixe
d te
rm w
ith
tenu
re (d
ifficu
lt to
rem
ove
Com
miss
ione
rs
with
out c
ause
, e.g
. in
com
pete
nce
or
prov
en m
iscon
duct
)
Fixe
d te
rm w
ithou
t te
nure
but
not
di
fficu
lt to
rem
ove
Com
miss
ione
rs
No fi
xed
term
and
Co
mm
issio
ners
can
be
repl
aced
eas
ily
The
tenu
re o
f th
e Ch
airm
an a
nd C
omm
issio
ners
are
fixe
d by
law
. Ac
cord
ing
to T
he A
nti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t200
4, th
e co
mm
issio
ners
are
app
oint
ed fo
r 5 y
ears
[Sec
tion
6(3)
]. Th
e Co
mm
issio
ners
are
wel
l pro
tect
ed fr
om a
ny fo
rcef
ul a
nd u
ndue
rem
oval
. Sec
tion
10(3
) of T
he A
nti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t, 20
04, p
rovid
es th
at n
o Co
mm
issio
ner s
hall
be re
mov
ed fr
om o
ffice
ex
cept
on
simila
r gro
unds
and
in a
ccor
danc
e wi
th th
e sim
ilar p
roce
dure
s as
app
lied
to th
e re
mov
al
of a
Jud
ge o
f the
Sup
rem
e Co
urt.16
0
Howe
ver,
to w
hat e
xten
t the
se tw
o gr
ound
s ar
e te
nabl
e in
disc
harg
e an
d im
plem
enta
tion
of A
CC’s
man
date
, and
how
inca
pacit
y an
d m
isbeh
avio
r are
def
ined
and
add
ress
ed a
nd w
ho in
itiate
s an
d in
vest
igat
es, a
nd b
ased
on
which
the
Pres
iden
t may
ord
er re
mov
al a
re n
ot c
lear
.So
urce
: The
Ant
i-Cor
rupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act 2
004;
Ban
glad
esh
Cons
titut
ion.
160
Befo
re 1
6th
Con
stitu
tiona
l am
endm
ent t
he p
roce
dure
of r
emov
al o
f the
Jud
ges
of th
e Su
prem
e C
ourt
was
mad
e th
roug
h a
Supr
eme
Judi
cial
Cou
ncil.
But
afte
r 16t
h C
onst
itutio
nal A
men
dmen
t the
rem
oval
of s
uch
kind
of c
onst
itutio
nal a
nd s
tatu
tory
pos
ition
s ar
e su
bjec
t to
the
appr
oval
of t
he p
arlia
men
t. Ac
cord
ing
to th
e Ba
ngla
desh
C
onst
itutio
n a
Judg
e sh
all n
ot b
e re
mov
ed fr
om h
is o
ffice
exc
ept b
y an
ord
er o
f the
Pre
side
nt p
asse
d pu
rsua
nt to
a re
solu
tion
of P
arlia
men
t sup
porte
d by
a m
ajor
ity o
f not
le
ss th
an tw
o-th
irds
of th
e to
tal n
umbe
r of m
embe
rs o
f Par
liam
ent,
on th
e gr
ound
of p
rove
d m
isbe
havi
or o
r inc
apac
ity [A
rticl
e 96
(2) &
(3)].
Par
liam
ent m
ay b
y la
w re
gula
te
the
proc
edur
e in
rela
tion
to a
reso
lutio
n un
der c
laus
e (2
) and
for i
nves
tigat
ion
and
proo
f of t
he m
isbe
havi
or o
r inc
apac
ity o
f a J
udge
. The
sam
e pr
oced
ure
is a
pplic
able
to th
e C
omm
issi
oner
s of
AC
C.
56
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
6.
ACA’
s op
erat
iona
l au
tono
my
and
impa
rtial
ity
High
(no
politi
cal
inte
rfere
nce)
Lim
ited
(som
e po
litica
l inte
rfere
nce)
Low
(hig
h le
vel o
f po
litica
l inte
rfere
nce)
A m
ixed
(pos
itive
and
nega
tive)
refle
ctio
n of
opi
nion
is fo
und
rega
rdin
g AC
C’s o
pera
tiona
l aut
onom
y an
d im
parti
ality
. ACC
com
miss
ione
rs a
nd o
fficia
ls cla
imed
that
they
hav
e su
fficie
nt o
pera
tiona
l au
tono
my
with
littl
e ex
cept
ion
in te
rms
of d
epen
denc
e on
the
Min
istry
of F
inan
ce fo
r its
bud
get
and
extra
allo
catio
n of
reso
urce
s if
and
when
nee
ded.
CSO
s an
d ex
perts
on
the
othe
r han
d no
ted
that
dep
ende
nce
on g
over
nmen
t for
bud
get a
nd m
anpo
wer s
houl
d no
t im
pede
ACC
’s fu
nctio
nal
auto
nom
y th
ough
it m
ay h
ave
a co
nstra
inin
g ef
fect
on
ACC’
s pe
rform
ance
.AC
C as
certa
ined
tha
t th
ey m
aint
ain
full
impa
rtial
ity i
n th
eir
all
activ
ities.
In
case
of
enqu
iry,
inve
stig
atio
n an
d fili
ng o
f cas
es th
ey d
o no
t tak
e in
to a
ccou
nt th
e po
litica
l and
soc
ial i
dent
ity o
f th
e ac
cuse
d. T
here
are
evid
ence
s th
at th
e AC
C ha
s lo
dged
cas
es a
gain
st m
any
high
pol
itical
pe
rson
s (s
uch
as m
inist
ers
and
MPs
) and
hig
h le
vel g
over
nmen
t offi
cials.
The
y do
not
face
any
kin
d of
pre
ssur
e or
influ
ence
. Sen
ior m
anag
emen
t of t
he A
CC n
oted
that
ope
ratio
nal a
uton
omy
and
impa
rtial
ity e
ssen
tially
dep
end
on th
e qu
ality
and
per
sona
lity/ p
rofile
of A
CC le
ader
ship
.Co
ntra
ry to
res
pons
es o
f ACC
offi
cials
abov
e, o
ther
inte
rvie
wees
que
stio
ned
ACC’
s op
erat
iona
l au
tono
my
and
impa
rtial
ity. T
heir
view
is th
at A
CC’s
oper
atio
nal a
uton
omy
is in
effe
ct o
n pa
per
but i
n pr
actic
e AC
C ca
n ha
rdly
exer
cise
its o
pera
tiona
l aut
onom
y. T
hey
also
not
ed th
at “A
CC is
no
t pol
itical
ly ne
utra
l”. F
or in
stan
ce, b
y an
alys
ing
the
data
on
ongo
ing
inve
stig
atio
ns a
gain
st 3
6 in
fluen
tial p
erso
ns, i
t was
foun
d th
at a
mon
g th
em 1
6 we
re a
gain
st th
e pe
rson
s be
long
ing
to th
e op
posit
ion
politi
cal p
artie
s, w
here
as o
nly
thre
e be
long
ed to
the
rulin
g pa
rty.16
1 In
spite
of h
avin
g en
ough
evid
ence
from
Ban
glad
esh
Bank
the
MD
of B
asic
Bank
was
not
inclu
ded
in c
harg
e sh
eet,
which
was
per
ceive
d to
hav
e po
litica
l con
nect
ion
at th
e hi
gh le
vel.
ACC
com
miss
ione
rs h
ave
the
powe
r of a
ppro
val t
o de
cide
agai
nst w
hom
the
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
will
be fi
led
and
ther
e ca
n be
cha
nce
of in
fluen
ce o
r par
tiality
. For
inst
ance
, in
the
Petro
bang
la c
ase
the
Inve
stig
atio
n O
ffice
r was
que
stio
nabl
y ch
ange
d, a
nd in
the
end
the
Com
miss
ion
gave
the
case
ap
prov
al w
ithou
t inc
ludi
ng th
e co
ncer
ned
chai
rman
in th
e ac
cuse
d lis
t. AC
C ca
n be
acc
used
to
“hav
e pl
ayed
par
tisan
role
and
did
not
take
act
ion
agai
nst a
ll acc
used
equ
ally”
. It i
s al
so a
llege
d th
at
som
etim
es p
anel
lawy
ers
were
ask
ed to
go
slow.
Sour
ce:
The
Anti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t 20
04;
inte
rvie
ws w
ith A
CC s
taff,
for
mer
ACC
Ch
airm
an, C
omm
issio
ner,
CSO
lead
ers,
pan
el la
wyer
, aca
dem
ician
s, le
gal e
xper
t, po
litica
l lead
ers,
fo
rmer
gov
ernm
ent o
fficia
ls, jo
urna
lists
.
161
Base
d on
the
data
col
lect
ed fr
om th
e AC
C (M
arch
201
6).
57
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
7.
Gov
ernm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
ACA
to
use
corru
ptio
n as
a
weap
on a
gain
st p
olitic
al
oppo
nent
s
Gov
ernm
ent h
as
not u
sed
ACA
as
a we
apon
aga
inst
po
litica
l opp
onen
ts
Evid
ence
of l
imite
d us
e of
ACA
by
gove
rnm
ent a
s a
weap
on a
gain
st
politi
cal o
ppon
ents
Evid
ence
of
wide
spre
ad u
se o
f AC
A by
gov
ernm
ent
as a
wea
pon
agai
nst
politi
cal o
ppon
ents
ACC
auth
ority
cla
imed
that
ACC
is n
ot u
sed
by th
e go
vern
men
t to
expl
oit p
olitic
al o
ppon
ents
, and
th
ere
is no
gov
ernm
ent i
nflu
ence
. The
y fu
rther
cla
imed
that
ACC
doe
s no
t see
the
pers
on b
ut th
e m
erit
of th
e ca
se a
nd q
uality
of t
he in
vest
igat
ion
when
givi
ng c
harg
e sh
eet &
FRT
. How
ever
, the
y ad
mitt
ed th
at A
CC h
as im
age
crisi
s.It
is pe
rcei
ved
by k
ey in
form
ants
(ex
perts
, aca
dem
ics, a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n ac
tivist
s, p
olitic
al le
ader
s)
that
the
ACC
has
been
use
d as
a to
ol fo
r pol
itical
har
assm
ent a
nd fa
vorin
g po
liticia
ns o
f the
rulin
g pa
rty. F
or in
stan
ce, a
n an
alys
is of
the
data
on
ongo
ing
inve
stig
atio
ns a
gain
st 3
6 in
fluen
tial p
erso
ns,
it wa
s fo
und
that
am
ong
them
16
were
aga
inst
per
sons
bel
ongi
ng to
the
oppo
sitio
n po
litica
l par
ties,
wh
erea
s on
ly th
ree
belo
nged
to th
e ru
ling
party
.162 T
his
raise
s se
rious
que
stio
ns re
gard
ing
ACC’
s cr
edib
ility
in te
rms
of o
bjec
tive
and
inde
pend
ent h
andl
ing
of c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses.
Ther
e ar
e al
so e
viden
ces o
f ACC
’s fili
ng o
f cor
rupt
ion
case
s, in
vest
igat
ion
and
conv
ictio
n of
top
leve
l po
litica
l lead
ers o
f the
rulin
g pa
rty in
the
past
thre
e ye
ars.
For
inst
ance
, rec
ently
in a
corru
ptio
n ca
se
agai
nst t
he M
inist
er fo
r Foo
d, R
elie
f and
Disa
ster
Man
agem
ent t
he A
ppel
late
Divi
sion
repe
aled
the
High
Cou
rt ju
dgm
ent o
f acq
uitta
l, an
d up
held
the
puni
shm
ent a
ward
ed b
y th
e lo
wer c
ourt.
163
Sour
ce:
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith A
CC s
taff,
for
mer
ACC
Cha
irman
, Co
mm
issio
ner,
CSO
lea
ders
, ac
adem
ician
s, le
gal e
xper
t, po
litica
l lead
ers,
form
er g
over
nmen
t offi
cials,
jour
nalis
ts.
2.
ACA’
s Fi
nanc
ial a
nd H
uman
Res
ourc
es (9
indi
cato
rs)
8.
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
AC
A’s
budg
et to
tota
l go
vern
men
t bud
get f
or
past
3 y
ears
Abov
e 0.
20%
Betw
een
0.10
% to
0.
20%
Belo
w 0.
10%
The
aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
ACC
’s bu
dget
to to
tal g
over
nmen
t bud
get h
as n
ot b
een
mor
e th
an 0
.025
%
in th
e la
st th
ree
year
s.
Sour
ce: M
inist
ry o
f Fin
ance
web
site;
ACC
Ann
ual r
epor
t 201
4.
9.
Suffi
cienc
y of
ACA
’s bu
dget
for p
erfo
rmin
g its
fu
nctio
ns
Mor
e th
an a
dequ
ate
(80%
to 1
00%
of
budg
et re
ques
t is
appr
oved
)
Adeq
uate
(66%
to
79%
of b
udge
t re
ques
t is
appr
oved
)
Inad
equa
te (l
ess
than
66%
of b
udge
t re
ques
t is
appr
oved
) an
d re
lies
on fu
ndin
g by
CSO
s an
d do
nor
agen
cies
Usua
lly th
e to
tal b
udge
t (10
0%) r
eque
sted
by
the
ACC
is ap
prov
ed a
nd p
rovid
ed b
y th
e M
inist
ry o
f Fi
nanc
e. H
owev
er, s
omet
imes
it re
quire
s hi
gher
allo
catio
n fo
r a n
umbe
r of a
ctivi
ties
(inve
stig
atio
n,
pros
ecut
ion
and
prev
entio
n). I
n or
der t
o ca
ter t
o th
e ne
eds
(suc
h as
trai
ning
, cap
acity
bui
ldin
g, a
nd
orga
nizin
g ev
ents
) AC
C re
ceive
s fin
ancia
l sup
port
from
oth
er a
genc
ies
(CSO
s an
d in
tern
atio
nal
bila
tera
l dev
elop
men
t par
tner
s).
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (1
6 M
arch
201
6).
162
Base
d on
the
data
col
lect
ed fr
om th
e AC
C (M
arch
201
6).
163
Dai
ly A
mad
erSh
omoy
.com
: http
://w
ww
.am
ader
shom
oys.
com
/new
site
/201
6/04
/10/
5667
48.h
tm#.
Vxxq
zDFq
_IV
(acc
esse
d on
24
April
201
6).
58
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
10.
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
ACA’
s bu
dget
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
ACA
budg
et is
gu
aran
teed
bas
ed
on p
revio
us y
ear’s
al
loca
tion
and
has
not b
een
redu
ced
ACA
budg
et h
as n
ot
been
redu
ced
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
ACA
budg
et h
as
been
redu
ced
durin
g pa
st th
ree
year
s
Ove
r the
last
thre
e ye
ars
the
allo
catio
n fo
r the
ACC
has
bee
n gr
adua
lly ra
ised,
with
an
incr
ease
of
deve
lopm
ent b
udge
t.164
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (1
6 M
arch
201
6); A
CC
Annu
al R
epor
ts 2
013,
201
4.
11.
ACA
pers
onne
l’s s
alar
y an
d be
nefit
sCo
mpe
titive
sal
ary
and
bene
fits
Adeq
uate
sal
ary
and
bene
fits
Low
sala
ry a
nd
limite
d be
nefit
sTh
e AC
C pe
rson
nel r
ecei
ve s
alar
ies
and
bene
fits
acco
rdin
g to
the
gove
rnm
ent p
ay s
cale
. Give
n th
e ne
w pa
y sc
ale
intro
duce
d la
st y
ear b
y th
e go
vern
men
t, AC
C of
ficia
ls co
nsid
er it
ade
quat
e.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, A
dmin
istra
tion,
Est
ablis
hmen
t and
Fin
ance
, ACC
(16
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
12.
ACA’
s se
lect
ion
crite
ria
for p
erso
nnel
Mer
itocr
atic
and
trans
pare
nt
proc
edur
es
Lim
ited
mer
itocr
atic
or tr
ansp
aren
t pr
oced
ures
Patro
nage
and
no
n-tra
nspa
rent
pr
oced
ures
The
recr
uitm
ent o
f ACC
sta
ff ca
nnot
be
term
ed to
tally
mer
itocr
atic
as 5
5% o
f the
vac
ant p
ositio
ns a
re
filled
in fr
om d
iffere
nt g
roup
s und
er q
uota
165 a
nd th
e re
st on
mer
it. Th
e AC
C fo
llows
The
Ant
i Cor
rupt
ion
Com
miss
ion (
Pers
onne
l) Em
ploym
ent
Rules
, 20
08 f
or it
s re
cruit
men
t. It
is ba
sed
on c
ompe
titive
ex
amina
tions
, sub
ject t
o va
rious
regio
nal,
gend
er a
nd e
thnic
quo
tas
pres
cribe
d by
the
gove
rnm
ent
which
is ap
plica
ble to
all p
ublic
recr
uitm
ents
in th
e cou
ntry
. The
selec
tion p
roce
dure
is to
tally
tran
spar
ent
as it
is m
anag
ed b
y the
Insti
tute
of B
usine
ss A
dmini
strat
ion (I
BA) o
f the
Univ
ersit
y of D
haka
. So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, A
dmin
istra
tion,
Est
ablis
hmen
t and
Fin
ance
, ACC
(16
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
13.
Expe
rtise
of A
CA’s
pers
onne
l in c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ion
High
leve
l of
expe
rtise
Lack
ing
expe
rtise
in
som
e ar
eas
Lack
ing
expe
rtise
in
man
y ar
eas
ACC
pers
onne
l lac
k re
quisi
te e
xper
tise
in s
ome
aspe
cts
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ion.
Acc
ordi
ng to
so
me
of th
e hi
gh o
fficia
ls of
ACC
and
oth
er s
take
hold
ers,
ther
e is
lack
of u
nder
stan
ding
am
ong
the
new
staf
f on
how
to in
vest
igat
e co
rrupt
ion,
whi
le th
e ol
der s
taffs
do
not k
eep
abre
ast w
ith th
e la
test
form
s an
d te
chni
ques
of c
orru
ptio
n su
ch a
s, m
oney
laun
derin
g an
d us
e of
cyb
er te
chno
logy
in
cor
rupt
ion.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (1
6 M
arch
201
6), D
G,
Dete
ctio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6), D
G, L
egal
and
Pro
secu
tion,
ACC
(2 M
arch
201
6);
Cabi
net D
ivisio
n, A
n In
depe
nden
t Rev
iew
of N
atio
nal I
nteg
rity
Stra
tegy
(NIS
), 20
13, p
. 39.
14.
Expe
rtise
of A
CA’s
pers
onne
l in c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
and
educ
atio
n
High
leve
l of
expe
rtise
Lack
ing
expe
rtise
in
som
e ar
eas
Lack
ing
expe
rtise
in
man
y ar
eas
Acco
rdin
g to
som
e of
the
hig
h of
ficia
ls of
ACC
, th
e re
leva
nt p
erso
nnel
eng
aged
in c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
and
educ
atio
n ar
e no
t ade
quat
ely
skille
d in
term
s of
com
mun
icatio
n. M
oreo
ver,
they
m
ostly
rely
on th
e lo
cal c
omm
ittee
s (‘C
orru
ptio
n Pr
even
tion
Com
mitt
ee’ a
nd ‘I
nteg
rity
Unit’)
cre
ated
fo
r pre
vent
ing
corru
ptio
n an
d pr
omot
ing
inte
grity
. So
urce
: In
terv
iew
with
DG
, Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (
16 M
arch
201
6);
Dire
ctor
, Pre
vent
ion,
Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach,
ACC
(10
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
164
For d
etai
ls p
leas
e se
e C
hapt
er 2
of t
his
repo
rt.16
5 Fo
r det
ails
see
http
://w
ww
.bps
c.go
v.bd
/pla
tform
/nod
e/61
.bps
c201
2.pm
l (ac
cess
ed o
n 24
Apr
il 20
16).
59
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
15.
Trai
ning
of A
CA’s
pers
onne
lW
ell-t
rain
ed
pers
onne
l with
man
y tra
inin
g op
portu
nitie
s
Som
e tra
ined
pe
rson
nel w
ith lim
ited
train
ing
oppo
rtuni
ties
Trai
ning
is
unim
porta
nt a
nd
negl
ecte
d
Trai
ning
is a
noth
er a
rea
that
nee
ds m
ore
atte
ntio
n. T
he A
CC o
fficia
ls ar
e se
nt to
shor
t tra
inin
g co
urse
s sp
onso
red
by g
over
nmen
t dep
artm
ents
, non
-gov
ernm
ent o
rgan
isatio
ns a
nd d
evel
opm
ent p
artn
ers.
In
the
last
thre
e ye
ars 4
7 tra
inin
g pr
ogra
ms w
ere
orga
nize
d fo
r the
ACC
staf
f in w
hich
956
staf
f too
k par
t. So
me2
5 of
thes
e tra
inin
gs c
over
ed te
chni
cal a
spec
ts s
uch
as a
nti-m
oney
laun
derin
g an
d co
unte
r-fin
ancin
g of
terro
rism
and
ass
et re
cove
ry, P
ublic
Pro
cure
men
t Act
200
6 an
d Pu
blic
Proc
urem
ent
Rule
s 20
08, l
and
man
agem
ent;
som
e 51
0 st
aff t
ook
part
in th
ese
train
ings
. Oth
er tr
aini
ngs
focu
sed
on n
on-te
chni
cal is
sues
, suc
h as
, bas
ic tra
inin
g on
com
pute
r, En
glish
lang
uage
, orie
ntat
ion
on A
CC
and
rela
ted
laws
inclu
ding
The
Rig
ht to
Info
rmat
ion
Act,
and
othe
r rel
evan
t iss
ues.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (1
6 M
arch
, 7 A
pril
2016
); AC
C An
nual
Rep
ort 2
014.
16.
Stab
ility
of A
CA’s
pers
onne
lLo
w tu
rnov
er a
nd
resig
natio
n ra
te (0
%
to 5
% p
er y
ear)
Mod
erat
e tu
rnov
er
and
resig
natio
n ra
te
(mor
e th
an 5
% to
10
% p
er y
ear)
High
turn
over
and
re
signa
tion
rate
(m
ore
than
10%
per
ye
ar)
The
turn
over
rate
of A
CC is
low
(2.7
1% p
er y
ear d
urin
g th
e la
st th
ree
year
s). S
uch
turn
over
was
du
e to
retir
emen
t, re
signa
tion
and
term
inat
ion
of th
e co
ncer
ned
staf
f. Te
rmin
atio
n to
ok p
lace
as
depa
rtmen
tal p
rose
cutio
n as
a re
sult
of a
llega
tion
raise
d ag
ains
t the
m a
nd d
uly
inve
stig
ated
and
pr
oven
. Mor
eove
r, ar
ound
14%
of t
he s
taff
recr
uite
d in
the
last
thre
e ye
ars
left
ACC
in th
e la
st fe
w ye
ars
for b
ette
r car
eer o
ppor
tuni
ties.
Sour
ce:
Inte
rvie
w wi
th D
G, A
dmin
istra
tion,
Est
ablis
hmen
t and
Fin
ance
, ACC
(16
Mar
ch 2
016)
; fo
rmer
Com
miss
ione
r (22
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
3.
ACA’
s De
tect
ion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n Fu
nctio
n (9
indi
cato
rs)
17.
ACA’
s ac
cess
ibilit
y to
co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nant
s/in
form
ants
, inc
ludi
ng
publ
ic an
d wh
istle
-bl
ower
s du
ring
past
3
year
s
ACA
is hi
ghly
acce
ssib
le a
s re
flect
ed in
the
high
pro
porti
on o
f co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
rela
tive
to p
opul
atio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of
cor
rupt
ion,
an
d pr
opor
tion
of c
ompl
aina
nts
conf
iden
t to
iden
tify
them
selve
s
ACA
is ac
cess
ible
as
refle
cted
in th
e m
oder
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
rela
tive
to p
opul
atio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of c
orru
ptio
n,
and
prop
ortio
n of
com
plai
nant
s co
nfid
ent t
o id
entif
y th
emse
lves
ACA
is in
acce
ssib
le
as re
flect
ed in
lo
w pr
opor
tion
of
corru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s re
ceive
d re
lativ
e to
pop
ulat
ion
and
perc
eive
d le
vel
of c
orru
ptio
n,
and
prop
ortio
n of
com
plai
nant
s co
nfid
ent t
o id
entif
y th
emse
lves
Com
plai
nts
are
rece
ived
in a
ll th
e AC
C of
fices
. In
the
last
thre
e ye
ars
in to
tal 2
9,43
0 co
mpl
aint
s (9
,810
com
plai
nts
on a
vera
ge p
er y
ear a
nd a
ccou
nts
for a
bout
0.0
06%
of t
he c
ount
ry’s
popu
latio
n)
were
rec
eive
d by
the
ACC.
How
ever
, alm
ost a
ll th
e co
mpl
aint
s we
re a
nony
mou
s an
d th
us th
e pr
ofile
of t
he c
ompl
aina
nts
coul
d no
t be
reve
aled
. Ano
nym
ity is
ther
efor
e a
com
mon
feat
ure
of th
e co
mpl
aint
s wh
ich m
ay b
e re
sorte
d to
eith
er to
har
ass
a pe
rson
or f
or fe
ar o
f bei
ng h
aras
sed
or
thre
aten
ed.
ACC
does
not
hav
e an
y sy
stem
/ stru
ctur
e fo
r pro
tect
ing
the
whist
le-b
lowe
rs. H
owev
er, p
rote
ctio
n wa
s pr
ovid
ed to
5-6
per
sons
dur
ing
this
perio
d wh
o pr
ovid
ed s
uppo
rt in
iden
tifyin
g co
rrupt
offi
cials
thro
ugh
‘trap
’ cas
es. S
uch
prot
ectio
n wa
s pr
ovid
ed b
y re
ques
ting
resp
ectiv
e po
lice
offic
ers.
Cons
ider
ing
the
low
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
rela
tive
to th
e po
pula
tion
and
high
per
ceive
d le
vel o
f cor
rupt
ion(
acco
rdin
g to
TIB
’s Ho
useh
old
Surv
ey 2
015,
67.
8% o
f the
ser
vice
recip
ient
s ex
perie
nced
cor
rupt
ion)
, and
pro
porti
on o
f com
plai
nant
s co
nfid
ent t
o id
entif
y th
emse
lves,
th
e AC
C ca
nnot
be
term
ed a
s ac
cess
ible
to c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aina
nts.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Det
ectio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6).
60
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
18.
ACA’
s re
spon
siven
ess
to c
orru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s du
ring
past
3 y
ears
ACA
is hi
ghly
resp
onsiv
e as
re
flect
ed in
the
high
pro
porti
on o
f co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
and
in
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
ACA
is re
spon
sive
as re
flect
ed in
th
e m
oder
ate
prop
ortio
n of
co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
and
in
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
ACA
is no
t re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e lo
w pr
opor
tion
of
corru
ptio
n co
mpl
aint
s in
vest
igat
ed a
nd
inve
stig
atio
n ca
ses
com
plet
ed d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
A co
mm
ittee
com
prise
d of
a D
eput
y an
d an
Ass
istan
t Dire
ctor
is re
spon
sible
for s
crut
inizi
ng th
e co
mpl
aint
s re
ceive
d by
the
ACC.
It is
obs
erve
d th
at m
ost o
f the
se c
ompl
aint
s do
not
fall
unde
r the
sc
hedu
led
offe
nses
und
er A
CC’s
man
date
. Afte
r scr
utin
y on
ly co
mpl
aint
s th
at a
re c
ogni
zabl
e (o
n an
ave
rage
9.6
3% o
f the
com
plai
nts)
wer
e ta
ken
for f
urth
er e
nqui
ry d
urin
g th
e la
st th
ree
year
s.
Amon
g th
e co
mpl
aint
s se
lect
ed fo
r enq
uiry
, 24.
04%
wer
e se
nt to
the
conc
erne
d m
inist
ry/ d
ivisio
n fo
r fur
ther
act
ion.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Det
ectio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6).
19.
ACA’
s wi
llingn
ess
to in
itiate
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
High
num
ber
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
in
itiate
d by
ACA
Mod
erat
e nu
mbe
r of
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initia
ted
by A
CA
Low
num
ber
of c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
in
itiate
d by
ACA
Durin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s a
tota
l num
ber o
f 5,1
61 c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
wer
e in
itiate
d by
the
ACC.
The
num
ber h
as b
een
incr
easin
g ov
er th
e la
st te
n ye
ars,
and
can
be
cons
ider
ed h
igh
give
n th
e ex
istin
g hu
man
reso
urce
.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n, A
CC (3
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
20.
Aver
age
num
ber o
f ca
ses
inve
stig
ated
by
the
ACA
per y
ear d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Mor
e th
an 1
,000
co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e AC
A pe
r yea
r dur
ing
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
Betw
een
300
to 9
99
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
inve
stig
ated
by
the
ACA
per y
ear d
urin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s
Less
than
300
co
rrupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e AC
A pe
r yea
r dur
ing
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
The
tota
l num
ber o
f cor
rupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e AC
C wa
s 3,
061
(1,0
20 p
er y
ear)
durin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Det
ectio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6).
21.
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
siona
lism
of
corru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
by
ACA
dur
ing
past
3
year
s
High
ly ef
ficie
nt
and
prof
essio
nal
inve
stig
atio
n of
co
rrupt
ion
case
s
Effic
ient
and
pr
ofes
siona
l in
vest
igat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
Inef
ficie
nt a
nd
unpr
ofes
siona
l in
vest
igat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n ca
ses
It ha
s be
en m
entio
ned
earli
er th
at th
ere
is la
ck o
f exp
ertis
e am
ong
the
ACC
pers
onne
l in
som
e as
pect
s of
cor
rupt
ion
inve
stig
atio
n. A
lthou
gh T
he A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t200
4 cle
arly
men
tions
a tim
elin
e fo
r com
plet
ing
corru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
, usu
ally
it tak
es m
ore
than
the
pres
crib
ed
time.
Acc
ordi
ng to
ACC
offi
cials,
it is
not
pos
sible
to m
easu
re th
e av
erag
e tim
e ta
ken
by th
e AC
C of
ficia
ls to
com
plet
e th
e in
vest
igat
ion
of a
cor
rupt
ion
case
as
the
dura
tion
varie
s de
pend
ing
on th
e na
ture
of t
he o
ffenc
e. W
hile
the
high
offi
cials
of A
CC c
laim
that
the
offic
ers
invo
lved
in c
orru
ptio
n in
vest
igat
ion
are
effic
ient
and
pro
fess
iona
l, ex
perts
exp
ress
ed th
eir c
once
rn o
n th
e ef
ficie
ncy
and
prof
essio
nalis
m o
f the
ACC
inve
stig
atin
g of
ficia
ls.So
urce
: In
terv
iews
with
DG
, Det
ectio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3
Mar
ch 2
016)
; DG
, Leg
al a
nd
Pros
ecut
ion,
ACC
(2 M
arch
201
6); e
xper
ts, p
anel
lawy
ers,
CSO
lead
ers.
22.
Aver
age
conv
ictio
n ra
te o
f cor
rupt
ion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y AC
A in
pa
st 3
yea
rs
Abov
e 75
%Be
twee
n 50
% to
75%
Belo
w 50
%Du
ring
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
(201
3 –
2015
)ther
e we
re a
tota
l of 2
09 c
onvic
tions
out
of 5
30 d
ispos
ed
case
s (37
%) l
odge
d by
the
ACC,
whi
le a
tota
l of 8
2 we
re co
nvict
ed o
ut o
f 274
disp
osed
case
s (30
%)
lodg
ed b
y th
e Bu
reau
.So
urce
: In
terv
iew
with
DG
, De
tect
ion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n, A
CC (
3 M
arch
201
6);
DG,
Lega
l and
Pr
osec
utio
n, A
CC (2
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
61
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
23.
ACA’
s wi
llingn
ess
to
inve
stig
ate
influ
entia
l pe
rson
s fo
r cor
rupt
ion
with
out f
ear o
r fav
our
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Cons
ider
able
ev
iden
ce o
f in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
for
corru
ptio
n
Som
e ev
iden
ce
of in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
for
corru
ptio
n
No e
viden
ce o
f in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
for
corru
ptio
n
Durin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s th
e AC
C in
itiate
d en
quiry
into
and
inve
stig
ated
mor
e th
an 3
0 in
fluen
tial
pers
ons
inclu
ding
exis
ting
and
form
er M
inist
ers
and
Stat
e M
inist
ers,
MPs
, May
ors,
gov
ernm
ent
high
offi
cials
(form
er s
ecre
tary
, Dire
ctor
Gen
eral
/ Dire
ctor
of g
over
nmen
t age
ncie
s), a
nd in
fluen
tial
busin
ess
pers
ons.
A n
umbe
r of t
hem
wer
e iss
ued
char
ge s
heet
s, s
ome
were
arre
sted
and
oth
ers
were
con
victe
d in
the
cou
rt. T
his
sugg
ests
ACC
’s wi
llingn
ess
to i
nves
tigat
e co
rrupt
ion
case
s irr
espe
ctive
of p
ower
and
pos
itions
in th
e so
ciety
. So
urce
: In
terv
iew
with
for
mer
Com
miss
ione
r, AC
C (2
2 M
arch
201
6);
DG,
Dete
ctio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6); D
G, L
egal
and
Pro
secu
tion,
ACC
(2 M
arch
201
6).
24.
ACA’
s ro
le in
rest
itutio
n,
asse
t rec
over
y, fr
eezin
g an
d co
nfisc
atio
n du
ring
past
3 y
ears
Very
act
ive ro
le b
y AC
AM
oder
atel
y ac
tive
role
by
ACA
Inac
tive
role
by
ACA
Durin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s, th
e AC
C fro
ze a
nd c
onfis
cate
d a
tota
l am
ount
equ
ivale
nt to
BDT
728.
12
milli
on th
roug
h co
urt.
Apar
t fro
m th
is ar
ound
BDT2
45.3
milli
on w
as c
onfis
cate
d in
mon
ey la
unde
ring
and
othe
r cas
es (e
xclu
ding
imm
ovab
le p
rope
rty c
onfis
cate
d in
201
5).
Howe
ver,
cons
ider
ing
the
volu
me
of c
apita
l flig
ht fr
om B
angl
ades
h (e
stim
ated
US$
5.6
billi
on d
urin
g 20
04-2
013;
US$
430
milli
on p
er ye
ar),
and
the
estim
ated
loss
due
to co
rrupt
ion
(at le
ast 2
-3%
of t
he
GDP
)166 ,
the
amou
nt re
cove
red
by th
e AC
C is
not s
igni
fican
t.M
oreo
ver,
ther
e ar
e ch
alle
nges
in th
e re
cove
ry a
nd m
aint
enan
ce o
f the
atta
ched
ass
ets.
So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n, A
CC (3
Mar
ch 2
016)
; “De
vKar
and
Jos
eph
Span
jers
, Illic
it Fi
nanc
ial F
lows
from
Dev
elop
ing
Coun
tries
: 200
4-20
13. G
loba
l Fin
ancia
l Int
egrit
y,
Dece
mbe
r 20
15;
http
://bd
news
24.c
om/e
cono
my/
2015
/07/
09/2
-3-p
erce
nt-o
f-gdp
-lost
-to-c
orru
ptio
n-m
uhith
(acc
esse
d on
25
April
201
6).
25.
Does
the
ACA
iden
tify
gend
er in
com
pilin
g co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
and
mon
itorin
g co
rrupt
ion
trend
s?
The
ACA
has
gend
er s
ensit
ive
dem
ogra
phic
info
rmat
ion
that
al
lows
it to
mon
itor
how
corru
ptio
n an
d its
ser
vices
affe
ct
wom
en d
iffer
ently
The
ACA
has
gend
er s
ensit
ive
dem
ogra
phic
info
rmat
ion
that
cou
ld
allo
w it
to m
onito
r ho
w co
rrupt
ion
and
its s
ervic
es a
ffect
wo
men
diff
eren
tly,
but i
t doe
s no
t ac
tivel
y m
onito
r th
ese
diffe
renc
es.
The
ACA
does
no
t col
lect
ge
nder
sen
sitive
de
mog
raph
ic in
form
atio
n.
Gen
der s
egre
gate
d da
ta o
n co
rrupt
ion
com
plai
nts
are
not c
olle
cted
mai
nly
beca
use
mos
t cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
are
lodg
ed a
nony
mou
sly. T
here
has
not
bee
n an
y at
tem
pt s
o fa
r by
the
ACC
to id
entif
y di
ffere
nt n
eeds
of t
he c
itizen
s es
pecia
lly w
omen
and
oth
er m
argi
naliz
ed g
roup
s.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n, A
CC (3
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
166
The
Bang
lade
sh B
urea
u of
Sta
tistic
s (B
BS) p
uts
Bang
lade
sh’s
cur
rent
GD
P at
aro
und
Tk 1
5.14
trilli
on, s
o a
3 pe
rcen
t los
s of
GD
P w
ould
be
as h
igh
as T
k 45
0 bi
llion.
For
det
ails
se
e: h
ttp://
bdne
ws2
4.co
m/e
cono
my/
2015
/07/
09/2
-3-p
erce
nt-o
f-gdp
-lost
-to-c
orru
ptio
n-m
uhith
(acc
esse
d on
25
April
201
6).
62
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
4.
ACA’
s Pr
even
tion,
Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach
Func
tions
(9 in
dica
tors
)
26.
Aver
age
prop
ortio
n of
ACA
’s op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re a
lloca
ted
to p
ublic
out
reac
h an
d pr
even
tion
durin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
Abov
e 1%
of
ACA’
s op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re
Betw
een
0.5%
an
d 1%
of
ACA’
s op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re
Belo
w 0.
5% o
f AC
A’s
oper
atin
g ex
pend
iture
An a
mou
nt o
f BDT
15
milli
on h
as b
een
allo
cate
d fo
r pub
lic o
utre
ach
and
prev
entio
n in
the
fisca
l yea
r (2
015-
16),16
7 whi
ch is
aro
und
2.65
% o
f the
ACC
bud
get.
The
tota
l ope
ratin
g bu
dget
of A
CC in
the
last
thre
e ye
ars
is BD
T 1,
605.
38 m
illion
.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
irect
or, P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h, A
CC (1
0 M
arch
201
6); A
CC
Annu
al re
port
2014
.
27.
ACA’
s co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiativ
es
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Man
y co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiativ
es
(ave
rage
of 3
or m
ore
per y
ear)
Som
e co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiativ
es
(ave
rage
of 1
-2 p
er
year
)
ACA
initia
ted
few
or n
o co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
itiativ
es
The
ACC
impl
emen
ts m
ultip
le c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initia
tives
bot
h at
nat
iona
l and
loca
l lev
els.
At
the
natio
nal le
vel th
e Co
mm
issio
n un
derta
kes p
reve
ntio
n ac
tivitie
s suc
h as
cam
paig
ns th
roug
h we
ek
and
day
obse
rvat
ions
(obs
ervin
g An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Wee
k in
Mar
ch a
nd ‘I
nter
natio
nal A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n Da
y’ in
Dec
embe
r ev
ery
year
), or
gani
zing
even
ts (
hum
an c
hain
s, m
eetin
gs,
rallie
s),
and
othe
r pr
omot
iona
l act
ivitie
s (a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n m
essa
ging
in th
e le
adin
g na
tiona
l dai
lies,
exh
ibitio
n of
sho
rt film
s, se
ndin
g te
xt m
essa
ges t
o m
obile
pho
ne u
sers
to re
frain
from
corru
ptio
n, d
istrib
utio
n of
T-s
hirts
in
scrib
ed w
ith s
loga
ns a
gain
st c
orru
ptio
n am
ong
com
mon
peo
ple,
diss
emin
atio
n of
ant
i-cor
rupt
ion
serm
ons
by im
ams
of m
osqu
es, a
nd d
issem
inat
ion
of a
nti-c
orru
ptio
n po
ster
s).M
oreo
ver,
the
ACC
has
star
ted
to c
ondu
ct p
ublic
hea
rings
in g
over
nmen
t and
sem
i-gov
ernm
ent o
ffice
s, w
ith a
vie
w to
ra
ising
awa
rene
ss a
bout
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n.At
the
loc
al l
evel
the
Com
miss
ion
has
been
eng
aged
in
cons
titut
ing
Corru
ptio
n Pr
even
tion
Com
mitt
ees
at th
e up
azila
, dist
rict a
nd m
etro
polita
n le
vels
as w
ell a
s ‘In
tegr
ity U
nits
’ in e
duca
tiona
l in
stitu
tions
. The
re a
re a
tota
l of 4
93 C
PCs
and
21,7
44 In
tegr
ity U
nits
all
over
the
coun
try. T
he ro
le
of th
ese
com
mitt
ees
is cr
ucia
l in
carry
ing
out C
orru
ptio
n Pr
even
tion
Wee
k (2
6 M
arch
to 1
Apr
il of
ev
ery y
ear)
and
obse
rvin
g In
tern
atio
nal A
nti C
orru
ptio
n Da
y on
9 De
cem
ber a
cros
s the
coun
try. T
he
CPCs
org
anize
d di
scus
sions
(6,7
59),
deba
tes
(1,3
38),
essa
y co
mpe
titio
ns (1
,240
), hu
man
cha
ins
(2,2
59),
rallie
s (2
,397
), se
min
ars
(485
), dr
amas
(544
), sp
eech
es b
y di
stin
guish
ed p
erso
ns (2
,345
), an
d ot
her e
vent
s (3,
406)
thro
ugho
ut th
e ye
ar d
urin
g 20
12 –
201
4, w
hile
the
Inte
grity
Uni
ts o
rgan
ized
simila
r eve
nts
in 2
014.
So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
irect
or, P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h, A
CC (1
0 M
arch
201
6); A
CC
Annu
al re
port
2014
.
167
http
://w
ww
.acc
.org
.bd/
asse
ts/b
udge
t_al
loca
tion_
2015
-201
6.pd
f (ac
cess
ed o
n 28
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
63
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
28.
Num
ber o
f rev
iews
of
org
anisa
tiona
l pr
oced
ures
, sys
tem
s &c
apab
ilitie
s co
nduc
ted
by A
CA to
pre
vent
co
rrupt
ion
durin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
Man
y re
views
wer
e co
nduc
ted
(rela
tive
to
no. o
f org
anisa
tions
in
juris
dict
ion)
A su
bsta
ntia
l num
ber
of re
views
wer
e co
nduc
ted
(rela
tive
to
no. o
f org
anisa
tions
in
juris
dict
ion)
Few
or n
o re
views
we
re c
ondu
cted
(re
lativ
e to
no.
of
orga
nisa
tions
in
juris
dict
ion)
To d
eal w
ith th
e in
stitu
tiona
l cor
rupt
ion
in th
e pu
blic
sect
or A
CC fo
rmed
11
team
s.16
8 Eac
h te
am
com
prise
d of
3-5
mem
bers
of t
he C
omm
issio
n’s
offic
ials.
The
se te
ams
were
dep
loye
d to
wor
k in
th
e re
leva
nt o
ffice
s/ d
epar
tmen
ts/ f
unct
iona
ries
(cov
ered
18
inst
itutio
ns in
tota
l) in
201
4. T
hese
in
stitu
tions
and
sec
tors
wer
e se
lect
ed c
onsid
erin
g th
e m
agni
tude
of
com
plai
nts
mad
e by
the
co
mm
on p
eopl
e, n
ewsp
aper
and
med
ia re
ports
and
pub
lic c
once
rns.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
DG
, Det
ectio
n an
d In
vest
igat
ion,
ACC
(3 M
arch
201
6).
29.
Freq
uenc
y of
inclu
ding
co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n re
com
men
datio
ns in
AC
A’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
ports
dur
ing
past
3
year
s
Freq
uent
lySo
met
imes
Not a
t all
The
team
s th
at w
ere
depl
oyed
in d
iffer
ent s
ecto
rs a
nd in
stitu
tions
of p
ublic
impo
rtanc
e su
bmitt
ed 1
1 re
view
repo
rts in
late
201
4 an
d ea
rly 2
015.
In th
ese
repo
rts th
e na
ture
and
pro
cess
of c
orru
ptio
n in
th
e re
spec
tive
inst
itutio
n we
re b
riefly
des
crib
ed. A
mon
g th
e re
com
men
datio
ns w
ere
60 d
welt o
n ho
w to
pre
vent
cor
rupt
ion
in th
e re
spec
tive
inst
itutio
n.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
G, D
etec
tion
and
Inve
stig
atio
n, A
CC (3
Mar
ch 2
016)
; ins
titut
iona
l rep
orts
su
bmitt
ed to
ACC
.
30.
ACA’
s pl
an fo
r pr
even
tion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
treac
h an
d its
im
plem
enta
tion
Com
preh
ensiv
e an
d cle
ar p
lan
which
is
impl
emen
ted
and
acce
ssib
le
The
plan
for
prev
entio
n, e
duca
tion
and
outre
ach
exist
s bu
t not
impl
emen
ted
fully
Ther
e is
no o
r a w
eak
plan
for p
reve
ntio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
tivitie
s
The
ACC
has
a ye
arly
plan
of
its p
rogr
ams
and
even
ts t
o be
org
anize
d at
the
nat
iona
l lev
el.
Mor
eove
r, al
l the
CPC
s an
d In
tegr
ity U
nits
sub
mit
thei
r yea
rly p
lans
to th
e AC
C. A
roun
d 80
% o
f the
an
nual
pla
n is
impl
emen
ted
at th
e CP
C le
vel, w
hile
all t
he ce
ntra
l leve
l eve
nts a
re o
rgan
ized
by A
CC.
Howe
ver,
in s
pite
of h
avin
g an
ann
ual p
lan
ther
e is
lack
of a
com
preh
ensiv
e an
d cle
ar p
lan
for
prev
entio
n, e
duca
tion
and
outre
ach.
The
ACC
is p
repa
ring
its C
omm
unica
tion
Stra
tegy
for f
ive ye
ars
(from
201
5 to
201
9). E
fforts
are
und
erwa
y to
prep
are
an ‘A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n St
rate
gic P
lan
of th
e AC
C’.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Dire
ctor
, Pre
vent
ion,
Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach,
ACC
(10
Mar
ch 2
016)
.
168
Thes
e in
clud
ed R
ajdh
ani U
nnay
an K
artri
pokk
ho (R
AJU
K), D
epar
tmen
t for
Edu
catio
n En
gine
erin
g w
hich
als
o co
vere
d Se
cond
ary
and
Hig
her S
econ
dary
Edu
catio
n D
epar
tmen
t, an
d N
atio
nal T
extb
ook
and
Cur
ricul
um B
oard
(NTC
B), D
epar
tmen
t for
Roa
ds a
nd H
ighw
ays,
and
Ban
glad
esh
Roa
d an
d Tr
ansp
ort A
utho
rity
(BR
TA),
Elec
trici
ty a
nd W
ater
re
sour
ces
whi
ch c
over
ed P
ower
Dev
elop
men
t Boa
rd (P
DB)
, Wat
er D
evel
opm
ent B
oard
(WD
B), D
haka
Ele
ctric
Sup
ply
Com
pany
(DES
CO
), Ba
ngla
desh
Pet
role
um D
evel
opm
ent
Cor
pora
tion
(BPD
C) a
nd W
ater
and
Sew
erag
e Au
thor
ity (W
ASA)
, Dha
ka C
ity C
orpo
ratio
n (N
orth
and
Sou
th),
Offi
ce o
f the
Dire
ctor
ate
Gen
eral
on
Hea
lth, L
ocal
Gov
ernm
ent
Engi
neer
ing
Dep
artm
ent (
LGED
), Pu
blic
Wor
ks D
epar
tmen
t (PW
D),
Nat
iona
l Boa
rd o
f Rev
enue
(NBR
) (C
usto
m) a
nd P
ort A
utho
rity.
64
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
31.
ACA’
s co
llabo
ratio
n wi
th
othe
r sta
keho
lder
s in
pr
even
tion,
edu
catio
n an
d ou
treac
h ac
tivitie
s
High
deg
ree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
th
ree
or m
ore
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Som
e de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
on
e or
two
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Littl
e or
no
colla
bora
tion
with
ot
her s
take
hold
ers
ACC
colla
bora
tes
with
oth
er s
take
hold
ers
such
as
the
Wor
ld B
ank,
ADB
, JIC
A, G
IZ, M
RDI,
BEI,
and
TIB
in d
iffer
ent p
reve
ntio
n, e
duca
tion
and
outre
ach
activ
ities.
Suc
h co
llabo
ratio
ns h
ave
been
un
derta
ken
on p
roje
ct-b
asis
shor
t-ter
m n
eed-
base
d, a
nd in
mos
t cas
es w
ere
initia
ted
by th
e AC
C.
The
ACC
is im
plem
entin
g a
proj
ect w
ith th
e W
orld
Ban
k on
the
impl
emen
tatio
n of
the
Natio
nal
Stra
tegy
, wh
ich s
tarte
d in
Jul
y 20
15 a
nd w
ill co
ntin
ue u
p to
201
8. F
our
proj
ects
hav
e be
en
impl
emen
ted
in p
artn
ersh
ip w
ith A
DB u
nder
whi
ch th
e CP
Cs a
nd In
tegr
ity U
nits
hav
e be
en fo
rmed
. O
ne p
ilot p
roje
ct is
bei
ng im
plem
ente
d by
GIZ
und
er th
e JR
CP p
roje
ct in
five
dist
ricts
whi
ch s
tarte
d in
201
4 wi
ll co
ntin
ue u
p to
201
9. T
he A
CC w
orke
d wi
th M
RDI o
n im
plem
enta
tion
of th
e Ri
ght t
o In
form
atio
n Ac
t in
2012
, and
with
BEI
on
the
capa
city
build
ing
of s
take
hold
ers.
The
ACC
sig
ned
Mem
oran
dum
of U
nder
stan
ding
s (M
oU) w
ith T
IB in
May
201
5 fo
r a y
ear f
or c
olla
bora
tive
cam
paig
n an
d re
sear
ch, a
nd w
ith th
e BF
IU o
f Ban
glad
esh
Bank
for c
apac
ity b
uild
ing.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Dire
ctor
, Pre
vent
ion,
Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach,
ACC
(10
Mar
ch 2
016)
; ACC
An
nual
Rep
ort 2
014;
MoU
sign
ed b
etwe
en A
CC a
nd T
IB (h
ttp://
www.
ti-ba
ngla
desh
.org
/bet
a3/in
dex.
php/
en/m
edia
-rele
ase/
4625
-acc
-and
-tib-
join
-han
ds-to
-aug
men
t-cor
rupt
ion-
prev
entio
n-ac
tiviti
es-
bang
la).
32.
ACA’
s re
sear
ch a
nd
expl
orat
ion
of c
orru
ptio
n ris
ks, c
onte
xt a
nd
cond
itions
Exte
nsive
use
of
rese
arch
, to
deve
lop
risk
asse
ssm
ents
and
se
ctor
al c
orru
ptio
n pr
ofile
s
Som
e de
gree
of
rese
arch
to d
evel
op
risk
asse
ssm
ents
and
se
ctor
al c
orru
ptio
n pr
ofile
s
Littl
e or
no
disc
erni
ble
inde
pend
ent
rese
arch
car
ried
out
by th
e AC
A
So fa
r no
disc
erni
ble
inde
pend
ent r
esea
rch
has
been
car
ried
out b
y th
e AC
C. T
he A
CC d
oes
not h
ave
its o
wn b
udge
t allo
catio
n fo
r res
earc
h an
d ex
plor
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
risks
, con
text
s an
d co
nditio
ns. H
owev
er, i
t has
dev
elop
ed a
dra
ft An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Com
mun
icatio
n St
rate
gy
for f
ive y
ears
, fro
m 2
015
to 2
019,
with
the
finan
cial a
nd te
chni
cal h
elp
of th
e W
orld
Ban
k, D
haka
O
ffice
in 2
014.
It is
an
outlin
e of
act
ivitie
s of t
he co
mm
itmen
t mad
e by
vario
us d
evel
opm
ent p
artn
ers
and
for i
mpl
emen
ting
thos
e in
ant
icorru
ptio
n ca
mpa
igns
. Effo
rts a
re u
nder
way
to p
repa
re a
n ‘A
nti-
Corru
ptio
n St
rate
gic
Plan
of t
he A
CC’ w
ith th
e te
chni
cal a
ssist
ance
of G
IZ.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Dire
ctor
, Pre
vent
ion,
Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach,
ACC
(10
Mar
ch 2
016)
; ACC
An
nual
Rep
ort 2
014.
33.
ACA’
s di
ssem
inat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
and
use
of
cam
paig
ns
Exte
nsive
di
ssem
inat
ion
of
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
and
relia
nce
on
cam
paig
ns
Lim
ited
diss
emin
atio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d re
lianc
e on
ca
mpa
igns
Does
not
diss
emin
ate
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
or re
ly on
ca
mpa
igns
Usua
lly m
essa
ges
on a
ware
ness
aga
inst
cor
rupt
ion
are
diss
emin
ated
by
the
ACC
thro
ugh
text
sm
s to
mob
ile p
hone
s, s
hort
films,
pos
ters
, and
ban
ners
. Acc
ordi
ng to
hig
h of
ficia
ls of
ACC
, the
m
essa
ges
have
som
e im
pact
, alth
ough
they
are
not
alw
ays
read
er o
r aud
ienc
e fri
endl
y, a
nd to
wha
t ex
tent
they
are
effe
ctive
has
not
bee
n m
easu
red.
The
ACC
mai
nly
relie
s on
the
activ
ities
of C
PCs,
In
tegr
ity U
nits
, and
rece
ntly
orga
nize
d pu
blic
hear
ings
to c
ampa
ign
agai
nst c
orru
ptio
n.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
irect
or, P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h, A
CC (1
0 M
arch
201
6).
65
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
34.
ACA’
s us
e of
its
webs
ite a
nd s
ocia
l m
edia
for d
issem
inat
ing
info
rmat
ion
on
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
Exte
nsive
use
of i
ts
webs
ite a
nd s
ocia
l m
edia
to s
prea
d co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n
Lim
ited
use
of it
s we
bsite
and
soc
ial
med
ia to
spr
ead
corru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
ACA
does
not
hav
e a
webs
ite a
nd d
oes
not r
ely
on s
ocia
l m
edia
to s
prea
d co
rrupt
ion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n
Alth
ough
the
ACC
has
a we
bsite
, it h
as n
ot s
tarte
d th
e us
e of
soc
ial m
edia
yet
. The
re a
re a
ver
y fe
w aw
aren
ess
raisi
ng m
essa
ges
on it
s we
bsite
. Alth
ough
ther
e is
a lo
t of i
nfor
mat
ion
on A
CC a
ctivi
ties,
no
t all
of th
em u
pdat
ed a
nd s
ome
are
exclu
ded
alto
geth
er. T
hese
inclu
de in
form
atio
n on
bud
get,
publ
ic he
arin
g an
d ot
her
activ
ities,
act
ivity
pla
ns,
annu
al r
epor
ts,
inve
stig
atio
n an
d pr
osec
utio
n st
atist
ics, u
pdat
ed a
cts
and
rule
s et
c. E
ven
the
orig
inal
ver
sion
of th
e An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act 2
004
coul
d no
t be
loca
ted
and
retri
eved
on
10 A
pril 2
016.
So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th D
irect
or, P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h, A
CC (1
0 M
arch
201
6); r
evie
w of
ACC
web
site
by th
e re
sear
ch te
am.
5.
ACA’
s Co
oper
atio
n w
ith o
ther
Org
anis
atio
ns (5
indi
cato
rs)
35.
Gov
ernm
ent s
uppo
rt (e
.g. A
ttorn
ey-G
ener
al’s
Offi
ce, D
irect
or o
f Pu
blic
Pros
ecut
ions
) to
ACA
for p
rose
cutio
n of
co
rrupt
ion
case
s
High
leve
l of
supp
ort a
s re
flect
ed
in a
bsen
ce o
f in
terfe
renc
e an
d av
erag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te o
f abo
ve 7
5%
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f su
ppor
t as
refle
cted
in
som
e in
terfe
renc
e an
d av
erag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te o
f 50
% to
75%
Low
leve
l of
supp
ort a
s re
flect
ed
in s
ubst
antia
l in
terfe
renc
e an
d av
erag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te o
f bel
ow 5
0%
The
ACC
has
very
little
inte
rface
with
the
Atto
rney
Gen
eral
’s (A
G) o
ffice
with
rega
rd to
pro
secu
tion.
In
the
last
thre
e ye
ars,
the
AG O
ffice
was
invo
lved
in o
nly
a fe
w sp
ecia
l cas
es (3
-4).
No in
terfe
renc
e wa
s ob
serv
ed fr
om th
e go
vern
men
t in
cond
uctin
g th
ese
case
s. T
he A
CC a
lso re
ceive
d ne
cess
ary
supp
ort f
rom
AG
Offi
ce.
Alth
ough
acc
ordi
ng to
law
ther
e sh
ould
be
a pe
rman
ent p
rose
cutio
n te
am o
f the
ACC
, thi
s ha
s no
t ha
ppen
ed d
ue to
a n
umbe
r of r
easo
ns. N
ow th
ere
is a
set o
f pan
el la
wyer
s of
ACC
thro
ugho
ut th
e co
untry
inclu
ding
PPs
. The
se p
anel
lawy
ers
cond
uct t
he p
rose
cutio
n of
ACC
’s co
rrupt
ion
case
s.So
urce
: Int
ervie
ws w
ith A
CC o
fficia
ls.
36.
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
encie
s (in
cludi
ng
othe
r ACA
s if
ther
e ar
e m
ultip
le A
CAs
in
coun
try)
High
deg
ree
of
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACAs
or b
etwe
en
ACA
and
othe
r in
tegr
ity a
genc
ies
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACAs
or
bet
ween
ACA
an
d ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
Conf
lict a
nd/o
r lac
k of
co
oper
atio
n be
twee
n AC
As o
r bet
ween
AC
A an
d ot
her
inte
grity
age
ncie
s
ACC
is th
e sin
gula
rly m
anda
ted
for
deal
ing
with
cor
rupt
ion
in th
e co
untry
. Whi
le d
ischa
rgin
g its
fu
nctio
ns, A
CC g
ets
nece
ssar
y co
oper
atio
n fro
m o
rgan
isatio
ns s
uch
as N
BR, B
ankin
g In
stitu
tions
, O
ffice
of t
he C
AG, a
nd A
G o
ffice
. Ho
weve
r, a
num
ber
of e
xper
ts o
bser
ved
that
ACC
’s co
ordi
natio
n wi
th o
ther
gov
ernm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
is n
ot a
dequ
ate
and
effe
ctive
. ACC
find
s it
diffi
cult
to g
et a
ppro
pria
te a
nd n
eces
sary
in
form
atio
n lik
e Ba
nk A
ccou
nt d
etai
ls of
acc
used
indi
vidua
l. Ban
ks te
nd to
slow
dow
n th
e pr
oces
s by
refe
rring
to B
anke
r’s B
ook
Evid
ence
Act
189
0. T
he s
ame
happ
ens
when
ACC
ask
s fo
r wea
lth a
nd
rela
ted
info
rmat
ion
from
NBR
. Com
plica
tions
aris
e du
e to
the
prov
ision
s of
Inco
me
Tax
Ord
inan
ce
1984
whi
ch d
o no
t allo
w th
e re
leas
e of
any
per
sona
l wea
lth d
ata
with
out t
he p
erm
issio
n of
the
cour
t. Al
thou
gh th
e An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Com
miss
ion
Act 2
004
clear
ly st
ates
that
the
Act s
hall
prev
ail o
ver
othe
r law
s cu
rrent
ly in
forc
e wh
en th
e AC
C in
vest
igat
es a
cor
rupt
ion
case
, lac
k of
kno
wled
ge a
nd
unde
rsta
ndin
g of
the
laws
raise
s am
bigu
ities.
Sour
ce:
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith A
CC o
fficia
ls, e
xper
ts a
nd C
SO le
ader
s; T
he In
depe
nden
t, 7
Febr
uary
20
16; C
abin
et D
ivisio
n, A
n In
depe
nden
t Rev
iew
of N
atio
nal I
nteg
rity
Stra
tegy
(NIS
), 20
13.
66
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
37.
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACA
and
non-
gove
rnm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
inclu
ding
CS
Os
and
priva
te
com
pani
es
High
deg
ree
of c
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n AC
A an
d ot
her o
rgan
isatio
ns
inclu
ding
CSO
s an
d pr
ivate
com
pani
es
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
ACA
and
othe
r org
anisa
tions
Conf
lict a
nd/o
r lac
k of
co
oper
atio
n be
twee
n AC
A an
d ot
her
orga
nisa
tions
Acco
rdin
g to
ACC
offi
cials,
ther
e is
a hi
gh le
vel o
f coo
pera
tion
betw
een
ACC
and
non-
gove
rnm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
inclu
ding
JIC
A, G
IZ, T
IB, M
RDI,
and
BEI e
tc. H
owev
er, a
ccor
ding
to s
ome
CSO
le
ader
s, A
CC’s
coor
dina
tion
with
NG
Os
is no
t up
to th
e de
sired
leve
l. Th
ey b
elie
ve A
CC h
as th
e po
tent
ial t
o en
gage
CSO
s at
the
com
mun
ity le
vel t
o cr
eate
pub
lic a
ware
ness
aga
inst
cor
rupt
ion
in
man
y wa
ys.
Sour
ce: I
nter
views
with
ACC
offi
cials,
exp
erts
and
CSO
lead
ers.
38.
ACA’
s pa
rticip
atio
n in
in
tern
atio
nal n
etwo
rks
Very
act
ive w
ith A
CA
parti
cipat
ing
in 3
or
mor
e ne
twor
ks
Activ
e wi
th A
CA
parti
cipat
ing
in 1
or 2
ne
twor
ks
ACA
does
not
pa
rticip
ate
in a
ny
netw
ork
ACC’
s pa
rticip
atio
n in
inte
rnat
iona
l for
ums
and
netw
orks
is m
anife
st fr
om it
s en
gage
men
t in
the
Conf
eren
ces o
f Sta
te P
artie
s in
UNCA
C, in
volve
d wi
th A
sia P
acific
Gro
up o
f Ant
i-Mon
ey L
aund
erin
g,
and
mem
ber o
f the
ADB
/OEC
D An
ti-Co
rrupt
ion
Initia
tive
for A
sia-P
acific
.So
urce
: Int
ervie
ws w
ith A
CC a
nd o
ther
gov
ernm
ent o
fficia
ls.
39.
ACA’
s co
oper
atio
n wi
th
ACAs
in o
ther
cou
ntrie
sHi
gh d
egre
e of
co
oper
atio
n wi
th
join
t pro
ject
s an
d te
chni
cal a
ssist
ance
wi
th s
ever
al A
CAs
in
othe
r cou
ntrie
s
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
in s
ome
area
s wi
th
one
or tw
o AC
As in
ot
her c
ount
ries
No c
oope
ratio
n be
twee
n AC
A an
d AC
As in
oth
er
coun
tries
No fo
rmal
coo
pera
tion
exist
s be
twee
n AC
C an
d AC
As o
f oth
er c
ount
ries.
ACC
’s co
oper
atio
n an
d ne
twor
k wi
th o
ther
ACA
s su
ch a
s M
alay
sia, I
ndia
and
Bhu
tan
are
at a
ver
y in
itial s
tage
. A n
umbe
r of
Mem
oran
dum
of U
nder
stan
ding
s (M
oUs)
are
exp
ecte
d to
be
signe
d wi
th th
ese
agen
cies
in th
e co
min
g da
ys.
Sour
ce: I
nter
views
with
ACC
offi
cials.
6.
ACA’
s Ac
coun
tabi
lity
and
Ove
rsig
ht (4
indi
cato
rs)
40.
Info
rmat
ion
prov
ided
in
and
acc
essib
ility
of
ACA’
s an
nual
repo
rt an
d we
bsite
Com
preh
ensiv
e in
form
atio
n on
AC
A is
prov
ided
in
annu
al re
port
and
webs
ite; s
ubm
itted
to
Par
liam
ent a
nd
easil
y ac
cess
ible
to
the
publ
ic
Lim
ited
info
rmat
ion
on A
CA is
pro
vided
in
ann
ual r
epor
t and
we
bsite
; sub
mitt
ed
to P
arlia
men
t but
not
ea
sily
acce
ssib
le to
th
e pu
blic
Subm
its a
nnua
l re
port
to g
over
nmen
t bu
t is
not a
vaila
ble
to
the
publ
ic
ACC
publ
ishes
its
annu
al re
port
on a
regu
lar b
asis
which
pro
vides
nec
essa
ry in
form
atio
n ab
out i
ts
ongo
ing
activ
ities,
info
rmat
ion
on in
vest
igat
ions
and
pro
secu
tion,
bud
get a
nd m
anpo
wer.
The
soft
vers
ion
of th
e An
nual
Rep
ort o
f 201
4 is
avai
labl
e on
the
webs
ite; h
owev
er c
onta
ct p
oint
for f
urth
er
info
rmat
ion
such
as
colle
ctin
g a
hard
cop
y of
the
annu
al re
port
may
be
prov
ided
on
the
webs
ite.
The
annu
al re
port
of th
e AC
C is
subm
itted
to th
e Pr
esid
ent w
ho th
en s
ubm
its it
to th
e Pa
rliam
ent.
The
webs
ite o
f ACC
is a
cces
sible
to e
very
one.
The
ACC
web
site
prov
ides
info
rmat
ion
on th
e m
issio
n, vi
sion,
func
tions
and
stru
ctur
e of
ACC
, pre
vent
ion
activ
ities (
pres
ent a
ctivi
ties o
f pre
vent
ion
wing
, cor
rupt
ion
prev
entio
n co
mm
ittee
s &
inte
grity
uni
ts, p
ublic
edu
catio
n pr
ogra
ms,
pro
mot
iona
l ac
tivitie
s, p
ublic
hea
ring)
, enq
uiry
and
inve
stig
atio
n (p
roce
ss, p
erfo
rman
ce, c
ase
stud
ies,
inst
itutio
nal
team
s, p
roce
dure
for l
odgi
ng a
com
plai
nt, l
ist o
f sch
edul
ed o
ffenc
es),
info
rmat
ion
on p
rose
cutio
n,
publ
ic re
latio
ns (i
nclu
ding
ACC
mag
azin
e, p
ress
not
ice/re
leas
es, p
rote
st n
otes
), an
d do
wnlo
adab
le
docu
men
ts (r
elev
ant l
aws
and
rule
s, a
nnua
l rep
orts
of A
CC, a
ppro
val o
f san
ctio
ns o
f cas
es).
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Com
miss
ione
r, AC
C (1
5 M
arch
201
6); D
irect
or, P
reve
ntio
n, E
duca
tion
and
Out
reac
h, A
CC (1
0 M
arch
201
6); A
CC A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
014;
ACC
web
site:
http
://ww
w.ac
c.or
g.bd
/.
67
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
41.
ACA’
s ov
ersig
ht
mec
hani
sms
Ove
rsig
ht
com
mitt
ees
with
ac
tive
parti
cipat
ion
by M
embe
rs o
f Pa
rliam
ent,
seni
or
civil s
erva
nts
and
prom
inen
t citiz
ens
Ove
rsig
ht
com
mitt
ees
with
M
embe
rs o
f Pa
rliam
ent a
nd/o
r se
nior
civi
l ser
vant
s as
mem
bers
Acco
unta
ble
to
Exec
utive
with
out
any
over
sight
co
mm
ittee
Ther
e is
no c
omm
ittee
for o
vers
ight
as
such
to m
onito
r ACC
’s pe
rform
ance
. Acc
ordi
ng to
the
Anti-
Corru
ptio
n Co
mm
issio
n Ac
t200
4, it
has
to s
ubm
it an
ann
ual r
epor
t to
the
Pres
iden
t whi
ch is
aga
in
requ
ired
to b
e su
bmitt
ed in
the
Parli
amen
t [se
ctio
n 29
].The
Par
liam
ent h
as th
e m
anda
te to
disc
uss
this
repo
rt. A
CC o
fficia
ls ar
e so
cially
acc
ount
able
to c
omm
on p
eopl
e th
roug
h its
pub
lic h
earin
gs.
ACC’
s pe
rform
ance
is in
tern
ally
mon
itore
d by
the
Mon
itorin
g an
d Ev
alua
tion
(M&E
) Bra
nch.
Sho
rt an
d de
taile
d in
spec
tions
are
the
mon
itorin
g to
ols t
o ov
erse
e th
e pe
rform
ance
of A
CC’s
divis
iona
l and
in
tegr
ated
offi
ces,
and
thes
e in
spec
tions
are
car
ried
out b
y Di
rect
or G
ener
als
and
Dire
ctor
s of
ACC
He
adqu
arte
rs. T
he M
&E B
ranc
h re
gula
rly e
valu
ates
thes
e in
spec
tion
repo
rts a
nd s
ubm
its th
e ke
y fin
ding
s to
the
ACC
Chai
rman
. As
this
is st
rictly
an
inte
rnal
insp
ectio
n th
ere
is no
sco
pe fo
r pub
lic
repr
esen
tatio
n th
is le
vel.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
Com
miss
ione
r, AC
C (1
5 M
arch
201
6); A
CC w
ebsit
e: h
ttp://
www.
acc.
org.
bd/
abou
t-acc
/mon
itorin
g-ev
alua
tion-
cell (
acce
ssed
on
28 M
arch
201
6).
42.
ACA’
s pr
oced
ure
for
deal
ing
with
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA p
erso
nnel
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l ar
e in
vest
igat
ed
by a
noth
er p
ublic
ag
ency
to a
void
co
nflic
t of i
nter
est
and
resu
lts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent i
mpo
sed
are
publ
icise
d
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l ar
e in
vest
igat
ed b
y its
inte
rnal
con
trol
unit
but r
esul
ts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent a
re n
ot
publ
icise
d
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l ar
e ig
nore
d or
not
in
vest
igat
ed w
ithou
t an
y ex
plan
atio
n
A pe
rman
ent I
nter
nal A
nti-C
orru
ptio
n Co
mm
ittee
, hea
ded
by it
s Ch
airm
an h
as b
een
cons
titut
ed to
co
nsist
ently
mon
itor,
supe
rvise
, enq
uire
, and
inve
stig
ate
into
any
cor
rupt
ion
alle
gatio
ns a
gain
st th
e AC
C of
ficia
ls an
d to
mak
e re
com
men
datio
ns fo
r tak
ing
lega
l and
dep
artm
enta
l act
ions
aga
inst
the
corru
pt s
taff.
So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th C
omm
issio
ner,
ACC
(15
Mar
ch 2
016)
; ACC
web
site:
http
://ww
w.ac
c.or
g.bd
/ab
out-a
cc/m
onito
ring-
eval
uatio
n-ce
ll (ac
cess
ed o
n 27
Mar
ch 2
016)
43.
Out
com
es o
f com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA o
r its
pe
rson
nel in
pas
t 3
year
s
All v
alid
com
plai
nts
agai
nst A
CA
pers
onne
l res
ult
in p
unish
men
t or
othe
r rem
edie
s, a
nd
outc
ome
is pu
blici
zed
Som
e va
lid
com
plai
nts
agai
nst
ACA
pers
onne
l res
ult
in p
unish
men
t or
othe
r rem
edie
s, a
nd
outc
ome
is pu
blici
zed
Com
plai
nts
invo
lving
AC
A pe
rson
nel a
re
igno
red
and
not
inve
stig
ated
at a
ll
In th
e la
st th
ree
year
s (20
12-2
014)
a to
tal o
f 24
com
plai
nts w
ere
lodg
ed a
gain
st A
CC p
erso
nnel
, all o
f wh
ich w
ere
reso
lved
wher
e fo
ur s
taff
were
acq
uitte
d 11
rece
ived
maj
or p
unish
men
t (di
smiss
al fr
om
serv
ice a
nd fo
rced
retir
emen
t), a
nd n
ine
rece
ived
min
or p
unish
men
t (pl
aced
in o
ther
gov
ernm
ent
orga
nisa
tions
). Th
ese
actio
ns a
re m
entio
ned
in th
e an
nual
rep
ort,
and
also
pos
ted
on th
e AC
C we
bsite
.So
urce
: AC
C An
nual
Re
port
2014
; ht
tp://
www.
acc.
org.
bd/a
bout
-acc
/sta
tistic
s-de
partm
enta
l-ac
tions
-take
n-ag
ains
t-acc
-per
sonn
el-2
011-
%E2
%80
%93
-201
3 (a
cces
sed
on 2
8 M
arch
201
6); D
G,
Adm
inist
ratio
n, E
stab
lishm
ent a
nd F
inan
ce, A
CC (7
Apr
il 201
6).
68
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
7.
Publ
ic P
erce
ptio
ns o
f the
ACA
’s P
erfo
rman
ce (7
indi
cato
rs)
44.
Publ
ic co
nfid
ence
that
go
vern
men
t has
give
n AC
A th
e re
quire
d po
wers
and
reso
urce
s fo
r cur
bing
cor
rupt
ion
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (a
bove
75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(50%
-75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (b
elow
50%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Acco
rdin
g to
exp
erts
, CSO
lead
ers a
nd jo
urna
lists
, the
ACC
is e
ntru
sted
with
the
requ
ired
powe
rs fo
r cu
rbin
g co
rrupt
ion,
but
the
reso
urce
s are
not
ade
quat
e (fo
r ins
tanc
e du
e to
lack
of a
dequ
ate
finan
cial
reso
urce
s, th
e AC
C ca
nnot
hire
sen
ior,
expe
rienc
ed la
wyer
s).
The
ACC
has n
eith
er co
nduc
ted
nor c
omm
issio
ned
any p
ublic
per
cept
ion
surv
ey o
n AC
C. H
owev
er,
acco
rdin
g to
ACC
offi
cials,
ther
e is
lack
of p
ublic
trus
t on
ACC.
The
com
mon
peo
ple
have
little
idea
ab
out th
e act
ivitie
s of A
CC or
the c
orru
ptio
n law
s. G
ener
ally,
peop
le ha
ve ne
gativ
e im
pres
sions
abou
t pu
blic
offic
es a
nd o
fficia
ls, a
s evid
ent in
the
Glo
bal C
orru
ptio
n Ba
rom
eter
201
3 (2
9% o
f res
pond
ents
in
Ban
glad
esh
felt
that
pub
lic o
fficia
ls an
d civ
il ser
vant
s we
re c
orru
pt/e
xtre
mel
y co
rrupt
). Ac
cord
ing
to th
e G
CB S
urve
y 20
15 (y
et to
be
publ
ished
), 82
.9%
of t
he re
spon
dent
s st
ated
that
they
hav
e no
t he
ard
abou
t the
ACC
or d
o no
t kno
w ab
out t
heir
func
tions
.So
urce
: Int
ervie
w wi
th C
omm
issio
ner,
ACC
(15
Mar
ch 2
016)
; FG
D wi
th C
PC a
nd C
CC m
embe
rs,
jour
nalis
ts (2
3 M
arch
201
6); I
nter
views
with
key
info
rman
ts; h
ttp://
www.
trans
pare
ncy.
org/
gcb2
013/
coun
try/?
coun
try=b
angl
ades
h (a
cces
sed
on 1
9 Ap
ril 2
016)
.
45.
Publ
ic co
nfid
ence
in
ACA’
s ad
here
nce
to d
ue
proc
ess,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in u
sing
its
powe
rs
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (a
bove
75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(50%
-75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (b
elow
50%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
The
ACC
has
neith
er c
ondu
cted
nor
com
miss
ione
d an
y pu
blic
perc
eptio
n su
rvey
on
its w
ork
and
prof
ile H
owev
er, a
ccor
ding
to th
e Na
tiona
l Tru
st su
rvey
201
5 co
nduc
ted
by T
IB(y
et to
be
publ
ished
), 68
.4%
of t
he r
espo
nden
ts s
tate
d th
at th
ey h
ave
som
e tru
st o
n th
e AC
C. A
ccor
ding
to e
xper
ts,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd o
ther
stak
ehol
ders
, the
ACC
is n
ot im
parti
al in
han
dlin
g co
rrupt
ion
case
s of t
he sa
me
natu
re. T
he c
omm
on p
erce
ptio
n is
that
the
role
of A
CC d
epen
ds o
n th
e in
tent
ion
of A
CC w
here
an
inve
stig
atio
n is
to b
e di
rect
ed a
nd th
e su
perio
r rol
e of
the
stat
e. It
is m
anife
sted
on
whet
her
evid
ence
s ar
e co
llect
ed o
r not
– a
cas
e is
avoi
ded
eith
er in
tent
iona
lly o
r out
of i
gnor
ance
.So
urce
: Tru
st S
urve
y 20
15, T
IB (u
npub
lishe
d).F
GDs
with
CPC
and
CCC
mem
bers
, jou
rnal
ists
(10
Febr
uary
and
23
Mar
ch 2
016)
; Int
ervie
ws w
ith k
ey in
form
ants
.
46.
Conf
iden
ce in
ACA
’s ad
here
nce
to d
ue
proc
ess,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in u
sing
its
powe
rs, a
mon
g pe
rson
s wh
o ha
d di
rect
con
tact
wi
th A
CA
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (a
bove
75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, per
sons
wi
th d
irect
con
tact
wi
th A
CA
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(50%
-75%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, per
sons
wi
th d
irect
con
tact
wi
th A
CA
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (b
elow
50%
) an
d vie
ws o
f ACA
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
, if
poss
ible
, per
sons
wi
th d
irect
con
tact
wi
th A
CA
No s
urve
y ha
s be
en c
ondu
cted
on
expe
rienc
e or
per
cept
ion
of p
erso
ns w
ho h
ad d
irect
con
tact
with
AC
C. H
owev
er, a
few
info
rman
ts w
ho h
ad d
irect
con
tact
with
the
ACC
stat
ed th
at s
ome
of th
e AC
C of
ficia
ls tre
at p
eopl
e ac
cord
ing
to th
eir s
ocia
l sta
tus
and
netw
ork.
In a
few
case
s th
e co
ncer
ned
inve
stig
atio
n of
ficer
trea
ted
peop
le w
ho h
ave
take
n on
rem
and
as if
they
are
alre
ady
conv
icted
.So
urce
: FG
Ds w
ith C
PC a
nd C
CC m
embe
rs,
jour
nalis
ts (
10 F
ebru
ary
and
23 M
arch
201
6);
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith k
ey in
form
ants
.
69
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
47.
Conf
iden
ce in
ACA
’s di
gnifie
d an
d re
spec
tful
treat
men
t of p
erso
ns
unde
r inv
estig
atio
n
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
the
views
of A
CA s
enio
r pe
rson
nel,
CSO
le
ader
s, jo
urna
lists
an
d pe
rson
s su
bjec
t to
inve
stig
atio
n, if
po
ssib
le
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of c
onfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in v
iews
of
ACA
sen
ior
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
jour
nalis
ts
and
pers
ons
subj
ect
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
vie
ws
of A
CA s
enio
r pe
rson
nel,
CSO
le
ader
s, jo
urna
lists
an
d pe
rson
s su
bjec
t to
inve
stig
atio
n, if
po
ssib
le
Acco
rdin
g to
som
e, A
CC o
fficia
ls tre
at p
eopl
e wi
th d
igni
ty a
nd re
spec
t dur
ing
inve
stig
atio
n. O
ther
s st
ated
that
the
treat
men
t var
ies
acco
rdin
g to
the
socia
l and
eco
nom
ic st
atus
of t
he p
erso
n un
der
inve
stig
atio
n.So
urce
: FG
Ds w
ith C
PC a
nd C
CC m
embe
rs,
jour
nalis
ts (
10 F
ebru
ary
and
23 M
arch
201
6);
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith k
ey in
form
ants
.
48.
Publ
ic pe
rcep
tion
of
ACA’
s ef
fect
ivene
ss in
co
rrupt
ion
cont
rol
High
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(abo
ve
75%
) and
vie
ws o
f CS
O le
ader
s, a
nti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
an
d jo
urna
lists
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f ef
fect
ivene
ss a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (5
0%-7
5%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(bel
ow 5
0%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Acco
rdin
g to
man
y, th
e AC
C is
not e
ffect
ive til
l now
. Onl
y 9.1
% o
f the
resp
onde
nts i
n th
e G
CB su
rvey
20
15 (y
et to
be
publ
ished
). st
ated
that
the
ACC
is do
ing
well
in fi
ghtin
g co
rrupt
ion
Acco
rdin
g to
a
surv
ey co
nduc
ted
by IR
I ear
ly th
is ye
ar, 4
9% o
f the
resp
onde
nts d
id n
ot se
e th
e G
over
nmen
t as f
ully
enga
ged
in o
r cap
able
of f
ight
ing
corru
ptio
n.16
9 In
anot
her e
arlie
r sur
vey,
66%
of t
he re
spon
dent
s st
ated
that
cor
rupt
ion
eith
er re
mai
ned
sam
e or
incr
ease
d in
the
last
five
yea
rs.17
0 In
anot
her e
arlie
r su
rvey
, 66%
of t
he re
spon
dent
s sta
ted
that
corru
ptio
n ei
ther
rem
aine
d sa
me
or in
crea
sed
in la
st fiv
e ye
ars.
171 T
he A
CC c
anno
t cla
im th
at d
ue to
its
activ
ities
man
y ca
ses
have
bee
n re
solve
d.
Sour
ce:
GCB
Sur
vey
2015
(un
publ
ished
); FG
Ds w
ith C
PC a
nd C
CC m
embe
rs, j
ourn
alist
s (1
0 Fe
brua
ry a
nd 2
3 M
arch
201
6); I
nter
views
with
key i
nfor
man
ts; I
RI S
urve
y, Ja
nuar
y 201
6; P
roth
omAl
o Su
rvey
201
3.
169
http
://w
ww
.iri.o
rg/re
sour
ce/ir
i%E2
%80
%99
s-ce
nter
-insi
ghts
-pol
l-opt
imis
m-g
row
ing-
bang
lade
sh%
E2%
80%
99s-
econ
omic
-futu
re (a
cces
sed
on 1
2 Ju
ly 2
016)
.17
0 ht
tp://
ww
w.ir
i.org
/reso
urce
/iri%
E2%
80%
99s-
cent
er-in
sigh
ts-p
oll-o
ptim
ism
-gro
win
g-ba
ngla
desh
%E2
%80
%99
s-ec
onom
ic-fu
ture
(acc
esse
d on
12
July
201
6).
171
Prot
hom
Alo
, 10
Oct
ober
201
3.
70
INDI
CATO
RIN
DICA
TOR
VALU
ESJU
STIF
ICAT
ION
OF S
CORE
S AN
D DA
TA S
OURC
ESHI
GHM
ODER
ATE
LOW
49.
Perc
eptio
n of
ACA
’s ef
fect
ivene
ss in
co
rrupt
ion
cont
rol
amon
g pe
rson
s wi
th
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith A
CA
High
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(abo
ve
75%
) and
vie
ws o
f CS
O le
ader
s, a
nti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
, jo
urna
lists
and
pe
rson
s wi
th d
irect
co
ntac
t with
ACA
, if
poss
ible
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f ef
fect
ivene
ss a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (5
0%-7
5%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
pers
ons
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA, i
f po
ssib
le
Low
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(bel
ow 5
0%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
pers
ons
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA, i
f po
ssib
le
Som
e in
form
ants
who
had
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith th
e AC
C cla
imed
that
it is
not
effe
ctive
till
now.
The
co
nvict
ion
rate
in c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses
is st
ill ve
ry lo
w. A
CC h
as to
reac
h pe
ople
, as
they
are
not
awa
re
abou
t ACC
’s ac
tivitie
s.
Sour
ce: I
nter
views
with
key
info
rman
ts.
50.
Perc
eptio
n of
ACA
’s ef
fect
ivene
ss in
dea
ling
with
com
plai
nts
amon
g fe
mal
e cit
izens
who
had
di
rect
con
tact
with
ACA
High
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(abo
ve
75%
) and
vie
ws o
f CS
O le
ader
s, a
nti-
corru
ptio
n ex
perts
, jo
urna
lists
and
fe
mal
es w
ith d
irect
co
ntac
t with
ACA
if
poss
ible
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f ef
fect
ivene
ss a
s re
flect
ed in
sur
vey
findi
ng (5
0%-7
5%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
fem
ales
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA, i
f po
ssib
le
Low
leve
l of
effe
ctive
ness
as
refle
cted
in s
urve
y fin
ding
(bel
ow 5
0%)
and
views
of C
SO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrupt
ion
expe
rts,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
fem
ales
with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith A
CA, i
f po
ssib
le
Not a
pplic
able
.
71
According to this assessment, the overall score for Bangladesh ACC is 61.22%, which falls in the ’moderate’ category. It is noteworthy that the score is 5.78 points short of the ‘high’ category, which indicates that the institution needs to improve by only a few indicators to rise to the high category. Among the 50 indicators, 21 indicators (42.86%) scored ‘high’, 19 (38.78%) scored ‘moderate’ and 09 (18.37%)scored ‘low’.
Figure 6: ACC’s Scores by Dimension
In sum, the strengths of the ACC includes legal independence and status with adequate legal powers and mandate; stability of budget which is gradually increased over years; staff stability with low turnover; willingness to investigate complaints, as it is responsive to complaints, willing to and has capacity to investigate influential persons, and high number of cases; corruption prevention initiatives with organisational reviews, engagement of stakeholders in prevention; collaboration with other stakeholders such as civil society, development partners; and participation in international networks.
On the other hand, the weaknesses of the ACC include inadequate budget particularly for development, investigation, recruitment of experienced lawyers, and donor dependency in prevention activities; low accessibility in terms of lodging complaints; inadequate/limited expertise and professionalism in investigation and prevention; low conviction rate; absence of independent oversight mechanism; lack
4 . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
72
of coordination with other public agencies; and low level of public confidence and negative perception on ACC’s effectiveness.
ACC’s main challenge lies in gaining people’s trust and confidence, maintain and sustain the strong areas, and overcome its weaknesses.
Figure 7: Indicators by Classification: Distribution of Performance and Enabling Factors
Considering the facts and circumstances of past three years the following recommendations are proposed under each dimension in order to help ACC stronger, more efficient and effective.
73
RECOMMENDATIONS
Financial and Human Resources
1. Enhanced budget for ACC: The budget of the ACC should be enhanced for:
a. Logistical support for enquiry and investigation (such as transportation, equipment, restoration of confiscated goods etc.);
b. Prevention activities (such as public hearing, research etc.);
c. Recruitment of highly skilled and efficient lawyers; and
d. Training of ACC staff.
2. Review of ACC’s organogram and increase staff strength: ACC should have its offices in all 64 districts with necessary staff and logistical support. The number of staff engaged in enquiry and investigation and prevention should be increased.
3. Increased transparency in appointment of Commissioners: The appointment process of the Chairman and Commissioners should be made more transparent. It should publicly disclose the names and profiles of the selected candidates before appointing the Commissioners. Participation from the political opponents and civil society in the process should be considered.
Detection and Investigation Function
4. Digitalization of the complaint system: The system of handling corruption complaints, investigation and case management should be digitalised. The system should be easy and user-friendly, and ensure anonymity. The ACC should also develop a proper structure for protecting whistle blowers.
5. Measures to increase the conviction rate: In order to increase the conviction rate of corruption cases the ACC should take measures such as consulting with lawyers before filing corruption cases and pursuing with the panel lawyers.
6. Enhanced drive for asset recovery: The ACC should take measures to recover, confiscate and freeze more assets out of corruption cases.
Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions
7. Long-term comprehensive strategic plan: The ACC should develop a long-term comprehensive strategic plan for preventing corruption through education and outreach programmes. It should also develop a mechanism to evaluate its activities.
74
8. Improved website: The ACC should have an improved website with the following features:
� Should be more interactive;
� Social media should be introduced;
� Should be made user friendly with a repository of literature and research scholarly papers [Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004, Section 17 (f)];
� Information should be regularly updated, and information on ACC’s budget, public hearing and other activities, activity plan, investigation and prosecution statistics should be provided; and
� Amended Acts and Rules should be uploaded.
Cooperation with other Organisations
9. Increased cooperation with other integrity agencies: The ACC should take measures to increase collaboration and cooperation with other integrity agencies, particularly in terms of avoiding potential ‘Conflict of Interest’ while conducting investigation into alleged corruption of its personnel.
Accountability and Oversight
10. Independent oversight mechanism: An independent committee consisting of public representatives, present/ former bureaucrats and civil society members of high integrity, credibility and acceptability should be formed to advise, monitor and evaluate key aspects of ACC’s work.
Public Perceptions of the ACC’s Performance
11. Enhance public confidence: The following measures should be taken to enhance public confidence.
� Publicise its activities on a larger scale, so that common people are aware of its achievements;
� Publish and regularly update detailed statements on income, assets and liabilities of Commissioners and senior officials;
� Take steps against corrupt public representatives & high officials, and people from other groups of the society; and
� Ensure effective and timely investigation and quick disposal of corruption cases.
75
Annex 1: Background to the project
Transparency International believes that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs), as public institutions tasked with combating corruption, must be transparent, accessible and accountable to citizens. They must operate with the utmost integrity, maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism and demonstrate effectiveness in their duties. Transparency International has identified ACAs as key partners in the fight against corruption and plans to work in constructive collaboration with governments who are ready to invest in improving their anti-corruption effectiveness by building strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Transparency International‘s initiative aimed at strengthening anti-corruption agencies combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. In mid-2013, Transparency International convened an experts meeting in Kuala Lumpur to explore the possibility of developing an ACA assessment tool. After receiving encouraging feedback and useful input, Transparency International commissioned a background review and draft framework by anti-corruption specialist, Alan Doig. The concept received further interest and backing from ACAs in Asia Pacific during the 18th and 19th Steering Group Meetings of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific in 2013 and 2014.
In 2014, Transparency International commissioned anti-corruption expert, Dr Jon Quah to further refine the framework, producing a set of indicators incorporating elements of TI’s National Integrity Systems assessment methodology and other relevant tools and principles. In April 2015, Transparency International organised a Focus Group Discussion in Bangkok, bringing together practitioners, researchers and ACAs to scrutinise the indicator framework and approach. Participants subsequently formed an Advisory Group to guide the finalisation of the tool.
The tool was piloted in Bhutan in 2015 and lessons learned around the research framework, process and approach were captured and used to finalise the methodology in consultation with the Advisory Group.
76
Annex 2: Interviewees
Persons interviewed during assessment of ACC– Dhaka, February-March 2016
Position Organisation1 Former Secretary Bangladesh Government2 Professor, Department of Law University of Dhaka3 Lawyer Bangladesh Supreme Court4 Former Advisor of Caretaker Government Bangladesh Government5 Executive Director Ain O Salish Kendra
6 Executive Director South Asian Institute of Advanced Legal and Human Rights Studies (SAILS)
7 Political Leader Jatiya Party8 Political Leader Bangladesh Awami League9 Commissioners ACC
10 Outgoing Chairperson andCommissioners ACC
11 Director Generals ACC12 Directors & Deputy Directors ACC13 Additional Secretary Ministry of Finance
14 Additional Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliament affairs
15 Panel Lawyer ACC
16 Chief Advisor/Governance Improvement National Integrity Strategy Support Project, JICA
17 National Project coordinator Justice Reform and Corruption Prevention Project, GIZ
18 Members, Corruption Prevention Committee (CPC) ACC
19 Members, Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) TIB
20 Senior Reporter Prothom Alo21 Editor Jamuna TV22 Special Correspondent Jamuna TV23 Staff Reporter Daily Janakantha24 Chief Reporter Asian Television25 Special Correspondent Banglanews2426 Staff Reporter Dainik Banik Barta27 Staff Correspondent New Age28 Staff Correspondent Independent TV29 Senior Reporter Daily Jugantor30 Senior Reporter Dainik Banik Barta31 Assistant Professor Jahangirnagar University
77
Annex 3: Stakeholders consulted
Persons engaged during consultation on assessment findings – Dhaka, 30 June 2016
Position Organisation1 Chairman ACC2 Commissioner ACC3 Commissioner ACC4 Secretary ACC
5 Director General, Administration, Establishment and Finance ACC
6 Director General, Prevention and Mass Awareness, Research, Experiment ACC
7 Director General, Enquiries and Investigation ACC
8 Director General, Legal and Prosecution ACC
9 Director General, Special Enquiries and Investigation ACC
10 Lead Researcher, ACA Strengthening study
Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka
11 Executive Director TIB12 Deputy Executive Director TIB13 Director, Research and Policy TIB14 Director, Outreach and Communication TIB
15 Senior Programme Manager, Research and Policy TIB
16 Programme Manager, Research and Policy TIB
78
Annex 4: References
“2-3 percent of GDP lost to corruption: Muhith”, Bdnews24.com, 9 July 2015, available at http://bdnews24.com/economy/2015/07/09/2-3-percent-of-gdp-lost-to-corruption-muhith
“3 independent bodies face lack of coordination”, The Independent, 7 February 2014, available at http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=203640:3-independent-bodies-face-lack-of-coordination&catid=129:frontpage&Itemid=121
“ACC case against MP Bodi: case filed without scrutinizing documents, court not satisfied with the plaintiff”, Prothom Alo, 24 December 2015.“ACC did not show up in the meeting: the Standing Committee will call again”, Prothom Alo, 29 January 2016.
“ACC law to spark mass protests’, The Daily Star, 22 November 2013.
“ACC sets record in giving clean chits”, The Daily Star, 1 January 2016.“ACC’s authority curtailed”, Prothom Alo, 11 November 2013.
“Graft takes 2-3 pc off the economy: Muhith says punitive measures are not enough to deal with the problem”,The Daily Star, 10 July 2015.
“Provision for prior permission illegal: HC observes change to law undermines ACC’s independence”, The Daily Star, 31 January 2014.
“The ACC does not find corruption information against pro-government people”, Prothom Alo, 9 December 2015.
ACC website: http://www.acc.org.bd/
ACC, ACC Annual report 2013 (Dhaka: ACC, 2014).
ACC, ACC Annual report 2014 (Dhaka: ACC, 2015), available at http://acc.org.bd/assets/acc_annual_report_-_2014.pdf
ACC, Anti Corruption Commission (Personnel) Employment Rules, 2008.
ACC, District/ Upazila/ City Corporation Corruption Prevention Committee and Supporting Organisations: Constitution and Working Guideline (Dhaka: ACC, May 2010).
ACC, Integrity Unit Constitution and Working Guideline 2015 (Dhaka: ACC, 2015).
Asian Development Bank, “Overview of NGOs and civil society: Bangladesh”, August 2008, available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28964/csb-ban.pdf
Ain o Salish Kendra, “Bangladesh: Failing to Fulfill Its Commitments”, available at http://www.askbd.org/ask/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ANNI_Report_2015-Bangladesh.pdf
ATM Shamsul Huda (undated), “Role of Civil Society in strengthening Electoral Democracy”, available at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/dj/internationalconf/Bangladesh.pdf
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, http://www.bbs.gov.bd/
BIGD, The State of Governance Bangladesh 2014-2015: Institutions, Outcomes, Accountability, (Dhaka: BIGD, 2015).
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Bangladesh”, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html
Department for International Development,Operational Plan 2011-2016 DFID Bangladesh, available athttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389036/Bangladesh.pdf
Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013, Global Financial Integrity, December 2015, available at http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf
Freedom House, Freedom in the Worlds 2015, available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf
79
Government of Bangladesh, Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004.
Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Constitution (16th Amendment).
Government of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, An Independent Review of National Integrity Strategy (NIS), May 2013.
Government of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Commitment for Golden Bengal: National Integrity Strategy of Bangladesh, Government of Bangladesh, October 2012.
Government of Bangladesh, Cultural Institution for Small Anthropological Groups Act, 2010.
Government of Bangladesh, Finance Division, Bangladesh Economic Review 2015, Ministry of Finance, available at http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/15_16/ber/bn/Chapter-1%20(Bangla-2015)%20final.pdf
Government of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan: 2016-2020 - Accelerating Growth and empowering citizens, available at http://www.plancomm.gov.bd/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7FYP_after-NEC_11_11_2015.pdf
H. Z. Rahman, “Bangladesh 2015: Crossing miles”, The Daily Star, 6 March 2006.
Harry Blair, “Civil Society, Democratic Development and International Donors” in Rounaq Jahan (ed.), Bangladesh. Promise and Performance (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2002) (second impression).
Human Rights Watch, Democracy in the Crossfire: Opposition Violence and Government Abuses in the 2014 Pre- and Post-Election Period in Bangladesh, 2014, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0414_ForUpload.pdf
Iftekharuzzaman, ‘The Anti-Corruption Commission: How Can It Be Made Effective?’, paper presented at the Roundtable Discussion organized jointly by TIB and Reporters Against Corruption, Dhaka, 17 September 2006.
Iftekharuzzaman, “Anti-corruption Commission (Amendment) Bill: Unconstitutional, discriminatory, self-defeating”, The Daily Star, 14 November 2013.
Institute of Governance Studies, The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008 (Dhaka: IGS, 2009).
Institute of Governance Studies and BRAC University, ‘Institutions of Accountability: Anti‐Corruption Commission’, Background paper (Dhaka: IGS and BRAC University, 2007).
International Crisis Group, Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis, Asia Report N°264 | 9 February 2015, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/264-mapping-bangladesh-s-political-crisis.pdf
International Republican Institute, Bangladesh Survey: Support for Government Growing; Corruption a Dominant Concern, 2 September 2015, available at http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-bangladesh-survey-support-government-growing-corruption-dominant-concern
International Republican Institute, Optimism Growing for Bangladesh’s Economic Future, 25 January 2016, available at http://www.iri.org/resource/iri%E2%80%99s-center-insights-poll-optimism-growing-bangladesh%E2%80%99s-economic-future
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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCYSTRENGTHENING INITIATIVEASSESSMENT OF THE BANGLADESHANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION 2016
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