Always Salute, Never Resign How Resignation Threatens Military Professionalism and National Security

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 8/7/2019 Always Salute, Never Resign How Resignation Threatens Military Professionalism and National Security

    1/3

    Published on Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com)

    Home >

    Always Salute, Never Resign

    How Resignation Threatens Military Professionalism and National Security

    Richard H. KohnRICHARD H. KOHN is Professor of History and Adjunct Professor of Peace, War, andDefense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has been Chief of AirForce History for the U.S. Air Force and Omar N. Bradley Professor of StrategicLeadership at Dickinson College and the Army War College.

    When news reports suggested that if the Obama administration did not follow GeneralStanley McChrystal's recommendations for the war in Afghanistan, the general mightquit, McChrystal immediately slapped them down. But soon after, others appeared to beurging him to do just that. The respected former vice chief of the U.S. Army, retiredGeneral Jack Keane, stated on a Sunday talk show that were he in McChrystal's shoes,he would probably resign. And in an op-ed, John S.D. Eisenhower, the son of PresidentDwight Eisenhower and a professional soldier and military historian, went so far as toclaim that officers "have an obligation to resign if they are unable to carry out the

    commander in chief's policies."

    Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, resigning (asking for retirement orreassignment) over advice not taken, policy disagreements, or moral or ethical qualmsundermines the relationship between military officials and their civilian superiors anddestroys the professionalism of the U.S. armed forces.

    As General Richard Myers and I argued two years ago in Foreign Affairs ("Salute andDisobey?" September/October 2007), an officer who threatens to -- or does -- resignover a policy decision commits a political act. He or she is publicly disputing thejudgment of civilian leaders and violating the principle of civilian control over the

    military, a fundamental tenet of American government and a basic precept of militaryprofessionalism. Because of the military's prestige and reputation for disinterestedpatriotism, such public dissent weakens civilian leadership in the public eye. Thoseopposing the decision could become emboldened, and the policy decision likelysubmerged, in partisan bickering. Indeed, that is why administrations have frequentlynegotiated with military leaders to gain their support prior to announcing importantdefense decisions, and why recent administrations have sometimes asked potentialappointees about their political party or the circumstances under which they mightresign.

    ys Salute, Never Resign http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print

    3 17/12/2009 06:

  • 8/7/2019 Always Salute, Never Resign How Resignation Threatens Military Professionalism and National Security

    2/3

    Furthermore, military leaders who claim that they are resigning for moral or professionalreasons are imposing their own conceptions of morality and professional behavior onthe country. While there may be general group norms, these kinds of judgments alwaysvary by individual. Even supposed norms provoke considerable disagreement within themilitary. Resigning because of moral doubts also violates the military's subordination tocivilian authority and contravenes an officer's oath to support and defend the U.S.Constitution.

    Likewise, it is not the role or function of the military to make policy. That job is properlythe responsibility of elected officials and those they appoint for that purpose. The role ofsenior military officers is to advise and then execute civilian leaders' orders, even whenthey seem to infringe on professional military matters. Officers cannot possibly know allof the larger national and international considerations that go into a policy or decision,in peace or in war. "There are too many influences involved," George C. Marshall,former chief of staff of the U.S. Army, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, onceput it, "and it is quite a question of how much of this would be familiar to militaryparticipants."

    There is no tradition of resignation at the most senior level of the U.S. armed forces.Just one instance, such as McChrystal resigning, could set a very dangerous precedent.Presidents, senior defense officials, and senators would inevitably begin to vet militarynominations more routinely on the basis of whether the officer might quit. Candidatesfor the Joint Chiefs and for the most significant command positions would findthemselves subjected to all sorts of litmus tests (regarding their politics, their ethicaland moral views, and other personal matters) that are likely to be irrelevant to theirsuitability for the role. In effect, senior military posts and wartime command positions --perhaps especially wartime command positions -- would become political appointments.One can imagine a president or secretary of defense wondering even then whether it issafe to be honest with a military leader who might spill all once safely in retirement. In

    fact, the last 60 years is riddled with examples of just such distrust and poorcommunication between the military and civilian superiors that produced bad policy.The Vietnam War stands out as the chief example, but strategic disagreements in the1950s, arguments over budgets in the 1970s, and interventions in the 1990s -- such asthat in Somalia -- were typical.

    Beyond undermining civil-military relations, resignations can also compromise themilitary internally. Any officer who chooses to quit abandons his or her troops and thecountry, giving heart to enemies and shaking the morale of the armed forces. If a seniorofficer -- one of the Joint Chiefs or a theater commander -- quits, it could, depending onthe circumstances, produce a political storm, however short-lived. If several did, itwould amount to a military revolt. In the wake of such an event, it could be extremelydifficult for successors to gain the confidence of their troops, especially if the move hadstruck a chord with the soldiers.

    These considerations apply mainly to the Joint Chiefs and most senior commanders.Officers who have fulfilled their service commitment at lower levels have the right toretire when they wish, for any reason. But if servicemen and servicewomen at any levelof the military begin to condition their continued service on personal moral standards orwhether they agree with their civilian superiors, the U.S. military would becomethoroughly politicized from the inside, and might come apart in wartime.

    ys Salute, Never Resign http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print

    3 17/12/2009 06:

  • 8/7/2019 Always Salute, Never Resign How Resignation Threatens Military Professionalism and National Security

    3/3

    One can imagine an extraordinarily rare instance in which an officer, genuinely believingthat he or she has become ineffective, is no longer the best person to serve in aparticular role. While the final judgment belongs to the civilians, the officer mightrequest retirement or reassignment and leave quietly -- as did Ronald Fogleman, formerU.S. Air Force chief of staff, in 1997 and Admiral William Fallon, former head of CentralCommand, in 2008 -- so as not to disrupt civil-military relations, intrude intopolicymaking, politicize the issue, or set a precedent that would weaken militaryprofessionalism. However, an officer's duty to "salute and obey," and the privilege thatcomes with his or her rank to "the special trust and confidence" of the nation's civilianleaders, must not, even in rare and unusual circumstances, be rendered meaningless byresignation. That would eventually destroy the U.S. military, both from within andwithout, and undermine the national security of the United States.

    Copyright 2002-2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.All rights reserved.

    Source URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65644/richard-h-kohn/always-salute-never-resign

    ys Salute, Never Resign http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print

    3 17/12/2009 06: