December 2009

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American Views on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Energy, and the Environment: 2009

Kerry G. Herron

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith

Conducted with funding and institutional support from Sandia National Laboratories and The University of Oklahoma.

Public Security Perspectives

American Views on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Energy, and the Environment: 2009

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Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D.

Research Scientist Center for Applied Social Research

University of Oklahoma

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. Professor and Associate Director

Center for Applied Social Research University of Oklahoma

December 2009

Center for Applied Social Research University of Oklahoma

2 Partners Place, 3100 Monitor, Suite 100 Norman, Oklahoma 73072

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express appreciation to the following organizations and individuals whose support made this project possible.

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

Joan Woodard, Ph.D. Executive Vice President and Deputy Laboratories Director for National Security, Technologies, and Systems

John M. Taylor Manager, NSTS Strategic Office

David Cunnington Graphic Artist

University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK

Carol L. Silva, Ph.D. Associate Director, Center for Applied Social Research Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science

Matthew Henderson Consultant, College Station, Texas

Abstract

We report findings from a national Internet survey of the US general public conducted in mid-2009 that investigates concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons (with emphases on the cases of North Korea and Iran), evolving views on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, and preferences for the future of US nuclear weapons. Our analysis of public views on terrorism in-clude assessments of the evolving threat, public tolerance for intrusive do-mestic measures for preventing terrorism, and perceived effectiveness of domestic efforts to prevent terrorism in the US. We also report findings from a national public survey on US energy and en-vironmental security administered by Internet in mid-2009. Key areas of in-vestigation include how factual knowledge about global climate change is related to support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and how public knowledge of energy issues relates to preferences for future energy policies. Additionally, we investigate how different sources of energy are perceived in terms of attributes, costs, risks, and preferences, and we analyze how public beliefs about nuclear energy are structured, to include risk/benefit tradeoffs and preferences for additional nuclear generation.

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Contents

Front Matter Abstract 3 Contents 5 Executive Summary 6

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 11 Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives 11 Section 1.2: Methodological and Conceptual Considerations 13 Section 1.3: Organization of the Report 20

Chapter Two: Nuclear Security 22 Section 2.1: Assessing Nuclear Proliferation Threats 22 Section 2.2: Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence 28 Section 2.3: Preferences for the Future of US Nuclear Weapons 35

Chapter Three: Security from Terrorism 46 Section 3.1: Evolving Public Assessments of the Threat of Terrorism 46 Section 3.2: Tolerance for Intrusive Prevention Policies 51 Section 3.3: Assessing the Struggle Against Terrorism 55

Chapter Four: Energy and Environmental Security 63 Section 4.1: Public Knowledge and Global Climate Change (GCC) 63 Section 4.2: Public Knowledge and Energy Policy Preferences 71 Section 4.3: Public Perceptions of Comparative Energy Sources 78 Section 4.4: Public Beliefs About Nuclear Energy 85

Appendix 1: Research Methodology 95 Section 1: Sampling 95 Section 2: Data Collection 98

Appendix 2: Nuclear Security & Terrorism Data Summaries 99

Appendix 3: Energy and Environment Data Summaries 138

References 179

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Executive Summary

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview

This report summarizes findings from an Internet survey conducted June 2–6, 2009 of US general public views on selected nuclear security and terror-ism issues. We also report findings from an Internet survey focusing on en-ergy and environmental security conducted May 28–29, 2009. Each of the surveys builds on previous foundational studies in this series to show opin-ion change over time.

Chapter Two: Nuclear Security

Q: How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran? (pg. 22)

Mean public assessments of the risks of further nuclear proliferation to addi-tional countries steadily have been rated above a value of seven on a zero-to-ten scale since our first measurement in 2005. When asked to assess risks of nuclear conflict with North Korea or Iran, assessments in 2009 are well above midscale and have increased 12 percent for North Korea and 19 percent for Iran since 2005. Risks of North Korea or Iran providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups also are rated high in absolute terms (above seven on a zero-to-ten scale) and have grown by about five percent for each country since 2005. When asked to consider the use of US military forces to compel North Korea or Iran to abandon nuclear weapons programs, mean support is significantly higher for participating as part of a UN military coalition than for acting unilaterally, and support for using military force against Iran is some-what higher than for acting against North Korea. Mean support for participat-ing in a military coalition grew by 18 percent against North Korea and by ten percent against Iran between 2006 and 2009. While lower in absolute terms, support has increased even more sharply for acting unilaterally against either state should diplomatic and economic efforts fail.

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Q: How are public beliefs about the efficacy of US nuclear deterrence evolving? (pg. 28)

Public assessments of the contemporary efficacy of nuclear deterrence are nu-anced. When the objects of deterrence are other countries, most respondents assign generally high, but differentiated, valuations to US nuclear weapons for different deterrence purposes. Using a scale from zero (not at all important) to ten (extremely important), participants rate the mean importance of US nu-clear weapons for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against us at well above a value of seven. The mean importance of US nuclear weapons for (a) deterring other countries from using chemical or biological weapons, or (b) for deterring other countries from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups is rated substantially lower, but each is above a value of six on the same scale. The mean importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring terrorist groups from using weapons of mass destruction is statis-tically significantly lower still, but remains above midscale.

The mean importance of nuclear deterrence systematically increases with age (but not monotonically) and systematically decreases among those respon-dents who did not experience the Cold War as adults. Because the net effect of Cold War experience potentially may be greater than that for chronologi-cal age, public valuations of US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes may slowly erode as the number of Americans who experienced some por-tion of the Cold War as adults declines.

Q: What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear weapons? (pg. 35)

In addition to nuclear deterrence, Americans continue to believe US nuclear weapons are important for maintaining US military superiority and interna-tional influence. Support for retaining US nuclear weapons averages about 7.5 on a 0–10 scale and has increased about 15 percent since 1993. When asked to size the US nuclear arsenal between zero and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the average preference in 2009 is 1,342, with ten percent preferring zero and 26 percent preferring 2,200. Re-spondents are open to reducing below 1,700 if Russia agrees to matching and verifiable levels, but most do not want the US to have fewer than any other country. Mean support for investing in US nuclear weapons infra-structure is above midscale and has increased about 18 percent since 1993.

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When presented with balanced arguments for and against modernizing the US nuclear stockpile, 52 percent support developing new nuclear weapons, 24 percent are undecided, and 24 percent oppose new weapons. Support for investing in nuclear weapons infrastructure or in new nuclear weapons has not declined in the face of difficult economic conditions.

Chapter Three: Security From Terrorism

Q: How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism changing, and how do they vary among demographic attributes and political orienta-tions? (pg. 46)

Mean assessments of the overall threat of terrorism of all kinds in the US peaked immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Between those seminal events and 2009, mean assessments of the threat of terrorism have declined about 20 percent, but they remain above pre-9/11 levels. Mean assessments of the overall threat of terrorism worldwide are sig-nificantly higher than those for the US (p < .0001). Respondents are pessimistic about future threats, and consider the mean threat of terrorism in the US over the next ten years to be significantly higher than it is today (p < .0001).

Assessments of the threat of terrorism systematically increase with age, political conservatism, and among women. Assessments systematically decrease with educational achievement and among racial/ethnic minorities.

Q: How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures intended to pre-vent terrorism influenced by threat perceptions and world views? (pg. 51)

As estimated using multivariate models, tolerance for intrusive domestic antiterror policies systematically increases with income, conservatism, hier-archism, and terror threat perceptions. Tolerance for such measures de-creases with education, and it is lower among racial/ethnic minorities.

Q: How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent ter-rorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond to acts of

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terrorism, and how confident are they that eventually we will prevail in the struggle against terrorism? (pg. 55)

Mean confidence in our abilities to assess the threat, prevent terrorism, and respond to acts of terrorism in the US are near midscale and trending upward. Airport security is rated higher, on average, than seaport/harbor security or land border security, but the trend for each is upward. Mean confidence in our abilities to respond to large-scale acts of terrorism is highest for the De-partment of Defense. Capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security and state-level agencies are rated near midscale; county and municipal capa-bilities are placed below midscale. Mean confidence in our abilities to pre-vent large-scale acts of terrorism averages slightly above midscale, while confidence in preventing small-scale attacks is below midscale, but both are trending upward. Mean assessments of the overall effectiveness of US efforts to combat terrorism and eventually to prevail over terrorism bottomed out in 2007 and have been trending upward since.

Chapter Four: Energy and Environmental Security

Q: How is public knowledge of the global climate change issue related to support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions? (pg. 63)

As factual knowledge about scientific consensus in the ongoing debate over global climate change grows, each of the following systematically increases: (a) public certainty that greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming; (b) assessed risks that global warming poses to people and the environment; (c) perceived importance of the US reducing greenhouse gas emissions; and (d) support for accepting international limits on greenhouse gas emissions.

Q: How is public knowledge of energy issues related to preferences for future energy policies? (pg. 71)

As basic factual knowledge about energy increases, dissatisfaction with cur-rent energy policies systematically increases, as do perceived risks of con-tinued reliance on fossil fuels and foreign sources of energy. In addition, as energy knowledge increases, support grows systematically for greater reli-

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ance on green alternatives to fossil fuels, including significant increases in nuclear energy.

Q: How are comparative sources of energy perceived in terms of attrib-utes, costs, risks, and preferences? (pg. 78)

Distinctions are evident in public perceptions of three different types of fossil fuels: coal and oil are perceived as being dirty and not preferable, and opin-ion is mixed about their safety, while natural gas is perceived by most re-spondents as clean and safe, but opinion is mixed about preferability. Solar, wind, and hydroelectric sources are perceived by substantial majorities as clean, renewable, safe, plentiful, and preferable. Nuclear generation is judged by most as clean but dangerous, and opinion is equally divided about its pref-erability as a source of electricity. Misperceptions exist about the relative costs of solar and wind generation compared to coal, with most participants considering solar and wind to be cheaper sources of electricity. The costs of natural gas and nuclear generation are perceived to be slightly higher than the costs of coal generation. In terms of overall risk, fossil fuels and nuclear power are rated at similar levels above midscale, while the risks of renew-ables sources are judged substantially lower and well below midscale. Solar, wind, and hydroelectric sources of generation are perceived to be “renew-able” by most participants, but confusion exists among more than half our respondents about whether that term should apply to nuclear generation.

Q: How are beliefs about nuclear energy structured? (pg. 85)

Americans’ beliefs about nuclear energy are systematically structured, and the relationships are consistent across multiple samples and over time. As age and education increase, support for nuclear energy increases modestly, but the largest demographic effect is gender: men are significantly more supportive of nuclear energy than are women. Beyond demographic predis-positions, support for nuclear energy largely is a function of informal bal-ancing of perceived risks and benefits, with benefits being judged to out-weigh risks. Lack of understanding that nuclear generation does not produce significant amounts of greenhouse gases means that the public has yet to relate nuclear energy to efforts to moderate global climate change.

Chapter One Introduction and Overview

his report presents findings from two Internet surveys of the American public. One survey of 1,754 participants conducted June 2–6, 2009 in-vestigates issues of nuclear security and terrorism. Another survey of

1,698 respondents conducted May 28–29, 2009 investigates public views on selected energy security and related environmental issues.

TEach of the surveys builds on comparative baselines established in 2005 (nu-clear security and terrorism), 2006 (energy and environmental security), and continuing surveys in 2007 and 2008. We also build on prior foundational re-search conducted between 1993 and 2003.1 Financial and institutional support for this study was provided by Sandia National Laboratories and the University of Oklahoma.

Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives

esearch goals are organized along two major lines of investigation involving four related dimensions of security. The energy and envi-ronmental security line of investigation consists of surveys con-

ducted in even-numbered years, supplemented by tracking surveys in odd-numbered years. Similarly, the nuclear security and terrorism line of investi-gation consists of surveys conducted in odd-numbered years, plus tracking surveys in even-numbered years. Both series were begun with two parallel Internet and phone surveys. Follow-up tracking surveys are accomplished via the Internet. All are designed to provide coordinated research and are in-tended to measure and analyze evolving public understandings of four inter-related dimensions of security: nuclear security; security from terrorism; en-ergy security; and environmental security.

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1 For the baseline study on nuclear security and terrorism, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006a; for the baseline study on energy and environmental security, see Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2007. For results of follow-on tracking surveys, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2007 and Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009a. Each is available on-line at: http://casr.ou.edu/nsp. Findings from previous surveys on related issues conducted between 1993 and 2003 are summarized in Herron and Jen-kins-Smith 2006b.

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http://casr.ou.edu/nsp

Nuclear Security and Terrorism

Primary research goals for this track are to analyze public views about the evolving nature of nuclear security and terrorism and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of related US security policies. Specific research objectives include the following:

• Identify emerging trends in public perceptions of US nuclear weapons policies and selected national and international security issues. Examine evolving US public assessments of risks, benefits, policy preferences, and research and investment priorities associated with nuclear weapons and strategic security.

• Where appropriate, map backward to selected baseline questions asked in previous surveys in this series for continued trend analyses and develop new questions intended for repeated application in future surveys.

• Measure public views on modernizing the US nuclear stockpile and inves-tigate public perceptions of what kinds of modifications to existing nuclear weapons constitute perceptions of “new” nuclear weapons. Monitor trends in public beliefs about the desirability and feasibility of nuclear weapons abolition.

• Investigate concepts of multidimensional security, to include public under-standings of how security and freedom should be balanced and under what conditions threats to national security warrant varying levels of public sac-rifice.

• Identify and analyze trends in public concerns about homeland security, including public assessments of the threat of terrorism and US policies to prevent and respond to terrorism.

• Analyze belief systems among members of the US general public and their relationships to views on nuclear security and terrorism.

Energy and Environmental Security

For this line of investigation, our primary research goals are to analyze public views about contemporary energy security and associated environmental is-sues and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of related US policies. Specific research objectives include the following:

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• Identify and analyze public perceptions of US energy security, to include: (a) energy supply and reliability; (b) energy vulnerabilities and threats; (c) relative risks and benefits of fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and renewable sources; and (d) relationships among energy security, costs, energy depend-ence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities.

• Where appropriate, map backward to selected baseline questions asked in previous surveys in this series for continued trend analyses and develop new questions intended for repeated application in future surveys.

• Investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, support for energy research and development and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.

• Analyze emerging changes and trends in public views on nuclear energy, to include risks, benefits, policy preferences, research and investment priori-ties, and public trust. Specifically investigate understandings and prefer-ences regarding nuclear materials management and disposal issues.

• Analyze public perceptions of nuclear fuel cycle and spent nuclear fuel management options, including (a) regional temporary storage, (b) reproc-essing, (c) permanent disposal, and (d) transportation to temporary or per-manent storage facilities.

• Analyze belief systems among members of the US general public and their relationships to views on energy and environmental security.

Section 1.2: Methodological and Conceptual Considerations

W e design all phases of the larger research project to support multi-dimensional analyses, including quantitative methods such as de-scriptive, relational, and trend analyses. In 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 we employed split survey designs providing parallel Internet and tele-phone surveys for comparing collection methods. As noted in previous reports in this series, the central tendencies among Internet and phone responses to some survey questions are statistically significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level (partly a function of large sample sizes), but after weighting for demographic representativeness, in no cases did we find substantive dif-ferences in aggregate responses between collection modes that were policy relevant. Policy implications deriving from phone and Internet collection methods were essentially the same in each of the four paired surveys.

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However, continuing developments in demographic and communication trends suggest that phone survey collections increasingly are varying from cross-sectional demographic patterns in the US—especially regarding re-spondent ages and socio-economic indices. This largely is because of the declining numbers of households with wired phone services and the sub-stantial difficulties in sampling the population of wireless-only phone users. As increasing numbers of Americans shift to wireless-only phone services, differences between potential respondents who can be reached by wired phone vs. those who can be reached by wireless-only services are growing. The latest available data from the National Center for Health Statistics re-garding demographic differences between adults in the US who have access to wired vs. wireless phone services include the following distinctions (Blumberg and Luke 2009):

• More than one of every five American homes (20.2%) has only wireless phone service. About 33.1% of US adults between the ages of 18 and 24 and about 41.5% of adults between the ages of 25 and 29 have only wire-less phone services. At the other end of the age range, only 3.3% of indi-viduals aged 65 and over have wireless-only services.

• More than three in five adults living with unrelated adult roommates (60.6%) live in households having only wireless phone services, and those who rent are more likely to have only wireless services (39.2%) than those who own homes (9.9%).

• Men (20.0%) are more likely than women (17.0%) to have only wireless service. Adults living in the South (21.3%) and Midwest (20.8%) are more likely than adults living the Northeast (11.4%) or West (17.2%) to have wireless-only services. And non-Hispanic white adults (16.6%) are less likely than Hispanic adults (25.0%) and non-Hispanic black adults (21.4%) to have wireless-only services.

• Adults with college degrees (18.0%) are more likely to have wireless-only phone services than are high school graduates (13.2%) or adults with lower levels of formal education (9.8%). Adults living with children (19.2%) are more likely than adults living alone (12.2%) or with only other adults (13.2%) to have mostly wireless services. Adults living in poverty (9.5%) or near poverty (11.3%) are less likely than higher income adults (18.2%) to have wireless-mostly phone services. And adults living in metropolitan areas (15.8%) are more likely to have wireless-mostly services than are those living in rural areas (13.4%).

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• Approximately 1.9% (nearly four million adults) have no telephone service of any type, and thus cannot be surveyed by phone.

Given the length and complexity of our surveys (averaging 25 minutes or more) interviewing via cellular phones is impractical because of costs, safety, and other location issues (Brick, et al. 2007). Interviewing respon-dents while they are at work also is impractical for similar reasons. This means that when collected by phone, our types of in-depth inquiries are lim-ited to respondents having home access to wired telephony. Given the trends in telecommunication patterns and differences in important demo-graphic dimensions, phone collections are becoming increasingly less de-mographically representative.2

At the same time that wired telephony is declining, access to Internet services continues to grow. Between 1995 and 1997, the proportion of adults having access to online services tripled from nine percent to 30 percent. By 2000, it had more than doubled again to 63 percent. Though the rate of growth in Internet access has slowed, it was 73 percent by 2004 and 81 percent in Octo-ber 2008. Today, only about two percent of computer users do not go online (HarrisInteractive 2008), and 63 percent of adults in the US access the Internet via broadband connections at home (Horrigan 2009). Not surprisingly, with increased access, the demographics of the online population have become in-creasingly representative of the US population as a whole. Internet use among those over 65 years of age, those who have not attended college, and those having annual household incomes of less than $25,000 continue to be some-what underrepresented, but large majorities of even these demographic cate-gories now have access to the Internet (HarrisInteractive 2008).

While we intend periodically to conduct parallel Internet and phone surveys in future cycles, our previous comparative findings, combined with the trends noted above, suggest that the phone comparisons have declining utility unless extensive weighting is used to correct for growing imbalances in demographic representativeness. Because Internet surveys can be conducted to control for demographic and regional representativeness (compared to national popula-tion data), weighting is not required for carefully executed Internet surveys.

2 Blumberg and Luke (2009) also note important behavioral differences relating to health issues (binge drinking, health status, insurance coverage, access to health care, and certain other access and behavior issues) between those having wireless-only services vs. those with wired phones or combinations of wired and wireless services.

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For these reasons, and because of our four prior surveys employing parallel Internet and phone collections, we limited collections for both our surveys in 2009 to Internet samples. As our findings show, central tendencies suggest a high degree of continuity in response patterns, and a high level of confidence in comparisons with previous surveys seems warranted.3 Collection methods and demographic representativeness are described in Appendix 1.

Conceptualizing Security

The term “security” is associated with contextual meanings that are so broad and variable that some scholars consider it to be an “essentially con-tested concept” (Buzan 1991, Freedman 1992, Gallie 1962, Rothschild 1995). Like other complex ideas such as power, justice, peace, and freedom, the concept of security includes an ideological dimension that reduces the utility of empiricism for resolving differences in definitional and conceptual explanations (Buzan 1991; Little 1981). Even those who specialize in secu-rity studies cannot agree on the boundaries of the concept or of the field of study. To some who take a more classically narrow approach, security re-lates to matters of the state and its military capabilities—particularly the use of force (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). But since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has broadened to include conventions associ-ated with many aspects of globalization and humanitarian concerns, such as hunger, health, human rights, economics and trade, global climate change, and international system stability (Fierke 2007). Some, such as Buzan (1991) and Fierke (2007) caution that the proliferating conceptual applica-tion of the term “security” to new fields and new concerns may locate agency in states rather than in institutional or individual actors in specific fields, and some issues may become militarized even though a political so-lution may be more appropriate.

While a detailed examination of the concept of security is beyond the scope of this brief discussion, it is useful note a few key points. Essentially, per-ceived security is about feeling safe from harm or danger, and actual secu-rity is about being safe. When measuring and analyzing public opinion, we are dealing with perceptions and beliefs, and thus at the individual level of analysis, security is a feeling that is inherently subjective to individual con- 3 Throughout this report, graphics show combined phone and Internet results where appli-cable for prior surveys.

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texts and beliefs. At a social level, security is a normative political con-struct. It is assessed by governmental agencies and political leaders, and is partially a function of policy processes. While some empiricism may be ap-plied, there remain large areas of subjective interpretation of public security that become the bases for official judgments and policies. These areas of subjectivity are the focus of intense public debate in which the views of ex-perts and those of the general public must be considered by policy makers.

One of the most critical aspects of defining and understanding the meaning of security is to recognize that it is heavily dependent on risk or threat. Theoretically, in the absence of some real or imagined risk or threat, secu-rity would be maximized, but actually, under such a theoretical construct (which is not realistically plausible), security would have no meaning at all. Edkins (2003) contends that the human desire for perfect security from all threats to our existence is illusory, and some degree of insecurity is inherent to all life—including human existence. Fierke (2007, 8) argues that: “The search for perfect security is not merely illusory, but becomes part and par-cel of the problem, that is, it contributes to the production of insecurity and the construction of threats.”

If it is the imagined and real sources of risks and threats that give the concept of security meaning, it follows that one of the most useful ways of conceiving security is in relation to perceived and actual risks and threats. Following the insightful conceptualization of security by Arnold Wolfers (1952), perhaps security can be best understood as the inverse of risk/threat. Because there are some risks and threats over which no individual or government has control (such as the threat of eventual death), comprehensive and enduring security is impossible. Because security takes its meaning from the absence of risk/threat, and because it is impossible to prove why something did not occur, attributing the sources and causes of security is problematic. We may presume the rea-sons a threatening event, such as interstate nuclear war, has yet to occur relate to deterrence based on mutually assured destruction, but we cannot know that is the sole or even primary reason. Similarly, we cannot know for sure why large-scale acts of terrorism have not occurred in the United States from Sep-tember 11, 2001 to the time of this writing. We can make assumptions about the effectiveness of preventive measures and about terrorist capabilities and motivations, but we cannot prove why another act of the scale of 9/11 has not yet occurred. From this line of reasoning, we conclude that the concept of se-curity is based on individual feelings and political assumptions and assess-

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ments of risks and threats. This becomes key when considering how to meas-ure and track security.

Because of the essentially contested nature of the concept of security, be-cause our understanding of it is based on assumptions about risks and threats, and because of the growing application of the concept of security to more fields and policy domains, we need to carefully delineate those di-mensions being studied in this project. As previously noted, we are limiting our investigation and analysis to public understandings of four interrelated dimensions of security.

• Nuclear security encompasses nuclear weapons and their development, management, modernization, and uses; nuclear materials and their produc-tion, applications, and safeguards; nuclear proliferation and associated im-plications; and public perceptions of and support for policies relating to each of these aspects of nuclear security.

• Terrorism and its implications for all levels of security include public under-standings of the various threats posed by terrorism, assessments of ongoing efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, and the effects of terrorism on key societal values such as freedom and liberty.

• Energy security includes energy dependence, adequacy of energy sources and supplies, threats and vulnerabilities to energy access, nuclear energy risks and benefits, alternative energy sources, and research and development into future energy requirements and options, including willingness to pay for energy research and development.

• Another dimension of security is the growing importance of environmental issues as they relate to traditional concepts of physical security, economic se-curity, and energy management. Of particular interest in this dimension is global climate change (another contested concept) and how public assess-ments of its dynamics are evolving.

Interrelationships

We consider these four dimensions of security to be closely related and in-teractive, and one of our long-term goals is to better understand how fellow citizens relate concepts and beliefs associated with multiple dimensions of security. Given the baselines established in each of our two lines of investi-gation into four dimensions of security, we are now able both to probe more

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deeply into their perceived connectedness and to monitor trends in relative public views. Some areas seem obviously to be closely related, such as nu-clear weapons and the potential for their use in terrorism. Others may be somewhat less clear, such as the relationships among energy independence, fossil fuels, and global warming. Still others are much more subtle, such as the relationships of porous borders and illegal immigration with security from terrorism and with the social and economic implications of the associ-ated labor pool. Through repeated and refined measurements, we pursue more detailed examination of how Americans relate these four dimensions, the degree to which they see crosscutting security implications, and how long-term trends evolve.

Measuring Security

Given the previously noted complexities involved in defining and conceptu-alizing security, direct questions about security and how secure people feel are problematic. First, one must specify what level of analysis is being asked: individual, national, regional, global? Next, it is quite possible for individuals to feel secure from terrorism or interstate war, and yet feel inse-cure about economic well-being, health, the costs of energy, environmental issues, or any number of other aspects affecting security at the individual level. And even when respondents are asked to assess security at a specific level of analysis, it is difficult for them to separate personal feelings and concerns at the individual level from those of the social and political groups to which they belong at higher and more aggregated levels of analysis. To address direct questions about security means that respondents must make several assumptions. First is the level of analysis; is it security for me per-sonally, or for my family, or for my community, or for my nation, or for everyone? The next cognitive demand is to evaluate security from what or from whom, which requires assumptions of specific sources of risks or threats and their nature. Then there is the temporal dimension of security, which raises issues of immediate and contemporary security versus longer-term and future security. This dimension is particularly relevant to discus-sions of energy and environmental security. There also is the important question of whose security is being threatened or strengthened and who is bearing what proportion of the costs. Security measures for one group often impinge on the security of other groups. This is particularly relevant in con-sidering security among different nation states or when dealing with issues

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such as immigration. Some people may be very accepting of intrusive or re-strictive measures if the associated costs seem likely to be born by others. While the designs of questions can specify some of these requirements, di-rect inquiries about security still demand cognitive compartmentalization and individual assumptions on the part of respondents, all of which can af-fect response validity.

For these and related reasons, we think it is preferable methodologically for purposes of opinion survey research to conceive of security and measure it as the inverse of risk or threat. As argued above, one of the many ways to con-ceive of security is as the absence or minimization of threat. Because threats can be more discretely defined and specified, we hypothesize that respon-dents are better able to compartmentalize and separately assess threats of dif-ferent types acting at different levels of analysis than they are to assess con-ceptual questions about the more difficult to specify and more variable concept of security. While we have included a few direct inquiries about se-curity assessments, we focus more intently on exploring public perceptions of threats and risks, the inverse of which can be used more reliably to repre-sent feelings of security (Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2009b).

Section 1.3: Organization of the Report

Chapter Two analyzes issues relating to nuclear security by addressing the following three inquiries:

• How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?

• How are public beliefs about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence evolving?

• What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear weapons?

In Chapter Three, we focus on security from terrorism by addressing the fol-lowing questions:

• How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism changing, and how do they vary across demographic groups and political orientations?

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• How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures for preventing terrorism in-fluenced by threat perceptions and world views?

• How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent terrorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond to acts of terrorism, and how confident are they that we eventually will prevail in the struggle against terrorism?

Chapter Four analyzes multiple dimensions of energy and environmental se-curity by addressing the following inquiries:

• How is public knowledge of the global climate change issue related to support for reducing greenhouse gas emissions?

• How is public knowledge of energy issues related to preferences for future energy policies?

• How are comparative sources of energy perceived in terms of attributes, costs, risks, and preferences?

• How are public beliefs about nuclear energy structured?

Appendix One describes sampling, data collection, and associated research methods. We also provide illustrations of the demographic representativeness of respondents compared to US national population parameters.

Because there are many more survey questions than can be discussed in this report, we provide two appendices listing all the questions contained in our latest surveys. In Appendix Two, we provide a comprehensive listing of ques-tions asked in the survey on nuclear security and terrorism. Response frequen-cies and central tendencies are displayed.

Appendix Three provides a comprehensive listing of questions asked in our survey on energy and environmental security. Here too, we describe distribu-tions of responses and central tendencies.

Chapter Two Nuclear Security

We begin our analyses by addressing the following three nuclear security issues.

• How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?

• How are public beliefs about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence evolving?

• What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear weapons?

Section 2.1: Assessing Nuclear Proliferation Threats

o address perceived risks of nuclear proliferation, we begin with the following general assessment of the threat of nuclear weapons spread-ing to additional countries.

S15: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk that nuclear weapons will spread to other countries within the next ten years?

TThe distribution of responses in 2009 is shown in Figure 2.1, and trends in mean responses since 2005 are charted in Figure 2.2.1

Figure 2.1: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Additional Countries: 2009

1 Phone and Internet responses are combined for all trend displays.

1 1 23

5

11 11

17 17 8

23

0

5

10 15 20 25 30

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

%

No Risk Extreme Risk

S15: Mean = 7.21

22

Figure 2.2: Mean Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Additional States

As shown in Figure 2.1, three out of four respondents in 2009 rate the risk of further nuclear proliferation above midscale, with the highest scale value of ten being the modal response. Figure 2.2 shows that mean judgments of proliferation risks have consistently been placed above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale. In five measurement periods, mean assessments have varied only between 7.56 and 7.21, representing a mere 3.5 percent of the available scale.

Perhaps the two states causing the most international concern in recent years about efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are North Korea and Iran. North Korea purportedly conducted nuclear test explosions in 2006 and 2009, and Iran is vigorously pursuing uranium enrichment capabilities that could be used to produce weapon-grade nuclear materials. To explore pub-lic concerns about both countries, we pose the following questions investi-gating public risk perceptions about nuclear conflict between the United States and North Korea or Iran. Trends in mean responses since 2005 for each state are charted in Figure 2.3

S16/S20 (separate questions asked for each state): Now consider the case of North Korea (Iran). For this question, assume that North Korea (Iran) pos-sesses nuclear weapons. On the scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk of the US being in-volved in a nuclear war with North Korea (Iran) within the next ten years?

7.41 7.56 7.40 7.22 7.21

0

2

4

6

8

10

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

xtreme Risk

No Risk

E

23

Figure 2.3: Mean Risks of Nuclear War Between the US and North Korea or Iran in Next Ten Years

First, note that all means in each measurement period are above midscale. Also note that North Korea’s first attempted nuclear test explosion in Octo-ber 2006 (after our survey of that year) which produced disputed results of whether a full nuclear explosion was obtained was associated with only a modest increase in threat by our subsequent measurement period one year later in 2007. During the period from 2006 to 2008, Iran was judged, on av-erage, to be a higher risk. North Korea’s second nuclear test was reported on May 25, 2009, shortly before our latest survey began, and likely is associ-ated with a significant increase in perceived risk compared to the previous measure in 2008 (p < .0001).2 These comparative trends suggest that re-spondents in five measurement periods judge the risk of US nuclear conflict with North Korea or Iran in the coming decade to be substantial and grow-ing. Between 2005 and 2009, perceived risks of nuclear conflict with North Korea increased about 12 percent, while risks of nuclear war with Iran grew about 19 percent. While Iran—which has yet to demonstrate a nuclear test explosion—is judged the higher risk in three of the five survey periods, by 2009 both countries are perceived to pose similar levels of risk of nuclear conflict with the United States.

2 Throughout this study, we report the results of analyses of variance (ANOVAs) in terms of p-value, which is a measure of the probability that differences in means would have oc-curred by chance. In this report, statistical significance is attributed to those differences that would have occurred by chance fewer than five times in 100 (equivalent to a 95 percent confidence level). However, statistical significance does not always equate to policy rele-vance. The importance of statistically significant differences in means must be judged in the context of the variables being measured and the groups being compared.

5.68

5.54 5.65 5.66

6.37

5.1

5.896.31

6.1

6.27

67

0

2

4

6

8

10

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Iran

North Korea

Extreme Risk

No Risk

24

Next we ask the following questions regarding the risk that North Korea or Iran might provide nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists.

S17/S21 (separate questions asked for each state): Again, assuming that North Korea (Iran) possesses nuclear weapons and using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk of North Korea (Iran) providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?

In Figure 2.4 we compare trends in mean risk assessments.

Figure 2.4: Mean Risks of North Korea or Iran Providing Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Materials to Terrorists

Though all means are well above midscale, Iran is judged in each measure-ment period to pose the greater risk of providing nuclear weapons or mate-rials to terrorist groups. Mean perceived risks increase about five percent for each country between 2005 and 2009.

Beginning in 2006, we added inquiries about public support for using mili-tary force to compel North Korea or Iran to abandon nuclear weapons pro-grams. As shown below, both lines of inquiry assume that diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to cause either state to abandon nuclear weapons ambitions. The first option includes the use of US military forces acting as part of a United Nations coalition; the second question asks about using US military forces unilaterally. We compare trends in mean responses to each question and for each country in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.

6.87 6.68 6.83

7.12 7.6

6.84 7.20

6 7.54 7.67 7.48

2008 2009

North Korea

xtreme Risk

No Risk 0

2

4

6

8

10

2005 2006 2007

Iran

E

25

S18/S22 (separate questions asked for each state): On a scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how would you feel about using US military forces, as part of a United Nations military coalition, to compel North Korea (Iran) to abandon its nuclear weap-ons program if diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?

S19/S23 (separate questions asked for each state): Again on a scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly sup-port, how would you feel about using US military forces, acting alone if nec-essary, to compel North Korea (Iran) to abandon its nuclear weapons program if diplomatic efforts fail and the United Nations declines to take such action?

Figure 2.5: Mean Support for Using US Forces as Part of a UN Military Coalition to Force North Korea or Iran to Abandon Nuclear Weapons Programs

Figure 2.6: Mean Support for Using US Military Forces Unilaterally to Force North Korea or Iran to Abandon Nuclear Weapons Programs

3.42 3.493.72

4.303.70 3.70

3.974.44

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2006 2007 2008 2009

trongly Support

y

Iran

North Korea

S

StronglOppose

4.39 4.434.71

5.194.71 4.65 4.87

5.18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2006 2007 2008 2009

y

y ppose

StronglSupport

Iran

North Korea

StronglO

26

Both options for using force to compel North Korea or Iran to abandon their respective nuclear weapons programs show similar trends, with mean support for US participation in UN coalitional efforts being significantly higher in ab-solute terms for all measurement periods than mean support for unilateral US military actions. Note that in most surveys, mean support within either option is somewhat higher for compelling Iran than for compelling North Korea to forego nuclear weapons capabilities. Note also the upward direction for all four trend lines. Support for coalitional action against Iran increases about ten percent between 2006 and 2009 while that for action against North Korea in-creases about 18 percent over the same period, and all means are above mid-scale. Similarly, support for unilateral US military actions against Iran grows about 20 percent, while support for unilateral actions against North Korea in-creases almost 26 percent, and mean support for each moves from below to above midscale. These data do not suggest that most Americans favor either form of military action at this time, but they do suggest growing public sup-port for future military actions if diplomatic and economic efforts to prevent either country to have nuclear weapons continue to be unsuccessful.

Short Answer

Q: How concerned are Americans about nuclear proliferation, and how do they assess the cases of North Korea and Iran?

Mean public assessments of the risks of further nuclear proliferation to addi-tional countries steadily have been rated above a value of seven on a zero-to-ten scale since our first measurement in 2005. When asked to assess risks of nuclear conflict with North Korea or Iran, assessments in 2009 are well above midscale and have increased 12 percent for North Korea and 19 percent for Iran since 2005. Risks of North Korea or Iran providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups also are rated high in absolute terms (above seven on a zero-to-ten scale) and have grown by about five percent for each country since 2005. When asked to consider the use of US military forces to compel North Korea or Iran to abandon nuclear weapons programs, mean support is significantly higher for participating as part of a UN military coalition than for acting unilaterally, and support for using military force against Iran is some-what higher than for acting against North Korea. Mean support for participat-ing in a military coalition grew by 18 percent against North Korea and by ten percent against Iran between 2006 and 2009. While lower in absolute terms,

27

support has increased even more sharply for acting unilaterally against either state should diplomatic and economic efforts fail.

Section 2.2: Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence

here are two interrelated questions associated with better under-standing how public judgments of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence may be evolving. One question is: deterrence for what purposes?

And the other is: deterring who? In answering either, assumptions must be made about the other.

TDeterring Other States

Our most extensive measures about nuclear deterrence assume the object of deterrence is one or more other states. Our inquiries into the purposes for which deterrence is sought are: (a) preventing the use of nuclear weapons against us; (b) preventing the use of other weapons of mass destruction against us; and (c) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear materi-als to other states or to non-state groups. We begin with the question for which we have the longest time series. We have asked the following question in each of our surveys since 1995. Mean responses are charted in Figure 2.7.

S24: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten means extremely important, how important do you believe US nuclear weapons are for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today?

Figure 2.7: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Other Countries from Using Nuclear Weapons Against Us

Not At All Important

xtremely E

7.60 7.41 7.66 7.62 7.47 7.16 7.13 7.17 7.28 7.33

0

2

4

6

8

10

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

Important

28

All means are above a value of seven and vary over only about five percent of the scale. In the post-Cold War security environment in which the two major nuclear arsenals have been substantially reduced and the risk of inter-state nuclear war is judged by most to have decreased from the nuclear standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, mean valuations of US nu-clear weapons for purposes of deterring use by other states has declined only 3.6 percent in 14 years. This illustrates that our respondents continue to judge the efficacy of interstate nuclear deterrence to be substantial.

In 1999 we began asking the following similar question about the impor-tance of US nuclear weapons for deterring other countries from using other types of weapons of mass destruction. Means are compared in Figure 2.8.

S26: How important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today?

Figure 2.8: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Other Countries from Using Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us

Extremely

6.57

6.03 6.08 6.14 6.13 6.21 6.69 6.74

0

2

4

6

8

10

1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

Important

Not At All Important

Again, all means are above midscale and public views of the mean impor-tance of US nuclear weapons for deterring the use of chemical or biological weapons against us has increased about three percent since 1999.

The third purpose (at the state level) for which nuclear deterrence might have utility relates to preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists. We have asked the following question annually since 2005. We show mean responses in Figure 2.9.

29

S25: On the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US nuclear weap-ons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists today?

Figure 2.9: Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Others From Providing Nuclear Weapons or Materials to Terrorists

Extremely

Here too, we find a similar pattern, with all means above midscale and a slight trend upward of about three percent.

These trends in mean responses suggest that our participants continue to view US nuclear weapons as important for deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation by other countries.

Deterring Nonstate Groups

The rise of nonstate entities capable of conducting terrorist strikes raises the important question of what role, if any, US nuclear weapons might play in deterring the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by such groups. Deterrence theory generally posits two requirements for effective deterrence. First, attribution to a high degree of certainty of who used nu-clear or other mass casualty weapons must be likely, and second, unavoid-able retribution that would be unacceptable to the initiator must be inescap-able. The difficulties of determining the source of a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials employed by nonstate terrorist groups and the difficulties of holding at risk resources of such groups make deterring them problem-atic. To measure how ordinary Americans perceive the utility of nuclear

6.03 5.72 5.97

0

2

4

6

8

10

2005 2006 2007

Important

6.19 6.24

2008 2009

Not At All Important

30

deterrence of such groups, in 2008 and 2009 we added the following ques-tions to our series on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence.

Lead-in: So far we have been asking you about deterring actions by other countries. Now we want you to consider the importance of US nuclear weap-ons for deterring terrorist groups that may have members from several differ-ent countries and may operate from multiple locations.

• S27: Using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten means extremely important, how important are US nu-clear weapons for preventing terrorist groups from using nuclear weapons against us today?

• S28: Again, on the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US nu-clear weapons for preventing terrorist groups from using chemical or bio-logical weapons against us today?

In Figures 2.10 and 2.11, we show distributions of responses and mean val-ues in 2008 and 2009.

Figure 2.10: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Terrorists from Using Nuclear Weapons Against Us

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2008: 5.98

2009: 6.34

Means

p = .0006

%

Not At All Important

Extremely Important

31

Figure 2.11: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Terrorists from Using Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us

Though many experts and analysts might disagree, most of our respondents consider US nuclear weapons to have nontrivial utility for deterring terrorist groups from employing weapons of mass destruction against us, with modal responses for both questions being the highest scale value of ten and means for both questions in both years being above midscale.

Relating Age and Cold War Experience to Valuing Nuclear Deterrence

Though the data presented above suggest that ordinary Americans continue to value US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, might those valuations evolve as the Cold War era fades in memory and an increasing proportion of the population comes to maturity without having experienced the Cold War as adults? When we began our investigations of the efficacy of nuclear deter-rence in 1995, only eight percent of respondents had not experienced some part of the Cold War as adults (defined as 18 years or older). By the time of our latest survey in 2009, 28 percent lacked Cold War experience as adults. As the Cold War recedes into history, will individuals who did not experi-ence it as adults value nuclear deterrence differently than those who coped with its nuclear tensions? If so, Cold War experience might become an im-portant cohort factor for future public valuation of nuclear security. Unfortu-nately, answering this question is not as simple as comparing measures among those who did and did not live through some portion of the Cold War as adults. Comparisons are complicated by the systematic effects of increas-

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2008: 5.77

2009: 6.16

Means

p = .0004

%

Not At All Important

Extremely Important

32

ing age—regardless of the experiences it encompasses. After controlling for gender, education, race/ethnicity, income, and ideology, age exerts a system-atic effect on valuations of the efficacy of deterrence. As age increases, per-ceived importance of nuclear deterrence also increases. To illustrate, we combine data from all our surveys between 1995 and 2009 to focus on the central deterrence question asked in each of the surveys—the importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring other countries from using nuclear weap-ons against us (Figure 2.7). After controlling for other demographics and for political ideology, as age increases one year (beginning with age 18), valua-tions of US nuclear weapons for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons increase 0.02 points on the zero-to-ten scale (p < .0001). This means that valuations of nuclear deterrence increase 1.24 points or 12.4 percent be-tween the ages of 18 and 80.3

Our next step is to illustrate the cold war experience factor without control-ling for the effects of chronological age. In Figure 2.12 we compare mean responses to our question about the importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring other states from using nuclear weapons among those in each sur-vey period who did and those who did not experience the Cold War as adults.

Figure 2.12: Mean Importance of Nuclear Deterrence Among Those Who Did and Did Not Experience the Cold War as Adults (Not Controlling for Age)

7.63 7.447.72 7.69 7.57

7.34 7.41 7.37 7.517.58

7.11 7.0

7.19 7.336.91

6.29 6.29 6.5

7

3 However, the relationship is not linear. Below ages in the mid-thirties, rates of increase are slower per year of age; among ages between the mid-thirties and mid-seventies, in-creases are greater per year of age; and at ages beyond the mid-seventies, assessed impor-tance of nuclear deterrence begins to decline.

2 6.546.72

5

6

7

8

9

10

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

Experienced Cold War as Adults

Did Not Experience Cold War as Adults

0 = Not At All Important—10 = Extremely Important

idscaleM

33

Notice that only the top half of the response scale is depicted. Differences in means between the two groups are statistically significant for each meas-urement period except for 1997 and 2001.

Our final step in this analysis employs combined data from all our surveys and uses multivariate regressions in which the predictor variables include demographics, political ideology, and a dummy variable coded such that those respondents who did not experience the Cold War as adults are as-signed a value of one, and all others are coded zero.4 These regressions in-dicate the influence of not having experienced the Cold War, while control-ling for chronological age, other demographic factors, and ideology. Regression results are summarized in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Multiple Regressions Predicting Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Deterring Nuclear Use by Other Countries (S24) Combined Data: 1995–2009 (n = 15,401)

Independent Variables

Coefficient(Slope)

t-Value

p-Value

Age (18–100) 0.02 9.05

of Americans who did not experience the Cold War as adults grows, public valuations of interstate nuclear deterrence may slowly erode.

Short Answer

Q: How are public beliefs about the efficacy of US nuclear deterrence evolving?

Public assessments of the contemporary efficacy of nuclear deterrence are nu-anced. When the objects of deterrence are other countries, most respondents assign generally high, but differentiated, valuations to US nuclear weapons for different deterrence purposes. Using a scale from zero (not at all important) to ten (extremely important), participants rate the mean importance of US nu-clear weapons for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against us at well above a value of seven. The mean importance of US nuclear weapons for (a) deterring other countries from using chemical or biological weapons, or (b) for deterring other countries from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups is rated substantially lower, but each is above a value of six on the same scale. The mean importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring terrorist groups from using weapons of mass destruction is statis-tically significantly lower still, but remains above midscale.

The mean importance of nuclear deterrence systematically increases with age (but not monotonically) and systematically decreases among those respon-dents who did not experience the Cold War as adults. Because the net effect of Cold War experience potentially may be greater than that for chronologi-cal age, public valuations of US nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes may slowly erode as the number of Americans who experienced some por-tion of the Cold War as adults declines.

Section 2.3: Preferences for the Future of US Nuclear Weapons

o better understand public preference about the future of US nuclear weapons, we pose questions and analyze responses relating to the following issues:

• Importance assigned to US nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence

T 35

• Support for retaining US nuclear weapons and for investing in associated infrastructures

• Public preferences for the number of operationally deployed US strategic nuclear weapons and conditions for reducing below the level of 1,700 cur-rently agreed to with Russia

• General impressions about prospects for modernizing the US nuclear arsenal

Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Purposes Other Than Deterrence

To track trends in public valuations of US nuclear weapons for non-deterrence purposes, we have been making the following inquiry since 1993. The trend in mean responses is graphed in Figure 2.13.

S29: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten means extremely important, how important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US influence and status as a world leader?

Figure 2.13: Mean Importance of Nuclear Weapons for US Influence and Status

In each measurement period, mean responses are well above midscale and the mean importance of nuclear weapons for US influence and status has grown about 15 percent since 1993.

In 2005 we began asking the following related question.

6.18 6.53 6.466.88 7.00

0

2

4

6

8

10

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

Not At All

6.93 6.74

6.88

6.75

6.90

7.14

2003 ‘0 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09portant

tremely portant

ExIm

Im

36

S30: Using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all im-portant and ten means extremely important, how important are nuclear weap-ons for maintaining US military superiority?

Again we chart mean responses in Figure 2.14.

Figure 2.14: Mean Importance of Nuclear Weapons for US Military Superiority

When considering the importance of US nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority, the trend is similar, with all means above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale. Clearly, US nuclear weapons are judged by our respondents to have value beyond nuclear deterrence for such things as influence, status, and military superiority. Eighteen years into the post-Cold War security environment, we detect no lessening of the importance most Americans attach to US nuclear weapons.

Given these valuations of US nuclear capabilities, how important do par-ticipants think it is to retain US nuclear weapons today? We chart the trend in mean responses to the following question in Figure 2.15.

S33: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all important and ten means extremely important, how important is it for the US to retain nuclear weapons today?

7.08 7.13 7.07

0

2

4

6

8

10

2005 2006 2007

Not At All

7.22 7.32

2008 2009portant

tremely portant

ExIm

Im

37

Figure 2.15: Mean Importance of Retaining US Nuclear Weapons Today

Contrary to our initial expectations when we began this series, mean assess-ments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons increased about 15 percent between 1993 and 2009. In the early post-Cold War period, mean assessments grew steadily to a peak measured immediately following the ter-rorist attacks of 9/11. After an initial adjustment following those events, means stabilized above a value of seven on the zero-to-ten scale.

Given the trends in perceived utilities of US nuclear weapons for deterrence and other purposes previously displayed, how supportive are citizens of sus-taining investments in nuclear weapons capabilities? Based on focus group discussions, we expect relatively few members of the general pubic to be well-informed about spending levels in various nuclear investment catego-ries. It is challenging even for experts to track investments in nuclear weap-ons infrastructures across dozens of funding categories and among many different government agencies. And assessing what people are willing to spend for “goods” of any type is a challenging endeavor requiring econo-metric techniques such as contingent valuation. But even if imprecise, hav-ing directional impressions about public support for investing in nuclear weapons capabilities can be useful for policy considerations. To provide general directional trend information about public support for investing in nuclear weapons infrastructures, we have posed the following question in each of our surveys since 1993.

S50: On a scale from one to seven, where one means spending should sub-stantially decrease and seven means spending should substantially increase,

6.59 6.787.19 7.5

7.75

0

2

4

6

8

10

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

Not At All

7.30 7.45

7.45 7.51

7.40 7.55

2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

tremely portant

ExIm

Important

38

how should government spending change for maintaining the ability to de-velop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future?

Most respondents do not begin from a position of knowing the level of cur-rent spending, and they are not told to what levels spending might increase or decrease. They are not forced to consider trade-offs among competing investments (opportunity costs), and they are not told to assume any addi-tional burden in terms of taxes or per-capita costs. Accordingly, results are not careful calibrations of spending choices, and we do not interpret them as indicating support for or opposition to any given spending level. Mean re-sponses are gross directional indicators of the general sense respondents have about investing in the infrastructures associated with the US nuclear arsenal. In figure 2.16 we chart the trend in mean responses.

Figure 2.16: Mean Judgments of How Spending Should Change for US Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure

Means above midscale suggest a general receptivity to proposals for in-creasing investments in nuclear weapons infrastructures; those below mid-scale suggest a general sense that such investments ought to decrease. The trend shows that from our initial measurement in 1993 to the period imme-diately following 9/11, mean support for nuclear weapons investments grew steadily to well above midscale. Following 9/11, mean support for such in-vestments declined and stabilized just above midscale, suggesting neither a strong public sense that investments in nuclear weapons infrastructures should increase nor decrease. Note that the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 did not produce a declining willingness to invest in US nuclear weap-

3.68 4.00

4.454.78 5.02

4.47

4.05

4.33

4.18 4.18

4.33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

Substantially

Substantially Decrease

Increase

39

ons capabilities. In fact the mean in 2009 is higher than in 2007 or 2008, matching that last recorded in 2006, well before the declining economic en-vironment. This pattern suggests that policies for modifying such invest-ments may be more elastic and accommodating than reactive to the eco-nomic climate.

Public Preferences for Sizing the US Nuclear Arsenal

In 2008 and 2009, we employed a multistage approach to investigate how many nuclear weapons are perceived to be sufficient. In the first stage, we provide respondents with a shared basic factual foundation using the fol-lowing statement:

Lead-in: Currently the US and Russia have more nuclear weapons than any other countries. The US and Russia have agreed to reduce their numbers of operation-ally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by the year 2012.

In stage two, we present respondents with the following opposing argu-ments appearing in random order.

Some people argue that since the end of the Cold War, US nuclear weapons have become much less important for our security and that of our allies. They argue that the US needs only a few hundred strategic nuclear weapons to pre-vent other countries or terrorist groups from using nuclear weapons against us or our key allies that do not have nuclear weapons such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. They think money spent on maintaining a large US nuclear arsenal should be substantially reduced.

Some people argue that because nuclear weapons have spread to other coun-tries such as India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea, and because Iran and some terrorist groups may be seeking nuclear weapons, it would be unwise for the US to reduce below 1,700 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons currently agreed to with Russia. They think money spent on the US nuclear arsenal must be sustained to prevent others from using nuclear weap-ons against us, and to reduce the need for our key allies to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

In the final stage of the inquiry, we pose the following question:

S35: Assuming zero is the minimum number and 2,200 is the maximum num-ber, how many operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons do you think

40

the United States needs to prevent other countries or terrorist groups from us-ing nuclear weapons against us and our key allies?

Note that the response range is bounded by zero at the low end and by the existing agreement with Russia at the high end. Responses are recorded verbatim; values above 2,200 cannot be entered, but any number between zero and 2,200 is accepted. We display distributions of responses from 2008 and 2009 grouped into categories of 200 each in Figure 2.17.

Figure 2.17: Preferred Number of US Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Weapons

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0 1- 200

201-400

401-600

601-800

801-1000

1001-1200

1201-1400

1401-1600

1601- 1800

1801- 2000

2001- 2200

%

2008: Mean = 1,425 / Median = 1,700 2009: Mean = 1,342 / Median = 1,500

In 2009, ten percent of respondents choose zero; 25 percent choose a range between one and 500; 13 percent select values of 501–1,000; 13 percent prefer a number from 1,001–1,500; 23 percent select a value from 1,501–2,000; and 27 percent choose the modal response of 2,001–2,200.5

To help gage opinions about conditions warranting reductions below the lower limit of 1,700, we posed four randomly ordered policy statements and asked participants in 2008 and 2009 to respond to them on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). We show each statement and corresponding mean responses in Table 2.2.

5 Responses to similar question in previous surveys in which upper boundaries were not specified suggest that some respondents would have selected higher numbers had those response options been available.

41

Table 2.2: Mean Stockpile Policy Preferences (1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

2008 2009

S36: The US should not reduce the level of its nuclear stockpile below the level of any other country.

5.13 5.10

S37: The US should decrease the numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the planned minimum of 1,700 if Russia agrees to similar reductions that are verifiable.

4.09 4.07

S38: The US should continue to reduce the numbers of operationally de-ployed strategic nuclear weapons below 1,700, even if Russia does not.

3.05 3.11

S39: Having large numbers of nuclear weapons is no longer necessary. As long as we have a few dozen nuclear weapons, we can prevent others from using nuclear weapons against us and our key allies.

3.36 3.33

S40: Regardless of what others do, the US should eliminate all its nuclear weapons as soon as possible. This would put the US in a position of moral leadership by setting an example for others; it would bring the US into compliance with a key objective of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and it would make the world safer.

2.65 2.74

Mean responses to these five policy options suggest that participants are open to reducing below 1,700 operationally deployed US strategic nuclear weapons if Russia agrees to matching reductions that are verifiable. How-ever, most do not want the US to have a smaller nuclear arsenal than any other country, and mean support is below midscale for reducing unilaterally below 1,700. Proposals for very low numbers approaching zero are opposed by most respondents.

Public Preferences for Modernizing the US Nuclear Arsenal

To better understand public views on the advisability of modernizing the US nuclear arsenal, we again employed a three stage inquiry in 2008 and 2009. We begin by providing the following shared basic statement of fact:

Lean-in: Existing US nuclear weapons were designed to meet needs during the Cold War when the Soviet Union was our primary adversary. They remain safe and effective, but are aging and expensive to maintain and refurbish. Currently we spend about 6.5 billion dollars per year maintaining the US nuclear stock-pile and associated infrastructure. New nuclear weapons could be designed and

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built with different goals, including making them safer and cheaper to maintain over the long-term, but new nuclear weapons are controversial.

Following the introductory statement of fact, we present the following ran-domly ordered opposing perspectives:

Supporters of new US nuclear weapons argue that they would be safer and more reliable; they would be better suited to our current security needs; we would need fewer of them; and over the life of the weapons, they would cost less than maintaining and refurbishing our current stockpile. They also note that new nuclear weapons could be developed without nuclear testing.

Opponents of new US nuclear weapons argue that they would stimulate a new nuclear arms race, encourage the spread of nuclear weapons to more coun-tries, and be expensive to develop. They argue that even if existing nuclear weapons do cost more in the long-run, developing new nuclear weapons sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world.

After providing a factual baseline and summarizing key opposing argu-ments, we ask participants the following question:

S46: On a scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about developing new US nuclear weapons?

Figure 2.18: Views on Developing New US Nuclear Weapons

0

5

10

15

20

25

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2008: 4.43

2009: 4.56

Means

p = .0326

Strongly Oppose

Strongly Support

%

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About 24 percent of respondents in 2009 oppose the option of developing new US nuclear weapons; another 24 percent are undecided or neutral; while 53 percent express support for the option. To test sensitivity of sup-port to cost factors, we follow this inquiry with one that tells respondents to assume that developing new nuclear weapons would allow the US to reduce life cycle costs of its nuclear weapons and associated infrastructures by one-third to one-half. Under those assumptions, support grows in 2009 from 52 percent to 62 percent, and the mean response increases significantly from 4.56 to 4.98 (p < .0001). Results suggest that public views on modernizing the US nuclear arsenal vary predictably with cost/savings assumptions.

To monitor trend information on willingness to invest in new nuclear weap-ons, we have been asking the following question since 1993:

S48: On a scale from one to seven, where one means spending should sub-stantially decrease and seven means spending should substantially increase, how should government spending change for developing and testing new nu-clear weapons?

We display the trend in mean responses in Figure 2.19.

Figure 2.19: How Government Spending Should Change for Developing and Testing New Nuclear Weapons (Means)

When we began asking this question only 18 months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most participants preferred that spending decrease for de-veloping and testing new nuclear weapons. Between then and our latest measurement in 2009, mean support grew by a substantial 48 percent to

2.77 2.613.13

3.453.79

3.42 3.66

4.06

3.82 3.97

4.11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09

ubstantially Increase

ubstantially Decrease

S

S

44

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slightly above midscale, registering our highest mean level of support to date. This trend, combined with the mean of 4.56 shown in Figure 2.18, suggests that public support for investing in new US nuclear weapons has evolved from opposition in the early post-Cold War years to a more accommodating position today. This trend is even more surprising when considering that growing public support has been sustained through recent and contemporary downturns in general economic conditions. While these data do not reflect widespread support for increasing such investments, multiple samples of the general public over a 16 year period of the post-Cold War era indicate sus-tained and even growing public willingness to consider modernizing the US nuclear arsenal—even in the face of difficult economic times.

Short Answer

Q: What are public preferences for the future of US nuclear weapons?

In addition to nuclear deterrence, Americans continue to believe US nuclear weapons are important for maintaining US military superiority and interna-tional influence. Support for retaining US nuclear weapons averages about 7.5 on a 0–10 scale and has increased about 15 percent since 1993. When asked to size the US nuclear arsenal between zero and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the average preference in 2009 is 1,342, with ten percent preferring zero and 26 percent preferring 2,200. Re-spondents are open to reducing below 1,700 if Russia agrees to matching and verifiable levels, but most do not want the US to have fewer than any other country. Mean support for investing in US nuclear weapons infra-structure is above midscale and has increased about 18 percent since 1993. When presented with balanced arguments for and against modernizing the US nuclear stockpile, 52 percent support developing new nuclear weapons, 24 percent are undecided, and 24 percent oppose new weapons. Support for investing in nuclear weapons infrastructure or in new nuclear weapons has not declined in the face of difficult economic conditions.

Chapter Three Security from Terrorism

In this chapter we address public views on the following questions about security from terrorism:

• How are public assessments of the threat of terrorism changing, and how do they vary across demographic groups and political orientations?

• How is tolerance for intrusive domestic measures for preventing terrorism influenced by threat perceptions and world views?

• How do members of the public rate domestic efforts to prevent terrorism in the US, how do they assess our abilities to respond to acts of terrorism, and how confident are they that we eventually will prevail in the struggle against terrorism?

Section 3.1: Evolving Public Assessments of the Threat of Terrorism

ssessing public concerns about terrorism in a useful manner requires over time measurements of multiple dimensions of potential threats. In 2008 we began asking a battery of questions involving overall

perceived threats of terrorism in the US and abroad, as well as perspectives of how the overall threat might evolve in the coming decade. Additionally, we inquire about more specific dimensions of the terrorist threat to include weapons of mass destruction and suicide bombings. Responses to the follow-ing battery of eight terrorism threat questions provide the basis for tracking trends as well as examining specific dimensions of perceived threats.

A

Lead-in: The following questions focus specifically on the issue of terrorism. For each, please consider both the likelihood of terrorism and its potential consequences. Each is answered on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat and ten means extreme threat.

• S53: Remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential conse-quences, how do you rate the overall threat of terrorism of all types throughout the world today?

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• S54: Focusing more specifically on our own country, and considering both foreign and domestic sources of terrorism, how do you rate the threat of all kinds of terrorism in the United States today?

• S55: Narrowing our focus to the threat of nuclear terrorism, how do you rate the threat of terrorists creating a nuclear explosion in the United States today?

• S56: So-called “dirty” bombs are devices that use conventional explosives to scatter radioactive materials. How do you rate the threat of terrorists us-ing a dirty bomb in the United States today?

• S57: Biological devices are used to spread biological agents such as germs and viruses. How do you rate the threat of terrorists using a biological de-vice in the United States today?

• S58: Chemical terrorism could result from terrorist attacks on US chemical installations or by terrorists purposely dispensing dangerous chemical agents. How do you rate the threat of chemical terrorism in the United States today?

• S59: How do you rate the threat of suicide