Annual Safety Performance Report - RSSB · PDF fileiv Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 Executive summary ... PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was

Annual SafetyPerformance ReportA reference guide to safety trends on GB railways

2016/17

Contents

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Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 i

Contents

Executive summary ........................................................................................................... iv

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1

2 Safety overview .......................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Risk in context ................................................................................................... 7

2.2 Trend in overall harm ......................................................................................... 9

2.3 Passenger safety ............................................................................................... 10

2.4 Workforce safety .............................................................................................. 12

2.5 Members of the public ...................................................................................... 14

2.6 Long-term historical trends ............................................................................... 16

2.7 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality risk ................... 19

2.8 Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values .................................... 20

Comparing rail safety within the EU .................................................................................... 26

2.9 Key safety statistics: safety overview ................................................................ 27

3 People on trains and in stations .................................................................................. 29

3.1 Passengers and public ....................................................................................... 30

Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2016/17 ............................................................. 30

Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree ............................................................... 31

Passenger/public assaults .................................................................................................... 36

Workforce injuries in 2016/17 ............................................................................................. 38

Trend in workforce harm by injury degree .......................................................................... 39

Workforce assaults............................................................................................................... 42

3.2 Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations ........................................ 43

4 Working on or about the running line ......................................................................... 47

4.1 Fatalities and injuries in 2016/17....................................................................... 48

4.2 Trend in harm by injury degree ......................................................................... 49

4.3 Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line ................................ 53

5 Road driving risk ........................................................................................................ 55

5.1 Scope of road driving risk .................................................................................. 56

5.2 Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries .................................. 56

5.3 Fatalities and injuries in 2016/17....................................................................... 57

5.4 Trends in workforce injuries from road driving .................................................. 58

Trend in injuries by industry sector ..................................................................................... 59

5.5 Key safety statistics: road driving risk ................................................................ 60

6 Train operations ......................................................................................................... 61

6.1 Train accidents .................................................................................................. 62

6.2 Train accident fatalities and injuries .................................................................. 63

6.3 Trend in harm from train accidents ................................................................... 64

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ii Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17

6.4 PHRTA categories: train accidents during 2016/17 ............................................. 65

6.5 Trend in the number of train accidents within PHRTA categories ....................... 66

6.6 The Precursor Indicator Model .......................................................................... 67

Trend in the PIM .................................................................................................................. 70

Trend in the PIM for passengers .......................................................................................... 71

Future of train accident precursor reporting ....................................................................... 71

SPADs.... ............................................................................................................................... 72

6.7 Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train operations .................. 73

Injuries during 2016/17 ........................................................................................................ 73

Trend in workforce harm related to train operations ......................................................... 73

6.8 Key safety statistics: train operations ................................................................ 74

7 Level crossings ........................................................................................................... 79

7.1 Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2016/17......................... 80

7.2 Types of level crossings ..................................................................................... 82

7.3 Trend in harm at level crossings ........................................................................ 83

7.4 Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings ..................................... 85

7.5 Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians ................................................ 86

Near misses with road vehicles ............................................................................................ 86

Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists ........................................................................... 87

7.6 Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings ................................................... 88

7.7 Key safety statistics: level crossings ................................................................... 92

8 Trespass ..................................................................................................................... 93

8.1 Trespass risk profile by event type .................................................................... 94

8.2 Trend in harm to trespassers ............................................................................. 95

8.3 Key safety statistics: trespass ............................................................................ 96

9 Suicide ....................................................................................................................... 97

9.1 Classification of fatalities .................................................................................. 98

9.2 Trend in suicide fatalities .................................................................................. 99

Suicide attempts and workforce harm .............................................................................. 100

Trends in harm from attempted suicide ............................................................................ 101

Trends in suicide by location .............................................................................................. 102

9.3 Suicide prevention initiatives .......................................................................... 103

9.4 Railway suicides in the wider context .............................................................. 105

9.5 Key safety statistics: suicide ............................................................................ 106

10 Yards, depots and sidings ......................................................................................... 107

10.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2016/17 ......................................... 108

Trend in workforce harm in YDS ........................................................................................ 109

10.2 Injuries to passengers and members of the public in YDS ................................. 112

Trend in harm to passenger and members of the public in YDS ....................................... 113

10.3 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings ................................................ 114

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Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 iii

11 Freight operations .................................................................................................... 115

11.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries ..................................................................... 116

11.2 Trend in harm to the workforce ...................................................................... 117

11.3 Passenger/public fatalities and injuries ........................................................... 118

11.4 Trend in harm to passengers and public .......................................................... 119

11.5 Trend in train accidents involving freight trains ............................................... 120

Potentially higher-risk train accident categories ............................................................... 120

Trend in freight SPADs ....................................................................................................... 121

11.6 Key safety statistics: freight operations ........................................................... 122

12 Health and wellbeing ............................................................................................... 125

Appendix 1. Fatalities in 2016/17 ................................................................................ 129

Appendix 2. Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting and risk modelling ............... 131

Appendix 3. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways ............................................. 134

Appendix 4. Level crossing types ................................................................................. 136

Appendix 5. Accident groups used within the ASPR ..................................................... 140

Appendix 6. Definitions ............................................................................................... 142

Appendix 7. List of abbreviations ................................................................................. 150

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iv Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17

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Executive summary

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iv Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17

Executive summary

Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2016/17.

The ASPR provides safety-related information for our Members, to support each in meeting its

objective to ensure health and safety is managed so far as is reasonably practicable. It also provides

the evidence base by which RSSB provides strategic cross-industry support to health and safety

prioritisation and management.

The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public

bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the

railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.

Headline statistics for 2016/17

• There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train derailments or collisions. This is the

tenth year in succession with no such fatalities.

• The number of train accidents occurring in the Potentially Higher-Risk Train Accident categories

was 22, three fewer than 2015/16. There were 272 SPADs in 2016/17, compared with 282 during

the previous year. At the end of 2016/17, SPAD risk stood at 45% of the September 2006 baseline

level, compared with 54% at the end of 2015/16.

• In total, there were 39 accidental fatalities, 469 major injuries, 12,376 minor injuries and 1,047

cases of shock/trauma. The total level of harm (excluding suicide) was 108.2 FWI, compared with

118.7 FWI recorded in 2015/16.

• Of the 39 fatalities, five were passengers and 33 were members of the public, of whom 27 were

engaged in acts of trespass. There was one workforce fatality during the year, occurring in a road

traffic incident.

• Passenger harm stands at 42.8 FWI overall. This is a decrease on the 49.5 FWI for 2015/16. There

were 1.73 billion passenger journeys in 2016/17, which is a 0.8% increase from 2015/16; the

normalised rate of harm decreased by 14%.

• Workforce harm stands at 27.9 FWI. This is an increase on the 26.8 FWI for 2015/16. There were

240 million workforce hours carried out in 2016/17.

• Harm to members of the public stands at 37.6 FWI. This is a decrease on the 42.4 FWI for

2014/15.

• In addition to the injuries above, which were accidental in nature, a further 237 people died as a

result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the 251 fatalities recorded for

2015/16.

Passengers Workforce

Public (non-trespass)

Public (trespass)

Suicide

2015/16 2016/17 2015/16 2016/17 2015/16 2016/17 2015/16 2016/17 2015/16 2016/17

Fatalities 8 5 0 1 6 6 32 27 251 237 Major injuries 294 266 160 164 16 22 22 17 33 47 Minor injuries 6747 6432 5749 5676 179 237 39 31 41 46 Shock/trauma 205 168 768 873 5 5 2 1 0 0

FWI 49.5 42.8 26.8 27.9 8.1 8.8 34.3 28.8 254.5 241.9

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Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 v

Train accidents

There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train derailments or collisions. This is the tenth

year in succession with no such fatalities, the longest such period on record. There were two

fatalities involving members of the public, arising from train collisions with road vehicles at level

crossings. The total harm from train accidents in 2016/17 was 2.6 FWI, this was an increase from 0.4

FWI in the previous year.

Many types of train accident typically carry little risk. The types of train accidents occurring on or

affecting the running line, and with the most potential to result in serious consequences, are known

as potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories. There were 22 train accidents occurring

in PHRTA categories; three less than the previous year. Six of the events were train derailments, two

of which involved passenger trains. Four of the events were low-speed collisions between trains,

three of which involved passenger trains.

The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) measures the underlying risk from the PHRTA categories of train

accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of their accident precursors. At 4 March 2017, the

PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was 6.4 FWI per year, compared with

6.1 FWI per year at the end of 2015/16. The rise was due to increases in the PIM contributions

related to level crossing and SPADs.

There were 272 SPADs in 2016/17, compared with 282 during the previous year. At the end of

2016/17, SPAD risk stood at 45% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared with 54% at the

end of 2015/16.

People in stations

There were four fatalities in stations, all of which were passengers. All four of the fatalities occurred

at the platform edge, one of which was related to getting on or off trains. This is the only fatality to

have occurred during boarding and alighting in the last ten years. Comparatively, there have been a

total of 38 fatalities at the platform edge that did not occur while getting on or off trains.

When the number of non-fatal injuries is taken into account, the total level of harm occurring to

passengers and the public in stations was 36.1 FWI, compared with 45.8 FWI (nine fatalities) for the

previous year. The main cause of non-fatal injuries in stations are slips, trips and falls. In 2016/17,

there were 152 major injuries in stations due to slips, trips and falls, compared with 185 events in

2015/16.

Assaults on passengers and members of the public

Assaults occur on the railway as in any public environment. RSSB uses data from the British

Transport Police to analyse trends in assault. The number of passenger and public assaults in

stations or on trains rose in 2016/17 to 4,476, compared with 4,028 for 2015/16. This is an increase

of 11% in absolute terms, and 10% on a normalised basis.

The overall increase in number was driven by increases in the less serious categories of crime;

Common assault increased by 8%, from 2,044 events in 2015/16 to 2,203 in 2016/17, and

Harassment increased by 24%, from 938 events in 2015/16 to 1,162 in 2016/17. More serious crimes

saw increases on a smaller scale. The only category not to increase in 2016/17 was Other violence.

Executive summary

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vi Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17

These increases reflect the national picture of increasing violence against the person offences across

England and Wales, which have seen a 19% increase in 2016 from 2015. Nationally there has been a

10% increase in violence with injury offences. These increases are in part increased reporting, and

partially a real increase in crime.

Workforce injuries

There was one workforce fatality recorded in 2016/17, involving an infrastructure worker in a road

driving incident. In the 10-year reporting period, road driving has accounted for seven workforce

fatalities, overtaking train strikes (six) as the leading cause of workforce fatalities. The overall level of

workforce harm for 2016/17 was 27.9 FWI, which is 4% higher than the 26.8 FWI recorded for

2015/16. When the increase in workforce hours is taken into account, the rate of harm was 1%

higher.

The increase in harm comes after a large reduction in harm was seen in 2015/16. When looking over

the reporting period, 2016/17 has the second lowest level of workforce harm, largely because of

reduced major injuries.

Level crossings

There were six fatalities at level crossings during 2016/17, four were pedestrian users, two were road

vehicle occupants. The overall level of harm at level crossings was 6.8 FWI, compared with 4.7 FWI

for 2015/16.

The annual moving average of pedestrian near misses is showing an upward trend, with quarter two

of 2016/17 recording the highest number of reported near misses over the reporting period. In

contrast, the near-miss moving average with road vehicles continues a long-term downward trend,

with quarter three of 2016/17 showing the lowest number of reported near misses over the ten

years.

Network Rail is implementing a plan for making substantial improvements during CP5, which runs

from April 2014 to March 2019.

Trespass and suicide

There were 27 trespass fatalities recorded in 2016/17 compared with 32 recorded in 2015/16. Since

2009/10, when improvements in classification of suicide and trespass fatalities occurred, the average

number of trespass fatalities has been 31.3 per year.

Over the past ten years, around 38% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the

approximately 62% that have occurred in other locations, the majority of these have occurred on the

running line. The proportion of trespass fatalities in stations for 2016/17 was somewhat lower, at

26% (seven fatalities).

There were 237 incidents of suicide or suspected suicide recorded for 2016/17, compared with 251

recorded for 2015/16 and 287 recorded for 2014/15. Around 20% of suicidal acts do not result in

fatality. In 2016/17 this was 28%, with 93 people carrying out non-completed suicidal acts. In these

cases, many people are left with life-changing injuries.

Rail Industry partners - including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions, BTP,

Samaritans, and RSSB - have been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the railway and

to support anyone involved in a railway suicide after an incident. In 2015 the contractual partnership

agreement between Samaritans and Network Rail was renewed for another five years. By the end of

2016/17, 14,500 Rail staff and British Transport Police officers had been trained on how to intervene

Executive summary

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Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 vii

in a suicide attempt. During 2016/17, BTP recorded a total of 1,593 interventions in suicide attempts

on the mainline railway. This compares to 1,137 made in 2015/16, a 40% increase.

Benchmarking the rail industry

The Railway Safety Directive states the requirement for Member States to ensure that safety is

generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved. The European

Railway Agency (ERA) is mandated to monitor the performance of Member States in this area. It

does this based on statistics related to injuries involving moving trains. The latest assessment by

ERA, which was based on data for the five-year period 2011-2015, shows the UK to have the best

safety record of the ten largest European railways.

In addition, at the national level, rail is shown to be the safest form of land transport. On a per

traveller kilometre basis, it is more than 20 times safer than car travel and around three times safer

than travel by bus or coach.

Summary

2016/17 saw improvements in many of the main measures used to assess safety performance. Total

system harm is now at the second lowest level over the least 10 years. Reductions in harm were

recorded for passengers and members of the public. Despite recent fluctuations, there are longer-

term improvements being seen in level crossing harm and train accidents.

Nevertheless, there are clear challenges that the industry is facing in other areas, such as managing

risk at the platform edge, managing assaults on trains and in stations, and emerging trends seen in

workforce road driving.

The shared industry strategy, Leading Health and Safety on Britain’s Railways, which we developed with industry in 2015-6 remains the cornerstone of how industry wants to make the next step change in safety performance. It is now firmly driven by its leaders under the umbrella of the Rail Delivery Group, with whom RSSB works closely on these key risk areas. In the year since its initial publication industry has focussed on providing the structure for an improved framework for the way it works together on health and safety, which has been steadily brought in across the various industry activities and groups. Experience suggests this new structure is already proving more effective, with more useful and productive conversations and exchanges of information taking place, helping industry maintain the right strategic focus on key risks. From 2017-8 onwards, RSSB will be publishing quarterly reports specifically to monitor industry’s implementation of the strategy in the key risk areas and management capabilities. These will include safety statistics and commentary on the achievements made to meet its shared commitments.

https://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/leading-health-and-safety-on-britains-railway

Introduction

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1 Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17

1 Introduction

Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2016/17.

The ASPR provides a range of safety-related information for our Members, to assist in the

management of safety. It incorporates data from the new Safety Management Intelligence System

(SMIS), which was introduced on 6 March 2017 (see below).

The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public

bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the

railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.

The overriding purpose of the ASPR is to support the rail industry in its aim of reducing risk so far as

is reasonably practicable. This aim is a requirement of legislation, embodied in the Railway Safety

Directive.

RSSB is the main source of mainline rail safety statistics in Great Britain, and its figures are

reproduced in the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) publication National Rail Trends and the

Department for Transport’s (DfT) Transport Statistics Great Britain.

In addition to the ASPR, we also produce a ‘sister publication’, the Learning from Operational

Experience Annual Report (LOEAR), which summarises some of the learning points arising from

accident investigations and other sources of information that have arisen during the year.

Scope of the report

The scope of the document remains unchanged from last year’s report and it continues to provide a

comprehensive overview of safety performance. However, the level of detail has reduced in some

areas as a consequence of the additional work required to build analyses on a combination of the

new and old SMIS data structures and the team’s ongoing commitment to develop and support the

new system. We will progressively rebuild this detail and exploit the opportunities that the new

system will provide for enhanced monitoring and analysis.

The scope is predominantly focused on incidents connected with the operation of the mainline

railway in Great Britain, but is extended to include fatalities and injuries to the workforce occurring in

road traffic accidents while driving on duty, and fatalities and injuries in yards, depots and sidings

(YDS). Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into the industry’s Safety Management Information

System (SMIS) on a long-standing basis, and will continue to be reported into the Safety

Management Intelligence System (SMIS). There is no mandatory requirement to report non-fatal

injuries in YDS, but the collection of such data to support safety analysis of YDS sites has been carried

out on a voluntary basis since April 2010, when, through agreement of the industry, it was formalised

in a railway group standard.

A more detailed outline of the scope can be found in Appendix 2.

Where the data comes from

Most of the analyses in the ASPR are based on industry-reported safety events. These are supplemented where appropriate with data from other sources, such as British Transport Police (BTP), the ORR and Network Rail.

https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/risk-analysis-and-safety-reporting/2017-02-report-learning-from-operational-experience-annual-report-2015-6.pdf?web=1

https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/risk-analysis-and-safety-reporting/2017-02-report-learning-from-operational-experience-annual-report-2015-6.pdf?web=1

Introduction

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Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 2

The rail industry’s new Safety Management Intelligence System (SMIS) was launched on 6 March 2017 and replaced the old Safety Management Information System. The analysis in this report is therefore based on data from both systems. Events up to and including 4 March 2017 were entered into the old system and migrated into the new system so that users could update records if more information came to light. Events occurring on and after March 5 were recorded in the new SMIS. The Safety Management Intelligence System is based on a new data model that will ultimately provide better monitoring information for the industry. However, there has been a short-term impact on the accuracy and completeness of some records as users become familiar with the data model and user interface, and while RSSB develops user guidance, rebuilds its data quality processes and resolves system issues.

To provide confidence in the numbers presented in this ASPR additional checks have been applied.

All fatalities, SPADs and potentially higher risk train accidents (PHRTAs) have been manually

validated. Other reports with missing components have been identified and amended within the

analysis. RSSB will work with industry to ensure these records are correct within SMIS. This learning is

being fed back as part of the process of embedding the new system into industry processes.

These additional checks have helped to create a seamless transition between systems so that the

information is consistent with that presented in previous Annual Safety Performance Reports and

covers the full year 2016/17. The exception to this is the Precursor Indicator Model (PIM). The full

PIM is shown to 4 March in this report because the new data requires a different approach to

tracking precursor trends. RSSB is progressively working to improve existing metrics to track train

accident risk and develop new ones so that the PIM evolves to be an improved tool over time. As we rebuild the PIM and other outputs there is an opportunity to rethink our reporting to better meet industry needs. Please contact us at [email protected] with requirements, ideas and suggestions.

Charts or tables that are based on sources in addition to SMIS will have this noted, either under the

chart or in a footnote.

How safety is analysed in the report

The rail industry collects a vast amount of safety-related information during each year: more than

75,000 records were entered into old SMIS during 2016/17, around 15,000 of which related to

injuries ranging from the very minor to the very serious. Each injury record contains information on

what happened and where, and who was involved. This allows detailed analysis to be carried out,

looking at the causes of risk from a number of different ways.

Because of the range in severity of injuries, it is useful to have a way of combining the range of

different consequences that can occur from a particular activity or event, so that a decision can be

made on how important it is to address. For example, a small number of events with more serious

consequences can be weighed against a large number of events with less serious consequences, to

inform at a systematic decision of where resource should be spent.

The agreed industry approach to combining injuries of differing levels of seriousness into one

composite measure is based on ‘weighting’ a multiple number of less serious events as being ‘equal’

to one fatality. The following table shows the weightings that are currently in use within the industry.

They were derived following extensive research and consultation using public focus groups.

mailto:[email protected]

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The composite measure is termed ‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ or FWI, for short.

Injury degree1 Weighting Number of injuries weighted

as equal to a fatality

Fatality 1 1

Major injury 0.1 10

Minor injury

(Class depends on seriousness of

injury)

0.005 (Class 1) 200

0.001 (Class 2) 1000

Shock/trauma

(Class depends on seriousness of

event resulting in shock/trauma)

0.005 (Class 1) 200

0.001 (Class 2) 1000

Modelled risk versus recorded harm

It is important to understand the distinction between modelled risk and recorded harm. Many of the

analyses in this report are based on actual data recorded over the past 10 years, and so they present

the observed level of harm that was recorded during that time. Recorded levels of harm can provide

an indication of what the underlying level of safety is, but how good an indication they provide is

influenced by a number of factors. ‘Statistical fluctuation’ is one such factor. This is a normally

occurring phenomenon, which reflects the amount of variability you might reasonably expect to see,

if you pick two different samples of data (eg from two different years). For some types of risk, where

the typical event occurs less frequently and with generally more serious consequences, you would

expect to get a high level of statistical fluctuation. On the other hand, for other types of risk, which

happen frequently and generally with less serious consequences, the level of statistical fluctuation

would be expected to be lower.

This is an important point because often what we want to know as an industry is ‘Are things getting

better or worse?’. And this is normally a more complicated question to answer than just looking at

how recorded levels of harm have changed from one year to the next. Train accidents offer the most

ready example of this effect; a year without a train accident does not necessarily indicate an

improvement in safety, and a year with such an accident does not necessarily imply a rise in risk.

Answering the ‘better/worse’ question normally needs to involve looking at trends averaged over a

longer period (moving averages), considering how harm has changed in relation to other system

factors such as usage (normalisation), and risk modelling.

RSSB’s Safety Risk Model (SRM) is the primary means of carrying out risk modelling for GB rail. The

SRM is based on a mathematical representation of all the events that could lead directly to an injury

or fatality, and provides a comprehensive snapshot of the underlying level of risk on the mainline

railway. The SRM is updated periodically, and is based on a combination of observed data,

mathematical modelling and expert judgement. The current version of the SRM is version 8.1, and

was published in June 2014.

1 Fuller descriptions of the different classes of injury are provided in Appendix 6.

Introduction

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Within the SRM, each injury is categorised by the hazardous event that caused it, and the major

precursor to that event. The ASPR uses the same set of hazardous events and precursors as the SRM,

so that both sides of the ‘risk coin’ can be presented – an estimate of the underlying level of safety

and information on how trends are varying.

There are around 133 hazardous events within the SRM, ranging from slips, trips and falls to

collisions between trains. In ASPR analyses, hazardous events of a similar type are often grouped

together; Appendix 5 provides a list of groupings that are commonly used through the report.

Report structure

The Safety overview chapter immediately follows this introduction. It sets the overall context by

presenting the current industry risk profile, as based on SRMv8.1, together with an overview of the

high-level trends in passenger, public and workforce safety performance during 2016/17. The

chapter contains information on the long-term changes in railway usage and performance, and how

the rail industry compares with other modes of transport. It also provides an update of how GB rail

is meeting the requirements set out by the legislation related to Common Safety Methods for

Monitoring.

The chapters following the Safety overview are divided into the main risk areas where industry works

together in support of safety management:

The People on trains and in stations chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured

while travelling on trains or using stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents

and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass or suicide. We have separated the analysis in

the chapter to look at members of the workforce separately from passengers and members of the

public. This is because the types of activities that the workforce carry out on trains and in stations are

different from those of passengers and the public. Passengers and the public are grouped together,

because they use the railway in similar ways and are exposed to the same types of risk.

The Working on or about the running line chapter covers the risk from the types of accident that

affect infrastructure workers while working on or about the running line.

The Road driving risk chapter reviews the risk to members of the workforce travelling by road vehicle

while on duty. The chapter looks at the impact of this activity on the groups of workers on the

railway, from station staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.

The Train operations chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable and potentially higher-risk train accidents,

focussing on those that occur away from level crossings, which are covered in a separate chapter.

The chapter also presents information on the harm experienced by shunters, train crew or other staff

when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities to do with the movement of trains.

The Level crossings chapter looks at the risk arising from train accidents at level crossings, and also

near misses involving road vehicles and pedestrians.

The Trespass chapter looks at incidents that involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are

as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. The trespass category is limited to events where the

person involved did not intend to cause harm to themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried

risk, and so it excludes people who access the railway to take their life.

The Suicide chapter presents trends and analysis of events that have been categorised as suicide or

suspected suicide, occurring on railway infrastructure.

Introduction

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The Yards, depots and sidings chapter looks at injuries to the workforce that occur in these locations,

and have been reported into SMIS, as well as harm reported by passengers and members of the

public.

The Freight operations chapter provides information and analysis across a range of risk areas directly

or indirectly affecting the freight community.

The Health and wellbeing chapter gives an overview of the efforts across industry to better

understand how work can impact the people working on the railway.

In addition, there are a number of appendices, which include scope of reporting, definitions of key

terms and supporting information for the chapters.

Data cut-off

RSSB bases the analyses in the ASPR on the latest and most accurate information available at the

time of production. We also continually update and revise previous years’ data in the light of any

new information. The data cut-off date for the 2016/17 ASPR was 13 June 2017 for old SMIS data.

The data from new SMIS was run on live data in the week commencing 12 June 2017.

Safety overview

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2 Safety overview

Over the past decade, industry initiatives have brought about improvements in many areas of

passenger and workforce safety. Over the same period of time, passenger journeys and passenger

kilometres have risen by 42% and 35% respectively, and train kilometres by 8%.

The industry continues to satisfy the safety requirement placed on it by the Railway Safety Directive,

which is to maintain safety and improve it where practicable.

2016/17 Headlines


tenth year in succession with no such fatalities.

• In total, there were 39 accidental fatalities, 469 major injuries, 12,376 minor injuries and 1,047

cases of shock/trauma. The total level of harm (excluding suicide) was 108.2 FWI, compared with

118.7 FWI recorded in 2015/16.

• Of the 39 fatalities, five were passengers and 33 were members of the public, 27 of whom were

engaged in acts of trespass. There was one workforce fatality during the year; occurring during

road driving.

• Passenger harm stands at 42.8 FWI overall. This is a decrease on the 49.5 FWI for 2015/16. There

were 1.73 billion passenger journeys in 2016/17, a 1% increase from 2015/16; the normalised

rate of harm decreased by 14%.

• Workforce harm stands at 27.9 FWI. This is an increase on the 26.8 FWI for 2015/16. There were

240 million workforce hours carried out in 2016/17.

• In addition to the injuries above, which were accidental in nature, a further 237 people died as a

result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the 251 fatalities recorded for

2015/16.

System safety at a glance

38

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Weighted injuries Fatalities

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Public

Safety overview

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2.1 Risk in context

Understanding the overall profile of risk on the railway helps with its management, by enabling focus

to be given to areas that are identified as priority. The SRM is a useful tool for this, as it provides a

stable estimate of the underlying level of risk from different sources.

The SRM risk information can be cut in a number of ways. For example, the information can be split

up to show the risk from train accidents separately to the risk from personal accidents (such as slips,

trips and falls). It can also be broken down by location, accident type, or the type of person the risk

affects.

The following chart shows the risk split by whether or not the injured person was intentionally trying

to harm themselves (take their life). The remaining risk, which is termed ‘accidental risk’ is broken

down by person type and location.

Chart 1. Risk in context (SRMv8.1)

Note: For harm in yards, depots and sidings, 96% involves the workforce with nearly all of the remaining 4% being members of the

public

• The total level of accidental risk on the mainline railway is 132.0 FWI per year, of which 44%

occurs to passengers, 20% occurs to the workforce, and 36% occurs to members of the public.

• A further 7.6 FWI per year occurs in yards, depots and sidings (YDS). Most of this risk (96%)

affects the workforce, with nearly all of the remainder involving members of the public

trespassing. More on this topic is included in Chapter 8 Trespass.

• The largest proportion of risk on the railway comes from people committing, or attempting to

commit, suicide. A substantial number of people a year decide to end their lives this way, and the

industry puts much effort into preventing these tragic events from occurring. More on this topic

is included in Chapter 9 Suicide.

In any given year, the observed levels of harm may differ from the SRM modelled risk. One reason for

this is statistical variation of frequently occurring events. Another is that the SRM provides an

estimate of the risk from low-frequency, high-consequence events that may not have occurred

during the year, such as train accidents with on-board injuries.

Suicide,244.1 FWI/year

Injuries in yards, depots and sidings,

7.6 FWI/year

Passenger injuries on the mainline railway,

58.4 FWI/year

Workforce injuries on the mainline,26.1 FWI/year

Public injuries on the mainline railway,

47.5 FWI/year

Safety overview

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The railway’s risk profile

The next chart uses information from the SRM to show the types of accident that result in harm. The

information is shown for different person types separately. The scope of the risk is all accidental risk

on the mainline railway or in YDS.

Information like this is useful for making decisions about where to focus effort, taking into account

that a number of factors will influence these decisions. Considering business or reputational risk may

lead you to focus on the risk from train accidents. Looking at how people are most likely to be fatally

injured would lead you to focus on accidents at the interface between the platform and trains or

track, whereas looking at the total level of risk would lead to a focus on slips, trips and falls in

stations.

The industry needs to take into account these factors, as well as the costs and benefits of potential

ways of reducing risk, when making decisions about its management.

Chart 2. SRMv8.1 accidental risk profile (139.6 FWI per year): mainline and YDS combined

2.1

1.6

4.0

6.5

33.5

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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Other accidents

Slips, trips and falls

Train accidents

Struck by train

Trespass

Other accidents

Electric shock

Falls from height

Train accidents

Road traffic accident

Assault and abuse

Struck by train

Platform-train interface

On-board injuries

Contact with object


Other accidents

Train accidents

On-board injuries

Assault and abuse

Platform-train interface


Pu

blic

Wo

rkfo

rce

Pas

sen

gers

SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)

Fatalities

Major injuries

Minor injuries

Shock and trauma

Safety overview

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2.2 Trend in overall harm

Chart 3 shows the trend in accidental FWI since 2007/08. Since 2009/10, there has been a better

classification of fatalities to members of the public; more information from BTP has improved

accuracy in distinguishing between suspected cases of trespass and suspected cases of suicide.

Chart 3. Accidental fatalities and weighted injuries

• There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train derailments or collisions during 2016/17.

There was one workforce fatality, occurring in a road driving incident.

• Thirty-eight people died as a result of other accidents. Five were passengers and 33 were

members of the public, 27 of whom were engaged in acts of trespass. When non-fatal injuries

are taken into account, the total harm occurring during the year was 108.2 FWI, compared with

118.7 FWI for 2015/16.

• A further 237 people died as a result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the

251 recorded for 2015/16.

Fatalities and major injuries due to suicide or suspected suicide

70 66 64

3953 49

40 45 4639

43.2 46.843.6

44.3

47.1 51.6

49.653 49.2

46.9

20.0 20.120.2

21.1

22.2 21.8

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136.0 135.6130.4

107.0

125.1 124.9

114.0121.7 118.7

108.2

0

20

40

60

80

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120

140

160

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Fatalities Major injuries Minor injuries Shock & trauma

Improved classification of fatalities to members of the public

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fatalities 207 220 243 209 250 245 275 287 251 237

Major injuries 26 32 26 36 23 35 54 38 33 47

Improved classification of suicide/trespass figures

Safety overview

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2.3 Passenger safety

Around 1.73 billion passenger journeys were made in 2016/17. The following section summarises the

fatalities and injuries that were recorded:

Fatalities

• There were no passenger fatalities in train derailments or collisions during 2016/17. This is the

tenth financial year in succession with no such fatalities.

• There were five passenger fatalities in incidents at stations or on trains. The on-board fatality at

Balham was investigated by RAIB, whose report highlighted the combination of passenger

behaviour, window design and clearance that contributed to the incident.

Passenger fatalities in 2016/17

Date Location Accident type Territory Description of incident

01/04/2016 Hither Green Platform edge incidents (not boarding/alighting)

South East A passenger fell from the platform edge and was struck by a through train, sustaining fatal injuries.

31/07/2016 Drumgelloch Platform edge incidents (not boarding/alighting)

Scotland A person fell from the platform and was struck by an approaching train. Alcohol was reported to be a factor.

07/08/2016 Balham Lean or fall from train in

running South East

A passenger travelling on a train put their head out of a droplight window and struck a lineside signal gantry, sustaining fatal injuries.

17/10/2016 Chester Platform edge incidents

(boarding/alighting)

London North

Western

A passenger fell between the train and platform while alighting, suffering multiple injuries. Alcohol was reported to be a factor. The passenger died on 21/02/2017. Investigations are ongoing as to whether the incident led directly to their death.

16/12/2016 Saltcoats station

Platform edge incidents (not boarding/alighting)

Scotland A passenger fell from the platform edge and was struck by a through train, sustaining fatal injuries.

Major injuries

• There were 266 passenger major injuries in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 6,432 recorded minor injuries, 1,137 (21%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party

went directly to hospital).

Shock and trauma

• There were 168 recorded cases of passenger shock or trauma, six of which were Class 1.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59245646ed915d20f80000a9/R092017_170525_Balham.pdf

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


Trend in accidental harm to passengers

The last 10 years have seen an average level of harm of 42.7 FWI per year. This is somewhat lower

than the SRM risk estimate of 58.4 FWI per year, but the SRM risk value includes estimates for

passenger risk arising from train accidents and passenger risk arising from assaults. Over the past

decade, the actual level of passenger harm from train accidents has been much lower than the

estimate, but because train accidents are low-frequency high-consequence events, this is not

unusual. With regard to passenger assaults, these injuries are mainly recorded by BTP rather than

SMIS.

Chart 4. Passenger harm by injury degree

• The level of passenger harm recorded for 2016/17 was 42.8 FWI. This was lower than the level

recorded for 2015/16; when normalised by passenger journeys there was a 14% decrease in the

rate of FWI.

• There were five passenger fatalities in 2016/17, four of which occurred in stations, while one

occurred on a moving train.

• Weighted major injuries dominate total passenger harm. The number of major injuries recorded

in 2016/17 was 266; this is a reduction of 28 on the previous year.

• The trend in passenger harm should be seen against the context of rising passenger usage. Over

the decade as a whole, there has been a reduction of around one fifth in the rate of harm,

normalised by passenger journeys.

7 5 5 7 5 3 4 38

5

21.0 23.1 23.325.0

25.8 31.2 27.3 29.8

29.4

26.6

9.6 9.9 10.2

10.6 11.5

12.011.9

11.9

11.9

11.0

38.0 38.3 38.7

42.8 42.5

46.543.5

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49.5

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0

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI p

er b

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nge

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rne

ysFW

I

Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate

Safety overview

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2.4 Workforce safety

Around 240 million hours of work were performed throughout the railway during the year. The

following injuries were recorded:

Fatalities

• There was one workforce fatality recorded during the year.

Workforce fatalities in 2016/17


05/06/2016 Eastbourne Road traffic accident South East

An infrastructure worker travelling home from a temporary place of work was involved in a road traffic accident, sustaining fatal injuries.

Major injuries

• There were 164 recorded major injuries in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 5,676 recorded minor injuries, 737 (13%) of which were Class 1.

Shock and trauma

• There were 873 reports of shock or trauma of which 245 (28%) were Class 1.

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


Trend in accidental harm to the workforce

Over the past decade, the average level of harm to members of the workforce has been 30.6 FWI per

year.

Chart 5. Workforce harm by injury degree

• The level of workforce harm for 2016/17 was 27.9 FWI. This was a slight increase on the level for

2015/16 on an absolute basis, but is the second lowest level for the last decade.

• The workforce fatality occurred in a road driving incident, which has now become the leading

cause of workforce fatalities since 2007/08, overtaking being struck by train.

2 3 3 1 1 2 3 3 1

17.918.3 16.4

15.7 17.2 16.217.7 18.2

1616.4

10.09.8

9.610.0

10.2 9.39.3 9.0

8.98.6

2.42.4

2.32.4

2.62.3

2.5 2.0

1.91.9

32.333.5

31.429.0

31.029.8

32.5 32.3

26.827.9

0

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI p

er 2

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orkfo

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rsFW

I

Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate

Safety overview

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2.5 Members of the public

Fatalities

• There were 33 fatalities to members of the public from accidental causes

• Twenty-seven people were engaged in trespass at the time of the accident

• Six people were users of level crossings; four pedestrian users and two road vehicle occupants

Non-fatal injuries to public

• Very few non-fatal injuries to members of the public are recorded. Many types of accidents that

occur to members of the public have a high likelihood of fatality. In addition, injuries occurring

during acts of prohibited behaviour such as trespass are not likely to be reported.

Major injuries

• Thirty-nine major injuries were recorded in 2016/17, of which 17 were to trespassers.

Minor injuries

• There were 268 minor injuries (31 to trespassers).

Shock & trauma

• There were six cases of shock or trauma (one to a trespasser).

Public fatalities in 2016/17 not due to suicide or trespass

Date Location Territory Type Description of incident

05/10/2016 Bentley station

(Hampshire) South East Footpath

An elderly man was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing. He was reported to have been on a mobility scooter and accompanied by a dog.

09/11/2016 Old Stoke Road

(Buckinghamshire) London North Western Footpath

A female was fatally struck by a train on the crossing while riding across on her bicycle.

03/01/2017 Marston

(Bedfordshire) London North Western AHB

The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a train struck the vehicle on the crossing. The road vehicle swerved around closed automatic half barriers.

07/02/2017 Frampton

(Gloucestershire) Western UWC-T

The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a train struck the vehicle on the crossing.

06/03/2017 Stokeswood (Shropshire)

London North Western UWC An elderly female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing.

24/03/2017 Nowhere (Norfolk)

South East Footpath A female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing, the female’s companion crossed without incident.

Safety overview

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Trend in accidental harm to members of the public

From 2009/10 the classification of trespass has been based on an improved data set; the overall

levels of harm to members of the public before and after this date are not directly comparable. The

average level of harm to members of the public over the period 2009/10 to 2016/17 was 44.8 FWI

per year.

Chart 6. Trend in public harm by accident type

• At 37.6 FWI, the harm to members of the public recorded in 2016/17 was a reduction on the

level for 2015/16.

• The number of level crossing fatalities for 2016/17 was six; four of which were pedestrian users,

two were road vehicle users.

5245 42

23

4034

25 2732

27

8

1213

6

4

9

811

4

6

65.7 63.860.4

35.1

51.648.7

38.0

44.442.4

37.6

0

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50

60

70

80

90

100

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Weighted injuries (all types) Level crossing fatalities

Other fatalities (not trespass or LC) Trespass fatalities

Improved classification of public fatalities

Safety overview

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2.6 Long-term historical trends

Train accidents

Over the past 50 years, there have been many improvements in rail operations and management,

such as multi-aspect signalling and increased application of the Automatic Warning System (AWS). In

more recent years, there have been developments in the areas of signals passed at danger (SPAD)

risk, including the implementation of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS),

improvements in track quality, and increased crashworthiness of rolling stock. These have all led to

further reductions in train accident risk.

Chart 7. Fifty-year trend in train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities

• There were no train derailments or collisions resulting in passenger or workforce fatalities during

2016/17. This is the tenth year in succession with no such fatalities.

• The chart shows train accidents that result in fatalities to passengers or the workforce, but it

does not show those involving members of the public, for example, fatalities resulting from a

train collision with a road vehicle at a level crossing.

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


Fatalities

Chart 8. Long term fatality trends

• The trend in fatalities for both passengers and workforce has shown marked long-term

improvement.

• The greatest improvement over the past 50 years has been in the number of workforce fatalities,

which was around 75 per year in the late 1960s, and has not exceeded three in any of the past 10

years. The amount of maintenance work being performed in the early 1960s, as well as the more

labour-intensive methods used, contributed to the higher-risk environment. Subsequent

technological and operational improvements not only reduced the railway’s maintenance

requirement, but also helped create better working conditions.

• The trend in public fatalities (mainly trespass, suicide and suspected suicide) is shown for the

whole railway system (ie including London Underground and other non-mainline railways) up to

2001/02 and for the mainline railway only from 1990/91 onwards. The ten-year period of overlap

indicates that the shape of the trend is similar, with or without the inclusion of non-mainline

data.

• In contrast to trends for passengers and workforce, there has been no sustained reduction in the

number of public trespass and suicide fatalities. Causes of trespass and suicide are not directly

influenced by technological or methodological advancements in railway operations.

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


Rail usage

In 2016/17, there were 1.73 billion passenger journeys (0.8% increase on 2015/16), 66.0 billion

passenger kilometres (2% increase), and 38.6 million freight train kilometres (4% decrease).

Chart 9. Trends in rail usage over the past 50 years

Data source: ORR National Rail Trends and DfT Transport Statistics Great Britain. Passenger journeys include both franchised and non-franchised passenger services.

• Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, passenger journeys and passenger kilometres

showed decreasing or flat trends, largely as a result of the increasing ownership of road vehicles.

• Since privatisation began in 1994/95, there has been a general growth in passenger kilometres

and journeys, reflecting changes in society, transport policy and the economic climate.

• In 2009/10, the economic recession led to a slowing down in the growth in rail usage; passenger

journeys briefly showed a small decrease. However, figures since then indicate that this was a

temporary effect, with usage again showing rising trends. Passenger growth continued in

2016/17 but at a slower rate than in recent years.

• Up until around 2006/07, freight usage showed a similar trend to passenger usage, although it

has never regained the volumes seen in the early 1960s and earlier. From 2006/07, the trend has

been less stable, with consecutive reductions taking freight volume in 2016/17 to levels last seen

in 1998/99.

• Compared with 10 years ago:

Passenger journeys have increased by 42%

Passenger kilometres have increased by 35%

Train kilometres have increased by 8%

Freight tonne kilometres have decreased by 19%

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


2.7 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality

risk

From the user’s perspective, the risk from using a mode of transport can be assessed on the basis of

fatalities per traveller kilometre. In theory, this allows him or her to compare the risk from

undertaking the same journey using different modes.

Chart 10. Traveller fatality risk for different transport modes (relative to rail)

• Rail transport has the lowest traveller fatality risk per traveller kilometre:

The motorcycle is by far the highest risk mode of popular transport, with a fatality risk per

kilometre three orders of magnitude greater than rail.

Car travel is around 20 times less safe, on average, than making a rail journey of the same

length.

Bus and coach travel is around seven times safer than making the same journey by car, but

around three times less safe than rail.

Data source: SRMv8.1 for rail (based on data to the end of September 2013). Transport Statistics Great Britain 2015 for all other modes (table RAS53001 covering data to the end of calendar year 2015). A three-year average of rates was used to estimate casualty rates for bus and coach occupants using years 2013-2015, inclusive. A single year, 2015 was used for other forms of road transport.

1 3 21

350399

1387

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Mainline railway Bus or coach Car Pedal cycle Pedestrian Motorcycle

Fata

lity

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Safety overview

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2.8 Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values

The Railway Safety Directive states the requirement for Member States to ensure that safety is

generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved. The European

Railway Agency (ERA) is mandated to develop Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and National Reference

Values (NRVs) to monitor the performance of Member States in this area.

The NRVs are designed to reflect observed baseline levels of safety in each Member State. NRVs are

calculated based on a form of weighted average performance over a period of time; this reduces the

effect of ‘outliers’, in recognition of the potentially distorting effect of a single multi-fatality event.

The current (second) set of NRVs are based on the six-year period 2004 to 2009; the first set were

based on the four years from 2004 to 2007.

The ERA is monitoring each Member State’s performance against its NRVs to determine whether

levels of safety are at least being maintained in each category. The level of performance is assessed

using the Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) that National Safety Authorities submit to the ERA as part

of their annual safety reports. 2

While the rest of the ASPR presents statistics on data for GB mainline railway, the analysis in this

section covers UK as a whole, as it is at this level that the CSIs, CSTs and NRVs are set.

RSSB co-ordinates the collation of GB CSIs by identifying potentially relevant events from SMIS and

validating them with the transport operators involved. It provides CSI data to the ORR on behalf of

the industry, which satisfies the requirements set out in the Railways and Other Guided Transport

Systems (ROGS) Regulation 20(1)(c) for transport operators to produce an annual set of safety data.

The CSTs apply to all Member States. The CST in each category is equal to the lower of (i) the highest

NRV value and (ii) 10 times the average NRV for all Member States. Meeting the second set of CSTs is

unlikely to be of concern to countries with relatively strong safety performance, such as the UK. In

the longer term, the ERA is likely to set more challenging CSTs that apply to all Member States and

are targeted to the higher-risk parts of the rail system.

The second set of NRVs

NRVs and CSTs are defined in terms of fatalities and weighted serious injuries (FWSI), divided by a

suitable normaliser, and specified for six categories, pertaining to different groups of people. A

serious injury, which occurs if the victim is hospitalised for a period of longer than 24 hours, is given

one-tenth the weighting of a fatality.

The person type categories align with those used by RSSB, with the exception of passengers. The ERA

defines a person as a passenger only if he or she is on, or in the act of boarding or alighting from, a

train; this is more restrictive than the RSSB/RIDDOR definition. The ERA category others covers other

(RSSB) passengers – such as a person who falls from a platform and is struck by a train – as well as

members of the public who are neither trespassing nor using a level crossing.

2 Because CSIs are available only from 2006, and because of concerns about the quality of the CSI data being provided by some Member States, the ERA based its NRV calculations on data supplied to Eurostat under European Commission (EC) Regulations No 91/2003 and 1192/2003. Prior to 2006, UK data submitted to Eurostat aligns with that published by the ORR (ie only confirmed suicides are omitted), whereas from 2006 onwards the data are based on an application of the Ovenstone criteria. This resulted in an inflated number of reported trespasser fatalities for 2004 and 2005, relative to subsequent years. RSSB and ORR work together to ensure the consistency of the annual ERA and Eurostat submissions.

Safety overview

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_________________________________________________________________


It is important to note that the NRVs, CSTs and accident-related CSIs only cover significant accidents

that involve railway vehicles in motion (collisions, derailments, persons struck by trains etc). The CSIs

therefore only represent a subset of the accidents that take place on the railway, and measuring

against the NRVs does not provide a complete assessment of overall safety performance.

Table 5 shows the second set of NRVs and CSTs, as they apply to the UK. The column NRV rank shows

where the UK’s NRV ranks among the EU-25 countries.3

For the UK, the second set of NRVs present much more challenging targets than the first set,

especially in the area of passenger safety. The level of harm specified by NRVs 1.1 and 1.2 is now less

than the SRMv8.1 estimate of the risk to passengers from accidents that are within the scope of

European reporting.

NRV and CST definitions and values4

NRV Category NRV

number Definition

UK NRV NRV rank

in EU-25

CST Second set

First set

Passengers

NRV 1.1 Number of passenger FWSI per billion passenger train kilometres.

2.73 6.22 1 207

NRV 1.2 Number of passenger FWSI per billion passenger kilometres.

0.028 0.0623 1 1.91

Employees NRV 2 Number of employee FWSI per billion train kilometres.

5.17 8.33 3 77.9

Level crossing users

NRV 3.1 Number of road vehicle occupant and pedestrian FWSI per billion train kilometres.

23.0 23.0 1 710

NRV 3.2 Number of road vehicle occupant and pedestrian FWSI per billion train traverses over a crossing.

n/a n/a n/a n/a

Others NRV 4 Number of other person FWSI per billion train kilometres.

7.00 6.98 n/a 35.5

Unauthorised persons on railway premises

NRV 5 Number of unauthorised person FWSI per billion train kilometres. Note: This excludes suicides.

84.5 94.7 5 2050

Whole society NRV 6

Total number of passengers, employee level crossing user, other and unauthorised person FWSI per billion train kilometres.

120.0 131.0 2 2590

3 Norway, which sits outside the EU but collaborates with the ERA and EU Member States on matters of railway safety, has NRVs that are lower than the UK’s in the categories of employees, level crossing users and whole society. 4 NRV 3.2 has been omitted from the assessments of the first and second set of NRVs because of concerns about the quality and consistency of normalising data across the Member States. For NRV 4, assessment was first published in the 2013 report. It is not appropriate to rank the UK on this NRV because the data behind its calculation was not based on the UK (there being insufficient events for the UK over the period of its calculation). The NRV for Ireland is based on the UK, as insufficient data for Ireland was available.

Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Assessing performance against the NRVs

The ERA assesses performance against each NRV on the basis of the latest available calendar year’s

performance and a moving weighted average (MWA) over a defined period. The periods used for the

calculation of the NRVs/CSTs and MWAs are shown in the diagram below. The assessment for 2016,

as presented in the charts in this section, is provisional; ERA will publish the official report on this

data in 2018.

To make allowance for statistical uncertainty, the ERA will only consider flagging up concerns about

safety to a Member State if its level of performance falls outside the NRV plus a 20% tolerance limit,

and if this apparent deterioration cannot be attributed to a single high-consequence accident.

In such cases, and in relation to the NRV in question, the ERA will then ask whether this is the first

time that the State has been in this position in the last three years, and whether the number of CSI-

reportable events has remained stable or decreased.

• If the answer to both questions is yes, the ERA will still conclude that performance is acceptable,

and the Member State will not be required to take specific action.

• If the answer to both questions is no, then the ERA will conclude that there has been a probable

deterioration of safety performance. The Member State will be required to provide a written

statement explaining the likely causes and – where needed – submit a safety enhancement plan

to the European Commission (EC).

• In the remaining cases, the ERA will conclude that there has been a possible deterioration of

safety performance, and the Member State will be required to provide a written explanatory

statement.

The DfT is accountable to the EC for the UK’s performance. If there were to be a genuine

deterioration in safety, then the DfT would initially look to ORR, as the safety regulator, to ensure

that the industry was taking remedial action. ORR would aim to work in co-operation with the

industry to understand the cause of the poor performance, and to ensure that the appropriate action

was taken. However, if enforcement action were needed, the relevant legislative tools would be:

• Health and safety enforcement powers, which might be applicable if safety levels were

deteriorating to an unacceptable level.

• ROGS regulations, which require each transport operator to have a safety management system

that ensures the mainline railway can achieve its CSTs.

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

ERA assessment schedule & scope

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

2010 assessment 2011 assessment 2012 assessment 2013 assessment 2014 assessment 2015 assessment 2016 assessment 2017 assessment

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

MW

A (

5 y

rs)

Firs

t se

t o

f

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

MW

A (

4 y

rs)

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

Firs

t se

t o

f

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

MW

A (

4 y

rs)

Seco

nd

set

of

NR

Vs

/ C

STs

Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Current performance against the NRVs

The second set of NRVs are based on the six years of data from 2004 to 2009. The ERA’s results of the

sixth assessment of the second set of NRVs, published in March 2017 was based on the five-year

period 2011 to 2015, and showed that all States met their NRVs in all categories, apart from:

Possible deterioration of safety performance:

• Bulgaria (employees)

• Italy (unauthorised persons)

• Slovakia (employees; whole society)

• Sweden (employees)

UK data for 2016 has not yet been submitted to the ERA (it will feature in the ERA’s 2018

assessment), but the following charts present provisional performance estimates based on the data

that has been collated by RSSB on behalf of transport operators. If the green line (the weighted

moving average of normalised FWSI) lies below the dashed red line (the NRV plus a 20% tolerance

limit) then safety performance is judged to be at an acceptable level. The provisional estimates

indicate that UK’s safety performance continues to be at an acceptable level in all measured NRV

categories.

NRVs for passenger safety

• The UK has the lowest NRVs for passenger

safety of all EU States.

• The NRVs relating to passenger safety cover

passenger FWSI from train accidents and

from other accidents involving railway

vehicles in motion (for example, a fall on

board a train caused by sudden braking).

There was one passenger fatality within

scope of CSI reporting during 20165.

• The highest FWSI values for passengers were

recorded in 2004 and 2007. These reflect the

injuries that occurred in the train accidents at

Ufton and Grayrigg respectively.

• The second set of NRVs represent a level of

passenger risk that is substantially lower than

the SRMv8.1 estimate. Consistently meeting

these NRVs will therefore be a considerable

challenge for the UK railway. Nevertheless,

performance since 2008 has been within the

NRVs.

5 This incident has resulted in the actual rate reaching the NRV, although the weighted moving average remains below the level. The injury to the passenger occurred on a train travelling near Balham, highlighted on page 31

Chart 11. Passenger safety: NRV 1.1

Chart 12. Passenger safety: NRV 1.2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

pe

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ain

km

Normalised FWSI (actual)Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)NRVNRV plus 20% tolerance

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

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0.16

0.18

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

pe

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Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


NRV for employee safety

• Most FWSI in this category arises from infrastructure workers being struck by trains.

• There were no workforce fatalities during

2016 that were within scope of CSI reporting.

• In 2004, there were particularly high

numbers of both fatalities and serious

injuries to infrastructure workers.

• When compared to estimates from SRMv8.1,

the employee NRV is a good estimate of the

underlying level of risk to employees from

accidents within the scope of European

reporting.

NRV for level crossing safety6

• The UK has the lowest NRV for level crossing

safety of all EU Member States.

• This NRV covers both pedestrians and road

vehicle occupants involved in collisions with

trains on level crossings (but not train

occupants).

• When compared to estimates from SRMv8.1,

the values of the level crossing NRVs are a

reasonable estimate of the underlying level

of risk to level crossing users from accidents

within the scope of European reporting.

• The ERA has not set values for NRV 3.2 because of concerns about the quality of normalising

data. NRV 3.2 will measure FWSI at level crossings normalised by the number of times that trains

are estimated to traverse level crossings during the year. There are currently no plans in place to

normalise by the volume of road traffic and the number of pedestrians using level crossings.

6 Although ERA notes that data quality is improving, because of on-going concerns about the quality of information being supplied by some Member States, it continues to use Eurostat data to assess performance against the NRVs. The classifications used by Eurostat do not differentiate between level crossing users, unauthorised persons and others. ERA analyses are based on the assumption that anyone in this combined category who is injured in an accident at a level crossing is a level crossing user, anyone injured in a rolling stock in motion accident is an unauthorised person, and anyone else is classed as other. This results in a number of casualties being misclassified (for example, people who are struck by trains at, or after falling from, the platform edge will feature as unauthorised persons in the ERA statistics and in the charts in this section). ERA will begin using CSI data once they have sufficient confidence in its quality. See also the footnote 2 on page 20.

Chart 13. Employee safety: NRV 2

Chart 14. Level crossing safety: NRV 3.1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

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35

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

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Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


NRV for other persons7

• This NRV covers the risk to people who do not fall into any other category. This includes people

who are struck by trains in stations (when not trespassing or boarding or alighting from trains)

and members of the public who are not trespassing or using level crossings. However, because of

the limitations on the data classifications of the Eurostat data used by ERA (see footnote 6 on

page Error! Bookmark not defined.), the ERA data does not accurately reflect the numbers

falling into this category.

• The NRV of 7.0 FWSI per year was not based on UK data because there were too few incidents

for its calculation.

NRV for unauthorised persons8

• This NRV covers the risk from trespassers being struck by trains, and from ‘train surfers’.

• Performance since 2012 has been within

the NRV. This follows 2011 where

performance was above the NRV, but

within the 20% tolerance limit: the number

of trespass fatalities in that year was

relatively high. The weighted moving

average has consistently been within the

NRV since 2008.

• Some of the Eurostat data used to set the

NRV was based on a different suicide

classification than is being applied to CSI

data (see footnote 2 in Section 2.8).

NRV for the whole of society

• The UK NRV value in this category is the second lowest of all Member States.

• This NRV represents the overall impact of

the railway on its passengers, staff and

members of the public (excluding suicides

but including trespassers).

• Performance in 2016 was within the NRV.

• Unauthorised persons (that is, trespassers)

are the dominant contributor to this risk

category. Changes in the risk to passengers,

staff, level crossing users and others are

likely to have relatively little impact.

7 See footnote 6. The analysis of performance against this NRV is insufficiently meaningful for review, given the limitations on the data behind it. 8 See footnote 6.

Chart 15. Safety of unauthorised persons:

NRV 5

Chart 16. Whole society safety: NRV 6

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

pe

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km


Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were used.

0

50

100

150

200

250

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FWSI

pe

r b

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rain

km

Normalised FWSI (actual)

Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)

NRV

Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were used.

Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Comparing rail safety within the EU

Chart 17. Passenger and workforce fatality rates on European Union railways 2011-2015

• The ERA uses data from a rolling five-year period to assess performance against the NRVs and

CSTs. Passenger and workforce fatality rates in the UK were well below the EU average over the

five-year period 2011-2015. There have been no passenger fatalities in train derailments or

collisions on the UK mainline since 2007.

• The EU average of 21.7 is down 5.1 from the 26.8 reported last year, a reduction of around 20%.

Reductions occurred in the nations with the highest totals; Spain, Bulgaria and Poland.

• A single multi-fatality accident can have a significant effect on the fatality rate. This is relevant to

Spain, where a derailment occurred at Santiago de Compostela in July 2013, killing 79 people.

• Chart 18 shows that the UK ranked best among

the ten largest EU-25 railways.

92

.1

79

.9

56

.5

44

.6

35

.5

32

.0

31

.8

27

.3

27

.1

22

.7

13

.9

12

.9

12

.1

10

.8

10

.4

10

.2

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5.5

4.0

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21.7

0

20

40

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80

100

120Sp

ain

Bu

lgar

ia

Pol

and

Latv

ia

Ro

man

ia

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a

Cze

ch R

epu

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Hun

gary

Esto

nia

Au

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a

Lith

uan

ia

Fran

ce

Ger

man

y

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ven

ia

Bel

giu

m

Ital

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Swed

en

Por

tuga

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De

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Fin

lan

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Net

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and

s

Un

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d Ki

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Gre

ece

Luxe

mb

our

g

Irel

and

Fata

liti

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pe

r b

illi

on

tra

in k

m

Normalised workforce fatalities

Normalised passenger fatalities

EU average

Chart 18. Fatality rates for the ten largest

railways

Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


2.9 Key safety statistics: safety overview

Safety Overview 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fatalities 49 40 45 46 39

Passenger 3 4 3 8 5

Workforce 2 3 3 0 1

Public 44 33 39 38 33

Major injuries 516 496 530 492 469

Passenger 312 273 298 294 266

Workforce 162 177 182 160 164

Public 42 46 50 38 39

Minor injuries 12779 12788 13201 12714 12376

Passenger 6384 6388 6881 6747 6432

Workforce 6215 6237 6139 5749 5676

Public 180 163 181 218 268

Incidents of shock 1217 1264 1091 980 1047

Passenger 238 236 253 205 168

Workforce 973 1026 833 768 873

Public 6 2 5 7 6

Fatalities and weighted injuries 124.94 114.03 121.68 118.67 108.23

Passenger 46.45 43.50 44.95 49.50 42.77

Workforce 29.79 32.49 32.29 26.80 27.88

Public 48.70 38.05 44.44 42.37 37.58 Harm from suicides and attempted suicides 248.57 280.52 290.89 254.47 241.88

Suicides 245 275 287 251 237

Safety overview

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________



People on trains and in stations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


3 People on trains and in stations

This chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured while travelling on trains, or using

stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents (which is covered in Chapter 6 Train

operations) and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass (which is covered in Chapter 8

Trespass).

The analysis looks at members of the workforce separately from passengers and members of the

public, which we have grouped together. This is because the types of activities that the workforce

carry out on trains and in stations are different from those of passengers and the public. Passengers

and the public are grouped together because they use the railway in similar ways and are exposed to

the same types of risk.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were four fatalities in stations: all were passengers. When the number of non-fatal injuries

is taken into account, the total level of harm occurring to passengers and the public was 31.4

FWI, compared with 35.8 FWI for the previous year.

• There was one fatal accident on board a train: involving a passenger. The total level of passenger

harm on board trains was 7.0 FWI compared with 6.9 FWI for the previous year.

• There were no fatalities to members of the workforce in stations or on trains. The total level of

workforce harm recorded in stations in 2016/17 was 5.3 FWI, compared with 6.3 FWI for the

previous year. The total level of workforce harm on board trains was 3.4 FWI, compared with 3.7

FWI for the previous year.

• Injuries in stations and on trains account for nearly half of the accidental risk profile, as

estimated by SRMv8.1.

Train and station safety at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trends in harm

Other accidental

risk(71.7 FWI;

51%)

Workforce in stations

(6.3 FWI; 5%)

Workforce on trains

(4.1 FWI; 3%)

Passengers and public in stations(48.6 FWI; 35%)

Passengers and public on

trains(8.8 FWI; 6%)

38.3

39

.5

39

.5 45

.7

47.2

48

.5

44.8 48

.1 51.7

43

.4

12

.5

12

.1

11

.2

10.1

12

.0

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.0

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80

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07

/08

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Passengers/ public Workforce

FWI

Weighted injuries

Fatalities

People on trains and in stations: passengers and public

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


3.1 Passengers and public

Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2016/17

Fatalities

• There were five fatalities within the scope of this chapter, four occurring at stations and one on a

train.

People on trains and in stations: passenger and public fatalities in 2016/17


01/04/2016 Hither Green Platform edge incidents (not boarding/alighting)

South East A passenger fell from the platform edge and was struck by a through train, sustaining fatal injuries.

31/07/2016 Drumgelloch Platform edge incidents (not boarding/alighting)


07/08/2016 Balham Lean or fall from train in

running South East


17/10/2016 Chester Platform edge incidents


London North

Western





Major injuries

• There were 270 passenger/public major injuries in 2016/17.

• 79% occurred at stations, and over half of these were slips, trips and falls.

Minor injuries

• There were 6,506 passenger/public minor injuries, 1,171 (18%) of which were Class 1 (ie the

injured party went directly to hospital).

• Of the Class 1 minor injuries, more than 90% occurred at stations.

Shock and trauma

• There were 163 recorded cases of passenger/public shock or trauma. None of these events were

Class 1 which is given to events that have a higher potential for a serious outcome.


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree

The average level of passenger/public harm in stations or on board trains over the last 10 years has

been 44.7 FWI per year, of which 5.9 FWI per year relates to fatalities. As SMIS data does not contain

complete information on passenger/public assault, it is likely that the level of harm is somewhat

higher than this. The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from assault to passenger and public is 10.0 FWI per

year, and is based on data obtained from BTP; trends in BTP assault data are analysed in Section 0.

Chart 19. Trend in harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations, by injury degree

• The total level of harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations for 2016/17 was 43.4 FWI, a

reduction of 16% from the previous year.

• The most readily available normaliser for the trends is passenger journeys. It is not perfect, as it

does not cover members of the public visiting stations for the purposes of shopping, eating or

other activities, but this data is not available.

• When normalised by passenger journeys, the rate of passenger/public harm in 2016/17

decreased by 17% on the rate for the previous year to the lowest for any year in the period

shown.

6 5 59 8

4 4 49

5

22.2 24.2 24.0

25.6 27.232.0

28.431.8

30.4

27.0

9.7 10.1 10.3

10.8 11.7 12.2

12.1

12.1

12.1

11.2

38.339.5 39.5

45.747.2

48.5

44.8

48.1

51.7

43.4

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6

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI p

er 1

00

m jo

urn

eys

FWI

Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Chart 20. Passenger/public harm by injury degree and location

• In 2016/17, harm in stations reduced to the third lowest level for the reporting period. Harm on

trains increased to the highest level of the same period. Between 2007/08 and 2013/14, harm on

trains was around a tenth of that occurring in stations, whereas the recent annual changes mean

it represents around one quarter of that occurring in stations.

• The average annual harm in stations over the ten year period is 39.5 FWI. In 2016/17 there was a

21% decrease in harm in stations from the previous year. The normalised level is now the lowest

for the decade.

• The average annual harm on trains over the ten year period is 5.2 FWI. In 2016/17 there was a

15% increase in harm on trains from the previous year. The normalised level is now the highest

for the decade.

6 5 59 8

4 4 49

4

19

.8

21

.8

21

.0 22

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24

.7

28

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1.3 1.4 1

.4 1.5

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1.6

1.6

1.434.4 35.7 35.0

41.043.1 43.5

40.3 41.944.8

35.4

3.8 3.94.5 4.7

4.1

5.04.5

6.26.9

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/17

In stations On trains

Train FW

ISt

atio

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WI

Fatalities Major injuries Minor injuries Shock and trauma Normalised rate


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in passenger/public fatalities

There has been an average of 5.9 passenger/public fatalities per year on trains and in stations over

the last 10 years.

Chart 21. Passenger/public fatalities in stations or on trains, by accident type

Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass

• Most fatalities over the last 10 years have been at the platform-train interface, with slips, trips

and falls being the next highest category although we have seen a reduction in slips, trips and

falls over recent years. There have been seven fatalities in the category of assault and abuse9;

SMIS is more likely to have records of this level of consequence than it is to have records of less

serious events, which will be held by BTP.

• Over the past 10 years, there has been one

fatality as a result of accidentally leaning or

falling from a moving train. This occurred at

Balham on 7 August 2016. The incident was

investigated by RAIB, which highlighted the

combination of passenger behaviour, door

design and clearance that contributed to the

incident. Trains with opening droplights can

result in passengers exposing themselves to

risk, if they place part of their body outside

of the train.

9 The category of assault and abuse also includes any incidence of unlawful killing, murder or manslaughter and any incidence of lawful killing in self-defence.

43

4

65

1

4

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12

1

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10

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fata

liti

es

Platform-train interface Slips, trips and falls Contact with object or person

Assault and abuse Lean or fall from train in running

Chart 22. Fatalities by person type

6

5 5

9

8

4 4 4

9

5

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Fata

litie

s

Passenger

Public


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in passenger/public major injuries

There has been an annual average of 273 passenger/public major injuries in stations or on trains over

the past 10 years.

Chart 23. Passenger/public major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type

Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass

• Over the past 10 years, the number of passenger/public major injuries on trains and in stations

has been generally increasing. However, this has been in line with the general increase in use of

the railway, as can be seen by the flatter shape of the normalised rate of major injuries.

• This year has seen a notable reduction in the number of major injuries reported. The majority of

major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls in stations. There were 152 major injuries due to

slips, trips and falls in 2016/17, an 18% decrease from 2015/16.

142165 154 163

182210

192 202185

152

40

4143

46

48

65

5150

52

4821

2325

2320

24

2634

46

50222

242 240256

272

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318304

270

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Majo

r inju

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Maj

or

inju

rie

s

Slips, trips and falls Platform-train interfaceOn-board injuries Assault and abuseContact with object or person Manual handling/awkward movementLean or fall from train in running Normalised rate


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface

An accident is considered to have occurred at the PTI if the incident resulted in the person wholly or

partially crossing the boundary between the platform and the track, or the platform and the train (if

present). The PTI presents a number of potential hazards for station users which can be exacerbated

by their own behaviour, such as rushing, or being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Risk at the

PTI is the focus of a dedicated industry stakeholder group, the PTI Working Group, which RSSB chairs.

RSSB, supported by industry stakeholders, has developed a risk assessment tool for assessing the PTI,

which reflects the principles set out in Industry Standards

• The overall level of harm at the PTI decreased by 19% in 2016/17 compared with the previous

year. This is due to the relatively high number of fatalities that occurred during 2015/16.

• When considered separately, the level of harm for boarding/alighting events increased slightly,

while the level of harm from other accidents at the PTI decreased by 43%.

• While the levels of harm from boarding and alighting events and from other events at the PTI are

broadly similar in terms of overall FWI, the injury profile is very different. Fatalities while

boarding or alighting are extremely rare (there has only been one such event during the past 10

years) while fatalities due to other accidents at the PTI have occurred each year. Over the period

as a whole, there have been 38 fatalities at the PTI, not related to boarding or alighting trains.

Chart 24. Passenger/public harm at the platform-train interface

4.3 4.4

5.35.8

6.36.9

6.05.5

5.96.6

5.6

4.75.2

7.1

6.0

3.0

5.5

3.7

7.7

4.4

9.9

9.1

10.5

12.912.3

9.8

11.5

9.2

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11.0

0

3

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9

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15

2007

/08

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/17

Platform edge incidents(boarding/alighting)

Platform edge incidents (notboarding/alighting)

All platform edge incidents

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Passenger/public assaults

Assaults occur on the railway, as they can in any public environment. The modelled risk from assaults

to passengers/public on trains and in stations is estimated by SRMv8.1 to be 10.0 FWI per year, of

which 0.6 FWI per year relates to fatalities. While SMIS is a good source of information on workforce

assaults, the BTP is the primary source for non-workforce assaults.

The number of violence against the person offences have increased for most Home Office Forces in

the last year. There has been a national increase across all forces in England/Wales of 19% for the

calendar year 2016 compared to 2015. Similarly, the number of violence with injury offences have

increased nationally be 10%. This compares favourably with BTP increases of 18% and 7%

respectively. These increases are in part increased reporting, in part increased recording and partially

a real increase in crime.

Chart 25. Overall trend in assault and harassment to passengers/public

• The number of passenger and public assaults (including harassment) rose in 2016/17 to 4,476,

compared with 4,028 for 2015/16. This is an increase of 11% in absolute terms, and 10% on a

normalised basis.

• The overall increase in number was driven by increases in the less serious categories of crime,

Harassment and Common Assault. The more serious categories of GBH and more serious cases

of violence and Actual bodily harm increased, but less significantly.

• In absolute terms, all categories of crime increased apart from Other Violence. In particular, cases

of Harassment increased by 24%, on top of a 77% increase last year.

• The increase in the normalised rate of assaults is driven by the increasing rate of Harassment and

Common Assault events. The normalised rate of Actual Bodily Harm has reduced in the last ten

years whilst the rate of GBM and more serious cases has remained relatively steady.

1205 1138921 949 947 853 869 864 895 961

1172 1175

10761190 1312 1378 1418

16722044

2203

301 281

258349 332 361

445

532

938

1162

2790 2712

23652613 2692 2700

2847

3218

4028

4476

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Assau

lts pe

r millio

n p

assen

ger jo

urn

eys

Ass

ault

s

Other violence Harassment

Common assaults Actual bodily harm

GBH and more serious cases of violence Normalised Rate

Source: Event data BTP, normalisers ORR


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Chart 26. Passenger/public assault and abuse by location

• Assaults are slightly more frequent in stations than onboard trains, with around 57% of assaults

having occurred in stations over the past decade.

• The total number of assaults in stations rose by 11%, to 2,452, compared with 2,202 in 2015/16.

The total number of assaults on trains rose by 11% to 2,024, compared with 1,826 in 2015/16.

• The increase in overall number for each location was driven by increases in the recorded

incidence of less serious events. The number of Common assaults increased in stations and on

trains by 10% and 5% respectively. The incidence of Harassment in stations and on trains

increased by 22% and 26% respectively.

796 731554 600 594 521 536 516 545 603

409 407 367 349 353 332 333 348 350 358

663 660

605706 733 802 808 955

11581273

509 515 471 484 579 576 610 717886 930

149 156

135

180 140 160 185228

393

478

152 125123 169

192 201 260304

545684

1679 1626

1369

1572 1538 1558 1602

1807

2202

2452

1111 1086996 1041

1154 11421245

1411

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2024

0

0.5

1

1.5

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0

500

1,000

1,500

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2,500

3,0002

007

/08

20

08/0

9

20

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3

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7

20

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8

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9

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0

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1

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2

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12/1

3

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4

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14/1

5

20

15/1

6

20

16/1

7

In Station On Train

Assau

lts pe

r millio

n p

assen

ger jo

urn

eys

Ass

ault

s

Other violence HarassmentCommon assaults Actual bodily harmGBH and more serious cases of violence Normaliesd rate

Source: Event data BTP, normalisers ORR


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce injuries in 2016/17

Fatalities

• There were no workforce fatalities in stations or on trains in 2016/17.

Major injuries

• There were 42 workforce major injuries in stations or on trains recorded in 2016/17.

• 71% occurred at stations.

Minor injuries

• There were 2,718 recorded minor injuries in stations or on trains, 297 (11%) of which were Class

1 (ie the injured party was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).

Shock and trauma

• There were 565 recorded cases of workforce shock or trauma, four of which were Class 1 (ie

involved witnessing a fatality).


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in workforce harm by injury degree

The average level of workforce harm in stations or on trains over the past 10 years has been 10.4 FWI

per year; there have been no fatalities. The average level of harm in stations has been 6.5 FWI per

year, with 3.9 FWI per year occurring on trains.

Chart 27. Trend in harm to workforce on trains and in stations, by injury degree

• The level of harm recorded for 2016/17 was 8.7 FWI, which is a decrease on the level of 10.0 FWI

for 2015/16.

• The amount of harm occurring in stations is greater than on trains (an approximately 60:40 split

over the period as a whole). The injury profile in each location differs, with 77% of major injuries

occurring in stations.

Chart 28. Workforce harm by injury degree and location


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce major injuries

Workforce major injuries comprise a set of injuries originally listed in RIDDOR, and include losing

consciousness (as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations

and hospital stays of 24 hours or more.10

Chart 29. Workforce major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type

• There were 42 major injuries to workforce in 2016/17, a decrease of 11 from the previous year.

This is lower than the annual average of 46.9 for the period as a whole.

• Since 2007/08, 29% of major injuries have been caused by slips, trips and falls. At 11, the figure

for 2016/17 was a reduction on the number seen last year.

• Incidents at the platform-train interface are the second most common cause of major injuries,

accounting for 21% of major injuries over the period shown.

10 These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version

of RIDDOR, published in 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety performance analysis, the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.

128 9

6

18

8 610 11 9

1519

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4 63

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80

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Maj

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inju

rie

s

On-board injuries Falls from height

Fires and explosions (not involving trains) Assault and abuse

Manual handling/awkward movement Contact with object or person

Slips, trips, and falls Platform-train interface


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce PTI chart – Overall harm at PTI

Chart 30. Workforce harm at PTI, split by activity

Source: SMIS

• The average workforce harm resulting from PTI incidents over the period shown is 1.5 FWI per

year.

• Eighty-eight percent of harm occurs while boarding or alighting.

• There are no significant trends in the data.

1.41.3

1.5

0.9

2.0

1.3

0.9

1.31.5

1.1

0.30.2

0.0

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0.10.2

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/17

Platform edge incidents(boarding/alighting)

Platform edge incidents (notboarding/alighting)

All platform edge incidents

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce assaults

Our industry’s workforce is exposed to risk from assault, as are many other industries that are

customer-facing. The risk from assault to workforce in stations or on trains, as modelled by SRMv8.1,

is 1.7 FWI per year, of which 0.02 FWI per year relates to fatalities.

Chart 31. Workforce assaults leading to injury or shock/trauma, by location and worker type

• The reported number of assaults resulting in harm to workforce on trains and in stations has

seen an increase in 2016/17.

• After the reduction of harm from assaults in the first half of the decade, the second half has been

generally stable.

• Over the last 10 years, around 60% of

workforce assaults have occurred in stations.

• Harm from workforce assaults has also seen

a similar pattern, stabilising over the last five

years, as shown in Chart 32.

1032946

774699 704

530 508 530476

535

810

701

483 471 490

332 368314 281

351

0

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In stations On trains

Ass

ault

s le

adin

g to

inju

ry o

r sh

ock

/tra

um

a

Other workforce

Revenue protection staff

Station staff

Other on-board train crew

Train drivers

Infrastructure workers

Chart 32. Workforce harm from assaults

2.7 2.62.2

1.7

2.3

1.5 1.4 1.61.4 1.5

0

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FWI

Shock and traumaMinor injuriesMajor injuriesFatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


3.2 Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations

Passengers and public on trains and in stations

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17


On-board injuries 0 0 0 0 1

Assault and abuse 2 0 1 2 0

Platform-train interface 1 4 2 6 4

Slips, trips and falls 1 0 1 0 0

Contact with object 0 0 0 1 0

Other injury 0 0 0 0 0

Major injuries 320 284 318 304 270







Minor injuries 6478 6454 6977 6850 6506

Class 1 1439 1419 1276 1322 1171

Class 2 5039 5035 5701 5528 5335


Class 1 0 1 0 1 0

Class 2 235 229 245 203 163

Fatalities and weighted injuries

48.47 44.76 48.13 51.75 43.35

On-board injuries 3.79 3.99 5.08 6.02 7.31

Assault and abuse 3.61 1.07 2.60 3.28 1.02

Platform-train interface 9.83 11.53 9.18 13.55 11.00

Slips, trips and falls 29.49 26.43 28.49 25.80 21.84

Contact with object 1.38 1.49 2.33 2.74 2.02

Other injury 0.37 0.26 0.45 0.36 0.17

Passengers and public assaults on trains and in stations

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Total 2700 2847 3218 4028 4476

GBH and more serious cases of violence

82 91 122 108 114

Actual bodily harm 853 869 864 895 961

Other violence 26 24 28 43 36

Common assaults 1378 1418 1672 2044 2203

Harassment 361 445 532 938 1162


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce in stations and on trains

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17


Major injuries 41 43 40 53 42

Electric shock 0 0 0 0 0

Falls from height 0 3 2 1 0


Struck by train 0 0 0 0 0






Minor injuries 3178 3174 3097 2943 2718

Class 1 362 306 312 320 297

Class 2 2816 2868 2785 2623 2421


Class 1 10 5 1 6 3

Class 2 607 614 505 449 562


9.38 9.34 8.85 10.00 8.68

Electric shock 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01

Falls from height 0.00 0.31 0.21 0.10 0.00

Assault and abuse 1.47 1.44 1.61 1.41 1.47

Struck by train 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00


On-board injuries 2.53 2.19 2.44 2.44 2.35



Other injury 0.86 0.96 0.70 1.33 1.11


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________



Working on or about the running line

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


4 Working on or about the running line

This chapter investigates the types of accident that affect infrastructure workers while working on or

about the running line.

A detailed breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key

safety statistics table at the end of this chapter.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were no workforce fatalities involving infrastructure staff working on or about the running

line. The total level of harm arising from running line work during 2016/17 was 9.4 FWI, which is

an increase of 21% compared with 7.8 FWI occurring in 2015/16. The total harm comprised 72

major injuries, 1,374 minor injuries and 17 cases of shock/trauma. The infrastructure worker

fatally injured in the road driving incident is covered in Chapter 5 Road driving risk.

• Slips, trips and falls account for the largest proportion of major injuries to workforce on or about

the running line. At 36 major injuries, 2016/17 saw an increase on the 27 major injuries that

occurred in 2015/16 due to slips, trips and falls.

• Contact with objects is the next largest contributor to major injuries on the running line. The

recorded number for 2016/17 was 24, which is higher than the 18 that occurred during 2015/16.

• Although this chapter focuses on injuries to infrastructure workers on and about the running line,

infrastructure workers also carry out work in other locations, such as stations, and are also

subject to risk while travelling between sites. The level of harm from areas away from the

running line shows a variable trend and is influenced by the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of

fatal events.

Working on the running line at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in harm

Working on or about the

running line(10.1 FWI;

7.2%)

Other accidental risk

(129.4 FWI;92.8%)

10.311.4 10.9

9.08.1

9.3

10.910.1

7.89.4

0

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/17

FWI

Weighted injuriesFatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


4.1 Fatalities and injuries in 2016/17

Fatalities

• There were no fatalities on or about the running line in 2016/17.

Major injuries

• There were 72 infrastructure worker major injuries on or about the running line recorded in

2016/17.

• Half of these were slips, trips and falls, while one third were contact with objects.

Minor injuries

• There were 1,374 recorded minor injuries on or about the running line, 204 (15%) of which were

Class 1 (ie the injured party was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the

injury).

Shock and trauma

• There were 17 recorded cases of shock or trauma, one of which was Class 1 (it involved

witnessing an electric shock from overhead line equipment).


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


4.2 Trend in harm by injury degree

Over the past decade, the average level of harm to infrastructure workers engaged in track work has

been 9.7 FWI per year, of which 1.1 FWI per year have been fatalities.

Chart 33. FWI by injury degree

• There were no infrastructure worker fatalities during work on the running line in 2016/17.

• The level of harm recorded for 2016/17 was 9.4 FWI. This was higher than the 7.8 FWI recorded

for 2015/16, due to an increase in major injuries.

• The number of major injuries recorded in 2016/17 was 72. Major injuries predominate in the

injury profile for running line work, accounting for 69% of the harm since 2007/08.

23 3

1 1 1

6.6

6.9 6.5

6.4

6.1

6.37.5

8.0

5.6

7.2

1.6

1.51.4

1.6

2.0

1.9

2.42.1

2.2

2.2

10.3

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9.0

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7.8

9.4

0

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16

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Fatalities

The broad category of ‘infrastructure worker’ encompasses those whose work involves inspecting,

maintaining and renewing the track, signalling and telecommunications equipment, and other

railway infrastructure, such as earthworks and bridges. The majority of workforce fatalities occur to

those involved in work on the infrastructure, reflecting the higher-risk environments in which this

work takes place.

Chart 34. Fatalities by accident type, 2007/08 – 2016/17

• Since 2007/08 there has been a total of 11 fatalities to infrastructure workers on or about the

running line.

• Most fatalities have resulted from workers being struck by trains. Six workers have been killed in

this way since 2007/08. The last one due to this cause was in 2013/14, and involved a member of

a gang working on the track near Newark Northgate station.

• The Contact with object fatality was a worker who received fatal crush injuries when becoming

trapped between non-rail vehicles.

• In the past ten years, there have been two fatalities in the Falls from height category: one worker

was working on a bridge and another was working on a ‘cherry picker’ that toppled over. A third

fatality during the period also involved a fall: a worker fell from a road-rail vehicle when the

crane basket failed. However, as this vehicle was operating on the running line at the time of the

accident, it is classed as a train for reporting purposes, and categorised differently in the chart,

under the Other accidents category.

• The remaining fatality in the Other accidents category was a worker who died after becoming

overcome by fumes while engaged on bridge maintenance work near the running line.

Other accidents, 2

Contact with object or person, 1

Falls from height, 2

Struck by train, 6

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431737/R012015_150216_Newark_North_Gate.pdf


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Major injuries

Workforce major injuries are defined in RIDDOR 1995 Schedule 1, and include losing consciousness

(as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations and hospital

stays of 24 hours or more.11

Chart 35. Major injuries by accident type

• There were 72 major injuries while working on the running line in 2016/17, this is a rise from the

10-year low reported in 2015/16.

• Since 2007/08, 47% of major injuries have resulted from slips, trips and falls.

• Contact with object has the next highest proportion of major injuries, accounting for 30% of all

major injuries over the period shown.

• The injuries in the category Train accidents refer to cases such as those where infrastructure

workers at the trackside have been struck by small pieces of debris thrown up by trains that have

hit objects on the track, or where rail vehicles that have derailed in possessions and have

subsequently come into contact with workers at the site.

11 These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version of RIDDOR, published in 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety performance analysis, the term ‘major injury’ has been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.

23 2729 29

35 32

4237

27

36

29 26 19 1812 15

15 24

18

24

66

6 7

9

5

6669

65 6461

63

75

80

56

72

0

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Maj

or

inju

ries

Train accidents Slips, trips, and fallsContact with object or person Falls from heightMachinery/tool operation Manual handling/awkward movementStruck by train Workforce electric shockOther accidents


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Infrastructure worker fatalities – all locations

The broad category of ‘infrastructure worker’ encompasses those whose work involves inspecting,

maintaining and renewing the track, signalling and telecommunications equipment, and other

railway infrastructure, such as earthworks and bridges. Most workforce fatalities occur to those

involved in work on the infrastructure, reflecting the higher-risk environments in which this work

takes place.

Chart 36. Workforce fatalities by accident type

• There was one infrastructure worker fatality in 2016/17, this occurred away from the running

line in a road traffic accident.

• There have been seven road traffic incidents over the period shown, making it the largest cause

of workforce fatalities since 2007/08.

2

3 3

1 1

2

3 3

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fata

litie

s

Road traffic accident Struck/crushed by train Electric Shock

Falls from height Other workforce injury Contact with object


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


4.3 Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line

Infrastructure work 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17





Machinery/tool operation 0 0 0 0 0



Manual handling/awkward movement 0 0 0 0 0

Other accidents 0 0 0 0 0





Machinery/tool operation 7 9 4 5 5





Minor injuries 1272 1520 1359 1312 1374

Class 1 169 216 173 210 204

Class 2 1103 1304 1186 1102 1170


Class 1 3 1 7 0 1

Class 2 3 6 1 7 16




Struck by train 1.30 1.00 0.10 0.11 0.00

Machinery/tool operation 0.87 1.12 0.61 0.69 0.70

Falls from height 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.01

Electric shock 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.02 0.03

Manual handling/awkward movement 0.33 0.43 0.62 0.67 0.66

Other accidents 0.57 0.66 0.34 0.10 0.57


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________



Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


5 Road driving risk

Within this report, road driving refers to any member of the workforce travelling by means of a

motorised vehicle between sites while on duty, or travelling to and from their home to a non-regular

place of work, including door-to-door taxi provision.

This chapter investigates the impact of this activity on the wide variety of railway roles, from station

staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.

A breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key safety

statistics table at the end of this chapter.

2016/17 Headlines

• There was one workforce fatality in a road traffic accident in 2016/17. There were eight major

injuries, 147 minor injuries and 21 cases of shock/trauma reported. This equates to 2.2 FWI,

compared with the 1.1 FWI (no fatalities) occurring in 2015/16.

• The SRMv8.1 estimate for the risk to the workforce from road driving is 1.2 FWI per year, but this

was averaged over a four-year period up to September 2013, and later years have been notably

in excess of this.

• This latest fatality makes road driving the leading cause of workforce fatality over the last

decade. Reported harm from road driving incidents continues to increase, but this is likely to

reflect increased awareness and reporting rather than increased risk.

• Although road driving risk has come under focus within the industry, with a consequent

improvement in reporting levels, there is still work to be done to ensure that all injuries not

currently covered by the Railway Group Standard, but covered by HSE guidance are recorded.

Since 2007/08, there have been seven fatalities recorded in SMIS as being work-related, but a

number of other fatalities are known to have occurred, which have not been reported.

• The Road Risk Group (RRG) was formed in December 2015 to encourage the rail industry to work

together on road risk issues. The RRG is a strategic group where cross-industry work takes place

at the highest level. The RRG outputs are ‘co-operation framework programmes’ directed to and

owned jointly by the respective industry groups.

Road driving risk at a glance


Risk to the workforce

from driving whilst on duty (1.2 FWI; 1%)


(138.4 FWI; 99%)

<0.1 0.3 0.3 0.61.4 1.3

2.8 2.7

1.1

2.2

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

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/08

20

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/15

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/16

20

16

/17

Weighted Injuries FWI

Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


5.1 Scope of road driving risk

Within this report, the scope of road driving risk covers accidents to any member of the workforce

travelling for work purposes. This is defined as travelling from their home to somewhere else that is

not their usual place of work, and from their usual place of work to somewhere that is not their usual

place of work. It does not include commuting, which is defined as being from their home to their

usual place of work. This is explained in the RSSB leaflet Towards Better Reporting of Road Traffic

Collisions (RTCs) which may be located on the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk.

5.2 Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries

SMIS was created for building commonality in incident reporting among rail companies, and has

identified a number of key safety concerns across the industry since its implementation, but we have

not benefitted to the same extent in understanding road driving risk.

The industry is required by the relevant Railway Group Standard to record in SMIS any incidence of

fatalities or injuries to the workforce occurring as a result of a road traffic accident while driving on

duty between sites, to carry out work in association with the maintenance or working of the

operational railway. Companies have tended to develop their own databases, recording these

incidents at various levels of detail, but we are now seeing a concerted effort throughout the

industry to collate these reports centrally in SMIS to enable increased analysis and understanding. As

such, reporting of injuries from road driving is improving.

http://www.rssb.co.uk/

Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


5.3 Fatalities and injuries in 2016/17

Fatalities

• There was one workforce fatality from road driving recorded in 2016/17.

Road driving fatalities in 2016/17


05/06/2016 Eastbourne Road traffic accident South East


Major injuries

• There were eight major injuries from road driving recorded in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 147 recorded minor injuries from road driving, 34 (23%) of which were Class 1 (ie the

injured party was incapacitated from normal duties for more than three days, not including the

day of the injury).

Shock and trauma

• There were 21 recorded cases of shock or trauma from road driving, 19 (90%) of which were

Class 1 (ie occurred in an accident that had a notable risk for a fatal outcome).

Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


5.4 Trends in workforce injuries from road driving

The increasing trend in the reported number of road driving injuries is striking, but it is likely to

reflect an improvement in reporting rather than an increase in risk. We can see evidence for an

improvement in reporting when we look at how the recorded number of injuries has changed for

lesser degrees of injury, particularly minor injuries.

Chart 37. Road driving injuries by injury degree

• At 177, the number of road driving injuries in

2016/17 was higher than the 145 recorded in

2015/16. Since 2007/08 there have been a

total of seven fatalities recorded in SMIS.

• There is a clearly increasing level of reported

harm from road driving incidents over the last

10 years. Work is ongoing to ensure that all

injuries not currently covered by the Railway

Group Standard, but covered by HSE guidance

(see section 5.1) are reported.

1 12 2

10

1

2

3

4

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fata

liti

es

02 2

42 1

5 47 8

0

5

10

Ma

jor

inju

ries

6 45 51 69 67 74 97 107 116 147

0

50

100

150

200

Min

or

inju

ries

2 6 9 7 6 11 1122 21

0

10

20

30

Sho

ck a

nd

Tr

au

ma

Chart 38. Road driving harm by injury

degree

Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in injuries by industry sector

The chart below shows the number of road driving injuries over the last 10 years, this time broken

down by industry sectors12.

Chart 39. Road driving injuries by industry sector

• Over the past 10 years, the greatest proportion of reported road driving incidents has involved

staff working for Network Rail (65%). The majority of these events have involved infrastructure

workers; the nature of infrastructure work requires travel to, from and between work sites. The

Contractors category also comprises infrastructure workers, and has accounted for 17% of

reported injuries.

• The categories TOC and FOC account for around one fifth of reported injuries. A number of these

events involve train drivers, station staff and other members of the workforce travelling by taxi

to work locations.

12 Improved classification of data allowed the removal of 'Other’, as displayed in the 2015/16 ASPR.

2 34 40 59 49 63 81 74 86111

0

50

100

150

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Net

wo

rk R

ail

2 1 1 4 7 9 1733 30

51

0

20

40

60

Co

ntr

act

ors

1 1

4

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23

0

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2

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FOC

213

17 19 17

813 15

26

15

0

10

20

30

TOC

Road driving risk

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


5.5 Key safety statistics: road driving risk

Road Driving 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17


NR 1 0 1 0 0

Contractors 0 2 1 0 1

FOC 0 0 0 0 0

TOC 0 0 0 0 0


NR 1 2 1 3 3

Contractors 0 2 1 4 5

FOC 0 0 2 0 0

TOC 0 1 0 0 0

Minor injuries 74 97 107 116 147

Class 1 15 30 24 44 34

Class 2 59 67 83 72 113


Class 1 6 11 11 22 19

Class 2 0 0 0 0 2

FWI 1.26 2.77 2.67 1.10 2.18

NR 0.23 0.40 1.28 0.54 0.53

Contractors 1.01 2.22 1.14 0.47 1.61

FOC 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.00

TOC 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.04

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


6 Train operations

This chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable train accidents. The term ‘train accident’ covers a very wide

range of event types, from potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories such as

passenger train derailments to those with typically less serious consequences, such as trains being

struck by stones. Train accidents are reportable under RIDDOR if they affect or occur on the running

line. Additional RIDDOR criteria apply to different types of accident and these are summarised in

Appendix 6.

The chapter also presents information on the risk presented to shunters, train crew or other staff

when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities related to the movement of trains.

2016/17 Headlines


tenth year in succession with no such fatalities, the longest such period on record.

• There were two fatalities involving members of the public, arising from train collisions with road

vehicles at level crossings.

• The total harm from train accidents in 2016/17 comprised three reports of major injuries, 97

reports of minor injuries and 27 reports of shock/trauma. This equates to 2.6 FWI.

• There were 22 train accidents occurring in PHRTA categories, which is the lowest number since

2010/11. Six of the events were train derailments; two of which involved passenger trains. Four

of the events were collisions between trains, three of which involved passenger trains.

• On 4 March 2017 the PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was 6.4 FWI

per year, compared with 6.1 FWI per year at the end of 2015/16. The increase was due to

increases in the PIM contributions related to level crossings, train operations, and SPADs.

• There were 272 SPADs in 2016/17, compared with 282 during the previous year. At the end of

2016/17, SPAD risk stood at 45% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared with 54% at

the end of 2015/16.

Train accident risk at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in PIM indicator

Train accidents

(8.0 FWI; 6%)


(131.6 FWI; 94%)

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


6.1 Train accidents

Accidents are usually categorised by their initial event. For example, a derailment that resulted in a

collision between trains would be classed as a derailment, even if it was the subsequent collision that

caused most of the harm.

Train accidents occurring within YDS sites or within possessions are not reportable under RIDDOR

unless they result in injury or they affect the running line. Train accidents occurring wholly within YDS

or possessions, and which do not result in injury, are not included in the statistics in this chapter.

Measuring the risk from train accidents

The SRM models all sources of risk on the railway, including the risk from train accidents. The SRM

contains models of the causes and consequences of train accidents, encompassing 23 hazardous

events and more than 1,700 separate accident precursors. It provides an estimate of the underlying

level of risk associated with accident types that have not occurred for many years, or have never

occurred.

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from train accidents is 8.0 FWI per year, which is 6% of the total

accidental risk profile. This includes an estimate of the harm from train accidents in possessions and

on YDS sites.

Potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories

Many train accident categories typically carry little risk. The types of train accidents occurring on or

affecting the running line, and with the most potential to result in serious consequences, are known

as potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories. All PHRTA categories are reportable

under RIDDOR.

The PHRTA categories are:

• derailments on the running line (other than whilst shunting), or which affect an unprotected

running line

• collisions between trains on the running line (excluding roll backs and open doors)

• buffer stop collisions which cause any damage

• trains striking road vehicles

• large objects falling onto trains

• train explosions

Tracking the risk from PHRTA categories

The PIM provided a measure of underlying train accident risk by tracking changes in the occurrence

of accident precursors. It used risk weightings derived from the SRM and enables risk to be

monitored on an on-going basis. The PIM and its outputs are discussed in more detail in Section 6.6.

Other train accidents (non-PHRTA categories)

The majority of train accident categories carry a typically lower potential for serious consequences.

This group includes train fires; trains that strike objects on the line without subsequently derailing;

roll-back collisions and open door collisions. Notwithstanding their non-PHRTA categorisation, it is

still possible for specific events to be serious.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


6.2 Train accident fatalities and injuries

Fatalities

• There were two fatalities in train accidents during 2016/17, both of these were due to trains

striking road vehicles at level crossings.

Major injuries

• There were three major injuries from train accidents in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 97 reports of minor injuries.

Shock & trauma

• There were 27 reports of shock/trauma from train accidents.

Train accident fatalities in 2016/17


03/01/2017 Marston



07/02/2017 Frampton



Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


6.3 Trend in harm from train accidents

Trends in the harm from train accidents is variable. The majority of events classed as train accidents

result in little or no harm, but the potential for more serious consequences exists.

Chart 40. Fatalities and weighted injuries in train accidents (excluding suicides)

• There were two fatalities in train accidents during 2016/17 due to trains striking road vehicles at

level crossings. There were three major injuries recorded, 97 reports of minor injuries and 27

reports of shock/trauma. At 2.6 FWI, the annual level of harm from train accidents was below

the ten-year average of 2.9 FWI.

• The level of harm to passengers from train accidents varies considerably from year to year, and a

single major accident can dominate that year’s figures.

• The fatalities on this chart are members

of the public in road vehicles which

were struck, either on a level crossing,

or (much more rarely) after their

vehicle strayed onto the line at another

location.

2

7

1

6

2 2 21.0

2.6

8.2

1.41.8

6.4

2.62.1

0.4

2.6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Workforce Weighted injuries

Public Weighted injuries

Passenger Weighted injuries

Public Fatalities

Chart 41. FWI in train accidents, by location

0

1

2

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4

5

20

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/08

20

08

/09

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At a level crossing Not at a level crossing

FWI

Public Fatalities Passenger Weighted injuries

Public Weighted injuries Workforce Weighted injuries

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


6.4 PHRTA categories: train accidents during 2016/17

Table 9 lists the 22 events within the PHRTA categories that occurred in 2016/17 (except those

involving level crossings, which are detailed in Chapter 7). The events coloured red below are those

that the RAIB is investigating, or for which it has published a report.

Potentially higher-risk train accidents in 2016/17

6

2

Date Location Territory Train Operator Description

16/09/16Watford Tunnels

(WCML - Fast/Slow)

London North

WesternLondon Midland

Passenger train derailed after striking a landslide while exiting a

tunnel (leading vehicle only).

05/11/16Southampton Eastern

DocksSouth East DB Schenker

Passenger train derailed due to rotten sleepers and track out of

gauge.

4

Date Location Territory Train Operator Description

08/05/16 Oxley ChordLondon North

WesternFreightliner Freight train derailed and rerailed. Number of wagons unknown.

20/10/16 Fletton Jcn London North Eastern Devon & CornwallNon-passenger train consisting of hauling locomotives derailed (two

vehicles) and continued on to block the line.

24/01/17Lewisham (Blackheath

Line)Kent DB Cargo (UK)

Freight train derailed (two wagons) and the rear three wagons

detached from the rest of the train.

20/03/17 East Somerset JcnWestern Thames

ValleyDB Cargo (UK)

Freight train derailed following an unsolicited brake application

(seven wagons).

4

3

Date Location Territory Train Operators Description

03/04/16 Plymouth Western Great Western Railway

Rear-end collision between two passenger trains in station. Train was

signalled onto platform without sufficient room to fully fit into the

platform.

17/08/16 Aberdeen Scotland UnknownCollision between locomotive and coaching stock during shunting

operation.

13/01/17 Gloucester Western Great Western RailwaySlow-speed collision between two passenger trains in station. Driver

accidentally selected reverse.

1


03/03/17 Edinburgh Waverley Scotland ScotRail Slow-speed collision between two ECS units in station.

3

2


21/06/16 Shrewsbury Western London MidlandPassenger train struck buffer stops due to driver's loss of

concentration.

28/03/17 Victoria (VC) Sussex Govia Thameslink Railway Passenger train struck buffer stops after failed detachment.

1


20/06/16 Nottingham London North Eastern East Midlands Trains ECS struck bufferstops in station due to uncoupling error.

Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossing (excl derailments) 3

3


15/06/16 Uphill Jcn Western Great Western RailwayPassenger train struck a motorcycle which had been intentionally left

on the line.

25/08/16 Crescent RoadLondon North

WesternMerseyrail

Passenger train struck a road vehicle which had been driven onto the

railway in error.

03/12/16 Cleghorn Scotland Virgin West CoastPassenger train struck a road vehicle which had been driven onto the

railway in error.

0

6

5

1

22

Non-Passenger

Derailments (excluding at level crossings)

Passenger

Non-Passenger

Collisions between trains

Passenger

Passenger

Non Passenger

Total number of train accidents in PHRTA categories

Buffer stop collisions

Passenger

Non-Passenger

Passenger

Trains struck by large falling objects

Collisions with road vehicles on level crossings

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


6.5 Trend in the number of train accidents within PHRTA categories

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from the PHRTA categories of train accident is 7.3 FWI per year. While

PHRTA categories comprise the types of train accident that typically have the greatest potential to

result in higher numbers of casualties, the majority result in few or no injuries. Conversely, a train

accident from a non-PHRTA category may have a serious consequence (albeit more rarely).

Chart 42. Trend in the numbers of PHRTAs

• In 2016/17, there were 22 events falling within the PHRTA categories of train accident. This is the

lowest number seen since 2010/11 and continues the improvement seen in the last two years.

• At six, the number of derailments is a reduction on the previous year’s total of 11. There were

two events involving passenger trains: one involved striking a landslide, while the other was due

to rotten sleepers and track out of gauge.

• There were four collisions between trains, three of which involved passenger trains. Three

occurred at low speed in stations. The fourth occurred during shunting operation.

• There were six collisions with road vehicles at level crossings, and three away from level

crossings. There were three RIDDOR-reportable buffer stop collisions.

4 6 4 6 5 6 6 4

20 16 20

8

13 16 11 16 116

43

3

34

3

8 2114

5

9 1010

7 46

42

49

42

18

33 3432

25 2522

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Acc

ide

nts

Trains striking road vehicles at level crossingsTrain struck by large falling objectTrains striking buffer stopsTrains running into road vehicles not at level crossings & no derailmentTrain derailments (excludes striking road vehicles on level crossings)Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


6.6 The Precursor Indicator Model

The PIM measures the underlying risk from the PHRTA categories of train accidents by tracking

changes in the occurrence of their accident precursors. It was first developed in 1999, and has been

subject to a series of modelling improvements over time.

The launch of SMIS on 6 March 2017 caused a break in continuity, which means it is not currently

possible for us to produce the full PIM. New SMIS will ultimately enable better monitoring. However,

more work and time is needed to create robust indicators from the data therein and to understand

how these indicators relate to train accident risk as measured in FWI. The full PIM was run up till 4

March 2017 and results presented in this section end at that date. RSSB is progressively working to

improve existing metrics to track train accident risk and develop new ones so that all themes of the

PIM can continue to be monitored, publishing results on a four-weekly basis.

The full PIM monitors train accident risk to passengers, workforce and members of the public such as

motorists on level crossings. The PIM value is an annual moving average, so it reflects precursors that

had occurred during the previous 12 months. It is normalised by train kilometres, to account for

changes in the level of activity on the railway.

The PIM used the basic equation

risk = frequency x consequence

Frequency estimates for each accident precursor are based on reported errors, faults and failures.

Consequence estimates are derived from the SRM. The SRM provides an estimate of the risk at a

particular point in time and the current version is 8.1, which was published in June 2014.

For some events, the PIM risk calculation also takes into account hazard rankings, which are assigned

to certain types of precursor events by technical specialists. The PIM uses risk ranking derived from

these to lend weight to the potentially most severe events. The risk from all precursors over the

previous 12 months is then summed and scaled to reflect the increased risk exposure due to

increases in rail traffic. The results are quoted as an estimate of FWI per year.

The full PIM monitors the risk from PHRTAs: train derailments; train collisions, including those with

other trains, buffer stops and road vehicles (both at and not at level crossings); trains struck by large

falling objects; and train explosions.

The precursors covered by the PIM can be arranged into various grouping schemas, depending on

the use to which the model was being applied. Whichever grouping is used for examining the results,

the underlying contributions from the precursor event types are unchanged and provide the same

total risk estimate.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


Comparing the PIM index with other measures of train accident risk

The different risk modelling tools should not be equated, even though FWI per year is the common

measurement unit. SRMv8.1 provides an estimate of 7.3 FWI per year for PHRTA category train

accidents (out of the 8.0 FWI per year for all categories of train accidents) based on long-term

monitoring of events and expert judgement. This includes some very rare scenarios which have a

chance of occurring but may not yet have done so, and hence the observed level of harm can often

be less than the modelled risk. The PIM uses understanding taken from the SRM as a baseline of its

risk knowledge and as such will give a closely aligned value at the points at the completion of each

SRM version’s assessment period.

Changes in the total number of RIDDOR-reportable accidents are unlikely to accurately reflect

changes in train accident risk, because many of them are relatively low-risk events. Although PHRTA

categories form a subset of train accidents with a typically higher average consequence, it is also

unlikely that changes in their overall frequency will be proportional to changes in risk.

Year-on-year changes can be difficult to interpret because factors such as the weather and chance

play a role. The following points should be borne in mind when considering the different indicators of

train accident risk:

• The SRM provides the most thorough assessment of train accident risk, but the train accident

part of the model is updated only every 18 months to two years.

• The PIM aims to provide an indication of changes to the risk from a particular set of train

accidents, by tracking frequently occurring precursors, and mapping frequencies to risk using

information on average consequences. Some components of the PIM are sensitive to a relatively

small number of incidents, and the available precursors may not always correlate directly with

the risk that they are being used to track.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Train accident risk broken down by PIM grouping structure

Chart 43 shows the modelled contribution to train accident risk from each PIM group, together with

the risk from non-PHRTA categories of train accidents, which were not covered by the PIM.

Chart 43. Train accident risk by PIM group and person type (SRMv8.1)

• While level crossings contribute most to overall risk, they have a relatively low impact on

passenger and workforce safety when compared to other PIM groups. Chapter 7 Level crossings

contains more detail on this risk area.

• The SRM shows that when grouping the risks in this way, the largest contribution to passenger

risk comes from events that are classed as infrastructure failures.

0.930.74 0.79

3.37

0.820.64 0.69

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

Infrastructurefailures

SPADs Infrastructureoperations

Level crossings Objects onthe line

Train operationsand failures

Not covered bythe PIM

SRM

mo

de

lled

ris

k (F

WI p

er

year

) Public

Workforce

Passenger

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in the PIM

Chart 44 shows the PIM's day to day estimates of the underlying risk from PHRTA category train

accidents from April 2010 to 4 March 2017. Due to the launch of SMIS on 6 March 2017 producing

the full PIM after 4 March 2017 is no longer possible. Prior to April 2010 the data used to create the

PIM was not sufficiently detailed to make daily estimates of the underlying risk. In the chart below,

the period prior to April 2010 is shown for illustrative purposes; while the overall PIM value across

this date is unchanged, there will be discontinuities in some of the groupings, because of the

limitations on data prior to April 2010.

Chart 44. Ten-year trend in the overall PIM – to March 4 2017

• As of March 4 2017, the PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was

6.4 FWI per year, compared with 6.1 FWI per year at the end of 2015/16.

• The PIM contribution related to level crossings increased from 2.1 FWI at the end of 2015/16 to

2.4 on March 4 2017. This was due mainly to increases in components associated with user

behaviour.

• The PIM contribution related to infrastructure operations reduced from 0.9 FWI at the end of

2015/16 to 0.7 FWI on 4 March 2017. This was due mainly to decreases in components

associated with operational incidents at level crossings.

• The PIM contribution from SPADs and adhesion increased from 0.7 FWI at the end of 2015/16 to

0.8 FWI on March 4 2017. The SPAD contribution in the PIM is based on a different methodology

than the SPAD risk ranking methodology.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in the PIM for passengers

The PIM can be split into layers describing the risk to passengers, the public, and workforce. The risk

to passengers is a key subset used when managing train accident risk, and is examined in more detail

here.

Chart 45 shows the trend in the overall PIM indicator (the topmost line), and trends in the

contribution of the PIM groups to passenger risk.

Chart 45. Ten-year trend in the PIM for passengers – to March 4 2017

• On March 4 2017, the passenger proportion of the PIM stood at 2.7 FWI per year, equal to the

2.7 FWI at the end of 2015/16.

• The greatest share of the risk to passengers (0.7 FWI per year) was from the infrastructure

failures group of categories. SPADs and infrastructure operations each contributed around

0.5 FWI per year.

Future of train accident precursor reporting

The launch of the Safety Management Intelligence System (SMIS) on 6th March caused a break in

continuity, which means it is currently not possible to produce the PIM. Whilst the new SMIS will

ultimately enable better monitoring more work and time is needed to create robust indicators from

the data therein and to understand how these indicators relate to train accident risk as measured in

FWI.

The work needed to create indicators from the data in new SMIS is underway. In the meantime RSSB

is taking a transitional approach that will ensure all areas of the PIM will, on an incrementally

increasing basis, continue to be monitored. As some risks vary seasonally, it will take at least 12

months to rebuild a robust and complete picture of train accident risk.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


SPADs

Historically, SPADs have been the cause of some of the most serious train accidents. The last fatal

accident due to a SPAD occurred at Ladbroke Grove in 1999, where 31 people lost their lives. The

industry subsequently focused much effort on reducing the risk from SPADs. An important strand of

work was the TPWS fitment programme, completed at the end of 2003. This was supplemented by a

wide range of other initiatives aimed at addressing signalling issues and improving driver

performance, including better driver selection, training and management.

A SPAD strategy group has been established, reporting to TARG, in order to examine in detail, the

current underlying causes of SPADs, to model their risk more effectively, and ultimately to develop

further countermeasures against them.

The estimated risk, labelled Underlying risk in Chart 46, is based on the number and characteristics of

SPADs that have occurred during the previous 12 months.

Chart 46. Trend in SPADs and SPAD risk

• There were 272 SPADs in 2016/17, compared with 282 during the previous year.

• At the end of 2016/17, SPAD risk stood at 45% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared

with 54% at the end of 2015/16.

• There were 7 SPADs with a ‘potentially severe’ risk ranking, which is one fewer than in 2015/16.

• Since TPWS was introduced, there have been several events where the driver has reset TPWS

and continued forward without the signaller’s authority. Although such events are relatively rare,

they are potentially serious because they negate the safety benefits of TPWS. There was one

TPWS reset and continue incident following a SPAD in 2016/17, which occurred at Bangor and

involved a passenger train.

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


6.7 Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train

operations

The types of activities considered under this area include the shunting or preparation of trains, and

ad-hoc and planned access of the track by train crew, for example to investigate a problem with a

train in running, or to change ends of a train.

Injuries during 2016/17

During 2016/17, there were:

• No workforce fatalities associated with train operations.

• Two major injuries: both involved train drivers alighting to the track.

• Fifty minor injuries: 39 were to drivers or other train crew, with 8 occurring to shunters, and

three occurring to train maintenance staff. The most frequent events were slips, trips and falls

(31), but also boarding and alighting injuries (8), contact with objects (5) and manual handling

injuries (4). In addition, one worker struck themselves with a spanner while maintaining a train,

and another fell unwell when working during a hot day.

Trend in workforce harm related to train operations

Chart 47 shows the trend in harm over the past 10 years. In that time, there haves been no fatalities.

The last fatality involved a train driver, who was electrocuted after coming into contact with the

conductor rail while investigating a problem with his train.

Chart 47. Workforce harm from personal accidents related to train operations

0.6

0.30.2

0.4 0.4 0.4

0.20.3

0.10.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2 0.2 0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.8

0.5

0.4

0.60.6

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.2

0.3

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________


6.8 Key safety statistics: train operations

Train accidents 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17


Passenger 0 0 0 0 0

Workforce 0 0 0 0 0

Public 6 2 2 0 2


Passenger 0 1 0 1 2

Workforce 0 1 0 1 0

Public 1 0 0 0 1


Passenger 19 54 7 28 78

Workforce 31 22 15 11 18

Public 2 2 1 2 1


Passenger 3 5 1 3 5

Workforce 34 34 18 14 22

Public 2 0 0 0 0

Fatalities and weighted injuries 6.40 2.56 2.13 0.36 2.64 Passenger 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.16 0.38

Workforce 0.23 0.32 0.11 0.20 0.15

Public 6.12 2.01 2.01 0.00 2.11

Workforce train operations 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 Fatalities 0 0 0 0 0

Contact with object or person 0 0 0 0 0

Boarding and alighting 0 0 0 0 0




Other accident 0 0 0 0 0


Contact with object or person 0 0 0 0 0

Boarding and alighting 1 0 0 1 2




Other accident 0 0 0 0 0


Class 1 13 11 13 8 12

Class 2 69 57 54 47 38


Class 1 0 0 1 0 0

Class 2 1 1 0 0 6


Contact with object or person 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01

Boarding and alighting 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.22


Struck by train 0 0 0 0.00 0

Electric shock 0 0 0.11 0.00 0

Other accident 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Train accidents 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 Total train accidents 693 636 635 609 549 PHRTA categories 34 32 25 25 22 Involving passenger trains 20 17 7 15 15 Collisions between trains 4 5 2 6 3

Derailments 7 0 0 3 2

Collisions with RVs not at LC 2 1 0 2 3

Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed) 7 8 5 3 5

Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed) 0 0 0 0 0

Striking buffer stops 0 3 0 1 2

Struck by large falling object 0 0 0 0 0

Not involving passenger trains 14 15 18 10 7 Collisions between trains 1 1 0 0 1


Collisions with RVs not at LC 1 0 0 1 0

Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed) 3 2 2 1 1

Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed) 0 0 0 0 0



Non-PHRTA categories 659 604 610 584 527 Involving passenger trains 561 524 556 509 470 Open door collisions 0 0 1 0 1

Roll back collisions 4 0 1 3 0

Striking animals 324 268 304 273 293

Struck by missiles 66 52 55 51 43

Train fires 40 31 34 37 43

Striking level crossing gates/barriers 1 5 3 3 1

Striking other objects 126 168 158 142 89

Not involving passenger trains 98 80 54 75 57 Open door collisions 0 0 0 0 0




Train fires 11 5 3 7 3



PIM precursors 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

2016/17 March 4

Total 7.95 7.64 6.70 6.13 6.40

Infrastructure failures 1.56 1.57 0.77 0.97 0.89

SPAD and adhesion 0.73 0.87 1.06 0.73 0.80

Infrastructure operations 0.84 0.87 1.06 0.85 0.73

Level crossings 3.29 2.80 2.44 2.11 2.37

Objects on the line 0.85 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.65

Train operations and failures 0.68 0.70 0.54 0.59 0.97

Passengers 3.30 3.38 2.81 2.67 2.69

Infrastructure failures 1.28 1.30 0.62 0.80 0.72

SPAD and adhesion 0.52 0.63 0.78 0.54 0.59

Infrastructure operations 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.52 0.48

Level crossings 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.18

Objects on the line 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.34 0.25


Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


PIM precursors: incident counts 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

2016/17 March 4

Track 1045 883 711 641 462

Broken fishplates 431 332 269 255 172

Broken rails 180 120 95 104 85

Buckled rails 10 19 14 9 7

Gauge faults 4 3 2 2 2

S&C faults 412 397 319 257 186

Twist and geometry faults 8 12 12 14 10

Structures 1570 1775 1766 1708 1604

Culvert failures 6 27 4 9 7

Overline bridge failures 14 31 26 31 13

Rail bridge failures 32 66 50 44 34

Retaining wall failures 5 7 6 10 6

Tunnel failures 8 11 7 6 3

Bridge strikes 1505 1633 1673 1608 1541

Earthworks 196 171 59 162 85

Embankment failures 56 39 21 46 20

Cutting failures 140 132 38 116 65

Signalling 8845 9094 8474 7535 7490

Signalling failures 8845 9094 8474 7535 7490

SPAD and adhesion 403 570 487 403 399

SPAD 248 290 302 274 246

Adhesion 155 280 185 129 153

Infrastructure operations 2978 2863 3329 3410 3163

Operating incidents - affecting level crossing 74 87 100 107 85

Operating incidents - objects foul of the line 306 276 701 680 698

Operating incidents - routing 2057 1989 2018 2122 1907

Operating incidents - signaller errors other than routing 19 18 24 29 28

Operating Incidents - track issues 157 128 121 106 107

Operating Incidents - Other issues 365 365 365 366 338

Level crossings 2101 1880 1796 1302 1186

LC failures (active automatic) 906 767 760 501 383

LC failures (passive) 1053 993 935 710 715

LC incidents due to weather (active automatic) 2 1 1 1 2

LC incidents due to weather (active manual) 4 5 4 1 2

LC incidents due to weather (passive) 1 1 0 2 0

Public behaviour (active automatic) 41 38 23 15 22

Public behaviour (active manual) 19 7 1 10 2

Public behaviour (passive) 75 68 72 62 60

Objects on the line 2358 2644 1824 2273 1777

Animals on the line 1667 1622 1298 1509 1423

Non-passenger trains running into trees 39 125 46 69 25

Passenger trains running into trees 232 551 237 334 143

Non-rail vehicles on the line 52 43 60 58 39

Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions 21 17 14 11 7

Passenger trains running into other obstructions 97 129 83 101 47

Non-passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 7 3 2 2 4

Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 20 33 27 36 28

Flooding 223 121 57 153 61

Train operations and failures 21 11 8 4 10

Rolling stock failures (brake/control) 19 6 5 1 3

Runaway trains 2 5 3 3 7

Train speeding (any approaching buffer stops) 12 14 10 13 21

Train speeding (non-passenger) 42 40 30 25 20

Train speeding (passenger) 81 105 81 113 78

Displaced or insecure loads 19 27 32 17 38

Non-passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 10 5 7 8 8

Passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 51 31 44 55 57

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


PIM precursors: risk contribution 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

2016/17 March 4

Track 0.463 0.526 0.298 0.311 0.244

Broken fishplates 0.033 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.010

Broken rails 0.049 0.030 0.022 0.022 0.020

Buckled rails 0.046 0.193 0.026 0.017 0.013

Gauge faults 0.071 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.012

S&C faults 0.191 0.133 0.055 0.052 0.035

Twist and geometry faults 0.073 0.138 0.167 0.197 0.153 Structures 0.127 0.219 0.152 0.159 0.141

Culvert failures 0.007 0.025 0.001 0.010 0.007

Overline bridge failures 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.007

Rail bridge failures 0.062 0.143 0.101 0.097 0.096

Retaining wall failures 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.006

Tunnel failures 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000

Bridge strikes 0.038 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.024 Earthworks 0.832 0.673 0.173 0.367 0.260

Embankment failures 0.158 0.057 0.018 0.045 0.017

Cutting failures 0.674 0.617 0.154 0.322 0.243 Signalling 0.133 0.155 0.140 0.126 0.136

Signalling failures 0.133 0.155 0.140 0.126 0.136 SPAD and adhesion 0.729 0.878 1.053 0.719 0.784

SPAD 0.692 0.815 1.011 0.690 0.750

Adhesion 0.038 0.063 0.042 0.029 0.034 Infrastructure operations 0.841 0.900 1.044 0.847 0.671

Operating incidents - affecting level crossing 0.412 0.436 0.334 0.331 0.179

Operating incidents - objects foul of the line 0.052 0.045 0.265 0.137 0.110

Operating incidents - routing 0.028 0.081 0.139 0.122 0.092

Operating incidents - signaller errors other than routing 0.028 0.028 0.045 0.007 0.036

Operating Incidents - track issues 0.083 0.077 0.032 0.020 0.042

Operating Incidents - Other issues 0.237 0.233 0.230 0.230 0.213 Level crossings 3.291 2.808 2.432 2.091 2.273

LC failures (active automatic) 0.042 0.035 0.027 0.018 0.013

LC failures (passive) 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.010

LC incidents due to weather (active automatic) 0.104 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066

LC incidents due to weather (active manual) 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.004

LC incidents due to weather (passive) 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000

Public behaviour (active automatic) 1.435 1.488 0.919 0.600 0.879

Public behaviour (active manual) 0.257 0.075 0.009 0.093 0.019

Public behaviour (passive) 1.391 1.116 1.390 1.275 1.281 Objects on the line 0.847 0.800 0.831 0.865 0.567

Animals on the line 0.032 0.029 0.022 0.025 0.024

Non-passenger trains running into trees 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001

Passenger trains running into trees 0.125 0.154 0.064 0.091 0.039

Non-rail vehicles on the line 0.539 0.426 0.590 0.571 0.384

Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000

Passenger trains running into other obstructions 0.084 0.103 0.069 0.084 0.039

Non-passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 0.013 0.027 0.024 0.032 0.025

Flooding 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Large Falling Objects 0.052 0.056 0.060 0.060 0.055


Rolling stock failures (brake/control) 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.006

Runaway trains 0.195 0.410 0.215 0.215 0.501

Train speeding (any approaching buffer stops) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Train speeding (non-passenger) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003

Train speeding (passenger) 0.022 0.035 0.027 0.038 0.026

Displaced or insecure loads 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.011 0.024

Non-passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 0.091 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.046

Passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 0.263 0.128 0.152 0.191 0.197

Train Explosions 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.068

Train operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________



Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7 Level crossings

This chapter covers the risk related to level crossings. The SRM modelled risk of 11.4 FWI per year

falls within the remit of the Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG) and comprises 8% of the total

mainline system FWI risk. The majority of risk is borne by members of the public with most

casualties occurring to road vehicle13 occupants and pedestrians. Network Rail continues to put

significant resource into reducing the risk at level crossings.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were six fatalities at level crossing during 2016/17, four were pedestrian users and two

were road vehicle users. The overall level of harm at level crossings was 6.8 FWI, compared with

4.7 FWI for 2015/16.

• At six, the number of train collisions with vehicles at level crossings saw an increase compared to

the four in 2015/16. The number of such accidents is relatively low, and shows some variability,

but the generally lower numbers over the duration of CP4 are reflective of an improvement in

level crossing risk. This is supported by a reducing trend in the recorded number of near misses

with road vehicles at level crossings.

• Improving level crossing safety is a major focus for the industry. Network Rail is implementing

further safety improvements during CP5, which runs from April 2014 to March 2019, and which

build upon the 31% reduction in level crossing risk achieved during the course of CP4. At the end

of 2016/17 Network Rail’s LCRIM model, which tracks changes in the aggregate risk at level

crossings, stood at 11.8 FWI, compared with 12.3 FWI at the end of 2015/16.

• Most level crossing risk arises from user behaviour, but recent reports and incidents have also

highlighted factors related to crossing design and signaller error. See Chapter 10 of the LOEAR for

more details.

Level crossing performance at a glance


13 The term road vehicle is used in this report to describe a range of vehicles, including farm machinery, motorcycles and off-road vehicles such as quad bikes. It does not include pedal cycles, whose users are grouped with pedestrians.

Level crossing risk (11.4 FWI;

8%)


(128.2 FWI; 92%)

10.9

13.214.0

7.4

5.2

9.9 9.8

11.8

4.7

6.8

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

20

07

/08

20

08

/09

20

09

/10

20

10

/11

20

11

/12

20

12

/13

20

13

/14

20

14

/15

20

15

/16

20

16

/17

FWI

Weighted injuries

Fatalities

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7.1 Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2016/17

Fatalities

• Excluding suicides and suspected suicides, six people (four pedestrians and two road vehicle

occupants) died in accidents at level crossings in 2016/17. RAIB have initiated an investigation

into the incident shown in italics.

Major injuries

• There were six major injuries at level crossings in 2016/17. Two were slips, trips and falls, two

involved members of the public striking or being struck by level crossing barriers, one was a

member of the public struck by a train, and one was the driver of a tractor that was struck by a

train.

Minor injuries

• There were 77 reported minor injuries, most of which resulted from falls or being struck by

crossing equipment. Twenty-five of the reported minor injuries were to the passengers of the

train that struck a tractor, this event also resulted in a major injury which is reported in the

above section.

Shock & trauma

• There were 39 reports of shock or trauma, mostly affecting train drivers involved in accidents or

near misses.

Fatalities at level crossings in 2016/17


05/10/2016 Bentley station

(Hampshire) South East Footpath


09/11/2016 Old Stoke Road

(Buckinghamshire) London North Western Footpath


03/01/2017 Marston



07/02/2017 Frampton




London North Western UWC An elderly female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing.


South East Footpath A female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing, the female’s companion crossed without incident.

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Collisions between trains and road vehicles

• There were six collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings during the year, two

of which resulted in fatality.

Trains striking level crossing gates or barriers

Usually, trains strike barriers only when a previous incident, such as a road traffic accident, has

caused the barrier to be foul of the line immediately prior to the train’s arrival. Crossing gates may be

struck when high winds cause them to blow open, either due to defective clasps or users failing to

close or secure them properly after passing.

• There were two instances of trains striking level crossing gates in 2016/17, and no occasions

where barriers were struck. None of the collisions resulted in injury.

Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings in 2016/17


10/04/2016 Hockham Road

(Norfolk) South East UWC-T

A passenger train struck a tractor at Hockham Road level crossing. 27 injuries were sustained, including a major injury sustained by the tractor driver.

27/05/2016 Fishguard Harbour (Pembrokeshire)

Western AOCL

A passenger train struck a lorry at Fishguard Harbour Automatic Open level crossing. The train driver reported shock / trauma as a result of the incident.

12/08/2016 Waterbeach

(Cambridgeshire) South East UWC-T

A passenger train struck a road vehicle at Nairns No 117 user worked crossing. There were two injuries reported as a result of this incident.

07/10/2016 Kingmoor (Cumbria)

London North Western OC

A non-passenger train struck a tipper truck at Virtual Quarry Open Crossing. There were no injuries reported as a result of the incident.

03/01/2017 Marston


The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a passenger train struck the vehicle on the crossing. The road vehicle swerved around closed automatic half barriers.

07/02/2017 Frampton


The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a passenger train struck the vehicle on the crossing.

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7.2 Types of level crossings

Level crossings vary in the level of protection they offer. There are two broad groups:

• Passive crossings: where no warning of a train’s approach is given other than by the train driver

who may use the train horn. The onus is on the road user or pedestrian to determine whether or

not it is safe to cross the line. Instructions for proper use must be provided at each location,

along with other appropriate signage.

• Active crossings: where the road vehicle or pedestrian is warned of the approach of a train

through closure of gates or barriers and/or by warning lights and/or alarms. The operation of an

active crossing can either be automatic (eg barriers that are raised and lowered automatically) or

manual, where a rail operator will work the crossing protection.

An illustrated guide to the different level crossing types may be found in Appendix 4.

• Generally, automatic barrier and manually controlled crossings (including those monitored by

CCTV) are installed on public roads with high levels of traffic.

• Automatic half-barrier crossings, which cause less disruption to road traffic for each train

traverse, also tend to be heavily used and, compared with manually controlled crossings, have a

relatively high average risk per crossing. Automatic open crossings, which have lights but no

barriers, have a higher average risk from collisions with road vehicles.

• Passive crossings for road vehicles are generally used in rural areas. These crossings tend to be

either on private roads, for example to provide access between a farm and fields, or on roads

that provide access to a farm. In general, user-worked crossings (UWCs) tend to be comparatively

high-risk relative to the volume of traffic passing over them.

Level crossing categories by class and type (June 2017)

Source: Network Rail (ALCRM), June 2017

Number

UWC-T User-worked crossing with telephone 1677

UWC User-worked crossing 456

OC Open crossing 47

FP Footpath crossing 2063

MCG Manually controlled gate 143

MCB Manually controlled barrier 167

MCB-OD Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection 90

MCB-CCTV MCB monitored by closed-circuit television 426

AHB Automatic half-barrier 431

ABCL Automatic barrier locally monitored 57

AOCL-B Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barrier 66

AOCL/R Automatic open crossing locally or remotely monitored 31

UWC-MWL User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights 106

FP-MWL Footpath crossing with miniature warning lights 127

5887Total

Crossing type

Pas

sive

Act

ive

Man

ual

Au

tom

atic

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


• Crossings that are not designed for vehicles are grouped under the single category of footpath

crossings for the purposes of this report, because detailed information about them is not well

captured in incident reports. The category also includes bridleway crossings and barrow

crossings.

7.3 Trend in harm at level crossings

Most of the harm at level crossings arises from pedestrians, cyclists and road vehicles being struck by

trains. Some people are also injured each year as a result of slips, trips and falls, or striking, or being

struck by, crossing barriers.

Chart 48. Harm at level crossings (excluding suicides)

• The total level of harm at level crossings in 2016/17 showed an increase of 2.1 FWI compared

with the previous year. Despite the increase, the overall harm was still notably lower compared

with the ten-year average of 9.4 FWI per year.

• Level crossing harm tends to be dominated by a relatively small number of fatalities, so figures

from a single year should be interpreted with caution. The relatively small number of fatal events

makes it difficult to identify trends in harm. However, there is evidence of improvement in

safety: the annual average level of harm since 2010/11 has been notably lower than for previous

years. Other indicators, such as collisions and near misses with road vehicles, also point towards

safety improvement, as does the output of Network Rails Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model

(LCRIM). The other indicators are reviewed later in this chapter.

10

1213

6

4

9 9

11

4

6

10.9

13.2

14.0

7.4

5.2

9.9 9.8

11.8

4.7

6.8

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock & trauma Minor injuries

Major injuries Fatalities

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Level crossing fatalities

The 10 years to March 2017 have seen 84 fatalities on level crossings, excluding suicides. This figure

comprises 65 pedestrians (including two passengers using station crossings) and 19 road vehicle

users.

The last level crossing accident resulting in train occupant fatalities occurred at Ufton in 2004, when

a passenger train derailed after striking a car that had been deliberately parked on the crossing by its

driver, as a suicidal act. The train driver and five passengers were killed, in addition to the car driver.

Chart 49. Fatalities at level crossings

• Over the period shown, 75% of fatalities at level crossings have been public pedestrians

struck by trains.

Suicide

Suicides are not included in the statistics in this chapter, but are covered in Chapter 9 Suicide; since

April 2007, around 10% of railway suicides have taken place at level crossings. The number of

suicides recorded at level crossings saw an increase in 2016/17 compared to the previous year. The

number reported in 2015/16 was the lowest in the ten-year period shown.

810

86

3 4

79

4 4

2 5

1

5

2

2

2

2

10

1213

6

4

9 9

11

4

6

0

4

8

12

16

20

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fata

liti

es

Passenger pedestrian struck by train on station crossing

Road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains

Public pedestrian struck by train

Suicides and suspected suicides at level crossings

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Pedestrian 20 22 32 26 25 25 35 29 11 21

Road vehicle occupant 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 20 23 33 26 25 25 35 29 11 21

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7.4 Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings

Historically, most collisions at level crossings have occurred on AHBs, AOCLs and UWCs. The

proportion of collisions that result in a fatality varies by crossing type, reflecting factors such as

differences in train speed. For example, many AHBs are situated on faster lines and, as a result,

collisions with road vehicles are more likely to result in fatalities to road vehicle occupants.

Chart 50. Train accidents at level crossings and other locations

• At six, the number of train collisions with vehicles at level crossings saw an increase in 2016/17

when compared to the previous year. Despite the increase the number of accidents remained

low when compared to the past ten years. The number of such accidents is relatively low, and

shows quite some variability but the generally lower numbers are reflective of an improvement

in level crossing risk; the ten-year average for these accidents is 32 per year.

8

21

14

59 10 10

74 6

34

28

28

13

24 24 22

1821 16

42

49

42

18

33 3432

25 25

22

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Nu

mb

er

of

inci

de

nts

Other location

Level crossing

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7.5 Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians

Due to the relatively small number of accidents at level crossings, it is hard to monitor trends and

identify patterns from accident data alone. The industry also collects data on near misses. Near

misses are typically reported by train drivers who feel that they have had to take action to avoid a

collision, or that they came close to striking a road vehicle or pedestrian. Near miss reporting is

necessarily subjective, and is likely to be influenced by factors such as the ease of making a report

and its perceived effect. It is also likely that many near misses go unobserved due to prevailing light

and visibility conditions.

Near misses with road vehicles

Chart 51. Trend in reported near misses with road vehicles

• The number of near miss reports in 2016/17 increased from the previous year. However, there

still appears to be a long-term downward trend in near misses with road vehicles; the quarterly

average over the period shown is 35 near misses.

• There is clear seasonality in near miss reporting, with a higher incidence in spring and summer.

This may be due to heavier traffic (particularly on farm crossings around the times of haymaking

and harvest), and train drivers may be more likely to identify that a near miss has occurred

during daylight hours.

• Other seasonal factors that affect level crossing risk include ice and snow and sunlight, which can

make it harder for the motorist to see warning lights.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Ne

ar m

isse

s

Near misses

Annual moving average

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists

Chart 52. Trend in reported near misses with pedestrians and cyclists

• There appears to be a slight upward trend in the number of reported near misses with

pedestrians and cyclists. Q2 of 2016/17 showed the highest number of reported near miss

incidents in the 10-year reporting period.

• As with road vehicle near misses, reporting is seasonal. It is likely that there are more pedestrians

and cyclists using level crossings during spring and summer when the weather tends to be better,

and, as with road vehicle near misses, train drivers are more likely to see crossing users during

daylight hours.

• Around 12% of the near misses shown in the chart involve cyclists.

• A qualitative review of accident data suggests that dog walkers may be particularly vulnerable to

accidents at level crossings. Around 14% of near misses over the past ten years have mentioned

a person walking a dog, and a number of fatal incidents during the same period have related to

dogs running onto the line. In July 2015, Network Rail launched a new campaign in partnership

with Dogs Trust, urging people to keep their dogs on a lead near level crossings.

• Auditory distractions, such as personal stereos, also have the potential to increase the risk to

level crossing users and have been mentioned in relation to a number of events over recent

years.

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

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Near misses

Annual moving average

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


7.6 Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings

Continuously improving level crossing safety remains a major focus for Network Rail, working in

partnership with others in the rail industry. Level crossing safety is a core element of the industry

safety strategy Leading Health and Safety on Britain’s Railway. The cross-industry Level Crossing

Strategy Group provides direction and supports change.

Network Rail has continued to invest in level crossing safety in Control Period 5 (CP5) through a ring-

fenced fund. Crossing closures remain the key measure in safeguarding public safety. New

technology is now also more widely used to reduce risk and further solutions are being developed.

Investment in level crossing safety will exceed £230m by the end of the current control period with

further investment plans being prepared for CP6.

Among the safety initiatives delivered and planned are:

• The 100+ dedicated Level Crossing Managers continue to support sustained improvement in level

crossing safety through engagement with users, asset inspection and risk assessment. Their

subject matter expertise, local knowledge and focus on stakeholder engagement, which includes

building relationships with authorised users and wider local communities, improves capability to

understand and target risks. The experience and maturity of the organisation, underpinned by

enhanced guidance and policy, has enabled a truly balanced qualitative and quantitative risk

management approach to level crossing safety.

• Continuous improvement is not limited to investment in people; it also extends to understanding

level crossing risk. Improved census data has led to better intelligence about users of level

crossings. Consequently, this knowledge has increased accuracy in risk assessments and enabled

better targeting of risk reduction measures. Narrative risk assessments, which blend the

quantitative risk model output with the qualitative structured judgement of the Level Crossing

Manager, have succeeded as a catalyst for safety improvement, embracing the local environment

and user behaviours in risk judgements.

• Network Rail continues to improve safety through design during asset renewals, but the number

of CP5 renewals is now smaller than originally planned.

• 264 legal closures have been achieved during the first three years of the control period. A further

20 crossings were also reduced in status to reduce risk and improve safety. This takes the total

number of crossings closed since the start of CP4 (April 2009) to 1068.

• The Transport and Works Act order process is being piloted as a more strategic approach to

reducing level crossing risk. This approach takes account of multiple level crossings, other

transport systems and rights of way requirements to deliver greater public safety benefits.

• Analysis of the effectiveness of the half-barrier overlay systems, installed at 66 automatic open

level crossings across the network, has proved very encouraging. Using incident data spanning a

four-year period and accounting for enforcement after installation, the data has demonstrated

that near miss events involving vehicles and pedestrians have decreased by 64% overall. For

vehicles alone, this is extended to a 100% success rate. Train and road vehicle collisions have also

successfully reduced from three events before installation to none afterwards.

• Significant progress has been made in the management of risk at footpath crossings protected by

whistle boards. Work to assess the effectiveness of whistle boards, optimise whistle board

positioning or provide alternative controls has concluded. Network Rail has also worked in

collaboration with RSSB, industry partners and the ORR to adjust the quiet period when Drivers

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


are instructed not to sound train horns. Shaving the shoulder hours off the quiet period, but

preserving a full six hours, now 00:00 to 06:00, better reflects patterns of level crossing use and

increases user safety. The challenge for the rail industry remains how to manage safety where

crossings are used during the hours which train Drivers are instructed not to sound train horns

except in emergencies.

• Further progress has been made in the deployment of supplementary audible warning devices at

footpath level crossings protected by whistle boards. The technology uses radar equipment to

detect approaching trains and wayside horns to provide a localised audible warning at the

crossing. 56 level crossings are now equipped with this technology across the network.

• Deployment of overlay miniature stop light (MSL) systems has continued. The systems, which

provide an alternative to conventional but more expensive MSL solutions, warn users of

approaching trains by providing a red light and audible warning at passive crossings. There are

now 23 overlay systems in operation with more programmed for delivery in CP5.

• The number of locations permanently equipped with red light safety equipment (RLSE) stands at

28. RLSE is a camera system with Home Office Type Approved (HOTA) number plate recognition

technology. The equipment is designed to promote safe behaviour and deter red light running,

barrier weaving or other risk-taking activity. Recording and analysing pre- and post- installation

behaviour is underway. The findings will help to quantify the safety benefits of RLSE and help to

shape decisions about future investment in the technology. Early data is encouraging and

reoffending rates are very low.

• The fleet of mobile safety vehicles, managed in partnership with the British Transport Police

(BTP), continues to promote safety awareness and target locations of poor user behaviour and

risk taking. The driver education programme remains an effective tool in reducing reoffending

rates.

• Network Rail’s long-term vision-led level crossing safety strategy ‘Transforming Level Crossings’

which sets the direction of the company’s level crossing risk reduction, is being used to shape the

CP6 bidding process. The strategy is endorsed by key stakeholders and industry partners

including the industry’s regulatory body the Office of Rail and Road (ORR).

• Innovation technology is being further embraced by the industry to improve level crossing safety.

Network Rail is developing automatic full barrier level crossing technology using obstacle

detection systems and is also seeking innovation from suppliers to provide lower cost user based

warning systems which meet recognised safety integrity levels. Next generation obstacle

detection systems are also being procured.

• Network Rail and RSSB have concluded research paper T936 which directed improvements to the

algorithms which underpin the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM). Network Rail is now

embarked on a programme of work to implement the revised algorithms into an enhanced

version of the tool, taking opportunities to improve interdependent links where possible. The

improvements to the algorithms increase accuracy in risk modelling and facilitate alignment with

RSSB’s safety risk model (SRM) to enable ease of calibration.

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


• Safety awareness campaigns which are targeted toward educating specific user groups and/or

feature specific crossing types are demonstrating success. The Keep a Clear Head awareness

campaign launched in December 2016 yielded a down-turn in alcohol related events compared

to previous years. Education is an important tool and Network Rail continues to work

collaboratively with partners across the globe through the International Level Crossing

Awareness Day (ILCAD) community. Specific campaigns are run in partnership with many

organisations to reach those at risk and help change awareness and behaviours.

Level crossings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Network Rail level crossing risk tools

Network Rail uses the All Level Crossing Risk Model (ALCRM) within its wider level crossing risk

management process. ALCRM supports the structured expert judgment of Level Crossing Managers.

Together with the qualitative narrative risk assessment, the risk model enables a balanced

assessment of risk. ALCRM is used to:

• Quantitatively calculate safety risks for each level crossing on the network. Calculations are

influenced by features such as usage, road speeds and layout, numbers and speeds of trains and

the level of protection provided at the crossing.

• Model the safety benefits of risk reduction schemes and support decision making regarding the

appropriateness of solutions, prioritisation of schemes and the targeting of control measures.

• Support cost-benefit analyses of risk control measures to help maximise expenditure and risk

reduction.

In addition, Network Rail developed a Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model (LCRIM) to track changes in

the aggregate risk at level crossings.

Chart 53 shows the LCRIM and the progress made during CP4 (12.6 FWI) and the current figure of

11.8 FWI at the end of 2016/17.

Chart 53. Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model – FWI benefit

Data source: Network Rail

• The LCRIM uses data from ALCRM and is updated at each of the 13 reporting periods within the

financial year.

• The safety benefits associated with the delivery of level crossing risk reduction initiatives and

crossing closures are calculated within ALCRM and are reflected within the output of the LCRIM.

There has been some fluctuation in the overall risk as a result of improved census intelligence

and increased road and rail traffic.

18.3 FWI

12.6 FWI

12.8 FWI

12.3 FWI

11.8 FWI

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Level crossings

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7.7 Key safety statistics: level crossings

Level crossings 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fatalities at LC (level crossings) 9 9 11 4 6

Pedestrians 4 7 9 4 4

Passenger on station crossing 0 0 0 0 0

Member of public 4 7 9 4 4

Road vehicle occupants 5 2 2 0 2

Train occupants 0 0 0 0 0

Passenger on train 0 0 0 0 0

Workforce on train 0 0 0 0 0

Weighted injuries at LC 0.92 0.78 0.76 0.68 0.84

Pedestrians 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.62 0.61

Road vehicle occupants 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11

Train occupants 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.12


Collisions with road vehicles at LC 10 10 7 4 6

Resulting in derailment 0 0 0 0 0

Collisions with gates or barriers at LC

2 5 4 3 2

Gates 2 2 4 3 2

Barriers 0 3 0 0 0

Reported near misses 440 410 380 385 411

With pedestrians 295 279 277 296 313

With road vehicles 145 131 103 89 98

Suicide and attempted suicide 25.216 35.22 29.1 11.221 21.215

Suicide 25 35 29 11 21

Attempted suicide 0.216 0.22 0.1 0.221 0.215

Trespass

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


8 Trespass

We categorise incidents as trespass if they involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are

as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. Such behaviour includes deliberately alighting a

train in running (other than as part of a controlled evacuation procedure), and getting down from the

platform to the tracks, for example to retrieve an item that has been dropped. An exception to the

rule of classing the deliberate access of a prohibited area as trespass is at level crossings. This is

because level crossings are areas of the railway that are legitimately accessible by people for most of

the time.

The trespass category is limited to events where the person involved did not intend to cause harm to

themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried risk, and so it excludes people who access the

railway to take their life: these events are analysed in Chapter 9 Suicide.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were 27 trespass fatalities recorded in 2016/17 compared with 32 recorded in 2015/16.

Since 2009/10, when improvements in classification of suicide and trespass fatalities occurred,

the average number of trespass fatalities has been 31.3 per year.

• Over the past ten years, around 38% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the

approximately 62% that have occurred in other locations, the majority of these have occurred on

the running line. The proportion of trespass fatalities in stations for 2016/17 was lower, at 26%

(seven fatalities).

Trespass at a glance


Risk from trespass (33.4

FWI; 24%)


(106.2 FWI; 76%)

54.748.3

44.0

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41.636.9

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Weighted injuries

Fatalities

Trespass

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8.1 Trespass risk profile by event type

The breakdown of trespasser risk in Chart 54 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore represents the

modelled estimate of the underlying risk to trespassers.

The risk to trespassers is dominated by fatality risk, with weighted injuries accounting for a very small

part of the FWI total. This is partly because non-fatal injuries to the trespassers are less likely to be

reported to rail companies, and partly because the hazards that account for most of the risk (in

particular, being struck by trains) are more likely to result in fatality than injury.

Chart 54. Trespass risk by accident type

Source: SRMv8.1

• The main source of risk arising during trespass is being struck by a train, which accounts for

around 70% of the total risk from trespass.

• Electric shock accounts for 15% of total trespass risk and falls from height account for 10%.

• Around 3% of trespass risk involves people deliberately exiting a train in running or sustaining

injuries while ‘train-surfing’.

• The remaining category, Other, comprises around 2% of the total risk to the trespassers, and

covers events such as slips, trips and falls in areas of the railway, away from the running line.

0.6

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Other

Train surfing

Jump from train in service

Fall from height

Electric shock

Struck by train

SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)

Fatalities

Major injuries

Minor injuries

Shock and trauma

Trespass

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


8.2 Trend in harm to trespassers

From 2014/15 onwards, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to trespass and

suicide has been made available by BTP to the industry through the enhanced co-operation taking

place across the industry. A specific team was established within BTP, and has worked with Network

Rail and RSSB to look at classification of fatalities. As part of this partnership, BTP have been able to

share more information on railway fatalities as far back as 2009/10. This enabled the industry to

review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdict has not yet been returned, or was recorded as

open or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria. An outcome of this increased

data sharing is that while trespass and suicide data should be more accurate over the past eight

years, the analysis of separate trends in trespass and across the decade as a whole cannot be done

on a consistent basis. The same limitations apply to trends in suicide.

Chart 55. Trend in trespasser FWI by injury degree

• At 27, the number of trespasser fatalities recorded in 2016/17 was lower than the number seen

last year, and below average compared with the level of fatalities seen since 2009/10, when the

improvements in classification occurred.

• The trend in reported trespass, which

shows a clear seasonal variation, had been

generally stable over the period 2010/11 to

2013/14. From the middle of 2014/15

onwards, an increasing trend has been

seen.

52

4542

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Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities

Improved classification of trespass fatalities

Chart 56. Trend in reported trespass

Trespass

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_________________________________________________________________


8.3 Key safety statistics: trespass

Trespass 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17



Fall (including from height) 1 2 3 3 1

Jump from train in service 0 2 0 0 0


Train surfing 0 0 0 0 0




Fall (including from height) 16 14 9 12 9

Jump from train in service 1 0 0 1 0


Train surfing 1 0 1 1 0



Class 1 22 12 19 24 21

Class 2 10 9 7 15 10


Class 1 1 1 1 1 0

Class 2 0 0 0 1 1


Electric shock 5.01 3.61 6.51 3.43 1.42

Fall (including from height) 2.68 3.45 3.98 4.29 1.95

Jump from train in service 0.12 2.00 0.00 0.10 0.00

Struck by train 27.92 17.51 18.51 26.41 25.43

Train surfing 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00

Other accidents 1.10 1.10 0.00 0.01 0.02

Suicide

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_________________________________________________________________


9 Suicide

When categorising fatalities, it is important to try to distinguish between suicides and accidental

deaths, because the means of addressing these issues will be different. The criteria that the railway

uses to differentiate between suicides and accidental fatalities are explained in Section 9.1 and

Appendix 3.

Any passengers, members of the public, or members of the workforce who take their life are

included in the analysis in this section.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were 237 incidents of suicide or suspected suicide recorded for 2016/17, compared with

251 recorded for 2015/16 and the 287 recorded for 2014/15.

• Around 28% of suicidal acts did not result in fatality during 2016/17 with 93 people carrying out

non-completed suicide acts. In these cases, many people are left with life-changing injuries.

• Nearly all suicide-related events result in shock or trauma for members of the workforce who are

directly involved in the event. Each member of the workforce will react differently to being

involved in a suicide-related event; for all it will be upsetting, but for some it may result in severe

post-traumatic stress and affect their ability to return to their former role.

• Rail Industry partners - including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions,

BTP, Samaritans, and RSSB - have been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the

railway and to support anyone involved in a railway suicide after an incident. In 2015 the

contractual partnership agreement between Samaritans and Network Rail was renewed for

another five years. By the end of 2016/17, over 14,500 frontline railway personnel had been

trained on how to intervene in suicide attempts and there have been outreach working meetings

taking place between priority locations and Samaritans branches across the country. In addition,

around 1,575 personnel have had Trauma Support Training.

Suicide at a glance


Suicide (non-accidental: 244.1 FWI)

Third-party risk from suicide

(accidental risk: 1.2 FWI;

1% )


(138.4 FWI; 99%)

207

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FWI

Fatalities Major Minor Shock/trauma

Suicide

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_________________________________________________________________


9.1 Classification of fatalities

For the rail industry, determining whether a fatality was accidental or suicide is straightforward

where a coroner’s inquest has been held, and a verdict reaching either of those two conclusions has

been returned. Where the coroner has yet to return a verdict, or returns an open or narrative

verdict, some judgement must be applied.

Most coroners’ reports take around six months to complete, and some verdicts are not returned until

several years after the event. A coroner will then only return a suicide verdict if there is evidence that

shows beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased intended to take his or her own life. If the cause

of death cannot be confirmed to this extent, an open or narrative verdict will be returned. In these

cases, and those where the inquest is still awaited, the industry applies rules known as the

Ovenstone criteria (see Appendix 3) to determine on the balance of probability, whether a fatality

was the result of an accident or suicide. The decision is based on all the information available, which

might include evidence gathered by the local Network Rail manager and/or BTP. This approach

enables the industry to develop, implement and monitor appropriate preventative measures

applicable to the separate issues of suicide and trespass. Fatalities that have been judged by the

industry to have been suicides, but have not been classed as such by the coroner, are referred to as

suspected suicides.

To ensure that statistics are as accurate as possible, the classification of suicide and accidental

fatalities is reviewed and reclassified on an on-going basis. Work is currently taking place to review

previous years’ open/narrative events, in the light of increased information from BTP, as well as the

availability of coroners’ reports.

Through enhanced co-operation taking place within the industry, BTP have been able to share more

information on railway fatalities, going back as far as 2009/10. This has enabled the industry to

review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdicts are not yet returned, or are recorded as open

or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria. An outcome of this increased data

sharing is that there is a discontinuity in the charts in this chapter, and also Chapter 8 Trespass;

classifications up to and including 2008/09 have been based on a reduced amount of information.

This means that trespass figures for years prior to 2009/10 may be overestimates of the true level,

while suicide figures may be underestimates. Caution must therefore be taken in comparing the last

seven years with the first three years of the last decade.

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


9.2 Trend in suicide fatalities

Chart 57 presents the trend in harm from suicide and suspected suicide for the past 10 years. The

dark bars represent the number of events with a coroner’s confirmed verdict. The light bars

represent the number of verdicts that were open, narrative, or not yet returned, which are currently

classed as suspected suicide, based on application of the Ovenstone criteria.

The discontinuity resulting from greater information being available from 2009/10 onwards is

reflected in the chart. Later years have greater proportions of unconfirmed categorisations, while

coroners’ inquests or verdicts are still awaited.

Chart 57. Trend in suicide fatalities and weighted injuries

Note: For 2009/10 onwards, the classification of open, narrative and unreturned coroners’ verdicts has based on an improved amount of information.

• Given the proportion of cases that are

open, narrative or unreturned, which is

where judgement needs to be applied,

it is useful to look at the trend in

trespass and suicide fatalities as a

whole.

• Chart 58 shows that although up to

2014/15 there has been a generally

increasing trend in fatalities due to

trespass or suicide, numbers have

reduced since.

Chart 58. Trend in trespass and suicide fatalities

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Suicide attempts and workforce harm

When a suicide attempt takes place on the railway, the effects are not limited to the person carrying

out the attempt. As well as the emotional effect on any family or friends of the person, people

witnessing the event may well be traumatised.

Chart 59. Trends in suicide and workforce shock/trauma

• At 330, the number of suicides and attempted suicides during 2016/17 was an increase on the

322 occurring last year, and above average for the decade as a whole. Around 28% of suicide

attempts did not result in fatality during 2016/17; some people were left to face life with serious

and debilitating injuries.

• Chart 59 also shows the associated trend in the number of shock or trauma events experienced

by the workforce in relation to suicide events; Chart 60 presents the information in FWI format.

Each member of the workforce will react differently to being involved in a suicide-related event;

for all it will be upsetting, but for some it may result in severe post-traumatic stress and affect

their ability to return to their former role. Chart 61 shows the time lost by the workforce who

have had the traumatic experience of being involved in a suicide incident. Around 50% of people

return within four weeks of the incident, and around 75% have returned within eight weeks.

Chart 60. Workforce harm caused by

suicide-related events

Chart 61. Workforce time lost due to suicide

207 220 243209

250 245275 287

251 237

3852

4051

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245272 283

260

294 296

355 345322 330

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2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

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Non-fatal injuries from attempted suicide

Suicide fatalities

Workforce shock trauma

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trends in harm from attempted suicide

Chart 62. Trends in harm from attempted suicide

• There were 93 non-fatal injuries from attempted suicide recorded in 2016/17, the highest level

over the reporting period. Of these, 47 were major injuries.

• The total number of suicides in 2016/17 was 237, since 2007/08 only three years have had lower

totals.

• When including unsuccessful suicide attempts, 2016/17 has the third highest total over the

decade.

• The increased number of injuries and the generally higher levels of suicide fatalities over recent

years coincide with the national picture for suicides, as shown in section 9.4.

• Around 59% of these injuries have occurred on the running line since 2007/08. There has been

an increase in the number occurring on the running line in recent years, while those in stations

have remained stable.

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trends in suicide by location

Chart 63. Trend in suicide fatality harm by location

• Since 2007/08, around 49% of suicides have occurred on the running line. In 2016/17 there was a

reduction in suicide events in these locations for the second year in a row.

• Since 2007/08, around 40% of suicides have occurred in stations. The number of suicides in

stations for 2016/17 reduced this year remaining above the annual average following two years

of the highest recorded values for the period.

• The number of suicides at level crossings increased this year, but remains below the annual

average for the reporting period. Over the past 10 years, around 10% of suicides have occurred

at level crossings. The remaining small percentage of events have occurred in other locations.

• The occurrence of suicide on the railway is likely to be influenced by wider societal trends, as well

as by initiatives taken by the railway to prevent suicide attempts.

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


9.3 Suicide prevention initiatives

Rail Industry partners (including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions, BTP,

Samaritans, and RSSB) under the banner of the Rail Industry Suicide Stakeholder Group (RISSG) have

been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the railway and to support those involved or

who witness such an event. In 2015 the contractual partnership agreement between Samaritans and

Network Rail on behalf of the rail industry was renewed until 2020.

The industry’s suicide prevention programme involves the roll out of a number of prevention and

post-incident support initiatives. These include multi-agency partnership working at national and

local level, bespoke training of rail industry staff, a national public awareness poster campaign, the

implementation of physical mitigation measures at railway locations, post-incident support at railway

stations provided by local Samaritans volunteers and work to encourage responsible media reporting

of suicides. Increasingly important are the relationships being forged with local authorities and MPs

as collectively there is recognition that the rail industry is but one player in addressing the societal

issue of suicide.

Table 14 presents a general overview of the national and local activities covered by the programme.

By the end of 2016/17, 14,500 Rail staff and British Transport Police officers had been trained on how

to intervene in a suicide attempt. 1 in 6 staff are now suicide prevention aware and through the

training have been given the confidence and skills to identify, approach and support someone in

need.

During 2016/17, BTP recorded a total of 1,593 interventions in suicide attempts on the mainline

railway. This compares to 1,137 made in 2015/16, a 40% increase.

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Summary of programme activities

AT NATIONAL LEVEL AT LOCAL LEVEL

Partnership working

• Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group and working groups

• Development of guidance and policies

• Appointment of programme support teams and leads in key organisations (Samaritans, Network Rail, TOCs)

• Collation and dissemination of data centrally (by Network Rail, RSSB, BTP, Samaritans and RDG)

• Creating the industry’s 9 Point Plan

• Working with Public Health England to share the rail industry’s understanding of suicide prevention nationally

• Rail Suicide Prevention Conference

• Ongoing awareness activities at stations with Samaritans volunteers

• Community outreach location activities

• Local engagement/development of local suicide prevention plans

• Station audits

• Third party engagement and community outreach activities

• Liaison with local authorities

• Liaison with MPs

• Network Rail route and train operator teams working to deliver the requirements of the 9 Point Plan

• Data analysis to inform resource deployment

• Escalation process for emerging risk locations

Prevention activities

• Commissioning research work to identify long term suicide prevention measures

• Deploying anthropologists to study rail related suicides in the field

• Design and delivery of public awareness campaign

• Coordination of the ESOB(Emotional Support Outside Branch) service

• Samaritans’ media monitoring and encouraging responsible reporting of suicides

• DfT building suicide prevention arrangements into franchise agreements

• Priority location identification

• Introducing additional mitigation measures at suicide cluster locations

• Staff undertaking Managing Suicidal Contacts training and suicide prevention training materials, including the Learning Tool. More information on the tool can be found here: http://www.samaritans.org/news/samaritans-wins-another-award-partnership-rail-industry

• Public awareness (poster) campaign roll out, Samaritans metal signs and distribution of information for station and rail staff

• Physical mitigation measures

• British Transport Police Suicide Prevention Hotline - for rail staff to use to report any concerns they may have for the immediate safety of people on the railway

• Designing bespoke mitigation measures for high risk locations

Post-event activities

• Development and delivery of Trauma Support Training for all rail staff and RISSG partners

• Development of trauma support materials for rail staff

• Production of guidance to prevent copycat suicides (media guidance, memorials policy)

• Staff undertaking Trauma Support Training

• Post-incident visits to stations by Samaritans to support staff and public who have witnessed or been involved in fatal and non-fatal incidents

• Industry counselling services for rail staff

http://www.samaritans.org/news/samaritans-wins-another-award-partnership-rail-industry

http://www.samaritans.org/news/samaritans-wins-another-award-partnership-rail-industry

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


9.4 Railway suicides in the wider context

Suicides on the railway represent by far the largest proportion of railway-related fatalities, but they

represent a relatively small percentage of suicides on a national level. National suicide figures are not

available as recently as railway figures, and are published on a calendar year basis; the chart shows

the latest available calendar year comparisons. The national figures used are based on the year when

the death was registered.

Chart 64. Railway suicide trend in the wider context

Source: SMIS and ONS

• Over the period shown in the chart, the average number of national suicides has been 5,857 per

year. The years 2011-2015 have seen a sustained higher level of national suicides. This increased

number of suicides at a national level has been in line with an increased number seen on the

railway. The number seen in 2015 is the lowest in four years, but remains higher than historic

figures.

• The proportion of the national total occurring on railway property has been 4.1% over the

analysis period; the most recent available years for comparison have shown slightly higher

proportions.

5,5615,391

5,718 5,682 5,612

6,057 5,9936,242 6,122 6,188

245

206 208226 232

222

268 273287

260

4.4%3.8% 3.6%

4.0% 4.1%3.7%

4.5% 4.4%4.7%

4.2%

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

Rai

lway

su

icid

es

Natio

nal su

icide

s

All suicides

On railway property

Railway suicides as % of national total

Suicide

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


9.5 Key safety statistics: suicide

Suicide 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Fatalities 245 275 287 251 237

Struck by train 233 265 282 243 230

Not train related 12 10 5 8 7



Not train related 11 15 14 11 16


Class 1 13 19 16 31 34

Class 2 3 6 4 10 12


Class 1 0 3 1 0 0

Class 2 0 0 0 0 0


248.57 280.52 290.89 254.47 241.88

Struck by train 235.46 269 284.43 245 233.21

Not train related 13.11 12 6.46 9 8.67

Injuries to others 249 292 243 214 189



Shock and trauma 249 292 242 214 188

Yards, depots and sidings

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


10 Yards, depots and sidings

Railway companies are required to manage risk and carry out risk assessments on areas away

from the mainline operational railway, such as yards, depots and sidings (YDS).

Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into SMIS on a long-standing basis. While there is no

mandatory requirement to report non-fatal injuries, the collection of data to support safety

analysis of YDS sites has been carried out on a voluntary basis, through agreement of the

industry. This was formalised as an appendix to a railway group standard (GE/RT8047 Standard

for Safety Information Reporting) in April 2010.

We now have sufficient data to incorporate YDS into the scope of reporting of safety

performance and risk estimation on an on-going basis.

2016/17 Headlines

• There were no workforce fatalities in YDS sites during 2016/17. The total level of workforce

harm was 5.6 FWI, which has remained fairly consistent with the previous year which was

5.7 FWI. This represents the lowest level of harm since consistent recording of YDS harm

started, in 2007/08.

• Since 2007/08, harm in YDS sites has accounted for around 21% of the total harm to the

workforce.

• Injuries to passengers and members of the public also occur in YDS sites, with lower

frequency, but often more serious consequences due to the nature of the event. There was

one fatality to members of the public occurring in YDS sites during 2016/17. This fatality

was a member of the public, suspected of deliberately trespassing on railway property and

accidentally falling from height into railway sidings while attempting to climb a fence.

YDS risk at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in YDS workforce harm

Risk in yards, depots and

sidings(7.6 FWI; 5%)


(132.0 FWI; 95%)

1

6.37.2

6.2 6.06.6 6.9 6.8

8.1

5.7 5.6

0123456789

10

20

07

/08

20

08

/09

20

09

/10

20

10

/11

20

11

/12

20

12

/13

20

13

/14

20

14

/15

20

15

/16

20

16

/17

FWI

Weighted injuries

Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


10.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2016/17

The majority of injuries recorded on YDS sites are those suffered by members of the workforce.

Fatalities

• There were no workforce fatalities on YDS sites during 2016/17.

Major injuries

• There were 38 major injuries reported on YDS sites in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 1,171 minor injuries reported on YDS sites, 157 (13%) of which were Class 1

reported in 2016/17.

Shock and trauma

• There were six reported cases of shock/trauma on YDS sites in 2016/17.


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in workforce harm in YDS

Workforce fatalities in YDS have been reported for some years, and non-fatal injuries have been

reported by industry agreement more recently. Trends in non-fatal injuries can now be

measured from 2007/08 onwards, ie over the last ten years.

Chart 65. Trend in workforce harm in YDS

• At 5.6 FWI, 2016/17 has the lowest level of harm since

consistent recording of YDS harm started, in 2007/08.

• The average level of workforce harm in YDS over the

last 10 years has been 6.5 FWI per year.

• The majority of YDS incidents result in major injury,

accounting for 67% of harm in YDS since 2007/08. The

ten-year average for major incidents is 4.4 FWI per

year.

• Since 2007/08, workforce harm in YDS has comprised

around 21% of the total harm to the workforce.

1

4.25.1

4.1 3.74.4 4.8 4.8

5.0

3.8 3.8

2.1

2.1

2.12.2

2.22.1 2.0

2.1

1.9 1.8

6.3

7.2

6.2 6.06.6

6.9 6.8

8.1

5.7 5.6

0

2

4

6

8

10

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities

Chart 66. Proportion of workforce

harm in YDS since

2007/08

Harm in YDS21%

Other workforce

harm79%


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Major injuries

Chart 67. Trend in major injuries by accident type

• The number of major injuries in 2016/17 has remained the same as in 2015/16. The chart

shows no discernible pattern over the reporting period.

• The majority of major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls, with contact with objects

forming the next largest category.

4 4 4 3 5 5

6 5 3 6 34

26

32

2321

33

3027 30

28 22

9

8

8

7

79

8

11

68

3

542

51

41

37

44

48 4850

38 38

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Maj

or

inju

rie

s

Other injury Platform-train interface

Slips, trips and falls Contact with object or person

Electric shock Manual handling/awkward movement


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Workforce harm in YDS by worker type

Chart 68. Trend in harm by worker type

• Engineering staff have shown the highest proportion of injuries over the period, although in

recent years infrastructure workers have been at a very similar level. Differences in hours

worked in YDS will also be a factor in the number of injuries occurring.

• The injury profile for engineering staff has the greatest proportion of minor injuries (39%)

and the profile for infrastructure workers has the least proportion (23%). This may be due to

differences in activities, or may also indicate differences in reporting.

0.7

0.90.9

1.7

1.10.9

1.2

1.7

0.5

1.31.5

2.3

1.4

1.1

1.51.7

2.32.22.3

1.5

3.5

2.7

2.5

1.8

2.22.0

2.32.3

2.0

1.4

0.7

1.31.41.4

1.8

2.3

1.0

1.8

0.9

1.4

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

420

07/0

820

08/0

920

09/1

020

10/1

120

11/1

220

12/1

320

13/1

420

14/1

520

15/1

620

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720

07/0

820

08/0

920

09/1

020

10/1

120

11/1

220

12/1

320

13/1

420

14/1

520

15/1

620

16/1

720

07/0

820

08/0

920

09/1

020

10/1

120

11/1

220

12/1

320

13/1

420

14/1

520

15/1

620

16/1

720

07/0

820

08/0

920

09/1

020

10/1

120

11/1

220

12/1

320

13/1

420

14/1

520

15/1

620

16/1

7

Other Infrastructure worker Engineering staff Drivers / Shunters

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


10.2 Injuries to passengers and members of the public in YDS

Injuries to passengers and members of the public also occur in YDS sites, with lower frequency.

Fatalities

• There was one accidental fatality on YDS sites during 2016/17.

Passenger/public fatalities on YDS sites during 2016/17


22/07/2016 Powderhall Sidings (Lothian)

Fall from height Scotland

A member of public is suspected to have accidentally fallen from height while attempting to climb a public fence, into railway sidings. This event is suspected to be deliberate trespass.

Major injuries

• There were no major injuries recorded on YDS sites in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were two minor injuries recorded on YDS sites in 2016/17; both were site visitors

involved in a slip, trip or fall.

Shock and trauma

• There were no shock or trauma injuries recorded on YDS sites in 2016/17.


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in harm to passenger and members of the public in YDS

The following chart shows that injuries to members of the public in YDS sites are rare, but with a

notable likelihood of being extremely serious.

Chart 69. Trend in passenger/public harm in YDS

• Recorded information for injured passengers and public in YDS is limited. Given the

likelihood of fatalities in such an environment the values are subject to large annual

variations.

• The fatality in 2009/10 occurred to one of a group of teenage boys, who were playing on top

of a train in a depot, and came into contact with the OLE. Two of the fatalities that occurred

in 2015/16 were to members of the public suspected of deliberately trespassing on railway

property, and the third was a member of public who is suspected of accidentally fall from

height over a public wall, into railway sidings.

1.0

3.0

1.0

1.1

0.1

0.4

3.2

1.0

0

1

2

3

4

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


10.3 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings

Yards, depots and sidings (workforce) 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17




Train accidents 0 0 0 0 0













Minor injuries 1437 1256 1359 1175 1171

Class 1 173 174 179 175 157

Class 2 1264 1082 1180 1000 1014


Class 1 0 1 0 0 0

Class 2 7 6 1 2 6


Electric shock 0.02 0.02 1.01 0.02 0.11

Manual handling/awkward movement 0.35 0.75 0.53 0.33 0.36

Train accidents 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00




Other injury 0.56 0.74 0.71 0.38 0.40

Yards, depots and sidings (passenger/public) 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17




Shock and trauma 1 0 3 0 0


Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11 Freight operations

Over the past 10 years, freight operations have contributed around 8% of the total train miles

on the network. In 2016/17, there were 38.6 million freight train miles, and 17.2 billion freight

tonne km was moved.

A good proportion of freight operations take place in YDS, and although some freight companies

have started using SMIS to record incidents of workforce injury in these sites, there is no

mandatory requirement to do so and some under-reporting appears likely.

2016/17 Headlines

• During 2016/17, there were no fatalities, seven major injuries, 125 minor injuries and seven

cases of shock/trauma occurring to the workforce in relation to freight operations. The total

level of harm during the year was 0.9 FWI.

• During 2016/17, there were four train accidents in PHRTA categories that involved freight

trains. This is lower than the ten-year average of 9.9 per year, and notably lower than the

number occurring during 2015/16. Of the four events, three were derailments and one was

a collision with a road vehicle at a level crossing. Derailments dominate the freight profile

for PHRTA categories of train accident. A cross-industry working group has been focussing

on risk reduction in this area.

• At 31%, the percentage of freight train PHRTAs over the past 10 years has been

disproportionately high when compared with the percentage of train miles (8%). In

contrast, at 3%, the percentage of non-PHRTA category train accidents over the past 10

years has been lower than the percentage of train miles.

• In 2016/17, there were 64 SPADs which involved freight trains. When normalised by the

number of train miles, the rate of freight SPADs is consistently higher than for passenger and

other trains combined. Over the last five years, the normalised rate of freight SPADs has

shown an upward trend, however the normalised rate decreased in 2016/17.

Freight operations at a glance

Harm in context (SMIS) Trends in freight-related harm

Average harm arising in

connection with freight operations,

4%

Other accidental

harm, 96%

9.5

1.3

1.0

3.1

7.0

4.1

8.2

2.3

1.0 1.1

0.7 0.9

0.8

0.6 1

.2 1.3

1.0 1

.6

0.7 0.9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

200

7/08

200

8/09

200

9/10

201

0/11

201

1/12

201

2/13

201

3/14

201

4/15

201

5/16

201

6/17

200

7/08

200

8/09

200

9/10

201

0/11

201

1/12

201

2/13

201

3/14

201

4/15

201

5/16

201

6/17

Passenger & Public Workforce

FWI

Fatalities

Weighted Injuries

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.1 Workforce fatalities and injuries

Fatalities

• There were no workforce fatalities associated with freight operations in 2016/17.

Major injuries

• Seven major injuries to workforce were reported in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There were 125 minor injuries to the workforce recorded in 2016/17.

Shock & trauma

• Seven cases of shock/trauma to workforce were reported in 2016/17.

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.2 Trend in harm to the workforce

This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving the workforce recorded in SMIS

over the last 10 years.

Chart 70 includes all workforce injuries recorded in SMIS where the train operator, responsible

organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. It is important to note that this

does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident rests with the companies identified in

this way.

Chart 70. Trend in harm to the workforce associated with freight operations

Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a freight company

• In total during 2016/17, there were no fatalities, seven major injuries, 125 minor injuries

and seven cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of harm during the year was 0.9

FWI.

• Workforce fatalities are relatively rare, and the injury profile is typically dominated by major

injuries. There have been no freight workforce fatalities in the last 10 years.

0.6 0.70.5

0.2

0.9 1.0

0.7

1.2

0.4

0.7

0.10.2

0.3

0.4

0.30.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.20.7

0.90.8

0.6

1.21.3

1.0

1.6

0.7

0.9

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.3 Passenger/public fatalities and injuries

Fatalities

• There was one fatality to a passenger due to being struck by a freight train at a station.

Freight operations: passenger and public fatalities in 2016/17





Major injuries

• There was one major injury due to freight operations in 2016/17.

Minor injuries

• There was one minor injury due to freight operations in 2016/17.

Shock & trauma

• There were no cases of shock/trauma from freight operations to passengers/public in

2016/17.

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.4 Trend in harm to passengers and public

This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving passengers or public recorded in

SMIS over the last 10 years.

Chart 71 includes all passenger and public injuries recorded in SMIS where the train operator,

responsible organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. As with workforce

injuries, it is important to note that this does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident

rests with the companies identified in this way.

Chart 71. Trend in harm to passengers or public associated with freight operations

Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a freight company

• In total during 2016/17, there was one fatality, one major injury, one minor injury and no

cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of passenger/public harm during the year

was 1.1 FWI.

9

1 1

3

7

4

8

21 1

9.5

1.31.0

3.1

7.0

4.1

8.2

2.3

1.0 1.1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

FWI

Shock and trauma

Minor injuries

Major injuries

Fatalities

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.5 Trend in train accidents involving freight trains

Chapter 6 Train operations covers the risk from all types of train accident and gives an update on

safety performance of train accidents in the last 10 years. This section looks at train accident

safety performance in the freight sector. A detailed list of freight train accidents in PHRTA

categories occurring in 2016/17 can be found in Chapter 6.

Potentially higher-risk train accident categories

Chart 72. Trend in the number of PHRTA category train accidents, broken down by train

type

• During 2016/17, there were four train accidents in PHRTA categories that involved freight

trains. This is lower than the ten-year average of 9.9 per year, and notably lower than the

number occurring during 2015/16.

• Of the four events, three were derailments and one

was collision with a road vehicle at a level crossing.

Derailments dominate the freight profile for PHRTA

categories of train accident. A cross industry

working group has been established to focus on

this area.

• At 31%, the percentage of freight train PHRTAs

over the past 10 years has been disproportionately

high when compared with the percentage of train

miles (8%).

18

1210

2

7

11 1215

8

4

24

37

32

16

2523

20

10

17 18

0

10

20

30

40

50

2007

/08

2008

/09

2009

/10

2010

/11

2011

/12

2012

/13

2013

/14

2014

/15

2015

/16

2016

/17

2007

/08

2008

/09

2009

/10

2010

/11

2011

/12

2012

/13

2013

/14

2014

/15

2015

/16

2016

/17

Freight Passenger trains and other trains

PH

RTA

s

Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings

Trains struck by large falling objects

Buffer stop collisions

Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (without derailment)

Derailments (excluding collisions with road vehicles on level crossings)

Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)

Chart 73. PHRTA category train

accidents by train type

Freight31%

Non-freight69%

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Trend in freight SPADs

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from non-passenger train SPADs is 0.33 FWI per year14.

Chart 74. Trend in the number of SPADs, broken down by train type

• In 2016/17, there were 272 SPADs in total, 64 of which involved freight trains. Of the 64

freight SPADs, none were risk-ranked ‘potentially severe’ (ie 20 or higher) and 10 were risk-

ranked ‘potentially significant’ (ie between 16 and 19).

• When normalised by the number of train miles, the rate of freight SPADs is consistently

higher than for passenger and other trains combined. In the last five years, the normalised

rate of freight SPADs has shown an upward trend, however the rate decreased in 2016/17.

• Work to better understand red aspect approaches is underway as part of the Strategic

Partnership between RSSB and the University of Huddersfield. A prototype Red Aspect

Approaches to Signals (RAATS) tool is currently being trialled by industry. Differences in red

aspect approach rates are likely to explain some of the differences in headline SPAD rates

between passenger and freight operators, and the work is starting to yield further

intelligence on why SPAD rates vary between signals and between operators.

14 The figure is calculated from SRMv8.1 and this modelling includes the potential consequences of a SPAD involving a non-passenger train; for example, a potential collision involving a passenger train and a freight train. It is not possible to disaggregate freight-only SPAD risk due to the current definition of precursors.

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


11.6 Key safety statistics: freight operations

Freight injuries 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

















Minor injuries 195 177 199 169 126

Class 1 27 32 34 29 23

Class 2 168 145 165 140 103


Class 1 7 6 5 3 2

Class 2 4 5 3 5 5


Electric shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Train accidents 1.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00

Struck by train 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00




Other injury 2.39 6.38 2.79 1.11 0.18

Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Freight train accidents 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17

Total freight train accidents

PHRTAs 11 12 15 8 4

Collisions between trains 0 1 0 0 0


Collisions with road vehicles not at LC 1 0 0 1 0

Collisions with road vehicles at LC (not derailed)

3 2 1 1 1

Collisions with road vehicles at LC (derailed)

0 0 0 0 0



Non-PHRTAs 40 31 19 31 18

Open door collisions 0 0 0 0 0




Train fires 5 3 1 5 0



Freight operations

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________



Health and wellbeing

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


12 Health and wellbeing

In 2013/14 RSSB worked with the rail industry to develop a strategy for the health and wellbeing

of the railway workforce. The Health and Wellbeing Policy Group (HWPG) has agreed to support

data collection for a Health and Wellbeing dataset. This proposal is being taken to the RDG HR

Directors’ Forum and they are considering the feasibility of use.

The HWPG was newly chaired in June 2017, and four activity areas have been agreed going

forward. These are:

• Validating an industry prioritised roadmap. The Health and Wellbeing roadmap has

provided a vital focal point for industry and has steered the activity and growth in the

area of health and wellbeing. The roadmap is to be reviewed and updated in-line with

shifting industry priorities and to reflect progress already made in several areas.

• Defining clear industry roles and responsibilities. Industry needs to be as clear about

their roles and responsibilities related to health and wellbeing as they are relating to

safety. It is essential that industry is aware of their legal and ethical responsibilities

around health and wellbeing in order to match the same high standards we see across

the board on safety matters.

• Sharing industry data and knowledge. Companies need a point of comparison across

industry in order to establish markers of progress and growth in the field. Sharing health

and wellbeing data also contributes to a wider cultural shift that strong employee health

and wellbeing is not a competitive advantage, instead it is a standard that all of industry

should be aiming for.

• Increasing the impact within industry. There has been a tremendous shift in attitude

towards and appetite for help and support with health and wellbeing across the

industry. Many companies cite employee health and wellbeing as their number one

priority. Industry needs to learn from and collaborate with the work being done in core

areas of health and wellbeing in order to create a stronger impact within wider industry.

RSSB and HWPG reviewed the Britain’s Healthiest Workplace (BHW) survey and concluded that

there is value in promoting rail company participation in this initiative as it provides a useful

source of wellbeing data that complements industry efforts to collate ill health data. Industry

groups have been informed of BHW through HWPG and there has been an early expression of

interest from member companies. HWPG will continue to promote the survey over the coming

year. RSSB will create links with BHW so that aggregated rail data can be shared across the

industry to enable benchmarking.

Developing the dataset

The advised dataset has been developed through industry workshops and HWPG oversight for

Industry Ill Health. The KPIs within the dataset are:

Sickness absence management key performance indicators:

• Total number of days lost per sickness category

• Total number of days lost per sickness category – work-related

• Sickness absence rate (percentage of days lost due to illness vs planned days)


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


• Work-related sickness absence rate

Statutory health surveillance key performance indicators

• Number of people exposed to identified hazards that need health surveillance,

broken down by hazard

• Number of people who show ill effects as a result of being exposed to health

hazards, broken down by condition (new, worse and stable cases)

Psychological wellbeing key performance indicators

• How satisfied are workers with their lives?

• How do employees view their general health?

• How satisfied are workers with their working conditions?

• How often does work negatively affect employees’ mental health?

While data collection and analysis methods are being developed, the Health and Wellbeing

Policy Group has begun to estimate health and wellbeing risk based on expert opinion from

major sector groups. The draft risk profile, which will be further developed with support from

the industry groups, is below. A version for publication will be developed by industry

professionals within relevant sector groups.

Knowledge Searches to support development of health and wellbeing risk management at the

cross-industry level have been put into the R&D team at RSSB. The knowledge searches centre

on modelling and benchmarking.

Prototype of the health and wellbeing risk profile

Note: this version is for information purposes only and is not an agreed representation of industry risk.

Po

ten

tial

Bu

sin

ess

Ris

k

High

Aging workforce

Obesity

Stressors

Mental ill health Manual handling

Health risk factors Dust or Particle Fatigue

Medium

Vibration

Radiation (including Solar) Trauma

Cancers (societal) Noise

Shift work Sleep disorders Legionella Recreational D&A

Drugs (Medical)

Low

Temperature Paints Fitness for Duty

Solvents Workers as carers

Embryonic Understanding Maturing Embedded


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Mental Health Work stream

Industry has acknowledged that mental health is an area which needs greater investigation and

support. RSSB have devised a programme to support companies to become industry leaders in

mental health management. Working with companies to identify key areas of concern relating

to mental health management, RSSB is then able to provide the relevant help, support, guidance

and best practice case studies to allow companies to better manage and reduce the impact of

these concerns on employees, and the wider business.

RSSB has worked with companies to reduce mental health stigma and promote a more open and

honest culture around mental health within the workplace. By signing the Time to Change

Employer Pledge, RSSB has committed to ending mental health stigma in the workplace. By

making our journey transparent, RSSB hopes to encourage other companies to follow in our

footsteps and embark on their own Employer Pledge.

The HWB team within RSSB are helping companies who wish to commit to a future without

mental health stigma and regularly speak at events to normalise mental health issues and

reduce stigma and fear around mental health management. The HWB team is able to advise

companies on how best to align their mental health management policies with NICE guidance to

ensure all policies promote and support evidence-based mental health treatment.

RSSB are working closely with the Trade Unions on positive health initiative delivery and looking

to support companies to take a proactive rather than reactive stance.

Going forward RSSB, and specifically the HWB team, will continue to support companies who identify a mental health management concern, and use these case studies to broaden the impact of such success and learning across the wider industry. There has been some fantastic progress in this area and RSSB wants companies to feel confident becoming leaders in this hitherto unknown part of health and safety management.

The ORR (2015) report on work-related ill health in rail workers15

The ORR report highlighted several key findings including evidence from The Health and

Occupation Research (THOR) network data (2014), which suggests that railway operatives may

suffer higher levels of work-related respiratory diseases compared with the wider working

population. The level of skin disease appears to be comparable to all workers.

The report also found that railway operatives appear to be at no higher risk of death from

mesothelioma (serious asbestos-related disease) than the wider working population. The

occupation group for (all) vehicle body builders/repairers, which may include some rail workers,

does show a higher number of deaths from mesothelioma caused by past exposures to

asbestos, than the average for all workers.

Over the four years of ORR's first health programme, 320 cases of occupational disease were

reported to us under RIDDOR: the vast majority were cases of HAVS reported by Network Rail.

The relatively small number (18) of other RIDDOR diseases reported from across the industry

included upper limb conditions due to repetitive work, occupational asthma, occupational

dermatitis and leptospirosis.

15 Better health is happening: ORR assessment of progress on occupational health up to 2014 and priorities to 2019 - HSE and ORR

data


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_________________________________________________________________


While this work is developed, more information on the topic is available through these links;

• RSSB Reports on Health Data metrics https://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-

performance/workforce-health-and-wellbeing/collecting-health-data

• ORR 2015 report Better health is happening: ORR assessment of progress on

occupational health up to 2014 and priorities to 2019

http://www.orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/18233/better-health-is-

happening.pdf

• The Britain’s Healthiest Workplace Survey

https://www.vitality.co.uk/business/healthiest-workplace/

Chapter 11 of the LOEAR has more details on specific health & wellbeing lessons learned during

the reporting year, while Section 8.4.1 covers ISLG’s survey on work-related pressure, which

reveals issues around the balance between delivery and safety, cites planning among the causes,

and sleepless nights, headaches and mood swings among the effects.

https://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/workforce-health-and-wellbeing/collecting-health-data

https://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/workforce-health-and-wellbeing/collecting-health-data

http://www.orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/18233/better-health-is-happening.pdf

http://www.orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/18233/better-health-is-happening.pdf

https://www.vitality.co.uk/business/healthiest-workplace/

Appendices: Fatalities

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_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 1. Fatalities in 2016/17

Workforce 1

Date Location Event type

Territory Event description

05/06/16 Eastbourne Road traffic accident

South East


Passenger 5



01/04/16 Hither Green PTI (not boarding / alighting)

South East

A passenger fell from the platform edge and was struck by a through train, sustaining fatal injuries.

31/07/16 Drumgelloch PTI (not boarding / alighting)


07/08/16 Balham

Lean or fall from train in running

South East


17/10/16 Chester

PTI (boarding / alighting)

London North Western


16/12/16 Saltcoats station PTI (not boarding / alighting)


Public (not including trespass or suicide) 5



05/10/16 Bentley Station (Hampshire)

Pedestrian struck by train at LX

South East


09/11/16 Old Stoke Road (Buckinghamshire)




03/01/17 Marston (Bedfordshire)

Road vehicle struck by train at LX


The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a train struck the vehicle on the crossing. The road vehicle swerved around the closed automatic half barriers.

07/02/17 Frampton (Gloucestershire)

Road vehicle struck by train at LX

Western The driver of a road vehicle was fatally injured when a train struck the vehicle on the crossing.




An elderly female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing.



South East

A female was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing, the female’s companion crossed without incident.

Public (trespass) 27

In stations 7

Not in stations 20

Public (suicide) 237

Coroner’s confirmed verdict 25

Application of Ovenstone criteria 212

Appendices: Fatalities

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Appendices: Scope

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_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 2. Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting and risk modelling

Railway Industry Standard RIS-8047-TOM: Reporting of Safety Related Information lays out the

requirements on mainline infrastructure managers and railway undertakings for reporting safety

related information via the Safety Management Information System (SMIS). It covers

requirements related to injuries and events such as train accidents, irregular working and SPADs.

This appendix describes the scope of RSSB’s safety performance reporting and safety risk

modelling, based on the information reported to SMIS, and other sources.

General:

All events listed in Table A of RIS-8047-TOM, occurring at sites within scope, with the exception

of:

• incidents due to occupational health issues and terrorist actions.

Injuries and incidents of shock/trauma:

Workforce:

All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to members of the workforce whilst on duty and:

• involved in the operation or maintenance of the railway at sites within scope, or

• travelling to or from sites within scope while involved in the operation or maintenance of

the railway, or

• directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.

Passengers and public:

All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to passengers and public who are:

• at a site within scope, or

• directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.

Sites within scope and outside scope for all person types for safety performance reporting:

Within scope Outside scope

Railway infrastructure and trains on sections of operational railway under the management of Network Rail, or where Network Rail is responsible for the operation of the signalling.

The operational railway comprises all lines for which the infrastructure manager and railway undertaking have been granted a safety authorisation and safety certificate (respectively) by the ORR (under Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC). The table on the following page details which railway lines this applies to. Railway infrastructure includes all associated railway assets, structures and public areas at stations.

Yards, depots and sidings managed by Network Rail or third parties. The reporting of non-fatal injuries and incidents in third party yards, depots and sidings is undertaken on a voluntary basis.

• Station car parks

• Offices (except areas normally accessible by members of the public)

• Mess rooms

• Training centres

• Integrated Electronic Control Centres and Signalling Control Centres

• Outside the entrance to stations

• Station toilets

• Retail units and concessions in stations

• Construction sites at stations which are completely segregated from the public areas

• Track sections closed for long-term construction, maintenance, renewal or upgrade

• Public areas away from the platform-train interface (PTI) at non-Network Rail stations16

16 The platform-train interface is in scope at non-Network Rail stations on NRMI lines, for example on London Underground and Nexus. See the following page for details.

Appendices: Scope

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Railway lines in scope:

Line / Section Notes

Criteria In / Out of

Scope

Ow

ne

d b

y N

R?

NR

op

era

te t

he

sign

alli

ng?

In s

tati

on

s

On

or

abo

ut

the

trac

k/at

PTI

High Speed 117

The entire line, including St Pancras, is

managed, operated and maintained by

NR.

✓ ✓ In In

Heathrow Express:

Paddington to Heathrow

Central

NR-owned infrastructure. ✓ ✓ In In

Heathrow Express:

Heathrow Central to

Terminals 4 and 5

Owned by BAA but maintained on their

behalf by NR. ✓ ✓ In In

Nexus – Tyne and Wear

Metro:

Fellgate to South Hylton

Owned and managed by NR, but stations

served only by metro trains. ✓ ✓ Out In

Nexus – Tyne and Wear

Metro:

All sections apart from

Fellgate to South Hylton

Neither managed by NR, nor is the

signalling controlled by NR. Out Out

LUL Metropolitan Line:

Chiltern services between

Harrow-on-the-Hill and

Amersham

This section is owned and operated by

LUL and its subsidiaries / operators. Out Out18

LUL District Line:

Gunnersbury to Richmond

This section was a joint operation with

Silverlink Metro, for which NR is now

responsible.

✓ ✓ Out In

LUL District Line:

East Putney to Southfields

LUL owns the infrastructure. NR owns the

signals, but the signalling is operated by

LUL.

Out Out

LUL Bakerloo Line:

Services north of Queens

Park

Track managed by NR, who also operates

the signalling. ✓ ✓ Out In

Island Line on the Isle of

Wight

The service is wholly operated and

managed under a franchise to South

West Trains.

Out Out

East London Line TfL owns and maintains the track, but NR

operates the signalling. ✓ In In

All other NR owned stations ✓ ✓ In In

17 The risk from High Speed 1 train operations is modelled in the same way as all other lines, ie as an average railway, rather than explicit modelling of High Speed 1 characteristics. The contribution of Eurostar services to HEM/HEN risk is included. 18 PTI and on-board injuries on these Chiltern services are in scope, injuries on or about the track are out of scope.

Appendices: Scope

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_________________________________________________________________



Appendices: Ovenstone criteria

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_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 3. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways

Every railway fatality in Great Britain (including Scotland) is classified as:

• Accidental, or

• Suicide (that is, in accordance with the coroner’s verdict – or Scottish equivalent), or

• Suspected suicide

The classification of suspected suicide is only used when a coroner’s report into the fatality has

not recorded a confirmed verdict of the cause of death. It is a managerial assessment of

whether the cause of death was more likely to be intentional or non-intentional, based on

applying the Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways, and requires objective evidence of

intentional self-harm for the fatality to be classified as suspected suicide rather than accidental.

The classification is wholly for management statistical purposes and is not:

• For the purpose of passing judgement on the particulars of any case

• For use outside the Railway Group

• For any other purpose

The classification is a matter for local railway management judgement, based on all available

evidence (for example, eyewitness accounts of the person’s behaviour – which may be the train

driver’s own account – BTP findings or the coroner’s findings).

The criteria for suspected suicide

Each of the following, on its own, may be treated as sufficient evidence of suspected suicide, in

the case where the coroner has returned an open or narrative verdict, or has yet to return a

verdict:

• Suicide note

• Clear statement of suicidal intent to an informant

• Behaviour demonstrates suicidal intent

• Previous suicide attempts

• Prolonged depression

• Instability; that is, a marked emotional reaction to recent stress or evidence of failure to

cope (such as a breakdown)

In the absence of evidence fulfilling the above criteria, the fatality should be deemed accidental.

A classification should always be reviewed whenever new evidence comes to light (such as

during investigations or at a coroner’s inquest).

Appendices: Ovenstone criteria

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Appendices: Level crossing types

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_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 4. Level crossing types

Active crossings: Manual

Manually controlled gate (MCG): This crossing is equipped with gates, which are manually operated by a signaller or crossing keeper either before the protecting signal can be cleared, or with the permission of the signaller or signalling system. At the majority of these crossings, the normal position of the gates is open to road traffic, but on some quiet roads the gates are maintained ‘closed to the road’ and opened when required if no train is approaching.

Manually controlled barrier (MCB): MCB crossings are equipped with full barriers, which extend across the whole width of the roadway, and are operated by a signaller or crossing keeper before the protecting signal can be cleared. Road traffic signals and audible warnings for pedestrians are interlocked into the signalling system.

Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection (MCB-OD): MCB-OD are full barrier crossings equipped with an obstacle detection system as a means of detecting any obstacles on the crossing prior to signalling train movements. The obstacle detection system comprises of RADAR and scanning laser obstacle detectors. The lowering sequence is instigated automatically upon detection of an approaching train. MCB-ODs are equipped with road traffic lights and audible alarms. The barriers, road traffic signals and audible warnings for pedestrians are interlocked with the signalling system. The signaller typically does not participate in operation of the crossing and does not have a view of it. Indications on the state of the crossing warning lights, barriers and obstacle detection system are provided to the signaller and the barriers can be lowered and raised manually if required.

Manually controlled barrier protected by closed circuit television (MCB-CCTV): Similar to MCB crossings, except that a closed circuit television (CCTV) is used to monitor and control the crossing from a remote location.


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Active crossings: Automatic

Automatic half-barrier (AHB): AHB crossings are equipped with barriers that only extend across the nearside of the road (so that the exit is left clear if the crossing commences operation when a vehicle is on it). Road traffic signals and audible warnings are activated a set time before the operation of the barriers, which are activated automatically by approaching trains. The barriers rise automatically when the train has passed, unless another train is approaching. Telephones are provided for the public to contact the signaller in case of an emergency or, for example, to ensure it is safe to cross in a long or slow vehicle. These crossings can only be installed where the permissible speed of trains does not exceed 100mph.

Automatic barrier locally monitored (ABCL): As far as the road user is concerned, this crossing looks identical to an AHB crossing. The difference is that train drivers must ensure that the crossing is clear before passing over it. Train speed is limited to 55mph or less.

Automatic open crossing remotely monitored (AOCR): The AOCR is equipped with road traffic signals and audible warnings only: there are no barriers. It is operated automatically by approaching trains. Telephones are provided for the public to contact the signaller in an emergency. Only one crossing of this type remains on NRMI, at Rosarie in the Scottish Highlands.

Automatic open crossing locally monitored (AOCL): Like the AOCR, this crossing is equipped with road traffic signals and audible warnings only and is operated automatically by approaching trains. A physical difference apparent to the user is that no telephone is provided. An indication is provided to the train drivers to show that the crossing is working correctly, they must ensure that the crossing is clear before passing over it and train speed is limited to 55mph or less. If a second train is approaching, the lights continue to flash after the passage of the first train, an additional signal lights up, and the tone of the audible warning changes.

Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barriers (AOCL-B): AOCL-B is a simple half barrier overlay to previously commissioned AOCL crossings.

User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights (UWC-MWL): This crossing has gates or full lifting barriers, which the user must operate prior to crossing. Red/green miniature warning lights, operated by the approach of trains, inform the user whether it is safe to cross.


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Passive crossings

User-worked crossing (UWC): This crossing has gates

or, occasionally, full lifting barriers, which the user

must operate prior to crossing. The user is responsible

for ensuring that it is safe to cross; hence there must

be adequate visibility of approaching trains. Once

clear, the user is required to close the gate or barriers.

These crossings are often found in rural areas, for

example providing access between a farm and fields.

They often have an identified user, some of whom

keep the crossing gates padlocked to prevent

unauthorised access.

User-worked crossing with telephone (UWC-T):

These are similar to the standard user-worked

crossing, but a telephone is provided. In some

circumstances (for example when crossing with

livestock or vehicles) the user must contact the

signaller for permission to cross, and report back

when they are clear of the track. They are provided

where visibility of approaching trains is limited, or

the user needs to cross over the railway on a regular

basis.

Open crossing (OC): At open crossings, which are

sited when the road is quiet and train speeds are low,

the interface between road and rail is completely

open. Signs warn road users to give way to trains.

Road users must therefore have an adequate view of

approaching trains. The maximum permissible speed

over the crossing is 10mph or the train is required to

stop at a stop board before proceeding over.

Footpath crossing: These are designed primarily for pedestrians

and usually include stiles or wicket gates to restrict access. The

crossing user is responsible for making sure that it is safe to cross

before doing so. In cases where sufficient sighting time is not

available, the railway may provide a ‘whistle’ board, instructing

drivers to sound the horn to warn of their train’s approach, or

miniature warning lights. A variant is the bridleway crossing, which

is usually on a public right of way, although some are private and

restricted to authorised users. Some footpath crossings are in

stations and these can be protected by a white light (which

extinguishes when a train is approaching) and are generally only

used by railway staff. All these crossing types, some of which have

automatic protection, are analysed as a single group in this report

because of concerns over the accuracy of crossing type data in

SMIS.


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_________________________________________________________________



Appendices: Accident groups

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 5. Accident groups used within the ASPR

Accident grouping Description of the types of event contained within grouping

Train accidents:

collisions and

derailments

Collisions between trains, buffer stop collisions and derailments

(excluding those caused by collisions with road vehicles at level

crossings).

Train accidents:

collisions with road

vehicles at level

crossings

Includes derailments.

Train accidents:

collisions with objects

Collisions between a train and another object, including road vehicles

not at level crossings and trains hit by missiles. Excludes derailments.

Train accidents: other Train divisions, train fires, train explosions, structural damage

affecting trains.

Assault and abuse

All types of assault, verbal abuse and threat. Also any incidence of

unlawful killing, murder or manslaughter and any incidence of lawful

killing in self-defence.

Contact with object Any injury involving contact with objects, not covered by another

category.

Contact with person Injuries due to bumping into, or being bumped into by, other people.

Excludes assaults.

Falls from height Generally speaking, uninterrupted falls of more than 2m. Excludes

falls down stairs and escalators.

Fires and explosions

(not involving trains)

Fires or explosions in stations, lineside or other locations on NRMI.

Lean or fall from train

in running

Injuries resulting from accidental falls from trains, or from leaning

from trains.

Machinery/tool

operation

Injuries from power tools, being trapped in machinery, or track

maintenance equipment. Does not include injuries due to arcing.

Does not include injuries due to being struck by things thrown up by

tools or from carrying tools/equipment.

Manual

handling/awkward

movement

Strains and sprains due to lifting or moving objects, or awkward

movement. Excludes injuries due to dropping items being carried,

which are classed under contact with objects.

On-board injuries All injuries on trains, excluding train accidents, assaults, and those

occurring during boarding or alighting, or whilst leaning from trains.

Appendices: Accident groups

_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Accident grouping Description of the types of event contained within grouping

Platform-train

interface


Accidents occurring whilst getting on or off trains. Includes falls

between train and platform where it is not known if the person is

boarding or alighting.

Platform edge

incidents (not

boarding/alighting)

Accidents that involve falls from the platform (with or without trains

being present) or contact with trains or traction supplies at the

platform edge. Excludes accidents that take place during boarding or

alighting.

Road traffic accident Accidents occurring directly as a result of road vehicle usage.

Slips, trips, and falls Generally speaking, falls of less than 2m anywhere on NRMI (except

on trains), and falls of any height down stairs and escalators.

Struck/crushed by

train

All incidents involving pedestrians struck/crushed by trains, excluding

trespass, platform edge and boarding and alighting accidents.

Suicide All first-party injuries arising from suicide, suspected suicide and

attempted suicide.

Trespass

First-party injuries resulting from people engaging in behaviour

involving access of prohibited areas of the railway, where that access

was the result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. This includes

actions such as deliberately alighting a train in running (other than as

part of a controlled evacuation procedure), accessing the track at

stations to retrieve items, or climbing on the outside of overbridges

etc. Errors and violations at level crossings are not included in this

category.

Witnessing suicide or

trespass

Shock/trauma or other third party injuries arising from witnessing or

otherwise being affected by suicide and trespass fatalities.

Workforce electric

shock

Electric shock involving third rail, OLE, or non-traction supply.

Includes burns from electrical short circuits. Does not include injuries

due to arcing, which are classed under ‘other’.

Other Any other event not covered by another category.

Appendices: Definitions

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_________________________________________________________________


Appendix 6. Definitions

Term Definition

Assault SMIS records incidents in which ‘in circumstances related to their work,

a member of staff is assaulted, threatened or abused, thereby affecting

their safety or welfare.’

BTP records and categorises criminal assaults in accordance with Home

Office rules. For the majority of RSSBs work, BTP crime codes have been

grouped into higher level categories to facilitate analyses and

comparisons with SMIS records.

Child A person under 16 years of age.

Fatalities and

weighted injuries

(FWI)

The aggregate amount of safety harm.

One FWI is equivalent to:

one fatality, or

10 major injuries, or

200 Class 1 minor injuries, or

200 Class 1 shock/trauma events, or

1,000 Class 2 minor injuries, or

1,000 Class 2 shock/trauma events.

Fatality Death within one year of the causal accident. This includes subsequent

death from the causes of a railway accident. All are RIDDOR reportable.

Freight train A train that is operated by a freight company.

Note that this includes freight locos which do not have wagons

attached.

Hazardous event An incident that has the potential to be the direct cause of safety harm.

HLOS A key feature of an access charges review. Under Schedule 4 of the

2005 Railways Act, the Secretary of State for Transport (for England and

Wales) and Scottish Ministers (for Scotland) are obliged to send to ORR

a high level output specification (HLOS) and a statement of funds

available (SoFA). This is to ensure the railway industry has clear and

timely information about the strategic outputs that Governments want

the railway to deliver for the public funds they are prepared to make

available. ORR must then determine the outputs that Network Rail

must deliver to achieve the HLOS, the cost of delivering them in the

most efficient way, and the implications for the charges payable by

train operators to Network Rail for using the railway network.


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Term Definition

Infrastructure

worker

A member of workforce whose responsibilities include engineering or

technical activities associated with railway infrastructure. This includes

track maintenance, civil structure inspection and maintenance, S&T

renewal/upgrade, engineering supervision, acting as a Controller of Site

Safety (COSS), hand signaller or lookout and machine operative.

Level crossing A ground-level interface between a road and the railway.

It provides a means of access over the railway line and has various

forms of protection including two main categories:

Active crossings– where the road vehicle user or pedestrian is given

warning of a train’s approach (either manually by railway staff, ie

manual crossings or automatically, ie automatic crossings)

Passive crossings – where no warning system is provided, the onus

being on the road user or pedestrian to determine if it is safe to cross

the line. This includes using a telephone to call the signaller.

The different types of crossing are defined in Appendix 4.

Major injury Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public as defined in

schedule 1 to RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012. This includes losing

consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations, loss of sight

(temporary or permanent) and other injuries that resulted in hospital

attendance for more than 24 hours.

Minor injury Class 1

Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public, which are neither

fatalities nor major injuries, and:

- for passengers or public, result in the injured person being taken to

hospital from the scene of the accident (as defined as reportable in

RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012).

- for workforce, result in the injured person being incapacitated for

their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar days, not

including the day of the injury.

Class 2

All other physical injuries.

National Reference

Values (NRVs)

NRVs are reference measures indicating, for each Member State, the

maximum tolerable level for particular aspects of railway risk. NRVs are

calculated and published by the European Railway Agency, using

Eurostat and CSI data.


_________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________


Term Definition

Network Rail

managed

infrastructure

(NRMI)

All structures within the boundaries of Network Rail’s operational

railway, including the permanent way, land within the lineside fence,

and plant used for signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for

railway operations. It does not include stations, depots, yards or sidings

that are owned by, or leased to, other parties. It does, however, include

the permanent way at stations and plant within these locations.

Operational

incident

An irregularity affecting, or with the potential to affect, the safe

operation of trains or the safety and health of persons.

The term operational incident applies to a disparate set of human

actions involving an infringement of relevant rules, regulations or

instructions.

Ovenstone criteria An explicit set of criteria, adapted for the railway, which provides an

objective assessment of suicide if a coroner’s verdict is not available.

The criteria are based on the findings of a 1970 research project into

rail suicides and cover aspects such as the presence (or not) of a suicide

note, the clear intent to take their life, behavioural patterns, previous

suicide attempts, prolonged bouts of depression and instability levels.

See Appendix 3.

Passenger A person on railway infrastructure, who either intends to travel on a

train, is travelling on a train, or has travelled on a train. This does not

include passengers who are trespassing or who take their life – they are

included as members of the public.

Passenger train A train that is in service and available for the use of passengers.

Note that a train of empty coaching stock brought into a terminal

station, for example, becomes a passenger train in service as soon as it

is available for passengers to board.

Pedestrian This refers to a person travelling on foot, on a pedal cycle, on a horse or

using a mobility scooter.

Possession The complete stoppage of all normal train movements on a running line

or siding for engineering purposes. This includes protection as defined

by the Rule Book (GE/RT8000).

Potentially higher-

risk train accidents

(PHRTA)

Accidents that are RIDDOR-reportable and have the most potential to

result in harm to any or all person types on the railway. They comprise

train derailments, train collisions (excluding roll backs), trains striking

buffer stops, trains striking road vehicles at level crossings, trains

running into road vehicles not at level crossings (with no derailment),

train explosions, and trains being struck by large falling objects.

Precursor A system failure, sub-system failure, component failure, human error or

operational condition which could, individually or in combination with

other precursors, result in the occurrence of a hazardous event.

http://rssb-intranet/skandpwiki/Wiki%20Pages/station.aspx


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Term Definition

Precursor Indicator

Model (PIM)

An RSSB-devised model that measures the underlying risk from train

accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of accident precursors.

See Section 6.6 for further information.

Public (members

of)

Persons other than passengers or workforce members. This includes

passengers who are trespassing (eg when crossing tracks between

platforms), and anyone who commits suicide, or attempts to do so.

RIDDOR

(The Reporting of

Injuries, Diseases

and Dangerous

Occurrences

Regulations)

RIDDOR refers to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous

Occurrences Regulations, a set of health and safety regulations that

mandate the reporting of, inter alia, work-related accidents. These

regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and

updated several times. In 2012, there was an amendment to the

RIDDOR 1995 criteria for RIDDOR-reportable workforce minor injuries

from three days to seven days. For the purposes of the industry’s safety

performance analysis, the more-than-three-days criterion has been

maintained, and the category termed Class 1 minor injury. In the latest

version of RIDDOR, published 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was

dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer

to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as

major. Again, for consistency in industry safety performance analysis,

the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated

definition from RIDDOR 1995.

Risk Risk is the potential for a known hazard or incident to cause loss or

harm; it is a combination of the probability and the consequence of that

event.

Running line A line shown in Table A of the Sectional Appendix as a passenger line or

as a non-passenger line.

Safety

Management

Information

System (SMIS)

A national database used by railway undertakings and infrastructure

managers to record any safety-related events that occur on the railway.

SMIS data is accessible to all of the companies who use the system, so

that it may be used to analyse risk, predict trends and focus action on

major areas of safety concern. From 6 March 2017 the database was

replaced with the Safety Management Intelligence System (SMIS)

Safety Risk Model

(SRM)

A quantitative representation of the safety risk that can result from the

operation and maintenance of the GB rail network.


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Term Definition

Shock/trauma Shock or traumatic stress affecting any person who has been involved

in, or has been a witness to, an event, and not suffered any physical

injury.

Shock and trauma is measured by the SRM and reported on in safety

performance reporting; it is within the scope of what must be reported

into SMIS. However, it is never RIDDOR-reportable.

Class 1 Shock/trauma events relate to witnessing a fatality incident or

train accident (collisions, derailments and fires).

Class 2 Shock/trauma events relate to all other causes of shock/trauma

such as verbal assaults, witnessing physical assaults, witnessing non-

fatality incidents and near misses.

Signal passed at

danger (SPAD)

An incident where any part of a train has passed a stop signal at danger

without authority or where an in-cab signalled movement authority has

been exceeded without authority.

A SPAD occurs when the stop aspect, end of in-cab signalled movement

authority or indication (and any associated preceding cautionary

indications) was displayed correctly and in sufficient time for the train

to stop safely.

SPAD risk ranking

tool

A tool that gives a measure of the level of risk from each SPAD. It

enables the industry’s total SPAD risk to be monitored and it can be

used to track performance, and inform SPAD investigations. The score

for each SPAD ranges from zero (no risk) to 28 (a very high risk) and is

based on both the potential for the SPAD to lead to an accident and the

potential consequences of any accident that did occur. SPADs with risk

rankings between 16 and 19 are classified as potentially significant, and

those with risk rankings of 20 and above are classified as potentially

severe.

Suicide A fatality is classified as a suicide where a coroner has returned a

verdict of suicide.

Suspected suicide The classification used for fatalities believed to be a suicide and which

have not yet been confirmed by a verdict from a coroner.

Trackside A collective term referring to the running line and yards, depots and

sidings.

Train Any vehicle (with flanged wheels on guided rails), whether self-

powered or not, on rails within the GB rail network.

Train accident Reportable train accidents are defined in RIDDOR. The main criterion is

that the accident must have occurred on, or affected the running line.

There are additional criteria for different types of accident, and these

may depend on whether the accident involves a passenger train.


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Term Definition

Buffer stop

collision

This occurs when a train strikes the buffer stops. Accidents resulting in

only superficial damage to the train are not reportable under RIDDOR.

Collision between

trains

This term describes collisions involving two (or more) trains. Accidents in

which a collision between trains results in derailment or fire are included

in this category.

Roll back collisions occur when a train rolls back (while not under

power) into a train on the same line (including one from which it has

decoupled).

Setting back collisions occur when a train making a reversing movement

under power collides with a train on the same line, usually as part of a

decoupling manoeuvre.

Shunting movement/coupling collisions arise when the locomotive or

unit causing a collision is engaged in marshalling arrangements. While

they characteristically occur at low speed and involve the rolling stock

with which the locomotive or unit is to be coupled, accidents may

involve a different train that could be travelling more quickly.

Coming into station collisions occur between two trains that are

intended to be adjacent to one another (for example, to share a

platform) but are not intended to couple up or otherwise touch.

Normally, but not always, the collision speed will be low, because one

train is stationary and the approaching train will be intending to stop

short of the stationary train (rather as for a buffer stop). This operation

is known as permissive working.

In running (open track) collisions occur in circumstances where trains

are not intended to be in close proximity on the same line. The speed of

one or both of the trains involved may be high.

Collisions in a possession occur where there is a complete stoppage of

all normal train movements on a running line or siding for engineering

purposes. These collisions are only RIDDOR-reportable if they cause

injury, or obstruct a running line that is open to traffic.

Derailment This includes all passenger train derailments, derailments of non-

passenger trains on running lines and any derailment in a siding that

obstructs the running line. Accidents in which a train derails after a

collision with an object on the track (except for another train or a road

vehicle at a level crossing) are included in this category, as are accidents

in which a train derails and subsequently catches fire or is involved in a

collision with another rail vehicle.

Open door collision This occurs when a train door swings outward, coming into contact with

another train.


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Term Definition

Train fire This includes fires, severe electrical arcing or fusing on any passenger

train or train conveying dangerous goods, or on a non-passenger train

where the fire is extinguished by a fire brigade.

Trains being struck

by missiles

This includes trains being struck by airborne objects, such as thrown

stones, if this results in damage requiring immediate repair.

Trains running into

objects

This includes trains running into or being struck by objects anywhere on

a running line (including level crossings) if the accident had the potential

to cause a derailment or results in damage requiring immediate repair.

Trains striking

animals

This includes all collisions with large-boned animals and flocks of sheep,

and collisions with other animals that cause damage requiring

immediate repair.

Train striking road

vehicle

All collisions with road vehicles on level crossings are RIDDOR-

reportable. Collisions with road vehicles elsewhere on the running line

are reportable if the train is damaged and requires immediate repair, or

if there was a possibility of derailment.

Train Protection

and Warning

System (TPWS)

A safety system that automatically applies the brakes on a train which

either passes a signal at danger, or exceeds a given speed when

approaching a signal at danger, a permissible speed reduction or the

buffer stops in a terminal platform.

A TPWS intervention is when the system applies the train’s brakes

without this action having been taken by the driver first.

A TPWS activation is when the system applies the train’s brakes after

the driver has already initiated braking.

TPWS reset and continue incidents occur when the driver has reset the

TPWS after an activation (or intervention) and continued forward

without the signaller’s authority.


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Term Definition

Trespass/

Trespasser

Trespass occurs when people intentionally go where they are never

authorised to be.

This includes:

Passengers crossing tracks at a station, other than at a defined crossing.

Public using the railway as a shortcut.

Passengers accessing the track at station to retrieve dropped items.

Public using the running lines for leisure purposes.

Public committing acts of vandalism / crime on the lineside.

Passenger / public accessing the tracks via station ramps.

Public inappropriate behaviour on other infrastructure resulting in a fall

onto the railway.

Public jumping onto railway infrastructure.

On train passengers accessing unauthorised areas of the train (interior

or exterior).

Note: Level crossing users are never counted as trespassers, providing

they are not using the crossing as an access point into a permanently

unauthorised area, such as the trackside.

Workforce Persons working for the industry on railway operations (either as direct

employees or under contract).

Notes:

‘Under contract’ relates to workforce working as contractors to (for

example) a railway undertaking or infrastructure manager (either as a

direct employee or a contractor to such organisations).

Staff travelling on duty, including drivers travelling as passengers, are to

be regarded as workforce. When travelling before or after a turn of

duty, they are to be treated as passengers.

British Transport Police (BTP) employees working directly for a railway

undertaking or infrastructure manager on railway operations should be

treated as workforce.

On-board catering staff (persons on business, franchisees’ staff etc) and

any persons under contract to them on a train (for example, providing

catering services) should be treated as workforce.

Appendices: List of abbreviations

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Appendix 7. List of abbreviations

Acronym Expansion

ABCL automatic barrier crossing locally monitored

ADEPT Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport

AHB automatic half-barrier crossing

ALCRM All Level Crossing Risk Model

AOCL automatic open crossing, locally monitored

AOCR automatic open crossing, remotely monitored

ASPR Annual Safety Performance Report

ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies

ATP automatic train protection

AWS automatic warning system

BAA British Airports Authority – one instance in app. 3

BTP British Transport Police

CCTV closed-circuit television

COSS controller of site safety – one instance in app.7

CP control period; we are currently in the fifth period, CP5, which runs from April 2014 to March 2019

CSI common safety indicator

CST common safety target

DRSG Data and Risk Strategy Group

DfT Department for Transport

EC European Commission

ECS empty coaching stock

ERA European Railway Agency

ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System

ESOB Emotional Support Outside Branch

EU European Union

FOC freight operating company

FWI fatalities and weighted injuries

FWSI fatalities and weighted serious injuries

GB Great Britain

GBH grievous bodily harm

GIS geographic information system

GPS Global Positioning System

GSM Global System for Mobile Communications

HEM hazardous event movement

HEN hazardous event non-movement

HET hazardous event train accident

HLOS High Level Output Specification – one instance in app.7

HOTA Home Office Type Approved


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Acronym Expansion

HSE Health and Safety Executive

HWPG Health and Wellbeing Policy Group

ILCAD International Level Crossing Awareness Day

IOSH Institution of Occupational Safety and Health

ISLG Infrastructure Safety Leadership Group

LC level crossing

LCRIM Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model

LCSG Level Crossing Strategy Group

LED light emitting diode

LENNON Latest Earnings Networked Nationally Overnight (system)

LIDAR light detection and ranging

LOEAR Learning from Operational Experience Annual Report

LSCG Level Crossing Strategy Group

LUL London underground – only in appendices

LX level crossing

MCB manually controlled barrier crossing

MCG manually controlled gate crossing

MWA moving weighted average

MWL miniature warning lights

NR Network Rail

NRMI Network Rail managed infrastructure

NRT National Rail Trends

NRV national reference value

NSA National Safety Authority

NFSG National Freight Safety Group

NTS National Travel Survey

OC open crossing

OD obstacle detection

OLE Overhead line equipment

ONS Office for National Statistics

ORBIS Offering Rail Better Information Services

ORCATS Operational Research Computerised Allocation of Tickets to Services (system)

ORR Office of Rail and Road

OTP on-track plant

PHRTA potentially higher-risk train accident

PIM Precursor Indicator Model

PTI platform-train interface

PTSRG People on Trains and Stations Risk Group

RADAR Radio Detection And Ranging

RAIB Rail Accident Investigation Branch

RDG Rail Delivery Group


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Acronym Expansion

RID Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail

RIDDOR Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995

RISSG Rail Industry Suicide Stakeholder Group

RLSE red light safety equipment

ROGS The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems

RRG Road Risk Group

RRUKA Rail Research UK Association

RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board

RTC Road Traffic Collision

RTS Rail Transport Service

RV road vehicle

SMIS Safety Management Information System (from 06 March 2017 Safety Management Intelligence System)

SMS safety management system

SPAD signal passed at danger

SPDHG Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group

SRM Safety Risk Model

SRR SPAD Risk Ranking

SSRG System Safety Risk Group

TARG Train Accident Risk Group

TOC train operating company

TORG Train Operations Risk Group

TPWS Train Protection and Warning System

TRG Trespass Risk Group

TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability

UK United Kingdom

UWC user-worked crossing

UWC-T user-worked crossing with telephone

YDS Yards, depots and sidings

Documents

Annual Safety Performance Report - RSSB · PDF fileiv Annual Safety Performance Report 2016/17 Executive summary ... PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was