ALSP Last Minute Poli 2010

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I.

What constitutes as taking in eminent domain cases1) Asking for permission to enter a property for the purpose of construction ofa bridge [not on the property itself ], the paying of monthly rentals as acondition for entering a property, and thereafter sending a mere request tothe owners to either sell or donate the property does not constitute astaking within the meaning of the law. (Tan vs Republic 523 SCRA 203)

2) In the case of Napocor vs. Ibrahim (526 SCRA 149) the Court ruled that:there is a taking in this sense when the owners are actually deprived or

dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical destruction or amaterial impairment of the value of their property, or when they are deprivedof the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in this context when theexpropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but formore permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to apublic use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of allbeneficial enjoyment thereof. Moreover, taking of the property forpurposes of eminent domain entails that the entry into the property must beunder warrant or color of legal authority.

Thus, when the expropriator entered a property without the permission orwithout the knowledge of the owners (as when the former constructs sub-

terrain tunnels) and when the improvements do not contribute to increasethe value of the property, the courts will not use the valuation of the propertyat the time of the actual taking but at the time the owner discovers the illegalentry or taking; or upon the commencement of the negotiations for theexpropriation of the property.

Note:

The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to the surface owner ofland.

The power of eminent domain encompasses even the simpleimposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemnedproperty.

Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owner ofthe propertys normal beneficial use the expropriator is liable to payfull compensation for the land.

Acts that can be considered as campaigning

In the case of Panera vs Comelec (G. R. No. 181613, September 11,2009) the Court ruled that: the conduct of a motorcade is a form of

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election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely withinthe ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code.

o The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to

introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seekto be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visibleso as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their namesin the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably,motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than topromote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.

Who are candidates under election laws?

In the case of Panera vs Comelec (G. R. No. 181613, November 25,2009) the Court ruled that: a person who files a certificate of candidacyis not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

o The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the election

periods as x x x fixed by existing law prior to RA 8436 andthat one who files to meet the early deadline will still not beconsidered as a candidate.

o This ruling is based on the second sentence of Section 15 of RA

8436.o Thus, election offenses can only be committed during the

campaign period.

II.

How to apply the state immunity doctrine to specific cases involvingthe Philippine State

Step 1. Determine if the suit qualifies as a suit against the State. When the Republic is sued by name;

When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

When the suit is on its face against a government officer but thecase is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer butto the government. (Republic v. Sandoval 19 March 1993)

Step 2. If it is a suit against the State, determine if there is an expressconsent to be sued.

UNINCORPORATED GOVT AGENCIES: The State consents to besued on money claims involving liability arising from contract underAct 3083. But the claim must be filed with the Commission on Audit,under CA 327 and PD 1445.

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INCORPORATED GOVT AGENCIES: Express consent based ontheir charter. An incorporated government agencies may be used ifits charter expressly provides that it can sue and be sued.

Incorporated Govt Agencies could even be sued for torts.

LOCAL GOVTS: One of the corporate powers of local governmentunits is to sue and be sued. (See Section 22, Local GovernmentCode)

They are subject to suit even in the performance of suchfunctions because their charter provides that they can sueand be sued.

Step 3. If there is no express consent, determine if there is an impliedconsent to be sued.

Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the Stateitself:

commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim

or when it enters into a contract.o However, this doesnt apply when the contract

involves sovereign and governmental acts (jureimperii)

Step 4. Even if there is no consent, express or implied, determine if the

case falls under the exceptions to the general rule of state immunity fromsuit.

In these cases, the State may still be sued even if it has noconsent

a public officer may be sued to compel him to do an actrequired by law;

a public officer may be sued to restrain him from enforcing alaw claimed to be unconstitutional;

a public officer may be sued to compel an officer to paydamages from an already appropriate assurance fund or arevenue officer to refund tax overpayments from a fundalready available for such purpose;

an action may be filed to secure a judgment that the officerimpleaded may satisfy himself without the government itselfhaving to do a positive act to assist him;

where the government itself has violated its own laws, theaggrieved party may directly implead the government evenwithout first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit, asthe doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an

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instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Sanders v.Veridiano, 10 June 1988)

The doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve as aninstrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Amigable vsCuenca, February 29, 1972)

Step 5. Even if the State can be sued, determine if it is liable.

When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to givethe other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State hasa liability. (Department of Agriculture v. National Labor RelationsCommission, G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993)

Step 6. If the State is liable, determine if there can be execution against it.

Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed,the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. (Cityof Caloocan v. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003)

Unincorporated Govt Agencies: Disbursements of public funds mustbe covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.(Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission,G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993)

o Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment.

o Funds and properties of unincorporated government

agencies are exempt from execution and garnishment. Public funds of local governments are not subject to execution.

o There must be an appropriation as required by law (in the

form of an ordinance)

Funds and properties of incorporated government agencies may besubject to execution.

Step 7. If execution is not allowed, determine how recovery can be madeagainst the State.

Money claims against unincorporated government agencies mustbe filed with the Commission on Audit (Act 3083 in relation to CA327 and PD 1445).

III.

PIL Doctrines laid down inProvince of North Cotabato vs Republic (G.R. No. 183591, October

14, 2008)

Construction of the term first nation

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Brion, J.:

Facts:

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena Cityfor three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term ofoffice, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relationwith a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently liftedthe Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing thefunctions of his office and finished his term.

Issue:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption ofhis term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA7160, or the Local Government Code)?

Ruling:

General requisites for the application of the three term limit

1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms inthe same local government post; and

2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms

Construction of the three term limit

Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gavefull effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent tostrictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, theCourt signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule . Effectively,these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor oflimitation rather than its exception.

Construction of the word interruptionThe interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title tooffice. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a lengthof time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to bethe case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to befaithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to

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no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as anexample and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Nature of preventive suspension

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barredfrom performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in themeanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is aconsequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Ruling of the Court in the case at bar

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands thatpreventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allowsan elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventivesuspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspendedofficial continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising thefunctions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. Thebest indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absenceof a permanent replacementand the lack of the authority to appointone since no vacancy exists.

Montebon vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 180444, April 09, 2008

Interruption of the three term limit

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

Respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive termsas municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his secondterm in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeededas vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L.Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position ofmunicipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents succession to the office of Vice Mayor interruptsthe application of the three term limit for the position of municipal councilor?

Ruling:

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Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. It is cleartherefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way beconsidered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in thecomputation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severancefrom office for any length of time short of the full term provided bylaw amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether toaccept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Codemakes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanentlyunable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned beconsidered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law.Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office thathe is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if forsome reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the postvacated.

Laceda, Sr. vs. Limena

G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008


QUISUMBING,J.:

Facts:

Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for threeconsecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was elected for hisfirst two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he servedhis third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged withthe Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon ,pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.

Issue:

Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the newpolitical unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.

Ruling:

While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogonand Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the

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former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be saidthat for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No.9164, the office ofPunong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality ofSorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post asthat of the office ofPunong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City.

The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City , is the sameas before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay arethe same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be theirPunong Barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda heldpower and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806did not interrupt Lacedas term.

Bolos, Jr. vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 184082 March 17, 2009


PERALTA,J.:

Facts:

For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position ofPunongBarangayof Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in1994, 1997 and 2002.

In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay ofBarangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol andwon. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving hispost as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayanposition, which was until June 30, 2007.

Issue:

Can it be said that the petitioner voluntarily renounced his office?

Ruling:

The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term ofoffice for barangayofficials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretionto fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. Thediscussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of officeofbarangay officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and moreprecisely, [a]s provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 43(b)of the Local Government Code provides that barangayofficials are coveredby the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term ofoffice ofbarangayofficials shall be five (5) years.

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Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipalcouncilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as PunongBarangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikelythat respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the SangguniangBayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote forhim as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his formerposition. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entailabandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it.Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation oflaw. He instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangayduring his thirdterm when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member ofDauis, Bohol , which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office ofPunong Barangay.

Construction of the term by operation of law

The term operation of law is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopediaas a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by theeffect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected. Black's LawDictionary also defines it as a term that expresses the manner in which

rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mereapplication to the particular transaction of the established rules of law,without the act or cooperation of the party himself.

Dizon vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 182088 January 30, 2009


CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Moralesduring his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being acandidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales wereconsidered stray votes.

Issue:

What is the effect of Supreme Court decision which was promulgated a daybefore the 2007 elections?

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Ruling:

Our ruling in the Rivera caseserved as Morales involuntary severance fromoffice with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from officefor any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to aninterruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case waspromulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day,Morales notified the vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayorassumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. Theassumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short

it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus,Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.

We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for thefollowing periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1

July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However,because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor forthe 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor ofMabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served thefull term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before theexpiration of the term.

Note: If the Rivera decision was promulgated after Morales term then theresult would have been different.

Akbayan v. Aquino

G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008

JPEPA

Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens andtaxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition toobtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines EconomicPartnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offerssubmitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments andannexes thereto.

Issue:

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Can the petitioners, by invoking their right to information on matters of publicconcern, succeed?

Ruling:

No, the negotiations between the Philippine and Japanese representatives areprotected by the deliberative process privilege.

JPEPA is a matter of public concern

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it isevident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during thenegotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.

What is the scope of deliberative process privilege?

the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, mustconstitute definite propositions by the government and should not coverrecognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomaticsecrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

How to overcome the executive privilege claimed by the publicrespondents

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can beovercome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to bemade flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberativeprocess privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a freshbalancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as"the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "theseriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the"possibility of future timidity by government employees.

Note: Diplomatic negotiations come within the ambit of executive privilege.Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as wellas of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of thenegotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working draftsof opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.

Note: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, isregarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the

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country's sole representative with foreign nations. The Senate, as a form oflimitation to the power of the President, may concur upon the two-thirds voteof all its Members.

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