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An Initial Security An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard 802.1x Standard Tsai Hsien Pang Tsai Hsien Pang 2004/11/4 2004/11/4

An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard. Tsai Hsien Pang 2004/11/4. Outline. Introduction IEEE 802.1x Standard Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack Proposed solution Conclusion Reference. 802.11 Security. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

An Initial Security An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE Analysis of the IEEE

802.1x Standard802.1x Standard

Tsai Hsien PangTsai Hsien Pang

2004/11/42004/11/4

Page 2: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

2004/11/4 2

OutlineOutline

► IntroductionIntroduction► IEEE 802.1x StandardIEEE 802.1x Standard►Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attackMan-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack►Proposed solutionProposed solution►ConclusionConclusion►ReferenceReference

Page 3: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

2004/11/4 3

802.11 Security802.11 Security

►A wireless network is broadcast by nature, A wireless network is broadcast by nature, and the media is reachably-broadcast.and the media is reachably-broadcast.

►Authentication and data encryption.Authentication and data encryption.►The 802.11 standard for WLAN communicThe 802.11 standard for WLAN communic

ations introduced the Wired Equivalent Prations introduced the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol.ivacy (WEP) protocol.

Page 4: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Basic Security MechanismsBasic Security Mechanisms

►Two Model: ad-hoc and infrastructure Two Model: ad-hoc and infrastructure mode.mode.

►A wireless client establish a relation A wireless client establish a relation with an AP, called an association.with an AP, called an association. Unauthenticated and unassociatedUnauthenticated and unassociated Authenticated and unassociatedAuthenticated and unassociated Authenticated and associatedAuthenticated and associated

Page 5: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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802.11 State Machine802.11 State Machine

► STA and AP exchange STA and AP exchange authentication authentication Management frames Management frames between state 1 and 2.between state 1 and 2.

►Open system ,share Open system ,share key and Mac-address key and Mac-address based control list.based control list.

►WEP was designed to WEP was designed to provide confidentiality.provide confidentiality.

Page 6: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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WEP ProtocolWEP Protocol

►The WEP protocol is used in 802.11 networThe WEP protocol is used in 802.11 networks to protect link level data during wirelesks to protect link level data during wireless transmission.s transmission.

► It relies on a secret key It relies on a secret key kk shared between t shared between the communicating parties to protected thhe communicating parties to protected the body of a transmitted frame of data.e body of a transmitted frame of data.

►Encryption of a frame proceeds: checksuEncryption of a frame proceeds: checksumming and encryption.mming and encryption.

Page 7: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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WEP Protocol (2)WEP Protocol (2)

Page 8: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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The Drawback of WEPThe Drawback of WEP

►Keystream ReuseKeystream Reuse The IV field used by WEP is only 24 bits wide, nThe IV field used by WEP is only 24 bits wide, n

early guaranteeing that the same IV will be reearly guaranteeing that the same IV will be reused for multiple message.used for multiple message.

21)),(42()),(41(21

),(422

),,(411

PPkvRCPkvRCPCC

kvRCPC

kvRCPC

22),(4

11),(4

PCkvRC

PCkvRC

Page 9: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

2004/11/4 9

The Drawback of WEP (2)The Drawback of WEP (2)

►Message ModificationMessage Modification The WEP checksum is a linear function of The WEP checksum is a linear function of

the message.the message.

Page 10: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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OutlineOutline

► IntroductionIntroduction► IEEE 802.1x Std and RSNIEEE 802.1x Std and RSN►Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attackMan-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack►Proposed solutionProposed solution►ConclusionConclusion

Page 11: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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IEEE 802.1x and RSNIEEE 802.1x and RSN

► IEEE 802.1x is a security framework IEEE 802.1x is a security framework must provide network access must provide network access authentication.authentication.

►RSN (Robust Security Network) RSN (Robust Security Network) provides mechanisms to restrict provides mechanisms to restrict network connectivity to authorized network connectivity to authorized entities only via 802.1x.entities only via 802.1x.

Page 12: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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IEEE 802.1x SetupIEEE 802.1x Setup

► SupplicantSupplicant: An entity : An entity use a service via a port use a service via a port on the on the AuthenticatorAuthenticator..

► AuthenticatorAuthenticator: A : A service provider.service provider.

► AAA ServerAAA Server: A central : A central authentication server authentication server which directs the which directs the AuthenticatorAuthenticator to to provide the service provide the service after successful after successful authentication.authentication.

Page 13: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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802.11 Association802.11 Association

Page 14: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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A Typical Authentication Session A Typical Authentication Session using EAPusing EAP

EAPOL RADIUS

EAPOL Start

Page 15: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Extensible Authentication Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)Protocol (EAP)

► EAP is built around EAP is built around the challenge-the challenge-response response communication communication paradigm.paradigm.

► Four type messages: Four type messages: EAP Request, EAP EAP Request, EAP Response, EAP Response, EAP Success, EAP Failure.Success, EAP Failure.

Page 16: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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EAPOLEAPOL

► The EAP Over Lan (EAThe EAP Over Lan (EAPOL) protocol carries POL) protocol carries the EAP packets betwthe EAP packets between authenticator aneen authenticator and supplicant.d supplicant.

► An EAPOL key messagAn EAPOL key message provides a way of ce provides a way of communicating a highommunicating a higher-layer negotiated seer-layer negotiated session key.ssion key.

Page 17: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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RADIUSRADIUS

►Remote Authentication Dial-In User Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Protocol.Service (RADIUS) Protocol.

►The Authentication server and the The Authentication server and the authenticator communicate using the authenticator communicate using the RADIUS.RADIUS.

Page 18: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Dual Port ModelDual Port Model

►The AP (Authenticator) must permit The AP (Authenticator) must permit the EAP traffic before the the EAP traffic before the authentication succeeds.authentication succeeds.

Page 19: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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802.11/1x State Machine802.11/1x State Machine

Page 20: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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OutlineOutline

► IntroductionIntroduction► IEEE 802.1x Std and RSNIEEE 802.1x Std and RSN►Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attackMan-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack►Proposed solutionProposed solution►ConclusionConclusion

Page 21: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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AttackAttack

►MIM (Man-in-Middle) attack.MIM (Man-in-Middle) attack.►Session Hijacking.Session Hijacking.►Denial of Service (DoS).Denial of Service (DoS).

Page 22: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Man-in-MiddleMan-in-Middle

►An attacker forge this packet on behalf An attacker forge this packet on behalf of the authenticator and potentially of the authenticator and potentially start a simple Man-in-Middle attack.start a simple Man-in-Middle attack.

Page 23: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Session HijackingSession Hijacking

►The session hijack by spoofing a The session hijack by spoofing a 802.11 MAC disassociate message.802.11 MAC disassociate message.

Page 24: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Denial of Service (DoS)Denial of Service (DoS)►EAPOL Logoff, EAPOL Start message EAPOL Logoff, EAPOL Start message

spoofing.spoofing.►EAP failure message spoofing.EAP failure message spoofing.►Spoofing of 802.11 management Spoofing of 802.11 management

frames.frames.►Large number of associate request.Large number of associate request.

Page 25: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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OutlineOutline

► IntroductionIntroduction► IEEE 802.1x Std and RSNIEEE 802.1x Std and RSN►Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attackMan-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack►Proposed solutionProposed solution►ConclusionConclusion

Page 26: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Per-packet Authenticity and Per-packet Authenticity and IntegrityIntegrity

►Lack of per-packet authenticity and Lack of per-packet authenticity and integrity in IEEE 802.11 frames has integrity in IEEE 802.11 frames has been a key contributor in many of the been a key contributor in many of the protocol’s security problems.protocol’s security problems.

►There are currently no plans by the There are currently no plans by the IEEE to add integrity protection to IEEE to add integrity protection to management frame.management frame.

►The session hijack attack primarily The session hijack attack primarily exploited.exploited.

Page 27: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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Authenticity and Integrity of Authenticity and Integrity of EAPOL messagesEAPOL messages

►Addition of an EAP authenticator Addition of an EAP authenticator attribute.attribute.

Page 28: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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OutlineOutline

► IntroductionIntroduction► IEEE 802.1x Std and RSNIEEE 802.1x Std and RSN►Man-in-Middle, Session Hijack attackMan-in-Middle, Session Hijack attack►Proposed solutionProposed solution►ConclusionConclusion

Page 29: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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ConclusionConclusion

►Because the transport medium is Because the transport medium is shared, permits attackers easy and shared, permits attackers easy and unconstrained access.unconstrained access.

►Our attacks demonstrate that the Our attacks demonstrate that the current RSN architecture does not current RSN architecture does not provide strong access control and provide strong access control and authentication.authentication.

Page 30: An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard

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ReferenceReference

1. Arunesh Mishra, William A. Arbaugh, “An Initial security analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard”.

2. N.Borisov, L.Goldberg, D.Wagner, “Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11”. Proc., Seventh Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, July, 2001, pages 180-188.

3. IEEE, Lan man standard of the ieee computer society. Wireless lan media access control and physical layer specification. IEEE standard 802.11, 1997.