American Democracy Reconsidered

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American Democracy Reconsidered: Part IAuthor(s): L. J. SharpeSource: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1973), pp. 1-28Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/193591

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B.J.Pol.S. 3, I-28Printed n GreatBritain

American Democracy Reconsidered: Part IL. J. SHARPE*

We allude particularly to the municipal institutions; which ... as might have beenexpected,are thevery ountain-headf Americandemocracy, nd theprincipal auseofall that is valuable n its influences:but, of whichEnglish ravellers, race who haveeyes and see not, ears and hear not, have not so much as perceived he existence.J. S.MillIn his celebrated study of American democracy written in 1888, Lord Brycereservedhis most condemnatoryreflections for city governmentand in a much-quoted passageasserted:'There is no denyingthat the governmentof cities is theone conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the Nationalgovernmenttell but little for evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of theState governmentsare insignificant comparedwith the extravagance,corruptionand mismanagementwhich mark the administrationof most of the greatcities'.1This paper does not attempt the daunting task of bringing Bryce up to date;rather,it has the more limited objectivesof examiningsome of the main charac-teristics of the American system of urban governmenttoday and the concepts ofdemocracy that inform it, and of posing the question 'Is it democratic?' ratherthan 'Is it bad?' in the Bryceansense.The paperwill focus on American city government, but becausein the UnitedStates 'the connection between local and national politics is peculiarlyclose' andthe study of city politics 'affords exceptional opportunities to generalizeaboutAmerican political culture, American democracy and democracy in general'2 tmay be assumed that much of what is said will apply to American governmentgenerally.Moreover, the discussion will in any case inevitably embracesome ofthe relevantliterature on national governmentand democratictheory generally.Sinceall accountsthat are of anyvalue of thepolitical systemof anothercountry* NuffieldCollege,Oxford.This article s theproductof a congenialsabbaticalyearspentatQueen'sUniversity n Canadaandis based on a papergivenat the CanadianPoliticalScienceAssociationConferenceheld at StJohn's,Newfoundland n I97I. Many peoplehaveread andcommentedon it; too manyto mentionallof them ndividually.But I would iketo mention hefollowing whose help went well beyondthe normalline of duty: BrianBarry,Lewis Gunn,StevenKotler,HansLovink,W. J. M. Mackenzie,JohnMeisel andFrankSmallwood.PartIof the articleappears n this numberof theJournal;PartII andthe Conclusionswill appear nthenext number.1J. Bryce,TheAmericanCommonwealthNewYork: Macmillan,I899),Vol. II, p. 281.2Both quotationsare taken from E. Banfield and J. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 2.

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B.J.Pol.S. 3, I-28Printed n GreatBritain

American Democracy Reconsidered: Part IL. J. SHARPE*

We allude particularly to the municipal institutions; which ... as might have beenexpected,are thevery ountain-headf Americandemocracy, nd theprincipal auseofall that is valuable n its influences:but, of whichEnglish ravellers, race who haveeyes and see not, ears and hear not, have not so much as perceived he existence.J. S.MillIn his celebrated study of American democracy written in 1888, Lord Brycereservedhis most condemnatoryreflections for city governmentand in a much-quoted passageasserted:'There is no denyingthat the governmentof cities is theone conspicuous failure of the United States. The deficiencies of the Nationalgovernmenttell but little for evil on the welfare of the people. The faults of theState governmentsare insignificant comparedwith the extravagance,corruptionand mismanagementwhich mark the administrationof most of the greatcities'.1This paper does not attempt the daunting task of bringing Bryce up to date;rather,it has the more limited objectivesof examiningsome of the main charac-teristics of the American system of urban governmenttoday and the concepts ofdemocracy that inform it, and of posing the question 'Is it democratic?' ratherthan 'Is it bad?' in the Bryceansense.The paperwill focus on American city government, but becausein the UnitedStates 'the connection between local and national politics is peculiarlyclose' andthe study of city politics 'affords exceptional opportunities to generalizeaboutAmerican political culture, American democracy and democracy in general'2 tmay be assumed that much of what is said will apply to American governmentgenerally.Moreover, the discussion will in any case inevitably embracesome ofthe relevantliterature on national governmentand democratictheory generally.Sinceall accountsthat are of anyvalue of thepolitical systemof anothercountry* NuffieldCollege,Oxford.This article s theproductof a congenialsabbaticalyearspentatQueen'sUniversity n Canadaandis based on a papergivenat the CanadianPoliticalScienceAssociationConferenceheld at StJohn's,Newfoundland n I97I. Many peoplehaveread andcommentedon it; too manyto mentionallof them ndividually.But I would iketo mention hefollowing whose help went well beyondthe normalline of duty: BrianBarry,Lewis Gunn,StevenKotler,HansLovink,W. J. M. Mackenzie,JohnMeisel andFrankSmallwood.PartIof the articleappears n this numberof theJournal;PartII andthe Conclusionswill appear nthenext number.1J. Bryce,TheAmericanCommonwealthNewYork: Macmillan,I899),Vol. II, p. 281.2Both quotationsare taken from E. Banfield and J. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 2.

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2 SHARPESHARPE

are essentially comparative exercises with the observer's home country as the(usually unconscious) measuringrod, it may bejust as well to make this explicit.So the first part of this paper - Part I - will assess the democratic character ofAmerican city government by comparing it directly with that of my homecountry, Britain.Democracy is, of course, a notoriously difficult form of governmentto define,and no claim is made that the characteristics to be compared in Part I cover allaspects of democratic government; nor is any rank order of relative importanceattempted; rather,discussion will be confined to those aspects that are generallyregardedas being the hallmarks of American local democracy in the literature,especially the literature that compares the American and British systems. It ishoped that a sufficiently convincing primafacie case is made out in Part I to atleastjustify the question 'Is Americancity governmentdemocratic?'beingraised.Part II of the paper will drop explicit comparisons with Britain and concentrateon those broaderattributesof governmentthat, it will be argued,all democraticsystems should possess as prerequisites. Again thereis no attempt to be compre-hensive; the concepts discussedare those that seem to be missing, or only weaklyperceived, in the United States. This is the aim; the problem mentioned above ofthe inevitabilityof the home country's remainingthe unconscious measuringrodof course remains. It may be said in mitigation, however, that in lacking thesebasic attributesthe American system appearsto be less like those of other com-parableadvancedindustrialdemocracies than is the British.This may seem at firstglancea presumptuousandformidabletask, particularlyfor an outsider and an Englishman. Whatever else the American system maybe, it is usuallyconceded by most political scientists,American or otherwise,thatit is democraticand usually that it is more democratic than the systemin Britain.As thevirtual nventorsof modernrepresentativedemocracy, t is hardly surprisingthat Americans have an intense pride in their democratictraditions.As Dahl hasput it, in the United States 'the common view seems to be that our system is notonly democratic but is perhaps the most perfect expression of democracy thatexists anywhere'.3It seems likely that this peculiarly strong association in theUnited States between democracy and American society has meant that itspolitical practices, whatever these may be, must of necessity be thought to bedemocratic and thereforejustified.4The conditions of American society becamethe conditions of democracy: the one has become inextricablybound up with theother to an extent that would be unusual in other democracies. In this instance,then, it may be that the task is not so presumptuous as it appears and that theoutside observer may be better equipped to sit in judgement than the homeobserver.That this paperwill concentrateon urbangovernmentand not all local govern-ment needs special emphasis. What remainsof genuinelyrurallocal government

3 R. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, I96I), p. 316.4 'To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American', Dahl, WhoGoverns?p. 317.

are essentially comparative exercises with the observer's home country as the(usually unconscious) measuringrod, it may bejust as well to make this explicit.So the first part of this paper - Part I - will assess the democratic character ofAmerican city government by comparing it directly with that of my homecountry, Britain.Democracy is, of course, a notoriously difficult form of governmentto define,and no claim is made that the characteristics to be compared in Part I cover allaspects of democratic government; nor is any rank order of relative importanceattempted; rather,discussion will be confined to those aspects that are generallyregardedas being the hallmarks of American local democracy in the literature,especially the literature that compares the American and British systems. It ishoped that a sufficiently convincing primafacie case is made out in Part I to atleastjustify the question 'Is Americancity governmentdemocratic?'beingraised.Part II of the paper will drop explicit comparisons with Britain and concentrateon those broaderattributesof governmentthat, it will be argued,all democraticsystems should possess as prerequisites. Again thereis no attempt to be compre-hensive; the concepts discussedare those that seem to be missing, or only weaklyperceived, in the United States. This is the aim; the problem mentioned above ofthe inevitabilityof the home country's remainingthe unconscious measuringrodof course remains. It may be said in mitigation, however, that in lacking thesebasic attributesthe American system appearsto be less like those of other com-parableadvancedindustrialdemocracies than is the British.This may seem at firstglancea presumptuousandformidabletask, particularlyfor an outsider and an Englishman. Whatever else the American system maybe, it is usuallyconceded by most political scientists,American or otherwise,thatit is democraticand usually that it is more democratic than the systemin Britain.As thevirtual nventorsof modernrepresentativedemocracy, t is hardly surprisingthat Americans have an intense pride in their democratictraditions.As Dahl hasput it, in the United States 'the common view seems to be that our system is notonly democratic but is perhaps the most perfect expression of democracy thatexists anywhere'.3It seems likely that this peculiarly strong association in theUnited States between democracy and American society has meant that itspolitical practices, whatever these may be, must of necessity be thought to bedemocratic and thereforejustified.4The conditions of American society becamethe conditions of democracy: the one has become inextricablybound up with theother to an extent that would be unusual in other democracies. In this instance,then, it may be that the task is not so presumptuous as it appears and that theoutside observer may be better equipped to sit in judgement than the homeobserver.That this paperwill concentrateon urbangovernmentand not all local govern-ment needs special emphasis. What remainsof genuinelyrurallocal government

3 R. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, I96I), p. 316.4 'To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an American', Dahl, WhoGoverns?p. 317.


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AmericanDemocracyReconsideredmericanDemocracyReconsideredin most industrial countries seems to be a profoundly different animal to theurbanvariety. What may be said for one is almost certain to be wrong for theother and in many ways rural local government never quite seems like localgovernmentin the classical sense.5Any comparison of the urban government of even two countries faces theinevitable problem that there is a vast difference between differentcities withineach country under examination. Comprehendingthe pattern of urban govern-mentin one countryis an exercise n comparativegovernment n itself.Nowhere isthis more true than in the United States where each state has evolved over alengthy period its own inimitable style of urban government and where withineach state urbanareas have adopted differentforms so that even within one statemore variety may be apparent than in other national systems. Despite thesedifficulties, t is nonethelesspossible to discern a high degreeof unanimityamongprofessional observers,both among those who have sought to isolate the maincharacteristics of American urban government and among those who havecomparedthe two systems. It is probablytrue to say, however, that much of thisliterature,with the exception of some of the community power studies, excludesthe American Deep South. Similarly, most of the literature on British urbangovernment cited in this paper excludes Scotland and Northern Ireland: in thecase of Scotlandbecause relevant data is at presentscarce;in the case of NorthernIreland because its style of local politics appears to have little in common withthat of the rest of the United Kingdom. Until very recently in Northern Irelandfranchise restriction, gerrymanderingand religious discrimination were appar-ently rampant and it would be a charitable observer who could claim muchof the province's local governmentfor democracywithout demur.6

5Thiscertainlyeemsto be trueof localgovernmentnsomeruralareasof Britainwhicheventhecharitablewouldhavedifficultyn claiming ordemocracy, speciallyf theytook whatmaybe termedthe extremepositionof Dahl to the effectthatcompetitive lectionsare the sinequanonof democracy R. Dahl,Preface o DemocraticTheoryChicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,I956), pp. 131-2). In the deeplyruralshires,despitethe existenceof the formalframeworkofdemocracyor overthreequarters f a century,anythingupto 90opercentof theseats arenevercontested(the medianpercentageof uncontestedseats for all countiescalculatedby DouglasAshfordof CornellUniversity or theperiod1949-67wasalmost 60 percent)and it is possiblethat someindividual eats haveneverbeencontestedsincethecountycouncilswereestablishedin I888.In thesecountiesthere is no partysystemso there s little or no consistentoppositionto those in poweron the councilwhich is oftenrun by whatappears o be a self-perpetuatingsocial oligarchydrawnmostlyfromthe retiredserviceofficerclass,the landedgentryand thearistocracy.Publishedmaterialon thesecounties s scantybut for someindicationof the com-position of the councils see L. J. Sharpe,'Elected Representativesn Local Government',British Journalof Sociology, XIII I962), 189-209. Something of the flavour of the county style ofgovernment can be derived from J. M. Lee, Social Leaders and Public Persons (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, I963). See also B. Keith-Lucas's Epilogue to an edited version of J. Redlichand F. Hirst, The History of Local Government in England (London: Macmillan, I958); J.Stanyer, CountyGovernment n Englandand Wales(London: Routledge, I967) and R. Y. Pomfret,'Rural Oligarchies or Rural Democracy?' Rural District Review, LXIX1963).6 See C. O'Leary, 'Northern Ireland: The Politics of Illusion', Political Quarterly, XL (I969),307-15, and R. Rose, Governing WithoutConsensus (London: Faber, 1971), p. 441-2.

in most industrial countries seems to be a profoundly different animal to theurbanvariety. What may be said for one is almost certain to be wrong for theother and in many ways rural local government never quite seems like localgovernmentin the classical sense.5Any comparison of the urban government of even two countries faces theinevitable problem that there is a vast difference between differentcities withineach country under examination. Comprehendingthe pattern of urban govern-mentin one countryis an exercise n comparativegovernment n itself.Nowhere isthis more true than in the United States where each state has evolved over alengthy period its own inimitable style of urban government and where withineach state urbanareas have adopted differentforms so that even within one statemore variety may be apparent than in other national systems. Despite thesedifficulties, t is nonethelesspossible to discern a high degreeof unanimityamongprofessional observers,both among those who have sought to isolate the maincharacteristics of American urban government and among those who havecomparedthe two systems. It is probablytrue to say, however, that much of thisliterature,with the exception of some of the community power studies, excludesthe American Deep South. Similarly, most of the literature on British urbangovernment cited in this paper excludes Scotland and Northern Ireland: in thecase of Scotlandbecause relevant data is at presentscarce;in the case of NorthernIreland because its style of local politics appears to have little in common withthat of the rest of the United Kingdom. Until very recently in Northern Irelandfranchise restriction, gerrymanderingand religious discrimination were appar-ently rampant and it would be a charitable observer who could claim muchof the province's local governmentfor democracywithout demur.6

5Thiscertainlyeemsto be trueof localgovernmentnsomeruralareasof Britainwhicheventhecharitablewouldhavedifficultyn claiming ordemocracy, speciallyf theytook whatmaybe termedthe extremepositionof Dahl to the effectthatcompetitive lectionsare the sinequanonof democracy R. Dahl,Preface o DemocraticTheoryChicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,I956), pp. 131-2). In the deeplyruralshires,despitethe existenceof the formalframeworkofdemocracyor overthreequarters f a century,anythingupto 90opercentof theseats arenevercontested(the medianpercentageof uncontestedseats for all countiescalculatedby DouglasAshfordof CornellUniversity or theperiod1949-67wasalmost 60 percent)and it is possiblethat someindividual eats haveneverbeencontestedsincethecountycouncilswereestablishedin I888.In thesecountiesthere is no partysystemso there s little or no consistentoppositionto those in poweron the councilwhich is oftenrun by whatappears o be a self-perpetuatingsocial oligarchydrawnmostlyfromthe retiredserviceofficerclass,the landedgentryand thearistocracy.Publishedmaterialon thesecounties s scantybut for someindicationof the com-position of the councils see L. J. Sharpe,'Elected Representativesn Local Government',British Journalof Sociology, XIII I962), 189-209. Something of the flavour of the county style ofgovernment can be derived from J. M. Lee, Social Leaders and Public Persons (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, I963). See also B. Keith-Lucas's Epilogue to an edited version of J. Redlichand F. Hirst, The History of Local Government in England (London: Macmillan, I958); J.Stanyer, CountyGovernment n Englandand Wales(London: Routledge, I967) and R. Y. Pomfret,'Rural Oligarchies or Rural Democracy?' Rural District Review, LXIX1963).6 See C. O'Leary, 'Northern Ireland: The Politics of Illusion', Political Quarterly, XL (I969),307-15, and R. Rose, Governing WithoutConsensus (London: Faber, 1971), p. 441-2.

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4 SHARPESHARPEI. SOME DEMOCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS COMPAREDFor the purposes of this section of the paper perhaps the best comprehensivesketch of the main featuresof American city governmentis Banfield'sessay 'TheManagement of Metropolitan Conflict'7 since it follows fairly closely the con-clusions of other observers8who have summarized what they see as some of themain characteristicsof American urbangovernment.It has the furtheradvantageof being an explicit attempt to underline these featuresby contrastingthem withtheBritish.Banfield'sessay maybe taken as anexemplarof thegenre.In it he emphasizesthat authorityin American cities lies always in the popularwill. The system is therefore an open one with the public being directlyinvolvedat all levels of decision-makingand having veto power over the most importantdecisions.Governmentitself is kept deliberately ragmentedto ensure thispopularpredominance. The main political focus is on the individual as a consumer and'anygainto the consumeris worthanycost to thepublic'.The reins of governmentin the cities areusually entirelyin the hands of the workingclass, who, in the largecities at least, set the styleof government.This styleis a flexible one which attacheslittle importance to the public interest in terms of the whole community, so thatthose in power neverattempt to impose comprehensivesolutions but are contentto ratify agreementsreachedby conflicting groups. City politics is largely aboutthis conflict.

British city government by contrast, claims Banfield, is a closed system; thevoter may control government by giving or withholding consent but he may notparticipatein its affairs.The local authority has therefore a very high degree ofautonomy: 'the tastes of individuals count for little against presumptive rights.When the rights pertain to the body politic... then the tastes of individualsmaybe disregardedentirely'. The government itself is immensely strong and alwaysattempts to be comprehensivein the name of the generalinterest. It is therefore

7 In E. Banfield,ed., UrbanGovernmentNewYork:FreePress,964).8 See especiallyG. Almond andS. Verba,TheCivicCulturePrinceton:PrincetonUniversityPress,963); H. Kaplan,UrbanPoliticalSystems NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,967),pp. 209-10, whichis also an explicitcomparisonof the two systems.Threefurtherarticlesarealso of specialimportance or they comparethe two systemsand share some of Banfield'sconclusionson thebroadcharacter f Americanurbangovernment,but alsotake a morecriticalstance to someaspectsof theAmerican raditionalongsimilar ines to thispaper.TheseareK.Newton, City Politics in Britain andAmerica, and Community Decision-makers and CommunityDecision-making in England and the United States (Birmingham: Birmingham University, I968and I970), DiscussionPapersseriesE andF. F. Smallwood, GamePolitics versusFeedbackPolitics' n E. Morlan,ed., Capital,Courthouse&CityHall (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 966).For a muchbroader reatmentof thedistinguishingharacteristicsf the Americanand Britishpoliticaltraditions,see S. Lipset,TheFirstNew Nation(New York: GardenCity, 1967);R.Alford, Party and Society (London: John Murray, I964); E. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy(Glencoe: Free Press, 1956);T. Truman, 'A Critiqueof SeymourM. Lipset'sArticle', TheCanadian Journal of Political Science, iv (197I), 497-525; S. Rothman, 'Modernity andTradition n Britain' n R. Rose, ed., Studiesin BritishPolitics (London: Macmillan, I966);H. Eckstein, TheBritishPoliticalSystem' nS. Beerand A. Ulam,eds.,Patternsof Government(New York: RandomHouse, I962).

I. SOME DEMOCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS COMPAREDFor the purposes of this section of the paper perhaps the best comprehensivesketch of the main featuresof American city governmentis Banfield'sessay 'TheManagement of Metropolitan Conflict'7 since it follows fairly closely the con-clusions of other observers8who have summarized what they see as some of themain characteristicsof American urbangovernment.It has the furtheradvantageof being an explicit attempt to underline these featuresby contrastingthem withtheBritish.Banfield'sessay maybe taken as anexemplarof thegenre.In it he emphasizesthat authorityin American cities lies always in the popularwill. The system is therefore an open one with the public being directlyinvolvedat all levels of decision-makingand having veto power over the most importantdecisions.Governmentitself is kept deliberately ragmentedto ensure thispopularpredominance. The main political focus is on the individual as a consumer and'anygainto the consumeris worthanycost to thepublic'.The reins of governmentin the cities areusually entirelyin the hands of the workingclass, who, in the largecities at least, set the styleof government.This styleis a flexible one which attacheslittle importance to the public interest in terms of the whole community, so thatthose in power neverattempt to impose comprehensivesolutions but are contentto ratify agreementsreachedby conflicting groups. City politics is largely aboutthis conflict.

British city government by contrast, claims Banfield, is a closed system; thevoter may control government by giving or withholding consent but he may notparticipatein its affairs.The local authority has therefore a very high degree ofautonomy: 'the tastes of individuals count for little against presumptive rights.When the rights pertain to the body politic... then the tastes of individualsmaybe disregardedentirely'. The government itself is immensely strong and alwaysattempts to be comprehensivein the name of the generalinterest. It is therefore

7 In E. Banfield,ed., UrbanGovernmentNewYork:FreePress,964).8 See especiallyG. Almond andS. Verba,TheCivicCulturePrinceton:PrincetonUniversityPress,963); H. Kaplan,UrbanPoliticalSystems NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,967),pp. 209-10, whichis also an explicitcomparisonof the two systems.Threefurtherarticlesarealso of specialimportance or they comparethe two systemsand share some of Banfield'sconclusionson thebroadcharacter f Americanurbangovernment,but alsotake a morecriticalstance to someaspectsof theAmerican raditionalongsimilar ines to thispaper.TheseareK.Newton, City Politics in Britain andAmerica, and Community Decision-makers and CommunityDecision-making in England and the United States (Birmingham: Birmingham University, I968and I970), DiscussionPapersseriesE andF. F. Smallwood, GamePolitics versusFeedbackPolitics' n E. Morlan,ed., Capital,Courthouse&CityHall (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 966).For a muchbroader reatmentof thedistinguishingharacteristicsf the Americanand Britishpoliticaltraditions,see S. Lipset,TheFirstNew Nation(New York: GardenCity, 1967);R.Alford, Party and Society (London: John Murray, I964); E. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy(Glencoe: Free Press, 1956);T. Truman, 'A Critiqueof SeymourM. Lipset'sArticle', TheCanadian Journal of Political Science, iv (197I), 497-525; S. Rothman, 'Modernity andTradition n Britain' n R. Rose, ed., Studiesin BritishPolitics (London: Macmillan, I966);H. Eckstein, TheBritishPoliticalSystem' nS. Beerand A. Ulam,eds.,Patternsof Government(New York: RandomHouse, I962).


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AmericanDemocracyReconsideredmericanDemocracyReconsideredable to allow a substantial degree of autonomy to a large professionalizedbureaucracy.Placidityandharmonyratherthan conflictare theprevailingnorms.The ethos of British city government is almost exclusively middle and upperclass, the few working-class representativeson the councils and working-classelectors being content to remain deferential.Banfield'sconclusions and those of the other commentators cited on the twosystems may be conveniently summarizedcompositely as follows: Americancitygovernment tends to be experimental,contentious,open,demotic,participatory,andpluralist;whereas the Britishtends to be conservative,placid, closed,deferen-tial,autonomousand monist.We will now try to assess how far this catalogue matchesreality; that is to say,to put some sort of roughandreadymeasuringrod to Americanurbandemocracyby comparing what are felt to be its essential features with those of anothercomparable system, bearing in mind that no single set of characteristicscanrepresenteveryone'sview and that in reality no tradition is as monolithic as thiskind of comparison has to assume. All that is claimed for this catalogue is thatit seems to representthe majorityview and involves a comparisonwith a systemthat is, if anything, regardedas of slightlydubious democraticpedigree.9Regret-tably, we lack much accurateinformation about some of the attributes listed sothe following assessment sometimes has to make some fairly hefty bricks withvery little straw.The first two sets of opposed attributes, experimental/conservativeand con-tentious/placid, may appearat firstsight to have little bearingon democracyoneway or the other. They are included because they tend to find a place in mostgeneraldescriptionsof American city government,as if they, if not the emblemsof democracy,are at least strongly associated with it. For example, the notion ofAmerican city government's being more experimental, or 'flexible', or 'free-wheeling' because it is free from the constrictions of the old world figuresfairlyprominentlyin the literature.Similarly,contention and conflict seem also to havebecome subtlywoven into theAmericanconceptionof theessentialcharacteristicsof democracy.This view is reflected n Banfield's claim that city politics is largelythe management of conflict and can be found, perhaps in less extreme form,scatteredthroughout the literature.10I. Experimental/ConservativeContemplatingthe vast array of electoral arrangements,representativesystemsand decision-makingstructures of American cities, it would be difficult for oneto deny that American urban politics are more experimentalthan British."1The

9Accordingto Eckstein:'WhetherBritain s a democracyor not, Britishgovernments atleast supremelyconstitutional n character', 'The BritishPoliticalSystem',p. Ioi). AlmondandVerba,CivicCulture,ake a different iewhowever,andgiveBritaina higherrating n termsof democraticqualitythanthe United States.10E. Banfield,ed., Big CityPolitics(New York: RandomHouse, I965),p. 3.

1' L. Boyle, 'British and American City Government', Local Government Finance, LXXI(I967). Banfieldstronglyconcurs that Americancity government s innovatingand attributes

able to allow a substantial degree of autonomy to a large professionalizedbureaucracy.Placidityandharmonyratherthan conflictare theprevailingnorms.The ethos of British city government is almost exclusively middle and upperclass, the few working-class representativeson the councils and working-classelectors being content to remain deferential.Banfield'sconclusions and those of the other commentators cited on the twosystems may be conveniently summarizedcompositely as follows: Americancitygovernment tends to be experimental,contentious,open,demotic,participatory,andpluralist;whereas the Britishtends to be conservative,placid, closed,deferen-tial,autonomousand monist.We will now try to assess how far this catalogue matchesreality; that is to say,to put some sort of roughandreadymeasuringrod to Americanurbandemocracyby comparing what are felt to be its essential features with those of anothercomparable system, bearing in mind that no single set of characteristicscanrepresenteveryone'sview and that in reality no tradition is as monolithic as thiskind of comparison has to assume. All that is claimed for this catalogue is thatit seems to representthe majorityview and involves a comparisonwith a systemthat is, if anything, regardedas of slightlydubious democraticpedigree.9Regret-tably, we lack much accurateinformation about some of the attributes listed sothe following assessment sometimes has to make some fairly hefty bricks withvery little straw.The first two sets of opposed attributes, experimental/conservativeand con-tentious/placid, may appearat firstsight to have little bearingon democracyoneway or the other. They are included because they tend to find a place in mostgeneraldescriptionsof American city government,as if they, if not the emblemsof democracy,are at least strongly associated with it. For example, the notion ofAmerican city government's being more experimental, or 'flexible', or 'free-wheeling' because it is free from the constrictions of the old world figuresfairlyprominentlyin the literature.Similarly,contention and conflict seem also to havebecome subtlywoven into theAmericanconceptionof theessentialcharacteristicsof democracy.This view is reflected n Banfield's claim that city politics is largelythe management of conflict and can be found, perhaps in less extreme form,scatteredthroughout the literature.10I. Experimental/ConservativeContemplatingthe vast array of electoral arrangements,representativesystemsand decision-makingstructures of American cities, it would be difficult for oneto deny that American urban politics are more experimentalthan British."1The

9Accordingto Eckstein:'WhetherBritain s a democracyor not, Britishgovernments atleast supremelyconstitutional n character', 'The BritishPoliticalSystem',p. Ioi). AlmondandVerba,CivicCulture,ake a different iewhowever,andgiveBritaina higherrating n termsof democraticqualitythanthe United States.10E. Banfield,ed., Big CityPolitics(New York: RandomHouse, I965),p. 3.

1' L. Boyle, 'British and American City Government', Local Government Finance, LXXI(I967). Banfieldstronglyconcurs that Americancity government s innovatingand attributes

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6 SHARPE

British systemhas always been reluctant to experimentwith its internaldecision-making structure. Its electoral structure is another matter since it tends to begoverned by statute and is therefore beyond the control of individual councils,although it is doubtful whether variation would ensue if local authorities weregiven greaterfreedom to make their own electoral arrangements.This unadven-turousness is clearlyrevealed by the reactions of city councils to the recommen-dations of the Report of the Maud Committee on Management.12In all but aminority of councils it seems the response has been fairly tentative.13Viewed in terms of the servicesprovided by urbangovernment,however, theremay be little difference between the two systems. The willingness of Britishboroughs to experimentin the provision of health, welfare and cultural servicesseems to stand in contrast to the American experience.14Moreover, viewed as awhole, British urban government has been rather more experimental than theAmericanin termsof metropolitan reorganization.The fundamentalredesigningof the local governmentstructure of London, Birminghamand Teesside duringthe I96os, and the wholesale reorganizationof the systemin England and Walesembodied in the Local Government Act, 1972, stand in sharp contrast to themuch more limited metropolitan umbrella schemes establishedin Miami, BatonRouge and Nashville which have left the existing structures and boundariesvirtuallyuntouched.15All in all, it would be difficultto say with any finalitywhich is the more experi-mental system.There is a much narrowerconception of what are the appropriatelimits of government, both national and local, in the United States - of whichmorelater- andthis affectsthe extentof serviceexperimentationacutely.Equally,the belief that, once created,a municipalitytakes on a life of its own and can onlybe abolished or amalgamated provided a majority of its citizens agree makesfundamentalchange on the scale of the Britishexamplescited extremelydifficult,whatever the role or inclinations of senior government.16But the absence ofentrenched professional officer groups, the much stronger adherence to thethis to the fact that power is highly diffused: 'a selection process (or political system) which allowsof the exercise of power rather than that of persuasion by affected interests produces a widercanvass of policy alternatives than does a process which allows the affected interests only theopportunity to persuade', E. Banfield, Political Influence, paperback edition (New York: FreePress, I965), pp. 334-5.

12 Report of the Committee on Management in Local Government(Maud), Vol. I. (London:HMSO, 1967).13 See R. Greenwood, A. Smith and J. Stewart, New Patterns ofLocal GovernmentOrganization

(Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1971), and J. Elliott, 'TheHarris Experiment in Newcastle upon Tyne', Public Administration, XLIX(1971), I49-62.14 Banfield, ed., Big City Politics, p. 12.15 It must be admitted that this grants the British system a more experimental stance than it

may merit since the decisive factor in bringing all reorganization schemes in Britain to theStatute book is the central government.16 But not wholly impossible since the new created metropolitan authority - Unigov - coveringthe city of Indianopolis and the adjoining Marin county seems to be a fundamental change inthe existing structure. See HUD Challenge (Washington: Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment, May 1971).

6 SHARPE

British systemhas always been reluctant to experimentwith its internaldecision-making structure. Its electoral structure is another matter since it tends to begoverned by statute and is therefore beyond the control of individual councils,although it is doubtful whether variation would ensue if local authorities weregiven greaterfreedom to make their own electoral arrangements.This unadven-turousness is clearlyrevealed by the reactions of city councils to the recommen-dations of the Report of the Maud Committee on Management.12In all but aminority of councils it seems the response has been fairly tentative.13Viewed in terms of the servicesprovided by urbangovernment,however, theremay be little difference between the two systems. The willingness of Britishboroughs to experimentin the provision of health, welfare and cultural servicesseems to stand in contrast to the American experience.14Moreover, viewed as awhole, British urban government has been rather more experimental than theAmericanin termsof metropolitan reorganization.The fundamentalredesigningof the local governmentstructure of London, Birminghamand Teesside duringthe I96os, and the wholesale reorganizationof the systemin England and Walesembodied in the Local Government Act, 1972, stand in sharp contrast to themuch more limited metropolitan umbrella schemes establishedin Miami, BatonRouge and Nashville which have left the existing structures and boundariesvirtuallyuntouched.15All in all, it would be difficultto say with any finalitywhich is the more experi-mental system.There is a much narrowerconception of what are the appropriatelimits of government, both national and local, in the United States - of whichmorelater- andthis affectsthe extentof serviceexperimentationacutely.Equally,the belief that, once created,a municipalitytakes on a life of its own and can onlybe abolished or amalgamated provided a majority of its citizens agree makesfundamentalchange on the scale of the Britishexamplescited extremelydifficult,whatever the role or inclinations of senior government.16But the absence ofentrenched professional officer groups, the much stronger adherence to thethis to the fact that power is highly diffused: 'a selection process (or political system) which allowsof the exercise of power rather than that of persuasion by affected interests produces a widercanvass of policy alternatives than does a process which allows the affected interests only theopportunity to persuade', E. Banfield, Political Influence, paperback edition (New York: FreePress, I965), pp. 334-5.

12 Report of the Committee on Management in Local Government(Maud), Vol. I. (London:HMSO, 1967).13 See R. Greenwood, A. Smith and J. Stewart, New Patterns ofLocal GovernmentOrganization

(Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1971), and J. Elliott, 'TheHarris Experiment in Newcastle upon Tyne', Public Administration, XLIX(1971), I49-62.14 Banfield, ed., Big City Politics, p. 12.15 It must be admitted that this grants the British system a more experimental stance than it

may merit since the decisive factor in bringing all reorganization schemes in Britain to theStatute book is the central government.16 But not wholly impossible since the new created metropolitan authority - Unigov - coveringthe city of Indianopolis and the adjoining Marin county seems to be a fundamental change inthe existing structure. See HUD Challenge (Washington: Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment, May 1971).


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AmericanDemocracyReconsideredmericanDemocracyReconsidereddivision of powers doctrine, and the problemscreatedby corruption,have giventhe American system far greater scope for experiment in decision-makingprocedures.2. Contentious/PlacidThis is a very difficult set of attributes to assess since the very openness of theAmericansystemmeans that conflict when it does occur is usuallyin publicview,whereas underthe Britishsystemit may be there but be hidden from public (andacademic) view. British urban politics are not only usually shrouded from thepublic gaze, but social habits frown on the vehementexpressionof disagreementin public,andthe much moredevelopedandprofessionalizedpermanentbureauc-racyin Britainhas a very importantinfluencein moderatingthe tenor of politicalconflict. It would be a profound mistake to confuse style with content however.Debatingall issuesin ostensibly polite formis one of themore cultivatedtraditionsof British politics but these issues would seem to be every bit as contentious asthose that crop up in Americancities. The confusion of style for content certainlyseems to have misled Banfield who explicity equates the two.17Moreover,all themajor urban authorities in Britain and most of the medium range ones are run,by American standards,on rigid partylines and this means that the opportunityto exploit a potentially sensitive issue is seldom squanderedby the oppositionparty. And many non-sensitive issues, not to say non-issues, are the subject ofparty conflict.Thereis, as yet, nothing comparableto the racial conflict that seems to impingeon practically every aspect of urbanpolitics in the United States, particularly nthe largernortherncities, but it would be wrong to underestimate the extent ofpolitical conflict that occurs in Britishcity councils if only becausethey have themain responsibilityfor housing and schools. These two services,touching as theydo on fundamental aspects of equality, have provided the basis for some of thesharpest party conflict on the home policy front in Britain since the end of theSecond World War. In some respects the class antagonism that always lies justbelow the surfacein Britishsociety has been more evident in urban local govern-ment than in national.18Partyantagonismsat the city level can be equally bitterand acrimonious on other issues as well.193. Open/ClosedThat American urban politics are open and more open than British seems irre-futable. It seems likely that Americancity governmentis one of the most open of

17 See E. Banfield,UrbanGovernment,The Managementof MetropolitanConflict', n par-ticularp. 39.18 See W. Hampton, Democracy and Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1970),Chap.x, for a fairlytypicalpartybattleoverhousingpolicyin Sheffield.19See G. Jones, Borough Politics (London: Macmillan, 1969), Chap. xvI, on the aldermanicissuein Wolverhamptonoranexampleof thebitternesshat can enter ntoBritish ocalpoliticson a non-policy ssue.

division of powers doctrine, and the problemscreatedby corruption,have giventhe American system far greater scope for experiment in decision-makingprocedures.2. Contentious/PlacidThis is a very difficult set of attributes to assess since the very openness of theAmericansystemmeans that conflict when it does occur is usuallyin publicview,whereas underthe Britishsystemit may be there but be hidden from public (andacademic) view. British urban politics are not only usually shrouded from thepublic gaze, but social habits frown on the vehementexpressionof disagreementin public,andthe much moredevelopedandprofessionalizedpermanentbureauc-racyin Britainhas a very importantinfluencein moderatingthe tenor of politicalconflict. It would be a profound mistake to confuse style with content however.Debatingall issuesin ostensibly polite formis one of themore cultivatedtraditionsof British politics but these issues would seem to be every bit as contentious asthose that crop up in Americancities. The confusion of style for content certainlyseems to have misled Banfield who explicity equates the two.17Moreover,all themajor urban authorities in Britain and most of the medium range ones are run,by American standards,on rigid partylines and this means that the opportunityto exploit a potentially sensitive issue is seldom squanderedby the oppositionparty. And many non-sensitive issues, not to say non-issues, are the subject ofparty conflict.Thereis, as yet, nothing comparableto the racial conflict that seems to impingeon practically every aspect of urbanpolitics in the United States, particularly nthe largernortherncities, but it would be wrong to underestimate the extent ofpolitical conflict that occurs in Britishcity councils if only becausethey have themain responsibilityfor housing and schools. These two services,touching as theydo on fundamental aspects of equality, have provided the basis for some of thesharpest party conflict on the home policy front in Britain since the end of theSecond World War. In some respects the class antagonism that always lies justbelow the surfacein Britishsociety has been more evident in urban local govern-ment than in national.18Partyantagonismsat the city level can be equally bitterand acrimonious on other issues as well.193. Open/ClosedThat American urban politics are open and more open than British seems irre-futable. It seems likely that Americancity governmentis one of the most open of

17 See E. Banfield,UrbanGovernment,The Managementof MetropolitanConflict', n par-ticularp. 39.18 See W. Hampton, Democracy and Community (London: Oxford University Press, 1970),Chap.x, for a fairlytypicalpartybattleoverhousingpolicyin Sheffield.19See G. Jones, Borough Politics (London: Macmillan, 1969), Chap. xvI, on the aldermanicissuein Wolverhamptonoranexampleof thebitternesshat can enter ntoBritish ocalpoliticson a non-policy ssue.

7


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8 SHARPESHARPEall democraticsystems.Shils considers that the openness of Americandemocracyis one of its main pillars, publicity being seen as a good in itself. 'Repugnanceofgovernment secretiveness was an offspring of the distrust of aristocracy.'20British urban government, by contrast, is often closed to the point of absurdityand virtuallythe whole of the decision-makingprocess is usually fenced off fromthe public and the press. The various attempts that have been made to give thepressgreateraccesshave been circumventedandthegeneralpublicusuallyremainsignorant of the major decisions until they reach the council agenda. Dissatis-faction was expressed at this state of affairs for a long period, culminating inspecificlegislation in I962 designed to give the press greateraccess; but this hasproved to be largelyineffective.21A similarfate probablyawaits anotherattemptto give the pressaccess to committees incorporatedin the Local GovernmentActof I972. An attempt has been made in recentyears to open up land use planningprocedures to the public,22but whether this will be repeated for other servicesremains to be seen.An importantelementin the openness of American city governmentseems tobe derivedfromthe statusof the local presswhichby Britishstandards s accordedby the elector and the elected a place in the community that makes it almost apart of the formal processes of government. In some cities it seems to play therole of the official political opposition to city hall, and in others, particularlynon-partisancities, it appearsto form an essentialpart of the electoralprocess aswell.23 In all cities government is required to maintain a continuous flow ofinformation to its electorate, and the press, radio and televisionplay an essentialpart in transmitting and interpreting this information. New York is probablysui generis among American cities but Sayre and Kaufman's description of theplace of the media in its government may stand as a fair summary for mostAmerican cities:Like other institutionsof the city, the mass communicationsmedia are profoundlyaffectedby governmental ctionsand decisions.In this respectthey are classedwithothernon-governmentalroups.

In otherrespects,however, heyarespecialanda classapart.In the firstplace, theyarenotmerely ontestantsnthegreatgameof thecity'spolitics, heyarealso theprinci-palchannel hroughwhichallothercontestantseach hegeneralpublic,hence, heyhavea great mpact usuallydeliberately,ometimesnadvertently on somegovernmental20 Shils,TheTormentf Secrecy,p. 37.Barryarguesconvincinglyhatthegreateropennessofthe Americansystemis a directresultof the fragmented haracterof the government: sinceinfluences a functionof power-diffusionndinformationa functionof influence,mayit not bethatalthougha politicalsystemwhichfragmentspowerrequiresmore informationon the partof ordinarycitizens t at the sametimeprovidesa strongermotive for acquiringnformation?'B. Barry,Political Argument (London:Routledge, I965), p. 271.21 See D. Hill, Participation inLocal Affairs (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), Chap. vi.22 Theproceduresnvolveconsultationwiththe publicbefore, duringand after the accep-tanceof structure ndlocalplans.TheystemfromPeopleandPlanning,heReportof theCom-mitteeon PublicParticipationn Planning Skeffington)London:HMSO, I969).23 E. Lee, The Politics of Non-Partisanship (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, I960),

p. I63.

all democraticsystems.Shils considers that the openness of Americandemocracyis one of its main pillars, publicity being seen as a good in itself. 'Repugnanceofgovernment secretiveness was an offspring of the distrust of aristocracy.'20British urban government, by contrast, is often closed to the point of absurdityand virtuallythe whole of the decision-makingprocess is usually fenced off fromthe public and the press. The various attempts that have been made to give thepressgreateraccesshave been circumventedandthegeneralpublicusuallyremainsignorant of the major decisions until they reach the council agenda. Dissatis-faction was expressed at this state of affairs for a long period, culminating inspecificlegislation in I962 designed to give the press greateraccess; but this hasproved to be largelyineffective.21A similarfate probablyawaits anotherattemptto give the pressaccess to committees incorporatedin the Local GovernmentActof I972. An attempt has been made in recentyears to open up land use planningprocedures to the public,22but whether this will be repeated for other servicesremains to be seen.An importantelementin the openness of American city governmentseems tobe derivedfromthe statusof the local presswhichby Britishstandards s accordedby the elector and the elected a place in the community that makes it almost apart of the formal processes of government. In some cities it seems to play therole of the official political opposition to city hall, and in others, particularlynon-partisancities, it appearsto form an essentialpart of the electoralprocess aswell.23 In all cities government is required to maintain a continuous flow ofinformation to its electorate, and the press, radio and televisionplay an essentialpart in transmitting and interpreting this information. New York is probablysui generis among American cities but Sayre and Kaufman's description of theplace of the media in its government may stand as a fair summary for mostAmerican cities:Like other institutionsof the city, the mass communicationsmedia are profoundlyaffectedby governmental ctionsand decisions.In this respectthey are classedwithothernon-governmentalroups.

In otherrespects,however, heyarespecialanda classapart.In the firstplace, theyarenotmerely ontestantsnthegreatgameof thecity'spolitics, heyarealso theprinci-palchannel hroughwhichallothercontestantseach hegeneralpublic,hence, heyhavea great mpact usuallydeliberately,ometimesnadvertently on somegovernmental20 Shils,TheTormentf Secrecy,p. 37.Barryarguesconvincinglyhatthegreateropennessofthe Americansystemis a directresultof the fragmented haracterof the government: sinceinfluences a functionof power-diffusionndinformationa functionof influence,mayit not bethatalthougha politicalsystemwhichfragmentspowerrequiresmore informationon the partof ordinarycitizens t at the sametimeprovidesa strongermotive for acquiringnformation?'B. Barry,Political Argument (London:Routledge, I965), p. 271.21 See D. Hill, Participation inLocal Affairs (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), Chap. vi.22 Theproceduresnvolveconsultationwiththe publicbefore, duringand after the accep-tanceof structure ndlocalplans.TheystemfromPeopleandPlanning,heReportof theCom-mitteeon PublicParticipationn Planning Skeffington)London:HMSO, I969).23 E. Lee, The Politics of Non-Partisanship (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, I960),

p. I63.


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AmericanDemocracyReconsideredmericanDemocracyReconsideredandpartydecisions. n the secondplace,thepopular mageof government ndpoliticsdependsheavilyon theinformation uppliedbythe communicationsmedia.Thewholetenor, heatmosphere,fpolitical ontest s coloredbytheirpresentationsndportrayals.While it perhapscannot be said that the mass media are morepowerfulthan othernon-governmental articipantsn the politicaland governmentalprocess,it is clearthatthey occupya uniqueposition.24If information about the major policy issues confronting the community is adesideratumfor the ordinary elector in a representative democracy, and therecan be little doubt that it is, then the American system passes this part of thedemocratic test with flying colours.The openness of American city government as compared with British is alsoreflected n the much greaterpoliticalvisibilityof its executivearm - indeed in thefact that it has an executivearm. For British urbangovernmentenduresthe worstof both worlds: it concentratespower through the party but lacks any visible ordirectlyaccountable executive. Thereare, therefore,no personalitiesaround whichthe little information that is vouchsafed to the world outside town hall can beinterpretedand made comprehensible.The political visibility of a Mayor Daley,or Lindsay, or Yorty, and the clarity that their existence can give to the publicpresentation of key issues, is wholly outside the experience of any British city,whose levers of power are manipulatedin almost complete anonymity.

4. Demotic/DeferentialThe assumptionin the literature25 hat Americancity politics areless middle classand less deferentialin character than British seems to be much less accurate thanthose so far discussed.It therefore warrantsa rather more extended examination.Adequate information is lacking, especially on the American side, so any con-clusion must be tentative. There is also the problem that the concept of class isnotoriously difficult to define with any precision and is sometimes used veryloosely in the literature on urban politics.26 An additional hazard arises fromdiffering conceptions as to who is and who is not middle class in Britain and theUnited States. Nevertheless, some of the difficulties of making comparisonsbetween the two countries can be avoided by takingthe unquestionably working-class category of manual worker.The Maud Committee Reporton management

24W. Sayre and H. Kaufman, GoverningNew YorkCity (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,I960), p. 8I.25This is especially true of Banfield but see also S. Greer, Governing the Metropolis (NewYork:JohnWiley, I962), p. 45. Thetendency o believe hatAmerican ocalgovernment s, oroughtto be,moredemotic s alsobroughtouttangentiallyn Almond andVerba CivicCulture,Table 4, p. I76). Whereasamong the unskilled there is little differencebetween the UnitedStates andBritain n theproportionwhothoughtthat the ordinarymanshould be active n hislocal community,at the upperend of the social scale almost threequartersof the Americansamplewere of thisopinion comparedwith42 percent of theBritishsample.26 See for example E. Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), especiallyChap.m.

andpartydecisions. n the secondplace,thepopular mageof government ndpoliticsdependsheavilyon theinformation uppliedbythe communicationsmedia.Thewholetenor, heatmosphere,fpolitical ontest s coloredbytheirpresentationsndportrayals.While it perhapscannot be said that the mass media are morepowerfulthan othernon-governmental articipantsn the politicaland governmentalprocess,it is clearthatthey occupya uniqueposition.24If information about the major policy issues confronting the community is adesideratumfor the ordinary elector in a representative democracy, and therecan be little doubt that it is, then the American system passes this part of thedemocratic test with flying colours.The openness of American city government as compared with British is alsoreflected n the much greaterpoliticalvisibilityof its executivearm - indeed in thefact that it has an executivearm. For British urbangovernmentenduresthe worstof both worlds: it concentratespower through the party but lacks any visible ordirectlyaccountable executive. Thereare, therefore,no personalitiesaround whichthe little information that is vouchsafed to the world outside town hall can beinterpretedand made comprehensible.The political visibility of a Mayor Daley,or Lindsay, or Yorty, and the clarity that their existence can give to the publicpresentation of key issues, is wholly outside the experience of any British city,whose levers of power are manipulatedin almost complete anonymity.

4. Demotic/DeferentialThe assumptionin the literature25 hat Americancity politics areless middle classand less deferentialin character than British seems to be much less accurate thanthose so far discussed.It therefore warrantsa rather more extended examination.Adequate information is lacking, especially on the American side, so any con-clusion must be tentative. There is also the problem that the concept of class isnotoriously difficult to define with any precision and is sometimes used veryloosely in the literature on urban politics.26 An additional hazard arises fromdiffering conceptions as to who is and who is not middle class in Britain and theUnited States. Nevertheless, some of the difficulties of making comparisonsbetween the two countries can be avoided by takingthe unquestionably working-class category of manual worker.The Maud Committee Reporton management

24W. Sayre and H. Kaufman, GoverningNew YorkCity (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,I960), p. 8I.25This is especially true of Banfield but see also S. Greer, Governing the Metropolis (NewYork:JohnWiley, I962), p. 45. Thetendency o believe hatAmerican ocalgovernment s, oroughtto be,moredemotic s alsobroughtouttangentiallyn Almond andVerba CivicCulture,Table 4, p. I76). Whereasamong the unskilled there is little differencebetween the UnitedStates andBritain n theproportionwhothoughtthat the ordinarymanshould be active n hislocal community,at the upperend of the social scale almost threequartersof the Americansamplewere of thisopinion comparedwith42 percent of theBritishsample.26 See for example E. Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), especiallyChap.m.

9


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IO SHARPEO SHARPE

in local government27gives the following percentagesfor manual workers onEnglish urban councils:County Boroughs 24 per centMunicipal Boroughs 21 per centUrban Districts 21 per cent

Thereis no comparably comprehensivedata for the United States,but what thereis, as Newton has pointed out, strongly suggeststhat therearesubstantiallyfewermanual workers on American city councils.28Newton quotes Miller's, D'An-tonio's, and Williams and Adrian's findings, derived in Miller's case from adirectcomparison of the social composition of the Bristol (England)council withthe Seattleand Atlanta city councils, and in the other cases on datafrom a numberof other American cities.29

Rossi, although not covering the comparative aspects, also found that themiddle classes dominate America's local community institutions, and Agger,Goldrich and Swansonfound a similar dominance on the councils of threeof thefour towns in their study.30That manual workers are few and far between inAmerican local government is also suggested in Lowi's analysis of the socialcomposition of New York's mayoral cabinet over the period I898 to I967.31Finally, Prewitt, in what is probably the most thorough and comprehensiveexamination of the composition of local councils in the United States, concludesthat for potential councilmen, 'On balance it is advantageous to be white, male,Protestant,college educated, in a prestigeoccupation, above averageincome andnative stock preferablyAnglo-Saxon descent.'32This is hardlyas conclusive as the evidence for Britain. That it is probably onthe whole representative,however, is suggested by two further considerations.The first, as Newton suggests, is the strong link betweenworking-classmember-ship of city councils and the existenceof a socialist party. Epstein's findingsdrawnfrom a number of countries suggest this and it certainlyseems to be the case for

27 Report, Vol. 2, Table 1.9.28Newton, Community Decision-makers and Community Decision-making, p. 9. D. Berryviewingpoliticsnationallyalso concludesthat in the UnitedStates'politicalactivity s largelya preserveof the middleclass, and thusAmericanpolitics mightbe regardedas class basedinthat both major politicalpartiesarelargelymiddleclassparties',TheSociologyof GrassRootsPolitics (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 25.29 D. Miller, Industry ndCommunityPowerStructure: Comparative tudyof an Americanand an English City', American Sociological Review, xxII (1958), 9-15; D'Antonio et al., 'Insti-tutionalandOccupationRepresentationnElevenCommunitySystems',AmericanSociologicalReview,xxvI (1961), 440-6; O. WilliamsandC. Adrian,FourCities(Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,I963),p. 78.30 P. Rossi, 'Theory,Researchand Practice n CommunityOrganization'n C. Adrian,ed.,Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development,

I960); R. Agger, D. Goldrich and B. Swanson, The Rulers andthe Ruled(New York: John Wiley,1964),Chap.vn.31 T. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New York: Free Press, 1964) p. 51.32 K. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders (New York: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 3.

in local government27gives the following percentagesfor manual workers onEnglish urban councils:County Boroughs 24 per centMunicipal Boroughs 21 per centUrban Districts 21 per cent

Thereis no comparably comprehensivedata for the United States,but what thereis, as Newton has pointed out, strongly suggeststhat therearesubstantiallyfewermanual workers on American city councils.28Newton quotes Miller's, D'An-tonio's, and Williams and Adrian's findings, derived in Miller's case from adirectcomparison of the social composition of the Bristol (England)council withthe Seattleand Atlanta city councils, and in the other cases on datafrom a numberof other American cities.29

Rossi, although not covering the comparative aspects, also found that themiddle classes dominate America's local community institutions, and Agger,Goldrich and Swansonfound a similar dominance on the councils of threeof thefour towns in their study.30That manual workers are few and far between inAmerican local government is also suggested in Lowi's analysis of the socialcomposition of New York's mayoral cabinet over the period I898 to I967.31Finally, Prewitt, in what is probably the most thorough and comprehensiveexamination of the composition of local councils in the United States, concludesthat for potential councilmen, 'On balance it is advantageous to be white, male,Protestant,college educated, in a prestigeoccupation, above averageincome andnative stock preferablyAnglo-Saxon descent.'32This is hardlyas conclusive as the evidence for Britain. That it is probably onthe whole representative,however, is suggested by two further considerations.The first, as Newton suggests, is the strong link betweenworking-classmember-ship of city councils and the existenceof a socialist party. Epstein's findingsdrawnfrom a number of countries suggest this and it certainlyseems to be the case for

27 Report, Vol. 2, Table 1.9.28Newton, Community Decision-makers and Community Decision-making, p. 9. D. Berryviewingpoliticsnationallyalso concludesthat in the UnitedStates'politicalactivity s largelya preserveof the middleclass, and thusAmericanpolitics mightbe regardedas class basedinthat both major politicalpartiesarelargelymiddleclassparties',TheSociologyof GrassRootsPolitics (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 25.29 D. Miller, Industry ndCommunityPowerStructure: Comparative tudyof an Americanand an English City', American Sociological Review, xxII (1958), 9-15; D'Antonio et al., 'Insti-tutionalandOccupationRepresentationnElevenCommunitySystems',AmericanSociologicalReview,xxvI (1961), 440-6; O. WilliamsandC. Adrian,FourCities(Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,I963),p. 78.30 P. Rossi, 'Theory,Researchand Practice n CommunityOrganization'n C. Adrian,ed.,Social Science and Community Action (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development,

I960); R. Agger, D. Goldrich and B. Swanson, The Rulers andthe Ruled(New York: John Wiley,1964),Chap.vn.31 T. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New York: Free Press, 1964) p. 51.32 K. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders (New York: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 3.


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AmericanDemocracyReconsideredmericanDemocracyReconsideredBritish local councils.33 Since socialist parties are virtually non-existent inAmerican city government,34we may expect in the absence of any other factorthat working-class councilmen are correspondingly rare. This seems to be thecase for government at the national level where socialist parties have been evenless conspicuous. Matthews, in his historical survey of the composition of theprincipalarms of federal governmentup to I950, concludes: 'Paradoxicallythemorerigid and inequalitarianBritishsociety seemsto have a largerproportionofworkingclass in positions of authoritythan the more mobile and open society ofthe United States'.35

Despite these strongindications that Americanurbangovernmentis probablyless demotic than is usuallyassumed,and certainlyless so than the British,it maystill be argued that, unlike their American counterparts, British councillors,whatever theirclass, pursuemiddle- or upper-class nterestsor deferto those whodo.36 This brings us to what is usually regardedas one of the most importantcharacteristicsof Americanpolitics ascomparedwithBritish: themarkedabsenceof deferencein America.Two preliminary observations need to be made before this assumption isexamined more closely. First, it is probably true that for an industrialsociety oflong standing Britain does exhibit a marked degree of status consciousness inpersonal relationships as compared to the United States, and this could findexpressionin theelectorate'schoice of representatives.As we shallsee, this seems,at the very least, unlikely. Second, deferencecould occur in the attitudes of theelected; that is to say, British working-class councillors, even when in power,might defer to or pursue middle- and upper-class interests more than theirAmerican counterparts.37To take the second assertion first, there seems littleworthwhileevidence to support it; on the contrary, there are at least indicationsthat in general working-classinterests are, if anything, better cateredfor underthe British system than under the American. Indeed, for a number of socialindicators that offer a crude measure of the quality of working-class life it isdifficultto escape the conclusion that, as comparedwith most other comparable

33 L. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (London: Pall Mall, I967), p. 199;L. J. Sharpe, 'Elected Representatives in Local Government' and 'The Politics of Local Govern-ment in Greater London', Public Administration,xxxvIII (I96o),157-72.34 Banfield, ed., Big City Politics, p. 12.35 D. Matthews, The Social Backgroundof Political Decision-Makers (New York: Doubleday,1954), p. 47. Matthews covered only the 1945-50 Parliament when the Labour Party (whichaccounts for virtually all working-class MPs) was in a majority. Rose shows however, that forthe whole post-war period up to I966 the average of working-class MPs was 36 per cent; R.Rose, 'Class and Party Divisions: Britian as a Test Case' in M. Dogan and R. Rose, eds.,European Politics: a Reader (London: Macmillan, 197 I).36 See R. Jessop, 'Civility and Traditionalism in English Political Culture', British Journal ofPolitical Science, I (I97I), 1-24, for an exhaustive discussion of the different ways in which theconcept of deference has been employed in the study of British politics and for an assessment oftheir validity.37Banfield seems to claim that British local authorities toil largely on behalf of the middleclass, but his main evidence is the restriction on licensing hours and Green Belt policy, both ofwhich are central government responsibilities, see 'The Management of Metropolitan Conflict'.

British local councils.33 Since socialist parties are virtually non-existent inAmerican city government,34we may expect in the absence of any other factorthat working-class councilmen are correspondingly rare. This seems to be thecase for government at the national level where socialist parties have been evenless conspicuous. Matthews, in his historical survey of the composition of theprincipalarms of federal governmentup to I950, concludes: 'Paradoxicallythemorerigid and inequalitarianBritishsociety seemsto have a largerproportionofworkingclass in positions of authoritythan the more mobile and open society ofthe United States'.35

Despite these strongindications that Americanurbangovernmentis probablyless demotic than is usuallyassumed,and certainlyless so than the British,it maystill be argued that, unlike their American counterparts, British councillors,whatever theirclass, pursuemiddle- or upper-class nterestsor deferto those whodo.36 This brings us to what is usually regardedas one of the most importantcharacteristicsof Americanpolitics ascomparedwithBritish: themarkedabsenceof deferencein America.Two preliminary observations need to be made before this assumption isexamined more closely. First, it is probably true that for an industrialsociety oflong standing Britain does exhibit a marked degree of status consciousness inpersonal relationships as compared to the United States, and this could findexpressionin theelectorate'schoice of representatives.As we shallsee, this seems,at the very least, unlikely. Second, deferencecould occur in the attitudes of theelected; that is to say, British working-class councillors, even when in power,might defer to or pursue middle- and upper-class interests more than theirAmerican counterparts.37To take the second assertion first, there seems littleworthwhileevidence to support it; on the contrary, there are at least indicationsthat in general working-classinterests are, if anything, better cateredfor underthe British system than under the American. Indeed, for a number of socialindicators that offer a crude measure of the quality of working-class life it isdifficultto escape the conclusion that, as comparedwith most other comparable

33 L. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (London: Pall Mall, I967), p. 199;L. J. Sharpe, 'Elected Representatives in Local Government' and 'The Politics of Local Govern-ment in Greater London', Public Administration,xxxvIII (I96o),157-72.34 Banfield, ed., Big City Politics, p. 12.35 D. Matthews, The Social Backgroundof Political Decision-Makers (New York: Doubleday,1954), p. 47. Matthews covered only the 1945-50 Parliament when the Labour Party (whichaccounts for virtually all working-class MPs) was in a majority. Rose shows however, that forthe whole post-war period up to I966 the average of working-class MPs was 36 per cent; R.Rose, 'Class and Party Divisions: Britian as a Test Case' in M. Dogan and R. Rose, eds.,European Politics: a Reader (London: Macmillan, 197 I).36 See R. Jessop, 'Civility and Traditionalism in English Political Culture', British Journal ofPolitical Science, I (I97I), 1-24, for an exhaustive discussion of the different ways in which theconcept of deference has been employed in the study of British politics and for an assessment oftheir validity.37Banfield seems to claim that British local authorities toil largely on behalf of the middleclass, but his main evidence is the restriction on licensing hours and Green Belt policy, both ofwhich are central government responsibilities, see 'The Management of Metropolitan Conflict'.

III


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12 SHARPE2 SHARPE

industrial societies, the poorest section of the American working class gets afairly rough deal. Despite the highestper capita income in the world, the UnitedStates has had a consistently high unemployment rate;38among the eighteenindustrial democracies (or 'western systems') it ranks twelfth in terms of infantmortality, sixteenth in male life expectancy,39and the percentageof GNP spenton welfareis half that of Britain and a third that of France.40Another indicatorof working-class welfare that is even more relevant to the present discussion,since it is largely the responsibilityof local governmentin both countries and canbe measured in fairly unambiguous terms, is public housing. The proportion ofthe total housing stock provided by government is 30 per cent in Britain;41thecomparablefigurefor the United States is I per cent.42The other claim, that the British electorateis more deferential than the Ameri-can, has received rathermore attention from political scientists. The most oftencited evidence of it nationally is that about a third of working-classvoters votefor the ConservativeParty,that is to say, they defer to an interest other than theirown by voting for a party which is composed of and symbolizes an 'ascriptive'elite instead of, presumably (this is not always made clear in the literature),someone in theirownsocial class.Themost systematicstudiesof thisphenomenon,notably those of Nordlinger, and McKenzie and Silver, both conclude thatworking-class loyalty to the Conservatives is in fact derived from deference.43However, the most comprehensive general study of voting attitudes in Britain,thatby Butler andStokes, suggeststhat thegenerationfactor is farmoreimportantin accounting for working-class Conservatism. They argue that many olderworking-class voters do not vote Labour because there was no Labour Partywhen they formed their political allegiance, and in support of their contentionthey show that the differencebetween the percentage of the working class sup-porting the Conservatives and the percentage of the middle class supporting

38 The Americanunemployment ate has neverfallen below 3-2 per cent since the SecondWorldWar(Banfield,TheUnheavenlyCity,p. 93)andthis isahigherpercentagehanthe Britishunemploymentateever reacheduntil 197I.The relationbetween he unemployment ateandthe well being of the poorerend of the workingclass is well illustratedby the findingthat areduction n the US ratefrom5-4percent to 3-5 percentwouldincrease ull-timeemploymentfor I,042,000 poor and such a reduction would have the net result of bringing 1,8I ,000 abovethe poverty ine, R. G. Hollisterand J. L. Palmer,TheImpactof Inflation n thePoor,Instituteof Researchon PovertyDiscussion Paper(Wisconsin, 969), quotedin J. TobinandK. Ross,'Living With Inflation', New York Review, 6 May I971.39Rose, Governing Without Consensus, Table XV, I.40H. Aaron, 'SocialSecurity: nternationalComparisons'n 0. Eckstein,ed., Studies n theEconomics of Income Maintenance (Washington: Brookings Institution, I967). See G. Myrdal,Challenge o Affluence London: Gollancz,I963), Chap. iii, for a discussionof the differencebetween he USA andotherWesterndemocraciesn theattitudetowards he poor.41 D. V. Donnison, The Governmentof Housing (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967).

42A. Downes, 'Housing - Myth and Reality', Minnesota Municipalities, LV(I97O).43E.Nordlinger,The WorkingClass Tories(London:MacGibbon&Kee, 1967); R. McKenzieandA. Silver,Angels n Marble London:Heinemann,1968).This also seemsto be the case inrelationto other studies.See for exampleW. G. Runciman,RelativeDeprivation ndSocialJustice Harmondsworth: enguinBooks, 1972),p. 172. SeealsoJessop, CivilityandTraditional-ismin EnglishPoliticalCulture' or otherreferences.

industrial societies, the poorest section of the American working class gets afairly rough deal. Despite the highestper capita income in the world, the UnitedStates has had a consistently high unemployment rate;38among the eighteenindustrial democracies (or 'western systems') it ranks twelfth in terms of infantmortality, sixteenth in male life expectancy,39and the percentageof GNP spenton welfareis half that of Britain and a third that of France.40Another indicatorof working-class welfare that is even more relevant to the present discussion,since it is largely the responsibilityof local governmentin both countries and canbe measured in fairly unambiguous terms, is public housing. The proportion ofthe total housing stock provided by government is 30 per cent in Britain;41thecomparablefigurefor the United States is I per cent.42The other claim, that the British electorateis more deferential than the Ameri-can, has received rathermore attention from political scientists. The most oftencited evidence of it nationally is that about a third of working-classvoters votefor the ConservativeParty,that is to say, they defer to an interest other than theirown by voting for a party which is composed of and symbolizes an 'ascriptive'elite instead of, presumably (this is not always made clear in the literature),someone in theirownsocial class.Themost systematicstudiesof thisphenomenon,notably those of Nordlinger, and McKenzie and Silver, both conclude thatworking-class loyalty to the Conservatives is in fact derived from deference.43However, the most comprehensive general study of voting attitudes in Britain,thatby Butler andStokes, suggeststhat thegenerationfactor is farmoreimportantin accounting for working-class Conservatism. They argue that many olderworking-class voters do not vote Labour because there was no Labour Partywhen they formed their political allegiance, and in support of their contentionthey show that the differencebetween the percentage of the working class sup-porting the Conservatives and the percentage of the middle class supporting

38 The Americanunemployment ate has neverfallen below 3-2 per cent since the SecondWorldWar(Banfield,TheUnheavenlyCity,p. 93)andthis isahigherpercentagehanthe Britishunemploymentateever reacheduntil 197I.The relationbetween he unemployment ateandthe well being of the poorerend of the workingclass is well illustratedby the findingthat areduction n the US ratefrom5-4percent to 3-5 percentwouldincrease ull-timeemploymentfor I,042,000 poor and such a reduction would have the net result of bringing 1,8I ,000 abovethe poverty ine, R. G. Hollisterand J. L. Palmer,TheImpactof Inflation n thePoor,Instituteof Researchon PovertyDiscussion Paper(Wisconsin, 969), quotedin J. TobinandK. Ross,'Living With Inflation', New York Review, 6 May I971.39Rose, Governing Without Consensus, Table XV, I.40H. Aaron, 'SocialSecurity: nternationalComparisons'n 0. Eckstein,ed., Studies n theEconomics of Income Maintenance (Washington: Brookings Institution, I967). See G. Myrdal,Challenge o Affluence London: Gollancz,I963), Chap. iii, for a discussionof the differencebetween he USA andotherWesterndemocraciesn theattitudetowards he poor.41 D. V. Donnison, The Governmentof Housing (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967).

42A. Downes, 'Housing - Myth and Reality', Minnesota Municipalities, LV(I97O).43E.Nordlinger,The WorkingClass Tories(London:MacGibbon&Kee, 1967); R. McKenzieandA. Silver,Angels n Marble London:Heinemann,1968).This also seemsto be the case inrelationto other studies.See for exampleW. G. Runciman,RelativeDeprivation ndSocialJustice Harmondsworth: enguinBooks, 1972),p. 172. SeealsoJessop, CivilityandTraditional-ismin EnglishPoliticalCulture' or otherreferences.


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AmericanDemocracyReconsidered 13mericanDemocracyReconsidered 13Labour drops to 6 for the age cohort that reached voting age in the post-I95Iperiod.44This comparativelyminor difference could easily be accounted for byreligious and regional variations that may have nothing to do with deference.McKenzie and Silverand Nordlingersupport their hypothesis with the resultsof attitudesurveys.45The most telling of McKenzie and Silver's results is that 48percentof the Conservativeworking-classsupporters n theirsample,ascomparedwith 28 per cent of Labour working-class supporters, would prefer a primeminister to be of high social status. Most of the other attitudes they examine -towardsthemonarchyandtheHouse of Lords - are shown to be almostasstronglyheld by the Labour-supportingworking class as by the working-class Tories.Although they recognize that deference 'is not the only ideological basis ofcontemporaryworking-classConservatism', hey say: 'Thefactthatmany workingclass Conservativesprefer Prime Ministers to be of elite social origin, take abenignview of the upperclass, favourretainingan unalteredHouse of Lordsandare relatively content with their social status and prospects, suggests the ideaof "deference"as a basis of working class Conservativevoting.'46But this assertion raises the question of whether the working classes of anycountry are 'normally' inclined to hold very strong views about changing theexisting political orderand, if they are, whetheranythingabout theirtendencytodeference can be inferred. As Parkinhas pointed out, given the fact that partiesof thestatusquoare morelikelyto reflect hedominant ideals of industrialsociety,it seemsperverseto begin on the assumptionthat all working-classvoters shouldbe supportersof socialism and then to treat those who are not as deviants.47Onthe face of it, it seems doubtful; and it is highly probable that if we substitute'Republican' (or 'Democrat' in the South) for 'Conservative'; 'WASP' for 'elitesocial origin'; and 'Senate'(or 'Supreme Court')for 'House of Lords', McKenzieand Silver's conclusion would be equallyvalid for the United States. It is usuallyaccepted that Americans, whatever their attitude to governmentgenerally,holdcertain of their national political institutions in greaterveneration than othersbecause these institutionsembodythe idealsonwhich the nationitself wasfounded.The very persistence of these institutions virtually unchanged for almost twocenturies testifies to this. There are also other aspects of American society thatreinforce this innate conservatism. As Lipset has put it: 'A strong societal em-phasis on achievement and equalitarianism... combined with strong religiousbelief, particularly among the lower strata, should maximise the legitimacy of

44 David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, I969),p. I07.45 See McKenzie and Silver, Angels in Marble, Chap. v, and Nordlinger, The Working ClassTories, Chaps. IIIand Iv.

46 McKenzie and Silver, Angels in Marble, p. I63. Similarly, Nordlinger asserts that because41 per cent of the Conservative-voting working class prefer to be led by a peer, as compared with20 per cent of the Labour working class, 'the importance attached to high status in the Englishpolitical system is forcefully underscored', p. 66.47F. Parkin, 'Working Class Conservatives', British Journal of Sociology, xviii (I967),278-90.

Labour drops to 6 for the age cohort that reached voting age in the post-I95Iperiod.44This comparativelyminor difference could easily be accounted for byreligious and regional variations that may have nothing to do with deference.McKenzie and Silverand Nordlingersupport their hypothesis with the resultsof attitudesurveys.45The most telling of McKenzie and Silver's results is that 48percentof the Conservativeworking-classsupporters n theirsample,ascomparedwith 28 per cent of Labour working-class supporters, would prefer a primeminister to be of high social status. Most of the other attitudes they examine -towardsthemonarchyandtheHouse of Lords - are shown to be almostasstronglyheld by the Labour-supportingworking class as by the working-class Tories.Although they recognize that deference 'is not the only ideological basis ofcontemporaryworking-classConservatism', hey say: 'Thefactthatmany workingclass Conservativesprefer Prime Ministers to be of elite social origin, take abenignview of the upperclass, favourretainingan unalteredHouse of Lordsandare relatively content with their social status and prospects, suggests the ideaof "deference"as a basis of working class Conservativevoting.'46But this assertion raises the question of whether the working classes of anycountry are 'normally' inclined to hold very strong views about changing theexisting political orderand, if they are, whetheranythingabout theirtendencytodeference can be inferred. As Parkinhas pointed out, given the fact that partiesof thestatusquoare morelikelyto reflect hedominant ideals of industrialsociety,it seemsperverseto begin on the assumptionthat all working-classvoters shouldbe supportersof socialism and then to treat those who are not as deviants.47Onthe face of it, it seems doubtful; and it is highly probable that if we substitute'Republican' (or 'Democrat' in the South) for 'Conservative'; 'WASP' for 'elitesocial origin'; and 'Senate'(or 'Supreme Court')for 'House of Lords', McKenzieand Silver's conclusion would be equallyvalid for the United States. It is usuallyaccepted that Americans, whatever their attitude to governmentgenerally,holdcertain of their national political institutions in greaterveneration than othersbecause these institutionsembodythe idealsonwhich the nationitself wasfounded.The very persistence of these institutions virtually unchanged for almost twocenturies testifies to this. There are also other aspects of American society thatreinforce this innate conservatism. As Lipset has put it: 'A strong societal em-phasis on achievement and equalitarianism... combined with strong religiousbelief, particularly among the lower strata, should maximise the legitimacy of

44 David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, I969),p. I07.45 See McKenzie and Silver, Angels in Marble, Chap. v, and Nordlinger, The Working ClassTories, Chaps. IIIand Iv.

46 McKenzie and Silver, Angels in Marble, p. I63. Similarly, Nordlinger asserts that because41 per cent of the Conservative-voting working class prefer to be led by a peer, as compared with20 per cent of the Labour working class, 'the importance attached to high status in the Englishpolitical system is forcefully underscored', p. 66.47F. Parkin, 'Working Class Conservatives', British Journal of Sociolog

Documents

American Democracy Reconsidered