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Powers of Life and Death Beyond

GovernmentalityMitchell Dean

Published online: 09 Nov 2010.

To cite this article:Mitchell Dean (2002) Powers of Life and Death Beyond Governmentality, CulturalValues, 6:1-2, 119-138, DOI: 10.1080/1362517022019775

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ISSN 1362-5179 Print/ISSN 1467-8713 online/02/010119-20 2002 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/136251702201977 5

Cultural Values, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 & 2, 2002, 119138

Powers of Life and Death BeyondGovernmentality1

Mitchell Dean

AbstractThe work of Foucault on liberal government, and that of his followers, is subject to two

dangers. The first is to regard the critical character of liberalism (as governing throughfreedom) as providing safeguards against the despotic potentials of biopower andsovereignty. The second is to regard these heterogenous powers of life and death assomehow simply relocated or reinscribed within the field of liberal governmentality. Thelatter point is a major methodological error; the former closes the gap between theanalytics of government and the normativity of liberalism itself. By working through thesedangers, our understanding of the ethos of liberal government is transformed. That ethostoday requires us to link governing through freedom to the powers of life and death, theexercise of choice to the sovereign decision, the contract to violence, economic citizenshipto moral discipline and obligation, and rights and liberties to enforcement.

Of all the themes concerning power in the work of Michel Foucault, thetheme of governmentality would appear to have given rise to the most sustainedbody of empirical political and social analysis, not only in France but also inseveral other countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom.2 Heconceives government as the conduct of conduct. Conduct is used here as anoun and a verb. As a verb, to conduct means to lead, to guide, and to direct. Asa noun, conduct equals roughly behavior, action, comportment, or the embodiedrepertoire of that which sociologists call habitus.3Government is given the verybroad definition of shaping the way we act. This notion of government wouldappear to give rise to several possibilities.

It opens up the possibility of a disclosure of the different forms of knowledgeand truth by which various agents have come to call into question and to act uponthe conduct of others, or indeed of themselves, for assorted ends. This is the studyof the problematizations, the programs and, above all, the rationalities ofgovernment. In the following, I shall be referring principally to one kind ofrationality, that which is concerned with the government of the state. This is thesense in which Foucault (1981, 1991a, 1997a, 1997b) himself appeared to use theterm governmentality in his famous lecture of the same name. Rationality is notused here in a normative sense, as in the Frankfurt School, i.e. as an ideal ofReason. It is used to refer to how we actually reason, the Realrationalitat (Flyvberg1998), in this case about governing the state.

The study of government further leads us to an investigation of the means,techniques and instruments by which these ends of government are to be realized.This is a study of the technologies of government. Government is hence a practical


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and technical domain not reducible to philosophy or ideology. It also enables us toexamine the kinds of individual and collective identity, and forms of subjectivityand agency, which are constructed by these rationalities and technologies ofgovernment. These identities are a component of the ethos of government, of the

world which is sought, of the utopia to be won or dystopia to be avoided, of thekind of beings we hope to become and to create, of what we wish to combat oravoid, and of the material we seek to work upon. To summarize, we might talkabout the episteme, the techne , and the ethos of government.

All this is a part of kind of thick description of aspects of government. Butthere is also the possibility of another, critical side to these analyses. This is thepoint at which analysis reveals points of disjunction between the more or lessexplicit rationalities of government, both in their theoretical and their pro-gramatic forms, and what we might call the logic or intelligibility of practices, oreven their strategy. To put this another way, these analyses reveal the immanentdisjunction and dissonance between the programmers view and the logic ofpractices, their effects in the real (Foucault 1991b; Dean 1998: 1934; Dean 1999:6970; Gordon 1980: 24651). The domain of effects in the real cannot be read offthe programs of government themselves. Explicit theoretical and programaticrationality thus enters practices and may be deciphered within them, but it neverexhausts them. Barbara Cruikshanks (1999) work on empowerment is a case inpoint. The programatic rationality of empowerment views the world asdichotomized into the powerful and powerless, and claims to be an externalmeans of effecting a quantitative increase in the power of the latter. The effects ofpractices of empowerment are quite different: they entail technologies which seekto qualitatively transform subjectivity; they deploy and extend powers of self-

government; and they exist within a specific set of relations of power betweenvarious agents (bureaucrats, activists, politicians, the poor). To show thatrationalities of empowerment exist within this wider field of effects is to have thecritical consequence of calling into question the very logic and ethos of notions ofempowerment themselves. This disjunction between programatic rationality andthe logic of governmental practices is crucial to my present argument.

The literature on governmentality is thus not simply about philosophies,mentalities or theories: it is about practices, regimes and effects. Contrary torecent arguments (Dupont and Pearce 2001), an analytics of government does notclaim that the intelligibility of political and social practices can be read off the

writings of governors, policy writers and advisors. When applied to thecontemporary government of the state, as we shall do here, it concerns not simplyliberalism but also liberal ways of governing. It concerns, in this case, a theory oflimited government underpinned by a moral philosophy of freedom and rightsand the singular logics of liberal modes of government (Dean 1991: 13).

As a way of thinking that is one part empirical possibility and the other criticalpotential, the literature on governmentality would always have danger ofbecoming empirically top heavy and being accused of normative deficiencies. Weall know it has become almost an academic industry in the English-speakingworld. But can it retain its critical potential? And can it define what that potentialis?4 This paper contributes to answering these questions. It does so not by

advocating a normative standpoint but by suggesting why it is a mistake toconflate the liberal theory or conception of the state with modalities of the liberalgovernment of the state.


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Biopolitics (Foucault 1997a: 739). Perhaps he was stuck with an old title.Nevertheless, there liberalism enters into the picture as the framework of politicalrationality in which problems of the biopolitics of the population began, as he putsit, to have the look of a challenge. In a system anxious to have the respect of legal

subjects and to ensure the free enterprise of individuals, he asks (Foucault 1997a:74), how can the population phenomenon be taken into account?

On this account, liberal and democratic forms of governing are a relativelybenign version of the combination I have just spoken about. Biopower istempered by liberal economic freedoms and democratized sovereignty. Liberal-ism criticizes, reviews and rationalizes powers of life and death by governingthrough the liberties and rights of subjects; that is, by the employment of thepowers of freedom.

According to this view, a system of natural liberty is first found in thosedifferent spheres external to government, such as those of commercial society orthe market, by the empirical philosophies of the Scottish Enlightenment. Here,liberalism suspects that one is always governing too much. In contrast to theGerman police sciencePolizeiwissenschaftof the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies that is always worried whether there is disorder and insufficientregulation, economic liberalism does not dare to exercise governmentalitywithout a `critique far more radical than the test of optimization (Foucault1997a: 74).

On the other hand, we have witnessed what might be called a democratiza-tion of sovereignty with the development of parliamentary institutions. This isa delegation of sovereign powers onto representative institutions that make itpossible both to identify the exercise of sovereign powers with the will of the

people and to regulate the participation of those who comprise the people.Part of the problem of representative democracy is how to govern theparticipation of individuals and factions in government. It is how to keepgovernors and governed separate, or how to ensure that the exercise of freedomby individuals does not undermine the security of governmental institutions(Hindess 1997).

One suspects that the emphasis on liberal governmentality, and its powers offreedom, might reproduce the view that liberal-democratic forms of rule offersafeguards against aspects of sovereign and biopolitical powers of life and death.In this regard, there is a risk of narrowing the relationship between the

normativity of a liberal conception of government and governmentality studies.My view is that we must be careful that our analyses of contemporarygovernment do not amount to a soft endorsement of the normative claims ofcontemporary liberal democratic forms of rule. We must be careful of theassumption that liberal-democracy and notions of individual and even humanrights offer a prophylaxis against the less savoury aspects of biopolitics or ofsovereign powers. The following arguments should be sufficient to show why.

This is connected to another possible danger, which I shall call the reinscrip-tion thesis. Here, these other domains of power might be treated as having beenreinscribed and in some sense made subordinate to the contemporary liberalframework of governmentality. In such a view, heterogeneous powers such as

sovereignty, discipline and of biopower are all repositioned within the space ofgovernmentality. The richness of empirical possibility of an analytics ofgovernment thus leads to a downgrading of the importance of theoretical


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Life and Death Beyond Governmentality 123

questions of the relations between these power formations. In my view, it is vitalto consider these theoretical questions in relation to the government of the statemore broadly and liberal government more specifically.

I want here to propose some key arguments that stand in contrast to this

exegesis. These points are crucial if we are to understand contemporarytransformations of liberal-democratic rule. The first is a kind of methodologicalpoint on these domains and zones of power. The second concerns this tendencytoward acquiescence to the normativity of contemporary liberalism. These pointsneed to be accepted before we can begin to characterize the contemporarymetamorphosis of the liberal government of the state. That government, I shallsuggest, is multiform, arising as much from powers of life and death as forms ofgovernment in Foucaults sense. Biopolitics and sovereignty might be beingrewritten in the language of governmental expertise in the multiple, negotiatedcontracts by which conduct is to be shaped. But powers of life and death remainin the premises of such contracts. The ethos of liberal government todayindeed,as everis as much about life as liberty, responsibility as freedom, obligation asrights, decision as choice, and violence as much as contract. We cannot properlyunderstand this if we continue to hold to the two premises I have stated.

Heterogeneous and Indistinct Powers

My first counter-premise, then, is the following. If we take seriously thepostulate that power is heterogenous and multiform, then the field of powerrelations cannot be reduced to an analytics of government, where the latter isunderstood as the conduct of conduct. While there is no doubt that this analysis

can help us understand the practices concerned with the direction of conduct forvarious ends, it is important not to telescope contemporary politics into questionsof government. Transformations of governmentality need to be placed againstcontingent transformations of the exercise of sovereign and biopolitical powers oflife and death.

The work on governmentality is thus of a limited region within modern powerrelations, politics and forms of rule. The analytics of government, conceived as themultidimensional analysis of the different ways in which our conduct is guidedand directed, and for various ends, exists within a broader field. This is a complexfield of overlapping powers that has been partially mapped by Foucault.

This field includes the powers of death, of punishment and of coercion that areusually associated with the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty is indeed a complexof powers unto itself. Its terrioriality and its claims to a monopoly of legitimateviolence were noticed by Weber (1948: 778). Its decisionistic character isemphasized in Schmitts epochal treatment of the sovereign as he who decidesthe state of exception (1985b: 5). It deductive character, grounded in thespectacular of the right of death, is analysed by Foucault (e.g. 1979: 13559). Tospeak of sovereignty does not amount to a project of bringing the state back in.Indeed, sovereign powers could today be as dispersed as governmental powers.The phrase democratization of sovereignty, which gives rise to oxymoron, thesovereign subject, suggests occasions on which certain sovereign decision have

been delegated to various personages and groups.The field of power also includes the powers of life, of the living, and of the

processes of life, which have been previously assigned the title biopolitics. We


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cannot turn to contemporary issues of biomedicine, bioethics and biosciencewithout intellectual equipment that allows us to examine how the shaping ofconduct and the exercise of choice concerns matters that deal with the organic andvisceral materiality of bodies and the vitality, morbidity and mortality of the

species body of the population. Such choices are biopolitical in that theyconcern powers of the fostering of life and letting die. An example of this is theremoval of life support systems for an individual in a coma or one defined asbrain dead. Another example is the termination of pregnancy consequent upongenetic and other forms of screening or risk assessment.5These choices are oftenmade by individualsfor example, relatives, carers, prospective parents,sometimes but less often by medical and health specialistsinformed byexpertise through which we attempt to govern conduct. The first point to note isthat, in each of these examples, there is not only governmental regulation ofchoice but biopolitical concerns with the fostering of life and with letting die.

But we can push the analysis even further. The word choice is perhaps tooredolent of both the market place and its shopping mall consumer culture. Thechoices involved, in these examples, are to introduce and accent a ratherdifferent word, decisions. They are decisions on bare life, to employ GiorgioAgambens phrase (1998). Drawing upon Aristotle, he finds two concepts of lifeat work in Western political thought: that of bios, the morally and politicallyqualified life of the community; and the zoe, bare life, or life stripped naked,symbolized by the naked human individual (Agamben 1998: 15). For Agam-ben (83), drawing upon Walter Benjamins account of the universal proscriptionagainst murder (1978: 2989), it is sovereign power that is at work in themaking of such decisions on the life that can be terminated without the

commission of homicide. These decisions are thus made as choices shaped byvarious kinds of expertise, embedded within practices that concern theenhancement of life. There is thus sovereignty, governmentality and biopolitics.And while they might enter a zone of irreducible indistinction (Agamben1998: 9), they are not reinscribed within one another in the sense that onedimension of power has privilege over the other.

These decisions are sovereign decisions and not merely governmental or evenbiopolitical choices because they involve not merely a matter of letting die buta form of killing without the commission of homicide. Or at least they involve apoint at which it is difficult to know whether we are letting die or exercising a

right of death. This is what I meant when I suggested that sovereignty itself couldbe dispersed like other power relations onto individuals, parents, families andhealth experts. I call this a delegation of sovereignty which parallels thedelegation of sovereign powers onto legislatures, state governments and so on. Inthe biomedical field, sovereign decisions of the continuation of life or itstermination have, at least to some extent and in some cases, now been delegatedonto individuals, parents and families. This delegation is caught with a networkof forms of expertise of counsellors, bioethicists, institutional ethics committees,medical and legal professional bodies, as much as it is within the remit oflegislatures, courts, judges and politicians.

Another example of an equally heterogenous set of powers is found in the

treatment of those groups variously called asylum seekers, illegal immigrantsand refugees. While we can map fundamental transformations in the nationaland international government of refugees (Lippert 1998), these governmental


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regimes are incomplete without decisions on who is to be included and who isto excluded from the juridical-political order. Some are thought worthy ofinclusion in the citizenry; others are placed in the paradoxical situation of beingincluded through their exclusion. In Australia, for example, those awaiting

processing are placed outside the political order within the perimeters ofdetention centers. These sovereign decisions on the value of populations area condition for a government of such populations, which regulates theirmovements across national borders, assigns them particular statuses and treatsthem accordingly. There is also an unexpected biopolitical dimension to thetreatment of refugees when we consider that their status depends upon formsof knowledge, policy and legislation associated with notions of human rights.Such rights are ascribed to individuals, under the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, at the moment of their birth, as Agamben notes (1998: 127). Allhuman beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, reads its firstarticle. Indeed, the refugee might stand as an example of bare life in thecontemporary world (see Agamben 1998: 1313).

We should note that Agamben so blurs the distinction between sovereignty andbiopolitics as to erase the shifts and transformations proposed by Foucaults workon biopolitics and state biologisms of the nineteenth century and to prevent ananalysis of the character of contemporary shifts. However, there are contexts inwhich it is well not to draw the boundaries between these contemporaryformations of power too tightly or one is likely to miss the zones ofindistinction. These are the regions in which these heterogenous powers act insuch concert that it is difficult to know whether we are in the presence ofbiopolitical or sovereign powers.

While an analytics decomposes the current regimes of power into theirconstituent elements, we should recognize that there are also key thresholds inwhich sovereignty. governmentality and biopolitics cease to exist as distinguish-able categories. The powers of life and death enter into a network of indistinctionwith each other and with government. Biopolitical powers for the medical care oflife might also entail sovereign decisions about the termination of life. Providingcounselling for those deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy after genetictesting is not simply about conducting conduct, of the shaping of choicethrough contractually negotiated expertise, but about the sovereign decision onthe termination or continuation of bare life.

As the current government of refugees demonstrates, or the history ofindigenous peoples within lands of colonization, there is hardly a form of theliberal government of the state that does not rest upon domination, coercion,violence or the threat and symbolics of violence. It is impossible to examine theconstitutional legitimacy of the founding of states such as the United States,Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, for example, without confronting theviolent appropriation of land and extirpation of its inhabitants that this entailed.All this occurred with the blessing and active participation of the foundingthinkers of modern constitutionalism such as John Locke, as James Tully (1995:708) has shown, despite the apparent contradiction with the accepted princi-ples of sovereignty and consent. A more recent example is the history of

welfare reform in the United States in the 1990s, particularly after the passingof the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Actof 1996. This is partially a history of the forcible clearing off the welfare rolls


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those who would not conform to the requirements that they look and find paidemployment or enter a training program (Mead 1997; Scram 2000, Peck1998).

This point about the multiform character of ensembles of rule can be quite

easily made in relation to the ethos of welfare. In what does this ethos seek?From Foucault (1981, 2001), it is about an effort to maximize the security of thepopulation and the independence of its members. This entails balancing the laborof forming a community of responsible, virtuous and autonomous citizens with apastoral care of their health, their needs and their capacities and means to live.The ethos of welfare is a potent admixture of rights and obligations, freedom andcoercion, liberty and life. It is formed through practices of freedom by whichcitizens are formed and form themselves. Yet these are located within a web ofsovereign powers by which subjects are bound to do certain things. These includethe use of deductive and coercive powers of taxation, of systems of punishment,detention, expulsion and disqualification, and of compulsion in drug rehabilita-tion, child support, immunization and workfare programs, etc., for the achieve-ment of various goals of national government.

More fundamentally, these sovereign powers consist in decisions as to whatconstitutes a normal frame of life, and hence of what constitutes public order andsecurity, and when such a situation obtains (Schmitt 1985b: 9). Today there arevarious rationalities of the government of the state that attempt to provide ameans of deciding this normal frame. Among communitarians, such as Etzioni(1996), this normal frame is decided upon by the shared moral values ofcommunities. Among sociologists such as Anthony Giddens (1998) and UlrichBeck (2000), this normal frame is defined by the processes that lead to a new kind

of institutionally negotiated individualization and cosmopolitanism. Among newpaternalists, such as Lawrence Mead and his associates (1986, 1997), it is decidedby the views of the citizenry made known by their representatives in theCongress. There is an agreement between all three groups that, however wedecide the content of this normal, everyday frame of life, at least certainpopulations can be invited, expected and, indeed, obligated,to follow it. AsGiddens puts it (1998: 37),

We need more actively to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what wedo and lifestyle habits we adopt. The theme of responsibility, or mutualobligation, was there in old-style social democracy, but was largely dormant,since it was submerged within the concept of collective provision. We have to finda new balance between individual and collective responsibilities today.

Fifty years ago, T. H. Marshall smuggled in sovereign notions of rights to justifythe pastoral character of the welfare state in his classic essay, Citizenship andSocial Class (1963). Today, welfare reform, and its instruments of workfare,emphasizes the converse of rights, obligations, when it demands the transforma-tion of the individual as a condition of the exercise of a pastoraland indeedpaternalistcare. Both cross the threshold between the political-juridical order ofsovereignty and pastoral government of conduct. For Marshall, pastoral care is a

function of social rights; for new paternalists, communitarians and Third Waysocial democrats, sovereign instruments bind those receiving pastoral care topaternally defined collective obligations.


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Summing up this part of the argument, government, understood as the conductof conduct, is one zone or field of contemporary power relations. To understandthose relations we need to take into account heterogenous powers such as thoseof sovereignty and biopolitics. The exercise of power in contemporary liberal

democracies entails matters of life and death as much as ones of the direction ofconduct, of obligation as much as rights, as decisions on the fostering orabandonment of life, on the right to kill without committing homicide, as well asof the shaping of freedom and the exercise of choice. Nevertheless, havingdistinguished this heterogenous field of power, there are key thresholds that arecrossed in which these distinctions begin to collapse. Sovereign violence, itssymbols and its threat, is woven into the most mundane forms of government.The unemployed, for example, are to transform themselves into active job-seekersor participate in workfare programs under the sanction of the removal of thesustenance of life. In contemporary genetic politics and ethics, too, we enterthresholds where it becomes unclear whether we are in the presence of thepowers to foster life or the right to take it. The biopolitical, the sovereign, thegovernmental, begin to enter into zones of indistinction.

Liberal Democracies

My second counter-premise follows from the first, and concerns the nature ofliberal democracies. If regimes of power are constituted through multiform,heterogenous trajectories and zones of power relations, then it is necessary toremain skeptical of the way in which contemporary liberal forms of rule areunderstood. It is my contention here that a liberal understanding of the

government of the state systematically underestimates the manner in whichliberal polities are engaged in sovereign decisions and a biopolitics of thepopulation that concern, in their different and sometimes indistinct ways,fundamental matters of life and death.

There are three aspects of the liberal understanding of the state that aregermane to the argument here. All three can also be viewed in the work of themost vigorous and able defenders of liberalism, such as Stephen Holmes (1993;1995). These postulates are that of limited government, of individual liberty, andthe anti-authoritarian character of liberalism. The first means that liberalgovernment is one in which there are constitutional constraints on the sovereign

powers exercised by the state. In liberal-democracies, this can be presented asconstraints on majority rule, popular sovereignty, or the will of the people. Thesecond means that the principle of this limitation of government is found in theindividual freedoms which exist in private life and in a sphere of civil societyseparate from the state. The third employs this system of limitations and rights todistinguish liberalism from authoritarian forms of government.

All three postulates are clearly a part of a liberal conception of government.They are, in other words, part of liberal ways of thinking about the means andobjectives of the use of sovereign powers. They are all, however, easily shown tobe a product of that specific standpoint. In other words, they are a part of theprogramatic rationality of liberal constitutionalism. They do not consider the

effects of such rationality in the practical domain to which it is linked.That standpoint first presupposes the existence of an already existing sovereign

power exercised over a distinct territorial domain. By famously defining the


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sovereign as he who decides the state of exception, Carl Schmitt (1985b: 5) wasable to show, for example, that these sovereign powers are both inside andoutside the rule of law which is established by constitutional democracies. Theconstitutional and juridical framework rests on something external to itself which

both establishes it and which it claims to regulate, but which it cannot constitute.As Holmes agrees (1993: 57), liberal principles of majority rule and equalitybefore the law can operate effectively only within the confines of legitimateterritorial borders, yet these principles are totally incapable of creating orjustifying such borders. Liberal constitutionalism is a way of thinking about theuse, restriction, democratization and regulation of sovereign power within adefinite territory, which nevertheless it must simply presuppose. All discussion ofmandates provided by representative institutions are discussions of how adetermination is made on who is to use these sovereign powers and for whatpurposes. It is not a discussion of the existence of sovereign powers.6

More broadly, the development of liberal constitutionalism in the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries is accompanied by either the establishment or theextension of permanent police and armed forces, centralized ministries of state,government departments and large public service bureaucracies, mass compul-sory schooling, national poor relief and social insurance systems, public healthservices and systems, and national taxation systems. The notion of government asan institutionally restricted sphere is thus compatible with what an earliergeneration of historians called in relation to England and controversies overBenthamite influences, the nineteenth-century revolution in government(MacDonagh 1958; Parris 1960). As Holmes (1995) shows, this doctrine is as leastas much an enabling one as a constraining one.

Much of the debate between liberalism and anti-liberalism, however, rests onwhether the institutions of the liberal state (parliament, the executive, thelegislative, the judiciary, government bureaux) conform to the ideal of how theyshould operate. Thus Schmitts (1985a) famous critique of parliament as anindecisive talking shop between opposed interest groups rests on its fundamentaldeparture from the ideal as an arena of rational deliberation in which the peoplesrepresentatives arrive at decisions on behalf of the general welfare. StephenHolmes rebuttal of Schmitt (1993: 578) is that parliaments can and do make andimplement binding decisions that are backed by instruments of law and force andthat, moreover, liberal thinkers have long considered the issues of the use of force,

of the question of exception, of the control of asocial passions, and so on. Thedebate strikes me as interesting, however, less for the ultimate resolution of theissue of liberalism versus anti-liberalism and more for the way the attack and thedefense of liberalism start to make visible the actual practices and operations ofliberal kinds of rule. Both anti-liberals such as Schmitt,7 and liberals such asHolmes, start to move the analysis of liberalism away from its status as a moralphilosophy that drives the design of institutions of state and more toward itspractical and technical operation. They begin to highlight aspects of the paradoxof liberalism as an ideal of limited government.

From a post-Foucauldian perspective, of course, this is only one, and quitesmall, aspect of the paradox of liberalism as limited government. Here, liberal

government presents itself as operating through semi-autonomous non-statedomains and specialist knowledges of them: civil society, culture, economy andpopulation. Because of the idea that government must work through social,


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cultural, economic and vital processes external to the state to achieve thebetterment of the life of the population, however, the potential for thegovernment, whether through state or nonstate agencies, of aspects of individualand collective life is boundless. Liberal government is total, not because it is

equivalent to authoritarian rule, or because it is completely successful in therealization of its aims. Rather it is total because its program of self-limitation islinked to the facilitation and augmentation of the powers of civil society and theuse of these powers, in conjunction with the sovereign, disciplinary andbiopolitical powers of the state itself, to establish a a comprehensive normal-ization of social, economic and cultural existence.8

A good example of an attempt to provide this kind of rationale forcomprehensive government of life is found in the rationality of economicglobalization. I have suggested elsewhere that the discourse of globalization is amanifestation of the transformation of the liberal problematic of security from thesecurity of economic processes external to government to a kind of security ofgovernmental mechanisms themselves (Dean 1999: 194). Here, I want to simplynote how the postulation of processes external to the formal apparatus of thestate, indeed, external to the territory of the national state itself, can provide astanding reason for the reformation of all aspects of individual and collectiveconduct to make them more efficient and competitive (Hindess 1998). Moreover,such reformation can be done in the name of promoting freedom but byemploying coercive means. Enforcing work obligations for the unemployed,single parents or people with disabilities, for example, can thus be linked to adiscourse on the global necessity of economic freedom.

The contemporary politics of obligation of those in receipt of social assistance

reminds us that liberalism attempts to govern as much through dominationaword that covers a myriad of conditionsas it does through freedom. Liberalforms of governing are exceedingly ambivalent about the idea of a self-determining subject. As far as the poor who might claim assistance wereconcerned, the formation of liberal government of the state in the nineteenthcentury in England was more fundamentally concerned with responsibilitycertainly a capacity closely related to obligationthan it was with freedom(Dean 1991). If it was about freedom at all, then, this form of liberalism wasseeking to establish a positive conception of freedom in Berlins sense (1997). Anaccount of the formation of liberal government requires us to make reference to

Malthus injunction to create the conditions by which laborers would exercisewhat he called moral restraint, that is, restraint from reproduction (Dean 1991:7781). If they did not, such conditions would dictate that they would starve todeath and watch their children starve to death. The Malthusian diagram ofdomination is one that enforces the ontological violence of nature. This equalityof all before the violence of nature, as much as Adam Smiths system of naturalliberty, is the foundation of liberal conceptions of government and of law.

Consider even those who believed that the provision of subsistence was anecessary end of government and legislation, such as Jeremy Bentham and EdwinChadwick (Dean 1991: 156210). They envisaged a framing of administrativedevices and centralized state bureaucracy that would ensure the maintenance of

the forms of life appropriate to the class of laborers and those constituted as theirnatural dependants, i.e., their wives, their children, and the mothers of thosechildren.This administrative logic dictated a detailed regulation of the lives of


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those reliant on poor relief which would rival anything found in the Germanpolice scientistsif not exceed it. The late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century liberal critique of police facilitates the attempt at the detailed regulationof the lives of the laboring classes, the poor and the indigent, under centralized

state bureaucratic superintendence. And, infused throughout the administrativedevice of less eligibility that was to ensure that the life of the pauper was toappear less advantageous than that of the laborer, was the Malthusian violencewritten into the bioeconomic realities of population and subsistence.

To sum up, liberalism presents itself as a form of limited government offeringrestraints on sovereign power. In contrast, liberal government offers the mostfundamental and enduring extension of the powers of the government of the stateso far witnessed. Moreover, this limitation is undertaken in the name ofindividual rights and liberty. Yet liberal forms of government of the stateinstrumentalize and shape various forms of freedom and choice. This isirrespective of whether liberals believe that freedom is an attribute of individualsexchanging on the market (Adam Smith), or that it is the product of specific social,institutional and cultural conditions, variously conceived.9 Moreover, it is just asroutine to attempt to form and to work through other kinds of capacities of certaintypes of individuals. The procreative prudence and economic responsibility of theMalthusian independent (male) laborer is one example. The obligation of thewelfare mom on workfare in the contemporary USA is another. Sometimesthese and other capacities are viewed as a condition of freedom. On otheroccasions, working through these other attributes (obligation, for example) ortransforming them (immaturity, idleness, etc.) by illiberal means, are fundamentalfeatures of liberalism. The attempt to govern through freedom is a contingent

feature, not a necessary corollary, of liberal claims to be a limited form ofgovernment that respects individual liberty. Moreover, liberal government has nomonopoly on notions of freedom. The neo-roman theory of free states in whichthe civil freedom of individuals is only possible in a self-governing politicalassociation is one example of another conception (Skinner 1998). The ancientGreek notion of sophrosyne, a state in which one could attain freedom in relationto the practice of pleasures, and not be a slave to them, is another (Foucault 1985:78). And given that regimes that from a liberal point of view are calledauthoritarian often justify themselves in terms of what Berlin long ago called apositive conception of liberty, the justification of domination in the name of

freedom cannot be viewed as a distinguishing feature of liberalism.I shall now make some remarks that use these two insights in an examinationof the contemporary transformations of government. That is, I shall examinethose transformations in relation to the postulate of multiple, heterogenousand indistinct powers, and the view that contemporary forms of governing inliberal democracies have no necessary relation to individual freedom or theshaping of it.

Transformations of contemporary government

I have argued above that we cannot understand liberalism in its own

terms; that is, as a system of safeguards against authoritarian rule. Nor can weunderstand contemporary formations of rule purely in terms of government orgovernance defined as those zones of powers concerned with the conduct of


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conduct. Both of these postulates run counter to certain tendencies of theliterature on governmentality, and to many of the themes of the literaturesconcerning governance, globalization and networks. Together, they reinstate theimportance of biopolitics and sovereignty, and of situating shifts of government

and rule within them. I want now to suggest a framework for doing this.Let me start with transformations of government and governance considered

without reference to other formations of power. If we do this, contemporary liberalgovernment of the state might be described in the following way:

1. It is above all a form of governing through freedom rather than one that reliesalmost exclusively on domination or coercion. As we have noted, freedom isboth artefact and technical means for the realization of governmentalobjectives. As the latter, it emphasizes how governing is more about steeringand facilitation of networks than about command and hierarchy (Rosenau2000: 182).

2. Contemporary rationalities and programs of government seek to elicit andshape choices often through the use of expertise and services provided by arange of different types of providersfor profit, nonprofits, and publicoftenacting in partnership. Those who are governed are thus often subjectified asconsumers, customers, rational choice actors, and so on. Various socialwelfare, health and education clients are asked to make choices in a market inservices so that services might be more individualized, tailored to particularneeds, made more efficient by being customer focused, and geared to combatwelfare dependency.

3. The central instruments of these forms of government are the construction of

markets, quasi-markets, the use of formal rationalities of accounting andauditing, the utilization and formation of various communities, and themyriad forms of the expertise of risk. Older divisions between public andprivate sectors break down, market-based norms of competition and efficiencygovern state as much as non-state institutions, the notion of socialgovernment becomes highly problematic, and risk devolves onto pluralagencies such as individuals, families, households, communities, businessesand so on.

4. A central problem for contemporary liberalism is the reform of all individualand institutional conduct so that it becomes more competitive and efficient.

This problem is encapsulated in the rationality of globalization whichenvisages a global economy of transnational corporations and capital andfinancial flows that vitiatesor severely limitsattempts by national states togovern what remains of their national economy for the benefit of thepopulations of such states.

5. The outcome of these new forms of governmentality in advanced liberaldemocracies is the production of postsocial forms of citizenship: economiccitizenship, active citizenship, and prudentialism that are characterized by newforms of right.

This characterization might be understood as providing an excellent thick

description of theprograms and rationalities of governing in contemporary liberaldemocracies. However, it fundamentally concurs with the three aspects of theliberal conception of the government of the state we have identified. First, it regards


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government as working through the admittedly constructed freedom and choicesof individuals. Second, it characterizes contemporary liberalism as concerned tolimit the extent of formal political authority by the implementation of market-styled techniques which transform state organizations and create partnerships

with corporate and community bodies. Third, it focuses on the transformation ofliberal-democratic citizenship into new active, economic forms, rather thancentrally addressing the emergence of new coercive and authoritarian means.

While the strength of the governmentality analysis has been its attendance tothe actual rationalities and techniques through which the contemporary liberalgovernment of the state is accomplished, it confirms rather than criticizes muchcontemporary liberal social science. In the latter, current forms of governancedisplace systems of hierarchy and command with facilitating steering mecha-nisms and linkages and flows between horizontal networks (e.g. Castells 2000;Rosenau 2000). It downplays the role of the national state in favor of every othertype of governmental and nongovernmental agency and social movement, butespecially the actors of the global economy. Indeed, governing occurs through theglobal economy more than any other site and is about constructing networks,linkages and partnerships, between different types of agencies for both financialgain and collective provision. In such a view, the world has become fundamen-tally depoliticized. It is one in which politics is an empty ritual seeking to gratifyour appetites for mediatized spectacles (e.g. Castells 2000: 80).

A rather different diagram of possible forms of contemporary liberal govern-ment emerges when contemporary transformations of the government of the stateare located on multiple zones of power. Here, shifts occur in relation to thepowers of life and death characteristic of biopolitics and sovereignty as much as

in the zone concerned with the conduct of conduct; that is, the zone ofgovernmental power:

1. The freedomdomination relationship needs to be repositioned in relation tosovereign and biopolitical powers of life and death. In regard to sovereignty,there is a contemporary proliferation of the techniques of arrest, incarceration,punishment, expulsion, disqualification and, more broadly, coercion that arecentral to the treatment of populations of asylum seekers, of criminal andprison populations, even of idle youth and social welfare recipients. Of course,on some occasions some of these populations might be asked to exercise

freedom and choice, but this should not distract attention from the reneweduse of sovereign powers in programs of mandatory detention and sentencing,zero-tolerance policing and tough love and new paternalist approaches towelfare.10 Similarly, biopolitical issues of the fostering or disallowing of life,however modulated through individual freedom, cannot be reduced to it.

2. Thus the question of the shaping of choice by means of various forms ofexpertise leads to a sovereign decision on the forms of life that can be killedwithout committing homicide and those that can be allowed to live, andindeed be fostered by various biopowers. The clearest example here is the wayin which contemporary biomedical practices employ various forms ofexpertise (risk assessment, prenatal screening, counselling, criteria on the

futility of further treatment, notions of brain death, bioethics, etc.) to constitutefamily members, prospective mothers and fathers, carers, doctors, etc., as lociof decision concerning the termination of life or the attempt to preserve and


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foster it. These are sovereign decisions on what constitutes life that can bekilled without committing homicide (in the language of Agamben).

3. The institutional means for the shaping of conduct thus also carry with themthe threat of sovereign violence, the symbolics of violence and violence itself.

Thus the establishment of institutions and markets to provide for the long-termunemployed or the single parent is accompanied by a fundamental threat tothe life and dignity of the individual. Behind the agreements which theunemployed or the single parent must contract into in return for subsistence,is the threat of an ultimate sanction, a withdrawal of assistance and thus awithdrawal of the means of life. Perhaps even more effective than the actualsanction, is the symbolics of threat that accompanies the designation of a lifewhich is deemed unworthy, in the language of National Socialists, orundeserving, in the language of nineteenth-century moralizing philan-thropy. The question of violence, of micro-violences, of the symbolics andthreat of violence, of legal and legitimate violence, as much as the variousforms of the conduct of conduct and the governing through freedom,including and especially the contract, is a component of certain types ofcontemporary liberal rule.

4. The key intelligibility of contemporary rule is given in more than in itseconomic self-image. The problem of new forms of productive, efficient andentrepreneurial economic citizenship and rights here meets new forms ofmoral discipline, restraint and, above all, obligation. The problem ofcontemporary rule is not simply about economic competition and networks ina globalized (or regionalized) economy, but about disorder, dysfunction, socialpathology and welfare dependency. The personal disorder of the welfare

recipient, and the beneficial moral effects of the supervision of the boss is asimportant as increasing the productivity of the population for contemporarywelfare reform in the USA (Scram 2000: 367). Moreover, the development ofthe working poor in low-paid, insecure unionized jobs establishes apopulation subject to wide discretionary uses of the arbitrary powers of theboss. These powers might decree no talking at work, no drinking of waterduring work time, and use of only designated breaks to go to the toilet(Ehrenreich 2001). At the heart of certain contemporary transformations ofgovernment is not simply the economic concern, in which the production of acertain form of economic citizenship is necessary for economic security in a

global economy; it is also a political one in which the diagnoses of disorder andpathology require the reimposition of authority and the reinscription of thepoor within a hierarchy.

5. At least in certain key domains, notably relating to those on social support,notions of citizenship are being reconfigured so that obligation has becomemore fundamental than rights, and enforcement has replaced entitlement.This is the case for new paternalists, communitarians, and Third Way SocialDemocrats. While this notion of obligation can be understood as the converseof rights, I want to suggest that obligation is today breaking loose of thejuridical discourse of citizenship and coming to assume a relation to thevalue of life itself. Obligations are enforced by sanctions in which the

removal of the means of life or its threat is at stake. Obligation is thusunderlined, even in its contractual form, with the threat, symbolics ordeployment of violence.


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Insofar as our studies of rule in contemporary liberal democracies conform to thefirst description, they replicate certain aspects of the normative understanding ofliberalism in which the key dilemma is how a limited sphere of government might

facilitate and activate the capacities of its citizens in a cost-effective way. Governingthrough the exercise of freedom and choice within constructed markets and inpublicprivate partnerships, by plural agencies such as individuals, families,neighborhoods, assorted communities, regions and other associations, and underthe marketized pastoralism of experts, forms one contemporary response to such adilemma. In this respect the contemporary ethos of welfare concerns how toprovide for the needs of the population in such a way as to form and maintain anactive and independent citizenry in a manner which strengthens rather thanundermines economic performance. The contemporary liberal rationalities of thiskind of the government of the state concern markets, capital flows, globalization,risk, enterprise, individualization, agency, and so on.

This is, however, only a partial description of contemporary politics and whatis at stake in the liberal government of the state. It rests to some degree upon amisunderstanding of the history of the formation of an autonomous rationality ofgovernment. For even Adam Smith, in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1978: 5)proposes that the problem of order or, as he puts it, internall peace is what hecalls the first and chief end of every system of government. Moderngovernmental rationalities in general, and liberal rationalities of government inparticular, are thus concerned to secure the conditions of social and political order.In so doing, moreover, they necessarily presuppose a power that determines whatconstitutes public order and decides when it obtains or is disturbed. They

presuppose sovereignty. This is missing in not only the assiduous attempts tochart the mechanisms of contemporary rule by those inspired by governmentalityapproaches, but also by the dominant narratives presented by contemporarysocial science.

I want to suggest that much contemporary discussion of the liberal governmentof the state is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of order.Whether we examine the new paternalism, social policy ideas of mutualobligation, or even sociologists discussions of individualization and responsibil-ity, we find the question of the political means of securing social order on theagenda. The contemporary debate here is about the content of a normal frame of

life within a political order, and the means of securing it. It is about how order canbe restored or maintained and social pathology and dependency combated.Contemporary liberal rationalities might identify the emergent normal frame oflife with the enterprise, partnerships and networking required by the globalimperatives of economic competition and efficiency. But they also concernthemselves with how that frame of life will be secured both collectively andindividually.

There is nothing new to this scenario, as Smiths lectures suggest. However, weshould also consider Agambens thesis that sovereign power is becomingindistinct from biopolitics. In this case, the sovereign decision on the establish-ment of a particular form of life (bios) meets matters of mere existence (zoe) itself.

Whether we consider the welfare of the poor, the rights of refugees or indigenes,biomedical interventions, or environmental catastrophe, we are not simply facedwith the enhancement of the life of the population but the sovereign decision on


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bare life, of that life which forms the exception for our moral and politicalexistence and which, ultimately, can be allowed to die or even killed withoutcommitting homicide.

Furthering the study of governmentality means continuing with, but also going

beyond, a focus on those power relations conceived as the direction of conductand the shaping of choice. An analysis of these relations is always in danger ofacceding like certain contemporary social scienceto the normative content ofliberalism and neoliberalism themselves. It is only by the sustained effort toreposition this analysis within an analysis of sovereign and biopolitical powersthat we begin to gain an intelligibility of governing in liberal democracies that isno longer fundamentally liberal.

Notes

1. This paper is the revised text of a lecture delivered at the Institute of Sociology,

University of Copenhagen, on 28 August 2000 and at the Ethos of Welfare conferenceat the University of Helsinki three days later.

2. See Barry et al. (1996) and Dean and Hindess (1998) for examples of the latter.3. For varying approaches see Mauss (1979), Bourdieu (1990) and Elias (1997).4. These questions have been asked by several papers (OMalley et al., 1997; Stenson

1998). I have devoted a few passages to them (Dean 1999: 349).5. Two excellent sociological accounts of the decisions on bare life made in the context

of various prenatal techniques and related forms of expertise are those of Barbara KatzRothman (1994) and Kolker and Burke (1994). See also Beck-Gernsheim (1996) on thenew powers over the planning of life.

6. In Australia, as in other settler societies of the former British Empire such as Canada

and New Zealand, we have the situation in which the physical body of the sovereignis literally both inside and outside the juridical-political order of the nation and itsterritory. Thus a sovereign decision on the state of exception was made in 1975 whenan official appointed by the Prime Minister, the Governor-General, acting as arepresentative of Queen Elizabeth the Second, dismissed a popularly electedgovernment and appointed the Leader of the Opposition as Prime Minister. Thesepowers are referred to as reserve powers under the Australian Constitution. What ispeculiar about the Australian polity is the actual location of the sovereign in anothernation, not that the sovereign is both inside and outside the juridical-political order.

7. Note that any characterization of Schmitt as an anti-liberal must account for the recentcharacterization of his position as authoritarian liberalism (Cristi 1998), and his 1932

address to a business association (1998).8. The total character of liberalism was brought to my attention by Ilpo Helens recentand helpful essay (2000: 160). See my paper (Dean, 2002) on Liberal Government andAuthoritarianism for further explication of this point.

9. Freedom could be the artefact of a legal and bureaucratic framework such as for thepostwar German Ordoliberalen (Foucault 1997a: 778; Gordon 1991; Tribe 1995), of thegeneralization of market conditions for the Chicago School, and of the development ofcivilizational constraints for Hayek (1979).

10. OMalley (1999) and Stenson (2000) provide good overviews of the range of punitiveand policing practices and strategies respectively.

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Mitchell Dean is the author of several books and myriad articles on post-Foucauldian social and political analysis, including Governmentality: Power andRule in Modern Society (Sage 1999). He is currently Head, Division of Society,

Culture, Media and Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney.

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