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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY, MISSOURI

STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. )

CORNEALIOUS MICHAEL ANDERSON, III )

)

Petitioner, ) Docket # 13MI-CV-00776

)

vs. )

) Underlying Criminal Case:

IAN WALLACE, Warden, Southeast Correctional ) St. Charles County Circuit Court

Center, ) Case # CR0199-00253F

) (Sentenced May 19, 2000)

Respondent. )

REPLY TO STATE’S RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner, CORNEALIOUS MICHAEL ANDERSON, III, by and through undersigned

counsel, hereby submits this Reply to the State’s Response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause.

1. In his response, Respondent places the blame on (1) the Clerk of the St. Charles County

Circuit Court for allegedly failing to transfer the appellate bond to the Missouri Court of Appeals

and the Missouri Supreme Court, and (2) upon Petitioner for having “unclean hands,” asserting

that he “took advantage of the situation in the apparent hope that no one would ever bring the bond

to the Court’s attention.” (Response, p. 3-4). Respondent faults Petitioner for failing to inform

the Missouri Supreme Court that he was out on bond that was supposed to have terminated upon

the Court’s decision dated May 28, 2002, denying his direct appeal. (Response, p. 3).

2. Operating on these two factual assumptions, Respondent claims that Petitioner’s petition

should be denied, claiming that because he bears at least partial responsibility, he cannot claim the

protections of the Due Process guarantees contained within the Missouri Constitution and the

United States Constitution. Respondent’s argument fails for several reasons.

3. First, the State consented to Petitioner’s application for bond pending appeal after he

was sentenced on May 19, 2000. The Order granting the appeal bond was filed with the trial court

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and served upon the State, who signed for the Order on June 6, 2000. (See Exhibit C). The

conditions on the bond imposed no duty whatsoever upon Petitioner other than to return to court

when ordered to do so, and stay out of trouble. He fully satisfied the conditions of his bond.

4. Thus, the State had actual notice that Petitioner was out on bond pending appeal. It was

the State who failed to notify the Missouri Supreme Court that Petitioner was out on bond, and to

request a warrant for his arrest in 2002. Contrary to the State’s claims, Petitioner was under no

obligation to inform the Court that he was out on bond. Rather, the burden rested upon the State

as the prevailing party.

5. Not only did the State fail to notify the Missouri Supreme Court after the May 28, 2002

decision denying Petitioner’s direct appeal, but the State again failed to notify either the Missouri

Supreme Court or the St. Charles County Superior Court that Petitioner remained out on bond in

September, 2002.

6. When Petitioner filed his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Case # 02-CV-

129038 on September 11, 2002, he specifically wrote in the first paragraph on the first page that

he was not in custody, signed the petition, and supplied the Court and the State his current home

address. (See Exhibit L). At no time during the next two years while that petition was pending

did the State ever seek to revoke Petitioner’s bond, inform the Missouri Supreme Court and request

a warrant, or direct Petitioner to surrender.

7. The record conclusively establishes by incontrovertible documentary evidence that

Cornealious Michael Anderson III never hid the fact that he was out on bail.

8. Having dispensed with the notion that Petitioner somehow bears some responsibility for

the alleged failures of the Clerk of the Court, the documented failure of the State, and the

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documented failure of the Department of Corrections, Respondent’s argument that enforcement of

this judgment does not violate Due Process fails.

9. Petitioner is not asking this Court to reverse the Missouri Supreme Court. Respondent

misses the point entirely. Petitioner is asking this Court to declare his continued incarceration

unconstitutional based upon the State’s failure to enforce a judgment for 13 years.

10. The Respondent also ignores binding legal precedent in this State: Ex Parte Bugg, 163

Mo.App. 44, 145 S.W. 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912). While it is true that it is old case law, it has not been

overruled, bears directly on the case at bar, and because it is a decision from a higher court, is therefore

binding upon this Court. Respondent instead focuses on Federal cases, which are neither binding nor

similar to the specific facts of this case, and are therefore unpersuasive. This Court is therefore bound by

Bugg.

11. Contrary to the Respondent's position, equitable estoppel lies against a governmental

entity "where right of justice or the prevention of manifest injustice requires its application."

Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #2 v. City of St. Joseph, 8 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).

As the Court of Appeals held in that case, public rights yield to private individual rights when the

individual possesses greater equitable rights. Id.

12. Here, Petitioner possesses greater equitable rights than the State. It was the State of

Missouri through the Prosecutor that failed or refused to execute upon the judgment of conviction

and sentence. It was the Missouri Department of Corrections that failed to take any remedial action

on a “prisoner” that was not actually incarcerated until 13 years later. Whether the Clerk of the

Court shares any responsibility is irrelevant for the purposes of this petition, because one thing is

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abundantly clear – Cornealious Michael Anderson III bears no responsibility for the delay.1

13. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Ex Parte Bugg, 163 Mo.App. 44, 145 S.W. 831 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1912) is worth repeating, as it is particularly applicable in this case.

We do not think that mere delay in the infliction of the punishment

assessed is a sufficient reason for relieving the convicted party from

the consequences of a judgment against him, unless the delay has

been so great that society could derive no good from its

enforcement; but when such delay has occurred without the fault

of defendant, although with his consent, we should have no

hesitancy in refusing to enforce the judgment. The criminal laws

of this state are not based upon any idea of retaliation against the

offender for the wrong he has done, but punishments are inflicted

solely for the protection of society, and when the execution has,

without the fault of defendant, been so long delayed that society

can no longer have any interest in its enforcement, there would

seem to be no good reason why its enforcement should be

insisted upon.

Id. at 832-833 (emphasis added).

14. The equities in this case clearly favor Petitioner. For 13 years, the State of Missouri

utterly neglected to enforce the judgment of conviction and sentence. As a result of this complete

failure, or refusal, Cornealious Michael Anderson was lulled into a false sense of security by the

State’s lack of interest. Rather than taking advantage of the situation with sinister intentions, he

took advantage of his freedom by living a law-abiding, productive and responsible life. He learned

a valuable trade as a carpenter, got married, had children, bought and built a home in St. Louis,

coached youth football, and joined a church where he was an active member. Eventually, he

started three successful businesses where he employed other people, proving himself to be a

valuable member of society that benefitted from his activities and his tax revenue.

1 There is no evidence that supports Respondent’s theory that the Clerk of the Circuit Court failed to transmit the bond

to appellate courts. Even if that were the case, as urged above, it was not the Clerk’s duty to enforce the judgment,

nor does that excuse the Department of Corrections carrying a “prisoner” on its rolls for 13 years that was not actually

incarcerated.

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15. One of the goals of the criminal justice system is to reform individuals to make them

productive, contributing members of society. He was able to accomplish by himself what the

criminal justice system consistently fails to accomplish for millions of others – to reform them and

make them better citizens. It would be absurd to expect that incarcerating this man at this stage in

his life, given all of his accomplishments, would reform him. Rather, the reverse is true: we would

be taking a good person out of society and making him bad. In short, there is no good reason to

incarcerate this man after 13 years other than vindictiveness.

16. The cruel and unusual punishment lies not in the 13-year sentence, but its application

13 years later, that would destroy not only the life that this man has worked so hard to achieve, but

ruin the lives of 4 young children and a young wife who depend on this man. Such a scenario is

not only illegal, but immoral. As the Bible instructs, "Fathers shall not be put to death for their

sons, nor shall sons be put to death for their fathers." Deuteronomy 24:16.

17. Prison is intended to segregate those individuals that pose such a threat that their

removal from society is necessary for the protection of the public. Prison is inappropriate for

people such as Cornealious Michael Anderson III, who are the pillars of the community. Society

loses if this man is incarcerated at this stage in his life after all that he has accomplished.

18. “While the measure of what is conscience shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does,

as Judge Friendly put it, ‘poin[t] the way.’” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847

(1998). As of this writing, approximately 27,000 individuals have signed an online petition at

http://www.change.org/petitions/attorney-general-chris-koster-release-cornealious-michael-

anderson-iii-from-prison supporting Mr. Anderson’s release. As set forth in Exhibit O and the

Supplemental Petition, the victim of the crime has come forward and publicly stated that he

believes it would be an injustice to force Mr. Anderson to serve this sentence. The continued

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incarceration of Mr. Anderson does, indeed, shock the conscience of tens of thousands of people,

and should shock the conscience of this Court as well.

19. The Respondent submits that this matter may disposed of by conversion of this matter

to a declaratory action. Counsel for Petitioner has researched the matter, and the law as set forth

in Anderson v. Crawford 309 S.W.3e 863 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). The case clearly sets forth a basic

premise of law – a person cannot receive credit for jail time while he was actually out on bond

unless he was erroneously released. Here, Petitioner was not erroneously released – he was

properly released on bond pending appeal.

20. However, this Court has the inherent power to decide this petition and grant the writ

to the extent that he is credited for all of the time spent at liberty as if he were incarcerated nunc

pro tunc from either (1) the date of his conviction and sentence, May 19, 2000; (2) the date he was

released on bond from the Department of Corrections, June 8, 2000, or (3) from the date that his

direct appeal was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court, May 28, 2002. That would be the

functional equivalent of the alternate course suggested by Respondent.

21. For the reasons set forth in his Petition, Supplemental Petition, and this Reply,

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the relief requested herein.

22. Counsel further requests that this Court hold a hearing in the matter as soon as

practicable to determine the merits of the petition, hear argument, and receive evidence as

necessary to substantiate the claims made herein.

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Dated: April 17, 2014

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Patrick Michael Megaro, Esq.

Patrick Michael Megaro, Esq.

Of Counsel, Brownstone, P.A.

Attorneys for Petitioner

33 East Robinson Street, Suite 210

Orlando, Florida 32801

(o) 407-255-2165

(f) 855-224-1671

pmegaro@appealslawgroup.com

New York Bar ID # 4094983

New Jersey Bar ID # 3634-2002

Florida Bar ID # 738913

North Carolina Bar ID # 46770

Admitted Pro Hac Vice in Missouri

/s/ Samuel Henderson, Esq.

Samuel Henderson, Esq.

BROWNSTONE, P.A, of counsel

2015 Bredell Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63143

(o) 314-775-9798

Hendersa85@hotmail.com

Missouri Bar ID # 56330

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 17, 2014 I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court via

electronic filing, and served a paper copy of the same upon the following parties via the United

States Postal Service

Assistant Attorney General Michael J. Spillane

PO Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

Mike.Spillane@ago.mo.gov

/s/ Patrick Michael Megaro, Esq.

Patrick Michael Megaro, Esq.