22 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 26 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2010

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE MILITARYAFRICOM, culture and future of Human Terrain Analysis

On 3 December 2009, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) accepted a comprehensive assessment of the US Armys Human Terrain System (HTS) proof of concept programme, conducted over a two-year period by the Associations Ad Hoc Commission on Anthropologys Engagement with the Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC). The 72-page assessment sought to offer a thorough examination of the pro-gramme in its various parts, with significant attention given to activities of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and related implications for the discipline of anthropology.1 Not surprisingly, it has been the activities of HTTs that have generated the most controversy among anthro-pologists in the US. HTTs are teams composed of both military and social science personnel embedded with US military units in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams employ rapid appraisal-type ethnographic techniques to address a deficit of socio-cultural knowledge on the part of Army and Marine field com-manders. This knowledge, in turn, is intended to help improve decision-making by com-manders on the ground so as to avoid poten-tial kinetic2 engagements. For this reason CEAUSSICs report was particularly dedicated to evaluating the ethics and efficacy of HTTs in the field.

Anthropology and securityI will not rehearse the details of the HTS programme here, since it has already been discussed in these pages (see Gonzlez 2008, McFate and Fondacaro 2008).The present comment updates those earlier exchanges. Briefly, CEAUSSIC was convened in late 2006 in response to the AAA leaderships growing awareness that the diverse agencies, institu-tions and goals of the security sector broadly conceived were increasingly engaging with anthropologists and with the methods and concerns of anthropology, both in the US and globally. CEAUSSICs first report,3 issued in late 2007, addressed this broad landscape with the purpose of describing the different kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations (CEAUSSIC 2007: 4). Our initial report neither opposed nor endorsed such engagement a priori, but rather (1) highlighted our disciplinary lack of familiarity with these expanding arenas of security (at least since the Vietnam era), (2) began to describe what anthropological practice looks like in such arenas, (3) encouraged healthy disciplinary discussion and debate about the extent and kinds of such practice, and (4) recommended the AAA revisit its Code of Ethics in light of the emerging imbrication of anthropology with security.

If forecasts in the annual Quadrennial Defence Review emphasizing the importance of the social sciences to future military missions, an increased emphasis upon cultural knowledge in military doctrinal frameworks, and new Department of Defense (DoD) funding streams to support appro-priate research and development in desirable disciplinary fields for the next several years, are all reliable indicators, this security context prom-ises to be a long-term fact for anthropology that will outlast the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. For this reason, the way anthropology (and the social sciences in general) respond to, co-operate with, avoid or critique these ramifying arrangements of the security sector amounts to a litmus test4 for determining what we mean by engaged or public anthropology with respect to policy-making arenas, both in the present and in the near future. And any public anthropology or discipline-transcending conversation with audi-ences other than ourselves that uses our discipli-nary frames to engage with urgent social issues in an activist, advocacy or policy capacity is likely to confront comparable issues. This is, therefore, an important discussion.

Our 2009 report, however, dealt only with HTS. This report was meant to provide a detailed description, as a point of reference to provide a better grounding for ongoing disciplinary debate over this controversial programme which continues to make news.5 On this basis, we researched the programme extensively. Our research included: a formal request for informa-tion,6 the compilation of primary and secondary sources, dozens of interviews with former and current programme personnel (with priority given to members of HTTs, both advocates and critics), and with military clients, as well as direct observation in theatre. With respect to HTTs, we examined their training in research methods, the varied circumstances of fieldwork, their relationship to military counterparts, typical research questions, modes of data collection and storage, and the kinds and quality of their products. While we were at pains to maintain balance in the report, CEAUSSIC concluded that the programme, in its present particulars, is not a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology.

Important reasons for this include: the absence of an ethical framework for the pro-gramme (which allows it to operate in a state of exception), the inability of HTT members to guarantee reliable control over the data they collect, inadequate training both in social sci-ence methods and preparation for battlefield conditions, the fact that HTTs potentially put both themselves and research subjects in harms way, and a high probability that data collected by HTTs would be used as military intelligence. Our report concludes:

When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment all characteristic factors of the HTS concept and its

application it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology. (CEAUSSIC 2009: 3)

HTS, in short, represents one approach putting social scientists in Humvees to the US mili-tarys utilization of cultural knowledge. As our report spells out, from an anthropological point of view, this is a deeply flawed approach.

Given its purpose of generating a better understanding of the cultures of Iraqis and Afghanis in order to avoid hostilities, the HTS programme is of a piece with the current US doctrine of counterinsurgency (or COIN), which prioritizes a hearts and minds campaign among local and civilian populations over more conventional approaches to warfare.7 But what has been at issue for the community of anthropologists has been this application of its signature method participant-observation eth-nography on behalf of the US military, to help it make use of culture in the context of counter-insurgency. In other words, the ethics debates regarding HTS have focused more on anthro-pology in its mode of fieldwork and less on the conception of culture that underwrites the project.8 However, future iterations of HTS are likely to take us beyond the ethics of fieldwork to more varied applications of the conceptual apparatus of anthropology, and in particular to increasing importance of the culture concept in the absence of fieldwork. But we have so far thought very little about this.9

AFRICOM and counterinsurgencyThe US House Armed Services Committee is currently undertaking a review of the HTS pro-gramme, which is scheduled to be completed by the spring of 2010.10 Part of the reason for this is that HTS is in line to receive an additional infu-sion of funding rumoured to be as high as $300 million,11 as it moves from the status of proof of concept to become a program of record. HTS continues to occupy the anthropology slot for military planners. The indications are that either the HTS programme itself, or a similar human terrain-like capacity, is now slated to be part of combatant commands beyond the Middle East.12 Moreover, the Houses investigation is already thinking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and accepts what is now an increasingly doctrinal fact for the US military: that its future engage-ments will all require the significant application of socio-cultural knowledge.13 Anthropology should be giving more consideration to the implications of these longer-term developments.

Perhaps the most notable near-future develop-ment in this regard is the effort to build up the newest US combatant command on the conti-nent of Africa, AFRICOM.14 The stated goals for AFRICOM provide a vision of things to come. As Catherine Besteman puts it, AFRICOM is set to pioneer within the military a new soft power approach oriented toward non-kinetic force and humanitarian objectives (Besteman 2009: 115). Since its creation in 2007, AFRICOM has been promoted as a com-

comment

ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 26 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2010 23

batant command plus. AFRICOM, we have been told, is less about war fighting and more about war prevention. As a recent report by the US Congressional Research Service emphasizes, AFRICOM has been promoted as less about establishing a US military presence on the con-tinent and more about inter-agency facilitation of non-military operations in collaboration with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State, with a large civilian component, and aimed at building a stable security environment (see Ploch 2009).

This means that AFRICOM will be con-cerned with such wide-ranging issues as combating HIV-AIDS, fighting corruption, addressing weak governance and poverty in the region, and the support of human rights. These humanitarian objectives will be com-bined with a focus on US strategic interests in the region, including counterterrorism,15 oil and global trade, and maritime security, while also addressing armed conflicts and violent extremism. These activities have been blithely summarized by AFRICOM commander William E. (Kip) Ward as the 3-D strategy of defense, diplomacy, development (Ward 2009). As was recently noted in Foreign Policy, AFRICOM fits in quite nicely with the world of counterinsurgency (Dikinson 2009).

HTS is likely to have a place in the new AFRICOM-type organization of regional com-batant commands. The House Armed Services Committee has described HTTs as critical enablers helping US combatant commands to shape military planning in pre-conflict environ-ments, and Ward (2009) has already testified to the importance of the business of socio-cultural awareness, human terrain analysis. As early as January of last year, it was already being reported that AFRICOM was discussing the need for socio-cultural cells, including personnel with expertise in human terrain, all-source and geo-spatial analysis (quoted in Hodge 2009). Job ads for a human terrain analyst in connec-tion with AFRICOM have appeared regularly throughout 2009.16 AFRICOM is also actively creating a new social science research centre, to be based jointly in Stuttgart and Djibouti, for the purpose of mapping the complicated human terrain on the African continent (Vandiver 2009). Advertisements for human terrain analysts being recruited by AFRICOM prioritize the understanding of tribal and clan composition, ethnicity and religion. They also emphasize cre-ativity in data collection and data mining tech-niques. The next iteration of HTS, therefore, is likely to be integrated into the humanitarian soft power goals of AFRICOM-like arrangements.

Identifying anthropological practiceThe potential alignment of HTS with AFRICOM presents a new set of questions for the discipline of anthropology to consider. We should be thinking beyond the HTS pro-gramme per se and working towards a balanced assessment of what future HTS-like arrange-ments will look like, as these raise new ques-tions of ethics, method and analysis. Of basic importance is what the use of socio-cultural knowledge will involve as part of AFRICOM-type development and diplomacy efforts. In

particular, how culture figures in such a mixed military and humanitarian effort is something to which we should be giving our attention, especially in terms of the relationship between military-driven humanitarianism and soft power or counterinsurgency goals.17 What, in short, are the limits and parameters of any possible anthropological role in such situations, and where should it be located in practice?

AFRICOM institutionalizes an ongoing mili-tary civilian surge. This might not be a bad thing. However, CEAUSSICs recent report on HTS can provide guideposts for lurking prob-lems and pitfalls, ethical and otherwise. One of the problems with HTS, as it currently looks, is that it is impossible to ascertain its specific purpose. Depending on the audience and upon where you are in the HTS scheme of things in government circles inside the beltway, at AFRICOMs home base at Fort Leavenworth, part of a reach back cell,18 or downrange with an HTT the very identity of the programme changes. As the 2009 CEAUSSIC report notes:

The current arrangement of HTS includes potentially irreconcilable goals which, in turn, lead to irreducible tensions with respect to the programs basic identity. These include HTS at once: fulfilling a research function, as a data source, as a source of intelligence, and as performing a tactical function in counterinsurgency warfare. Given this confusion, any anthropologist considering employment with HTS will have difficulty determining whether or not s/he will be able to follow the disciplinary Code of Ethics (CEAUSSIC 2009: 3).

In short, the programme is fraught with contra-dictions. Perhaps intentionally, therefore, it can exploit the lack of clarity between these several functions when convenient. This includes such key distinctions as between research, and all things entailed thereby for social scientists, and intelligence overt or clandestine collec-tion of cultural content knowledge in ways not constrained by the ethics of social scientists. But of course this difference is a crucial one for anthropologists and cannot be glossed over.

One of the reasons why HTS the programme, and the activities of HTTs in the field, cannot be described in any reasonable sense as anthro-pology is because the programme has had little interest in engaging with the community of social scientists (or with social scientists working in other capacities in or with the mili-tary), in good faith and in a serious-minded and rigorous way, to determine the extent and limits of social scientific contributions to such efforts more realistically and appropriately. As a result, as the CEAUSSIC report emphasizes, too often HTTs appear to adopt the priorities of military commanders for whom they work as their own research priorities. And their research questions are often limited to the execution of basic COIN strategy. What this means is that HTT social scientists are highly vulnerable to the loss of the critically independent perspective that is a pre-requisite for the legitimate conduct of research.

Problem-solving instrument: Cultural modelling?Looking forward, at least as problematic is the vision of culture that too often appears to be promoted by the work of HTTs in the

field, obliged to sell themselves to the military unit with which they are embedded. This can quickly become a decontextualized cultural content knowledge, distinct from any par-ticular social scientific method, that is at once controllable and a variable for manipulation, itemization and archival stockpiling, with the promise of a dubious certainty of definitively mapping the cultural terrain. The culture concept, in short, is transformed into a mili-tary tactical problem-solving resource, largely depopulated and well removed from the cir-cumstances of any effort of engaged or public anthropology of the near future. And this, in turn, makes it available for other applications.

Recent AFRICOM job ads seeking human terrain analysts give special attention to geospatial analytical tools and methods and to social networking models.19 What this sug-gests is that human terrain analysis is now a point of reference for the DoD in ways that go beyond the HTS programme. Between 2008 and 2010 increased DoD funding has been given for key technologies supporting human terrain understanding (quoted in Forte 2009), for the purposes of forecasting, mapping and modelling funding which will almost triple from 2009 to at least 2013.20 What this means is that human terrain is now increasingly synonymous with the accelerating work of human, social, culture and behaviour modelling (HSCB).21

In such a scenario Human Terrain Teams would be allotted the role of collectors, who generate data based on observations, ques-tionnaires, and interviews, while new human terrain subject matter experts would fill the role of analysts, applying this data to the work of modelling and analysis, restricted to de-identified data.22 But what are the ethics of anthropological practice with respect to such programmes of cultural modelling, where con-texts of data collection and of analysis of elic-itation, interpretation and use are potentially so thoroughly dissociated from one another in terms of space, time and the people involved? It is time for the discipline of anthropology to give more attention to the methods and ethics of such policy-centred forms of knowledge pro-duction as typically performed by varieties of analysts (rather than just ethnography).23

Modellers are one variant of analyst. But epistemological and ethical discussions of the work of cultural modelling are as yet underde-veloped, and in the limited space of this article I can refer only briefly to some of the key issues.24 Many of these appear to be technical challenges. But they are not just that. Modellers are concerned with how best to quantify culture for computation an exercise fraught with the risk of a false summing up, say, of culture X or the collective behaviour of Y. This risk is distributed and dispersed into many technical questions, such as: definition of units of data, reliability of data, comparative fungibility of data, relative weighting of both cultural and non-cultural inputs, and different goals for models (e. g. mapping versus forecasting), among others. In the predictive mode, models promise, if not certainty, at least reliable insight about the decision-making of collective cultural behaviour. For military planners, then, cul-

24 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 26 NO 1, FEBRUARY 2010

tural models might improve their own tactical decision-making by mapping or forecasting the decision-making of cultural others. And yet, hand-in-glove with the concept of culture that emerges from the work of HTTs, cultural models assume the pursuit of certainty, poten-tially reducing culture to classifiable, com-parable and equivalent traits and bits in ways radically distant from any meaningful context of a culture for its members.

How specific cultural models are constructed, how they are used, and the relative transparency of such models, not just for users but also for ostensible subjects, are all questions still well off anthropologys ethical radar. The involve-ment of anthropologys conceptual apparatus with the building of cultural models, however, promises to be a part of AFRICOM-type human terrain analysis. And such cultural models are social artefacts to a greater extent than those developed for weather prediction. What, for example, are the ethical implications when

analysts use wrong-headed assumptions, and poorly collected data, to create inaccurate maps of a given stretch of cultural terrain in ways that might lead to distorted representations of groups which, in turn, are part of the mix promoting mistaken tactical decisions that end in violence?

On the horizon, then, is a military-driven systems approach to cultural problem-solving, which seeks to utilize culture as a key variable (along with others) to shape the environment in keeping with defined mission priorities for combatant commands which are now increas-ingly inclined to understand such priorities in the humanitarian terms of both development and diplomacy. As a formulation, human terrain identifies a conception of cultural information as an instrumental or soft-power variable to be incorporated as part of contem-porary counterinsurgency. This is no longer necessarily in reference to the HTS programme per se, or even to the exigencies and ethics of ethnographic fieldwork carried out among

people, but now as applied to often highly tech-nical forms of analysis of modelling.

Contemporary anthropology should be debating what sort of role, if any, it has with respect to such burgeoning high-tech military humanitarianism, including the instrumental-ized conception of culture that goes with it. Such a discussion must take us beyond the conventional consideration of the ethics of fieldwork to encompass new arenas of practice. As the AAA undertakes a review of its Code of Ethics, CEAUSSIC seeks to promote such a discussion with a casebook project that will explore the ethics of the diversity of such emerging forms of anthropological practice with respect to the security sector.25 l

Robert AlbroAmerican Universityalbro@american.edu

Robert Albro chairs the American Anthropological Associations Ad Hoc Commission on Anthropologys Engagement with the Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC).

1. The report is available for download on the AAA website at: http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/CEAUSSIC-Releases-Final-Report-on-Army-HTS-Program.cfm.

2. Kinetic is military parlance for the proactive use of potentially lethal force.

3. This report can also be found on the AAA website at: http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/upload/FINAL_Report_Complete.pdf

4. That is, how the discipline collectively responds to such long-term invitations to participate in shaping, and transformation, of policy into practice vis-a-vis the security sector will go a long way to determine to what extent policy engagements will be part of what we mean by public anthropology as a disciplinary project.

5. There have been three confirmed fatalities among HTTs. As recently as November of last year, there came a report of a further casualty (see Stanton 2009). And as I write, yet another civilian HTT casualty has come to light. Meanwhile, one more HTT member has been convicted of manslaughter.

6. Our request for information was forwarded to programme management on 28 November 2008. We received a reply from HTS on 27 April 2009, the details of which compose Appendix B of our report. Further details of the reports methodology are given therein (CEAUSSIC 2009: 9-12).

7. COIN doctrine places greater emphasis on skills such as language and cultural understanding, than does conventional warfare (Counterinsurgency Field Manual F 3-24 2007: 40).

8. For further discussion of implications of the fieldwork-centred nature of debate about HTS and the AAAs Code of Ethics, see Albro (2006).

9. In other words, the current pursuit by the US and other militaries of greater cultural knowledge is part and parcel of the recent and broad-ranging appearance of the culture concept as a problem-solving resource across a wide range of policy arenas, including, but not limited to, security, trade, development, and human rights. For more discussion of the expanding global policy relevance of culture, see Briedenbach and Nyri (2009).

10. It notes: In light of varied reports on the effectiveness and usefulness of HTS or the benefits of the HTS, the committee directs DoD to conduct an independent assessment of the system, including related technology development efforts (US HASC 2009: 28).

11. The budget for HTS, and figures for accompanying funding allocations, are not available in any one place. A variety of military programmes and non-military contractors are funded to address different components of the programme as a whole.

The details of HTS funding through the 2009 DoD budgetary cycle are available in CEAUSSIC report (2009: 17-18). The figure of $300 million for 2010-11 cited here comes from unnamed sources within the programme.

12. The House Armed Services Committee recommended establishing at least one Human Terrain Team (HTT) for each regional combatant command, including the Pacific Command, the Southern Command, and the Africa Command (Skinner 2008). This recommendation was subsequently made part of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2009.

13. For example, the newest generation of US Department of Defense doctrinal field manuals, including most obviously the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual and the 2007 Stability Operations Field Manual, make abundant reference to the importance of understanding the cultural terrain and to cultural intelligence-gathering.

14. For early discussion on AFRICOM in these pages see Besteman (2008) and Keenan (2008).

15. Jeremy Keenan (2009, 2008) has discussed the AFRICOM concept, from 2002 onwards, as part of a US effort to militarize the continent of Africa (namely the Pan-Sahel Initiative of 2003/4, and the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative of 2005), justified on the basis of the supposed expansion of terror threats in the Sahara-Sahel region, directed towards both Europe and Africa.

16. These have almost all been posted by BAE Systems, a subcontractor that recruits for the HTS programme.

17. For an example of such work, see Rubinstein (2008).

18. Reach back cells are US-based teams set up to support teams in the field with additional information.

19. See, for example, one such ad from July 2009: http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/BAE_SYSTEMS/DEU/AFRICOM_Mid_Level_Human_Terrain_Analyst/009575387/job.

20. A US Office of Secretary of Defense budgetary justification itemizes a steady increase of funding for human terrain modelling from $9 million in 2008 to more than $23 million by 2013. For further budgetary details see http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2008/OSD/0603670D8Z.pdf.

21. For a comparable discussion, see also Gonzlez (2008).

22. These quotes are taken from a Power Point presentation by Libby White, a programme manager for the US Department of Energys Protection of Human Research

Subjects programme, presented on 13 November 2009 at a DoE Human Subjects Working Group meeting.

23. For a comparison of the communities of anthropologists and analysts, see Albro (2009).

24. For more exhaustive discussions of the epistemological and ethical challenges of computational modelling, see McNamara et al. (2008) and Shruti and Loi (2009).

25. Details about this casebook project can be found at: http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/CEAUSSIC/Ethics-Casebook.cfm.

Albro, R. 2006. Does anthropology need a hearing aid? Anthropology News 47(8): 5.

2009. Anthropologists and analysts. CEAUSSIC blog post, 8 June. http://blog.aaanet.org/2009/06/08/ceaussic-anthropologists-and-analysts/.

Besteman, C. 2009. Counter AFRICOM. In Network of Concerned Anthropologists (ed.) The counter-counterinsurgency manual, pp. 115-132. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.

2008. Beware of those bearing gifts. An anthropologists view of AFRICOM. Anthropology Today, 24(5): 20-21.

Briedenbach, J. and Nyri, P. 2009. Seeing culture everywhere: From genocide to consumer habits. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (American Anthropological Association) (CEAUSSIC) 2007. Final report. Available at: http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/upload/FINAL_Report_Complete.pdf

2009 Final Report on the Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program. Available at: http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/CEAUSSIC-Releases-Final-Report-on-Army-HTS-Program.cfmCommunities (American Anthropological Association).

Dikinson, E. 2009. Think again: AFRICOM. Foreign Policy, November. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/17/think_again_africom; accessed 28 December 2009.

Forte, M. 2009. U.S. Congress and the Human Terrain System, 4 November. http://zeroanthropology.net/2009/10/04/u-s-congress-and-the-human-terrain-system/; accessed 23 October 2009.

Gonzlez, R. 2008. Human Terrain: Past, present and future applications. Anthropology Today 24(1): 21-26.

Hodge, N. 2009. Help wanted: Human Terrain teams for Africa. Danger Room

12 January: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01/help-wanted-hum/; accessed 7 September 2009.

Keenan, J. 2009. The dark Sahara: Americas war on terror in Africa. London: Macmillan.

2008. US militarization in Africa: What anthropologists should know about AFRICOM. Anthropology Today, 24(5): 16-20.

McFate, M. and Fondacaro, S. 2008. Cultural knowledge and common sense: A response to Gonzlez in this issue. Anthropology Today 24(1): 27.

McNamara, L.A. et al. 2008. R & D for computational cognitive and social models: Foundations for model evaluation through verification and validation. Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories.

Ploch, L. 2009. Africa Command: U.S. strategic interests and the role of the U.S. military in Africa. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service: CRS Report for Congress.

Rubinstein, R. 2008. Peacekeeping under fire: Culture and intervention. Kent, Wash.: Paradigm Press.

Shruti, K. and Loi, M.C. 2009. Ethical issues in computational modeling and simulation. Unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Cincinnati, Ohio, 5-8 March.

Skinner, D. 2008. House Armed Services Committee discusses U.S. Africa Command in annual fiscal report. http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1770; accessed 29 December 2009.

Stanton, J. 2009. HTS Sergeant Wesley Cureton wounded. Cryptome, 10 December. http://cryptome.org/0001/hts-cureton.htm; accessed 28 December 2009.

US Army and Marine Corps 2007. Counterinsurgency field manual FM 3-24. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

US House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 2009. FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act Summary. http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/HASCFY10NDAA061709.pdf; accessed 11 October 2009.

Vandiver, J. 2009. AFRICOM Building Research Center Stars & Stripes June 15. http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63315; accessed January 13, 2010.

Ward, W.E. 2009. Transcript: Ward testifies to House Appropriations Committee on U.S. Africa Command (March 2009). http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2844; accessed 30 December 2009.