Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

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Forest Policy and Economics

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An institutional analysis of deforestation processes in protected areas: The case of thetransboundary Mt. Elgon, Uganda and Kenya

Jon Geir Petursson a,⁎, Paul Vedeld a, Marieke Sassen b,c

a Department of Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Norwegian University of Life Sciences, P.O. Box 5003, N-1432 Ås, Norwayb Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlandsc World Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi, Kenya

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +354 8667659; fax: +E-mail address: jon.petursson@umb.no (J.G. Peturss

1 REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and

1389-9341/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. Allhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2012.09.012

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 2 May 2011Received in revised form 18 September 2012Accepted 18 September 2012Available online 31 October 2012

Keywords:Mt. ElgonUgandaKenyaInstitutionsDeforestationProtected areas

Protected areas (PAs) are a country's key strategy to conserve and manage forest resources. In sub-SaharanAfrica, the effectiveness and efficiency of PA institutions in delivering sustainable outcomes is debated, how-ever, and deforestation has not been avoided within such formal regimes. This paper analyzes the processesthat led to deforestation within the PAs on the transboundary Mt. Elgon, Uganda–Kenya, employing institu-tional theory. Landsat satellite imagery helped identify and quantify forest loss over time. The study showedhow, since 1973, about a third of all forests within the PAs on Elgon have been cleared in successive process-es. Within formal protected area regimes, complex political and institutional factors drive forest loss. Weargue, therefore, that policies to counter deforestation using a PA model have to be considered and under-stood against the broader background of these factors, originating both inside and outside the PA regimes.

© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Deforestation is a major global issue especially due to its impact onthe environmental services that forests deliver, associated biodiversitydepletion and contribution to climate change (Sunderlin et al., 2005).Furthermore, deforestation often negatively affects the livelihoods ofpeople dependent on forest products and services, especially the ruralpoor in developing countries (Vedeld et al., 2007). Deforestation is, onthe other side, also amain process in increasing agricultural production,especially in Africa (Openshaw, 2005).

Establishing and maintaining protected areas (PAs) constitute acountry's key policy strategy to conserve and govern biodiversity re-sources (Zimmerer et al., 2004). PAs have been a central element inthe governance of forest resources and many countries have broughtsignificant parts of their tropical high forest under such regimes(Schmitt et al., 2009). Likewise, in East Africa, most biodiversity andcarbon-rich tropical high forests are already under formal PA regimes(Matiru, 1999;Howard et al., 2000). PA establishment is awidely promot-ed measure to counter deforestation, and is now gaining a newmomen-tum through the emerging REDD1 climate change mitigation strategy(Angelsen et al., 2009). Assessing a country's performance in avoiding de-forestation within their already established forest PAs can therefore alsobe seen as an approach to evaluate their potential capacity and constraints

354 5458600.on).forest Degradation.

rights reserved.

in complying with future REDD policy obligations (Oestreicher et al.,2009).

Instituting a PA is amajor policy intervention that implicitly comprisesa legal demarcation between humans and nature and, subsequently, theestablishment of particular institutional structures, or resource regimes,to govern the respective area (Vatn, 2005). PAs are not uniform, butestablished and governed according to different categories of conserva-tion anduse (IUCN, 1994;Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). The effectivenessof PA models in delivering sustainable forest governance is disputed,however, and environmental degradation and even deforestation arenot avoided within such regimes, despite their generally strong legal sta-tus (Oestreicher et al., 2009; Hayes, 2006; Clark et al., 2008). Many alter-native solutions to advance their efficiency and effectiveness have beendebated (Hutton et al., 2005). An important element of this debate re-volves around the social impact and legitimacy of PA conservation strate-gies with regard to an often poor and natural resource-dependentpopulation (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005; Kaimowitz and Sheil, 2007).It is becoming increasingly apparent that PAs canno longer be the domainof conservation and forest officials only, but that they should have abroader societal mission contributing to wider development concerns(Naughton-Treves et al., 2005).

Deforestation processes have complex causes and a multitude of ef-fects. Causes of deforestation can generically be differentiated in proxi-mate and underlying drivers (Angelsen, 2009). Proximate causes aredirect activities such as logging or agricultural practices, while underlyingcauses or drivers can be political, economic, institutional and cultural fac-tors (Geist and Lambin, 2009). Deforestation within already established

(4)

(3)(1)

(2)

Institutions: rules,norms,conventions

Outcome:

Deforestationwith in the PA

The resource: MtElgon forestattributes

The actor level: PAorganisations, localcommunities etc.

Actors andinstitutionsoutside thePA regime

(5)

Patterns of interaction

1 Powerful actors outside the PA regime can deliberately change its institutions and as such have an impact on outcomes. The wider political context will also impact PA regimes.

2 Other powerful actors outside the PA regimes, such as donors, NGOs and political actors, can have an impact on actors’ activities inside the PA regime and therefore both the institutional framework and outcomes

3 Institutions both shape the actions of the actors and are influenced by their activities. The actors have different powers to influence the institutions

4 The actors’ activities are guided by the PA’s institutional framework and will impact the resources at stake. The physical properties of the resources are also important.

Fig. 1. Analytical framework to examine the performance of the PA regimes and processes of deforestation.Based on Vatn (2005).

23J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

PA units, however, represents a distinct institutional challenge, giventhe formal properties of the PA regimes where governments have de-cided to maintain forests, applied a legal protection and commissioneda governing organization (Oestreicher et al., 2009). Processes leading toforest losswithin PAs are thus different to those that drive deforestationon other land tenure arrangements that lack such formalized govern-ment property rights status.

In this paper, we use institutional analysis to study deforestationprocesses in different PA regimes, using the case of Elgon on the bound-ary between Uganda and Kenya. The key research question we raisedwas: What processes drive deforestation within existing protectedareas, using the case of Elgon in Uganda and Kenya?

Our objectives were (1) to assess the efficiency of the PAs on Elgonin avoiding deforestation; (2) to examine the processes that havecontributed to forest loss within the PAs on Elgon and their ecologicaland social outcomes; (3) to analyze differences between the varioustypes of PA regimes in their ability to address deforestation; and (4)to reflect on possible policy recommendations for PA governance toavoid future deforestation.

2 Institutions are not self-contained arrangements, but will operate and interplay inmultitude with other institutional arrangements. Interplay is therefore a major factorwhen examining governance outcomes.

2. Institutional analytical framework

2.1. Institutional understanding

This paper uses the lenses of institutional theory to examine de-forestation processes in different PAs on Elgon in Kenya and Uganda(Ostrom, 1990; Young, 2002; Ostrom, 2005).

We define institutions as socially constructed formal and informalsets of rules, norms and conventions that both shape and are shapedby the interactions betweenpeople and betweenpeople and the environ-ment (Scott, 1995; Vatn, 2005). Institutions that are established explicitlyto govern environmental and natural resources, such as protected areas,

are termed resource regimes (Young, 2002; Vatn, 2007). We define gov-ernance as both decision-making and the establishment, maintenanceand change of institutions to foster coordination and resolving conflicts,hence resource regimes (Vatn, 2005). Resource regimes facilitate actors'coordination and interaction and further coordinate interactions withthe environment (Fig. 1).

Institutions do not emerge or exist in a vacuum. Moreover, institu-tions established to govern a PA will be influenced both by the formerhistorical–institutional processes in the area, as well as by thewider in-stitutional and political context within which they operate. Such histor-ical processes can relate to older legislations or earlier managementnorms and practices. Interplay2 with external actors and institutions,outside the PA regimes, will therefore often have an influence on out-comes, depending on their relative powers (Fig. 1).

Population and poverty are themost commonly claimed causes ofland degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lambin et al., 2001). Re-gardless of strong criticisms, ideas based on scarcity and populationgrowth are still the dominating or hegemonic narrative, widely guid-ing policies related to natural resource management in Sub-SaharanAfrica (Struhsaker et al., 2005).

Insights from more cross-cutting disciplines provide valuableperspectives that help understand and explain society–environmentinteractions in more comprehensive ways, such as those focusing onasymmetries of power and access (Gibson, 1999; Adger et al., 2001;Ali et al., 2005). Power is the capacity of agents to achieve desiredoutcomes in social practice (Giddens, 1984). Different actors' controlof power in forest PA governance is one key aspect of understanding

24 J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

processes of deforestation, emphasizing the importance of institu-tions at different levels (Hayes, 2009). Institutions both are formedthrough and reflect power asymmetries in the society, where power-ful actors impose their institutional preferences on the less powerfulactors. The actors and their interest are often institutionalized or for-mulated through policy arenas where common understanding, in-terest and policy preferences that can form powerful instrumentsor coalitions in governance are developed.

There is a growing focus on explaining governance of biodiversityand associated conservation outcomes in wider political contexts andthrough scrutinizing political processes (Gibson, 1999; Ali et al., 2005).A widespread, technical or “apolitical” view on the linkages betweenlocal people and environmental degradation in developing countriestends to misguide policies. This can often severely impact the localpeople's livelihoods and rights (Beck, 2000). Especially in the naturalscience literature, we often see naïve assumptions concerning ratio-nal policymaking and institutional change where government agen-cies purportedly seek the most preferred or conducive collectiveoutcome (Gibson, 1999). However, we believe that actors andgroups having the authority to propose and implement policychanges often have multiple motives and do not necessarily aim atthe optimization of the collective interest or sustainability. Further-more, instrumental rationality may be contested as a sound ontolog-ical framework for both explaining and understanding patterns ofbehavior (Vatn, 2005).

We thus perceive PA regimes to be political institutions, establishedand controlled by actors who have the power to enforce them. Examina-tion of the wider political and historical context is important in order toexamine and understand PA institutional performance and outcomes.

2.2. PA dynamics

The first PAs in colonial East Africa created around 1900were broad-ly classified as game reserves or forest reserves, the former focusing onwildlife and the latter on forest resources (Child, 2004). Nature conser-vation was not a priority in these regimes, and the objective was to ap-propriate and govern natural resources, and providewildlife and timberfor the colonial interests (Hingston, 1931). Generally, local communitysettlements, cultivation and subsistence hunting were banned, whilesome extraction of non-timber forest products was allowed. From themid-1930s, PA regimeswithmore strict control of human access startedto expand, with the emergence of national park regimes that excludedall human access and extraction (Steinhart, 1989). This included bothnew areas as well as conversion of some of the areas already demarcat-ed as game reserves, and later forest reserves to more strict conserva-tion regimes such as national parks (Child, 2004).

The general PA strategy in Africa has thus been based on what hasbeen phrased as the “fortress” approach, excluding human settlementand outcomes were largely measured in biological terms (Hutton et al.,2005). Despite a long lasting hegemony, the ability of the “fortress” ap-proach to deliver effective conservation and its social impacts havecome under considerable scrutiny in most African countries (Barrowet al., 2001), and human–PA conflicts are more the rule than the excep-tion (Norgrove andHulme, 2006;Neumann, 1997). The critique of the ex-clusion approach and suggested alternatives revolve around contrastingviews on the role of the nation state and of government, both concerninginstitutional governance levels and spatial scales (Abbott et al., 2007). Themain governance alternative, put forward since the mid-1980s, has beencommunity conservation3 (CBNRM). It focuses on alternative institutionallevels of governancewhere the local community level is consideredmoreappropriate than the central government level for delivering both

3 Often phrased community based natural resource management (CBNRM).

efficient biodiversity conservation and improved local livelihoods andin more legitimate ways (Hutton et al., 2005).

Additionally, since 1997, pro-conservation actors have activelyadvocated a new reform in PA governance, namely the establish-ment of joint governance between adjoining PAs across nationalboundaries (Van Amerom, 2001). Transboundary protected areamanagement (TBPAM) is now a widely promoted policy strategy,presumed to be a more effective and efficient institutional arrange-ment (Muhweezi et al., 2007).

3. The Elgon case in Uganda and Kenya

Mt. Elgon is an extinct 4321 m high solitary volcano on the bound-ary between Uganda and Kenya in East Africa situated just north ofthe equator. It is a major mountainous forest area with extensiveareas of undulating hills and gentle slopes (Scott, 1998).

The vegetation is zoned by altitude.Mountain forest vegetation spansbeyond the farmlands from about 2000 m up to about 3500 m, withmany important indigenous species (Van Heist, 1994). Above 3500 m,Afro-Alpine heath and moorland are the main vegetation types.

Elgon is a major water-catchment area in western Kenya andeastern Uganda, feeding major rivers running to Lake Turkana,Lake Kyoga and Lake Victoria (Van Heist, 1994). The abundant rain-fall and the inherently fertile volcanic soils make the area highlyproductive, both for agriculture and intrinsically for the naturalecosystem.

Elgon's afro-mountainous flora has high biodiversity value,both locally and on a global scale (Van Heist, 1994). The Interna-tional Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has listed 37 faunalspecies in the area as “globally threatened,” of which nine speciesare endemic, making the area a priority for species conservation(Cameron et al., 2000).

There are multiple boundaries on Elgon. All lands beyond the farm-lands have been gazetted under some category of PA in both countries(Fig. 2). The international border bisects the mountain almost equallywith 107,821 ha under protection in Kenya and 114,500 ha in Uganda(Van Heist, 1994).

Logging has been an important economic activity on both sides ofthe border for a long time. Legal logging of the native forests, howev-er, has not been practiced on any large scale on the Ugandan sidesince the post-Amin period, but continued until around the year2000 on the Kenyan side. Indeed, a 1986 Presidential decree bannedall logging in Kenya's natural forests but excluded the Mt. Elgon ForestReserves (Hitimana et al., 2004). Parts of the native forests have beenconverted to softwood plantations in both countries (KFD/KWS, 2001;UWA, 2000).

Historically, Elgon was inhabited by two main groups of indige-nous people. The dryer northern and eastern parts by the Sabei (inUganda)/Sabaot (in Kenya), a semi-pastoral Nilotic group, and themore fertile southern/western parts by the Bagishu, a Bantu agricul-tural group (Roscoe, 1924). The upper forests and moorlands werethe homelands of the hunting/gathering pastoral El-Kony group cur-rently called Mosop/N'dorobo in Kenya and Benet in Uganda, butthe El Kony are closely related and by some not distinguished fromthe Sabei/Sabaot people (Lynch, 2006).

The farmlands around Elgon are among the highest populatedareas in East Africa with a population density in some areas exceeding1000 people/km2. The surrounding administrative districts are hometo more than 2 million people (Soini, 2007). The heavy reliance of thelocal communities on resources from the mountain has been exten-sively studied and verified on the Ugandan side (Scott, 1998) andthe Kenyan side (Myrhen, 2007). The Elgon ecosystem therefore hasgreat value for the livelihoods of the surrounding local communities,for conservation purposes as well as for natural resource extractionand use.

Fig. 2. Map of the PA regimes on Mt. Elgon, straddling the Uganda–Kenya border, with surrounding districts.

25J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

4. Methodology

This study draws upon a wide range of resources. Field data werecollected in 2004 and 2008, and again in 2009 when deforestationsites were visited. Semi-structured interviews were conducted withstaff from the KenyaWildlife Service (KWS), UgandaWildlife Authority(UWA), Kenyan Forest Department (FD), The International Union forConservation of Nature (IUCN), The Norwegian Agency for Develop-ment Cooperation (NORAD) at the Norwegian Embassy in Kampalaand the Mt. Elgon County Council (MECC). Further, the study drawsupon direct observations and knowledge gathered while conductinghousehold interviews4 in local communities in the Elgon region thatadded to the understanding of human–PA interactions. Secondarydata were collected, especially onmanagement history, plans and prac-tices. Triangulation, based on themultiple data sources,was used to val-idate the qualitative data.

Satellite imagery was used to measure and verify deforestationover time. Landsat images from 1973 (MSS), 1988, 2001 (TM) and2009 (ETM+) (all data from the U.S. Geological Survey), a 90 m

4 The household data is not analyzed in this paper. Analysis of the household data ispresented in Petursson et al. (2011).

digital elevation model, two vegetation maps and field observationswere used to produce four separate classification images of forestcover in Elgon.

The images were taken during the dry season (February) to min-imize cloud cover and maximize differences between evergreen andseasonal vegetation. All imageswere co-registered to the 2001 imageusing second order polynomial registration. RMS errors were below0.5 pixels (15 m) and registration was verified visually. The 1988and 2001 images had substantial cloud cover and cloud shadow atthe higher altitudes. Clouds and cloud shadow were masked out ofthe 1988 and 2001 images using classification and visual interpreta-tion (Jensen, 2006). Gaps were filled where possible, using addition-al images.

Each image was classified using a combination of unsupervisedand supervised classification techniques (Jensen, 2006). Spectralseparability of the classes was investigated using graphical displaysand statistical analysis. The classes resulting from classificationwere combined into two classes: “forest” and “non-forest”, basedon field observations and ancillary data (Van Heist, 1994; KenyaWildlife Service et al., 2001). The classes were clumped (3×3 win-dow) to reduce noise and subjected to a 3×3 majority filter to addspatial coherency.

ME ForestReserve 1929

ME National Park,access undercollaborativeagreements 1995.

Successivechangeswithin the FR1929-1993

ME NationalPark,no communityaccess 1993

Ugandaindependence 1962

Fig. 3. Evolution of PA area regimes on the Ugandan side of Elgon.

5 This includes 4000 ha lost near and around the plantation areas in the northernpart of Elgon, but not the areas excised under the Benet resettlement scheme in 1983.

26 J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

The definition of “forest” is based on the vegetation map by VanHeist (1994) and estimated to represent a canopy cover of around30%. This includes some older regenerated forest. Plantations of exoticand native species are included.

5. Results

5.1. PA area regimes on Elgon

The PA approach was introduced in Elgon during British colonialtimes in 1929 (KFD/KWS, 2001; UWA, 2000). A forest reserve wasestablished on each side of the mountain under the administrationof the respective forest departments. This was the result of concernsabout over-exploitation of natural resources by local people, but wasalso related to broader goals of regulating the use of the various areasfor hunting, logging, grazing and conservation to meet the needs ofthe colonial powers (Hamilton, 1984). The first recorded timber ex-ploitation in the border town of Suam was reported as early as in1921 (GoU, 1996).

Since then, the PA regimes on both sides of Elgon have evolvedand changed successively. At present, the whole landscape abovethe farmlands is placed under five distinct PA regimes, one in Uganda(Fig. 3) and four in Kenya (Fig. 4). The various PAs are governed bydifferent management authorities with jurisdiction over their re-spective areas. The most recent PA approach is a TBPAM program, fa-cilitated by NORAD/IUCN beginning in 2004, that aims at enhancingcooperation between the PA regimes on Elgon across the nationalboundaries (Muhweezi et al., 2007).

5.2. Deforestation processes within Elgon PAs

Although all forest areas on Elgon have been under PAs for a longtime, most regimes have failed to avoid deforestation (Soini, 2007;White, 2002). We used semi-structured interviews, field visits andsecondary sources to collect data on deforestation within the PAsand examine the processes behind. With the aid of the satellite imag-ery that goes back to 1973, we were able to identify four key process-es that have contributed to most of the forest loss. We have thenmapped, verified and quantified the social data through satellite im-agery (Table 1). We organize our results and discussion on the defor-estation processes accordingly.

From the interviews and secondary data analysis, some other pro-cesses were recorded to have contributed to various levels of forest deg-radation within the PAs, such as over-exploitation by logging companiesin the native forests and illegal logging in both countries. However, asthese were not found to have contributed to deforestation as total landconversion visible on the satellite imagery but more to different levelsof degradation, we do not discuss them further in this paper.

5.3. The Amin and post-Amin periods in Uganda

When Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962, the for-ests on Elgon were governed as a forest reserve (Table 1). The colonial

forest administration had devolved substantial authority to local gov-ernments, but political changes after independence led to the aboli-tion of the role of local forest governance (Turyahabwe et al., 2006).Up to 1967, forests were managed by a local forest service, typicallyunder kingdoms that had local strong and coherent government sys-tems (Nsita, 2005). In 1967, all forest management was centralizedunder the republican constitution (Mugyenyi et al., 2005).

In 1971, Idi Amin seized power in the country through a militarycoup, staying in power till 1979. During this period, Ugandan societyexperienced civil war and disorder and the institutional structuresconcerning governance of natural resources deteriorated badly(Kabwegyere, 1995). The Forestry Department became largely dys-functional due to corruption, land and resources within the PAswere in some areas deliberately exposed to an “open access” tenureand in others, human settlement was facilitated and formalized bythe Amin government. After Aminwas overthrown, a long period of po-litical instability followed, with successive presidents in power, untilstate order was gradually restored following the establishment of theNational ResistanceMovement (NRM) government in 1986. This turbu-lent period of time resulted inmajor depletion ofwildlife stocks and for-est resources within the Ugandan PA estate.

The Amin and post-Amin periods and the destructive political sys-tems these instituted had devastating impacts on the forests withinthe Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve (White, 2002). The forest administrationbecame largely dysfunctional. Amin announced that he would giveback to the people the forest the “British had stolen from them”

(Norgrove and Hulme, 2006). People were therefore deliberately fa-cilitated by the government to convert forest to agriculture, and inthe Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve many people also obtained formal titleto land inside the reserve. This resulted in substantial encroachment,exploitation and settlement within the PA boundary. The land and re-sources were not only accessed by local communities residing onElgon, but also by powerful political actors and army veterans thattook the opportunity to seize land (Bunker, 1987).

Furthermore, during this period clashes between the two tradi-tional ethnic groups on Elgon escalated (Scott, 1998). The Sabei onthe northern parts of the mountain had served in large numbers inAmin's army. After the downfall of Amin, many of them desertedand returned home, heavily armed and experienced in violent con-flicts. Once home, they used the opportunity to strike back at theirlong-established neighbors and foes from the southern part of themountain, the Bagishu. This resulted in the Bagishu striking back,but also fleeing from the northern side of the mountain and, havingnowhere else to go and no land to return to, they moved into the for-est in large numbers (Bunker, 1987).

The analysis of satellite imagery shows that between 1973 and1988, almost 15,500 ha5 of native forest was lost within the boundaryof the Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve (Fig. 5). In addition, significant parts ofthe forest were reportedly seriously degraded (White, 2002).

ME Forest Reserve1932 Trans Nzoia Forest

Reserve 1968

Chepkitale Nationalreserve 2000

ME Forest Reserve1968

ME National Park1968

ME Forest Reserve2000

Kenyaindependence1963

Fig. 4. Evolution of the PA regimes on the Kenyan side of Elgon.

27J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

The analysis illustrates the challenges fragile states face in governingforest resources, where periods ofwar and political instability can easilyerode otherwise relatively functional forest governance institutions.Under weak state regimes, and especially under state disintegrationand civil wars, deforestation processes take place regardless of the for-mally established PA regime in question.

The NRM government gradually started to rebuild natural resourcegovernance after seizing power in 1986. Part of that was a large scaleforest sector reform that included conversion of many of the forest re-serves to national parks. In 1993, the Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve wasconverted to a national park, an institutional change that came afterseveral years of discussions and tugs of war betweenwildlife and forestauthorities, where different donors and political actors played im-portant roles. The conversion processes implied evictions of peoplethat had entered during the Amin reign, park boundary demarcationand a strict no-go policy for local communities to access park re-sources (Gosamalang, 2003). This sparked a significant conflict be-tween the PA authorities and local communities on rights to landand access to resources, much of which is still not resolved. Althoughcommunity conservation measures have settled conflicts in someareas, other communities dispute the legitimacy of the evictionsand boundary demarcation, claims that are presently being handledby the Ugandan court system.

5.4. The softwood plantations in Uganda and Kenya

Forest policies during the colonial period introduced fast growingsoftwood plantations within the forest reserves in both countries. Inorder to facilitate timber production, native forests were cleared andconverted into softwoodplantations. After independence, foreign donorscontributed significantly to plantation development in both Uganda andKenya, as was common in Africa at the time, when forest-industrial de-velopment was the favored forestry paradigm (FAO, 2003).

5.4.1. Uganda plantationsThe first trials with softwood plantations on Elgon started in 1955

with small experimental plots within the Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve(GoU, 1996). From independence in 1962 to the Amin coup in 1971,external donors invested in the conversion of native forests to fastgrowing pine and cypress plantations. Around 1500 ha of native for-est was cleared on the northern part of the mountain, in Kapkwataand Suam (UWA, 2000).

Following the conversion to a national park in 1993, the maturesoftwood plantations in the park became a controversial issue. Thenew institutional framework did not provide incentives to give theUganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), the executive agency of the na-tional park, sufficient interest in governing the plantations sustain-ably. Also, the plantations, as they were composed of exotic species,were regarded as alien and incompatible with biodiversity conserva-tion objectives of the national park. This institutional misfit providedspace for powerful actors connected to UWA to harvest the planta-tions and reap considerable monetary gains. During this process,most of the softwood plantations were clear-cut without considering

regeneration and the revenues accrued did not go back to park ad-ministration. However, the UWA has now changed its policy regard-ing the plantations, they have accepted their existence, and createdinstitutions to restore and govern them to generate revenues for thepark, as manifested in the current management plan (UWA, 2000).

In addition to the direct loss of around 1500 ha of native forest lostdue to the softwood plantations, the 1973 satellite image shows thataround 2800 ha had already been deforested in the area before 1973,most of it around the plantations. This was most likely the result ofpeople having settled there to work in the plantations (GoU, 1996).By 2009, the area deforested in and around the plantations in theUganda figure had risen to more than 6000 ha (Fig. 6).

The process of deforestation has revealed significant institutionalconstraints when changing the PA regime from a forest reserve to anational park. The institutional change gave an opportunity forrent-seeking behavior as the softwood plantations were left in an in-stitutional vacuum. Instead of clarifying the destiny of the now insti-tutionally created “alien resource” following the conversion fromforest reserve to national park, the plantations became a blurredand contested resource, out for grabs by different rent-seeking actorswith connections to UWA and other powerful actors.

5.4.2. Kenya plantationsAs in Uganda, native forests were replaced by softwood planta-

tions in the Kenyan forest reserves by replacing during the colonialperiod and early independence. The key financial and technologicalbackups were provided by donor agencies. From 1960 to 1999 theplantation area increased from around 1500 ha to 10,000 ha (Soini,2007; KFD/KWS, 2001).

The forest reserve regime, however, has not been able to deliversustainable governance of the softwood plantations for two main rea-sons. The first reason relates to governance of the Shamba system.According to Forestry Act 385, executed by the Forestry Department,the Shamba system allows local communities temporary croppingrights between the trees during certain stages of plantation establish-ment. The idea is to create a win–win situation where the farmers getrights to crop the forest floor and simultaneously facilitate forest treeestablishment by tending and weeding (Imo, 2009). When the cano-py closes, the farmers are supposed to leave the area and move to an-other plot. The Shamba system was initially used to convert nativeforest to plantations but since this was stopped in 1979, the systemcontinued as a preferred method of re-establishing harvested soft-wood plantations (Kagombe and Gitonga, 2005). However, the gover-nance of the Shamba system for this purpose failed, due to manyreasons. The farmers were required to rent the plots from the FD.That created monetary dependency at the FD and by that a disincen-tive for the FD officials to transfer the agricultural plots back to forest,as should have happened once the trees matured. In order to sustainthe agricultural potential, the forest tree seedlings were purposelydamaged or up-rooted. Furthermore, the FD failed to control thenumber of farmers and the type of agricultural practices and tocarry out proper replanting. As demand for agricultural land is high,the regeneration of plantation areas failed and large forest tracts actually

Table 1Processes that have caused deforestation in the PAs on Mt. Elgon, Uganda and Kenya.

Event PA regime Actors with decisionmaking power

Official intention Institutional aspects Practice Patterns of interactions Ecological outcome Social outcome

The Amin and post-Aminchaos in Uganda 1971–1986

Mt. Elgon ForestReserve(now MENP)

Idi Amin andsuccessive leaders ofUganda

“People should get backthe forests, the colonialpowers took fromthem” cit. Amin

The institutions to govern theforest reserve became largelydysfunctional. Further, thegovernment issued land rightsto people to settle within theforest in some areas, and inothers an open access scenariocame about

Uncontrolled landconversion toagriculture inside thePA

Due to weakness of theinstitutional and organizationalaspects of PA governance asfacilitated by governmental ac-tors, the native forest resourceswithin the PA were exploitedby settlers

Around 15,500 ha offorest was cleared,much more degraded.

Massive conflictbetween parkauthorities andpeople livinginside the park

Forest excisions andresettlements in Kenya.Started in 1973.

Mt, Elgon ForestReserve

Kenyan governmentdecided resettlementfrom the moorlands

Landless west Kenyansshould get title togovernment land and toresettle the Mosop

Difficult to identify who wassupposedto get land

The forest excisionspoorly planned

The native forest resourcesplundered by influx of a largenumber of settlers, notnecessarily from the Elgonregion.

Around 4000 haadditional to the initial4000 ha cleared, total8000 ha.

Violent conflictin the areabetweendifferent groupsand authorities

The softwood plantationsin Uganda and Kenyafrom 1950s

Uganda:successively Mt.Elgon FR and NP.Kenya: Mt. ElgonFR andTrans-Nzoia FR

PA authorities.Foreign aid missions

Produce timber insoftwood plantations

Uganda: during theinstitutional change from FR toNP, the institutions to governthe softwood plantations be-came unclear and disputed asexotic species were seen aliento a national park. Kenya: weakand corrupt forest governanceinstitutions

Once mature, thesoftwood plantationsare clear cut but notnecessarily by the“owner”.

Uganda: actors close to UWAused the opportunity to clearthe softwood plantations dur-ing the institutional changecausing conflicting govern-mental policies on softwoodplantations. Kenya: actors in FDused their position to allowun-sustainable harvest of thesoftwood plantations.

Around 16,000 ha ofnative forest was lost,plantation regenerationwas slow

The Benet resettlementcase, Uganda, startedin 1993

Successively Mt.Elgon FR and NP

Ugandan government,decision to resettlethe Benet 1983 afterdecades of debate

To resettle the Benetpeople from theprotected areas

Blurred rules on who shouldget what land in the degazettedarea

The resettlementexercise didn't succeed.Land grabbed bypolitically influentialpeople

Locally influential politicalactors took advance of theblurred process andgrabbed most of the land

Around 9000 ha wasdeforested, andconverted to farmlandby others than theBenet

Conflict ongoingas the Benet arestill residinginside thenational park

28J.G

.Peturssonet

al./Forest

Policyand

Economics

26(2013)

22–33

Fig. 5. Forest cover in 1973 and 1988 on the Ugandan side of Elgon. Major deforestation took place on the south and south-western slopes and additional forest was lost around theplantations.

29J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

became permanent agricultural areas. Between 1960 and 1999, morethan 2000 ha was completely converted to agriculture (MEICDP, 2001).Further encroachment into the remaining forest emanates from theseareas, as boundaries are unclear (Cameron et al., 2000), likely givingrise to the most recent loss of indigenous forest around the plantationsin Kenya. From satellite imagery, however, it is difficult to calculateexact figures because of the overlap of the plantation/Shamba areaswith the bamboo zone. The periodical dying off of bamboo creates natu-ral bare areas, but also helps spread fires facilitated by forest clearing.Many signs of fires were seen on the 2009 image inside the forest area.

The second reason for the plantation forest regime failure relates toharvesting practices. Government owns the plantations but leases outlogging concessions. It is the role of the FD to supervise harvestingand secure regeneration. However, what we found is that there is noguarantee that the money generated from the harvesting concessionsis available for replanting. In addition, a recent study found large quan-tities of illegal extraction of wood from the plantations on Elgon (Nieldet al., 2000). These plantationswere therefore “mined”without institut-ing effective regeneration. Our interview with the FD staff revealed re-cords of rent-seeking problems within the organization. As a measureto counteract suchbehavior, the government decided in 2002 to dismissall employees and only recruit some of them again. In addition, a newforest actwas passed by the parliament, aiming atmore efficient and so-cially soundmanagement of the forest reserves and reforming the FD tothe parastatal Kenya Forest Service.

Fig. 6. Forest cover in 1973 and 2009 in and around the plantation areas of Mt. E

What becomes evident is a loss of 9000–10,000 ha of native forestsin and around plantation areas on the Kenyan side of Elgon (Fig. 7).These plantations have not been sustainably governed, resulting inplundering of their resources, regeneration deficiencies and facilitatedencroachment of neighboring forests.

5.5. Forest excisions and land reforms in Kenya

Land is a major political issue in Kenya and its political history ismuch intertwined with struggle over land resources (Carter et al.,1933). Land was at the core of Kenya's colonial conquest and liberationwars and has continued to shape its political trajectories (Simiyu, 2008).As part of the political game, public land has been used by successivegovernments in independent Kenya as a means of political patronageand control (Klopp, 2000).

In the early 1930s, the Sabaot people were evicted from their fertilehomelands to give way for white colonial farmers in the Trans-NzoiaDistrict (Foeken and Verstrate, 1992). They were resettled in what isnow theMt. Elgon District. There are twomain subgroups of the Sabaot.The Mosop subgroup was resettled on the Chepkitale Trust land on themoorlands on the upper slopes of Elgon,while the othermain subgroup,the Soy, was settled down slope in Chepyuk (Simiyu, 2008).

The Mosop settlement in the moorlands became a concern for thegovernment after independence in 1963. This relates to the PA re-forms in 1968 when Mt. Elgon National Park was crafted out of the

lgon, Uganda. The plantations facilitated further deforestation around them.

Fig. 7. Forest cover in 1973 and 2009 in and around areas used for plantations and Shamba system in Kenya. Forest fires in dry bamboo have also caused losses further up-slope.

30 J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

forest reserve (KFD/KWS, 2001). A large section of the moorlands inChepkitale became part of the national park that employed a strictconservation strategy and perceived the pastoral Mosop as a threatto the conservation of the area. This seriously constrained their op-portunities for grazing and possibilities to access important forest re-sources. Negotiations to relocate the Mosop started in 1965 betweentheir leadership and the government. The majority of the Mosopagreed to move down the slope in 1971. To create space, a 3686 hasection of the forest reserve was degazetted and designated in theEmia and Chepyuk locations for their relocation (Simiyu, 2008).

The relocation process was, however, poorly implemented by theauthorities. There was inadequate monitoring of the legitimacy ofthe land claims, resulting in an inflow of people claiming rights andgrabbing land. The degazetted area was largely occupied by otherpeople, mainly by the Soy subgroup (Simiyu, 2008). The demarcationof the excised area has also been blurred, resulting in large areas offorest lands cleared in addition to the initial degazettement.

We recorded from the satellite imagery before 1973 that some ofthe forest in Chepyuk had already been encroached, and that sincethen all forests within the resettlement area and an additional4500 ha of surrounding forests have been cleared (Fig. 8). In total,the resettlement scheme in Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve has resulted inthe loss of more than 8000 ha of native forest.

Not surprisingly, the way the forest excisions and relocation pro-cesses were conducted has resulted in massive social impacts and

Fig. 8. Forest cover in 1973 and 2009 in and aro

conflicts, sparking a violent inter-ethnic conflict over rights to landbetween the Soy and Mosop.

5.6. The Benet resettlement case in Uganda

The Benet, a subgroup of the Sabei people, traditionally lived inElgon's forests in Uganda (Scott, 1998). When the forest reservewas established in 1929, the Benet were allowed to stay in theupper forests and moorlands. Resolving the Benet issue was, howev-er, a governance objective for the Forestry Department. The recordsshow that in the 1950s, the Benet, with a growing population, startedto settle more permanently and engage in more intensive agriculture(GoU, 1996). In 1983, the Forest Department decided that the Benetpeople should be evicted from the PA and resettled in the lower forestareas. For that purpose, 6000 ha would be excised permanently fromthe forest reserve (GoU, 1996). This decision was taken in the middleof the post-Amin period when most state institutions were still weakand great political instability persisted.

The initial area of 6000 ha excised from the forest reserve wasmeant to resettle not only the Benet but also some displaced relativesfrom the plains and people from Kapchorwa that were classified as in“need” of land (Luzinda, 2008). The resettlement exercise took placefor three months in 1983. Within that time, the Forest Departmentwas supposed to allocate land and issue title deeds, even if the formal

und the Chepyuk resettlement area, Kenya.

31J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

excisions had not been legally implemented and the areas never beendemarcated or surveyed (GoU, 1996).

The whole planning and implementation process of the forest ex-cision and resettlement was therefore inadequate. Firstly, while someBenet voluntarily left their settlements in the moorlands, many didnot wish to leave to become permanently settled farmers, a lifestylethey were not acquainted with (Himmelfarb, 2005). Secondly, theland was largely appropriated by others than the Benet, with signifi-cant parts of the excised forest areas allocated to Forestry Departmentofficials, local leaders and district officials (GoU, 1996).

The outcome was therefore that a great number of the Benet peo-ple did not get access to land as planned, but remained in the forestreserve and, due to the unclear demarcation of the degazetted areapeople were allocated 7500 ha instead of the initially planned 6000 ha(Fig. 9).

When the area was regazetted in 1993, the original 6000 ha bound-ary was drawn and this has since been a cause of violent conflict in thearea. The Mt. Elgon National Park administration still aims at relocatingthe Benet, both from the PA and also from some of the additional landssettled during the inadequate relocation exercise. These areas are con-sidered by the UWA to be within the park boundary, a view the Benetare highly reluctant to accept, in part because of their former experience(Himmelfarb, 2005). The conflict has led to further encroachment intothe forest, beyond even the 7500 ha boundary, and an additional1700 ha has been lost, bringing the total to more than 9000 ha.

6. Discussion

This paper has used institutional analysis to examine forest conser-vation performance in the PAs on Elgon in Uganda and Kenya sincethe countries gained independence. Satellite imagery helped to showand quantify the significant loss of forest that has taken place overtime, supporting the qualitative analyses of the processes under whichdeforestation has taken place.

We thus found that almost 50,000 ha of native forests (canopycover>30%) has been lost in the four processes described in the PAson Elgon in both countries. This is a high figure, as the whole forestarea on Elgon is around 150,000 ha. We further found that the defor-estation processes are interlinked with multiple conflicts that are stillunresolved and lastly, that there are differences between the differentPA categories in avoiding deforestation.

Employing the institutional analytical framework (Fig. 1), we havebeen able to examine the different processes that have produced de-forestation outcomes on Elgon, exploring the different patterns of

Fig. 9. Forest cover in 1973 and 2009 in and around the Benet resettlement area, U

interactions between the forest attributes, key actors and institutionsthat jointly have produced the deforestation outcomes.

In the case of the process during the Amin/post Amin period inUganda, the native forest resources within the PAwere exploited by ac-tors that settled in the park. As the central government had dismantledthe PA governance in Elgon, both the forest organizations and the insti-tutions for forest governance – and then in addition facilitated localcommunities to settle in the park – the process quickly resulted inlarge scale deforestation outcomes aswe outlined in the Results section.

The processes that caused deforestation in the KenyaMt. Elgon ForestReserve and in the Benet resettlement scheme process in Uganda are inmanyways similar. In both cases, the central governmentwas a key actoraiming at degazetting forestswithin the formal forest reserves to resettlelocal people historically having rights to the protected areas (Mosop inKenya and Benet in Uganda). This, however, proved difficult, partly be-cause of lax institutional frameworks around the resettlements such asland demarcation and register, and also due to challenges in identifyingwho were supposed to be the true beneficiaries of the resettlementschemes. The outcomes, therefore, have been that the native forest re-sources have been plundered by influx of a large number of settlers, inscales far beyond the initial resettlement area.

The resource attributes of the softwood plantation differ from thenative forests. The deforestation processes in the Ugandan plantationson Elgon were highly influenced by external actors, hence the motiva-tion from foreign aid missions to the Ugandan government to convertforest reserves to national parks with financial support in 1993. Thisallowed actors close to UWA to use the opportunity to clear the soft-wood plantations during the institutional change that took place. Thechange caused conflicting governmental policies due to the unclear sta-tus of softwood plantationswithin a national park. In Kenya the processwas found different. There, the problem was more internal to the FD,where actors in the organization used their position to benefit fromunsustainable harvest of the softwood plantations.

7. Conclusions and policy considerations

So what do our findings imply for forest governance to avoid de-forestation within PAs?

What is apparent from Elgon is that PAs are not immune from insur-gencies and state disintegration, as was evident in Uganda under theAmin period. When implementing deforestation measures, such asthe REDD initiative, political upheaval and instability have to be consid-ered as risk factors, especially in fragile states andwhere the institution-al frameworks or resource regimes are weak. Our data from Elgon show

ganda. The exact location of the 7500 ha line was not available so not drawn.

32 J.G. Petursson et al. / Forest Policy and Economics 26 (2013) 22–33

that such events can have dramatic impacts on PA governance institu-tions and on forest cover and can cause long lasting PA–people conflicts.

Rent-seeking and mismanagement are further contributingfactors. We found short rotation softwood plantations within thePAs particularly vulnerable during institutional change and further-more, susceptible to rent-seeking actors. In order to secure their sus-tainability, it is therefore important that the institutions for theirgovernance are purposely constructed to minimize the risk of suchmismanagement.

Forests gazetted as PAs are generally under governmental land ten-ure. While the central government has the power to gazette forests, ithas also the power to degazette them (Simiyu, 2008). In countries suchas Uganda and Kenya where land is a major political issue, this impliescertain dangers. The two cases we have described of PA forest excisionsand relocation of local people on Elgon show this clearly. The central gov-ernments, through high level political processes, deliberately cause de-forestation by degazetting parts of PAs and designating them foragriculture. Furthermore, when the excisions and relocation strategiesare poorly planned and the institutions that are supposed to devise theprocesses are not designed properly, the outcome can be even more de-forestation than initially planned in the degazettement decrees. Thisstudy has shown that the design of such processes also gives powerfulactors an opportunity to grab land and forest resources initially allocatedtomarginalized and often powerless forest dwellers for their livelihoods.This relates to the demarcation of the proposed degazettement areas,identification of the legitimate beneficiaries and the contracts offeredto them by the government. The study has therefore revealed significantinstitutional constraintswhen relocating forest dwelling people by excis-ing forest areas close to the PA boundary in both countries. Our findingsare therefore critical to the design of excisions of forest areas withinexisting PAs as such processes can lead to misappropriation of land andresources by powerful actors that do not have a legitimate stake in theprocess, cause uncontrolled forest loss far beyond the initial demarcationand spark off long lasting social conflicts, thus marginalizing still furtherthe already vulnerable local communities.

Our findings have also revealed that deforestation processes notonly have ecological impacts but also further facilitate and are facili-tated by social conflicts that continue after the deforestation processitself halts. This has a great impact in the local communities andmay, in the long run, further aggravate PA–people relations.

The only PA regime that has not suffered from a major forest loss isthe Kenyan NP. This area has been under a strict “fortress” conservationregime, with strong law enforcement. It is necessary, however, to look atthis performance in a wider perspective. This relatively small area har-boring the most valuable area for biodiversity was crafted from the Mt.Elgon Forest Reserve and converted into a national park in 1968. Thepark boundary was designed with relatively short borders adjoiningthe agricultural areas, mostly large state-owned farms. Therefore, accessto this area was of rather low importance for the local people and wasonly a relatively short distance from the forest reserves that do allow ac-cess to resources. Furthermore, due to its small size, it has been possibleto employ strict enforcement in the rugged landscape. By comparison, asimilar attempt was made in 1993 on the Ugandan side when the largeforest reserve was converted to a national park under a strict “no-go”policy. This proved to be impossible to enforce, given the size of thepark and the immense importance of the various forest resources forlocal people's livelihoods, and resulted in a new management approachin 1995 that instituted community access strategies.

Therefore, a large scale conversion of the more utilitarian forest re-serve regimes to no-go national park regimes is not a tenable or possibleapproach to avoid deforestation in the region, unless themultiple needsof local people for various forest environmental resources can be com-pensated. The current CBNRM approach in the Mt. Elgon National ParkUgandaneedsmore scrutiny, butmight have someof the essential com-ponents for such a strategy. Inclusion of local community rights and in-terests should be an implicit component of any large scale PA regime

that aims at avoiding deforestation, such as the widely promotedREDD programs (Angelsen et al., 2009).

Themost recent PA reform on Elgon is the TBPAMapproach, promot-ed by international conservation actors and donors (Muhweezi et al.,2007). However, our analyses did not show deforestation processes hav-ing transboundary linkages but rather that they were related to nationalinstitutional constraints and political processes. We did therefore notfind any reasonable rationale for instituting a joint TBPAM regime onElgon in order to avoid deforestation. Such strategies can bemore ecolog-ically relevant in PA complexes harboring migrating wildlife than in for-est parks. This adds to the growing critique of the approach frompolitical and institutional perspectives (Ramutsindela, 2007; Peturssonet al., 2011).

The study shows that the deforestation in already gazetted PAswas framed and driven by complex institutional and political factorsthat in part originated outside the PA regimes, like the politicalchaos in Uganda during Amin and the impact, foreign aid missionshad, on Ugandan PA policies in 1993. Rent-seeking is a further forcethat needs to be accounted for, both from powerful actors withinthe PA governance as well as from outside forces. The causes of defor-estation within PAs are complex and must be understood against thebroader background and the political contexts within which the PAregimes operate.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Prof. Arild Vatn for the valuable comments on earlierdrafts of this paper and to Dr. John Kabbogoza for the various kindsof support in gathering information in Uganda and Kenya. Furtherwe want to express our appreciation to all who assisted during thefieldwork in the Elgon area. This research was made possible withthe financial support from the Icelandic Development Agency (ICEIDA),Iceland Forest Service Research Station Mogisla and Icelandic ForestryAssociation.

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