Chapter 3

An lntegrative Theory oflntergroup Conftict

Henti TaifetJohn Tumer

Universiu of Btistol, England

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to present an outline ofa theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminarydata relating to the theory. Fint, however, this ap.proach to intergroup behavior and intergroup confli-ctmust be set in context, in relation to other approachesto the same problems.

Much of the work on the social psychology ofrntergroup relations has focused on patterns of indi_vidual prejudice and disqimination and on the motiva-tional sequenc€s of interp€rsonal interaction. Out_standing examples of these approaches can be found,respectively, in the theory of authoritarian personality(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanfor41950) and in the various versions and modifications ofthe th:ory of frr'stration, aggression, and displace_ment (such as Be*owitz, 1962, L969, fgZli. ttr"common denominator of most of this work has beenthe stess on the intraindividual or interpersonalpsychological processes leading to prejudiced at_utudes or discriminatory behavior. The comolex

awls_s9_99@_sog!4_processes EEGEEii3.-g-[:A*dth"="1.""h"td;ffi ;ur rne rocus ol the social psycholoqisb, Dreoccu-

The alternative to these approaches is rep-rcsented in the work of Muzafer Sherif and his as_sociates (see Chapter 1), and has been rcferred to bv

D. T. Campbetl ( 1965) as the ..realistic group conflicttheory" (R.C.T.). Its point of deparrurelor tire expla_nation of intergroup behavior is in what Sherif(1966)has called the functional relations between socialgroups. Ib cenbal hypothesis_..real conllict ofgT.op- ̂T:oo! !*ses intergroup conflict" (camp.beII,.1965, p.287)-is deceptivety sinple, intuitiveiyconvin_cing, and has received srong empiricat support(including Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Avigdor, i{i53;H:rvey, 1956; Sherif, Harvey, $hlte, Hooa, ASherif, I961; Blake& Mouton, I96la, 1962c; Bass &Dunternan, 1963; D. W. Johnson, 1967;Diab, 1970;._ - R.C.T. was pioneered in social psychology iythe Sherifs, who provided both an ctiotogy ofitrdgrorp hostility and a theory of competition as realisticand inst-umental in charact€r, motivated by rewardswhich, in principle, are extriNic to the intergroupsituation (see. Deufsch, l949bi Julian, l96gyl Opposed group int€resb in obtaining scarce r€sour@spromote _competition, and positively intexd€pendent(superordinate) goats facilitate cooperation. Conflia_ing_interesb develop through competition into overtsocial conJlict. It appears, too, that intergroup com-petition cnhances intagroup morale, colesivcness,3:d-cooperatiotr (see Vinacke, 1964; Fiedler, 1967;Kalin & Marlowe, 1968). Thus, rhe real conflicts ofgroup int€r€sts not only ceate anogonistic intergrouprclations but also height€n identification *ith, unipositive attachment to, the in-group.

This identrfication with 6e in-group, however,has been givcn relatively little promiDence.in the

34 Chap@r3

R.C.T- as a lheoretical problem in its own right. Thedevelopment of in-group identifications is seen in theR.C.T. almost as an epiphenomenon of intergroupconflict. As reated by the R.C.T., these identifica-tiots arc associated with certain pattems of intergrouprelations, but the theory does not focus either upon theproc€sses underlying the development 8nd mainte.nancc of group identity nor upon the possibly au-tonomous effects uPon the in-group and intergroupbehavior of these "subjective" aspects of groupmembenhip. It is our contention that the relative ne-glect of these processes in the R.C.T. is responsiblefor some inconsistencies between the empirical dataand the theory in its "classical " form. In this sense,the theoretical orientation to be oudined here is in-tended trot to replac€ the R.C.T., but to suPPlementit in some rcspects that seem to us essential for anadequate social psychology of intergroup conflict-partiqrlarly as the undentanding of the Psycho-logical aspects of social change cannot be achievedwithout an appropriate analysis of the social psychol-ogy of social conflict.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF INTERGROUPBEHAVIOR

Our point of deparhre for the discussion tofollow will be an a priori distinction between twoext€mes of social betravior, corresponding to whatwe shall call llllerpersonal versus intergrouP be'havror. At one exueme (whlch most proDaoly canDotbe found in is "pure" form in "real life") is thehteraction between two or more individuals that islJly determined by their interpersonal relationshipsand individual characteristics. and not at all affectedby various social groups or categories to wbich theyrespectively bclong. The other extreme consists ofinteractions between two or more individuals (orgroups of individuals) which are/zlly detcrmined bytheir respeclive memberships in various social groupsor categorics, and not at all affect€d by the interin-dividual personal rclationships betrwccn the peopleinvolvcd. Here again, it is unlikely that "pure" formsof this cxtrcmc can be found in "rEd" social situa-tions. Examples nearing the interp€rsonal cxtrcmewould be the relations betwecn wife and husband orbetween old fricnds. Examples near the intergroup

extreme are provided by the behavior of soldiers fromopposing armies during a batde, or by the behavior at anegotiating table of members representing two-partiesin an inlense intergroup conflict.

The main empirical questions conc€rn the con-ditions that determine the adoption of forms of socialbehavior nearing one or the olher exteme. Thefirst-and obvious-answer concerns iltergroup con-flict. It can be assumed, in accordance with our com-mon experience, that the more intense is an intergroupconflict, the morc likely it is that the individuals whoarc members of the opposing groups will behave tGward eadr other as a function oftheir respective groupmemberships, rather than in terms of their individualcharacteristics or interindividual relatiorships. Thiswas pre.isely why Sherif (1966, for example) was ableto abolish so easily the interindividual friendshipsformed in the preliminary stages of some of his fieldstudies when, subsequently, the individuals who hadbecome friends were assigned to opposing groups.

An institutionalizcd or explicit conflict of "ob-jective" interesb between groups, however, does notprovide a fully adequate basis, either theoretically orcmpirically, to account for many si ations in whichthe social behavior of individuals belonging to distitrctgrcups can be observed to appmach the "group"exteme of our continuum. The conflict in Sherif'sstudies was ' 'institutiondized.' ' in that it was officially arranged by the holiday camp authorities; it was"explicit" in that it dominated the life ofthe groups;and it was "objective" in the sense tlat, by the terrnsof the competition, one of the groups hal to be thewinner and the other group the loser. And yet, therc isevidence from Shcrif's own sfirdies atrd fiom otherresearcl (to which we shall refrrn lat€r) that the in-stitutionalization, explicitness, and "objectivity" ofan intergroup conflict are not r€ceJ.rary conditions forbehavior in terrns of the "group" exteme, althoughdrey will often prove to be sufrcient conditions . Oneclear exanple is provided by our carli€r experimenb(fajfel, 19?0; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,1971), which we shall discuss briefly below, in whichit was found that intergmup discrimination existed inconditions of minimal in-group affiliation , anonymityofgroup membership, absence ofconflicts of inter€st,and absence of previous hostility betwcen the groups .

An lntegrative Th@ry of lntergrcup hnflictOther social and behavioral continua are

associat{ with the interpersonal_intergroup con-tinuum. One of them may be coruidered as havinsa causal function in relation to the interpersonal_Iintergroup continuum. We shall characterize it asainby its two extremes, to whidt we shall refer as 4o-cial mobility" and "$ocial change." These teifiare Dor used herc rn theL sociological sense. Theyrefer instead to the individuals, belief systemsabout the nature and the structure of the relationsbetween social groups in their society. The beliefsystem of "social rnobitity" is based on the generalassumption that the society in *,trich the individualslive is a flexible and permeable one, so that if thev areDot satisfied, for whateverreason, with the condiionsimposed upon their lives by membership in socialgroulx or social cat€gories to which they belong, it ispossible for them @e it through talent, hard work,good luck, or what€ver otrer means) to move indi_vidually into another group which suits them beuer.A good example of this system of beliefs, built intothe explicit cultural and ideological traditions of asociety, is provided in the fol.towing passage fromHirsclman (1970):

lbc Eaditional American ide-a of success confirrns thc hold.whidl cxit has had on the D8tional iergination. Succcss----q, what amounts to thc same thing , upward socialEobility-has lotrg bccn cotrccivcd in terEs of evolutionaryindividualism. Thc successful individua! \to starrs out at alow rung of the social ladder, neccssadly leaves his owngroup as he riscs; he ..passes " into, or is ..acrepted,, by,lhc ncxt higher goup. Hc tak6 his immcdiate family alon!,but hardly anyonc else tpp. lO8-1091.

At the other extrcme, the bclief system of . !o-cial change" impli€s that lhe naturc and sfiuctur€ ofthe relations betwe€o social groups in the society isp€rcciv€d as chrracterized by markcd statificad;n,naking it impossible or vcry difficxlt for individuals,as individuals, to invest themsclvcs of an unsatisfac_tory, underprivilcged, or stigmatizcd group membcr-ship. A castc system, bascd on tace or anv othercriteria perccivcd as immutablc, is an obvious cxam_ple, but it nced not be thc main cxample. Theeconomic or social r€alities of a society may be such(as , for example, in the case of the millions of unem-

ployed during the depression of the 1930s) that theimpossibitity of ..geaing out" on one's own, as arlindividual, becomes an everyday reality thdt det€r_mrnes many forms of intergroup social bdravior- Buteven this example is still relatively extreme. Manysocial intergroup situations that contain, for whateverreasons , stong elements of s tratificati on perce ived assrct will move social behavior away from the pole ofinterpenolat patterns toward the pole of intergroupPure*:.@'

this belief system is that, in tte relevant intergroupsituatiotrs, individuals will not int€ract as individuals.on the basis of their individual characteristics or inteFpersonal rclatiorships , but as mernbers of theL groupsstanding in c€rtain defined relationships to memb€rsof other gmups.

Obviously, one must exp@t a marked correla_tion between the degree ofobjective sEatification in asocial system (however measurcd) and the social dif_fusion and intensity of the belief system of ..socialchange. " This, however, cannot be a one-to_one rela_tionship for a number of reasons , some of which willbe discussed below, although we cannot in this cha}.ter go i nlo the details of the many social_psychologicalconditions that may deGrmine tte bansition in crrtainsocial groups from an acceptance of stratification tobehavior characteristic of the int€rgoup pole of ourfirst conti.nuum-that is, to lhe sreation of socialmovemetrts aiming to change (or to preserve) thestatus quo (tajfel, in press). It may be interesting,however, to point to the close relationship that exisltsbetw€en an cxplicit intergroup conflict of interesC , onthe one hand, and the ..social change" system ofbeliefs on the other. One of the rnain features of thisbelief system is the perception by the individuals con-cemed that it is iurpossible or extremely difficutt tomove individually firom thcir own group to anothergroup. This h precisely thc situation in an intenseintergroup conflict of intaests, in which it is cx-ftmely diftiodt for an individual to conc€ive of thepossibility of "beraying', his or her own group bymoving to thc opposing group. Although this doeshappen on occasion, sanctions for such a mov€ are, otrthe whole, powerful, and thc value systems (at least in

Chaptet 3

our cultures) are in flagrant opposition to it. To use anexample ftom social-psychological research, it seemshardly possible that one of the boys in Sherif's hol idaycamps would decide to change sides, even thoughsome of his previously contracted friendships over-lapped group boundaries.

The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts ofinterests is closely related in our cultures to the de-gree of opprobrium attached to the notion of "rene-gade" or "traitor. " This is why rhe belief systemsconesponding to the "social change" extreme of ourcontinuum are associated with intense intergroup con-flicts. These conflicts can be conceived, therefore, ascreating a subclass or a subcategory of the subjectiveintergroup dichotomization characteristic of that ex-treme of the belief continuum. They share the basicfeanrre of the "social change" system of beliefs, inthe sense that the multigoup sFucture is perceived ssclaracterized by the eKteme difficulty or impossibil-ity of an individual's moving from one group toanother.

Tbe continuum of systems of beliefs disorssedso far has be€n seen to have a causal function insbifting social behavior toward menbers of out-groups between the poles of''iDterpersonal " and ''in-tergroup" behavior. To conclude this part of our pre-liminary discussion , we must characterize briefly twofirther and overlapping continua, which can be con-sidercd as encompassing the majot consequences ofsocial behavior that approacles one or the other end ofthe interpersonal-int€rgroup continuum. They bothhave to do with the variability or uniformity within agroup of behavior and attitudes concerning the rele-vant out-groups. The first may be described as fol-lows: the nearcr are members of a grouo to the ' 'socialchange' ' extreme of the bel ief-systerns cotrtin uu m andthe int€rgroup exFeme of the behavioral continuum.E ggfe.nprmity they will show in their behavioriowardmemb@-funcsecontinua will be correspondingly associarcd withgreat€r in-group variability of behavior toward mem-bcrs of the out-group. The seaond staGment is closelyr€lated lo lhe first the nearer arc merrbirs of a groupto the'social chatr=e-Fdl5d--lnterEmup--€x-

e

oulgroup as undifferentiated items in a unified social""E;,r,ffircharact€ristics. The vast literature in social psychbl-oli-ofr-fi6Eictioning of group stereotypes in situa-tions ofintense intergroup tensions is no more than anexample of this general statement.

Thus, this preliminary conc€ptualization rep-resents an approach to the social psychology of inter-group rclations that takes into account soci4lE)alitiesas well as their reflection-li6iiiiTdiifiGiJh

.

just discussed: at the beginning, because it can beassumed without much difficulty that the "socialchange" belief system is likely to reflect either anexisting and marked social stratification or an intenseintergroup conflici of interests, or both; at the end,because the consequences of the systems of beliefsarising from fte social situatioDs just mentioned arelikely to appear in t}le form of unifred group actions-lhat is, in ttre form of social movements airningeither to create social change or to prcs€rve the statusquo. We shall return later to an elaboration of thekinds of hypotheses that can be put forward concern-ing the creation of change versus the preservationof status quo. But before this is done, the realisticgroup conflict theory must be considered against thisgeneral background .

The implications of this conceparalization forintergroup relations in stratifi€d societies ard insti.tutions are both evident and direct. Whenever so-cial stratification is based upon an unequal divisionof scarce resources-such 8s power, prestige, orwealth-betwe€n social groups, the social situationshould be characterized by pervasive ethnocentrismand out-grcup antagonism between the over- and un-derprivileged groups (Oberschall, 1973, p. 33; seealso Chapt€rs 5 and f2). Howe-v-er, decades of rc-search into cthnic-group relations strggest that eth-nocentsism among sratifi eC groups is]6iii-i6i]ilrasb€€n, v€ry much a one-way street. Two rcc€ni book(MGAJy/5;cil-6Fftives6'd, 1976) surnrnarizea great deal of cvidence that minority or subordinategroup. members-such as lbe American Blacks, theFrench Canadians, the New Zealand Maoris, or theSouth African Bantus-frequently tend to derogate

An lntegrative Theory ot lntergroup Conflict:ialualol-ua-an

the in-group and display positive attitudes toward thedominant out-group . In other words , deprived grcups8re not always elhnocentric in the simple meaning ofthe tccm; |lley may, in fact, be positively orientedtoward the depriving out-group. Data of this kind arenot consistent with a simple application ofthe R.C.T.

Sorne writers (including Gregor & Mcpherson,1966; Modand, 1969; Milner, 1975, p. 93) have ar_gued that the status relations betwe€n dominant andsubordinate groups deterrnine the latters' identitvproblems. (By sociat stlo,tus we mean a .anking oihierarchy of perceived prestige.) Subordinate groupsoften se€m to intemalize a wider social evaluation oflhemselves as "inferior" or ..second class," andthis consensual inferiority is rcproduced as rela_tivc self-d€rogation on a number of indices that havebeen uscd in the various studies. Consensual shtusiself-where subjeclive and accorded prestige areidentical-is problematic for the R.C.T., which con_ceptualizes prestige as a scarcc resource, like wealrhor F)wer. Status differences betwean groups, likeothcr inequalities, should tend to acc€trtuat€ lhe inter-group conflics of inter€s$. Therefore, acaording totbe R.C.T., the impact of low status upon a suboidi-nate group should be to illensify its antagonism to-wad tfie high-status group (fhibaut, teSOy. yet,under some conditions at lest, low social status se€rnsto be conelated with an cnhancement, rather than alessening, of positive ou&group aftirudes.

It could be argued that only conllicrs of inter€stp€rc€ived as such create hostility. This requhes &atgroups must compare their respective sitrations . And ,accordin€ to some views, it is only dativcly similargmups lhat engage in mutual comparisons; thcreforc,many forns of stau$ diffcrences will reduce per_c€ivcd similadry (sce Fe tinger, f 954; Kidder eJtcwart, 1975). It follows that sanrs systems rnayreduce social conflict by resticting thc range of mean_lnSt{ colnoisgns availablc ro any given goup. Thisqypottsls may be I uscfi.rl lool ao sccormt for soc ofthc-deErminatrb ofsocial stability; but if it is taken toIts logical conclusion, it can ac€ount for no morc thanthat. It fails to account for social changc (in the scnseof changes in the mutual relations, bchavior, andattitudes of large-scale human groups that have be€ndlstlnctly different in status in the past), panicularly

11hen the- processes of change bccome very rapid.Stanrs differenc€s between groups oflen do nitreiainunilaterally associated with low levels of intergroupconflicb. For example, the generalization madlabove-that certain forms of political, economic. andsocial subordination of a social group tend to eiimi_nate or even reverse its ethnocentrism_is alreadydated. Research conducted in the last decade or sorcveals a changing pattern in intergroup relations.American Blacks (see N. Friedman, 1969; Hraba &Grant, l9?0; Paige, 1970; Brigham, f97l; Harris& Braun, t97I), Rench Carudians (Berry, Kalin, &Taylor, 1976), New Zealand Maoris {aughan, inry-To,_utd rhe Wetsh (Bourhis, Giles, & Tajfel,1973; Giles & Powesland, 1976;, for instancc, nowse€m to b€ lejecting their previously negative in_group evaluations and developing a positive e6no-c€ntrtc group identity. This .construclion of positivein-group attitudes is often accompanied by a newmilitancy over political and economic obje,ctives (seeTomlinson, 1970).

But &ese developments do not rescue theR.C.T. in its original form. The very suddenness with

tobjective deprivation and tl'e e@ul9rd@99s4cEs. on-E" "*Gry,uerc rs otten less ..objective" deprivation than therehas been in the past. Atr active and new search for apositive group identity seems !o be one of the criticallactors r€sponsible for the reawakeaing of thesegroups' clains to scarc€ resourc€s (Dizad, 1970)._ . In summaqr, the R.C.T. states that opposing

clains to scarc€ rcsourcrs, such as power, prortig", oiwealth, generate ethnoccntrism and ant gonis; be-twc€n grcups. Thcrefore, low stafis should tend tointensiry out-goup hostility in groups that 8re politi_caxy, cconomic€lly, or socially subordinate. Theevloenc€ suggesb, howwer, that whcre social-shuctural differcnc€s in the distribution of rcsourceshavc b€en instibtionalized, lcgitimizrd, and justifriedtbrough a consemually acc€ptcd st8t|s system (or atreast a staors Eystem trat is sufficiently frrm and perva-sive to prevent the creation ofcognitive altemadves toit), the result has been less and not more ethnocentrismin the different status group6. The price of this has

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A lnEgrctlve Theory ot tntergroup @nflict:i8lualol-ua-an

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&e in-group and display positive auitudes toward thedominant out-gmup . In otrer words , deprived groupsare not always ethnocenfic in the simple meaning offie tcrm; ftey may, in fact, bc positively oricntedtoward the depriving out-group, Dara of this kind arenot consistent wift a simple application oftheR.C.T.

Some $Titers (including Gregor & Mcpherson,1966; Modand, 1969; Milner, 1975, p. 93) have ar_gued that the status relations between dominant andsubordinale groups determine the latt€rs' identitvproblems. (By sociat Jbt[.r we mean a ranking orhierarchy of perceived prestige.) Subordinate groupsoften s€cm to intcrnalize a wider social evaluation ofdrcmselves as "inferior" or ..second class," andthis consensual iofcriority is rcproduced as rela_tivc self-derogation on a number of indice that havebeen used in the various studies. Consensual shtusi8ef-whcre subjective and accorded prestigc arcidentical-is problematic for the R.C.T., which con_ceptrslizes prcstige as a scarce resourc€, like wealthor power. Stanls differenc€s between groups, likeother inequalities, should tend to accentuate the int€r-group conflics of hter€sb. Therefore, according tothe R.C.T., thc irnFact oflow status upon a subordi_nate group should be to int€nsify its antagonism to_ward thc high-sh0rs group (fhibaut, 1950). yet,under somc conditions at least, low social s tat$ seemsto be correlated with an enhanc€ment, rather than alessening, of positive out-group attitudes.

It could be argued that only conflicts of interestp€rc€iv€d as such create hosdfiry. This requires thatgrcup's must compare their respective siO.rations . And ,according to some views, it is only telatively similargroups that engage in mutual comparisons; thcrefore,many forrrs of staus diff€rences will rcduce oer_ceivcd similariry (see Fcstinger, l95a; Kiddei &stewart, 195). It follows that status systems rDayreducc social conflict by restiixing the rangc of urean_ugur-comparisons available to any givcn group. Thislypot[csa may be I useftl tool to accaunt for som of&e_ dcbrminants of social stability; but if it is takcn !otB logical conclusion, it can acaount for no morc thanthrt. It fails to account for social change (in the senseof changcs in the mutual relations, bchavior, andaftihdes of large-scale human groups that havc be€ndlstindly different in shrus in the past), panicularly

when the- processes of change become very rapid.Sta[rs differcnc€s betwe€n groups often do notrentainunilatcrally associated witr low levels of intergroupconflicb. For example, the generalization madlabove-lhat c€rtain forms of political, economic, andsocial subordination of a social group tend to eiimi_nate or even reverse its ethnoc€ntism_is alreadydated. Research conducted in the last decade or slreveals a changing pattern in intergrcup relations.American Blacks (see N. Friedman, 1969; Ilraba &Grant, 1970; Paigc, 1970; Brigham, l97l; Harris& Braun, t97I), Rench C:nadians (Berry, Kalia, &Taylor, 1976), New Zealand Maoris (Vaughan, inry-.),_gd the Wetsh @ourhis, ciles, & Tajfet,1973; Giles & Powesland, 1926), for instance. nowse€m to be rejecting their previously negative in_group evaluations and developing a positive ethno_c€ntnc group identity. This construction of positiveitr-group attitudes is often accompanied by a newmilitaacy over potitical and economic obje,ctives (seeTomlinson, 1970).

But these developmenE do not rescue theR.C.T. in its originat form. The vcry suddenness with

toljdve deprivation and rherdor ne@uIgu$@eeesun. on-E" *oE y,rDerc $ ottcn less ..objective" deprivation than therehas been in the past. Atr aclive and new search for apositive group identity scems to bc one of the criticaltactors responsible for the reawakaning of thesegoups ' claims to scarce !€sourc€s (Diz:d , I 970) ., _ In summary, the R.C.T. states that opposing

clair.ns to scarce rcsourc€s , such as pow€r, prcstige, oiwealth, gcnerate ethnocentrism and anhgonisi be-twe€n gmups. Thcrefore, low stat$ should tend tointensify ourgroup hostility in grroups that are politi_cat-ty, cconomically, or socially subordinate. Thecvidence sr,rggess, howcver, that where social-stuctrral diff€rcnces in thc distribution of resourceshave bccn instiurtionalized, lcgitimizcd, and just'rfiedulrougn a @nsensually acceptrd 6tahs system (or atleast a staars B)6tem that is sufficicntly firm and p€rva_sive to pr€vent the creation ofcognitive altcrnatives toit), the result has bern less and not more ethnocentrismin the differcnt status groups. The price of this has

Chapter 3

been the subordinate groups' self-€ste€m. On theother hand , whenever a subordinate group begins , forwhatever reasons, to question or deny its presumedcharacteristics associated with its low status, thisseems to facilitate the reawakening of a previouslydormant conflict over objective resourc€s. At thesame time, it is likely that one of the counterrcactionsfrom the dominant groups in such situations will be towork for the preservation of the previously existing"subjective" and "objective" differertiations.

A tentative hypothesis about intergroup conflictin sratified societies can now be offered: An unequaldistribution of objective resources promotes antag-onism between dominant and subordinate groups,provided that the latter group rejecb its prcviouslyacc€pted and consensually negative self-image, andwith it the status quo, and starts working toward thedevelopment of a positive group ideotity. The domi-nent group may react to these developmenb either bydoing everything possible to maintain and justify thestatus quo or by attempting to find and create newdifferentiations in its own favor, or both (see Chapter12). A more detailed specification of some of thesEategies and "solutiors " that can be adopted in thissituation can be found in Tajfel (in press); we shallretnrn later to a discussion of some of them. For theFesent, it will be sufficient to state that, whether validor not, the hyp,othesis raises some important theoreti-cal problems that necd to be considered. The firstquestion is: what social-psychological procBSEs-arciffin-r@u-ft Fwnich-fi rrurrrdirerrft d6E6;;;ocial

MCquEsn'olls, we must now abandon speculation and con-sider some relevant data.

SOCIAL CATEGORIAT IO N ANDI NTERG RO U P DI SCRI M I NATION

The initial stimulus for the theorizing presentedhcre was providcd by c€rtain expcrimenal investiga-tions of intcrgroup behavior. Thc laboratory analog ofrlzl-worl<i erinocenrsm is inGi6SiilGiGihe

ctendency to favor tle in-group over the out-group in

evaluations and behavior, Not only are incompatiblegroup intefesb not always sufficient to generate con-flict (as concluded in th€ last section), but there is agood deal of expetimental ovidenca that these condi-tions are not always necessary for the development ofcompetition and disqimination between groups (forexample, Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wil-kens, l97l; Doise & Sinclair, 1973: Dojse & Wein-berger, 1973). This does not mean, of course, thatin-group bias is not influenced by the goal relationsbetween fre groups (see Harvey, 1956).

All this evidence implies that in-group bias is aremarkably omnipresent featrre of intergroup rela-tions. The phenomenon in iis extreme form has beeninvestigated by Tajfel and his associates. There havebe€n a number of studies (Tajfel et al., l97l; Biuig &Tajfel, 19?3; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Doisc, Csepeli,Dann, Gouge, Lanen, & Ostell, 1972; Turner, 1975),all showing that thc mere perception of belonging!o two distinct grouDs-rhat is, so-Al-eaEEbfiZatbnper se-is sufficient to higger intcrgm-ttlFcdmina-iioffi.r"a*GnG oim-eTl f an ouLgroup is sufficientto provoke intergroup compaitive or discriminatoryresponses on Oe part of the in-group .

In the initiat experimental paradigm (fajfel,1970; Tajfel et d., lg?l), the subj€cb (borh childrenand adul6 have acted as subjecb in the variousstudi€s) are randonily classified as members of twononoverlapping groups---astensibly on the basis ofsome tsivial performance criterion. They then make"decisions," awarding amounts of money to pairs ofotlrer subjects (excluding self) in specially designedbooklea. The recipien8 are anonymous, except fortheir individual code numben and their group mem-benhip (for example, member number 5l .of the Xgroup and member number 33 of rhe I group). Thesubjec6, who know their own group membership,award thc amounts individually and aaonymously.The response format of the booklets does not force th€subjects to act in terms ofgroup membcrship.

In this situation, there is neither a conllict of Iinteress nor previously cxisting hostility between Ore I"groups." No social interaction tskes place bctwecn flthe subjecs, nor is th€re 8Dy rational link betwern lleconomic self-inter€st and the strategy of in-groupt

I

I favoritism. Thus, thcse groups are purely cognitive,I and can be refened to as mininnl.

The basic and highly reliable finding is rhat rhefivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to in_goup favoritism and discrirnination against the out_group. Faimess is also an influential strategy. There isalso a good deal of evidence that, within lhe pattem ofr€sponding in terms of in-gmup favoritism, maximumdifference (M.D.) is more important to the subjectsthan maximum in-group profit (M.I.p.). Thus, theys€em to be competing with the out-gloup, rather thanfollowing a strategy of simple economic gain formembers of the in-group. Other data from severalexp€rimenb also show that the subjects' decisionswere significandy n€arer to the maximum joint payoff(M.J.P.) point when these decisions applied to thedivision of money betwe€n two anonymous mcmbesof the in-group than when they applied to two mem-b€rs of the out-group; that is, retatively less was givento the out-group, even when giving more would nothave alfected the amounts for the in-group. Billig &Tajfel (1973) have found the same results even whenthe-assignment to groups was made explicitly random.This eliminated the similarity on the performancecriterion witrin the in-group ss an alt€rnative explana-tion of thc results (see Byrne, l97t). en expiiciOyrandom classific{tiotr into groups proved in this sOdyto be a morc potent determinant of discrimination thanperc€ived interpersonal similarities and dissimilaritiesnot associated with categorization into groups.. Thequestion that arises is whether in_group biasin these "minimal,' situations is produced-by someform of the cxperimenter effect or of the demandcharact€ristics of tle exp€rimental sitration_in otherwords , whedrer explicit rcferenc€s to goup member-ship communicate to the subjects thit they are ex-p€cted to, or ought to, discriminate. The first Doint tobc madc about lhir interpreation of the resutt is thatcrplicit references to gmup menrbership are logicaltync.essary for opcrationalizing in thesc minimal situa_tions the major independent variablo--that is, socialcat€gtrization per se. This requircs not merely that thesubJects p€rceive themsclves as similar !o or differentftom others as individuals, but that they are mem-bers of discrete and discontinuous cateeories--tlEtis, "groups. " Second, a detaited anal-ysis of the

An lntegrc ve Theory of lntergroup C;onflict 99

llbjecs' posaession r€porrs (Bilig, 1972; Turner,1975) shows that they do not shary any common con-ception of the ',appropriate" or ..obvious,, way tobehave, that only a tiny minority have,o-" idoof the hypothesis, and that this minority does notalways conform to it.

The rnore general theoretical problem has beenrefened to elsewhere by one ofus as follows:

Sjmply and briefly stared, rhe argument (e,g., Gerard &Hoyt, 1974) amounts to the following: thc subjects acted interms of the inter$oup categorizstion providcd or imposcdby the cxperimentcn not neccssarily bectuse this bas bccnsuca€ssful in iDducing any genuinc awarencss of member-ship in sepa.ate 8nd distinct groups, but probably bccauscthey fclt that this kind of bchavic was expectcd of rhem bythc expcriment rs, and ther€fore thcy conformcd to thiscxpectation. The filst question to ask is why should thesubjects bc expe€ting the cxp€rimentars to crDe_.t of themthis kind ofbchavior? Thc Goard and Hoy aruwer to this isthat thc cxperimcntal rituatjon was rigged ao cause this kindol cxp€ctafon in thesubjects. This answerrrtains ib ptausi-bility only if wc assume that what was no more Otao a hiotfrom thc cxp.riment€rs about the notion of ,,groups,, beingrclevant to the subjects' behavior had becn suffrcicnt tidctenn inc, powcrful ly and cons istently, ap anicularform oflnt€rgroup behavi6. Il turn, if we assumc this___-and theassumption is by no mcans uoreasonable_-we must alsorssume dut this particulsr forr! of intetgroup behavior isonc which is capable ofbcitrg iuduccd by the cxpcrimetrtersmuch morc €asily than othcr forms (such as cooperationbetwcen thc groups itr exto(ing tbe maximum totaLamountof money from the erpedmcntcts, or a fair division of thespoils.between the groups, or simply |ardom rcspordi8g).And- this last assumption must bc backcd up in iL turn

-byaaothcr presupposition: aamcly, that for somc reaons(whatever thcy may bc) competitive behaviq betweengroups, 8t least in out culture, is cxFaordinarily aasy toEigger off-at which point wc are back where we startcd&om. Thc problcn thcn must bc res&ted in ten|l! offhe occdto. spccify why 8 certain tr'nd of inlcrgroup bchavia can bccllcrtcd so much Dore easily tha! otbcr linds: and thisspecifrc€tioD is ccdainly rct Dadc if wc tlst contcnt withthc cxplanatiotr that thc bchavior occurrpd bccausc it w6svcry casy for thc cxp€rimcntcG to makc it occur ffajfal,inprcssl.

_. Two points stand out: fint, minimal itrte.rgroupdiscrimination is not based on incompatible group

Chaptet 3

interests; second, the baseline conditions for inter-group conpetition seem indeed so minirnal as to causethe suspicion that we are dealing here with some factoror proc€ss inherent in the intergroup situation ihelf.Our theoretical orientation was d€veloped initially inrcsponse to these clues from our earlier experiments.We shall not trace the history of its development,however, but shall describe its prcsent form.

SO CIAL I DE NT ITY AN D SO CI AL CO M PAR I SO NMany orthodox definitions of "sociat groups ,'

are unduly restrictive when applied to the context ofintergmup relations. For example, when members oftwo national or ethnic categories interact on the basisof their reciprocal beliefs about their respectivecategories and of the general relations between them,this is clearly intergroup behavior in the everydaysense of the term. The "groups " to which the inter-actants belong need nat depqd upon the frequencyof intermember interaction, systems of role rela-tionships, or interdependent goals. From the social-psychological pcrspective, the essential criteria forgroup membership, as they apply to large-scale so-cial categories, arc that the individuals concemed de-fineliemselves and are defined by others as membersot a grcup.

We can conc€ptualize a group, in this sense, as acollection of individuals who perceivc thernselves tobe memb€rs of the same social category, share somecmotional involvement in this common definition ofthemselves, and achieve some degrec of social con-sensus about tlte evaluation of their group and of theirmembenhip of it. Following ftom this , our definitionof intergroup behavior is basically identical to that ofSherif(1966, p. 62): any behavior displaycd by oneormore actors towsrd one or more others that is based onthe actors ' identification of themselves and the othersas belonging to different social categorics.

Social categorizations arc conccived here ascognitive tools that segment, clsssify, and cder thesocial environment, and thus enable.the individual toundertake many forms of social action. But they donot mercly systematize the social world; they alsoprovide a system oforientation for sefreference: theycrcate and define the individual's placc in society.

Social groups, undentood in this sense, provide tlrcirmembers with an identification ofthemselves in socialterra. These identifications are to a very large extentrclational and comparative: rhey define the individ-ual as similar to or different from, as ..bett€r" or"worse" than, members of oher groups. (For a moredetailed discussion, see Tajfel, 1972b.) It is in astictly limited sense, arising from these considera-tions, that we use the te'.]l;. social identity. It consists,for the purposes of the present discussion, of thoseaspects ofaD individual's self-image that derive fmmthe social categories to which he perc€ives himself asbelonging. With this limited concept of social identityin rnind, our argument is based on the following gen_eral assumptions:

1. Individuals strive to maintain or enhanc€their self-csteem: they strive for a positive self-concePt.

2 . Social groups or categories and the member_ship of lhem are associated wilh positive or negativevalue connotations. Hence, social identitv mav bepositive or negative acmrding to dre evaluaions(which tend to be socially consensual, either within oracross groups) of those groups that contribute to anindividual's social identity.

3. The evaluation of one's own group is deter_mined wi6 reference to spe€ific other groups throughsocial comparisons in terms of value-laden attibutesand characteristics . Positively discrepant comparisonsbetween in-group and out-g.oup produce high pres-tige; negatively disoepant comparisons between in-group and ouGgroup result in low prestige.

From thesc assumptions, some related theoreti-cal principles can be derived:

1. Individuals srive to achieve or to maintainpositive social identity-

2. Positive social identity is based to a largecxtent on favorable comparisons that can be madebctween the in-group and some relevatrt out-groups:the in-goup must be perccived as positivcly differcn-tiat€d or distinct from the relevant out-groups .

3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, indi-viduals will strive cither to lcave their existing groupard join some more positivety distinct group snd/or tomakc their existing group more positively distinct.

The basic hypothesis, then, is that pressures

h€itrcial:tcntvid-' o r0orel n alcra-ists,

to evaluate one's own group positively throughin-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups toattempt to differentiate themselves from each other(see Tajfel, 1974a, 1974b; Tirrner, 1975). Therearcatleast thlee classes of variables that should influenceintergroup differentiation in concrete social situa-tions. First. individuals must have internalized theirgroup membership as an aspe.t of thcil self.ccncept:they must be subjectively id€ntified vith the rclevantin-group. It is not enough that the others define themas a group, although consensual definitions by othe$can become, in the long run, one of the powerfulcausal factors for a group's self-definition. Second,the social situation must b€ such as to allow f6-iTfrter-group comparisons that enable the selection andevaluation of the relevant relational attributes . Not allbetwe€n-group differences have evaluative sisnifi_cancc (tajfel, 1959), and those that do vary

-ftom

group to group. Skin color, for instance, is apparentlya more salient sttribute in the United State.s than inHong Kong (Morland, 1969); whereas languageseerns to bean especially salient dimens ion ofseDarateidentity in Rench Canada, Wates, and B jgium(see Giles & Powesland, 1976; Fishman A Giles, inpr€ss). Third, in-groups do Dot compare themselveswith cvery cognitively available out_group: the out-group must be perceived as a rclevant comparisongroup. Similarity, proximity, and situational sa-lience are among the variables that detcrmine out-group comparability, and pressures toward in_groupdistinctiveness should increase as a function of thiicomparability. It is important to state at rhis pointttlat, in many social situations, comparability reachesa much wider range than a simply cooceived ..simi_ladty " bctwe€n the goups.

The aim of differentiation is to maintail oracldeve sup€riority over an out-gmup on some dimen_sroos. Ary such act, th€refore, is essentially compai_tive. This conpetition requines a situation of mutualcomparison and diffcrentiation on a sharcd value di-m€trsion . In these conditions , intcrgroup ompctition ,wtuch may bc uDrelatcd to thc . .objectivc' ' goal rela_tions bctwc€a the groups, catr bc pledic{cd to occur.Timer (1975) has disringuished berwe€n social andinstsumental, or ..realistic, " competition. The formerr3 motivated by self-evaluation and takes place

An lntegrative Theory of lntergroup Conflict 41

through social comparison, whercas the latter is basedon "realistic" self-intdest and represents embryonicconflict. lncompatible group goali are necessary forrcalistic competition, but mutual intergroup compari_sons are neccssary, and often sufficient, for socialcompetition. The latter point is consistent with thedata from "minimal" group experimenb tlnt mereawareness of an out-group is sufficient to stimu-late in-group favoritism, and the observations (Fer_guson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wi.lkens, l97l;Doise & Weinberg er, 1973) ttrat the possiUi ty oisocial comparison genera0es .,spontaneous,, inter_group competition.

Social and realistic competition also differ in thepredictions that can be made about lhe @nseouenc€sfor subsequent intergroup behavior of winninjor los_ing. -After_ realis tic competition, the losing groupsshould be hostile to the out-group victon, Uotfr Ue,-\cause they have been deprived of a reward andJbecause their interaction has been exclusively conllic_tual. However, when winning and tosing establishshared group evaluations concerning comparativesuperiority and inferiority, then, so long as rhe terlrof the competition are perceived as legitimate and thecompetition iBelf as fair according to these legitimateteflns, the losing goup may acquiesce in the superior-ity of the winning out-group. This acquiescencc by agroup considering i$elf as legitimately . .inferior ,, hasbeen shown in a rccent study by Caddick (1924).Several other strdies reoort findings that arc in linewilh this interpretation: losing in-groups do not al-ways d€rogate, but sometimes upgrade, their cvalua_tions of the wirming out-groups (tbr example, Wilson& Miller, 196l; Bass & Dunteman, 1963).

Retrosp€ctively, at least, the social_idetrtitv/social-compar.ison theory is consistent with manv ofthe studies mentioned in tbe preccding seaion ofihi{-)chapter. Itr partiorlar, in thc paradigm of the ..miiri_Vnul group" experinenb (such as Tajfel et aJ.,lyll\,&e intergoup discrimination can be conccivcd asbeing due not to conflict over monetary gains, but to ,differcntiations based on camparisons made in terms :of moneta4r rcwards. Money firnctioned as a dimcn_sion of comparison (the only one available within theexperimental design), and the data suggest that larger .absolute gains that did not €stablish a differelcc in

tose'romlf asotitygcn-

&nc€sclf-

6er-ive

t b eionsin orD a n

?.tgr-)ughutessonsrr1es-l m -

rcti-

tain

indi-roup0r to. .iures

argeradeups:$cn-

42 ChapEr 3

favor of the in-group werc sacrificed for smaller com-parative gains, when the two kinds of gains were madeto conflict.

There is further evidence Cfurner, in press-a)that the social-competitive pattern of intergroupbehavior holds even when it conflicts with obviousself-interest. In this study, the distribution of eithermonelar5/ rcwards or "points " was made, within the''minirnal " intergroup paradigm, betwe€d selfand ananonymous "other," who was either in the in-groupor in &e out-group. As long as minimal conditionsexisted for in-group identification, the subjects wereprepared to give relatively less to themselves when theaward (either in points or in money) was to be dividedbetwecn self and an anonJ.mous member of the il-group, as compared with dividing with an anonymousmember ofthe out-group. These results seem particu-larly important, since the category of "self, " whichis by no means "minimaf" or ad hoc, was set hercagainst a tuly minimal in-gmup category, identicalto those used in the earlier experiments. Despitethis stark asymmetry, the minimal gmup affiliadonaffected the responses.

The theoretical predictions were taken outsideof the minimal categorization pdadigm in a furtherstudy by Turner (in press-b). He used face-to-facegroups working on a disclssion task. In eac.h session,two thre€-person groups discussed an identical issue,supposcdly to gain an assessment of thefu verbal intel-ligence; and then briefly compared their respectiveperformance. The subjects were lM male under-graduatcs. The criterion for intergroup differentiationwas the magnitude of in-group bias shown in theratings of the goups' work. llalf &re triads, composedof Arts students , believed that verbal intelligence wasimportart for them (High Importance, or H.I.); half,composed of Science students, did not (Low Impor-tance, or L.I.). Half the sessions involved two Arts ortwo Science groups (Similar Outgroup), and half in-volved one Arts and one Sciencc group (DissimilarOutgoup). Finatly, in rhe Stable Differencr cord!tion, subjects werc instructed that Arts stsdens weredefnitely sup€rior and Science students definitely in-ferior in verbal intelligencc; in the Unstable Differ-ence condition, therc was no explicit statement ihatone c€tegory was better than the other. These vari-ables were manipul ateA in a2xzxz factorial design.

The results showed that the Afis goups (H.I.)were more biased than the Science groups (L:I.); thatsimilar gmups differentiated more than dissimilargI

49l9_9!gs9qano_!9m9gmgleven tess so) m the Un_stab& cogrtjgg and ttrat, onl6frE-6fthdFddlFs,there was a signihaant main effect for out-group simi- tlarity: in-group bias increased against a similar out- /group- Although these data are relatively complex, /they do support some of our theoretical expectationsfland provide an illustation that variations in in-grouprbias can be systematically predicted from lhesocial-identity/social-comparison thmry.

We have argued that social and realistic compe-tition are conceptualy distinct, although most oftenthey are empirically associated in "real life." In anexpaiment by Tumer and Brown (1976), an attemptwas made to isolate the effects on intergroup behaviorof the postrlated autonomous pro@sses attributed to asearch for positive social identity. Ctrildren were usedas subjects, and the manipulations involved decisionsby the subjects about the distributiotr of payments forparticipation in the experiment, to be shared equallyby the in-group, between the in-group and out-grcupsthat were made rclevant or irelevant to compari-sons with the in-group's performance. Monetary self-interest (of a magtritude prcviously asc€rtained to beof genuine significance to the subjec6) would haveproduced no difference in the distribution decisionsinvolving the two kinds of out-group; it would alsohave led to decisions tending toward maximum in-group profit (M.I.P.) rather than toward maximumdifference (M.D,).

M.D. was the most influential strategy in thechoices. Furthermore, when the subjecb couldchoosein-group favoritism (M.D. +M.I.P.) and/or a fairnessstrategy, they were both morc discriminatory and lessfair toward the rclevant lhan the irrelevant comparisongroup. Other measures of in-group favoritism pro-duced an interaction between rcward level and typc ofout-group: more discrimination against the relevantthan thc irrelevant goup with bigh revarG, and l€sswith low rewards. Whatev€f, may be other explaft-tions for this interaction, we can at lcast conclude thatwhen reward levels are morc meaningful, in-groupfavoritism is cnhanccd against a more comparableout-group, independendy of the group members' eco-

nomic interests. Indeed, insofar as the subiects usedthe M.D. strategy, they sacrific€d ..objectivc" per-sonal and group gain for the sake of positive in_grbupdistinctiveacss .

On the whole, these studi€s provide someconfirmation for the basic social_identity/social_comparison hypotheses. We shall now attemDt toapply this analysis to somg ofthe problems raised inthe eadier sections of this chapter.

STATU S H I ERARC H I ES AN D SOC IAL C HA N G EThe r€conc€ptualization of social status at-

tempted e{rlier in this chapter needs now to be mademore explicit. Stafiis is not considercd here as a scarceresour€e or commodity, such as power or wealth: it isthe outcomc of intergroup comparison. It reflec8 agroup's relative position on some evaluative dimen_sions of comparison. Low subjective status do€s notprcmote int€rgmup competition dircctly; its effects onint€rgroup behavior are mediated by iocial identityprocesses. The lower is a group's subjective statusposition in rclation lo relevatrt comparison groups, thelcss is the conribution it can makl to posltiveiocialidentity. Thevadery ofreactions to negadve or threat-ened social idendty to be discussed below are anelaboration of the principles outlined earlier in thischapt€r.

l. In4ividual MobrTrry. The more an individualapproaches the structure of beliefs (most ofrcn sociallyslnred) desoibed in the Introduction to this chapter asthat of ''social mobility, " the more it is likety that hewill ry to leave, or dissociate himself froln,

-his ".rr

yll:.etllp. This usualty implies anempts, on anndividual basis, to achieve upward social mobility, toP* fuq a.Iower- to r higher-status group. ln arour--goup hicrarchy, G. F. Ross (1975) fodd a di_rcd. linear relationship betwcetr tow statJs and theoes[ie to pass upwards into another group. Many ear_licr studies rcport the cxistencc of itong for& forupwad social movement in status hierarchies. Ten-dencies to dissociate onesclf psychologically fromreuow members of low-prestige categories are lqownlo- maDy oj us from everyday erperience; they haveoeon noted more systematically by Jahoda (196 l) andA.lheb€f,8 and Zavalloni (1969), among others, and

An lntegrative Theory ol lnteercup @nflict 49

indirectly by rhe whole lirerature on racial identifica_tion and prefer€nce. The most important f""tu." ofindividual mobility is tiat the low stahs of one,s owngroup is not thereby changed: it is an individualistapproach designed, at least in the short run, to achievea personal, not a group, solution. Thus, individualmobility irnplies a disidentification with the erstwhilein-group.

, Z .l:r\lCreativity. The group members mayseet positive distinctiveness for the in-group by rede_f.ning or altering the elements of thi comparativesituation. This need not involve any changi in thegroup's ectual social position o( access to objectiveresources in relation to the out-group. It is a grouprather than an individualistic .fut"gy thut _.yfocus upon:

(a) C-omparing the in-group to thc outgroup onsomc- new dimension. Lemaine (1966) found, for ex_ample, that childrcn's groups which could not com_pare themselves favorably with othen in terms ofconstructing a hut--because they had be€n assisnedpoorcr building rnaterials lhatr the ouGg-up_t id"d. ,-to seek out oth€r dimensions of compaison invotvinenew consfructions in the hut's surroundings. ThJ

problems that obviously arise here are dose oflegitimizing the valuc assigned to the new socialproduc6-f[st in the in-group and then in the othergroups involved. To the extent that this legitimizationmay threaten the out-group's superior distinctiveness.an increase in intergroup tension can be predict€d.. (b! Changing the values assigned ro the attri-butes of the group, so that comparisons which. were

eS,evUystl negative are now perceived as positivc.rne chsslc example is .,Black is beautiful.,, Thesalient dirnension---skin color_remains tfie same,bur the prevailing value syst€m conceming it is:Je:y and r€verscd. The same proccss may undertiePeabody's (1968) fnding that even when variousgroups agr€c about their rospcctive characteristics , thetrait is evaluated more positively by the group rhatpossesses it.

(c) Changing the ou-Broup (or selectin* theout-g_roup) with which the in_group is comparei_inparticul4r, ceasing or avoidhg to use the iigh_statusour-group as a comparativc Jrame of relerence.rynere cornparisons are not made with the high_status

c)o,tn"

44 ChapEr 3

out-grcup, the relevant inferiority should decrease insalience, and self-esteem should recover. Hyman's(1942) classic paper on the psychology of status sug-gested that discontent among low-satus-group mem-bexs is lessened to the degree hat intaclass rather thanintergroup comparisons are made. More recently,Rosenberg and Simmons (1972) found that self-esteem was higher among Blacts rylo made self-comparisons with other Blackggther than Whites.Other work also suggests (see I. Kae,, 1964; Lefcourt& Ladwig, 1965) that, in certain circumstances, Blackperformance was adversely affected by the low self-esteem induced by the presence of the members of thedominant out-group . It follows that self-este€m can beenhanced by comparing with other lower-sanrsgroups rather than with those of higher sbnrs. This isconsistent with the fact that competition between sub-ordinate groups is sometimcs morc intense than be-twe€n subordinate and dominant groups-hence, forexample, lower-class or "poor white" racism.

3. Social Competition. The group membersmay seek positive distinctiveness through direct com-petition with the out-group. They may try to revcrsethe relative positions of the in- group and the out-groupon salient dimensions. To the degree that this mayinvolve comparisons related to the social structure, itimplies changes in the groups' objective social loca-tions. We can hypothesize, therefore, following theR.C.T., that this stategy will generate conflict andantagonism between subordinate and dominantgroups insofar as it focuses on the distibution ofscarce resourc€s. Data relevant to this strategy havebeen referred to earlier in this chapter.

lrt us assume as an ideal case some stratifica-tion of social groups in which the social hierarchy isreasonably conelated with an unequal division of ob.jective resources and a corresponding status system(based on tle outcomes of comparisons in t€rms ofthose resources). Under what conditions will this nrtlead to intergroup conflict----or, more precisely, to thedevelopment of competitive ethnoceutrism on the partof the subordinate group?

First, to the extent that the obieaive and thesubjeEiild prohibitions to "passing "- are weak (seeour earlier disclssion of the "social rnobility" stuc-ture of beliefs) , low status may tend , in conditions of

unsatisfaclory social identity, to prcmote the wide-spread adoption of individual mobility strategies , or atleast initial attempG to make use of these strategies.Insofar as individual mobility implies disidenrifica-tion, it will tend to loosen the cohesiveness of thesubordinate group. This weakening of subjective artadlment to the in-group among its members will tend:(a) to blur the perception of distinct group interestscorresponding to the distinct group identity; and (b) tocreate obstacles to mobilizing group members for col-lective action ov€t their common interests. Thus. thelow morale that follows from negative social identitycan set in motion disintegrative processes that, in thelong run , may hirder a change in the group status .

Second, assuming that the barrie$ (objective,mordfil'iEeological lrohibitions) to leaving one'sgrcup arc strong, unsatisfactory social identity maystimulate social creativity that tends to reduce thesalietrc€ of the subordinate/dominant group conflict ofint€rest. Stategy 2{c) mentioned above is likely to becrucial hcf,e sinc!, in general, access to r€sources suchas housing, jobs, income, or education is suflicientlycetrtral to the fate of any group that the relevant com-parisons are not easily changed or devalued. Fewunderprivileged groups would accept poverg/ as avirtue, but it may appear morc tolerable to the de-gee lhat comparisons are made wilh even poorcrgroups rather than with thosc drat are better off (seeRunciman. 1966).

As noted above, some writers (Festinger, 1954;Kidder & Stewart, 1975) imply that sFategy 2(c) is adominant response to status differences betweengroups . The assumption is that intergroup comparabil-ity decreases as a direct function of perceiveddissimi-ladty. If this were the whole story, then, somewhatparadoxically, lhe creaiion of a consensual status sys-tem would protect social identity froin invidious com-parisons. The causal sequence worild bc as follows:similar groups compare with cach otheq he outcomedercrmincs their relative prestige; the perceived statusdifference r€duces their .similarity and hence com-parability; intergroup comparisons ceasb to be made;subjective superiority and inferiority decrease in sa-lience; mrrespondingly, the groups' respective self-este€ms retlm to theL original point. There may beoccasions when this social-psychological recipe forthe maintenance of the status quo can be obeerved in

An lnEgrative Theory of tnteryroup Conflict

perhaps_, of spurious rivalry with some other deprivedgroup. Ilis in tlds context thatCanadians,

(see

something like its pure form. However, we shall areueprescntly that there are many shtus diffcrences draidonot reduce comparability.

For the moment, we can note that bodr indi-vidual mobility and some forms of social creativitycan work to r€duce intergroup conflict over scarceresourc€s-though with different implications. Theformer is destructive rf subordinate-group solidarityand provides no antidoteto.negative social identiw atgrolp level, The latter may restorc or creat! a posiiveself-image but, it can be surmised, at the price eidrerof a collective repression of objectivc deprivation or,

tions 8re p€rc€ived as immuable, a part of the fixedorder of things, then social identity is secure..It be_comes inseclre when the existing state of affairs be_llm b be.erystio1ed. An important coroltary to thisargument is that the dominant or high_status groups,too, can experience insecure socia iOentit!. enygT., . dt. 9i"!i":,jvely superior position ,rl groui,lmpt.ies a polential loss of positive comparisoni aniposslble negative comparisons, which must beguarded against. Sudr a threat may derive from thea:qvjry of rhe low-status group or from a conflict:1Tn *".high_sratus. gmup,s own value sysrem(lor :nmple, rhe sociopolitical morality) ani heactual foundations of its sup€riority. Like low_statusgroups, the high-status groups will react to insecuesocial

_idetrtity by searching for enhanced groupq$uncuveness -In brief, then, it is tue that clear_cut sta s

!ifl11ence1. maf .leaa ro a quiesc€nt social sysrem inwhrch neitter the ..inferior', nor the .,superior,,groups will show much ethnocentism. But this ..idealtype" situation must be considered in relation to trep€rc€ived shbility and tegitinacy of the system. per_c€tvd luegittmacy and7or instability provide new di_mensions of comparabil ity Oat are directly relevant tome atutudes and belravior of the social groups in-volved, whatever their position in dre system. .ibis isth€ social-psychological couDterpart !o what is widelyknown today as .,the revolution of rising expecta-tions . ' ' Providing that individual mobitity is unavail_able or undesirable, consensual inferiority wilGrcjected rnost fapidly when the situation is perceivedT

botr u:srabl-e. Td illegitimate. This is'prcbabiythe s€t of conditions underlying the devilopncntot ethnocentrism among Black Americans, FrenchLanadrans, and New Zaland Maoris, for instance.V.aughan (in prcss) reporb that the perceivcd feas!Durry ot social change (probably including, in thisusr'4c€, tbc pcrccivcd illegitimacy of thi prcscntlltual*). i, an important pt€dictor of fte deveJoping

'Maori cftnocentrism; N. Friedman (1969) ariui9il *F1 wc nry tenn the ..cognitive alteiaa_tive" of Black nationalism in the de-vcloping coun_dT ,*". influentiat in cnhancing Black Aiericansocial identitv.

_ On the other hand, wher the dominant grcup orseclions of it perceive their superiority as teg'itir;b,

. By revming the conditions under which socialstratificatioo do€s not produce intergroup conflict, wec:n hypothesiz€ that negative social identity promotessubordinategroup competitiveness toward the dom_tnatrt group to the degre€ that (a) subjective iden-ufi:1tr:l wi_rh rhe subordinare group is mainrained;alld O) the dominart group continues or begins to befTi:"d I a relevant comparison Foup. As a greardeal of work has becn done in social psycholog-y onthe determinants of cohesivcness and loyalty iirhingroups, we shall conc€ntrate on the seconi condition.let us consider a comparison betwe€n two foofballteams that have come first and second in their league,respectively. There is no argument about wh.ich basthe bigher stafirs, but alternative corparativc out-cojncs were 8nd, h the futue, still will be possible.lynen the new season begins, the teams wh be ascomparatle and competitive as they had been bcfore.rn |hrs rnshnc€, tle saoJs differencc does not re_ducc- the meaningfulness of comparisons because i,can be changed.

-. . This cxample ilusbares Tajfel,s (1974a) distinc-uon Dctwe€n secrra and irsrcure itrle{group compari-sons. fte crudilEid?G-6-G?Ftinction is whctherc:g:*-:h?natives to rhe actual ourcomc arcavarraDtg-wh€thtr other outcomes arc conccivable.Jtatus diffe(ences betwccn social groups in socials)ttcms showitrg various degrecs of stradfication canoe oEttnguished in the same way. Whcrc status rrla_

more

46 Chapter 3

they will pmbably react in an intensely discriminatoryfashion to any attempt by the subordinaF group tochange the intergroup situation . Such pedraps was thepost-bellum sinration in the Southern United States:the Whites, threatened by those who had been theirslaves, rapidly abandoned their Patemalistic ste-reotypes of the Blacks as "childlike" in favor ofopenly hostile and derogaory ones (see Van derBerghe, 1967). The reactions of illegitimately su-perior'groups arc more complex (I\rmer & Brown,1976). It se€ms that conflicts of values are reduced bygreater discrimination when superiority is assued, butby less discrimination when it is unstable. This calls tomind some Prisoner Dilemma surdies in which Whitediscrimination against Black opponents increased themore cooperative was the opponent, but decreased themore comptitive he was (Baxter, 1973; Cederblom& Dien, 19?0). Baxter suggested in the tide of hisarticle ("Prejudiced Liberals? ") that a conflict ofvalues may underlie his data.

Many of the points and hypotheses we haveadvanced in this chapter are not, in thernselves ' new(see, for instance, M. Sherif, 1966; Runciman, 1966;Milner, l9?5; Billig, L976). What is trew, we think,is the integration of the three processes of socialcategorization, self-evaluation through social iden-tity, and inte{grcup social comparison, into a coher-ent and testable framework for contributing to theexplanation of various forms of intergroup behavior,social conllict, and social change. This frameworkcontains possibilities of further development, and,to this extent, we hope that it may stimulate theo-retically dirccted research in areas that haYe not be€nconsidered here.

But some cautionary poins should be made.The equation of social competition and intergroupconflict made above rests on thc assumptions conc€rn-ing an "ideal O?e" of sociat statification in whichthe salient dimens ions of intergrouP diff€rentiation arethose involving scarce resources. In this resPect, wehave simply bonowed the central tenet of the R.C.T.Thcre is no reason, in fact, to assume that intergroupdiffe.rentiation is inhcrently conflictual. Some of theexperimental work that is proceeding at pr€scnt at theUniversity of Bristol points to the conclusion thateyaluative derogation of an out-group is conceptually

and empirically distinct from out-group hostility. Onthe other hand, social-identity processes may providea source ofintef,group conflict (in addition to the casesoutlined above) to the degee that the groups developconflicting interests with respect to the maintenance ofthe comparative situation as a whole. It seems plausi-ble to hypothesize that, when a group's action forpositive distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded, or inany way actively prevented by an out-group, this willpromote overt conflict and hostility between thegroups. This prediction, like many others, still re-mains to be tested."O BJECTIVE' AN D'SU BJ ECTIVE"CONFLICIS

None of the arguments outlined in this chapt€rmust be understood as implying. that the social-psychological or "subjective" t)?e of conflict isbeing considered herc as having priority or a moreimportant causal function in social rcality than the"objective'' determinants of social conflict of whichthe basic analysis must be sought in the social, eco- ,nomic, political, and hisorical strucnrres of a soci-ety. The major aim of the present discussion has be€nto determine what arc the points of insertion ofsocial-psychological variables into the causal spiral;and its argument has becn that, just as the effects ofthcse variables are powerfully determined by the pre-vious social, economic, and political pmc€sses, sothey may also acquire, in turn, an autonomous func-tion that enables them to deflect in one direction oranother the subsequent functioning of these processes .

It is rle-ady impossible itr most natural socialsituations to distinguish between discriminatory in-tergroup behavior based on real or perceived con-flict of "objective" interests betwe€n the gmupsand disgimination based on attempts to establisha positively-valued distinctivene,ss for one's owngroup. However, as wc have argued, the two can bedistinguished theoretically, since the goals of actionsaimed at the achievement of positively-valued in-group distinctiveness often relain no value outside ofthe context of intergrouP comparisons. An examPlewould be a group that does not necessarily wish toincrease the level of its own salaries but acts to preventother groups from getting nearer to Ois level so that

differentials are not eroded . B ut the d ifficulty w ith thisexample---as with many other similar examples-isthat, in this case, the preservation of salary differen-tials is probably associated with all kinds of "objec-tive" advantages that cannot be defined in terms ofmoney alone. In turn, .rone of these advantages willagain make sCSg only in lte comparative frameworkof intergroup -ompetition. Despite this confusingnetwork of mutual feedbacks and interactions. thedistinctions made here are important because theyhelp us to understand some aspccb of int€rgroup be-havior which have often been neglected in the past.

A fifther distinction must be made betwe€n"explicit" and "implicit" conflicts-a distinctionthat has to do with objectivity in a different way. Aconflict can be "objective" despite the fact that thegoals the groups are aiming for have no value outsideof the contq(t of intergoup comparison. This is sowhen the conflict is instiqrdonalized and legitimizedby rules and Dofms, whatev€r their origin, that areacccpted by the groups involved. This was the case inSherif's studi€s in their phase of competition betwecnlhe groups; and it also is the case in any footbau matchatrd in countless oth€r social activities. The behaviortoward out-groups in this kind of cotrflict can be clas-sificd, in tum, into two categori€s, one of which canbc rcfcrre;d to I instrununtal and the other asnoninstrumental. The instrumental category consistsof all those actioDs whose explicit aim can be directlyrclated to crusing the group to win the competition.Thc noninstrumcntat category, which could be re-ferred to as "gratuitous" discrimination against theout-goup, includes the creation of negativc stereo-

An lntegntive Theory of tntergroup Conflict 47

types and all other aspects of the ..irrelevant"in-group/out-group differentiations so well described,for example, in Sherift s[rdies. The fmt category ofactions is both commonsensically and theoreticallyac@unted for by assuming nothing more than thegroup's desire to win the competition-altfrough thisposes all the theoretical "comparison " problems dis-cussed in this chapter; the second category of actionscan be directly and parsimoniously accounted for interms of the social-comparison-social-identity_positiveingoupdistinctiveness sequence describedhere.

The "implicit" conflicb are tlose that can beshown to exist despite the absence of explicit in-stitutionalization or even an informal normative ac-c€ptanc€ of their existence by the groups involved.The proof of their existence is to be found in the largenumber of studies (and also everyday occurrences in" teal life') in which diff€rentiations of all kinds aremade between groups by their members although, onthe face of it, there are no "r€asons " for these dif-ferentiations to occur. Clear examples of this havebeen provided in several studies mentionod in thischapt€r in which the intoduction by the subjecn ofvarious intergroup differentiations directly dec reas edthe "objective" rewards that could otherwisc havebeen gained by the in-group, or even directly by theindividual. Findings of this kind, which can begeneralized widely to many natural social situations,provide a clear example of the n€ed to introduc€ intothe complex spiral of social causation the social-psychological variabtes of the ..rclational " and"cornparative " kind discussed in this chapter.