CHAPTER I11

ANTECEDENTS OF STATE-LED FORMALISATION

This chapter begins with a review of the development experience of

Kerala. It has been often highlighted that in Kerala, despite high levels of social

development, economic stagnation persists; and this has given rise to scepticism

about its sustainability. There are many factors that have caused stagnation of

agriculture and industry in Kerala. Its image as a 'labour problem state' is said to

be one of the important factors. It is viewed that headload workers have

contributed much to creating such an image. The emergence of headIoad workers

as a distinct labour category in the urban and semi-urban areas is analysed. This

analysis is followed by a study of the unionisation of this labour class. Its

impacts on themselves and on the development process are underscored. The

circumstances that led to the state intervention in the headload labour market

is also highlighted.

3.1 Development and Labour

Though Kerala is a small state in the Indian Union with a poorly

developed industrial base, it has received world- wide attention and admiration in

certain respects. After a year of its formation as a state, the people of Kerala

elected a Communist government into power.' In the state many different classes

of workers were mobilised and strengthened with more bargaining power and

I The State of Kerala was formed on 1 November 1956. The state's first legislative election was held in 1957. The Communist Party of India (CPI) won the elections and formed a democratically elected Communist government.

more control over the labour process.2 The state is known for the peculiar

attitude of its people to migrate to different parts of the world and enjoy a divine

blessing in the form of foreign remittances.' The early trade relationship with the

outside world brought Kerala into contact with different races, religions and

cultures and this resulted in a cultural integration in the state.4 A noted

achievement of Kerala, as appraised by many, has been its distinct development

experience, which has been referred to as the 'Kerala Model of ~ e v e l o ~ m e n t " .

Social development indicators suggest impressive performance of the

state, but economic development has not caught up with it.6 That is, the

development experience of Kerala is such that with a low level of per capita

income, lower than the all India level, the state has achieved a high level of

human development, somewhat equivalent to that of the developed countries

2 K.P Kannan, "Labour Institutions . . . ," Op. cit., pp.49-69. 3 P. Surendran, The Kerala Economy Dcvelopmenr, Problems and Prospects, Delhi, Vrinda

Publications (P) Ltd, 1999, p.3 1. 1 P.P. Pillai, Kerala Economy: Four Decades of Development, Thrissur, Institute of

Planning and Applied Economic Research, John Mathai Foundation, 1994, p.5. 5 The expression 'Kerala Model of Development' is associated with a study conducted by

the scholars at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapurarn, in 1975. Based on this study entitled "Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy: A Case Study of Selected h u e s with ret'erence to Kerala", published by the CDS and the United Nations, international scholars rojected a 'Kerala Model of Development'.

'Some of the statistical figurer can be invoked here to substantiate the argument. Kerala, the southernmost state of the Indian Union, spreads across 38863 sq. kms, which is only 1.27 per cent of the total area of the country. The population is 3 1.84 million, which is 3.1 per cent of the total population of India. (Census of India, 2001). Kerala's position is the third among the Indian states in respect of density of population, which is estimated to be 819 persons per. sq. km. Kerala is the most literate state in the country having the literacy rate of 90.92 as against the all India figure of 65.38. (Census of India, 2001). Kerala had the birth rate of 18.2, death rate of 6.4 and infant mortality rate of 16 in 1998 and the comparable rates of all India were 26.4, 9.0 and 72 respectively. (Economic Review, 1999). The life expectancy at birth was 68.23 years for men and 73.62 years for women in 1996-2000. Compared to the all India Level of 62.8 years for men and 64.2 years for women (Economic Review, 1999). These statistics show that in the case of physical quality of life indicators such as birth rate, death rate, infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy the achievement of Kemfa is remarkable as comparable with the a1 t India performance. In addition to these, Kerala has achieved substantial development in the areas of women's education, land reforms, adequate food supply, spread of reading habit, reduction of spatial gaps, people's participation in planning etc.

of the worlda7 The significance of Kerala's development experience is such that

i t challenges the widely held paradigm that agricultural and industrial

development would take place first and then only the improvement of the

standard of living of the people occur^.^ As this type of development contradicts

the paradigm, it has caught the attention of the academics and the policy makers.

But this development experience cannot be said to be unique to Kerala because

Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Peru also have similar development

experience.9 Though commonness may be observed, the causes and the specific

processes that engendered the deveIopment are distinct for each region. Given

the specificities of Kerala, two questions are worth addressing:

1. How could the state attain a high level of human development with a low

per capita income?

2. Given the low level of per capita income and economic growth, is it possible

to sustain and improve the achieved level of human development?

It is well known that the development experience of Kerala was not a

planned one, but evolved over centuries due to the pecuIiarities of the

state." The environment of the state, long history of international contact,

emergence and spread of working cIass consciousness and the presence of many

committed and self sacrificing organisers and leaders, are said to be the

important factors which contributed to the success of Kerala in building up high

7 C.T Kurian, "Sustainability of Kerala's Development Experience", in M.A. Oommen Rethinking Developmenl: Keralu 's Development Experience, Volume I, New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company, 1999, p. 149.

8 T.M Thomas Issac and P.K. Michael Tharakan, "Kerala: Towards a New Agenda", Economic und Political Weekly, August 1995, p.1993.

9 C.T Kurian, "Sustainability . . ., " Op. cif., pp. 150-5 1 . I0 P. Surendran, The Kerala Economy . . . Up, cil, p. 42.

social development." The important factors that have created a favourable

environment for development in the fields of education, health care, trade etc. in

the state are well documented.'* The important features in the educational sector

were spiritual learning attached with Hindu tempIes, Assan's Kudippallikudams,

(an indigenous institution for imparting learning), contribution of Christian

missionaries, that of Hindu and Muslim religious groups, government

intervention (through starting schools and providing grants to educational

institutions run by the private sector), opportunities for women's education and

linking of government jobs with educational qualification. In the field of health

care also Kerala has a remarkable heritage. The healthy physical environment

due to geographical and climatic reasons, spread of ayurvedic system of

medicine, government intervention in both preventive and curative measures of

health care etc. have contributed to a healthy environment for health care. Trade

links with the rest of the world, agrarian reforms, socio-cultural movements etc.

have also created a congruous environment for the development of the state.

From this brief account, one can state that the achievement of the state in human

development was entrenched in the history of social, political, economic and

religious milieu.

Kerala's development experience has been wall documented and analysed

in a number of studies.I3 These studies underscore the roles of the state, trade

unions, and socio-religious and cultural institutions, along with the influx of

" Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerafa: Developmeni Through Radica) Reform, New Delhi, Promilla and Co. Publishers, 1994, pp.49-54,

l2 P.P. Pillai, Keraia Economy . . . , Op, cit,, pp. 1-1 7. 13 Cenh-e for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapurarn, Poverty, Unempioyment and Development

Policy A Case Srudy ofSeIecud Issues wirh Reference ro Kerala, New York, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1975. Jean Dreze md Amartya Sen, Economic. . . , Op. cir., 1998. Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cir., 1994. K.K George, Limits to KeraIa Modei of Development: An Analysis of Fiscal Crisis and its impIicatiom, Thiruvananthapurarn, Centre for Development Studies, 1 999. M. A .Oornrnen, Essqs on Kerala Economy, New Delhi, Oxford and 1 B H PubIishing Company, 1993. Patrick Heller, The Labour. , . , Op. cii., 1999.

foreign remittances. Some of the institutions that were formed during pre-

independent period continued to function even after the formation of the state.

Nevertheless, among the different institutions that have contributed to the social

development of Kerala, the most prominent is the government.

3.1.1 State policy

In the post-formation period of Kerala, various schemes were executed by

the government for social development. Among them, the institutions for

education and health care were the most decisive. Special welfare measures of

different types were undertaken exclusively for uplifting the poor and the

marginalised. An efficient public distribution system was set up. State enterprises

were established to provide the people with necessary facilities like transport,

electricity etc.

Kerala's success in the all important field of basic capabilities was due to the

public policy involving education, health services, public distribution, better position

of women in the sociev and the greater public activism.14 ~ i f fe ren t social

organisations, with the patronage of the government, were active and strong in

building up educational institutions and hospitals at different parts of Kerala. These

efforts of the government should be viewed within the broader context in which

different social agents' function. The general tendency among the wealthy and

influential groups is to make use of all the opportunities and resources available in

the society for their profit, and while doing so the poor are made to remain poor.

Moreover, as they are preoccupied with the perpetuation of their place and position

in the society and economy, there will not be any significant effort to uplift the poor

from their sad plight. As the state and the social institutions are controlled by the

14 Amartya Sen, Inegualib Reexamined, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1 999, p. 1 28.

upper class in the society, an initiative from them to extend more facilities to the poor

cannot be expected. Yet, in KeraIa we observe state intervention in the

empowerment of the poor. Such a response of the state has been mainly due to the

active involvement of social agencies. For instance, different community based

social reform movements, trade unions and voluntary organisations have made

significant contributions in this direction. "The influence of western liberal thinking

and the socialist revolution in the erstwhile Soviet Union had facilitated a qualitative

improvement in the community based social reform movement to turn to radical

political movement that was emerged first in the Indian National Movement and was

later formed in to ~ o m m u n i s t s " ~ ~ . This was the general condition under which the

state had to perform such welfare functions.

The coexistence of high human development and weak economic

performance since the mid seventies may be best explained in terms of Iiberal

spending of the state and remittances fiom the Gulf countries. Kerala economy

may be referred to as an upward cum outward looking economy. It is an

economy of upward looking in the sense that society expects the government to

spend on human development even if it is through public borrowing. At the same

time, it i s also an outward looking economy as the society expects and does

receive considerable remittances from outside the statelnation. The inflow of

foreign remittances since the beginning of the fourth quarter of the twentieth

century has enhanced the standard of living of the people of ~ e r a 1 a . l ~

ln this it is worthwhile to make an enquiry on whether Kerala's

development experience is a model to the developing countries of the world or not.

I5 K.P Kannan, "Poverty Alleviation as Advancing Basic Human Capabilities: Kerala's Achievements Compared", Working Paper, Thiruvananthapuram, Centre for Development Studies, 1999, pp.26-27.

16 B.A Prakash, "The Economic Impact of Migration to the Gulf', in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerclla's Economic Drvelopment: Issues and Problems, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999, pp. 146-47.

Franke and Chasin observes that Kerala cannot be taken as a model to be copied,

but it has provided some useful lessons to be learned.I7 One of the statements

about the Kerala Mode1 of Development can be invoked here.

The basic weakness of the model is that it created only a few demographic indicators as the indicators of the quality of life. But if we take unemployment of labour force and the extent and magnitude of poverty as indicators of quality of life, then the model becomes a negative model. An economic performance with a steady deterioration of the productive sectors cannot be considered as a positive sign of development. l 8

The message conveyed through these lines is that Kerala's development

experience is not a desirable model, as it has not been able to solve the problems

of chronic unemployment and incidence of abject poverty. The mounting

unemployment and spread of poverty are thought to be posing hurdles to social

development and it is feared that in the future there wiIl be only the skeleton of

the much praised achievements made earlier. This calls our attention to the

nature of social development that has taken place.

Any discussion on Kerala's social development raises the question

whether the state has in reality achieved a high level of social deveIopment or

not. If the primary outcome of social development is the content of the society

and if we take into account the fact that there are undesirable incidences of high

rates of suicide, divorce and mental disorders, then the question is, how can one

say that Kerala has achieved a high level of social de~elo~tnent?'~ This brings

out the negative effects of development and its limitations.

17 Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cit., p. 1 12. IS B.A Prakash, "Kerala Economy: An Overview", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala's Economy:

Performance, Problems Prospects, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 28-29. 19 S.K Sasikumar and S. Raju, Dynamics of labour Market in Kerala, N L I Research

Studies Series, Noida, V.V Giri National Labour Institute, 2000, p.3.

We shall also look into the sustainability of Kerala's development experience.

As mentioned earlier, the influx of foreign remittances and excessive public

expenditure for nearly three decades have maintained and improved the physical

quality of the life of the Keralites. It is a blessing for the state that the flow of foreign

remittances is still continuing. But excessive public expenditure has put Kerala in a

severe fiscal crisis. The important causes of the fiscal crisis are "revenue deficit, low

realisation of revenue potential, excessive growth of non-plan revenue expenditure,

unsustainable debt burden, unsatisfactory performances of public sector enterprises

and low cost recovery of public services"20. It is viewed that the slow growth in

economy and the fiscal crisis reinforcing each other have been setting limits to the

Kerala Model of ~eve lo~rnent .~ '

It is true that Kerala has succeeded in extending the facilities of social

development not only to a few privileged classes but also to almost the entire area

covering a vast majority of people. But such governmental intervention does not

seem likely to continue as it is facing the predicament of financial crisis. Under such

a condition the sustainability of the Kerala Model of development does not allow us

to be optimistic about it. For instance, if the government withdraws its financial

supports to the educational and health sectors in Kerala, then the cost of education

and health care will rise to the extent that for a majority of the population they will

become inaccessible. Under such circumstances it is important to examine the causes

that lead to a lopsided economic development.

The gap between social and economic development in Kerala began to

widen in the 1950s resulting in acceIerated social development accompanied by

'O N.J. Kurian and Joseph Abraham, "The Financial Crisis: An Analysis", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala S Economic Development . . . , Op. cit., p.328.

2 I K.K George, Limits . . . , Op. cit., p. 1 12.

slow economic development.22 The economic stagnation of the state was visible

since the mid-1970s. The deterioration and stuntedness in the performance of

agricultural and industrial sectors is the combined result of a number of factors

such as the lopsided land reforms, lack of irrigation facilities, inadequate power

supply, resistance to technological change, high wage level and labour militancy.

In short, neither market mechanisms nor government interventions could

stimulate economic processes in Kerala. When we examine the government

interventions, we can find that failures lurked both in the formulation of policies

and in their implementation. We shall move on to substantiate the argument

employing select examples.

Land reforms have been implemented in the state for increasing

agricultural production, eliminating exploitation in the agricultural sector and

ensuring social justice. The performance of land reforms has been disappointing

in the case of fixing ceiling on land holdings and in the distribution of surplus

land. The unsatisfactory performance of the land reforms (though better than in

the all India level) may be attributed to the failure of the government to conceive

the sprit of land reforms and to implement the programmes effectively. The

interval of more than one decade between the ceiling proposal and its actual

implementation and the exceptions granted to plantation crops were serious

lapses from the part of the state.23 The long interval between the proposal and the

implementation of the ceiling on land holdings enabled many owners of surplus

land to transfer the surplus portion safely to others. The exceptions granted to the

plantation crops actually reduced the availability of surplus land to be distributed.

'* S.K Sasikumar and S. Raju, Dynamics . . . , Up. cit., pp. 10-1 1 M.A. Oornrnen, Essays . . . , Op, cit., p.9.

It is very clear that the state was lenient towards the pressure of capital. The role

of the state in this context is very clear in the following words "... unless land

reforms are backed by mass mobilisation, with a government sympathetic to the

working class, both in the States and in the Centre, they cannot s~cceed"'~.

In Kerala, irrigation facilities have been extended only to a limited area. It

is estimated that only 1 5 per cent of the total cropped area is under irrigation.25 it

is also estimated that more than 80 per cent o f the irrigated area is under paddy

~ u l t i v a t i o n . ~ ~ This shows the limited irrigation facilities extended to cropped area

under non-paddy cuI tivation. Though the per hectare cost of irrigation through

minor projects is comparatively low, priority has been given to major and

medium projects in the state." So it may be concluded that the government has

failed to set correct priorities and extend irrigation facilities to more areas

through minor projects.

Another instance of failure and limitation is in the generation and

distribution of electricity. The government set up the Kerala Electricity Board on

3 1 March 1957 for the generation and distribution of power in the state. Till the

beginning of the eighties the power position of the state was generally

satisfactory, but since then, shortage of supply has occurred. And power cuts

have been executed continually and regularly. The mismatch between the

demand and supply of power and the shortage of power supply to cop with the

increased demand are mainly due to the defective policy of the government. The

Kerala State Electricity Board depends on the hydro-electric source of power,

.- - -

24 {hid., p.6. ? S P.M. Thomas, "Agricultural Performance in Keraia", in B.A. Prakash, ed., Kerala's

E~~onomicDeveiupment , O p c i i , , p.179. 26 P.P. Pillai,Kerala . . , Up cit., p.81. 27 P.M. Thomas, "Agricultural. . . . , " Op. cir., p. 179.

63

which i s the main reason for the power shortage of the state. Therefore, the

government has to think seriously of the installation of atomic and thermal power

stations in the state." Thus the government failed both in taking proper polic,ies

and in the efficient implementation of the policies taken. This was the important

cause of the low level of commodity production in the state.

3.1.2 State and labour

Yet, another example for unsuccessful governmental intervention in Kerala

can be found in its labour policies. An important achievement of unionisation in

the state was the ensuring of sustained increase in wages that exceeded the increase

in cost of living.29 Along with the high wage cost, psychic cost was also high in the

state. Psychic cost is the cost incurred by the entrepreneurs due to psychological

fear which arises out of many factors, like labour unrest, input scarcity,

government policies, environmental problems etc, and among them labour unrest is

the most relevant one in the Kerala context.30 So, it may be concluded that

unionisation in the state has increased both wage cost and psychic cost.3' In the

analysis of psychic cost the cost of isolation should be emphasised in the context of

Kerala. Isolation cost may be defined as the feeling of isolation of the

entrepreneurs/ernployers due to the state's policy of non-interference of the police

in labour disputes.'' The state's policy of keeping the police out of labour disputes

28 N. Gopinathan Nair, "Power Development in Kerala", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerula's Econonzy . . . , Op. cir., p.328.

29 K.P. Kannan, "Political Economy of Labour and Development in Kerala: Some Reflections on the Dilemmas of a Socially Transforming Labour Force in a SIow Growing Economy", Thiruvananthapuram, Centre for Development Studies, 1998, p.8.

30 M.M. Tharnpi, "Economic Liberalisation and Industrial Development in Kerata: Challenges to New Investments", in B.A Prakash, ed.,' Kerala *s Economic Development: . . . , Op. cit., p.26 1 .

3 1 Labour c,ost = wage cost + phychic cost. j2 The coinage 'isolation cost' is intended to mean the helpless position of the employer when the

state had taken the policy of police neutrality in disputes between workers and employers. Employers felt isolated in front of the organisational clout and political influence of the working class.

was actually intended to help the labourers and their unionisation. But it created a

feeling of isolation among the entrepreneurs, as they were not given protection

when labour problems occurred. Employers were harassed and threatened by

unionised workers. The organisational strength and political clout made them

challenge the power of the capital. Employers quite often surrendered their rights

before trade unions. Therefore, in the analysis of the psychic cost, the isolation cost

faced by the entrepreneurs should be included.

With high labour cost and low labour productivity it was not profitable

for the industrial entrepreneurs and agriculturists to produce goods. So they

wanted to introduce technological changes, which were resisted by the unions.

The inability to introduce mechanisation forced many empIoyers to opt either to

close their factories or to shift them to the neighbouring states where labour cost

was very low.

Trade unions had adopted the strategy of resisting the technological

change in order to protect the employment of the workers. The resistance to

technological changes was not confined to industry but extended to agriculture

also. Organised strength of the agricultural labourers against mechanisation of

agriculture led many farmers to adopt the strategy of crop substitution. Some

even stopped the cultivation itself due to low productivity. High Iabour cost and

resistance to mechanisation, in effect, reduced employment opportunities both in

agriculture and industry. Trade unions succeeded to persuade the state to

intervene in this context through labour co-operatives, but this attempt was not

successful except in the co-operatives formed to manufacture beedi.')

33 K.P. Kannan, "State and Union Intervention in Rural Labour: A Study of Kerala", The Indian Jour~~al of Labour Economics, vo1.38, no.3, 1995, p. 460.

It may, thus, be concluded that the failure of the government both in the

formulation of proper policies or in the inefficient implementation of the policies

taken has led to economic stagnation of the state. Since 1990, the state has

realised the necessity of coping with technological changes and private

investment, and this in turn has put the state in a dilemma. That is, the dilemma

has been to find out ways to accomplish technological changes without

negatively affecting the interests of the So the emerging challenge of

the state is to protect the interests of the employers with out sending the workers

to be subjected to exploitation.

There has been a controversy among academics on the causal relation

between labour cost and industrial stagnation in Kerala. Subrahmanian and PiIlai

state that high wage-cost hypothesis does not explain industrial backwardness

and that it has no empirical basis in the context of eral la.)^ But, there is another

argument which contests this finding and asserts that Iabour costs in Kerala are

very high and 'cost' is defined not only in terms of wage and welfare costs, but it

includes the losses and inconveniences due to strikes and disputes.'6 In a study of

small-scale industries in Kerala the high labour cost hypothesis is accepted.j7 In

this study both wage costs and psychic costs are considered while calculating the

labour cost.

It may be argued that since the 1980s there has been a steady decIine in

labour unrest in Kerala. "But the tragedy seems to be that the Iabour unrest

remains as a stigma that makes the private investment shy away from the state"38.

34 K.P. Kannan, "Political Economy. . . ," Op, cii., p.24. 35 K.K Subrahmanian and P. Mohanm Pillai, "Kerala's Industrial Backwardness: Exploration of

Alternative Hypothesis", Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 21, No. 14, April 1986, p.585. 36 M.A Oommen, Essays. . . , Op. cit., p.101. 37 M.M. Thampi, "Development of Organised Small Scate Industries: Some Issues", in

B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala's Economy . . . , Up, cit., pp. 279-297. 38 V. Nanda Mohan, "Recent Trends in the Industrial Growth of Kerala", in B.A. Prakash,

ed., Keraia 's Economy . . . , Op. cif. , p.235.

That is, whether the wage component in Kerala is relatively high or not, the

psychic cost argument, inclusive of isolation cost, is all the more relevant as the

stigma persists. Many academics in the state maintain the view that the role of

headload workers is cruciaI to project Kerala as a 'labour problem zone'. Their

role to perpetuate the stigma is also attributed to their behaviour in the labour

market. There have been different representations of labour militancy by

different scholars. "Headload workers have a positive role in discouraging

investment in the

The following observation focuses on the irresistible bargaining capacity

of the headload worker.

The 'obstructionist profile' of labour, perhaps, refers to the loading and unloading workers, who are groups of young, able-bodied men seen in all important trade and industrial centres and road junctions in both rural and urban Kerala, who exhort money as wages because of their power to obstruct the handling of materials. The growth of this particular segment of work force highly unionised and closely identified with political parties, is likely to have contributed to the not-so-favourable image of the Kerala labour from the point of view of prospective investors .'*

Another representation highlights the 'closed shop' strategy, which puts barriers

to entry of the 'outsiders' into the headload labour market.

In the case of headload workers, the unions were able to erect very strong barriers of entry of workers to the local market places or towns, thus blocking the mobility of labour from rural to urban areas. Thus the restrictive practices of the unions practically discourage all categories of economic activities which require frequent Ioading and unloading of cornmoditie~.~'

39 T.N. Krishnan, "Koottaya Vilapesalum Ulpadana Vardhanavum", in A Group of Writers Keralathinte Vikasana Prasthanangal (Mal) Thiruvananthapuram, Chintha Publishers, 1992, p 46.

40 K.P. Kannan, "Labour Institutions . . . , " Op, cir., p.77. 4 1 B.A. Prakash, "Kerala's . . . , " Op, cit., p.38.

The following quote brings to light the link between headload workers

and the major political parties and shows how this link gave the workers

opportunities to use their muscle power in the collective bargaining for extra-

~narket wages.

Headload workers in Kerala have a long history of serving as the musclemen (goondas) that are a part of every politicaI party in India. . . . They have in particular developed a reputation for extortionate practices and "irresponsible demands". They can and do paralyse large markets, disrupt the flow of goods, and close down fa~tories.~'

The foHowing observation puts labour militancy in the most unfavourable

light. "There is neither decency nor discipline in their (headload workers) case.

They actually practise 'organised robbery'. It is the behaviour of this group that

scares away all decent people in starting new industrial ventures in the state"').

The non-sustainability and non-replicability of Kerala's development

experience and the lessons learned from it are, therefore, deeply entrenched

in the schisms of its labour market and this, whether really existing or

reproduced as stigma, in turn, is perpetuated in the contemporary situations

through the metaphoric reduction of the labourers to the stigmatised 'headload

worker'. This reduction has been getting material repeatability because of the site

of operation of the headload workers. Their activities take place in the open and

thus the judgements about them are publicly noticed and circulated in public.

The opinions of these economists do testify the centrality of the headload

workers in creating specific representations about labourers of Kerala with

respect to their role in blocking economic advancement. At this juncture, we

42 Patrick Heller, "The Labour . . . ," Op, cii., pp. 192-94. 43 K.C. Sankara Narayanan and M Meera Bhai, "Industrial Development of Kerala:

Problems and Prospects", in B. A Prakash, ed., Keraia 's Economy . . ., Op. cit., p.3 12.

proceed to examine the emergence of headload workers as a unified entity in the

urban and semi-urban areas and their subsequent unionisation.

3.2 Background to Unionisation

Carrying of material articles from place to place has a history very close to

the history of mankind itself. With the development of trade and commerce the

need for transportation of goods increased. This engendered the use of more and

more inechanical power, animal power and human labour; and headload work

was an indispensable component in the expanded pool of work force engaged in

the transportation of goods, A study on headload workers describes them in the

following words:

Headload workers are not a new race or class of people and they have been in existence since time immemorial. They have grown with times, though largely uneducated, and forming a large section in the lower social strata, partaking in whatever organised or unorganised economic, commercia1 or social activity requiring their effort. It is more of muscular power than brainpower that is demanded of a headload worker.44

In Kerala headload workers began to be identified as a unified category in

the second half of the twentieth cent~ry. '~ In the binaty opposition between

manual and intellectual labour, headload work has been placed in the former one

and it occupies the lowest position in the hierarchical distribution of work and

labour. That is, for one to engage in this specific work only hard manual labour

is needed and the work soils the labourer. The manual labourer status of the

headload worker gave them a low esteem in the society. Only those people who

had no other alternative to earn their livelihood joined the pool of headload

44 M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op. Cit., p.22. " Patrick Heller, The Labour . . . , Op, cit., pp. 19 1-1 94.

workers, particularly before their unionisation. Unionisation and state-led

formalisation are the important stages in the evolution of the headload labour

market to its present state,

Kerala has a glorious past of flourishing trade and commerce. From

ancient times, headload workers had much to contribute to the transportation of

goods from the points of origin to different destinations. As business activity

expanded, increasing number of headload workers began to be employed in

industrial and business establishments and commodity markets. In most of the

industrial establishments, headload work was not distinguished from other jobs

for work organisation and therefore no separate category of headload workers

was identified. Both men and women were employed to carry out headload jobs.

There was no discrimination between headload work and other casual works.

Nevertheless, in some establishments there was a separate category of

headloaders and they were treated as inferior and received only lower wages.

There were instances of the denial of benefits to the headload workers while

other workers received them; for instance there were events of denial of bonus to

these workers while their colleagues received it,46

Commercialisation of agriculture and urbanisation together resulted in

rapid expansion of markets and markets depended heavily on headload workers

to carry commodities. Headload work proliferated mainly in market places and

this was their main site of activity; therefore, here onwards we will concentrate

on the headload workers of markets. As mentioned earlier, in markets also there

46 R.S Unni, a trade union leader at Kollarn spoke about headload workers in the industrial establishments like Harrisons & Cross Field (India), Parvathi Mills etc. at Kollarn, "The management once used to treat these workers with out any regard, what so ever. Whatever strenuous work be done, they never used to pay willingly. The workers were even denied their right to ask for more. . . . . The headload workers of Pmathi Mills were denied bonus stating that they were not involved in the manufacturing process" (Interview with R.S Unni, in M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op, cit., pp. 128-1 29.

was no separate entity identified as headload workers as any casual labourer

could undertake this job. For instance, lorry drivers and their men or the attached

workers in shops and other establishments could also do the loading and

unloading of goods. As the volume of business increased, demand for headload

labour also increased and it became a specialised job since the mid-twentieth

century. With specialisation, the usage 'headload worker' was coined and

gradualIy it gained wide popularity. In the following section we will briefly

portray the general character of the headloader.

3.2.1 The speciaIised headload worker: The beginning

From the beginning the term headload worker signified those who

physically carried goods from one place to another in the market and other public

places for remuneration. UsualIy employers made 'spot contract' with them. The

nature of work required able-bodied men, as they had to generally perform

speedy hard work. Employers wanted them to finish the work at the earliest.

Usually, at least two workers were needed to carry out a given piece of work.

Therefore, wages were given for the piece of work done by the workers and they

shared the wages equally among them. The physically intensive nature of the

headload work was a barrier to the entry of non-able bodied workers to the

market and the piece wage system accentuated the advantageous position of the

able-bodied persons.47 Speedy hard work, collective work, piece wage system

and wage sharing were the important features of the headload labour market.

Headload workers proliferated in market places, boat jetties, bus stands,

railway stations, warehouses, construction sites and factory premises. Since the

47 Louise Waite, "Kerala's Informal Labour Market Intetventions: From Work to Well Being," Economic andPoliiicaI Weekh, vo1.36, no.26, June 2001, p.2395.

beginning of the second half of the twentieth century small groups of these foot

loose workers could be seen in small and large markets, the main work site of the

headloaders, all over Kerala.

In the beginning headload workers were mainly migrants from far and near.

At least during the earlier period of the growth of the headloader community, those

who defied the local customs and norms migrated and became headload workers. To

become a headload worker was only a last resort of the already impoverished and

marginalised to survive. Socially they were denigrated, and self-esteem was almost

an impossible quality for them. An important characteristic of headload workers,

which has direct bearing on theii. social status, is their ties with the family and village

to which they belong. Most of them had only very remote and feeble kinship and

af f~na relations with the villagers.

One of the sociological aspects of this class of workers may be

highlighted here. There is a general impression that workers of this category are

'essentially' outlaws. Whether this is true or not, there are certain factors that are

related to the specificities of the work process that influence their behaviour. The

time gap between spot-contracts that headloaders made with the employers was

not fixed; therefore, during the waiting period between two contracts there was

hardly any possibility to engage in any other productive or income earning job.

The waiting time ranged from a few minutes to a few hours. This unpredictable

waiting period had significant influence on the behavioural pattern of the

headloaders. The discontinuity between work and leisure germinated in them

tendencies to engage in extravaganza that crossed the bounds of social norms.

There was another characteristic of the work process. It was the footloose

nature of the workers. This was manly because although they had specific sites

of work they were not fixed. It used to be so mobile that there were no fixed

places for them to converge during the leisure time. Quite often the sites they

resorted to were either wayside common property or any vacant place in the

market. These places where they converged used to be treated as precarious sites

by the society,

Another feature of the specialised headload work system was that there was

no fixed wage for work. The contracts never included any wage schedule, and wage

was determined by the employer at will. The bargaining capacity of the headload

workers was weak, as collective bargaining was virtually non-existent, As most of

the workers were othenvise unemployed, the minimum wage that they received itseIf

appeared to them as a relief. As the employers were powerful and the headloaders

weak, there was no labour unrest in the market.

Although there was no labour unrest, there were conflicts among the

headload workers. The tussle between them took place when they interacted to share

wages and work. Tussles and feuds took place during the leisure hours also.

3.2.2 Beginning of formalisation

Besides the specificities in the work organisation, which we discussed in

the previous section, one aspect that needs to be highlighted at this juncture is the

non-existence of regulatory mechanisms whic,h give form to either employer-

headloader relations or mutual relations among the latter category. This was the

situation prior to the formalisation process among this category of workers; that

is, prior to the turn of- the mid-twentieth century. Absence of regulatory

mechanisms did create problems to both the employers and the labourers. An

arbitrary arrangement came up. The workers who touched the lorry first were

given the work to unload the goods therein. This arrangement did not systematise

the work organisation or work sharing. Realising the situation, employers began

to respond and they devised certain procedures.

One of the procedures adopted by the employers was to issue work pass to

the headloaders whom they chose. There were no criteria except the personal

interests of the employer in the selection of individuals for headload work. The

work-pass was basically a contract between the employer and the employee

without any mediation. Such procedure prevailed in many markets and the

regular employers preferred it. Work-pass procedure differed from market to

market and employer to employer.

A more formal work permit procedure was to issue work pass to all the

headload workers of a particular market place by turn. There was sufficient room

for the discretionary power of the employer; the 'undisciplined' could be

controlled by denying work permit. In this procedure also the contract was

directly between the employer and the headload worker. In those markets where

the goods movement was very high and regular, for instance, in railway goods

sheds, stockyards etc, employers gave agents the responsibility of issuing work

permit and distributing work and wages. The agent was variously called in the

local parlance as Moopan, Kal-tkaank etc.

In this system, which can be called the moopan system4' of work

organisation, the traders assigned the job of selecting the workers and allotting

the work to the -loyal and efficient workers. The employer and the workers

48 T.M Thomas Lssac described the moopans in the Coir induslry in Alappuzha: "The Moopans were usually trusted skilled workers who had been in the employment of the Company for a long penod and were men of considerable influence among the workers. Given the situation of acute labur scarcity, the m o o p a and conmctors had to develop patronclient trpe of relations with the workers in order to ensure an a d q w Labour supply". (T.M. Thomas Issac, From Caste Consciousness to Class Consciousness: Alleppey Coir Workers during Interwar Period," Economic and Polirical Weekly, vol. 20, no.4, Review of Political Economy, 1985, p.7 ).

were mediated by the moopan. The moopan system differed from market to

market and with respect to the nature of work.

The moopan system came into existence in the market places, where the

quantum of work was large. Therefore, in all important markets in the state this

system came into practice. A moopan was a headload worker who had made

agreements with one or more employers to supply the necessary workers to them.

In return he received the total wages of the workers from the employers and from

this he took a good amount for himself and distributed the rest among the

workers. Even the distribution of wages among the workers was not equal. The

workers were not even aware of the amount of wages that the moopan received

for their work. Neither the employer nor the moopan cared about the right of the

worker to know about his wages. The share that was taken by the moopan for the

intermediation was commonly called 'Moopan Kasu' . Thus, the moopan system

exploited the workers to a great extent,

Moopans were powerful in the headIoad labour market, They concentrated

mainly in railway goods sheds, ports, factories, wholesale trading centres etc.,

where a large number of workers were needed. Moopans were really the

employers' men and kept good relations with them. The workers did not have the

courage to oppose the Moopans. The Moopans could be questioned by

the workers only at the expense of the loss of their work.

In short, both the work permit procedures and the moopan system did

mark the beginning of formaIisation. But they did not significantly alter the

relation between the direct employer and the labourers or that among the

labourers. Such formalisation began with the initiation of unionisation.

3.3 The Phase of Unionisation

We have observed that as the headload labour market was unorganised

and predominantly non-formalised, headloaders were put under such a condition

that they could not resist exploitation by the moopan and the employer. Apart

from the humiliation inflicted by the employers, policemen used to drive them

from pillar to post. Some old workers of Kollam and Ernakulam markets (the

markets where case studies were made) reported that they had to approach the

political leaders to get them organised, mainly to prevent police hara~srnent.~'

That is, the demand for self-organisation as a trade union emanated from the side

of the headloaders themselves. Formalisation began not so much in the relation

between the employer and headload workers but among themselves. The

unionisation was a process that enabled them to employ collective bargaining as

a strategy to demand just wages. The sarcastic comment of a veteran trade union

leader may be mentioned here. He said that it was not 'class consciousness' but

'case consciousness' (fear of likely police cases) that led workers to approach

him for organising a trade union. He meant that the workers had no ideological

inspiration behind unionisation. Zn Ernakulam and Kcrllam markets the initial

enthusiasm showed by the headload workers to get organised did not stay for

long and in both markets union activities discontinued after a short while. Yet, as

police harassment continued, they once again felt the need for unionisation and

49 Frorn the interviews with workers and trade union leaders it was evident that in both these markets market based headload workers unions were organised due to the fear of police. Police treated these workers as outlaws and very often these workers were caught and petty cases were charged. In order to escape from police harassment workers in both these markets approached the leaders to get them organised. In the trade union history in Kerala it i s the widely held belief that the unorganised workers in Kerala were organised due to the initiation and radicalisation made by the political and trade union leaders. Here it is found an exceprion that this infor~nal group of workers approached the leaders to ger them organised.

as a result they got unionised. The main factor that prompted unionisation was

fear about the activities of governmental institutions such as the Police

Department. In other words, it was the relation between headload workers and

government that spurred them to think of unionisation. Since the 1960s trade

union activities continued unabated. The spread of the union activities was quite

rapid in the 1970s. 50

3.3.1 The Process of unionisation

The unionisation of headload workers can be analysed only in the context

of the wider political mobilisation of the labouring class of the state since 2920.

British plantation and factories had created a working class unity in Kerala, and

Kerala had a remarkable number of committed and self-sacrificing organisers

and leaders." The sufferings of the workers at the hands of the employers had

paved the way for the generation of such unity. The working class unity was a

very favourable factor for the unionisation process of the workers in the state.

The leaders inflamed the smaIl sparks. As a result, a strong and widespread

unionisation took place among the working class of the state.

The working class in Kerala has a long history of mobilisation and the

workers are more organised in Kerala than in any other Indian states.s2 The

unionisation of the workers began in 1922. It is believed that Bava Mooppan was

the founder of the trade union movement in the state. He founded the Travancore

Labour Association (TLA). The union was established in the coir belt in

Alleppey (Alappuzha). He organised the workers on humanitarian grounds

50 S. Mohanan Pillai, "Social Security . . . , " Op. cit., p.36. 5 1 Richard W, Franke, and Barbara H Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cil., pp. 52-53. '' Patrick Heller, The Labour. . . , Op.cit., p. 160.

against the severe exploitation by the employers. In the beginning, the labour

movement had strong links with the Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana (SNDP)

and later communism and radicalism of the work force became dominant forces

in the organisation of worker^.^' In the early years of TLA there was no capital-

labour conflict and the Association set out to eradicate the miseries of the

workers with the help of benevolent capitalists." Travancore Labour Association

was renamed as the Travancore Coir Factory Workers Union when it got

registration under the Travancore Trade Union Act of 1937. Quilon (Kollam)

was another major industrial centre in Travancore. It was famous for cashew nut

processing and tile making. At Quilon, a separate Labour Union was formed.

lust as it happened in the case of Labour Union of Alleppey, the Quilon Labour

Union was also renamed as Quilon Factory Workers Union. In Kuttanad,

agricultural labourers got organised in 1938. The Cochin Labour Union was

founded in 1933. In Trichur (Thrissur) the Labour Brotherhood was formed in

1935. In Cochin and Malabar the spread of unionisation gained momentum

during the 1940s.The progressive group in the Congress party, which disagreed

with the Gandhian principles, left the State Congress in its Quilon Session.

This group organised workers under the All Travancore Trade Union Congress.

(ATTUC). The Punnapra-Vayalar revolt of 1946 was a significant landmark in

trade union history though it is remembered mainly as a political struggle.

"From the outset, then, the making of Kerala's working class stretched across the

organised factory sector (coir manufacturing), work shop industries (beedi),

services (boatrnei), traditional agro-processing (cashew, toddy tapping), and

agriculture"55. Unionisation had been spreading to agriculture, plantation and

53 T.J Nossiter, Marxist State Governments in India: Politics, Economics and Sociey London, Printer Publishers, 1988, pp.52-53.

54 T.M Thoimas Issac, "From Caste .. .", Op. ccit , p. PE-8. '' Patrick HeIIer, The Labour. . . , Op. cit. p. 173.

service sectors with the beginning of the 1950s. All India Trade Union Congress

(AITUC), Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), United Trade Union

Congress (UTUC), Hindu Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), Swathanthra Thozhilali Union

(STU) were the important trade unions of this period.

Weadload workers, as already noted, were generally not an identifiable

group till the 1950s. Yet, it is true that the organisation of unorganised workers

in the state, which began in the 1920s, had covered headload workers also, not as

a distinct category but as workers among the category of casual workers in

plantations and factories. Moreover, in the fifties, when the distinction between

headload workers and shop employees was rather thin, both these categories of

workers were organised together in many markets.

3.3.2 Unionising the headload workers

In Kozhikode, one of the nerve centres of trade in Kerala, the unionisation

of the headloaders took place among the workers centred on the Port in 1948,

and the process of organising the workers had spread to the main market centres

by the 1950s. In Ernakulam, 'The Ernakulam Chumattu Thozhilali Union' was

formed in 1956, and in Thrissur, 'The Thrissur Chumattu Thozhilali Union' was

formed in 1957. It should be remembered here that the Labour Brotherhood, the

first working class organisation in Thrissur, founded in 1935, was the result of

the feeling of the workers for an organisation when they had to collect money for

the funeral expenses of a deceased headload worker.s6 1n Alappuzha separate

unions tbr headload workers began to flourish from the 1960s. In Kollam, the

first trade union for headload workers in the market was started in 1967.

5 h P. S Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual . . ., " Op, cil., pp. 40-4 1

In Kottayarn, the organisation of headload workers in the market area began

at the beginning of the 1970s only.

The headload workers were initially organised in the cities and important

municipal towns only, but by the second half of the twentieth century, with the

intervention of political parties in the labour market, the headload workers union

turned out to be a powerful entity through out the state. With the expansion of

the headload labour market and with their unionisation, the struggles between the

unions and the employers and also between unions arrayed under different

political parties became very common. The industrial relations in Kerala, which

were fairly better than in any other states in India, changed dramatically since the

mid-sixties and there after certain disturbing trends emerged in the trade union

The main consequence of this change was an unprecedented hike in

the collective bargaining power of the headload workers and this, in turn, created

conflicts between the employers and the headload workers.

From the foregoing discussion we can state that the unionisation of

headload workers started at the beginning of the 1950s and continued intensively

during the sixties and seventies. It progressed to a turbulent trade union scenario

in every economic sector. Thus, unionisation of the headloaders adversely

affected the general industrial relations and created paranoia about labour

militancy in Kerala.

3.3.3 The Attimari system

The paranoia was such that though the employers had no unwillingness to

employ the headloaders during the pre-unionisation period, they now began to

57 K. Ramachandran Nair, "Trade Unionism in Kerala," in B.A. Prakash, ed., KeraIa S Ecor?omy. . , Op. ci ! . , p. 33 1 .

avoid the unionised headloaders and revealed their preference to employ their

own attached workers. The reason for this was that the unionised headloaders

had begun to demand higher wages and better working conditions.

Collective bargaining power, in its extreme form, can be discerned from a

system of headload work organisation, namely 'attimari system'5s. This was an

important development in the headload labour market during the middle of the

1960s. This attimari system can be found only in Kerala and it is most powerful

in ~ o l l a m . ~ ~ The leader of the famous 'Pathinettara the former

attimari group in Kollam, told us about the origin of the attimari system and the

formation of the headload workers union in Kollam. The merchants in Kollam, a

well known port town of Kerala, who engaged in illegal trade in rice, sugar and

other food articles from other states during the food scarcity of 1967, transported

these without being sighted by the police and revenue officials. To unload these

articles into their warehouses they had to depend on daring and able-bodied men.

This clandestine activity was conducted at night in order to escape from the gaze

of the government officials concerned. The lorry drivers and their men thus

undertook the unloading of these goods at different shops. Taking advantage of

the situation, ten able-bodied workers at Kollam prevented the unloading work

and demanded the work assignment to be transferred to them, As the goods were

58 The term attimari is derived from the words 'atti' and 'rnarippu'. 'Atti' means arranging goods in vehicles and 'marippu' means lifting of goods from the atti and placing them on the heads of workers who stand near the vehicle. Usually two workers in a vehicle do atti and marippu, whereas the number of headloaders varies according to the quantity of goods and the availability of workers.

59 M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op. cil., p. 122 60 Two years before the formation of the trade union, the workers found a child discarded in front

of their ofice. They entrusted the child to a woman and paid Rs. 5 daily for looking after it. When the child was five years old, the inauguration of the union had taken place. Along with the 18 memkrs of the union the five years old child aIso garlanded the leader at the time of the inauguration of the union. Afterwards the 1 8 atrimari workers and their adopted were called ' Palhinetwara Company. '

brought illegally and the company of ten was too strong to be defeated easily, the

lorry drivers had to allow these local workers to unload goods into different

shops. The workers in average got Rs. 65 per day, which was five times the

normal rate in 1967. This daily earning was enormously high when compared to

the earnings of other casual workers during those days.

As black marketing became rampant with the active participation of the

attimari headloaders, the age-old clash between workers and the policemen

reappeared. As it happened in the past, workers wanted to get political protection

in order to escape fiom the surveillance of the police. The idea of forming a

union had arisen in their minds and they arranged a secret meeting in a house of

the prominent member of the 'Company of Ten'. In that meeting, they decided to

form a union to strengthen their position in the labour market. These ten workers,

along with eight other workers who specialised in the fruit market, formed a

trade union in Kollam in 1969. This event extended legitimacy to the claims, as

if justifiable, of the atdimari headloaders.

3.3.4 Rights in dispute

The headload workers' claim for monopoly of headload work in the market

had no legal backing and had no sanctity from the point of view of public interest.

Nevertheless, they had certain favourable factors to secure it; the most significant

factor was the fact that the workers were formed as gangs in the market with muscle

power and no individual employer could resist their demands. The pro-labour

governments in 1957, I967 and 1980 brought about a political environment for the

establishment of trade unionism in the state. Since 1957, the orientation of the

government labour policy was non-interference of the Police Department in disputes

between the employer and headload workers. The non-interference of the police in

labour disputes unless 'law and order problem' arose gave a green card to the

headload workers for aggressive bargaining. The reasons for the struggles between

the employers and the unions were more or less the same in all markets. Unions

struggled with the employers to secure job, better wages, ex-gratia payments and

favourable working conditions. While unions argued that they had the right to decide

who should be a headload worker and that they had their say over the distribution of

the available work among them, the employers argued that they had these rights and

not the unions. This was a cardinal issue, which remained unresolved till the 1980s.

The unionisation of the headload workers gained momentum with the split

of the AITUC and the formation of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) in

the year 1970. TiH then, AITUC, INTUC, UTUC, HMS, and STU were the trade

unions that had worked among headload workers and organised them in main

market places. The CITU came to prominence through aggressive organisation

of the headloaders wherever it could find them in Kerala.

The first half of the 1970s witnessed the proliferation of unionisation of

the headload workers, mainly under the aegis of the CITU. The INTUC got

strengthened in the headload labour market during the 'National ~ r n e r ~ e n c ~ ' ~ ' .

This led to frequent conflicts among the unions in many market places. Wherever

other unions were active and the INTUC wanted inroads there, they fought

against the already existing unions to gain a share of the total available work of

particular markets. Under the patronage of the government, they could go a long

way in strengthening the union.

-

" P.S. Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour. . . , " Op, cir., p 60. The President of India declared emergency on 25 June 1975 due to 'internal disturbance threat'. During the period the Indian National Congress to which the INTUC was affiliated was a major partner in the coalition ministry in Kerala.

The emergence of different unions gave rise to a situation where the issue

of work-sharing could not be resolved without entailing inter-union rivalry;

no rivalling unions could secure their demands for work easily. The emergence

of rival unions and their demand for work usually led to street frghk6' Work

sharing among different unions depended on the inter-union power situation.

The unions of headload workers had organised the largest number of

struggles in the state, when compared with other categories of workers, by the

early 1980s. The resistance of some powerful employers against the coercion of

the unions created a disturbed situation in the market. Owing to the high wage

level in the headload labour market, casual workers showed a tendency to enter

into the market by forming separate unions, This created inter-union disputes,

which added fuel to the fire. All these made the headload labour market an arena

for frequent quarrels and the resultant tension.

3.4 The Period of Struggles

At this juncture, we shall turn our attention to certain struggles waged by

different unions, which will bring to light the aggressive nature of unionisation.

We do not intend to give an account of all the struggles that have taken place in

the state. One peculiarity of the struggles in general was that they were short

lived, as settlements were arrived at within st few days. But some struggles lasted

for weeks. For instance, the strike conducted in Kozhikode in 1977 lasted for

eighteen days. It was organised for getting identity cards to the existing workers

and, thus, restricting free entry into the headload labour market, The 23 day long

strike in Palakkad in 1983 was for securing different demands of the workers.

62 A.C K Nambiar, "Unorganised . . . . , " Op, cil., p. 738.

A nearly two month long strike was conducted in Thrissur in 198 1 to secure the

rights of the union. It is important here to focus on the strike in Thrissur and to

elaborate the nuances involved in it.

In 1980 a dispute arose at Thrissur market on who had the authority to recruit

the headload workers-the employer or the union. The employers, mainly traders,

arranged a harial of 15 days in September 1980 against the union activities.

A settlement was arrived at on 25 September on condition that merchants could

choose workers From the existing pool of workers in the In the settlement,

neither the traders nor the workers got an upper hand. The employer did not get

the power to recruit the workers from outside and the unions did not get the right

to allocate work. So, both the parties were discontented and looked for an

opportunity to get a sweeping victory.

As a response to the stalemate situation that the employers had to face, the

Thrissur traders ventured to organise an all Kerala union called Kerala Vyapari

Vyuvasayi Ekupana Samiti. It was formed to protect the interests of the employers,

under the initiative of the wholesale merchants of Thrissur. Unionisation of headload

workers was, thus, reciprocated by the unionisation of the employers. The organised

traders became Inore confident in their fight with the kade unions. A wage related

dispute prepared the ground for a strike by the headloaders in Thrissur; and an

indefinite strike began on 22 August 198 1. About 600 workers participated in it.

Several levels of discussions were held to settle the strike, and the final settlement

was arrived at through the efforts of Bishop Poulose Mar Poulose of the Caldian

Syrian Church of Thrissur." The strike was called off on 14 October 1981, without

any definite solution to the vital issues of the regulation of work allocation and the

63 P.S Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour . . , " Op, cit., p. I 08. M The Kerala Institute of Labour and Employment, Keralu Headload Workers Strike at Trichur,

1981: A Landmark in Kera1a.s Industrial Relations Scene. Thiruvananthapuram, The Kerala Institute of Labour and Employment, 1982, pp. 2-3.

managerial powers enjoyed by the unions." The struggles in Thrissur were historic

because they led to the emergence of the Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samiti,

the state-wide merchants' organisation. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the

headload labour market has been a stage for the conflict between the militant

workers' unions and a powerful merchants' organisation.

3.5 Difficulties of Unionisation

We have seen that in the earlier period headload work was a part of the casual

work in the commercial and industrial establishments. Therefore, headload workers

were not an identifiable group at large, though in some establishments such a

category of workers was employed. Therefore, it is quite natural that their

unionisation took place some decades after the beginning of trade unionism in

the state. Even after the appearance of headload workers in the major markets, since

the beginning of thel950s, their unionisation in the radical line, as was done in the

case of many unorganised categories of workers, did not take place. Though

headload workers were getting organised since the beginning of the 1950s, it was

only in the 1970s that the unionisation became a part of the wider political

mobilisation of the workers. As pointed out by Vijayasankar, no attempt had been

made until the middle of the 1970s for the horizontal mobilisation of the headload

workers of various urban centres at an all Kerala

It is worthwhile to make an enquiry into why unionisation of the headload

workers and their federations at an all Kerala level got delayed compared to other

trade unions and also into the problems that had to be faced by the organisers

during the process of unionisation.

- -

(15 P.S. Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour . . . , " Op cit., p.112. 66 Ibid., p.104.

The unionisation of informal workers was undertaken in the state as a part

of the general political mobilisation of the workers, which gained momentum

since the 1920s. The contributions of the dedicated and philanthropic leaders

during the earlier period of mobilising workers for collective action and

unionising them on the basis of their trade, cannot be overlooked. The headload

workers were reluctant to join such collective action and they were not accessible

to the leaders. Unlike workers of other trades, this specific group had not gained

any political visibility and they could not identify themselves as a unified group

of workers. They had in mind no such political strategy, but only survival

strategy. Congregating them on one platform was also difficult as they were

mutually quarrelling for different reasons, which influenced their relative

earning capacity.

Many trade union leaders were reluctant to organise the headloaders in

markets because of the 'problem making' nature of the workers." Political leaders

considered educational backwardness a blessing as well as a curse in the process of

unionisation. It was a blessing because workers made their submission to the leaders,

which was a favourable factor for their unionisation. It was a curse because

politicisation of the uneducated was difficult. The leaders also suspected and feared

that they would be stigmatised as one among them. One trade union leader shared his

experience about the problems involved in organising the headloaders. While he was

convening a meeting of headload workers at work, a few workers displayed their

non-attachment to unionisation by preferring to work instead of listening to the

speech. That is, when a lorry arrived with a load, they went to the lorry and started

67 During our field study in Ernakulam and Kollam market areas we were told by some trade union leaders and workers that political leaders had shown not much interest in organising headload workers due to workers' 'lumpan status'.

unloading goods from it. To them the arrival,of a lorry was more important than the

arrival of the union leader.

Many local leaders were hesitant to organise headloaders, as this would be

tantamount to opposing the merchants, who were the main employers and rivals

of the headloaders. The local leaders maintained close ties with the employers,

which they did not like to break. As a result, the leaders restrained themselves

froin organising headload workers.

One serious problem with the unionisation of headload workers as a class

arose froin the restricted entry of new unions in the headload labour market. The

closed shop tactics adopted by unions was a hindrance for new unions to

establish themselves in the market. It was only through confrontations that new

unions could enter into the market and share the work that had been handled by

the existing unions.

3.5.1 Schism between headload workers'and the unions

Before we conclude this chapter, it may be worthwhile to recount some of

the observations that we have already made. Headload labour inarket in the pre-

unionisation period was characterised by unregulated labour market

environment. Free entry of headload workers into the market was allowed.

Employers were vested with the managerial power and they employed only those

workers who were loyal to them. The recruitment decisions were also influenced

by religious/caste/regionallkinshiplaffinal considerations. As the supply of

headloaders was greater than demand for them, employers could freely choose

the required number of workers from the pool of workers in the market. There

were also instances in which employers issued pass to the workers and the

workers had to show it to the lony drivers and country boatmen to get the work.

In markets where the rnoopan system was in practice, he was the recruiting

agent. In this system also the real power of the recruitment of the workers and

the allocation of the work was vested in the employers as the moopans were their

men, who always protected the interests of the employers.

With the emergence of unionisation the major issues of confrontation

between the employers and the workers centred on the question, who had the

right to recruit workers and allocate work among individual headload workers?

Though the employers had not transferred the right to the unions, in effect, the

unions had secured and enjoyed it through their collecticre bargaining strength

and militancy. Employers' resistance to the encroachment on their right was not

effective in many markets. Several employers in the case study areas opined that

the losing of managerial power was the major problem that they were facing in

the post unionisation period.

Trade unions were successful in improving the conditions of work

through collective bargaining, particularly in earning rightful wages. As a result

of the unionisation, wage schedules came into being in different markets; it

specified the piece rates for various types of works. Another remarkable

achievement of the trade unions was their success in establishing an employer-

worker relationship, particularly between the traders and the headload workers.

The employers tried to insist that there was no employer-employee relationship

in the headload labour market. They argued that no employer had a particular

worker and no worker had a particular employer. But through continuous

struggles trade unions had succeeded to secure fringe benefits such as bonus and

other allowances to their workers. The wage rates and fringe benefits differed

from market to market, depending mainly on workers' militancy and the quantity

of work in the market. Therefore, the unionisation among headload workers

could claim to its credit a number of success stories, In many respects the unions

succeeded in making their voice heard and in realising their demands. Besides

these positive impacts of unionisation on headloaders, the organisation of even

these foot loose workers and their unionised strength opened possibility for the

spread of unionisation among hitherto unorganised groups of workers.

Though the achievements of union intervention in the headload labour

market were many, there were also shortfalls and failures of trade unionisation.

They are discussed in three heads: its failure in disciplining the workers,

shortfalls in extending the welfare measures, and failure in creating a favourable

environment for the development of commodity production in the state.

Along with the prevalence of unionisation, labour militancy and general

unrest among the headloaders became rampant. Gangs of fearless able-bodied

men instilled fear among employers in the market place. Usually they used to fix

the wages exparte and extorted them from the employers and the customers. Any

attempt to resist the militancy of the workers led to the delaying of work,

destruction of goods, and some times violence. Majority of the workers were

drunkards and there were many instances of harassment and physical

manhandling during the time of bargaining for higher wages. This took place

mainly when they bargained with foot loose employers in the bus stand, railway

station, boat jetty etc., the worker-employer relationship got severed quite often.

An important objective of trade unions was to improve the life style of the

workers by extending different welfare measures to them. However, barring a

few exceptional cases in certain areas, trade unions had not taken serious efforts

to improve the general life style of the workers. Quite often, due to the absence

of any accountability on the part of the leaders, misappropriation of union funds

was not difficult. It is true that the trade unions did not show any serious interest

in ameliorating their life world. Also the welfare measures extended by the trade

unions were inadequate.

In practice, there were all the conditions to perpetuate their deplorable life

worlds. Not only were those welfare measures not forthcoming; they were often

dragged into the world of offences. There is a strong opinion among the headload

workers that they had been utilised by the unions and the political parties to which

they were afiliated, for their survival. An agitated worker stated: "Trade unions have

been exploiting us and in order to hide the exploitation they project us before the

public as rowdies". This had been so before state intervention in the headload labour

market; that is between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1 980s.

The headload workers had no other way but follow the commands of the

leadership. This was mainly because they feared trade union leaders, as they

were socially, economically and politically stronger. Another reason was that

headloaders had no alternative but take protection under trade unions to sustain

their employment status. Weadload workers of a union were not united as a single

body. There were inner groups that received patronage from the leadership and

followed their dictates. Usually a single worker or a small group could not

oppose the leadership.

Often the Trade unions, particularly unions of headload workers, were

accused of excessive militancy. The image of Kerala labour market that gained

wide popularity was that it was militant. Such an image dissuaded potential

investment in industrial production. The ideology that got inculcated among

workers was that they were to consider employers as mere exploiters who took

away the blood and sweat of the workers and returned only tears, The role of the

employers in providing employment was often overlooked. The spread of such

an ideology created the labour market imperfections, which made potential

investors be shy of investing in Kerala,

Union intervention in the headload labour market was successful to the

extent that it could increase wages and improve the working conditions, though

this did not improve their life world considerably. The headload labour market in

the nineteen seventies and early eighties was an arena of conflicts and

confrontations. What is most glaring in the history of the unionisation of

headload workers is the close bond between unionisation and labour militancy.

3.6 Growth of Workers' Militancy: Some Reflections

We have observed that trade union militancy in Kerala ti11 the 1980s had

negative influences on the economy in general and on manufacturing in

particular. Although militant' wage bargaining enhanced their earnings, their

place and position in the society and polity remained more or less the same as

before due to severaI reasons. An important question arises at this juncture.

Is militancy among the headload workers entirely a product of unionisation?

I t is generally held that unionisation is the sole reason for workers'

militancy. If it were true, then, all unionised workers would have been militant.

This is far from the truth and hence the militancy of headload workers cannot

be attributed entirely to the unionisation of the workers.

It was the specificities of the headload labour market that generated labour

militancy with unionisation. This can be brought out by studying the circumstances

92

that led to the situation and by focusing on the main players of the market such as

employers, workers and union leaders, and non-market bodies such as the Police

Department. Before focusing on these agents, we shouId focus on the structure of the

market, mainly the nature of employment and work there.

One of the main structural components that enabled workers to be militant

was the nature of their work. The work involved collective and intensive manual

labour, which was indispensable to the employer. The indispensability gave strategic

privileges to the unionised workers. The strategies that they adopted gave them

critical control over employment relations. The critical control placed them in such a

privileged position that they could even create losses to the employers. The strategies

included obstruction of work, delaying of work and making damages to the objects

they handled. Thus, the nature of their work paved way for their militant relation

with the employer, particularly their aggressive wage bargaining.

Another structuraI feature of the labour market can be found in the nature of

employment of the headload workers. Employment of headloaders was through spot

contract. This gave the workers freedom to choose their employers and this, in turn,

enhanced their bargaining power. Added to this was their fkeedom to engage in

multiple contracts in a day. This became further strengthened when the union

controlled the supply of labourers. With the help of trade unions, headload workers

could effectively implement the closed shop system, through which the entry of new

workers into the market was strictly restricted. Therefore, the empIoyers had no

alternative but to employ the existing workers.

As already mentioned, the character and behaviour of the players in the

market and their interaction have also influenced the growth of militancy. The

most important players in the labour market, from the point of view of

unionisation, are the workers. The social origin of the workers and the stigma

attached to their work has contributed to their militancy. As headload work was

socially construed as a low status occupation, it was socially and educationally

backward people who joined this work force. Their family and social ties were

also weak. All these made them feel that they were at the bottom of the social

hierarchy and they lost even their self-esteem. This made them vulnerable to

militant action without caring for its consequences.

Before unionisation, as mentioned in the foregoing discussions, the headload

workers were at the margins of the society and the market. As a result, the employers

had been exploiting and humiliating them. But unionisation helped them to bargain

with the employers and to gain market wages. Sometimes the helpless workers were

assigned excessive workload. This history of exploitation influenced the attitude of

the headloaders and often revengeful activities were opted. One Ernakulam based

worker observed that intimidation and threatening were part of the job itself, as

wages could be increased only by instilling fear among the employers. Employers, on

certain occasions, manoeuvred the militancy of the workers. Some employers used

the workers against their rivals in the business field. Employers were also forced to

accommodate the militancy of the workers and their demands for abnormally higher

wages when they were engaged in black marketing and other illegal transactions.

In the beginning, the employers overlooked the growth of militancy

among the headload workers and succumbed to their demands for higher wages.

There was no resistance against the militancy as the traders were also reaping

abnormal profits due to absence of stiff competition among them. Besides,

they felt that the burden of higher wages could be shifted to the shoulders of

the consumers.

Militancy of the workers gave advantage for the unions. We have already

noted the benefits that the workers gained from the unions. What we have to

examine is the benefits accrued by the unions due to the militancy. Trade unions

collected a fixed portion of the workers' earnings for the conduct of union

activities. When the workers began to aggressively claim higher wages from the

employers, the leaders remained silent although they knew that they were

demanding abnormal wages. The main reason was that as the earnings increased

the revenue of the unions also increased. Again, trade unions began to use these

workers as militant gangs, and the political parties giving patronage to the unions

gained from their muscle power. The workers were used for various political

activities ranging from pasting posters on the walls to spreading violence in the

street. In return to this, trade union leaders provided certain facilities to them.

Politicians gave unreserved support even to their unreasonable action^.^' The

failure of trade unions in disciplining the workers might also be attributed to the

existence of multiple trade unionism, increased inter-union rivalry and flow of

workers from one union to another. Under such circumstances, the trade unions

could not forcefully impose discipline among the workers.

A new generation of trade union leadership having neither ideological

commitment nor any sense of social concern is utilising workers for gaining

political 1everagen6' The headload labour market is not an exception to this

general trend. Only a few trade union leaders are from among headload workers.

In most cases the control is vested with leaders belonging to other occupations or

to no specific trade at all.

The worsening anarchy in the headload labour market due to investor-

intimidating labour militancy forced the state government to discontinue its

passive role in settling labour disputes. By the end of the 1970s the government

began to think seriously of intervening in the arena through proper Iegislation.

68 A .C. K. Nambiar, "Unorganised . . . . ," Op, cib., p. 738. h9 K. Ramachandran Nair, "Trade Unionism . . . . ," Op, cil., pp. 340-4 1