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8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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could
be said
[For
theLove
of
Language
137].
These limits do not
simply
set restrictions
on a
speaker's
or
a writer's
freedom;
hey
ratherdefine a
non-ego-centered
reedom,
one
not conceivable as
a
breaking
down of boundariesor a violation of
rules,
but as
the
creation,
in
accordancewith certain
aws,2
of
an
area
of
choice.
All
of
this
has
been reiterated
n
many
different
ways.
But the
consequences
of this
conception
of
language
and literaturehave not
provided
the
premises
for
a
continuing
research.
On
the
contrary,
he radical
challenge
to certain orthodoxies a
non-speaker-
centered
conception
of
language
containedhas been
imperceptibly
revised,
and the old
has returned
under he
guise
of the new. As the
fittingaccompaniment
o this
revisionism,
another
inguistics
is
currentlyappealed
to,
one Milner has
labeled
an
antilinguistics,
which
renouncesthe difficult
task
of
providing
a formal
account
of
the often recalcitrant
data
of
language
and of
submitting
his account o the standards f
logical economy.
This
is a
linguistics
that,
unwilling
to or
incapable
of
looking
directly
at the
impersonal
aws
of
language
tself and
analyzing
ts forms and
systems,
turns
nsteadto the humanvoice
divine withinlinguisticperformance, ubstituting ommunication orlanguage. Such a
substitute
inguistics goes by
various
names: discourse
analysis,
pragmatics, peech
act
theory,
communications
heory.3
It
provides
the
justification
for
the
returnof
a
unified
authorial
voice,
in
the
guise
of the
speaker,
to literature.
That
returnhas been
disguised:
it
poses
as a
challenge
to the
egocentric
theory
of
language,
which it
submerges
n
the notion of the unicite
or
oneness of the
subject,
and
yet
reintroduces his
egocentricity
under he
formof
a
multiplication
f
speakers
n
certain
configurations.
These are the various theories of dual
voice,
of
dialogism
and
heteroglossia,
of
polyphony,
enjoying
currency
at this
moment. Their
appeal
explains
in
part
the
discovery
and
republication
of
Bakhtin;
it
likewise
explains
the
following
Oswald Ducrothas
in
France.
In
the face
of
the declaration
f
the
deathof the
author
n
writing,
hese theories
perform
he function
of a kind
of
animism,
repeopling
he
text
with the
sound
of
personal
voices.
Moreover,
he
carnivalesque, heteroglossia,
polyphony -all
are
proffered
as
figures
of an
imaginary
reedom
whose
model,
whose
utopia,
s
a
crowd,
overflowing
boundaries,
breaking
ules
and
mingling
many
voices,
and
whose
ultimate
weaponagainst
power
is an
irony
conceived eitheras the
interpenetration
of voices or
as a
preordained ntentionality
which
intervenesdeus
ex voce to
provide
an
ultimate
harmony
and
meaning
that are
personal.
What s
Ducrot's
theory
of
polyphony
andhow
does it reintroduce
speaker-centered
linguisticsat the very momentit denies it? To answer thisquestion,I will counterpose
Ducrot's sketch of this
theory
to what he
rejects
as
that
theory's
contrary-the
most
recent
defense of the
dogme
intouchable
172]
that
chaque
enonce
possede
un et un
seul auteur
171],
namely,
the
theory
of the
language
of
narrative
iction as a
system
of
unspeakable
entences,
in
order
o
argue
that
Ducrot's
very
conception
of the
actualand
2.
The
questionofthefreedom
possible
withina
language
conceivedas a
system
of
rules
might
be
pursued
with
respect
to
Chomsky's
nsistenceon
linguistic
creativity
and
thefact
that he is
often
misunderstood
o
mean
by
this the
ability
ofthegrammar ogenerate
an
infinite
number
ofsentences
from afinite numberof rules and thespeaker's abilitytoproduceand interpret entences he has
never encountered
before.
It is the latter
which
defines
the
parameters of
this
creativity
but does
not
explain
or
predict
it.
3. See For
heLoveof
Language[138].
The
qualificationofthesedisciplines
s
antilinguistics
should
not be taken o mean that
the
questions
hey
reatare
illegitimate
or
without
nterest
but
only
that
they all
outside the
range
of
a
formal
linguistics.
Just as the
limits
of
a
formal
linguistics
are
not
an
argumentagainst
the
validity
of
its
claims,
so the
informal
nature
of
such
disciplines
is in
direct
relation to
the issues
they
address.
Whatrenders them
substitutes s
the claim
of
certain
of
their
practitioners
that
the
inability of formal
linguistics
to
account
for
this or that
aspect of
language
demonstrates he
superiority
of
an
nonformalpragmatics.
It is in this
way
thatthosewho
take
this
position deprive
themselves
of
the
discoveries
of
a
formal linguistics.
22
8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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possible
alternativesshows how the issues have been obscured. He assumes that the
relevant
dichotomy
exists between the
hypothesis
that
every
utterancehas
one
and
only
one
speaker,
ancredans
a
tradition
inguistique
172],
and
a
polyphonic heory
of
the
utterance hataims
to mettre n doute
e
postulat
selon
lequel
un enonce fait
entendreune
seule
voix
[172].
Ducrot's
implicit reasoning
assumes
that
the
only challenge
to
the
traditional
egocentric
view
of
language
is one that
counterposes
a multitudeof
voices,
assuming
various functions of the
speaker,
to
the
unicite of a
single
speaking
voice.
But
the issues can
be
posed
otherwise
and indeed
have been. Another alternative
exists,
one
that
renders
the
polyphonic
theory
as
only
a variation of
the
existing
one,
because the crucial ssue does not turnon whetheran utterance s restricted o one or more
than one voice but on whether
every
utterance
must have a
voice.
This
question
is
centralto the
theory
of
narrative
have
presented
n
Unspeakable
Sentences. Yet it has
gone
so
universally
unremarkedhat
the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences is
grounded
on
the claimed existence
of
speakerless
sentences that
it is
difficult
not
to
suspect
that it
is
here theattempt,whetherdeliberateorunconscious,appears o wardoff the menace to
the traditional
gocentricconception
of
language,
o echo Ducrot
[172].
But
the
empirical
consequences
of this claim and the
challenge
it
poses
to traditional
assumptions
cannot
be
grasped
until
the notions
author, voice,
speaker,
and
subject
have
been
rigorously
defined
in
terms
of
the data. This neitherDucrot nor other defenders of dual
voice
do,
contenting
themselves
with
what
Ducrot
calls a sketch. It is
in
this
way
that
the hardand inalterable
givens
of
language
and
the
laws
they
yield
can be avoided and
more
reassuring
notions
smuggled
in.
For
what
if
thereexisted utterancesunmarked
y
the
person
of even a
single
speaker?
Then such instancesof
language
would
have lost the
authority
and intentionalcoherence
attributable o that
person
called
by
grammatical
radition he
first.
What would then
be
the
consequence
for
the unicite of
the
speaking subject,
for
the
possibility
of
a
plurality
of voices? To
answer these
questions
we must turn o a
more
detailed
account
of
the
evidence of
narrativeas well
as
to the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences.
This
theory
requires
severalnotions. Some
are
already
a
part
of
generative
inguistic
theory
and hence
not introduced
solely
to account for
the
particular
data relevant to
narrative
style,
and a restrictednumberof others
are
justified by
the
sole evidence of
narrative.Their
meaning
s thus
specific
to the
theory,
even
when,
like
subject
or
SELF,
they
also
have
a
meaning
n
ordinary
anguage,
and t is the
theory-specific
meaning
which
must be understoodwhen interpreting he theoryand weighing its claims against any
alternative.
The
first notionto be
singled
out is thatof an
E,
or
Expression,
which rewrites
Chomsky's
S
(S
=
Sentence),
with
the further
tipulation
hatthis
highest
S
cannotbe
embedded,
that
is,
may
not
appear
subordinated
o
any
other E.
I
have
provided
justification
for this revision of
Chomsky's
S
[see
Conditions
on
Transformations
(1973)]
in
Narrative
Style
and the
Grammar
of
Direct and Indirect
Speech
and
Unspeakable
Sentences.
Once
introduced,
urther
onsequences
follow
from
it,
permit-
ting
a unified accountof what
can
be
referred o as
linguistic subjectivity
[see
Unspeak-
able
Sentences].
It is thus for
purely
syntactic
reasonsthat he two
principles
formulated
in
these two
works,
andwhose
functionDucrotsees as
warding
off
the threat
of
a plurality
of
subjects
172]-namely
thosesummarized s
1E/1
SELF
nd Priority
f
Speaker 4-
4.
1
Ell
SELF s
a
revision
of
Ell
I
or
Speaker
o
accountfor
the data
of represented
hought.
The
ormulation
of Unspeakable
Sentences is the
following:
a.
1
E/1
SELF. For
every
node
E,
there
is
at
most one
referent,
called the
subject
of
consciousness,
or
SELF,
to
whom
all
expressive
elementsare attributed. That
is,
all realizations
of
SELF in an E
are
coreferential.
b.
Priority
of
SPEAKER.
If
there is
an
I,
I is
coreferential
with the
SELF.
In the absence
of
an
I,
a
third-personpronoun may
be
interpreted
as SELF
[93].
diacritics / winter 1991
23
8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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are
principles
whose domain s the
E
or entiresentence.
(Moreover,
t
should be recalled
that
the notion
Sentence
in
transformational
rammar
s an initial
idealization of the
notion utterance. Such
a
grammar,accounting
for
competence
and not
perfor-
mance,
s a
grammar
not of
utterances,
which
belong
to
performance,
but
of
Sentences,
or
in
the
terminology
used
in
Narrative
Style,
of
Es.)5
Every
E
may
have
at
most one
subject
of consciousness or
SELF,
a second notionthe
theory
defines. The SELF
is
the
point
of
reference
for
a set
of
subjective
elements and
constructions-deictics,
nouns
and
adjectives
of
quality
[see Milner,
De la
syntaxe
d
l'interprdtation],
exclamations,
and
so
forth-which share features of
distributionand
syntactic
behavior. The
generalizationexpressed
in
1
E/1
SELF thus
relates these two
notions-E and SELF-in
a
precise way.
Note,
for
instance,
that the
generalization
applies
to the
unique
reference of a
speaker
in
an
E
only by
virtue
of the
obligatory
coreference
of
speaker
and
SELF,
that
s,
by
virtueof
Priority
of
Speaker.
Moreover,
no
comparable
laim
as
to the
uniqueness
of
the referentof the SELF s made about
any
unit
larger hananE;inparticular,heclaim is not extended o the notionTEXT, which,inthe
special meaning
attributed
o it
in
Unspeakable
Sentences,
is the
unit constituted
by
a
series
of Es
related
by
the
rules of
anaphora
nd of
concordanceof
person
and tense.
On the
contrary,
t is
explicitly
stated
n
Unspeakable
Sentences hat he evidence
supports
no such extension of
1
E/1
SELF to the
TEXT,
held
together,
hen,
only
by
the
rules
of
anaphora
nd
Concordance
f
PersonandTense. Concordance f Person
requires
hatall
instances
of
the first
person
remaincoreferential
hroughout
ll Es of a
TEXT,
but
t makes
no such
requirement
or the referentsof SELF.
As
a
result,
the
subject
or
SELF
may
change
from
E
to
E,
giving
rise to the
famous
shift
n
point
of view
of
the
moder
novel,
whatBlanchotrefers o
in
The
NarrativeVoice
as
the
multiplication
f little
egos
[136].
In
the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences,
the novelistic
text
may
consist
of a
plurality
of
different
hird-person
ubjects,
each one
unable o
penetrate,
o
to
speak,
the
E
or
sentence
occupied by
another,
what Sartreonce called la solitude de
chaque
unit6
phrastique
[117].
The result is a
kind
of
monadology
of the sentence whose
logical
consequence
is
a
plurality
of
subjective
worlds. Insofaras an intuitive
response
to the novelistic
form has
been the
acknowledgement
of
this
plurality
of
perspectives,
the
theory
of
unspeakable
sentences
provides
one model of this atomism of
points
of
view,
one
in
which
the
perspective,
that
s,
the
SELF,
is
a
centerto which
linguisticallysubjective
elements and
constructionsarereferredand
in
which
only
a
single
such center s
permitted
n
an E. But
it is nota model that does not account for multiplepointsof view.
To
point
out the
possible plurality
of
perspectives
which is
deducible
from a
theory
in
which
1E/1
SELF and
Priority
of
Speaker
or I)
apply
to
Es
and not
to TEXTS
is
not,
however,
to
say
that the
theory
of
unspeakable
sentences is a notational variant of a
polyphonic theory
of the utterance. Both
Ducrot's
polyphonictheory
and that
of
unspeakable
entences
confront,
n
part,
he same set of
facts,
which
may
be described-
an
initial
description
depending
on a
terminology
that further
analysis may
reveal to be
misleading-as
texts
containing
a
plurality
of
perspectives,
in
some sense
yet
to be
defined. But the
relegation
of each
single
SELF
(as
one
theory'sconcept
of
a
perspective,
counterposed
o the other's notion of
voice )
to
the
confines
of
one or more
E
and the
Ducrot does
not
seem to be
familiar
either with
the
fuller
presentation of
these
principles
in
Unspeakable
Sentences or with
the criticism
of
the
dual voice
theory
in that context or in The
FormalCoherence
ofRepresented
Speech
and
Thought,
but
only
with
my
1973
article
[
Narrative
Style ].
5. Ducrot also
insists on unedistinction
rigoureuse
entre
l'enonce
et 'la
phrase '
[174].
But
if
the distinction is
appropriately
nvoked
at
the
start,
he
unfortunately
does
not establish an
equally rigorous system
relating
these notions. This undermineshis attack on
1
Ell
SELF,
since
hecanpresent
claims
about
I'
nonce
without
pecifying
nwhat
way
this
constitutes
an
argument
against
a
theory of
Es,
which have
the theoretical
status
of
sentences.
24
8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
7/13
impossibility
of morethanone
SELF
appearing
n
a
single
E
yield
a
quite
different
picture
of the novelistic text
than
the
one
in
the
position
Ducrotoutlines.
(It
should be
pointed
out here
that
the
precisionrequired
and made
possible by
linguistic methodology
and the
formally
representable
vidence of
language
allow one
to
go beyond variously nterpret-
able nonformal
accounts,
such
as
thatof Bakhtin. It
may
not
be
entirelypossible
to decide
whetherBakhtin's
position
is
closer
to
thatof Ducrotor thatof
Unspeakable
Sentences-
at times
his
phrasing
seems to
permit
the
possibility
of
two
points
of
view
in
a
single
sentence,
and at other times it does not-because Bakhtin never
posed
the
question
in
these
terms.)6
What
is
decisive is that the
possibility
of
shifts
in
perspective
arises
in
the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences
under
quite specific
circumstances. For Concordanceof
Person,
the
principle
defining
the
larger
unit
of
the
TEXT,
among
other
things,
as
a
sequence
of
Es
in
which all referentsof the first
person
remain
coreferential,
ogether
with
Priority
of
Speaker,
a
principle affecting
Es,
means that
a
TEXT
may
shift
perspectivesonly
when
it has no firstperson. The crucial condition for the appearanceof a style displaying a
plurality
of
perspectives
thus
emerges
as the
possibility
of
sentences
(technically,
of
Es)
with no
speaker,
that
is,
sentences
in
which
the first
person
is
excluded,
in
which that
central
authority
of
the
personal
voice
of
the
speaker, nterpreting, valuating,
expressing
and
bestowing
coherence and
unity
on a
discourse,7
s absent.
In
the
linguistic analysis
of
that
narrative
tyle
known
in
French
as
style
indirect ibre and which
I
call
represented
speech
and
thought
can
be found the
syntactic arguments
hat Es with a
third-person
SELF cannot also contain a first
person,
or otherwise
they
could not receive the
interpretation
n
which
they
represent
a
third-person oint
of view. To
account
for
such
sentences,
a
subjectiveperspective
must be
isolated
independent
of the first
person
and
thus not
be
assumed
by
the authoritative
peaking
voice
of
any
narrator.
In
this
way,
a
novel
may
represent many
such
subjectivities,
each one
equal
from
a
linguistic
point
of
view,
without
giving
one
point
of
view
priority
over the other
(as
would be the case
if
a
speaker's
voice were allowed to
occupy
the same
E
as
a
third-personperspective),
and
unity
and
meaning
ome
to
reside elsewhere than
n
the
continuous,
personal
voice
of a narrator
ommenting
on
and
guiding
the
reading.
Each
single
perspective
remains
uninterpreted,
owever,
at
any higher
level
in
the
language
of the text.
6. See
Reboulfor
a discussion
of
Bakhtinwith
respect
to Ducrot's
polypony
and the
theory
of unspeakable
entences. For anotherdiscussion
ofBakhtin
andDucrot,see Moeschler. Ducrot's
characterization
of
the
theory of unspeakable
entences
and
the
logical
relations
holding among
its
various
claims
is,
at
any
rate,
inaccurate:
arrivee...
au
momentou
une
pluralit6
de
sujets
pourraient
tre
introduitsdans
1'enonce,
Banfield
formule
deux
principesqui
ecartent a menace. Elle
pose
d'abord
qu'il
ne
peut
y
avoir,
pour
un enonce
donne,
qu'un
seul
sujet
de
conscience,
repoussant
d'emblee
dans
le domaine
de
l'anormal es
exemples
qui
feraient
apparaitre
ne
pluralit6
de
points
de
vue
juxtaposes
ou
imbriques.
Et
ensuite,
afin
de
traiter
es cas ou
le
sujet
de conscience
n'est
pas
l'auteur
empirique
de
l'enonce,
elle
pose qu'il
n'y
a
pas,
dans
ces
enonces,
de
locuteur. Certes, e ne reprocheraipas a Banfield-bien aucontraire-de distinguer e
locuteur,
c'est
a
dire
l'etre
designe
dans l'enonce comme son auteur
(au
moyen, par
exemple,
de
marques
de la
premierepersonne),
et
le
producteur mpirique,
etre
qui
n'a
pas
a
etre
pris
en
compte par
une
description inguistique pr6occupee
seulement des
indications
semantiques
ontenuesdans
'enonce.
Ce
queje reprocherai
Banfield,
c'est
la
motivation
qui
1'amene cette
distinction,
a
savoir
e
souci de
maintenir
oute
que
cofte
l'unicit6
du
sujet
parlant.
[172]
7. Here
I
am
using
discourse
n
its
ordinary
sense. In
Unspeakable
Sentences the
term
is
reserved
or
that kind
of
sequence
of
Es,
that
is,
that kind
of
TEXT-a unit
that
is
not
necessarily
written-which is marked
inguistically by
the
presence of
a
speaker
and
an
addresseelhearer.
diacritics
/ winter 1991
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It
is
in
a
quite
different ashion thata
multiplicity
of
points
of view are accounted or
in
Ducrot.
Indeed, polyphony
or
Ducrotdoes not refer o an unlimited
number
in
terms
of
any
limits
imposed
by
the
grammar)
f
equal points
of
view-equal
because each
has
as
its
domain
an
equivalent
grammatical
unit,
the
E,
in
which
each
plays
an
equivalent
role.
For
Ducrot
every
sentence
is
divided between several different
unctions,
n
a
way
reminiscent of the division
between
speaker
and
self
in
the
theory
of
unspeakable
sentences
[see
The FormalCoherenceof
RepresentedSpeech
and
Thought ].
But the
similarity
only goes
so far. For the
division between
speaker
and
SELF
does not endow
the
speaker
with
the
independent
status of a full
speaking
subject grammatically
incarnated
n
the
first
person
and
separate
rom the
third-person
ELF,
whose
perspective
is
subordinated o
it.
The
speakermay appearonly
when it is
coreferentialwith
the
unique
SELF.
As
long
as
a
third
person subjectivity
s
represented,
no
speaking
voice can be
realized.
In
Ducrot's
account,
on the
contrary,
s well as
in
otherversions
of a
dual
voice
theory,
the text
in
which
a
third-person ubjectivity
is
represented
retains a
higher
authoritythat places this representedsubjectivitywithin a system of values-those
spoken
by
the
narrating oice -higher
than itself.
I
will not enter nto a detailedrefutation f Ducrot's
position,
restrictingmyself
to
the
more
important
ask
of
correcting
certain
recurrent
misconceptions
about the differences
between the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences and
what
seems to me
yet
anotherversion
of the
position
I have dealt with elsewhere
under he name of
dual
voice
theory.
There
I
have answered he
objections
of
proponents
f this
theory
n
detail.8
Moreover,
or these
objections
to
carry,
he
citing
of a few
purported
ounterexamples
oes not
suffice,
as
any
version
of
scientific
methodology
will
point
out.
A
countertheory
s
required,
one
accounting
or all the
data he first
theory
accounts
or,
as well
as
for
the
counterexamples.
Until
then,
the burden
of
proof
is on
any counterproposal.
Ducrot, however,
more
than
anyone, cavalierly
dismisses the detailed
edifice
of
rules,
arguments,
and
data- je
signalerai rapidement
une
recherche
americaine
[172]-he
wishes
to
replace
with a
hastily
constructed
sketch. His
methodology
does not
rely
on
logical
argumentation
r
the
marshaling
of
a rich
body
of evidence.
Rather,
each
example
is
just
another
n
a
long
list of
examples
of
different,
supposedly subjective aspects
of the
text,
each
different
example calling
for a new theoretical
onstruct,
nvented
ad
hoc.
Indeed,
the distinctions
Ducrot
makes
seem
ultimately
o
be undone
by
a
methodology
sorely
in
need of that
tool
of
logical economy,
Occam's
razor.
A
finite
number of
theoretical constructs and
principlesare not the means for Ducrotof accountingfor a great varietyof different
donndes,
which
in
turn
ustify
these
constructsand
rules; instead,
a numberof
isolated
examples
or
cases-quite
different
notions than those of
data
and
evidence-are
the
excuse
for
the
proliferation
of
loosely
defined
notions. Where
is the Ducrot of
the
elegantly argued
Peu
et un
peu ?
The
Ducrot
of
the sketchof
polyphony
s not
really
elaborating
a
systematic
theoryargued
on
the
basis
of
linguistic
evidence but is
making
a
loosely classificatory inventory
of
examples
supposedly
inserted
with
difficulty
in
a
theory
of
unspeakable
entences.
The issue of
methodand
argumentation
s
not unconnected o
thatof the
unquestioned
assumptions
and
misconceptions
of
Ducrot's attackon a
theory
of
language
centeredon
a
single subject.
For his whole
countertheory
of
polyphony depends
on a series of
distinctions-between
l'nonciateur,
le
locuteur,
and
l'auteur
empirique,
for
example-that,
if
he is to
make
good
the claim
to have
replaced
a
speaker-centered
linguistics,
he
mustdemonstrate re
empirically
distinct,
hat
s,
that
hey
account or
quite
differentand
clearly
defined
linguistic
phenomena
n
a
consistent
and
systematic
way,
as
8.
Indeed,
Ducrot's
critique
of
Narrative
Style
seems to
rely
on
two
secondary
sources;
it
is not
upon
his own
careful analysis
of
the
theory of
unspeakable
sentences
that
he
bases his
objections,
but
upon
these two
essays
[see
Ducrot
173].
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well as
theoretically
distinct from the
single,
unitary
ubject.
But
the
gestures
he makes
toward
a
theory
n which the
authority
of a dominant
peaking
voice is
challenged
never
transcend he idea of a
hierarchy
of
speaking
subjects,reduplicated
at
different evels.
In
insisting,
for
instance,
on the
distinction
between
le
locuteur,
c'est-a-dire l'etre
designe
dans
l'6nonce
comme son auteur
(au moyen, par exemple,
de
marques
de la
premiere
personne),
et le
producteur
empirique
[172]-an
important
distinction-he cannot
conceive
of
the
latter,
he
empiricalproducer
f
the
text,
except
on the model
of
another
speaker.
That the author's role
in
writing,
in
composing,
need
not,
cannot,
receive a
linguistic
representation
nified around he notion
of
a
voice does
not,
however,
seem to
have occurred
o
Ducrot,
and
he can conceive of
him
only
as
in
some
way speaking
n
the
text,
even
if
he
never
says
I,
unless
it
is to
represent
a fictional
persona:
The author
sets
before
us characters
who
in what
I
call,following
Anne
Reboul,
a
'first speech
exert a
linguistic
and
extralinguistic
action,
an
action the
authorhimselfdoes not takeresponsibilityfor.But the authormay, n a second
speech,
address the
public
through
the
characters,
either
by
assimilating
himself
to such and such
a
one
who
he seems to make his
representative
..
or
by thefact
that t seems
significant
that the
characters
speak
and behave n such
and such
afashion.
[205;
ed.
trans.]
When
discussing
Benveniste's notion
of
histoire,
Ducrot
seems to allow an
enonce
which
n'exhibe aucunauteurde la
parole.
But the
consequences
of
this
possibility
are
never
pursued,
nor is it
explicitly integrated
nto the
larger
polyphonic
ystem.
Thus,
the
author,
at one level
seemingly
silenced and banished
from
the text
by receiving
no
linguistic representation,
neverthelessreturns o address an audiencevia a
secondary
speech.
For
this is
ultimately
a
metaphoricway
of
describing
certain
phenomena
for which
it is the task
of
linguistics
and
a
literary heory
aided
by
linguistics
to find a moreaccurate
account. This includes an
analysis
of what it
might
meanto
represent
a
subjectivity
other
than
by expressing
t as a
speaker
would to a
listener.
The notion SELF
s
meant
o
capture
such
an
unspoken
otion of
subjectivity.
Whatfollows
from
this
unspeakability
s that
subjectivity
s
unmediated
by
another
nterpreting
oice.
The
inability
to
conceive
of
the
subject
as other hana
speaking
voice
prevents
Ducrot
rom
grasping
he
notion
of
SELF,
thatis, of a subjectwhich is not also a speaker,crucialto the statementof 1 E/1 SELF:
It
is this
1
Ell SELF
theory
that
permits
the use
of
the
expression
subject
while
presupposing
as
self-evident
hat
there
s a
being
who is
the
unique
author
of
the statement
[enonce]
and
responsible or
what is said in the statement.
If
one
has
no
scruples
or reticence n
using
this
expression,
hen,
it is because one
never even dreams
of calling
into
question
the
uniqueness
of
the statement's
origins.
[189;
ed.
trans.]
But
the
subject
is not
responsible
or
what is
said
n
the
Expression,
according
to
1
E/
1
SELF;
he is the
point
of reference or a
specific
setof
linguistically
subjective
elements
in
the
E,
which is
thereby
aken o
represent
his
perspective.
Yet
nothing
s
said
n
such
a
sentence;
an author
who is not
directly
embodied
n
a
first
person,
as a
speaker
s
in
his
speech, may manipulate anguage
n
accordancewith the
possibilities
inherent
n
it-and
at the
same
time
respecting
the limits
it
imposes,
in
order to
represent
a fictional
subjectivity-but
he does
not
speak
n
it. He
writes,rather,
nd
n
writingdisappears.
This
inability
of
Ducrot's to
get
beyond
the
concept
of a
speaking
voice is tied to the
inability
to see revealed
in
the evidence
of
language-in particular,
he evidence of
narrative-a
vision
of
language
other
than
the
egocentric
one,
a vision
in
which a
territory
s
opened
diacritics / winter 1991
27
8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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up
withinmanno
longer
governed
y
man,
n
which orms
andconstructions
ppear
emptied
f all human
resence.
Contrary
oDucrot's
xplicit
laim ohave
destroyed
he
onenessof the
speaking
ubject,
t is
preserved
t
every
evel. What eems
to be
the
unstated
onceptualization
ehind
hisclaim s one
in
whicha certain
nified
ubject-
namelyheauthor-is dividedntoanumberfseparateubjects,achunified ndentire,
but each nevertheless
ierarchically
ubordinatedo
the author
n some
undefined
semantic ashion.
In
this
manner,
henomena
uch as
irony
are
brought
ack to and
containedwithin he amiliarormof a
voice,
whereas
o
such
explanation
s
available
to the
theory
of
unspeakable
entences.
Indeed,
n
this
atter
heory
rony
receives
no
explanation.
But far from
being
a
deficiency
of
this
theory,
his lack
of
explanation
reflects
hefact hat
rony
s not
a
linguistic
henomenon,
n
thestrict ense
of thatwhich
is
formally epresentable
ithin
inguisticheory,
ndcanbe
represented
n
it
only
n
an
imaginary
ndnonfalsifiable
ay.9
For this
reason,
a
formal
inguistic heory,
unlike
Ducrot's,
oncedes hat here re
aspects
f
linguistic
erformance
hat
scape
explana-
tionwithin ts frameworkndacknowledgeshe existence f another isciplinewitha
long
andrich
history nalyzing
hose
aspects
of literature
boutwhich
inguistics
has
nothing
o
say-literary
criticism.
The
alternatives,herefore,
ounterpose
ot a
theory
entered
n
a
single unitary
subject
and a
polyphonic
heory
but rather ne
in
whicha
plurality
f
isolatedand
noncommunicating
oints
of vieworcenters
oexist
n
a narrative
tyle
n
which here s
no
first-person,ingle
omniscient
oice,
imposing personal nity,
and
one
in
which
polyphony
onsists
n
a
hierarchy
f
voices,
eachconceived n themodel
of
the
other,
et
one
providing
single,overarching
enter.
Ultimately,
f
course,
hechoice
between he
two
competing
models
will
depend
n
argumentationppealing
o the
evidence.
But
currently
he
issues
have
taken
on
an
ideological
oloring,
nd t
sufficesto name
one
position unitary
nd heother
polyphonic
or t to
appear
hat hesidesare
chosen.
I
have
ried o
suggest,
however,
hat ither
ide
might
hoose o call itself
polyphonic,
so
long
as
this erm emains
vocative
ather
han
learly
efined. havealso
riedo show
that
he
position
roughly
ketched
y
Ducrot
s
farfrom
being
the
one
presenting
he
greatest
hallenge
o the traditional
gocentric
iew of
language,
ar from
being
the
counterpart
n
linguistics
f a
contemporary
iterary
heory.
Instead,
t is
just
one of the
current
ways
n
which
he
returno the
traditional
ormulation
s
negotiated.
On
the
other
hand,
theory
f
the
anguage
f
narrative
n
which
a
configuration
f
sentencespossessingno subjective enterwhatsoeversentences f Narrationer se)
alternating
ith
entences
ossessing
ifferent
hird-person
enters f
subjectivity
ut
n
which
here
s no
single
center
of
subjectivity
olding ogether
he whole
text
is
by
no
means
a
unique
nd
solated ne.
I
have
argued
lsewhere
see
Ecriture,Narration
nd
the
Grammarf
French ]
hat t
is
such
a
view
of thenovel aken
s
the
paradigmatic
ase
of
literaturehat
emerges
n
the
fiftiesand
sixties
n
France ndthat
ays
the
empirical
groundwork
orthenew
theory
f
literaturehat ame o mark
hosedecades.
Itscentral
tenet,
as we have
seen,
tookvarious
orms: the deathof
the author
r
the
notionof an
6criture
which
was
not
the
personal
oice
of
a
writer
onceivedof as a
speaker.
Its
principles
were
to
be
sought
n
the
language
f the novel.
Each
n
a
strikingly
imilar
fashion,Barthes,
lanchot, utor,
Foucault,
nd
Deleuze awa
radical ivisionbetween
9.
In
other
words,
the
ormula
or irony
is
saying
one
thing
and
meaning
another.
But,
of
course,
that
meaning
is other
than the
semantic
meaning assigned
to the
sentences
by
the
grammar.
It is
for
this reason that ironic
intent s
difficult
o
prove
in
libel suits and
also
for
this
reason that
irony
can be a tool
ofpolitical
opposition
when
the
consequences of
direct
opposition
seem
too
severe.
For a
differentposition
on the
possibility
of
aformal
account
of
irony,
see
Sperber
and
Wilson,
Relevance,
sp.237ff. WhileSperber
ndWilsonreat
ronyformally,hey
nonetheless
place
it
outside
ormal
linguistics.
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two
possibilities
of
novelistic
style
that
set the
language
of narrative ff from
that
of
the
epic,
that
s,
a
narrative ied to the
spoken
language.
Blanchot
spoke
of it as
a
division
of
the il into an
il/it
and an
il/(s)he.
The
first
becomes the
mpersonal
oherenceof a
story
[135],
the
ndifferent-difference
hat
alters
he
personal
voice and
does not
speak
from
a
centre
[142];
the second marks
he
intrusionof
character: the novelist is
the
person
who
refuses to
say
'I'
but
delegates
that
power
to other
people;
the
novel
is
filled
with
little
'egos'
[135-36].
Blanchot's
distinction
corresponds
o the division of
labor
Barthes,
n
the
chapter Writing
and the Novel
in
WritingDegree
Zero,
sees
performed
by
the
narrative
past
(in
French the
pass6
simple)
and what
he
calls the
third
person
of the
novel,
that
s,
represented
hought.
It is
clear
that
for
both Blanchot and
Barthes these
divisions are
ultimately
grammatical,
ased
upon
differences of
person
and tense.
In
the
development
of the novel out of the
epic,
what are
essentially
two new
forms of
narrative
sentence are
accompaniedby
the
gradual ilencing
of
the
storyteller
and the
development
of a form
in
which
that
experience
one
does not recountbut that is
involved when one
recounts creates a distance that decentres he work [Blanchot139].
The
condition then
of
polyphony
n
this
view-of a
plurality
of
subjectively
centered
worlds,
to
use a
terminology
hatavoids
suggesting
a
speaker-is
the
silencing
of
the
central
person
of
an
author
as
narrator,who,
if
he
continues to
exist,
exists
somewhere
outside the
language
of
the
text,
in
another
dark,
as
Beckett
puts
it
in
Company.
The result s
the
creationof
linguistic
units-nonembeddable
sentences,
or
Es-that
owe
their
tructure o some
otherprinciple,
ome othercenter han he
speaker
and
the time
and
place
of his
speech
act.
In
the
case
of
sentences of
Narration,
hose
appearing
n
French n
thepass6 simple,10
here
s no
subjective emporal
nd
spatial
center
whatsoever.
Such sentences
recount he
past
by placing
discreteentities
that
are
past
events
in
a linear
order. But
there
s no
privileged
moment
o
which the othersare
referred;
he
orderof time
is
that
of
history,
outsideof
any
experience.
One
recognizes
n
this
account he
conception
of
time
that
Bergson,
in
L'essai sur les
donn6es
mmn iates
de la
conscience,
defines
by
contrast o la
dur6e;
t is le
temps que
l'astronome ntroduitdans
ses
formules,
e
temps
que
nos
horloges
divisent en
parcelles
egales
[80].
This
explains why
the French
narrative
past,
as
Benveniste has
pointed
out,
toleratesno
deictics.
In
the case
of
sentences of
represented
hought,
he result is even
stranger
and more
counterintuitive.Such sentencesare
organized,
o to
speak,
around
ubjectivecenters
hat
are not egos but third-personcenters of subjectivity,each representingspatially and
temporally
a
here anda now which does
not
designate
any
speech
act.
Stranger
till,
there
is
evidence
thatversions
of
such sentences
exist
thatare
not
occupied by any
third-person
SELF,
but nonetheless contain
spatial
and
temporal
centers.
They
present
unoccupied
perspectives,
inguistic
representations
f a
theoreticalconstruct
belonging
to
Bertrand
Russell's
theory
of
knowledge,
of
possible
worlds,
n
a
Russellian
reading
of
Leibniz.
Such
sentences describethe
sensibilia
of
the
physical
world as
events
grouped
aroundan
empty
center. It
might
be said that
this model
divides
or
factors out the
subject
into
various
linguistically
defined
aspects
of
subjectivity,
some
of
which
may
occur
in
isolation-the here/now of the
unoccupied perspective-and
others
obligatorily
in
conjunction
with this
spatial-temporal
enter.12There s no a
priori
reason for
deciding
that this account of
linguistic subjectivity
s
less
a
threat o the
oneness
of
the
subject
than
another,
since the
unity
of
the
subject
is
a notion that tself
needs
definition within
a
precise
and
empirically
testable
theory.
10.
Such
sentences
correspond
n crucial
ways
to
Benveniste's notion
ofhistoire.
11.
The notion
of
an
unoccupiedperspective
as a
linguistic
concept
is the
subject
of
my
Describing
the
Unobserved: Events
Grouped
around
an
Empty
Center.
12.
See,
in
particular, Unspeakable
Sentences,
chapter
5,
for
a discussion
of
reflective
and
nonreflective
consciousness.
diacritics
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1991
29
8/11/2019 Ann Banfield, 'L'Ecriture Et Le Non-Dit'
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The
world
delineated
n
this
theory
is one created
by
a written
anguage
associated
historically
with
realism,
thatrealism
which,
carried o its
logical
conclusions,
became the
modernism
of
Joyce
and
Woolf,
Proustand Beckett.
It is
a world-the one thatsensation
yields-that
is
fragmentary,
bsurd,
awless,
but not
self-contradictory
Russell
199].13
That world
presents
another
figure
of freedom than the Bakhtinianone. This is
the
freedomof a
writing
n which
the
writer,
poised
between two determinisms-a
personal
style,
an individualand
blind
necessity,
on theone
hand,
and a
rule-governed
anguage
on the other-discovers
an arena of choice
where he
can
create,
liberated
from
the
orthodoxies
of
the
past only
at
that
point
where he
relinquishes
personalexpression
and
ceases to
inhabit
and
use his
language
as
a
speaker.
Then,
at a certain
remove from his
style
and
his
language- that
distance that distances
even
him,
removing
him from
the
centre,
since it
constantly
decentres he
work
Blanchot139]-he
discovers
n
it and
with
a certain error
aws and truthswhose mode of
existence is
impersonal
and
which it
is
no
longer
appropriate
o
qualify
with the
possessive
pronoun.
That
discovery
is of
a
possibility inherent n language,butit is the written anguageof narrative hatreveals it.
A
language
and
a
style
are
blind
forces;
a modeof
writing
s an
act of historical
olidarity
[Barthesl4].
We
recognize
here Barthes's ecriture-that
existential freedomBarthes
claimed,
in
the
face
of
Sartre's
action
and
personal
engagement,
for
an
engaged impersonalwriting
rather
han
for an
engaged
writer. Thus he
choice
of,
and afterwards he
responsibility
for,
a mode
of
writingpoint
to the
presence
of
Freedom
16].
It is a
freedom that
must
engage
in
an
untiringstruggle against
that
doxa which it itself creates.
Writing
as
Freedom
is thereforea mere
moment. But
this
moment
is
one of the most
explicit
in
History,
since
History
s
always
and above
all a
choice
and the limits of this choice
[17].
Nor does this
conception
of freedom
reject
a
priori
the
figure
of the
carnivalesque
rowd
of voices
disrespectful
of laws
and limits. It
rather
ecognizes
thatthe
nostalgia
for such
a freedom
s
a
longing
for
something maginary,
or a freedom
seized
once
and
for
all,
a
freedom
in
which no choices are
required
because no real
consequences
would follow
from
them.
The freedomof
writing
s
haunted
by
a
past
far from
prelapsarian-that
past
of its
own
creation,
its own
history,
which
continually
returns to remind it
of the
unintended
consequences
of its own former
freedom,
to
deprive
its
present
of
the old
possibilities.
Such
aconception
of
language
and iterature
ffers no
imaginary
onsolations.
In
this
perioddesperate orconsolation,aperiodthat dentifies tselfwith nomoredecisive label
than
a
post-
which
only rejects
its
own
past,
the
hardvision of
literary
heory
thatwas
inaugurated
n
the
years
of the cold
war
and that
ived
through
1968 is
pushed
back
into
a
past
now
pronounced
rrelevant.Butthis does not
change
the fact thatall the
possibilities
inherent
n
it have
not
yet
been
exhausted,
despite
their
having
fallen
out of fashion.
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Ann.
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heUnobserved: Events
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ee note
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