AnAlysis of public opinion on MAcedoniA’s

Accession to the europeAn union

2014-2016

Author: ivan damjanovski

iMpressuM

title: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON MACEDONIA’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014-2016)

publishers:Johannes D. Rey, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in the Republic of MacedoniaMarko Troshanovski, Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” - Skopje

Author:Ivan Damjanovski

translation: Mariche Kirkova

design and preparation:Vincent Grafika

The publication can be downloaded for free at:http://www.kas.de/mazedonienhttp://www.idscs.org.mk

note:The stances exposed in this publication do not represent the positions of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung nor the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” – Skopje, but are personal views of the authors.

CIP - Каталогизација во публикацијаНационална и универзитетска библиотека “Св. Климент Охридски”, Скопје

316.654:341.171.071.51(4-672ЕУ:497.7)”2014/2016”

DAMJANOVSKI, Ivan Analysis of public opinion on macedonia’s accession to the European union : (2014-2016) / author Ivan Damjanovski. - Skopje : Institute for democracy Societas Civilis - (IDSCS), 2017. - 36 стр.: граф. прикази ; 21 см

Фусноти кон текстот

ISBN 978-608-4775-10-2

а) Европска Унија - Зачленување - Јавно мислење - Македонија - 2014-2016COBISS.MK-ID 102730250

conclusions

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• ThetrendsregardingsupportforMacedonia’sEUmembership are stable and follow a predictabletransitionoffrequencies.

• The tendencies of support for the accessionprocess inMacedonia are clearly correlatedwiththecredibilityoftheMacedonianperspectivesforEuropeanUnionmembership.

• ThemultiyeardecreasingtrendofEUmembershipsupportinMacedoniacontinuesin2016aswell.

• This decrease corresponds with the fall of thecredibility of the European Union’s enlargementpolicyinMacedoniaintheperiodafter2009.

• However,thevalueof77%supportforMacedonia’smembership in theEU is still exceptionallyhigh,especiallyifweconsiderthelongstagnationoftheaccessionprocess.

• ThereisagrowingpolarizationofpublicperceptionsonMacedonia’s readiness formembership in theEuropeanUnion.

• InthelasttwoyearsthereisagrowingdiscontentwithMacedonia’sprogressintheaccessionprocess,aswellasasignificantincreaseinthediscontentwith the domestic capacity and engagement onreforms.

4• ThegeneraltrendsofsupportforEUmembershiptoa certainextent correlatewith the stagnationof theaccessionprocess, thenegativeeffectsofthepoliticalcrisisonthecountry’sgovernance,butalso with the critical reports from the EuropeanCommissioninthelasttwoyears.

• Material and economical factors are the mostimportant incentives for attitude formation inregardstoEUmembership.

• TheprincipalmotivationforthehighsupportoftheaccessionprocessaretheexpectationsofmaterialandeconomicbenefitsfromEUmembership.

• ExpectationsofimprovementofthelivingstandardasaconsequenceofEUmembershipareadominantfactorforthesupportforEUmembership.

• ThesupportforMacedonia’sEUmembershipisofasociotropicnature.Itisnotbasedonexpectationsforpersonalmaterialbenefitsfromtheaccessionprocess,butratherontheanticipationofthefuturesocietaleconomicbenefitsfromEUmembership.

• Although identity, ideological and value basedfactorsarenotdecisive intheattitudeformationon thesupport forEUmembership, theyexplainthereasonsforitslongtermdecrease.

• Thedecreaseof the support forEUmembershipisnotamanifestationofgrowingeuroskepticismderiving from the sense of cultural threat or athreatstonationalidentity.

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5• TheidentityimplicationsstemmingfromthenamedisputewithGreeceisakeyfactorforthegradualdecreaseofthesupportforEUmembership.

• Ifthenamedisputeasanobstacleintheaccessionprocessisleftout,thesupportforEUmembershipreachesnearly90%.

• ThereisasignificantdisparityinthesupportforEUmembershipbetweentheethnicMacedoniansandAlbanianswhenthesupportisconditionedwithachangeofthecountry’sname.

• This gap is narrowing in the last two years dueto increasing numbers of ethnic Albanians whodon’t support a compromise on the name as apreconditionformembershipintheEU.

• Thepoliticalcrisisinthecountryandtheattitudeof certain political elites towards the EuropeanUnion’smediation role in its resolution does nothaveaseriousnegativeeffectonthesupportfortheEuropeanintegrationprocess.

introduction

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Duringthelast15years,thesupportforMacedonia’sEU membership and its accession process appearsasasubjectofnumerouspublicopinionresearches.However,most of these researches are ad-hoc andthey have rarely been effectuated in a longitudinaland consistent methodological framework. Thereis anobvious lackofunifieddatabases thatwouldofferrepetitivepublicopinionresearcheswhichwouldmeasurepublicattitudes throughageneralizedandcoherent methodological frame across multi-yeartimeperiods.Inordertofillthisgap,theInstituteforDemocracy“SocietasCivilis”–SkopjeandtheKonradAdenauer Foundation in 2014 started to establisha long termdatabaseon thepublic supportof theaccessionprocessandMacedonia’smembershipintheEU,whichwouldbeeffectuatedthroughannualpublicopinionresearches,basedonacoherentmethodologyand measurement of identical variables. This databaseisfocusingontwodimensionsofpublicopiniononMacedonia’sEUaccessionprocesswhichareaddressedineveryannualresearch,andwhosemeasurementiseffectuated through utilization of identical batteriesof survey questions. The first dimension seeks todetermine the general trends of public support forMacedonia’s membership in the EU. The seconddimension’sgoal is toestablishthedeterminantsofsuchsupportthroughalongtermanalysisofinfluenceofthreefactors:rationalist-utilitarian,identitybasedandcuesfrompoliticalelitesandpoliticalparties.Thisaccumulationofcomparabledataopensthewayforestablishmentofmoreserious longitudinalanalysesofthesupportforMacedonia’smembershipintheEU

8anditsdeterminants.Furthermore,asanadditiontothisunifieddesign,everyannualresearchwillfurtherinspectpublicopinionontheEUintegrationprocess,by examining current topics, specific for concretetimeperiods.

Thestartingpointof thisapproachare thefindingsof themonograph “Public opinion andMacedonia`saccession to the European union (2004-2014)”1,publishedin2014,whichalsoincludesthedatafromthepublicopinion researchconducted in2014,andrepresents a methodological reference point forsubsequent researches. This study has fulfilled twogoals.First,itdeterminedgeneraltrendsofsupportforMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion,thatpointoutacorrelationbetweenthedynamicsofthe support formembership in theEuropeanUnionand the development of the Macedonian processof accession in the European Union, manifestedin two time periods: 2004 - 2009 as a period ofconsistent and especially high support and 2010– 2014 as a period of incremental decrease of thesupport.Second,thestudyestablishedananalyticalmodel of the determinants of the support for EUmembershipthroughtheinteractionofthreefactorsof public attitude formation: rationalist-utilitarian,identity based and cues from political elites.2 Therationalistutilitarian frameassumes the importanceofcalculationsofmaterialbenefits,asthemainfactorfortheformationofindividuals’attitudesforsupportof

1 Damjanovski,Ivan.“PublicopinionandMacedonia`saccessiontotheEuropeanUnion(2004-2014)”,KonradAdenauerFoundation/InstituteforDemocracy“SocietasCivilis”–Skopje,2014

2 Forwidertheoreticalexplicationofthemodel,see:Ibid,p.13-24

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9theEuropeanintegrationprocess.Inthiscontext,thesupportcanbebasedonpresentorfutureperceptionsonthepersonal(egoisticlevel)orsocietal(sociotropiclevel) benefit from the accession in the EuropeanUnion.Ontheotherhand,thesupportoftheEuropeanintegrationprocesscanalsobeinfluencedbyidentityandvaluebasedfactors,whichshapetheindividual’spointofview,whichconsequentlyisthebasisofhis/hersattitudeformation.Thedegreeofnationalself-identification and the sense of cultural threat aremanifested as primary factors for the variation ofattitudes. Finally, the formation of public attitudestowardsEuropeanUnionmembershipcanalsobearesultof the influenceof cues frompoliticalpartieswhicharecapabletoimposetheirattitudesoncertainimportant social issues to their supporters. Thus,it ispresumed that thevariationof support for theEuropeanintegrationprocessdependsproportionallyonthehomogeneityofpoliticalparties’attitudesonthisquestion.

About the survey

ThispublicopinionanalysisforMacedonia’saccessionprocessintheEuropeanUnionin2016isacontinuationoftheresearchdonein2014.Thus,itemploysthesametheoreticalandanalyticalmodelofthedeterminantsofsupportofMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion,andatthesametime,convergesits’empiricalfindingswiththefindingsoftheresearchfrom2014.

Theprimarydatausedinthisanalysiscomefromapublicopinion telephone survey conducted by IDSCS during

10November2016onasampleof1100respondents.Thesampleisnationallyrepresentativebygender,age(above18 years), ethnicity, and it also has a representativecoverageof respondents fromall sixelectoralunits inthe country. The results arepresented in percentagesandaresubjecttoerrorof±3%.

This research uses identical methodology andquestionnaire as the survey research conductedin 2014. This approach creates conditions for minilongitudinal analysis of the support of Macedonia’saccession in the European Union in the last twoyears.Thus,accordingtothepreviouslyestablishedanalyticalmodel,thisstudyfocusesonanalyzingthegeneraltrendsandthebasicdeterminantsofsupportofMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnionintheperiodfrom2014–2016.

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GenerAl trends

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The support for Macedonia’s membership in theEuropean Union in the last decade is based on aconsistent and predictable distribution of attitudes,whichfollowsthedynamicsofprogressinMacedonia’saccessionprocess.ThetrendsofthissupportareinaclearcorrelationwiththecredibilityoftheMacedonianperspectivesformembershipintheEuropeanUnion.Thus, the constantly high support for membershipin theEuropeanUnion reaches itsmaximum in thetimeperiodfrom2004to2009whenthecredibilityoftheenlargementpolicyoftheEuropeanUnionisthehighest,i.e.whenthecountrywasawardedwiththecandidate status and received the recommendationto start accession negotiations. Consequently, thefall of the credibility of EU`s enlargement policy inMacedonia in theperiodafter2009, inducedbythede facto blockade of the commitments to start themembershipnegotiations,proportionallycorrespondswith thegradual and stable fall of the support formembershipintheperiodfrom2009to2016.

Thistendencyalsocontinuesin2016.TheresultsfromthesurveyconductedinNovember2016showa77%supportofMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion.FromacomparativeEuropeanperspective,thispercentofsupport isstillextremelyhigh,especiallyif we consider the prolonged stagnation of theaccession process. However, compared with 2014,thereisaslightdecreaseof3%inthesupportforEUmembership(table1).

14Table1

if next week there is a referendum for

membership of the republic of Macedonia in the eu, how would you vote?

20143 2016 trend4

% %

For 80 77 -3

Against 14 17 +4

Idon’tknow 6 4 -2

Iwon’tvote 1 2 +1

Ononehand,theseresultsconfirmthedecreasingtrendsofsupportforMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion.However,ifweconsidertheeuro-skepticdimensionoftheturbulenteventsontheEuropeanpoliticalsceneinthelasttwoyears,aswellasthedeeppoliticalcrisisinMacedonia,itseemsthatthesefactorsdon’thaveabigdistortiveinfluenceonthepublicopiniononMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion.

Seenthroughademographicprism,thedistributionofattitudes isconsistentacrossallcategories.Theevendistribution of attitudes is visible in the gender, age,professional,regionalandeducationcategory,wherebythe highest enthusiasm is noted with the elderlypopulation (support of over 85%). There is only onedeviation,withintheethnicitycategory,where19%ofethnicMacedoniansareopposingthemembershipinthe

3 Due to roundingdecimals, the total summaynotamount to100%(thisremarkappliestoallthetables).

4 Every variation of the trend between the results from 2014and2016which is in the intervalof+-3% isnot statisticallysignificant and should be interpreted as absence of variation(thisremarkappliestoallthetables).

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15EuropeanUnion(against74%ofthesamedemographicpopulationthatsupportsEUmembership).

AsimilardistributionisalsovisibleintheattitudestowardspersonalaffiliationwiththemembershipintheEuropeanUnion(table2).Hence,thecumulativepercentofthoserespondents that give significance to membership inthe European Union, i.e. those who answered “veryimportant”and“somewhatimportant”is77%.Incontrast,the cumulative percent of respondents that don’t giveimportancetotheEuropeanintegrationprocessreaches21%.Thecomparativeanalysiswiththeresultsfrom2014indicatesacorrespondingdecreaseof7%ofthedegreeofpersonalaffiliationwiththeideaofEUmembershipinthecumulativesumofthoserespondentswhoconsidertheEUmembershipasimportantandaninverselyproportionalincreaseof6%ofthoserespondentswhoconsiderthatEUmembershipisnotimportant.

Table2

how important is to you personally for Macedonia

to become a member of the european union?

2014 2016 trend

% %

Veryimportant 48 48 0

Somewhatimportant 36 29 -6

Somewhatnotimportant 5 5 +1

Notimportantatall 10 16 +6

Don’tknow 1 1 0

Noanswer/Refusestoanswer 0 0 0

16The last two years have produced another variationin the distribution of attitudes on Macedonia`sreadinessformembershipaswellastheperceptionsonMacedonia`sprogressintheEuropeanintegrationprocess. The survey results from November 2016indicate a growing public polarization regardingthe perception of whether Macedonia is ready tobe a member of the European Union. Half of thepopulationconsidersthatMacedonia isnotreadyformembership in the European Union, against 45%thatareconvincedintheopposite.Incomparisonto2014,wehave an imposition of a negative trend intherespondentperceptionmanifestedwithadeclineof6%ofthepositiveattitudesandanincreaseof7%ofthepopulationwhichconsidersthatMacedoniaisnotreadyformembershipintheEuropeanUnion(table3).

Table3

is Macedonia ready to become a member of

the eu? 2014 2016 trend

% %

Yes 51 45 -6

No 42 49 +8

Don’tknow(notreadable) 7 6 -1

Noanswer/Refusestoanswer 1 0 -1

SimilartendenciesaregeneratedbythedistributionofattitudesregardingMacedonia’sprogressintheprocessofEuropeanintegrationinthepastyear(table4).In2016,only11%of the intervieweesbelieve thatMacedoniahas achieved significant progress in the European

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17integrationprocess,andadditional28%considerthatthereissomekindofprogress.Thecumulativepercentof positive attitudes toward progress is 39% whichrepresentsafallofarelativelyhigh8%inthistwoyearperiod. Consequently, the percentage of respondentsdetecting a limited or no progress in the accessionprocess is growing exponentially. The cumulativepercent of respondentswith negative attitudes aboutthe country’s progress in the European-integrationagendain2016is37%,whichisby6%morethanin2014.Inaddition,onethirdofthepopulationconsidersthatin2016therewasnoprogressatallinMacedonia’saccessionprocess,and20%detectminimalprogress.

Table4

how much do you think Macedonia has progressed

in the eu integration process in comparison to

last year?

2014 2016 trend

% %

Progressedalot 14 11 -3

Somewhatprogressed 33 28 -5

Progressedalittle 20 20 0

Didn’tprogressedatall 26 30 +5

Thereisafalldown 5 7 +2

Don’tknow 2 3 +1

Noanswer/Refusestoanswer 0 1 0

The analysis of the perceptions on the reasons forthestagnationoftheprocessofEuropeanintegrationindicates a significant growth of discontent of the

18domestic reform capacity and engagement (table5). Thus, almost 40% of the respondents in 2016consider the lack of implementation of domesticreforms as themain reason why Macedonia is stillnotamemberof theEuropeanUnion.Thisvalue isby10%higherthanin2014.Atthesametime,thenumberofrespondentsthatconsiderthepoliciesofneighboringcountriestowardsMacedoniaasthemainfactorforthestagnationintheaccessionprocesshasdecreasedby12%(46%in2016).Only10%pointouttheEuropeanUnionasadetractoroftheMacedonianEuropeanintegrationprocess.

Table5

What do you think is the main reason why

Macedonia is still not a member of the eu?

2014 2016 trend

% %

Lackofrealizationofdomesticreforms 29 39 +10

EUisnotreadytoacceptMacedoniaasamembercountry

7 10 +3

NeighboringcountriesobstructMacedonia’smembershipintheEU

59 47 -12

Don’tknow 4 4 0

Noanswer/Refusestoanswer 1 1 0

Finally,suchviewsgeneratedivergentperceptionsaboutrespondentexpectationsofapossibledateofentryintheEUforMacedonia.Inthepasttwoyearsthereisamildgrowthofenthusiasmabout theexpectations

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19ofMacedoniaenteringtheEUinthenext3to5years(table6).Ifweconsiderthedynamicsoftheaccessionprocess in the previous EU enlargement cycleswithpost-communistcandidatecountries,thisdistributionofattitudesin2016indicatesunrealisticexpectationsandlackofinformationaboutthefunctioningofEU’senlargement policy. On the other side, 18% of therespondents consider thatMacedoniawould becomeanEUmemberinthenext10years.ThepercentageofthoserespondentswhoconsiderthatMacedoniawillneverbecomeanEUmemberisalsohigh(25%).

Table6

When do you think Macedonia will become an

eu member?2014 2016 trend

% %

Inthenext3years 14 18 +4

Inthenext5years 18 22 +4

Inthenext10years 21 18 -4

Inthenext20years 12 7 -5

Never 23 25 +2

Don’tknow/Noanswer 11 10 -1

The above mentioned trends correlate in a certainmeasurewiththestagnationoftheaccessionprocessinMacedonia,thepoliticalcrisis’snegativeeffectsonstate governance, but also with the critical reportsfromtheEuropeanCommissioninthelasttwoyears.Therefore,thiskindofdynamicdoesn’tdeviatefromthebasicassumptionsonthedecreasingenthusiasmtowards the progress and the perspectives of theaccessionprocess.

deterMinAnts of support for the europeAn inteGrAtion

process

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rAtionAlist-utilitAriAn fActors

ThefindingsofpublicopinionresearchonthesupportforMacedonia’smembershipintheEuropeanUnioninthelastdecadeindicateacombinedinfluenceoftheestablished determinants (material, identity-basedand cues from political elites) on the dynamics ofsupportfortheaccessionprocess.Thereto,rationalist-utilitarian preferences are inserted as a primaryfactor of the support for EUmembership. In otherwords,theprincipalreasonforthehighsupportoftheaccessionprocess are the expectations formaterialandeconomicbenefitsfromEUmembership.However,this support is not based on the current economicsituation in the country,buton theexpectationsoffuturegrowthofsociety’smaterialwellbeing,inducedbyEuropeanUnionmembership.

Thisargumentation isalsoconfirmedbytheresultsfrom the survey conducted in November 2016.Consequently, the primary parameters explainingthe approval of Macedonia’s membership in theEuropeanUnion,butalsotheparametersthatexplaintheoppositiontomembershipareeconomicintheirnature.Thus,outof77%ofrespondentsthatsupportMacedonianmembershipintheEuropeanUnion,46%statethattheprincipalreasonfortheirsupportaretheexpectationsof improvementofthe livingstandard.In addition, 16,5% of the respondents justify theirsupport through expectations of decreases of theunemployment rate, while additional 10% favors

22EU membership due to anticipation of easier accessto employment abroad. The cumulative sum of theeconomic factors indicates a significant majority ofrespondentssupportingtheaccessionprocessbasedonmaterial utilitarian views. There is a notable contrastwiththeothernonmaterialalternatives.Thus,16%ofthe respondents supporting Macedonia’smembershipin the EU, state the increased safety and stability ofthecountrythatwouldbeprovidedbyEUmembershipas themain reason for their consent.The ideologicaland political factors concerned with improvement ofdemocracyandaffiliationtothe“Europeanfamily”touchaverysmallpartofthepopulation(5%)(table7).

Table7

What is your reason for deciding to vote for

membership in the eu?2014 2016 trend

% %

Improvementofthestandardofliving 29 46 +17

Decreaseofunemployment 26 17 -9

Improvementofdemocracy 10 5 -6

Workers’mobility/easieraccesstojobsabroad 3 10 +7

Belongingtothe“Europeanfamilyof

countries”2 5 +3

Improvedsecurityandstabilityofthecountry 27 16 -11

Don’tknow/noanswer 2 1 -1

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23Atthesametime,theeconomicalinterestsarealsothemainfactorthatinfluencesattitudeformationamongtherespondentswhoopposeMacedonia’smembershipin the EU. Namely, 36% of the respondents thatwould votenegatively at an eventual referendum forMacedonia’sentranceintheEU,basetheirpositionontheexpectationsthattheentranceintheEUwouldworsenthestandardofliving.Additional15,7%considerthatEUmembershipwouldthreatentheMacedonianeconomy.On the other hand, the nonmaterial reasons for themanifestation of euro skeptic attitudes have a lowerinput.Inthiscontext,morenotableisthedistributionofattitudeswhichseetheEuropeanintegrationprocessasathreattonationalidentity(10%)orresentmentbytheEuropeanUnion(12%)(table8).

Table8

What is your reason for deciding to vote AGAinst

membership in the eu?2014 2016 trend

% %

Worseningstandardofliving 33 37 +4

ThreatstotheMacedonianeconomy 13 16 +2

Attemptstochangetheconstitutionalnameof

thecountry11 7 -4

Lossofnationalidentity 13 10 -2

WewillbecomedependentonBrussels 11 6 -6

Lossofsovereigntyandindependenceofthe

country7 5 -2

EUdoesn’twantus 6 12 5

Don’tknow/noanswer 6 8 2

24The comparative analysis with the research from2014 indicatesanevenbiggerstrengtheningof theinfluenceofmaterialutilitarianfactorsforsupportofEUmembership(tables7and8).Withinthecategory“improvement of the living standard” as a primaryfactorforsupportofEUmembership,thereisavisibleincrease of 17% at the expense of “decrease ofunemployment”whichmarksadecreasing intensityinthedistributionofattitudes.Anincreasingtrendofattitudes that indicate workers’mobility and easieraccesstoemploymentabroadasthemainreasonfortheir support for EUmembership is also indicative.Thesefindingscorrespondwithsomerecentresearchesofpublicopinionthatpointtowardsstrengtheningofthepreferencestomoveoutofthecountry.Ontheother hand, the nonmaterial factors regarding thestrengtheningofthecountry’ssecurityandstabilityanddemocraticimprovementrecordnotabledecreasesoffrequenciesinthelasttwoyears.Similartendenciesarealsonotablewiththedynamicsoftheeuroskepticattitudes.Thus,inregardstotheeconomicvariables,thereisamildincreaseofattitudeswhichdetecttheworseningof the livingstandardand the threats totheMacedonianeconomyasprimaryfactorsoftheiropposition to EU membership. Inversely, acrossmost nonmaterial explications (attempts to changethe constitutional name, loss of national identity,dependencyonBrusselsandlossofsovereignty),adecreasingtransitionofpublicattitudesoccurs.

The argument for the dominant position of therationalist-utilitarian factors in the formation ofattitudesonEUmembership is further strengthened

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25bythefrequencyofperceptionsontheareasonwhichEUmembershipwouldhave themostpositiveeffect(table 9). The percentage sumof attitudes that arerelatedtoindicatorsofeconomicnature,i.e.economicdevelopment(25%),unemploymentdecrease(18%),infrastructure improvement (5%) and quality of life(18%), significantly surpasses the political [stability(15%) and human rights and freedoms (9%)] andidentity-based factors (4%). In this sense, also thelongitudinal aspect of the distribution of attitudesregardingthisquestioninthetimeperiodfrom2014–2016featuresabalancedtransition,asmoresignificantdeviationscannotbedetected.

Table9

Which areas will be most positively affected

by Macedonia`s eu membership?

2014 2016 trend

% %

Economicdevelopment 23 25 +2

Stability 13 15 +2

Decreaseofunemployment 23 18 -5

Humanrightsandfreedoms 12 9 -3

Improvementofinfrastructure 6 5 -1

Qualityoflifeasawhole 16 18 +2

Strengtheningofnationalidentity 3 4 +1

Other 1 3 +2

Don’tknow 3 3 0

26Finally, the material utilitarian determinacy of thesupport for Macedonia’s EU membership continuesto be based on a clear sociotropic calculation. ThesupportforMacedonia’sEUmembershipisnotbasedoncalculationsofthepersonalmaterialbenefitsfromthe accession process and content with the currenteconomic situation onmicro level. On the contrary,the high support is firstly materialized through thepositive perceptions on the future anticipated socialeconomic benefits from EUmembership. The socio-tropic nature of the support formembership is alsomanifestedthroughtheconsistencyofthedistributionof attitudes across the demographic categories ofsocialcapital(educationandprofession),wheretherearenosignificantdisparitiesbetweentherespondentswith high and low social capital. Consequently, theaccession process in this stadium obviously doesn’tproduce groups of winners and losers from theaccessiontotheEU,totheextentthatthehighsupportforEUmembershipisshapedbyastableandequitabledivisionoffrequenciesacrossallprofessioncategoriesandlevelsofeducation.Thus,forexample,thespanoffluctuationsinthesupportformembershipbetweentherespondentswithsecondary,higherandpostgraduateeducationislessthan±3%oftheaverageof77%.

identity And vAlue bAsed fActors

AnalysesofpublicopinionontheEuropeanintegrationprocess in Macedonia confirm the assumption thatthe formation of attitudes about the support forMacedonia’sEUmembershipispredominantlybased

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27onmaterial,rationalist-utilitarianmotivations.Ontheotherhand, although identity, ideological andvaluebasedfactorsarenotquintessentialfortheformationof attitudes for support of EU membership, theyexplainthereasonsforthe longtermdeclinationofthissupport.

If we analyze the findings of the database used inthisanalysis,itbecomesobviousthatthefallofthesupportforEUmembershipisnotamanifestationofgrowingeuroskepticismderiving fromthesenseofculturalthreatorthreatstonationalidentity.Inthisaspect,theMacedoniancasediffersfromthegeneraltrendsinEurope,inthesensethattheexclusivityofnationalself-identificationdoesn’tplayanimportantroleinthevariationofthesupportforEUmembership.The sense for belonging to an exclusive nationalidentity in Macedonia is dominant and it is not asubjectofsignificantfluctuations.Almost70%ofthepopulation identifies exclusively with one nationalidentity,andcloseto20%manifestadoubleidentity,i.e. primary ethnical identification and secondaryidentificationwithaEuropeanidentity.ThepercentageofrespondentsthatfavorEuropeanidentityovertheirethnicidentityordeclareexclusiveEuropeanidentityisminimal (table 10). In addition, the comparativedatafrom2014and2016showthatthisdistributionofattitudesisextremelyconsistentinasmuchaswecannotnoticeanyfrequencyfluctuations.

28Table10

Above all, do you feel as? 2014 2016 trend

% %

OnlyMacedonian/Albanian/other 69 70 +1

Macedonian/Albanian/otherandEuropean 20 20 -1

EuropeanandMacedonian 6 7 +1

OnlyEuropean 3 3 0

Don’tknow 2 1 -1

However, this self-identification doesn’t have anegative effect on the support for EUmembership.72,5%oftherespondentsthatdeclareanexclusivenational identity also support Macedonia’s EUmembership.Thatsupportisincreaseduptoalmost90% among the respondents that also have anaffiliationtowardsEuropeanidentity.ThesetrendsofhighsupportforEUmembershipacrossallcategoriesof identityaffiliationarealsoconsistent in temporalterms.Thedistributionofattitudesinbothresearchesfrom2014and2016iscomplementaryandfeaturesminimaldeviationswithinalldemographiccategories.These characteristics of the public opinion on EUmembership deviate from the basic assumptionsonthe influenceof identityaffiliationonthedegreeof support for EU membership. In the Macedoniancase,thehighdegreeofexclusiveidentificationwithnational identity doesn’t generate significant euroskeptic energy. At the same time, the accession in

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29theEUisalsonotviewedasaculturalthreat,sinceonly 10% of the euro-skeptic respondents see theprocessofEuropeanintegrationasathreattonationalidentity (table3). Thekeyvariablewhich explainsthegradualfallofthesupportforEUmembershiparethe implications coming from the dispute betweenMacedonia and Greece about the use of the nameMacedonia, which is effectively imposing itself asthemainobstructionofMacedonia’sprogressintheaccessionprocess.

Theconflictover thenameopensseriousquestionsrelatedtonationalidentityandstatehoodthatleavelittlespaceforcompromisewiththeexternalincentivesformembershipintheEuro-Atlanticorganizations.Thus,only 22% of the respondents support Macedonia’smembershipifitwouldbeconditionedwithchangingofthecountry’sname,whichrepresentsafallof4%in comparison to 2014 (table 11). However, if thenamedisputeasanobstacleintheaccessionprocessisleftout,thenadditional65,5%oftherespondentswould support Macedonia’s EU membership undertheconstitutionalname.Inthatcase,thecumulativepercentofthesupportersforEUmembershipreachesthe 90% threshold of support. In this constellationof attitudes, the population which opposes EUmembership declines to 10%. Additionally, thecomparativeoverviewof results fromthe2014and2016surveysindicatesharmonizedtrendsofsupportinthelasttwoyears.

30Table11

Would you like/support

Macedonia to become a member

of the european union?

2014 2016

Generalresults

EthnicMacedonians

EthnicAlbanians

Generalresults

EthnicMacedonians

EthnicAlbanians

Yes,evenifthenameischanged

26 15 61 22 13 55

Yes,withkeepingthename

63 74 28 66 74 36

No 6 7 2 9 10 5

Don’tknow 4 3 8 3 2 4

Noanswer 1 1 1 1

The second negative implication coming from thename dispute ismanifested through the significantdisparityinthesupportforEUmembershipbetweenthe two dominant ethnic groups in Macedonia, theMacedonians and the Albanians. Nominally, thestableconsensusamongallethniccommunitiesaboutMacedonia’sEUintegrationperspectivesisfacedwithserious distortions when it is confronted with thepossibility of changing the name as an interveningvariable.Thus,only13%oftheethnicMacedonianswouldsupportEUmembershipevenifitwouldinducethechangingof thecountry’sname,whilewith theethnic Albanians the support is at 55% (table 10).On the other hand,membership in the EUwithoutchanging the constitutional name is an acceptable

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31positionfor74%oftheethnicMacedoniansand36%oftheethnicAlbanians.Besidesthefactthatinthelasttwoyearstherearenoticabletendenciestowardsnarrowingofthisgapasthereisanincreaseof8%ofethnicAlbanianswhoareopposingacompromiseonthenameissueasaconditionforEUmembership,stillthereisasignificantdisparitywithapotentialforadditional disruption of the inter-ethnic cohesion inthecountry.

cues froM politicAl pArties

Thetrendsofhighsupportoftheaccessionprocessin Macedonia confirm to an extent the validity ofthe assumptions on the influence of cues from thepolitical elites on attitude formation about theEuropean integration process. In the MacedonianpartysystemthereisaclearconsensusonthesupportforMacedonia’sEuro-Atlanticperspectives.Thereby,the lackofseriouseuroskepticpoliticalpartiesandsocialmovementsadditionallydecreasesthepotentialfor fragmentation of public opinion.Hence, even inconditionsofprolongedlowcredibilityoftheaccessionprocess,thepublicsupportisstillhigh.

On the other hand, the incremental decrease ofthe support for EU membership is somewhat in aconvergentrelationwiththegrowthofthe intensityof misunderstandings between the two biggestpolitical parties in Macedonia about the approachand the commitment of the governing elites to theaccessionprocess,aswellastheirrelationswiththe

32representativesoftheEuropeanUnion.However,thecomparativeanalysisofthesupportformembershipin the last two years indicates that the long termpoliticalcrisisinthecountryandtheattitudetowardstheEuropeanUnion’smediatingroleinitsresolution,whichincertaincasesresultedwithdisputesbetweenVMRO DPMNE and the EU representatives, doesn’thaveaseriousnegativeeffectonthesupportfortheEuropeanintegrationprocess,asthe3%decreaseofthesupportisminimal.