Anaphoric Inference During Reading 1986

8/12/2019 Anaphoric Inference During Reading 1986

1/7

Journal of Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, and Cognition1986, Vol. 12, No . 3, 34 6-352Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0278- 7393/86 / 00 .75

Anaphoric Inference During ReadingEdward J.O BrienFlorida Atlantic University

Susan A. Duffy and Jerom e L. MyersUniversity of MassachusettsA mherstThree experiments provide evidence that an anaphoric noun phrase reinstates its antecedent in thecourse of comprehension. Subjects read a series of texts each containing a target item. Immediatelyafter the last line of each text, the item was probed using a recognition task in Experiment 1 and anaming taskinExperiment2.Subjectswerefastertorespondtothe item w hen the lastlinecontainedan anaph oric reference to it than when the last line referred to a different item from the text. Addi-tional control conditions ensured thattheeffectwasnotdueto semantic priming and that the probeditem was no t in working memory w hen the last linewasencountered.Athird experimen t suggestedthat previous evidence for reinstatemen t reflected interference from a change of topic in the last linerather than facilitation du e to reinstatement of the probed item .

Although models of reading differ in specific assumptions,they share an em phasis on the role of inferential processes dur-ing comprehension (e.g., Clark, 1978; Kintsch & van Dijk,1978;Schank, 1975). As a result, considerable effort has beendevoted to demonstrating that inferences do occur on linethatis,during the reading process. One such inferential processis that involved in anaphoric reference. An anaphor in a textmight be some general concept, such asthecriminal,that refersto an earlier mentioned antecedent, such as theburglar. Ana-phoric inference is assumed to be a two-stage process in whichreadingcriminalreactivates, or reinstates in working memory,the antecedentburglar,and then the new information about thecriminal becomes integrated with the previous text proposi-tions about the burglar (McKoon &Ratcliff, 1980). Severalstudies have successfully demonstrated a slowdown in readingtimes at the point at which an a naphoric inference is necessary(e.g., Cirilo, 1981; Clark & Sengul, 1979; Ga rrod & Sanford,1977; Haviland Clark, 1974). However, as McKoon and Rat-cliff(1980)have argued, reading time differences alone do notprovide sufficient support for the anaphoric inference process.It must be further demonstrated that a slowdown in readingtime is accompanied by a reactivation of antecedent informa-tion.McKoon and Ratcliff (1980) provided just suchademonstra-tion. They showed that subjects were faster to recognize that a

This research was supported by Grants BNS8O-O118 and BNS83-17900 from the National Science Foundation awarded to Jerome L.Myersand Grant H D17246 from the Na tional Institute of Child Healthand Human Development awarded to Keith Rayner. Susan Duffy wassupported by Postdoctoral Traineeship Grant MH16745 from the Na-tional Institute of Mental Health.Wewish to thank LindaGrecesand Jam ie Toupal for their assistancein collecting and analyzing the d ata.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ed-ward J.O Brien,Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic Univer-sity, Boca Raton, Florida33431.

word had app eared earlierin atext when the wordwasprecededby a sentence containing an anaph oric reference to it.This pro-cedure responds to problem s in methods used in earlier studiesand promises tobevery useful in studies of more com plex infer-ential processes. The purpose of the present series of experi-ments is to provide converging evidence for processes initiatedby an an aphoric reference, with particular emphasis on severalremaining issuesweperceive as crucial to interpreting th e acti-vation measure used by McKoon and Ratcliff.Consider the following sample passage from McKoon andRatcliff(1980,p.672):

1.Aburglar surveyed the garage set back from the street.2a. The criminal slipped away from the street lam p.2b . Acat slipped away from the street lam p.Subjects read Sentence1followed by either Sentence 2a or 2b.For half the passages, there were two add itional sentences th atintervened between Sentence 1 and Sentence 2a or 2 b. Theywere then tested for recognition ofburglar. Recognition timesforburglarwere faster following Sentence 2a, which makes ananapho ric reference toburglar.There are four potential problems with this procedure . First,it is not clear that the antecedent concept has ever left w orkingmemory. The conclusion thatcriminalreactivatedburglarim -plies that the antecedentwasno longer in working mem ory justprior to the anaphoric reference. For thetwo-and four-sentencepassages usedbyMcKoon andRatcliff,microstructure analyses(Turner Greene,1978)and estim ates of buffersize(KintschVipond, 1979; Miller & Kintsch, 1980) suggested thatburglarcould have been in w orking mem ory when the last sentence wasread. Perhaps more to the point, itisreasonable that im portantconcepts mentioned in the first sentence would be consideredthematic and held in working memory until a new topic wasclearly established. Recognizing this possibility, Dell, McKoon,and Ratcliff (1983) used only the four-sentence passages fromMcKoon and Ratcliff(1980)and compared recognition timeswhen a probe was presented immediately prior to an anaphor

346


2/7

ANAPHORIC INFERENCE 347to times obtained when a probe appeared after an anaphor. Ifan anaph or does reactivate an antecedent concept absent fromworking memory, responses to a postanaphor probe should bemuch faster than responses to a preanaphor probe. Contraryto expectations, the postanaphor probe showed only a 12-msadvantage. Given the absence of strong evidence that the ante-cedenthasleft working mem ory before the anaphoric referent isread, itisimpo rtant to examine thisissuefurther. In the presentexperiments, considerably longer passages were used, withmany more propositions intervening between an antecedentand anaphor. We also included probes of the antecedent beforethe occurrence of the anaph or in all three experiments.

A second problem is that McKoon and RatclifTs baselinecondition may not be a ppropriate because it always introducesa new topic. If, as suggested above, the antecedent concept hasnot left workingmemory,recognition times to th is concept maystill be shorter following Sentence 2a than 2b because of inter-ference due to the introdu ction of the new conceptcatin Sen-tence 2b. Interference could occur for two possible reasons.First, a change in topic could createageneral interference effectin which all processes are slowed while greater capacityisbeingallocated in an attemp t to integrate the new topic with the exist-ing memory representation. However, this type of general inter-ference seems unlikely, since Dell et al. (1983) found that re-sponse times to control probes were not slowed following Sen-tence2b.A second possibility is that the introduction of a newtopic served to bump the antecedent burglar out of workingmem ory; the result would be a slowdown in recognition timestoburglar following Sentence 2b. In the present experiments,the possibility of this type of interference was avoided by usinga baseline condition in which the subject of the final sentencealwaysrefers toaconcept previously mentioned in thetext.Fur-thermore, in Ex periment 3, we directly assess the contributionof interference w hen the last sentence introduces a new topic.A third p roblem is that fast recognition times toburglarfol-lowing mention ofcriminalcould reflect, in part, lexical prim-ing due to the sem antic relation between the two concepts. Al-though the impact of semantic priming has been partly ad-dressed by previous studies (Chang, 1980; Dell et al., 1983;Garro d & Sanford, 1977; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980), we pro-vide a more direct measure of the priming effect on the anteced-ent by including a condition in which the sentence before theprobe contains the anaphor concept but does not refer to anantecedent in the text.

A final problem is the possibility that probe response timedifferences reflect integration processes that occur when theprobe is presented. It is possible that subjects respond faster toprobes that are more compatible with the sentences they havejust read. That interpretation is strengthened by considerationof several recent studies of priming in lexical decision tasks(McNamara & Healy, 1984; Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, &Langer, 1984) that have demonstrated that priming effects inthat task are partly due to backward integration. If that canoccur in a lexical decision task, why no t in a recognition taskin which the subject is essentially instructed to look back intomemory?To address thisissue,wereplaced the recognition taskof Experiment1 with a naming task in Experiments2and3.Inthe Seidenberg et al. (1984) and McNamara and Healy (1984)

studies, time to read words aloud did not appear to be influ-enced by backward integration processes.In summary, the activation measure used by the McKoonand Ratcliff (1980) and Dell et al. (1983) studies provides thestrongest evidence to date that antecedents are reactivated byan anaphor. N evertheless, there are several potential problem sthat require further examination. Our experiments are de-signed to address these problems by using additional controlsentences and an alternative response time measu re.

Exper iment 1Four conditions were employed in thisfirststudy. In the rein-statement condition, the last line of each passage contained acategory name (e.g.,the performer), which served as an ana-phoric reference to an earlier mentioned to-be-probed referent,whichwasa m ember of that category (e.g.,singer).T his experi-mental condition was compared with three control conditions:a baseline control, a semantic priming control, and a prean-aphor control. The passages in the baseline condition were very

similar to the reinstatement passages. The only difference wasthat in this condition the last sentence contained an anaphoricreference to a concept that had appeared much more recentlythan the to-be-probed referent. As a result, reinstatement isnecessary in both the baseline and reinstatement passages.However, since the a ppropriate referent is more distant in thereinstatement than baseline passages, reading times should belonger in the reinstatem ent condition (O'Brien, 1986). Further-more, response time to the probe should be faster when theprobe follows a reinstatement passage than when it follows abaseline passage; the hypothesisisthat the probed itemhasbeenreactivated only in the passage ending with an anaphoric refer-ence to it.In the semantic priming control condition, the last line ofapassage mentioned the category label used as an anaphor in thereinstatement passages. However, the sentencewaswritten suchthat the category did n ot refer back to the to-be-probed referent(e.g., Joh n wondered which performer would appear nex t ).One possible expectation ab out readingtimes isthattheywouldbe longer when the category requires a reinstatement searchthan when the category serves as a seman tic priming con trol. Itis possible, however, that the effect might be somewhat offsetbecause the semantic priming passages introduce a new con-cept. The more clear-cut prediction is for probe recognitiontimes. If the advantage of probe recognition tim es in the rein-statement condition over the baseline condition is not due tolexical priming, recognition times should be significantly fasterin reinstatementpassagesthan in the semantic control passages.Comparison of probe times following a semantic control pas-sage with those following a baseline passage is also of interest.Significantly shorter times in the semantic priming conditionwould indicate that there is semantic priming in this situationand would reinforce inclusion of a semantic priming co ntrol instudies of anaphoric inference.Finally, in the preanapho r cond ition, the passages were con-structed by deleting the last line of the reins tatement passages.If the to-be-probed referent is no longer in working m emory, asassumed, preanaphor control passages should result in rela-tivelylongtimes to respond to the probe.


3/7

348 E. O'BRIEN, S. DUFFY, AND J . MYERSTable 1ExamplePassageand Final Sentence orExperiments1and2asaFunctionof Condition

Condition Passage with alternative final lines

ReinstatementSemantic controlBaseline control

Bill was lateforwork again. Hehadforgottent o sethis alarmand hadoverslept.Toto pitalloff,he was now behindabusthat was having engine trouble.Asth ebu spulled intoabusy intersection, its enginesputtereda nddied. Bill shook his headindisbelief as the traffic arou ndh imcameto ahalt. There wasanimportan t sales meetingthis morning,an dhe was afraid he would missit. His bosshadalready warnedhimonceabout his tendencytooversleep. Bill sighedas he caught sight of a digital clockin anearby bankwindow.Hesat andstaredat

the stalled vehiclenotknowing whattodo .a police vehicleno tknowing whatto do.the digital clocknotknowing what todo.Note.The target antecedent isbusinal lconditions.aNothing was addedtothe above passageinthe preanap hor condition.

MethodSubjects. Forty-eight University of Massachusetts undergraduatesparticipatedforcourse credit. Three subjects answered more than threecomprehension questions incorrectlya ndwere replaced.Materials. Twenty-four experimental texts were constructed;an ex-amplecan beseeninTable 1. The texts rangedin length from 11to 22lines, withameanof14.4 lines; each line wasnolonger than 46 charac-ters.A nearly sentence ineach text introduced anoun that was desig-

natedas thetarget antecedent. This n oun was always referred toagaininth enext sentence of the text.Atleast6lines intervened between thislast referencetothe target nounand thelast line of the text M=8.1) .For each text, three different final sentences were written. Eachsen-tencewasfrom 2 to 3lines long,and the last line always contained akey adjective-noun phrase.In thereinstatement con dition, this phrasereferred to thetarget antecedent. Thenounw as acategory name,andthe adjective served to specify th e target antec eden t.Inthe baseline con-dition, this phrase explicitly referred to a concept mentioned morere -cently in the passage than the target antecedent.Inthe semantic prim ingcondition, the nounwasthe same category nam easin the reinstatem entcondition,but theadjective modifier made itclear that itreferred to anew concept and not to the target antecedent. The final sentencesdiffered aslittlea spossibleinboth contentandlength.T helast lineof

each of these sentences was equated forsyllable lengthsothat readingtimesforthese lines couldbecompared.T hemean syllable lengthsforthe last lines were 10.8,10.5,and 10.8 for thereinstatement, baseline,and semantic priming conditions, respectively. To createapreanaphorcondition , the last line of the passageinthe reinstatement con dition wasdeleted, thus interrupting the last sentence in themiddle. Themeansyllable length of the last lineinthe preanaphor condition was 10.0.Four sets of materials were constructed. Each set contained 6 textsineach of the four conditions. Acrosst he four sets, each text appearedonce in each experimental condition.Anadditional 24filleran d3prac-tice texts were written.T hefillerextsallendedin themiddle of a sen-tence; thus they resembled the preanapho r condition.For each text, four wordswerechosentoserveasprobe words. Withinthe experimental andfillerexts,24 hadtwo trueand twofalse pro bes;

12had onetrue,and 12 hadthree true.Thetarget antecedent rangedfrom 1 to 3syllablesinlength M=1.7) andfrom 3 to 8charactersinlength M=5.4).Theprobes were arranged ran domly withtherestric-tion that the target antecedentalwaysappeared firstinthe experimentalpassagesandthatanequal number of trueandfalse probes occ urredineach position.Procedure. Subjects were tested individuallyin asession that lastedapproximately 45 min.Texts were displayed one line at a time on a

video monitor controlledby aNorthstar Horizon computer. Each trialbegan with the wordReadyat the c enter of thedisplay.To read th rougha text, the subject pressed aline-advance key.Each pressof the keyerasedt hecurrent line of the texta nddisplayedt henext line. Linesofa passage were presented jus tasthey appear in Table 1. Comprehensiontime for each linewasconsideredto be thetime between keypresses.Atthe endof each passage,apress of the line-advance key initiatedth eprobe sequence. Preceding each probe,a row ofXs appearedfor 500msand wasautomatically replacedby theprobe word. Subjects wereinstructedtorespond as quicklybut asaccuratelya spossible, decidingwhether each of the w ordshadbeen presentedin thepassageornot.Acorrect responsewasfollowedbythe row of Xs and the next probe word.On those trials in which subjects responded incorrectly,or did no t re-spond within3.5 s, theword errorwas displayedfor 500 ms,followedby the Xs for the next probe word. To ensure that subjects read th epassages carefully, eac h trial e nded w ithacomprehension question.T hequestions were designed totest specific details aboutth epassages tha tdid no t involve the antecedent. Subjects answered thequestions ou tloud,an dthe experimenter, communicating throughanintercom, indi-cated whetheror not thesubject wascorrect. While being instructed,subjects were told tha t this wasth emost important part of the experi-ment an d that it was critical that they read each passage carefullyenoughto beabletoanswer each of the questions.

Results and DiscussionAnalyses of variance (ANOVAS) were performed on bothtimes to read the last line of the passage and times to recognize

the prob e. Two types ofFtestswere conducted:Fxdenotes anerror term based on subject variability, andF2denotes an errorterm based on item variability. These were followed by pairwisecomparisons forallpossiblepairsof means.Tocontrol the fami-lywise error rate Ef= .05), Tukey's WSD procedu re was used(Myers, 1979). Pairwise com parisons w ere conducted based onboth subject and item variability. Mean reading times andprobe response times are presented in Table 2.Reading times. As can be seen in Table 2, mean readingtimes were longest in the reinstatem ent condition and shortestin the preanaphor c ontrol. The variation among the four means

Table 2MeanR eading Times,Probe RecognitionTimes,an dErrorPro babilities, Experiment 1

ConditionReinstatementSemantic controlBaseline controlPreanaphor control

Reading times2915280827972410

Probe recognition

Times93298310151033

Prob.ofError.03.03.03.01

Note.Times areinm illiseconds.


4/7

ANAPHORIC INFERENCE 349was significant at the .01 level, F,(3, 132) = 19.82, MSe =119,046;F2 h, 60) = 9.70, MSe = 133,178. The WSD testsbased on subject and item variability both revealed the samepattern for pairwise comparisons. Reading times were signifi-cantly shorter in the preanaphor condition than in any of theotherthreeconditions. Th e means fortheotherthreeconditionsdid not differ significantly from each other, although there wasa strong trend for longer times in the reinstatement than in thebaseline and semantic control conditions. Interpretation of theshorter times for the preanaphor condition is complicated bythe fact tha t thisisthe one condition in w hich the last sentencewas not completed at the end of the last line. In Experiment 3 ,the preana phor passage was changed slightly to remedy this; itwill be seen that th e result notedwasstill obtained .

Probe recognition times. Recognition times were shortest inthe reinstatement condition, followed by semantic priming co n-trol times, baseline times, and p reanapho r times, in tha t order.The variation among these means was significant at^the .01level,F(3, 132)= 10.06,MSe=9,256; F2(3,60) = 8.37,MSC=5011.The WSD tests based on subject variability revealed thatsignificant differences existed forallpairs of means. In the itemsanalysis, the reinstatement probe times were again significantlyfaster than those for the baseline and preana phor controls, butother differences failed to a ttain th e .05 level.

The W SD analysis based on subject variability demon stratesa clear reinstatement effect. Beyond that, there is also evidencethat responses to a probe can be speeded by having just read asentence containingasemantically related word. Th is indicatesthat studies of reinstatement and inference should routinely in-cludeacondition similartothe semantic p riming co ntrol of thisstudy. The results of theWSD analysisbased on item variabilityare less clear-cut. In this analysis, the reinstatem ent conditionis not significantly faster than the semantic priming control.One goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the basic effect ofreinstatement versus semantic priming. A second goal was toexamine the possibility that the response does not reflect rein-statement but rather the time necessary to relate the probe tothe preceding contex t. As noted earlier, several researchers havesuggested that lexical decision reflects such a postlexical inte-gration process. Following their lead, we used time to name theprobe in Experiment 2.Experiment 2 reflects one other consideration. A review ofthe experimental passages indicated that the anaphor in thebaseline condition frequently referencedaconcept almostasfarback as the to-be-probed concept. This might be responsiblefor the failure to obtain a significant reading time difference

between the reinstatement and baseline conditions. The base-line passages were revised slightly so that the anaphor consis-tently referred to a m ore recent concept.Exper iment 2

In response to the concerns noted before, three m ajor proce-dural changes were introduced. First, in order to avoid possiblebackward integration effects, time to nam e the prob e was mea-sured rather than time to recognize it. Second, filler passageswere omitted; in the absence ofadichotomous response, therewas no longer a need for passages to balance the proportion ofyes and no responses. Third, several of the baseline passages

Table 3MeanReading Times andProbeNamingCondition

ReinstatementSemantic controlBaseline controlPreanaphor control

Reading times2459238622862117

Times, Experiment 2Probe namingtimes

499517510533Note.T imes are in milliseconds.

were revised to ensure th at the referent to the a naphor for thosepassageswasnever further than two lines back.Method

Subjects. Sixty-four University of Massachusetts undergraduates par-ticipated for course credit. Three subjects answered both comprehen-sion questions incorrectly for three texts and were replaced.Materials.The texts and conditions were identical to those used inExperiment 1except for the baseline condition. The final line of thebaseline conditionwasmodified to refertoa concept mentioned withintwo lines of the last line. The mean length of these lines was 10.6 sylla-bles. At the end of each text, the subject made a naming response to asingle word, the target antecedent. The three p ractice texts remained inthe experiment, but no fillerextswereused.Procedure.Subjects advanced through the texts as in Experiment 1.At the end of each text, a row of Xswaspresented for 300ms,followedby the target antecedent. Subjects named the word aloud, triggering avoice key. Afterthenaming response,twoquestions were displayed. Thesubject answered each question aloud, interacting with the experi-menter through the intercom asin Experiment 1.

Results and D iscussionReading and naming times are presented in Table 3. Therewere virtually no errors on the naming task. Therefore, errorrates are not presented. The d ata analyses were carried out ex-actly as in Experiment 1.Reading times. The reading times are again ordered as inExperiment 1, with reinstatemen t times slowest and times forthe preanapho r control condition fastest. T he variability amongthe four means was again significant at the .01 level, ^ ( 3 ,180) = 23.42,MSC=59,915;F23,60) = 8.12,M SC=64,264.Several pairwise differences were significant at the .05 level us-ing Tukey's WSD procedure. When the test was based on sub-

ject variability, the reinstatement condition differed signifi-cantly from both the baseline and preanaphor condition. Thesemantic priming conditionalsodiffered from each of the lattertwo. The baseline and preanaphor conditions differed signifi-cantly from each other as well. Tests based on item variabilityyielded the same results except that the contrasts of the rein-statement and semantic priming conditions against the baselinecondition were no longer significant.The reading times in the first two experiments provide indi-rect support for the hypothesis of a reinstatement search: Read-ing times are consistently longer for the reinstatement passagesthan for other passages. McKoon and Ratcliff(1980) actuallyobserved longer reading times in their baseline condition than


5/7

35 E. O BRIEN, S. DUFFY, AND J. MYERSin their reinstatement condition; itisencouraging to ob tain thepredicted outcome here. Of course, the critical testis acompari-son of response times to the probe. These will be considerednext.Naming times. The nam ing time m eans in Table 3 are or-dered much like the recognition time m eans in Table2;the ex-ception is that the semantic priming mean time is longer thanthe baseline mean time in the present experiment. The meansagain vary significantly, F,(3, 180) = 9.47, p


6/7

ANAPHORIC INFERENCE 351Table 5MeanReading Times a n d ProbeNaming Times, Experiment 3

Condition Reading times Probe namingtimesReinstatementPreanaphor controlTopiccontinuationTopic change

2 6 82 4 52 3 5 92 5 9

466485470490

Note.T imes are in milliseconds.

sentence that changed the topic was read more slowly than asimilar sentence that continued the topic, ?i(28) = 4 . 2 9 ; ^(20) =2 . 2 2 , p


7/7

35 E. O BRIEN, S. DUFFY, AND J. MYERSHaviland, S. E., & Clark, H. H. (1974). What's new? Acquiring newinformationas a process incomprehension.Journal of Verbal Learn-ingandVerbalBehavior, 13 ,512-521.Kintsch, W., van Dijk,T.A . (1978). Toward a model of text compre-hension and production.Psychological Review ,85 ,363-394.Kintsch, W., Vipond, D. (1979). Reading comprehension and reada-bility in educational practice and psychological theory. In L. G . Nill-son (Ed.),Perspectives on memory research(pp.329-365). Hillsdale,

NJ: Erlbaum.McKoon, G., & Ratcliff,R. (1980). The comprehension processes andmemory structures involved in anaphoric reference.Journalof Ver-bal Learning andVerbalBehavior, 19 ,668-682.McNamara, T. P., & Healy, A. F. (1984).Semantic andphonologicalpriming in lexical decision andreading. Unpublished manuscript.Miller,J.R., Kintsch,W.(1980). R eadability and recall of short prosepassages:Atheoretical analysis.Journal of Experimental Psycho logy:Human Learning and Mem ory, 6,335-354.

Myers, J. L. (1979).Fundamentalso fexperimentaldesign.Boston: Al-lyn Bacon.O Brien,E. J. (1986).Antecedent search processesand thestructure of

text.Manuscript submitted for publication.Schank, R. C. (1975). The structure of episodes in memory. In D. G.Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.),Representationandunderstanding(pp.237-272).NewYork:A cademic Press.Seidenberg, M . S., Waters, G. S., Sanders, M ., & Langer,P. (1984). Pre-and postlexical loci of contextual effects on word recog nition.Mem-ory Cognition, 12 ,315-328.Turner, A., &Greene, E. (1978).Constructionand use ofa propositionaltext base. JSAS Catalogue of selected do cume nts in psychology, MS1713.

Received Jan uary 9,1985Revision received August5,1985

Articles Published in the Mo st Recent Issue ofJEP Human Perception and Performance

May 1986 Vol.12,No.2Articles

115 Decision Processes in Visual Disc riminationRufinVogelsand GuyA.Orban133 Attention and Interference in the Perception of Brief Visual DisplaysPeter Dixon149 Structural Support for the Perception of GrowthLeonards.Mark,BethA . Shapiro, andRobertE.Shaw160 Temporal Integration and Vibrotactile Backward Masking

PaulM.Evansand JamesC.Craig169 Perception of Texture by Vision and Touch: Multidimensionality and IntersensoryIntegrationSusanJ.Lederman,GeorgieThome,andBill Jones181 Effect of Ecological Viewing Con ditions on the Am es' Disto rted Room IllusionWilliamL .Gehringerand Edward Engel186 Conjunction of Color and Form Without Attention: Evidence From an Orientation-Contingent Color AftereffectMichaelR.Houckand James E. Hoffman200 Locus and Persistence of Capacity Limitations in Visual Information ProcessingJamesA.Kleiss andDavidM.Lane211 Classifying Multidimensional Stimuli: Stimulus, Task, and Observer FactorsThomasB.Ward,ColleenM. F oley, and JanetCole226 Activation and Inhibition With Orthographically Similar WordsLuciaColombo

Documents

Anaphoric Inference During Reading 1986