An internationalist national Islamic struggle?

South East Asia Research, 18, 4, pp 757–791 doi: 10.5367/sear.2010.0017

An internationalist national Islamicstruggle?

Narratives of ‘brothers abroad’ in thediscursive practices of the Islamic Party of

Malaysia (PAS)

Dominik M. Müller

Abstract: Localized constructions of transnational Islamic kinshipor ‘brothers abroad’ are an integral part of discursive practiceswithin the community of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). Basedon empirical data gained from anthropological fieldwork between2009 and 2010, this article examines domestic manifestations andthe implicit subtexts of the party’s foreign policy, with particularregard to the Palestinian cause. Narratives of victimization andheroism are thereby as important as demonizing projections of de-linquency and evil, while at times images of local and external enemiesmelt together. Furthermore, it is shown that PAS’s Islamist inter-nationalism is essentially (g)local, whereas national and ummahistidentities are referred to only selectively.

Keywords: localization; transformative adaptations; transnationalIslam; Islamist politics; Malaysia; PAS

Author details: The author is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Anthro-pology/Cluster of Excellence ‘Formation of Normative Orders’, GoetheUniversity Frankfurt am Main, Senckenberganlage 31, 60325 Frank-furt, Germany. E-mail: [email protected].

In the ideologies and cultures of rhetoric of most political Islamic or‘Islamist’1 parties, Islamic internationalist arguments and nationalist ones

1 The term ‘Islamism’ is highly contested, and reasonable arguments have been madefor and against it (for an excellent overview of the debate, see Barzegar and Martin,2010). In my usage, it is understood as describing a modern ideology and movementthat regards politics and Islam as inseparable, although, as Emmerson (2010) con-vincingly insists, what constitutes Islamism transcends the sphere of politics. A typical

Copyright © 2010 SOAS. Reproduced by permission of IP Publishing Ltd.http://www.ippublishing.com South East Asia Research, 18(4): 757–91

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go hand in hand. The present article examines this phenomenon in thecontext of localized transformative adaptations and narratives of so-called ‘brothers abroad’ in contemporary discursive practices withinthe community of the Islamic Party of Malaysia [Parti Islam SeMalaysia,PAS].

Most of the data presented here are gained from anthropological field-work between February 2009 and June 2010, a fieldwork period of severalstays that altogether comprised 10 months.2

Brief overview of transnationalism in the organizationalhistory of PAS

Many scholars have discussed transnational dimensions in the historyof PAS and other Islamist organizations in Malaysia.3 Therefore, andgiven the article’s main focus on contemporary discursive practices,only a brief introductory overview will be sketched to situate the subject.

In PAS’s formative era and under the leadership of the left-wing-oriented PAS President Burhanuddin al-Helmy (1956–1969), trans-nationalism was a central concern, for example, in terms of thepan-Malayan nationalist vision of Melayu Raya [Greater Malaya]4 andan inclination towards the ideological principles of the Muslim Broth-erhood [Ikhwan al-Muslimeen] from Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami in Paki-stan, and the Indonesian Masjumi Party.5 At that time, PAS’s transnational

concern of this movement is the normative conviction that it is a religious duty toimplement – what its adherents regard as – Islam on all levels of private, public andsocial life in a ‘complete’ manner. The Islamist movement is diverse, fragmented,polycentric, cellular and glocalized, though it has some common normative grounds.Often it makes sense to use the term ‘Islamism’ in connection with qualifying adjec-tives, such as ‘political’, ‘violent’/‘non-violent’, ‘feminist’, etc.

2 The fieldwork was conducted for a PhD project at Frankfurt University, entitled‘Islamism, youth and the contestation of normative orders: a study on Dewan PemudaPAS, the youth wing of Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)’.

3 On the history of PAS, see Noor, 2004a, 2004b; Funston, 1976; Mohamed, 1991,1994. On domestic impacts of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, see Stauth, 2002;Noor, 2004b, p 330 ff; von der Mehden, 1990. For an account of PAS’s reactions on‘9/11’, see Noor, 2002, 2003. On local effects of the so-called ‘Islamic revivalism’with regard to the Malaysian Dakwah, youth and student movements since the 1970s,see Abdul Hamid, 2002, 2007; Muzaffar, 1987; Nagata, 1984; Stauth, 2002; Zainah,1987. For an overview of transnationalism in the history of the Malaysian Islamistmovements Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement ofMalaysia), Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), Islamic Representative Council (IRC) andAl-Arqam (and its predecessors), which also carries a chapter on PAS, see AbdulHamid, 2009a.

4 Liow, 2005.5 Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 150.

Narratives of ‘brothers abroad’ in PAS discursive practices 759

orientation largely focused on the formation of post-colonial order inthe region. Nevertheless, solidarity with physically distant Muslim broth-ers abroad was already a concern, for example, regarding the Palestiniancause. As early as the late 1940s, PAS’s predecessor Hizbul Musliminhad already established a Palestine Aid Committee.6

During the leadership of the staunch Malay nationalist Asri Muda(1969–82), PAS’s political agenda became gradually more ‘Malaysian’,and PAS joined the government coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) forthe first and last time in its history.7 To counter dissatisfaction with theparty’s development, Asri Muda tried to distract the PAS community’sattention from domestic problems by speaking at length about the causesof Muslims abroad (for example, Muslim separatist groups in Thailandand the Philippines), and ‘even called on Malaysian Muslims to’ join‘an international Muslim fighting force to help the Palestinians’ in 1975.8

Scandals, growing internal party anger over Asri’s leadership and a dis-astrous decrease in public support finally led to PAS’s exit from thegovernment coalition in 1978 and his spectacular ousting at the PASGeneral Assembly in 1982.9 Fuelled by ‘key global events in the Mus-lim world that […] informed’ a groundbreaking ‘reorientation of PAS’,10

a new generation of reformist key figures such as Yusuf Rawa, FadhilNoor, Abdul Hadi Awang, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Nakhaie Ahmadtook over the party’s leadership. With the intention of bringing PASback to the path of ‘true’ Islam, they institutionalized the new party-internal order of ‘religious scholars leadership’ [kepimpinan ulama].11

Inspired by the transnational waves of Islamic resurgence, these na-tionalist Islamist internationalists revived PAS’s internationalistcomponent and pushed it to a previously unseen level. The party re-modelled its ‘discourse with political vocabulary in line withcontemporary trends in global Islamism’.12 In contrast to its traditional‘constitutive oppositional Other’,13 the Malay Muslim government party,the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO),14 PAS increasingly

6 Liow, 2009, p 170.7 Noor, 2004a, p 253 ff.8 Noor, 2004a, pp 269–270; see also Nair, 1997, p 63; Liow, 2009, pp 171–172.9 Noor, 2004a, p 326.10 Liow, 2007, p 169.11 Dewan Ulamak PAS Pusat, 2009.12 Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 151.13 Noor, 2004b, p 743.14 Since Malaysia’s declaration of independence in 1957, UMNO has been the domi-

nant party in all government coalitions.


disentangled itself from the emphasis on ‘Malay supremacy’ [ketuananMelayu], which was now regarded as illegitimate asabiyyah [ethnocen-tric clan loyalty].15 The new PAS leaders brought in a more internationalistbrand of Islamism, partly due to educational backgrounds and first-hand experiences of the ‘winds of change’ in the Muslim world duringtheir studies abroad (for example, Yusof Rawa came under the influ-ence of the Muslim Brotherhood during his studies in Cairo and Meccaand attempted to bring PAS’s struggle in line with Islamist organiza-tions abroad;16 and Abdul Hadi Awang studied from 1969 to 1973 inMedina and 1974 to 1976 in Egypt, where he came into contact withthe Muslim Brotherhood).17 As Abdul Hamid18 notes, the ‘ulama-ledPAS has revived the importance of transnational Islam in its discourse,though not to the extent of displacing the primacy of realizing an Is-lamic polity in Malaysia’, while ‘international issues have consistentlybeen high on PAS’s agenda since the ascendancy of Middle Eastern-trained ulama to the helm of the party’.

Almost 30 years after the ‘ulama-leadership revolution’, frequentsymbolic interactions with foreign Islamist groups and expressions ofsolidarity with ‘oppressed brothers’ abroad have become an integraland ritualized part of PAS’s organizational culture.

Between constitutive Others and fictive brothers: mainconsiderations

PAS’s proclaimed Islamist internationalism is inevitably localized andto some extent nationalist in nature. National and Islamist-internation-alist identities are not mutually exclusive but complementary, and areselectively referred to in particular situational contexts.

In the Malaysian political landscape, solidarity with ‘oppressed brothersabroad’ – such as the Palestinian people, who will be referred to as themain example in this article – serves as a powerful and contested sym-bol and resource. In local discourse, the Palestinian cause is usuallyframed in Islamic terms. Therefore, if staged by the two Muslim partiesPAS and UMNO that aggressively compete over Muslim votes, expres-sions of solidarity with Palestine cannot escape from, in fact, being partof domestic politics. At least to some extent, such expressions must be

15 Noor, 2004a, p xxix.16 Noor, 2008, p 203.17 Jomo and Ahmed, 1988, p 852; Noor, 2004b, p 350.18 Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 151.


understood against the backdrop of the Malaysian ‘Islamization race’19

of historically generated ‘piety trumping’20 over Islamic legitimacy andpolitical power between these two parties that traditionally (re-)definethemselves in opposition to each other. As the article will show, thisrelational aspect of PAS’s organizational identity is reflected intransformative adaptations of the Palestinian conflict.

Furthermore, it will be illustrated that not only PAS’s constitutiveopposition to its estranged ‘brothers’ from the Malay Muslim partyUMNO, but also its ambivalent relationship with Shia ‘brothers abroad’reveals tensions in its proclaimed struggle for an ‘undivided ummah’.Fragmentation within this imagined borderless kinship community isoften emically claimed to be caused by the ‘evil plans’ of the secularistWest to ‘split the ummah’ and the ‘Westernized’ hypocrite [munafiq]Islamic ‘enemies within’. Internal conflicts tend to be externalized byblaming them on the usual suspects: secularism, Israel, the USA andthe West.

Talk about the brothers abroad is accompanied by a powerful emo-tional appeal. The narrative of victimization is thereby as important asthe narrative of heroization, just as in the case of enemy-Others such asIsrael and the USA, demonizing narratives of delinquency and evilnessare constitutive. Such emotional narratives find expression in the sym-bolic staging of solidarity and other practical manifestations of thecompassionate collective imagination of shared agony, shared strug-gles and common goals.

Foreign affairs and local practices – the General Assembliesof PAS in 2009 and 2010

At the 55th Annual General Assembly of the Islamic Party of Malaysia[Muktamar Tahunan PAS Pusat kali ke-55], which was held at StadiumMelawati in Shah Alam in July 2009, the Party’s president, Abdul HadiAwang, ceremoniously handed over a cheque for Malaysian Ringgit150,00021 to a representative of the Palestinian Islamist organization

19 Noor, 2003, p 79; Noor, 2004b, p 724; Liow, 2004; Liow, 2007, p 182, 2009, pp 15,16, 201; Zainah, 2005, p 122.

20 Liow, 2009, pp 13, 15.21 Malaysian Ringgit 150,000 = Euro 30,000 (July 2009). The donation was collected

by PAS’s newspaper Harakah. According to PAS’s Secretary General Mustafa Ali,this was ‘the latest contribution of a total amount of 1.7 Mio Ringgit’, at the timearound Euro 340,000 (official homepage of the PAS 55th General Assembly, Website:http://muktamar55.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article


Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (HAMAS), Sheikh Marwan AbuRas.22 This gesture of symbolic solidarity and material support from thePAS leadership for their Palestinian ‘brothers’ was answered by cheersof enthusiasm from the audience, accompanied by shouts of ‘takbir’and ‘Allahuakbar’, which within the cultural codes of PAS’s (and otherIslamist organizations’) event culture is similar to the clapping of handselsewhere. At the same event, other ‘special guests’ from abroad in-cluded members from Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (KhalilurRahman from its Sri Lankan branch) and Fathurohman Mahfudz fromParti Bulan Bintang (PBB, Indonesia).23

At the next General Assembly of PAS that was held at Pusat TarbiyyahIslam Kelantan in June 2010, again, a delegation of four HAMAS repr-esentatives was given significant space in the limelight. A member of

&id=278:harakah-bukan-sekadar-sebuah-media&catid=37:muktamar-penuh&Itemid=65, author’s translation, accessed 15 June 2010). It was not specified during whichperiod of time this sum came together. In addition, the Youth Wing handed over19,000 Ringgit (3,700 Euro) to Marwan Abu Ras (Website: http://tasikhijau.blog-spot.com/2009/06/muktamar-pemuda-menerima-tetamu.html, accessed 24 Septem-ber 2009).

22 Marwan Abu Ras is a HAMAS legislator and chairman of the Palestinian ScholarsLeague. He was a close companion of HAMAS founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (KonradAdenauer Stiftung, 2006). At the PAS Muktamar, he emphasized that the fight overPalestine would be a fight of the whole ummah, and asked the ummah to ‘wake up’and fight ‘side by side with the Palestinian people’ by all means, ‘including financialsupport’ (author’s translation, Website: http://pemudasarawak.wordpress.com/2009/06/08/wakil-hamas-gesa-umat-islam-bersama-palestine, accessed 20 July 2010).

23 In 2008, at the 54th General Assembly, guests from abroad included representativesfrom HAMAS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Indonesia) and Ikhwan al-Muslimeenfrom Jordan (Website: http://muktamar54.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=47, accessed 28 July 2010; see also Abdul Hamid, 2009a,p 153). Such visits are part of an organizational tradition to host delegates fromforeign Islamist organizations ‘adhering to variants of the Muslim Brotherhood andJamaat-i-Islami ideologies’ (Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 152) at PAS General Assem-blies. It is based on PAS’s self-understanding of belonging to a larger transnationalIslamic movement [harakah Islamiyah] of like-minded organizations. Despite ines-capable fragmentation and localized particularity, this movement shares commonground in its normative understanding of which role Islam should play at all levelsof private and public life, a role imagined to be universally valid. PAS’s close con-tact with these Islamist organizations stands no comparison to UMNO’s relationshipwith them, despite UMNO’s increasingly Islamist outlook, ummatic concern for ‘broth-ers abroad’ (Liow, 2009, p 170) and ambitious Islamic foreign policy (Nair, 1997).For its General Assembly, UMNO has invited delegations from Japan’s Liberal Demo-cratic Party, Indonesia’s Golkar Party, the Indian National Congress, the CommunistParty of China and United Russia (The Star: ‘Foreign political parties invited forUmno forum’, 29 July 2010). It should be noted, however, that PAS also tries toenhance its network with non-Muslim states such as China (Liow, 2009, p 172),though this is not (yet) reflected in the guest list of its General Assemblies.


Figure 1. A HAMAS delegate (Munir Said, second from the right) sitting next to arepresentative from the Lebanese Hezbollah (second from the left) at the GeneralAssembly of Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat in Kota Bharu, Kelantan on 10 July 2010.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

HAMAS’s Political Bureau, Munir Said,24 gave two fierce and uncom-promising speeches, one at the party’s main meeting, and one at theYouth Wing’s General Assembly [Muktamar Tahunan Dewan PemudaPAS Pusat ke-51], which was held nearby at the Kelantan Trade Centre.Once more, the event was also visited by other ‘dignitaries’ from abroad,which included representatives from Hezbollah (Lebanon), the EritreanIslah Party, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, Philippines) andthe Islamic Adhaalath Party from the Maldives (see Figure 1).

Palestine was one of the most central – or at least symbolically mostvisible – topics of this Muktamar. It started in the realm of clothing,with many participants wearing ‘Palestine shawls’ (see Figure 2). An

24 In the past, he served as official HAMAS representative in Sudan and Yemen (Website:http://www.palestine-studies.org/journals.aspx?id=9980&jid=1&href=fulltext,accessed 30 July 2010).


Figure 2. A Palestine HAMAS shawl that is popular amongPAS members.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

apparently popular type of these shawls depicted the logo of HAMAS,and was sold at several of the ‘PAS merchandise’ stalls. I had seen thesame type of HAMAS shawls being sold inside the PAS headquarters[Pejabat Agong PAS] in Kuala Lumpur months before, as well as atother events. However, the number of participants wearing them boreno comparison to any PAS events that I had previously attended. Among


Figure 3. PAS President Adbul Hadi Awang (right) and PAS Deputy PresidentNasharudin Mat Isa (left) wearing HAMAS shawls at the PAS General Assembly inJune 2010.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

PAS key figures that were seen wearing these HAMAS shawls at theGeneral Assembly in 2010 were PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang, PASSpiritual Leader [Mursyidul ‘Am] Nik Aziz and PAS Deputy President[Timbalan Presiden] Nasharudin Mat Isa (see Figure 3). Another typeof Palestine shawl also depicted the flag of Turkey – a novelty that hadto do with the raid on the six ships of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla byIsrael’s army on 31 May 2010, during which a number of Turkish activ-ists were killed, on ships sailing under the Turkish flag. The Turkishgovernment’s protest against Israel was among the most vocal, and loudlyapplauded in Malaysia, as reflected in the appearance of the Turkey–Palestine shawls.25

25 When the Malaysians who had been on the ships arrived back in Kuala Lumpur, theywere received by several Malaysian politicians. Deputy Prime Minister MuhyiddinYassin was wearing the Turkey–Palestine shawl, as were many other UMNO repre-sentatives. These shawls became contested political symbols, just like the repatriates


Figure 4. Visitors walking over flags of the USA and Israel at the PAS GeneralAssembly in June 2010. The texts state ‘Sila Pijak’ [Please step on it!] and ‘JahanamAmerika, Jahanam Israel’ [Destroy America, destroy Israel].Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

At the PAS Women’s Wing General Assembly 2010, many of therepresentatives wore colourful ‘Save Gaza’ headbands and Palestineshawls, and at one point, a group of women burned the US and Israeliflags in a symbolic statement of protest against these two nations.26

Directly behind the gates of the main Muktamar’s venue, two largeflags, a US and an Israeli one, were fixed to the ground, supplementedby a written request – ‘please step on it!’ (Sila pijak!) (see Figure 4).

themselves. At the PAS General Assembly, PAS leaders seemed eager to be photo-graphed next to Jamaluddin Elias, the Deputy President of the PAS-related NGOYayasan Amal, who had been on one of the ships.

26 For a series of pictures of this burning ritual, see Website: http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=163&Itemid=64;http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=164&Itemid=64; http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgal-lery2&page=inline&id=165&Itemid=64; http://muktamar56.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&page=inline&id=166&Itemid=64 (last accessed 1 September2010).


Not only did numerous visitors, including families with their children,enjoy doing so, but a number of PAS Youth leaders also posed there fora group picture, with broad smiles on their faces. Nonetheless, as inprevious years, PAS had invited the representatives of foreign embas-sies, including those of the USA. Although I could not identify whetherone of the few Western guests (totalling probably less than five, includ-ing myself, at the opening ceremony, and even fewer during the followingdays) belonged to the US Embassy, it is clear that this behaviour ofPAS reflects a more general pattern of ambivalence in its political ap-proach to Western countries. On the one hand, PAS is very active intrying to cultivate and intensify contacts with Western embassies. Thisis usually done by PAS’s Bureau of International Affairs [LajnahHubungan Antarabangsa dan Hal Ehwal Luar] and individual key fig-ures, and has been intensified particularly in its Youth Wing’s InternationalBureau since the General Assembly of 2009, when Raja MohammadAl-Hiss27 was appointed as the Bureau’s new head. On the other hand,anti-Western ideologies, rhetoric and symbolic practices are a domi-nant norm within the PAS community, and the West is seen by manyparty members as the biggest (earthly) source of evil, social problems,and by some as a natural enemy of Islam [musuh Islam]. Nevertheless,courtesy calls are made to Western embassies, and US Embassy del-egates are invited to PAS offices. In January 2010, the PAS Youth Wingestablished an ‘official relationship’ with the US Embassy that in PAS’sown media announcement was referred to as ‘historic’ [bersejarah] andin line with PAS’s ‘government in the waiting’ approach.28 Another suchmeeting, when representatives of a number of Western embassies wereinvited, was held on 24 February 2010 in Kuala Lumpur.29 On 1 February

27 According to Dr Raja Mohammad Al-Hiss, his Bureau has three main objectives:first, ‘to enrich the network between PAS, especially the PAS Youth, with all theembassies and diplomats’, second, to ‘raise public awareness about internationalaffairs’ and third, internal education in order to ‘ensure that our leaders, especiallythe youth leaders, are prepared to become a government’, for example, in terms of‘understanding the international law’ (interview with Raja Mohammad Al-Hiss, KualaLumpur, 7 December 2009).

28 Homepage of PAS Youth: ‘Pemuda PAS Jalin Hubungan Diplomatik Dengan KedutaanAmerika Syarikat’, 20 January 2010, Website: http://pemuda.pas.org.my/v2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=891:pemuda-pas-jalin-hubungan-diplomatik-dengan-kedutaan-amerika-syarikat&catid=1:terkini&Itemid=2 (accessed 17 July 2010).

29 It was attended by representatives from the USA, the UK, Germany, Finland, Po-land, Iran, China and the EU. PAS Youth leader Nasrudin Hassan stated that thismeeting was ‘very important in order to show that Pemuda PAS has good relationswith all countries in the world’ (my translation), cited in Harakahdaily, ‘PemudaPAS adakan dialog dengan kedutaan asing’, 25 February 2010.


2010, two representatives from the US Embassy, Jeremy Nathan andRavi Manickam, were warmly welcomed by the PAS state chief of Perak,Abu Bakar Hussein, and key PAS figure Nizar Jamaluddin, at a meet-ing in Perak.30 At the same time, numerous protest notes were handedover to Western embassies,31 and demonstrations were held, particu-larly in front of the US Embassy. According to personal informationfrom within PAS, for many years the Party’s Deputy President NasharudinMat Isa has enjoyed a good relationship with the US Embassy. He issaid to have been invited to George Bush Jr’s inauguration in Washing-ton in January 2001. However, notwithstanding this good relationship,he repeatedly appeared at PAS demonstrations in front of the US Em-bassy, the last time on 1 June 2010 when PAS handed over a memorandumthat demanded a stop to ‘military support’ for Israel.32 When trying toachieve a deeper understanding – or what Geertz (1973) refers to as a‘thick description’ – of PAS, one clearly needs to be aware not only ofthe differences between internal factions, but also of different levels ofdiscourse between its public discourse on normative and/or populistlevels, and the more rational considerations behind the scenes, as wellas the implicit subtexts of this multivocality.

The ambivalence in PAS’s approach toward the ‘West’ reflects itsbalancing between the two poles that constantly shape and reinforce itsinternal struggles: the permanent cleavages between a normative ideal-ism of an uncompromising Islamist stance in line with the proclaimed‘basis of the Islamic struggle’ [asas perjuangan Islam] and the require-ments of realpolitik. Many PAS figures, though not all of them, feelthat the political realities of the present coalition situation necessarilyrequire a high, and for idealists sometimes painful, degree of pragma-tism. Many think that for the time being, some distancing of anuncompromising, impatient insistence on the ‘asas’ [basis] may be nec-essary, for example, when it comes to PAS’s idealistic conviction that a‘complete’ institutionalization of Islamic law including Islamic criminal

30 Homepage of PAS Perak: ‘KUNJUNGAN WAKIL KEDUTAAN AMERIKA KEPEJABAT PAS PERAK’, 01 February 2010, Website: http://www.perak.pas.org.my/index.php/arkib-artikel/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1163:kunjungan-wakil-kedutaan-amerika-ke-pejabat-pas-perak&catid=51:aktiviti-perak&Itemid=128 (accessed 17 July 2010).

31 On 9 July 2009, a PAS Youth delegation handed over a memorandum to the GermanEmbassy, protesting about the murder of a Muslim woman. On the same day, an-other protest note was handed over to the Chinese Embassy, protesting about theoppression of Uighurs.

32 Harakahdaily, ‘PAS serah memo ke Kedutaan Amerika, bantah Israel’, 1 June 2010.


law [hudud, qisas, ta’azir] is a religious duty. Although both the hardlinersand the pragmatists regard this as being obligatory one day, a numberof leaders think that it cannot be done or even demanded too loudly inpublic at this point, because the time for it is not yet ripe, and also thePakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition with the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR)party and especially the Chinese-dominated non-Muslim DemocraticAction Party (DAP) would be in danger of breaking apart, much asPR’s predecessor Barisan Alternatif did earlier.33 Both in terms of howto deal with the West and with local political realities, PAS continues tostruggle between idealism and pragmatism.34

On the sidelines of the Muktamar in 2010, a closed-door meetingwas held between PAS leaders and some of the above-mentioned del-egates of foreign Islamic parties. One point that was discussed was thequestion of how to deal with the Jews, once Al-Aqsa [Jerusalem] hadbeen freed. While at demonstrations and public talks, slogans such asthe popular shout of ‘hancur Yahudi!’ [destroy the Jews!] or the lin-guistically slightly more creative ‘benci judi, benci Yahudi’ [hategambling, hate Jews] were frequently uttered during my research,35 thetalks behind the scenes took place on a more rational and differentiated

33 A PAS Youth member referred to an internal usrah meeting in ‘2002 or 2003’ whereMujahid Yusof Rawa stated that it was not the right time yet to implement hudud andan Islamic state [Daulah Islamiah], instead UMNO and corruption should be de-feated first, and the substance (instead of the term) of an Islamic state should beemphasized (interview with PAS Youth member, Kuala Lumpur, 22 January 2010).However, another Youth member argued: ‘When in Saudi Arabia hudud was imple-mented, nobody dared anymore to steal, to drink alcohol or to commit adultery’ (mytranslation, interview with PAS Youth Central Committee member, Ampang, 12 Feb-ruary 2010). Yet another member criticized the fact that even within Pemuda PAS,rarely would anyone understand hudud (interview with PAS Youth Central Commit-tee member, Seremban, 8 February 2010).

34 The discussion about factions in PAS usually revolves around either the categoriesof ulama, professionals and activists (terms that PAS members use to refer to them-selves), or pragmatic Erdogans and idealistic Erbakans (terms that PAS membersnowadays tend to regard as ‘used by our enemies to split us’). Yang Razali Kassim(2009) speaks of a more pragmatic, urbane and open-minded ‘New PAS’, as op-posed to the ‘old’ one. However, it should be added that among most key figures ofthe generation that is even younger than what he describes as ‘New PAS’, the trendgoes back to the positions of the old PAS, with a high degree of legalistic theology-centrism (a development that some of the elder so-called Erdogans have criticallynoticed). The fact that names from Turkish politics (Erdogan, Erbakan) are incorpo-rated is a noteworthy example of localized transformative adaptations.

35 Another such example is the visit of HAMAS parliamentarian Umar Misri to Gombakon 11 December 2009, when a prayer for the ‘destruction of the Jews’ [kehancuranyahudi laknatullah] was organized (Homepage of Pemuda PAS Gombak: ‘PemimpinHAMAS Ziarah Gombak’, Website: http://pemudagombak.com, 15 December 2009,accessed 2 January 2010).


level. During the talk at the Muktamar, the Hezbollah delegate statedthat once Al-Aqsa was back under Islamic control and ‘pacified’,36 itwould be required by Islamic law that the Jews should be a protectedminority [kafir dhimmi] and must be granted certain places of worshipinside Jerusalem. This opinion, according to what I have been told byone of the meeting’s attendees, was generally shared and accepted byall participants – behind closed doors.

During his speech at the Muktamar, the PAS politician Mohamad Sabuinitiated another spontaneous round of collecting money for Palestine,by suggesting that they handed round a number of kopiah [Muslim hats]to be filled with money. I found myself in a position to pass on a kopiahfull of monetary notes to those sitting next to me, wondering whetherunder German law my actions would constitute a criminal act of ‘sup-porting a terrorist organization’ (that is, HAMAS).

Be that as it may, at both General Assemblies in 2009 and 2010, Islamistinternationalism was a prominent topic and in the latter event was evena dominant one. PAS members showed a strong interest in their ‘broth-ers’ from abroad, be it through attendance at speeches of internationalguests, through enthusiastic applause (in the form of takbir), PAS mem-bers’ talks with reference to Palestine, or on other symbolic andperformative levels through the expressionist showcase of solidarity-related ‘clothes’.

‘PAS is HAMAS, UMNO is FATAH!’ – localized adaptationsof the Palestine conflict

Among the numerous external conflicts that include Muslims and playa role in PAS’s discursive practices, the Palestine conflict presentlyappears to be of the highest priority.

In February 2009, shortly after the Israeli army had conducted ‘Opera-tion Cast Lead’ and attacked targets in Gaza for about three weeks, aPAS member told me that a popular slogan among PAS members andsupporters was ‘PAS is HAMAS, UMNO is FATAH!’ – an identifica-tion of PAS with HAMAS (and the pejorative equation of the Malaysiangovernment party UMNO with FATAH), which revealed a deep local-ized transformative adaptation. Following the same theme, on his Internet

36 When I asked a participant of this talk why they believed it would be realistic toachieve this goal, he referred to the Quranic promise (on the theological level) andto new qualities of rockets brought in from Iran that could allegedly now for the firsttime reach targets deep inside Israel (on the more practical one).


blog, a PAS supporter referred to HAMAS as ‘PAS Palestin’.37 The basisfor such equations is the idea that UMNO (read FATAH) is a race-based(Malay, read Arab) nationalist party, allegedly corrupt, insincere or ‘un-Islamic’, whereas PAS (read HAMAS) is an incorruptible and righteous,truly Islamic party.38 In fact, among PAS members it is taboo to criti-cize anything that HAMAS does, or to praise FATAH, while ‘thePalestinians’ in general are constructed as Islamic role models. Nik Azizreferred to UMNO’s approach to Islam as ‘Islam plastik’ [plastic Is-lam], in contrast to ‘Islam Palestin’ [Palestinian Islam],39 whereas thelatter seems to represent the normative ideal type for him.

PAS and its ‘traditional nemesis UMNO’40 have battled each otherever since PAS was founded as an offspring of UMNO in 195141 (witha short intermission of relative calm when PAS entered BN between1973 and 1978).42 Against this backdrop, it can be argued that one vari-ety of the Malaysian Islamization race or ‘holier-than-thou’43 ‘battle forthe legitimacy of Islam’44 between UMNO and PAS is the process of‘Palestine trumping’. At first glance, both parties share an intense con-cern for Palestine.45 On several issues pertaining to the pro-Muslimforeign policies of UMNO, PAS has even expressed its support.46 How-ever, the question as to which of them appears to have the most solidaritywith Palestine may be regarded as just another battleground in the muchdescribed competition between PAS and UMNO, wherein both of them

37 Ibnu Hasyim: ‘Mengenali PAS & UMNO Di Palestin’, Website: http://www.ibnuha-syim.com/2009/07/mengenali-pas-umno-di-palestin.html, 6 July 2009 (accessed 15July 2010).

38 As another blogger puts it: ‘PAS & HAMAS: PARTI ISLAM. UMNO & FATAH: PARTIKEBANGSAAN DAN ASSOBIYAH’ (my translation: ‘PAS & HAMAS = Islamic Party,UMNO & FATAH = nationalist and communalist parties’), Website: http://mullahkane.blogspot.com/2009/01/konflik-sesama-saudara-di-palestin-dan.html (accessed 27 July2010).

39 Harakahdaily, ‘Islam plastik bukan Islam Palestin’, 23 August 2009.40 Noor, 2004a, p 242; 2004b, pp 746, 749.41 Funston, 1976, p 70; Noor, 2004a, p 72 ff.; Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 150.42 Noor, 2004a, p 253 ff.43 Chong, 2006, p 33; Zainah, 2005, p 121.44 Martinez, 2005, p 151.45 In rare cases, they have organized common demonstrations, for example, in front of

the US Embassy on 25 March 2003 to protest about the US invasion of Iraq (Liow,2009, p 168). However, during my fieldwork, I only came across separate protestson common concerns. For instance, the PAS Youth criticized UMNO for not joiningtheir protest march to the US Embassy (to express anger over the Israeli raid on theGaza Freedom Flotilla) on 4 June 2010, while Pemuda UMNO organized a separatedemonstration at Masjid Negara on the same day.

46 Liow, 2009, pp 171–172.


try to ‘out-Islam’,47 ‘out-Islamize’48 or ‘out-Islamicize’49 each other. While,as a renowned scholar noted, PAS is ‘putting pressure on the governmentby claiming legitimacy in speaking up for transnational Muslim causes’,50

it seems that UMNO in turn seeks to re-conquer this legitimacy by ‘out-solidarizing’ PAS with its own activities of staging ‘care’ for Muslimcauses abroad – a process that can be traced back at least to the 1980s,when UMNO started its Islamization programme, turned the state into a‘vehicle of Islamization’51 and thereby took the oppositional ‘wind out ofPAS sails’.52 In these mutual dynamics, the more solidarity a party appearsto show, the more Islamic credentials, credibility and moral capital can besecured, with the potential for transformation into political power. Undoubt-edly, both parties are well aware that such solidarity is a potent politicalresource. At the same time, and notwithstanding its theatrically stagedcharacter, much of the emotional outcry and compassion is real and ‘sin-cerely’ felt to be a moral duty by both PAS and UMNO activists. Similarly,equations of PAS with HAMAS and UMNO with FATAH among PASmembers are emically ‘sincere’ and strategically useful at the same time.

PAS views HAMAS as the only politically and morally legitimategovernment of the Palestinian people. By appropriating HAMAS’s dis-course on the ‘morally depraved’, ‘decadent’ FATAH that is ‘corruptedby the West’, PAS projects exactly this image of FATAH on to its mostimportant local rival UMNO. The compassion and solidarity with whatis locally constructed as an idealized picture of the brothers in Palestinefuels the hate towards what is locally constructed as a demonizing pic-ture of Israel and the West. The latter imaginative construction is thenadjusted to a regional context, internalized or appropriated, for exam-ple, by equating the local political enemy UMNO with the external enemyIsrael, or with FATAH. More than once, I heard someone shouting‘UMNO Yahudi!’ [UMNO Jews!] The same equation appears in theimagery of a VCD cover, entitled ‘UMNO pengkianat [sic] bangsa’[UMNO the traitor of the nation/race], where an UMNO logo is placednext to an Israeli flag53 (see Figure 5). Another such fusion is the slogan

47 Liow, 2009, p 111.48 Noor, 2004b, p 724.49 Peletz, 2002, p 11.50 Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 152.51 Liow, 2009, p 181.52 Liow, 2009, p 41.53 This refers to a debate that linked UMNO to Israel, based on the accusation that the

(‘Jewish-controlled’) public relations company APCO Worldwide had createdUMNO’s slogan of ‘1 Malaysia’ based on a model of ‘1 Israel’.


Figure 5. Visual constructions of enemy-Others – a pictorial juxtaposition of ‘1Malaysia’ and ‘1 Israel’.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

‘benci judi, benci Yahudi!’ [hate gambling, hate Jews!] which was popularin June 2010 when PAS debates revolved around licences for sportsbetting and the ‘evilness’ of Israel as exemplified in the Gaza FlotillaRaid. In March 2009, after the licence of PAS’s newspaper Harakahhad temporarily been revoked, PAS Spiritual Leader Nik Aziz com-pared UMNO with Israel when he stated that: ‘all their actions are likeIsrael’s spite toward the Islamic ummah’ [Tindak tanduk mereka seperti


Israel yang dendam terhadap umat Islam].54 The appropriative imagi-nation that PAS is HAMAS and UMNO is FATAH (or even ‘like Israel’)obviously serves the domestic political purpose to de-legitimize theUMNO-led government as corrupt, decadent and Westernized, while itsupports an advantageous profile for PAS, which may result in an in-crease in Islamic credentials and votes among the ‘Palestine-sensitive’Malay electorate.

When on 27 December 2008 the Israeli army started its three-week-long military attack on HAMAS in Gaza, with the declared intention tostop the rockets being fired by HAMAS targeting Israeli territory, thisled to a huge wave of protest and campaigns of solidarity in Malaysia.All over the country, ‘road shows’, mass prayers for Palestine, the es-tablishment of aid initiatives, calls for boycotts of brands, anddemonstrations took place. Several demonstrations were held in frontof the US Embassy, such as on 9 January, when a PAS delegation handedover a memorandum while protesters were chanting slogans and burn-ing US and Israeli flags outside.55 Nik Aziz walked over the flags of theUSA and Israel in a symbolic gesture of contempt during a protest rallyin Kota Bharu, and later burned the flags along with effigies of Peresand Bush.56 Charity events and solidarity concerts were organized,57 aidinitiatives – some close to PAS, others to UMNO and government-re-lated organizations – virtually outdid each other with depictions of deadand wounded children, with the aim of demonstrating Israel’s ‘cruelty’,the suffering of Gaza’s population, and to carry out effective fundraisingand public relations for both the Palestinian cause and their own.

In the realm of discursive micro-practices, during the course of myfieldwork, again and again I came across manifestations of the venera-tion of and identification with what is locally imagined as HAMAS.Inside the office of PAS Kawasan Besut (Terengganu), there were threestickers on the door: one depicted a HAMAS logo; one showed HAMASleader Ismail Haniyah; and a third carried a picture of HAMAS leader

54 HarakahDaily, ‘Boikot akhbar pro-Umno 3 bulan – Nik Aziz’, 2 March 2009.55 Malaysiakini, ‘Thousands in anti-Israel protests in KL’, 9 January 2009.56 Harakahdaily, Bantah Israel: ‘Nik Aziz bakar patung Bush, Shimon Peres’, 9 Janu-

ary 2009.57 On 24 January 2009, around 10,000 people gathered for a mass prayer ‘for Palestine’

in a stadium in Kota Bharu. The pop-nasyid group Raihan, whose Palestine-solidar-ity hymn ‘Untukmu Palestin’ [For you, Palestine] is often played at PAS events,performed three songs (Homepage of Cakna Palestin: ‘Rakyat Kelantan pelbagaikaum kutuk kekejaman Yahudi’, 24 January 2009, Website: http://caknapalestin.blogspot.com/2009/01/rakyat-kelantan-pelbagai-kaum-kutuk.html,accessed 27 July 2010). Another such popular local song is Rabbani’s title ‘Intifadah’.


Figure 6. Pictures depicting HAMAS founder SheikhAhmad Yassin and the PAS leaders Abdul Hadi Awang (right)and Nik Aziz (left) in a restaurant across the street of MaahadDarul Quran Rusila (Terengganu).Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

Khaled Mashal. A local PAS member proudly explained to me that afriend had brought them as a souvenir from the Middle East. In a res-taurant across the street from Maahad Darul Quran Rusila, a schoolfounded by PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang and located next to hishouse, three pictures were placed next to each other: one of Abdul HadiAwang, one of Nik Aziz, and slightly higher, positioned between both,a portrait of HAMAS founder Ahmad Yassin (see Figure 6). The logicof their arrangement speaks to a clear symbolic language of priorityand imagined relatedness in the transnational ‘Islamic’ – etically spoken,Islamist – movement [harakah Islamiyah/gerakan Islam].

At many PAS events, ‘PAS merchandise’ is being sold. These ideo-logical consumer products comprise not only those that depict PAS logos,but also others that are related to the internationalist component of theparty’s identity – often with reference to Palestine and HAMAS. Fortheir users, they serve as symbolic markers of solidarity, belonging andconnectedness to PAS and its larger ‘struggle’. They include shirts, jack-ets, shawls, stickers and VCDs. The producers of the VCD ‘Kekejaman


Figure 7. ‘Kekejaman Israel 2009 – Gaza Berdarah’ [Israel’s cruelty 2009 – BleedingGaza], VCD produced by members of Dewan Pemuda PAS Kawasan Sungei Petani.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

Israel 2009 – Gaza Berdarah’ [Israel’s Cruelty 2009 – Bleeding Gaza],who belong to the PAS Youth branch from Sungei Petani, made use of– or transformatively appropriated – original scenes of martial propa-ganda videos produced by HAMAS, and rearranged them with Malaysubtitles (see Figure 7). In that VCD, Malaysians were asked to supportPalestine in any form, including moral support through prayers, finan-cial support and a boycott of certain brands58 that were alleged to be

58 Some PAS members admitted to occasionally visiting McDonalds and Starbucks. APAS Youth activist from Melaka explained: ‘Sometimes we boycott, sometimes not’.


Figure 8. A T-shirt sold at PAS events, depicting an ‘Islamicwarrior’ with a rifle and a Quran in his hands. On the backof the shirt is the slogan ‘Save Palestine – SupporterHAMAS’ combined with a HAMAS logo.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

related to Israel. One shirt that was sold at PAS events depicted the logoof HAMAS, combined with a masked fighter holding a machine gun.On its reverse, a slogan clarified in no uncertain terms: ‘SupporterHAMAS’ (see Figure 8). Similarly, headbands referring to Palestineare often worn demonstratively at larger PAS events. Another such shirt


Figure 9. ‘Remember! Remember the Jew(s) will be defeated(Khaibar). The army of Muhammad will arrive!’ – a T-shirt sold atPAS merchandise stalls.Photo by Dominik M. Müller.

carried the face of iconic HAMAS founder Ahmad Yassin.59 On thereverse, a slogan says: ‘INGAT! INGAT YAHUDI AKAN KHAIBAR.TENTERA MUHAMMAD AKAN DATANG!’ [Remember! Rememberthe Jew(s) will be defeated. The army of Muhammad will arrive!] (seeFigure 9). The term Khaibar refers to a battle between the army of ProphetMuhammad and a group of Jews over the oasis of Khaibar in 628 AD,in which, despite them being outnumbered, was gloriously won byMuhammad’s troops.60 At PAS demonstrations, the Arabic phrase‘Khaibar, Khaibar, Ya Yahud, Jaish Muhammad Safayood’ [Khaibar,Khaibar, oh Jew(s), the army of Muhammad will arrive] can regularlybe heard. The same phrase is used by Islamist groups in other countries.Amrozi, one of the Bali bombers of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – whosebrand of Islamism is very different from the non-violent one of PAS –shouted it in the courtroom on the day he was sentenced to death. TheLebanese Hezbollah named a certain type of rocket Khaibar-1. Anotherexample of contextually related micro-practices can be seen in the spaceof self-expression and social interaction on the Internet. A PAS blogger

59 He was killed in an Israeli air strike in 2004 and is regarded as a martyr [syahid]within the PAS discourse.

60 Khaibar also serves as a precedent case in Islamic law. Once the Jews surrendered,they were granted the status of a protected minority.


from Terengganu posted the following on the social networking WebsiteFacebook:

‘Khaibar, khaibar O Jew(s), the Army of Muhammad will arrive. OJew(s), wait for the time when the army of Allah returns. Flare up theholy war, liberate the whole state. The souls of the brave go forwardbut have to die. Remember, Allah’s paradise awaits you. Stop dream-ing, firmly conduct jihad. Khaibar, khaibar O Jew(s), the Army ofMuhammad will arrive. Silently sneak on heavy tanks. Don’t let yourstep falter. Throw stones with full force, be assured we won’t lose.The martyr’s bomb will shake the earth, scatter fear on the Jews.Liberate Palestine, liberate it from evil. Forward soul, you become amartyr!’61

The reference to Khaibar as a symbol of pride and victory over ‘theJews’ serves as a common discursive ground for the fragmentedtransnational Islamist movement(s), while the enmity against Israel andthe Jews,62 and support for ‘the Palestinians’ are among the fields thatare most intensely shared.

An integral part of PAS’s event culture can be found in the sound- ormusic-scape. At the fringes of the latest Muktamar, as well as at manyother PAS events, largely the same set of ideological songs is playedover and over again and can be heard somewhere in the background.For instance, the lyrics of the party’s hymn (Lagu PAS) state:

‘Bersatulah wahai kaum muslimin’ – Unite, Muslims; […]‘Berjihadlah wahai kaum muslimin’ – Engage in Jihad, Muslims‘Biar syahid ataupun kemenangan’ – Let it be martyrdom or victory

61 Original: ‘Khaibar Khaibar ya Yahud, tentara Muhammad akan datang. Khaibarkhaibar ya yahud jaisyu Muhammad saufa ya’ud. Tunggu saatnya hai yahudi, tentaraAllah kan kembali. Kobarkan perang suci, bebaskan seluruh negeri. Jiwa-jiwapemberani maju meski harus mati. Ingatlah wahai diri, syurga Allah tlah menanti.… Tinggalkan semua mimpi, berjihad teguhkan hati. Khaibar khaibar ya yahud jaisyuMuhammad saufa ya’ud. Derap tank senjata berat, jangan surutkan langkah. Lontarbatu penuh semangat, yakin kita takkan kalah. Bom syahid mengguncang bumi, tebartakut kaum yahudi. Bebaskan palestina, bebas dari durjana. Majulah wahai jiwa,jadilah kau syuhada.’ The text was apparently taken from the lyrics of ‘KhaibarKhaibar ya Yahud’, a song from the Indonesian nasyid-band Ar-Ruhul Jadid.

62 PAS Youth leader Nasrudin Hassan wrote in an article: ‘Jews are the traditionalenemy of the Islamic ummah. They are the main motivator of the spirit of enmityagainst the Islamic ummah’ (Nasrudin, 2010, author’s translation).


‘Berjuanglah wahai Ansorullah’ – Fight, helpers of Allah‘Dengan matlamat daulah islamiah’ – with the aim of an Islamic state‘Berkorbanlah wahai yang beriman’ – sacrifice, pious people‘Dengan harta dan segenap kepunyaan’ – with all that you have.

By focusing on the heroic brothers that are literally fighting for Islamabroad, PAS appears to project the proclaimed obligation of jihad andan uncompromising sacrifice away from domestic struggles to someextent on to the struggles of its brothers abroad. As the brothers arelocally constructed as noble heroes, who fight a shared struggle for ashared cause, from PAS’s internal perspective they must – on a norma-tive level of discourse, though not necessarily in practical reality – besupported by any possible means.

For many years, PAS and HAMAS have cultivated a well establishedorganizational relationship, with delegates regularly visiting each otherand giving talks abroad. Personal contacts are vital for such organiza-tional ties. Among PAS’s internationalists who are at the forefront ofsuch contacts is PAS Youth activist Riduan Mohamad Nor. He visiteda refugee camp in Jabalia, Gaza, in January 2009, at a time when ac-cess to Gaza was only possible through the tunnels that were beingbombed at that time.63 During other travels, he met several HAMASfigures. At PAS activities, Riduan, who, as one of his friends stressedis ‘a REAL activist’, is rarely seen without a Palestine shawl. He iswell aware of the role of performative communication and makes pro-fessional use of symbolic politics, such as when he made a theatricalappearance at a demonstration with a baby doll in his arms64 thatsymbolized dead Palestinian children. Rarely will any Palestine-relatedPAS demonstration take place without him standing on the front linewith a megaphone nearby. For the more rational levels of discourse,the 39-year-old, who is about to receive his PhD in political sciencefrom Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), has published numer-ous books. Some of them are directly related to Palestine, while others

63 This was advertised with a picture of his visit in one of his books (Riduan, 2009, p412). In another book, he mentions a meeting with HAMAS ministers at Hotel Gaza(Riduan, 2010a, p 155).

64 Another prominent PAS figure, Husam Musa, was seen with a bloodstained doll inhis arms at a demonstration in front of the US Embassy in January 2009 (Website:http://pemuda.pas.org.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=646&Itemid=2, accessed 22 July 2010). Nik Aziz used dolls so that he could burn them: inthat case, the dolls symbolized George Bush and Shimon Peres (HarakahDaily: ‘BantahIsrael: Nik Aziz bakar patung Bush, Shimon Peres’, 9 January 2009).


refer to the larger transnational Islamic movement.65 Such activitiesserve a domestic purpose as well, notwithstanding their self-perceivedbrotherly altruistic or humanitarian intention. It is not unlikely thatRiduan achieved the highest number of votes in the 2009 internal PASYouth elections partly because of his most outstanding and well pub-licized practical commitment to Palestine and his subsequentstatus-enhancing credibility and trustworthiness.

For HAMAS, it is of strategic interest that Malaysian Muslims equatePalestine with HAMAS. Its leader Khaled Mishaal met PAS’s SyedAzman in Damascus, Syria in January 2010, where he claimed that ‘thewhole Palestinian people stand now behind HAMAS’.66 Within the PAScommunity, a HAMAS-centric view largely ignores the existence of a‘Palestine beyond HAMAS’, or Palestinian brothers who are ‘goodMuslims’ but nevertheless oppose HAMAS.

In the Manichean world view that dominates PAS discourses, the earthis trapped in a divine struggle between the purely good (the sphere ofAllah) and the purely evil (the sphere of syaitan, Satan). This under-standing of the world is often combined with an obvious indifferencetowards any nuances that might blur the picture. The discourse-domi-nating thinking in binary oppositions includes ideas such as PAS/HAMAS= good, UMNO/FATAH = bad; Palestinian struggle = Islamic struggle,Israeli cause = Anti-Islamic cause – which corresponds to the thinkingin other clear-cut binary oppositions such as Islam v Jahiliyah,67 goodMuslim v bad Muslim, Muslim going to heaven v Kafir going to hell. Inline with such thinking, it seems that there is no interest in a two-statesolution; nor would detailed conceptions of peaceful reconciliation andcompromise between Israel and Palestine be something that PAS wouldbe interested in. A full liberation of Palestine and total destruction ofIsrael appear to constitute the only acceptable objective for PAS.

For most PAS members, the Palestinian cause is essentially an Islamic

65 They include titles such as ‘Cinta di langit Gaza’ [Love in the Sky of Gaza] and‘Gaza Menangis: Menelusuri Sejarah Perjuangan Palestin dan Pembantaian di Gaza’[Gaza Crying: Following the History of the Palestinian Fight and the Slaughtering inGaza].

66 My translation. Quoted in Harakah: ‘Dunia masih meminggirkan rintihan Gaza’, 8–10 January 2010, p N11.

67 Literally ‘ignorance’ or ‘barbarism’, it indicates a negative evaluation of pre-Islamiclife and culture as compared with the teachings and practices of Islam. In PAS dis-course, it also refers to contemporary realities beyond what it regards as ‘true Islam’.PAS Youth leader Nasrudin (2010) also speaks of ‘modern jahiliyah’ [jahiliyah moden],a term that has been used before by Sayyid Qutb (Muhammad Qasim, 2002, p 8).


cause.68 It seems to be ignored that a section of the Palestinian peoplesee their struggle as territorial and political, rather than as a primarilyreligious one – just as the fact seems to be ignored that there are alsonon-Muslim Palestinians, who at times have been involved in fightingfor the Palestinian cause at arms (for example, in the Popular Front forthe Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] whose founder was a Christian).However, PAS’s ‘Islamized’ understanding of the Palestinian fight againstIsrael and for territory is very much in line with HAMAS’s historic‘achievement’ of making the Palestinian cause first and foremost a reli-gious one. When HAMAS delegate Munir Said stated in Kota Bharu on10 June 2010 that ‘HAMAS is not only a Palestinian movement, it is amovement of the entire ummah! HAMAS means the continuation to thestruggle of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic ummah in Iraq, justas it means a continuation for the struggle of all brothers’,69 his wordswent to the heart of the Malaysian imaginations of a shared Islamicstruggle and movement between PAS and HAMAS.

Estrangement in the family? PAS and the Shias

The Islamic Party of Malaysia has an ambivalent relationship with itsShi’ite ‘brothers’. Although many regard the Shi’ite brand of Islam as a‘deviant teaching’ [ajaran sesat] and presently the majority of PASmembers view the Shia with a lot of scepticism,70 everyone will admitthat the role model of the Iranian revolution had a tremendous ideologi-cal impact on PAS.71 Similarly, it is clear that its own party-internal‘revolution’, which in 1982 led to the formation of a new party-internalnormative order of kempininan ulama [religious scholars leadership]and the related institutionalization of the Majlis Syura [religious schol-ars council] was inspired by the Iranian doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih[Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists].

While Shi’ite Islam is regarded as substantially wrong by most PASadherents (with the exception of a very small faction that sympathizes

68 As Abdul Hamid (2009a, pp 151–152) noted, ‘in contrast with the government’sofficial view, PAS’s unswerving commitment to the Palestinian struggle was justi-fied on religious grounds’. He also mentions a ‘highly successful conference in 1989to commemorate the first intifadah [uprising]’.

69 The author’s sound recording. Author’s translation, based on a translation from Ara-bic into Malay at the event by Khalil Abdul Hadi, Kota Bharu, 10 June 2010.

70 Shi’ite Islam is marginal and highly restricted in Malaysia. According to the USState Department (2009), the Malaysian government continues ‘to monitor the ac-tivities of the small Shi’a minority’.


with Shia, but largely does so in secret), an emic anecdote indicates thatthe opinion of Shi’ite ulama from abroad may at times have had re-markable effects on PAS. During the tenure of the late PAS PresidentFadhil Noor (1989–2002), there was a heated internal debate about therole of women in PAS, whether they should be allowed to contest seatsin parliamentary elections, and if so, under what conditions. Fadhil Noor,who was generally known as progressive, supported the idea that womenshould be allowed to contest elections. But he was aware of the sharpresistances, especially among the – decisive – older generation of PASulama, who categorically rejected the idea. According to a narrative aPAS member told me, Fadhil Noor asked Mohamad Sabu, at the time aMember of Parliament and known to have good contacts in Iran andLebanon, to invite a highly respected figure from the Shi’ite ulama ofthe Lebanese Hezbollah to Malaysia in order to convince the conserva-tive PAS ulama. As I was told, the Lebanese guest argued his point, andnone of the initially sceptical PAS ulama dared to object. In the end,Fadhil Noor’s plan worked and – according to this narrative – had animpact on the present situation in which PAS has prominent femalerepresentatives such as Lo’Lo’ Ghazali and Siti Mariah Mahmud in theMalaysian Parliament. As one-sided and oversimplified as this particu-lar emic narrative may be, it is noteworthy that a religious scholar of aforeign organization whose brand of Islam is locally considered to bedeviant, and that in parts of the West continues to be categorized a ter-rorist organization,72 apparently made an effective contribution to improvethe role of women’s rights in PAS.73

However, it seems that the trend in PAS tends to move further away

71 Abdul Hamid, 2009a, p 151; Noor, 2004b, p 330 ff; von der Mehden, 1990.72 Hezbollah is listed on the US State Department’s (2010) list of Foreign Terrorist

Organizations; the EU does not list it.73 Conversation with a PAS Central Committee member, June 2010. PAS’s opening

towards female candidates was a multi-causal development in which this Shi’itescholar was just one element. Furthermore, PAS’s receptiveness to women in statepolitics pre-dates this visit. In 1959, PAS had its first female parliamentarian, KhatijahSidek (Zawiah, 1991/92, p 23). However, she remained the only female parliamen-tarian for decades, and in 1980 PAS banned female candidates. As Abdul Hadi Awangexplained: ‘Since 1959 we have had a woman parliamentarian, (…). During the 1960’sand 1970’s there were women candidates but after 1980 we decided that there shouldnot be any more women candidates. The reason is that elections in Malaysia areimmoral. We do not want women to be involved in such immoral things that [BarisanNasional] does during elections.’ (Islam Online: Interview: Abdul Hadi Awang,Terengganu Chief Minister, Malaysia, 25 June 2001, Website: http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1156077757865&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, last accessed 30 August 2010).


from seeing oneself connected to Shi’ite Islam. Even though guestsfrom Hezbollah continue to be invited to the PAS General Assemblies,in 2010 their representative was not provided with a forum to hold atalk, unlike the guests from Eritrea, the Maldives, the Philippines andPalestine/Syria. A PAS politician regarded this as ‘discrimination’ againstthe Shia.74 According to him, Abdul Hadi Awang finally even apolo-gized for not giving him an opportunity to speak, when he met theHezbollah delegate in Kuala Lumpur before the latter returned to Bei-rut.

In a book published by PAS Youth activist Riduan Mohamad Nor, hegives an overview of 34 ‘leaders of the modern Islamic movement’ [tokoh-tokoh gerakan Islam abad moden]. Notably, he does not mention oneShi’ite figure there.75

When I asked a PAS member responsible for international affairs aboutthe party’s relationship with Shia groups abroad, he answered:

‘[…] with Iran, we also have some relation, not just in terms of poli-tics, but also in terms of the development of the people, economicsand everything. And also with Hezbollah! We try to put aside thedifferences among us, okay. Although we are Malaysians we are notpractising Shia, okay. And there is a lot of ideas about Shia. And alsowhat is Hezbollah, also practising Shia, we try to put aside. We try tomake use of Islam as a, common, common, what u say? … [D.M.:“Common ground?”]… Ya, common ground! So, not try to discussabout their belief, and also they are not to discuss about our belief.[…] When we talk about Shia, it is, some say it is diverting fromIslam itself. Some say that they are defining Islam too much, ex-tremely. But, we try to put aside, okay. Like what has been practisedin Northern Ireland. OK, although you are Protestant, although youare Catholic, let’s put aside differences, let’s sit together, that’s whatwe are trying to do under the PAS. Having a good relation with Iran,having a good relation with Lebanon, under the name of Islam itself.Not discussing about the differences. Because, if you keep on talkingabout the differences, we cannot unite.’

PAS continues to send representatives and delegations regularly to Iran,the two latest cases that I am aware of being a visit of PAS President

74 Conversation with a PAS Central Committee member, June 2010.75 Riduan, 2010a.


Abdul Hadi Awang and Syed Azman in March 2010, when they metleaders of the Islamic Motalefeh Party,76 and a visit of the national headof PAS Youth, Nasrudin Hassan77 in March 2010.

PAS’s relationship with its Shi’ite brothers abroad and their organi-zations continues to be as ambivalent as ever. In contexts where it makessense to emphasize the commonality of religious brotherhood and blendout the differences, this will be done. In others, being essentially differ-ent is brought to the foreground. To illustrate this point, it may be addedhere that shortly before this article was finalized, a PAS member posteda video on Facebook that warned about Shias and portrayed them asliars, troublemakers and one of the biggest threats78 to the ummah.79

Another ironic situation emerges at the level of domestic party poli-tics: from the Islamic perspective, UMNO members are brothers (if onedoes not want to excommunicate them in takfir-manner and label theminfidel, as has been done in the past in the kafir-mengafir debates).80 Akey figure in PAS Youth told me:

‘UMNO is my brothers. Brotherhood. But different thinking. Theyare, we are brothers, it’s my brotherhood. But the UMNO thinks dif-ferent from me. We want the need of Allah Ta’alla, we do everythingfor the need of Allah Ta’alla, for fulfil the responsible Allah Ta’alla,but UMNO everything for the party. Different thinking. Differentdirection. Everything from PAS is ibadah,81 what important thing for

76 The visitors attended an inner-Islamic ‘religious dialogue’ event (Harakah: ‘PASjalin persefahaman dengan parti Ahmadinejad’, 19–21 March 2010, p 2).

77 Personal information from Nasrudin Hassan, sms from Tehran, 5 March 2010.78 Mohamad Sabu, who was detained without trial from 1984–86 and 1987–89 for al-

leged attempts to import the Iranian Revolution to Malaysia, stated: ‘Khomeini’smovement […] drew my attention as well as my friends’ in PAS Youth in the early1980s. […] we studied it, followed the events. […] A small number of PAS Youthmembers became ardent followers of Imam Khomeini’s message. A few of themattended courses held in Iran […]. Amongst the success of such interaction was thesetting up of Amal Unit [sic] which copied the success of the Jihad Sazendagi (JZ)movement in Iran. […] this propaganda of the Shii threat is merely created to savethe thrones of the rulers in the Arab countries […]’ (Sabu, 2010). His sceptical posi-tion on claims of a ‘Shii threat’ is presently not representative for PAS.

79 Several key figures in PAS were (involuntarily) ‘tagged’ in it on Facebook. For alink to the same video (‘Awas Perangkap Syiah – Syeikh Adnan Al-Ar’oor’ [Bewareof the Shii trap – Skeikh Adnan Al-Ar’oor], see Website: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pik3V5epnQU (accessed 16 June 2010).

80 Liow, 2009, p 38; Noor, 2004b, p 369; Stark, 2004, p 53.81 Ibadah means worship or submission – in PAS’s discourse, this includes the ‘total’

implementation of Allah’s ‘commandments’. There are two types of ibadah: ibadahumum (general ibadah) and ibadah khusus (special ibadah). The first refers to daily


PAS is ibadah. Important thing for UMNO is materialistic, that is adifference.’82

Ironically, PAS’s political enemy UMNO consists of (estranged) broth-ers, whereas its non-Muslim coalition partner DAP stands outside thisfictive kinship community. Although regarded as friendly infidels, thelatter are imagined to be condemned to hellfire.83

While internally there is often a discursive emphasis on a onenessthat transcends all differences, when etically examined, the ‘Islamicmovement’ is essentially and inevitably diverse, fragmented, plural andlocalized; whereas localization takes place in the form of transnationalinteraction and localized transformative adaptations. While the move-ment may regard itself as universalist from its emic perspective, eticallyspeaking it is a particularist one (one of many), and is, furthermore,internally subdivided. However, outsiders who point out internal con-flicts are often accused of trying to ‘split the unity of the ummah’[memecahkan kesatuan ummat Islam]84 and of being ‘enemies of Islam’.

A nationalist Islamist internationalism?

In the course of a growing political and cultural Islamization in Malay-sia, the normative idea of a borderless, transnational Islamic brotherhood[ukhuwah] grew in local discursive presence and importance. Beyondthis normative idea of ummahism, at least below the surface Malaysiannationalism and Malay ethnicity are still powerful elements in the localidentities of many PAS members, as well as in the current tactical politicalconsiderations of their leaders. One example of this was constituted by

activities that should be in line with Islamic teachings and performed with the inten-tion of seeking Allah’s pleasure (for example, supporting one’s family, going to workwith good intentions). However, according to a PAS Youth figure, to establish hudud[Islamic criminal law] is ibadah umum as well, and compulsory [wajib]. Ibadahkhusus refers to Islamic ritual practices such as praying, fasting, pilgrimage or recit-ing the Quran. Some ibadah khusus are compulsory, whereas some are consideredSunna (encouraged but not compulsory: for example, reciting the Quran).

82 Interview with a PAS Youth member, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 2009.83 PAS’s foreign policy is more compatible with UMNO than with DAP, while a com-

parable paradox can be observed with regard to the ‘bureaucratization of Islam’ thatwas institutionalized by none other than PAS’s adversary UMNO itself (Liow, 2009,p 43 ff; Abdul Hamid, 2009b, pp 13–17; Peletz, 2002, p 11). While UMNO hasturned the state into a ‘vehicle for Islamization’ (Liow, 2009, p 181) since the 1980s,DAP has always opposed such developments. Ibrahim (2009) argued that UMNOwas the ‘political party nearest to PAS’.

84 For an emic example, see Nasrudin, 2010.


the angry protests by PAS representatives against the BN government’s‘sell-out’ of Malaysian territory to Brunei85 and Singapore,86 where PASarguments were based on purely nationalist grounds. At least the Bruneiangovernment, with its Islamically defined state system of Melayu IslamBeraja [Malay Islamic Monarchy], from a religious kinship point ofview consists of ummatic brothers. However, in that case, nationalistMalaysian solidarity seems to be superior to religious solidarity. An-other example is that in addition to the PAS anthem (Lagu PAS), theMalaysian national anthem (Negaraku) is occasionally sung at PASevents. At the opening ceremony of a PAS event in Perak,87 first thehymn of Perak was sung, and afterwards the hymn of PAS – a remark-able order. Another example is Jamaluddin Elias, who was labelled a‘national hero’ [wira Negara] at the PAS General Assemblies in 2010after he returned from the Gaza Freedom Flotilla – a nationalist rheto-ric, although his heroism was presented in Islamic terms as well.

For PAS, the simultaneity of Islamist internationalism and national-ist Islamism does not appear to be contradictory, and local–specificparticularities of the Malaysian Islamic movement and the globalist–unitarianist imagination go hand in hand. However, this may be a prob-lem in the minds of those who have left PAS and joined the competingIslamist organization Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia (HTM). A PAS memberemphasized: ‘Hizbut Tahrir are part of our brothers. They are working[for the] movement as an NGO, we are working as a Muslim Party.’88

The difference, though the emic emphasis of united brotherhood maydownplay it, is first, Hizbut Tahrir’s rejection of democracy89 and sec-ond, its challenge of the notion of the nation state as such, given its aimto (‘re-’)establish a transnational Islamic caliphate.90 As Abdul Hamid91

85 Malaysia Today: ‘PAS: Giving up oil to Brunei unconstitutional’, 3 March 2010. Asimilar protest was uttered by a PAS Youth member from Sabah at the Muktamar inJune 2010.

86 Khairul Faizi, head of Dewan Pemuda PAS Johor, protested against a ‘secret deal’ ofthe BN government to give away Malaysian territory to Singapore.

87 The event ‘Himpunan 10,000 Pemuda PAS Perak 2010’ was held in Kubu Gajah on31 January 2010.

88 Interview with Mohd Adram Musa, Treasurer of Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat, KualaLumpur, 7 January 2010.

89 Liow, 2009, p 137.90 Although Hizbut Tahrir in principle challenges the idea of nation states, the situation

is more complex in detail, for example, in terms of the struggles to balance thebroader goals of the central and its localized(!) national branches, such as HizbutTahrir Malaysia (HTM) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). For more on HTM, seeMohamed Osman, 2010.

91 See Abdul Hamid, 2009, pp 150–151.


pointed out, ‘insofar as PAS’s external policies are concerned, its pan-Islamist leanings do not and have never reached the extent of advocat-ing the restoration of a global caliphate which transcends the boundariesof modern nation states. Capturing political power within Malaysia’sdemocratic political system has always been its utmost priority.’ Trans-nationalist Islamist groups that operate beyond national party politics –such as Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia – may have some impact on the way inwhich PAS will navigate the internationalist component of its organiza-tional profile in the future, as PAS is not only competing over supportwith UMNO, but with several other Islamist movements as well.92

Interestingly, when Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia called on the Malaysian Armyto go to war against Israel (during ‘Operation Cast Lead’), in a way it‘out-solidarized’ PAS.93 The normative rhetoric of the united ‘ummahIslam’ stands in contrast to the reality of fragmentation and difference.

If in the discursive practices of PAS, internationalism and Islamistnationalism go hand in hand without significant tension, we can con-clude that emically, the question about transnationalism (orinternationalism, or Islamist cosmopolitanism) and nationalism is notone of either/or, but of both at the same time. It depends on the require-ments of particular contexts as to which of the two components onerefers to. This simultaneity must be understood against the backdrop ofhow identities work in general: they consist of a wide multiplicity ofselectively emphasized (at times paradoxical) facets,94 and should notbe understood in a reductionist or ‘solitarist’ manner.

It can be argued that the idea of transnational Islamic brotherhood isembedded in a transnational and translocal phenomenon of (g)localizedummahism. Etically speaking, it cannot escape its de facto heterogene-ity and inner conflicts, whereas internally it is imagined by its adherentsas transcending national borders in its very essence. Ironically, then,discursive and practical manifestations of transnationalist ummahismare inevitably localized in nature.

Ernest Gellner95 defined nationalism as ‘a political principle, senti-ment and movement, …..which holds that the political and the nationalunit should be congruent’. Ummahism can comparably be understood

92 Islamist civil society actors continue to add significant facets to the complex andmulti-layered dynamics of contestation over the present and future role of Islam inthe Malaysian state and society (Abdul Hamid, 2009a, 2009b; Lemière, 2010; Liow,2009, p 113 ff; Hassan, 2002).

93 Mohamed Osman, 2010, p 102.94 Sen, 2007.95 Gellner, 1983, p xxvii.


as a transnationally oriented political principle, a sentiment and a move-ment, which holds that the political and the Islamic unit should becongruent. Similarly, both the ummah and the nation share characteris-tics of ‘a mythical kinship community’.96 However, I would not go asfar as Saunders97 in his argument that the ummah serves as a ‘new’ or‘ersatz nation’, a ‘non-territorial, postnational’ form ‘of allegiance thatwill, in certain cases, fill the role played by nation-states in the recentpast’. At least in the present case, in which Malaysian national identityremains largely unshaken within the PAS community, I find no indica-tion that would justify speaking of a ‘postnational’ situation. Its globalizedIslamic identity does not replace national identity – it is complemen-tary to it.

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Documents

An internationalist national Islamic struggle?