Analysis of Declassified Transfer of Power Files(30-9-2015) by the UK Government

byDr. Shankar Kumar Chatterjee

What follows here below is an analysis by Dr. Shankar Kumar Chatterjee of Kolkata, India, of files pertaining to the Transfer of Power declassified by the UK Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) on 30-9-2015 following a FOIA request submitted by S. Satbhai. The released material consists of 12 (most previously top secret) pages.

It is clear that before leaving India the British were trying to set in place the following:

1. Security Service2. Intelligence Service

If the Security Service, headed by a carefully chosen and competent British officer, started functioning, the Security Service could be able to do the spadework for founding the Intelligence Service in India. This would apparently be best achieved by appointing someone as the head of the Defence Security Office in India who could cover the requirements of both the Security and Intelligence Services. Someone who was persona grata to the Director of the Intelligence Bureau would not have had any difficulty in fulfilling that task.

Transfer of IPI (Indian Political Intelligence) to HMG (His Majesty’s Government)

The IPI had been functioning in the UK since 1909 and until 1937 functioned directly under the India Office. The Security Service had also been functioning under the India Office on the Indian vote up to 1937 and thereafter by the Government of India (DIB – Director of Intelligence Bureau), receiving valuable facilities from the Security Service acting in the capacity of the India/Burma Section. The Intelligence Bureau maintained organisations of its own in the UK, USA. and Europe.

For the rest it relied on contacts with the Security Services and Intelligence and other Government Departments. If the IPI was transferred to HMG, would it be necessary to “give” something to “get” something? In other words, should HMG give intelligence to India as much as it is getting now which might well exceed HMG’s requirements?

This apart, the other issue was whether it would be possible for the Security Service in the UK to extend cooperation to a department dependent on the Government of India - the Intelligence Bureau in case it is no longer headed by a European. There were concerns that both the DIB and the IPI posts might soon go into Indian hands. The constitutional development in India and the foreign policy of the UK needed to be looked into by the SIS and the Security Service. There was also the need to fill up and expand the MI5 and the SIS with trained European staff from India.

HMG was also interested in monitoring the anti-British activity in India. The British Intelligence Service could not afford to do without the intelligence inputs after the enforced termination of the arrangements prior to transfer of power as was available courtesy of the cooperation of the British IPI. Rather, the need of information on part of HMG would be intensified. A letter from the British PM to the DG Security Services dated 15 May 1946 directed him to cover the anti-British activities by Indians in India or Britain so long as India remained part of the Commonwealth in consultation with the India Office. The India Office was especially interested in ensuring that there would be adequate replacement of the sources of intelligence hitherto provided by the DIB and the IPI.

The Joint Intelligence Subcommittee had a meeting in August 1946 regarding the safeguarding the records in India emanating from the SIS and the British Security Service. Steps were taken by the India Office and the Foreign Office to ensure it. The Security Service and the SIS were invited to formulate a mechanism to obtain covert intelligence from India, forming a nucleus of experienced personnel.

Proposed Methods and Existing Sources of Obtaining Intelligence Relating to India

The DIB during his UK visit in April 1946 discussed with the Security Services and the SIS the need for setting up an alternate mechanism of collecting intelligence in India after the posts of DIB and IPI were manned by Indians as desired by Mr. Patel. It would have to be made clear to Mr. Patel that it would in that case not be possible for the Security Service and the SIS to extend the existing degree of cooperation to the IPI. in the event of non-cooperation by Indian incumbents and there needed to be a mutual agreement of exchange of sharing of intelligence about groups/organisations which were hostile to both, e.g, militant communism. That would entail the appointment of an Indian intelligence officer in Britain. All this was subject to the provision that India remained within the Empire. In case India decided not to remain within the Empire, the gathering of intelligence from India would be the job of the SIS and there would be no question of the maintenance of an Indian intelligence Officer in the UK.

Sir D. Monteath agreed to the IPI discussing the action plan with his colleagues. The note was to be shown to the Foreign Office as well.

A top secret letter dated the 20th August 1947 from one Herald to Sir P. Patrick KCIE CSI, Commonwealth Relations Office, says that since the British PM had allowed him to set up his organisation in India and Pakistan there would be the opportunity for cooperation in a wider field henceforth with Mr. Patrick’s colleagues who have joined the Commonwealth Relations Office.

The views of the then DIB were considered important in the future intelligence setup in India, especially for the collection of external intelligence from Afghanistan, Persia and China. The first essential was to establish relationship between the Security Service and the future Indian Intelligence Bureau. There was a proposal to maintain liaison officers at either end. For the “game to be played” properly it would be imperative that the liaison Officer in India would have to be an Indian. The addressee of this letter is supposed to act as a filter of information flowing to the Indian intelligence official and vice versa. The British Intelligence Officer would forward information from the DIB India to the British Security Service Head (the

addressee). The direct communication between an Indian DIB and the IPI was deemed “too dangerous” and a “narrower” channel of communication was necessary. In this, the decision of the Security Service was paramount and the Intelligence Service should not be allowed to take decisions single-handedly. The writer of the letter emphasises the role of the Security Service in setting up the intelligence mechanism. The option of obtaining the cooperation of the Indian DIB was considered easier than that of obtaining intelligence on its own from India.

In the event of the Indian Home Member being convinced that the continuation of the IPI is dependent on the goodwill of the UK Security authorities, and on complete cooperation with the Security establishment, he may decide to consider the IPI as redundant so as to terminate it altogether. When the disappearance of the IPI is imminent, the British authorities may decide to extend their own operations to provide the inputs the IPI used to provide to the Government of India regarding the activities of Indians working against the interests of the present Indian Government, which would be expected to welcome such information in exchange for information that would be of benefit to the British Government. This arrangement would be facilitated by the exchange of liaison officers particularly if the liaison officer from India in the UK was to be a European, which of course the Government of India would not like. The DIB also elaborated the mechanisms of destruction of certain top secret records as deemed fit by him and means were found for the UK Intelligence authorities to establish contacts in India.

The job of the IPI was to act as the representative of the DIB in the UK, giving him all intelligence with respect to the Government of India’s security, vetting the security of persons wishing to travel to India from the UK, USA, Europe, activities of enemies of the Indian Government like the Nazis, Fascists, Trotskyites, Ghadrites, Indian Workers Association, remnants of the 950th Regiment in Germany (Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian Legion in Germany), European Connections of the subversive group of the NWFP (Shami Pir, ex-King Amanullah), to act in similar capacity for the Government of Burma. He is also supposed to work in close cooperation with the British Security Services, Scotland Yard & the Passport Office.

IPI is virtually a security intelligence pool supplying information on Indian matters to the Government of India and HMG. So long as India remained within the Commonwealth, the functions of the IPI would continue. In case the Commonwealth chain was to be severed (as in the case of Eire), the IPI could no longer function under the control of the Government of India. In that event, the IPI would be taken over by HMG. In case India left the Commonwealth, the HMG could not afford to remain indifferent to the subversive activities of Indians, Burmese, etc. within the UK or Europe or the USA. Indian Security and Intelligence would then be as much necessary then as now. Hence the recommendations were for:

1. A formal transfer of the IPI staff to HMG2. Subsidising the IPI from the HMG to which the Government of India would also

contribute as long as it would remain within the Commonwealth Security/Intelligence network.

3. Retention of the IPI with its own separate, specialised staff and records working under the control of the Security and Intelligence Services.

It would be the choice of the Indian Government to decide what arrangement they would prefer, whether status quo or the latter. In case India remained within the Commonwealth, there was no reason for the Government of India not to prefer the former arrangement since the IPI was so closely linked with the British Security and intelligence system - provided the posts were filled in consultation with HMG.

In the normal course of events, the High Commissioner would procure enough information to keep both HMG and the Indian Governor General in the picture. Direct communication between the Indian Dominion and the Empire Security System would not be difficult to maintain unless the Dominion became hostile. In such case when the High Commissioner is unable to meet HMG’s requirements, the SIS would be required to do the job as in the case of foreign countries outside Empire Territory (so India would still be considered empire territory after Transfer of Power) The Security Service is supposed to function within a Dominion only if invited and in open cooperation (a la Operation Bluestar).

If India became independent there would an Ambassador instead of a High Commissioner (so are we not independent?) in both countries and intelligence would have to be procured and provided to HMG by the SIS. Under certain circumstances, it was being envisaged that maintenance of British troops would be needed as in case of Princely States refusing to join the Indian Union. And in that case, the British Army would be an additional customer for intelligence which could be provided by the SIS under the umbrella of the General Staff (as in Iraq and Egypt during the mandate).

All this was concerning internal intelligence within India. In the adjoining countries like Afghanistan and Iran it would be the responsibility of the SIS to gather intelligence.

Before the transfer of power to the new government, the IB would have to sift documents carefully and a large part of the would have to be either transferred to the UK or destroyed. This could only be done between the termination of the war and the transfer of power. (In case of the Irish Free State, the British ultimately handed them over the currently relevant files).

We can reasonably conclude that the implications are:

1. Commonwealth Membership precludes Independent status for India. Commonwealth countries are still considered Empire territory.

2. The Intelligence and Security System for the Dominion of India was planned by the British and designed to share intelligence per force through a well entrenched mechanism put in place. The British and Indian Intelligence would each have officials posted in the other country to serve as conduits of intelligence. Activities of common enemies could be instantly monitored inside and outside both countries.

3. Sensitive documents were to be removed to the UK or destroyed before their transfer to Indian hands.

4. The interests of the Commonwealth India and UK are deemed identical.