{Alleged Neglect, failure to communicate, and conduct ...briefwhich violated several sections ofIllinois Supreme Court Rule 341. ANSWER: Admitted that an order was entered and that

BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD

OF THE

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION

AND

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

JEFFREY SCOTT HARRIS,

Attorney-Respondent

No. 6197483.

ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMES the Respondent, Jeffrey Scott Harris, by his attorney, Kathryne Hayes, and

denying the allegations of the prefatory statement, Answers the First Amended Complaint as

follows:

COMMISSION RULE 231 STATEMENT

Respondent was licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois on May 13, 1988.

Respondent is admitted to practice law in the Northern District of Illinois; Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Respondent holds no other professional licenses.

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

1. At all times alleged in this complaint, Respondent owned and operated The LawOffices of Jeffrey S. Harris (hereinafter, "Respondent's law firm"), and was thesole attorney operating and providing services as part of that entity.

ANSWER: Admitted.

COUNT I

{Alleged Neglect, failure to communicate, and conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, ormisrepresentation - Christina Colon)

2. At all times alleged in this count, Respondent also worked for a law firm entitledAttorneys Serving You, which was owned and operated by attorney Gary Paul

Commission No. 2017PR00044

RaquelT

Filed - ARDC Clerk - Today's Date

McFarling (hereinafter "McFarling"). Attorneys Serving You employedRespondent on an as-needed basis in the representation of its clients.

ANSWER: Admitted.

3. On April 14, 2015, Mitchel Mursau (hereinafter "Mursau") through his attorney,Kim Coggins (hereinafter "Coggins"), filed a petition for dissolution of marriagefrom Mursau's then-wife Christina Colon (hereinafter "Colon") in the CircuitCourt of Marinette County, Wisconsin, docketed as Mursau v. Colon, casenumber 15-FA-55. At the time of filing, Mursau resided in Wisconsin, whileColon resided in Illinois.

ANSWER: Admitted.

4. On June 9, 2015, Colon, McFarling and Respondent agreed that AttorneysServing You, through Respondent, would represent Colon in a separate butrelated domestic relations action in which Colon sought to pursue a dissolution ofmarriage from Mursau in Illinois. At that time, the parties agreed that Colonwould pay Attorneys Serving You a legal fee of $300 per hour, and that Colonwould deposit with McFarling an initial $500 security retainer.

ANSWER: Admitted.

5. On June 9, 2015, McFarling filed in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois,a petition for court to exercise jurisdiction, as well as a petition for dissolution ofmarriage. The matter was docked as Colon v. Mursau, case number2015D001228, and assigned to the Hon. Linda Davenport (hereinafter "JudgeDavenport").

ANSWER: Admitted.

6. As Colon's June 9, 2015 petition for dissolution of marriage involved questions ofchild custody and matters affecting the best interests of Colon and Mursau's threechildren, Colon requested through her petition for court to exercise jurisdictionthat the Illinois court exercise jurisdiction over her matter pursuant to the UniformChild Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, as Illinois, and not Wisconsin,was the home state of Colon's three children.

ANSWER: Admitted.

7. On June 17, 2015, following the filing of Colon's petitions in the DuPage CountyCircuit Court, Respondent appeared in court on behalf of Colon, and continued toappear on her behalf throughout the remainder of the DuPage County CircuitCourt matter.

ANSWER: Admitted.

8. On August 19, 2015, following a telephone conference with a Wisconsincommissioner in Colon's Wisconsin matter, Judge Davenport entered an orderfinding that the Wisconsin court had not declined jurisdiction and was aconvenient jurisdiction for the parties, and as a result, dismissed Colon's DuPageCounty Circuit Court petition, due to lack ofjurisdiction.

ANSWER: Admitted that there was a telephone conference and that an order was entered and

that the order speaks for itself. Any remaining allegations are denied.

9. Between August 19, 2015 and September 18, 2015, Colon and Respondent agreedthat Respondent's law firm would file an appeal on her behalf in relation to theDuPage County Circuit Court order entered on August 19, 2015, described inparagraph 8, above. Colon and Respondent also agreed that Respondent wouldrepresent Colon in all matters related to Colon's appeal. Colon and Respondentdid not enter into a separate fee agreement for Respondent's representation inColon's appellate matter.

ANSWER: Admitted. Respondent further states that Respondent did not charge Ms. Colon for

the appeal and that she paid a portion of the costs incurred.

10. On September 18, 2015, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in the SecondDistrict Appellate Court of Illinois (hereinafter "Appellate Court"), appealingfrom the DuPage County Circuit Court's August 19, 2015 order, described inparagraph 8, above. The clerk docketed the matter as Colon v. Mursau, GeneralNumber 2-15-0948. Respondent filed the appeal under Respondent's law firm,and as the attorney of record for Colon.

ANSWER: Respondent admits that he timely filed a Notice of Appeal in the trial court and that

the Notice of Appeal speaks for itself.

11. On October 26, 2015, the Appellate Court entered an order setting a briefingschedule in Colon's matter. The order stated that the record on appeal orcertificate was to be filed no later than October 23, 2015, that the appellant's briefwas to be filed no later than November 13, 2015, that the appellee's brief was tobe filed no later than December 4, 2015, and the reply brief was to be filed nolater than December 11, 2015. Respondent received the October 26, 2015 ordershortly after it was entered.

ANSWER: Admitted thata briefing schedule order was entered on October 26, 2015. The order

is nonsensical and speaks for itself. Respondent admits receiving the briefing schedule order

shortly after it was entered.

12. Respondent did not file a record on appeal or certificate by October 23, 2016.

ANSWER: Denied as alleged.

13. On November 13, 2015, 21 days after the Appellate Court's deadline, Respondentfiled a motion titled "Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief," in which herequested an extension of time until December 1, 2015 to file both the record onappeal as well as Colon's brief.

ANSWER: Admitted that Respondent filed a motion seeking an extension of time and that the

motion speaks for itself. The remaining allegations are denied as alleged.

14. On November 18, 2015, by way of written order, the Appellate Court deniedRespondent's request for an extension of time to file the brief, and ordered thatprior to filing any other motions to extend, Respondent was required to file amotion to file the common law record instanter, as well as a motion to supplementthe record on appeal with the report of proceedings when complete. Respondentreceived the November 18, 2015 order shortly after it was entered.

ANSWER: Admitted that an order was entered and that the order speaks for itself; admitted that

Respondent received the order.

15. As of December 14, 2015, Respondent had not filed any record on appeal, motionto file the common law record instanter, motion to supplement the record onappeal with report of proceedings, or appellate brief. On the same date, theAppellate Court, on its own motion, ordered Respondent to file the brief withinseven days, or the court would dismiss the appeal. Respondent received theDecember 14, 2015 order shortly after it was entered.

ANSWER: The first sentence of paragraph 15 is denied as alleged. Admitted that the Appellate

Court entered an order on December 14, 2015 and that the order entered speaks for itself.

Respondent admits that he received the order. Any remaining allegations are denied.

16. On December 21, 2015, without filing any of the pleadings required by theAppellate Court's November 18, 2015 order, Respondent filed Colon's brieftitled"Appellant's Briefon Appeal." In addition to the brief, Respondent also submitteda "Certificate of Compliance" dated December 22, 2015 in which Respondentcertified that the brief conformed to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341. IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 341, under Article III of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules,titled Civil Appeals Rules, specifies the form, style, and length requirements ofappellate briefs, as well as the inclusion of a certificate of compliance, number ofbrief copies to be served, and citations. 111. Sup. Ct. R. 341.

ANSWER: Admitted that on December 21, 2015 Respondent filed a document titled

"Appellant's Brief on Appeal" and that the document speaks for itself. Denied that Respondent

failed to file "pleadings." Any remaining allegations are denied. In further answer, Respondent

states that at the time Respondent filed an appellate brief on Ms. Colon's behalf, Second District

Appellate Court Rule 106 (2015) governed certain accelerated cases pending before the Second

District Appellate Court of Illinois. A copy of Second District Appellate Court Rule 106 (2015)

is attached as Exhibit 1.

17. The brief Respondent filed, described in paragraph 16, above, did not conform tothe requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 in that the brief was notdouble-spaced, did not state any nature of the action, did not contain any points orauthorities, did not contain any statement of the issue or issues presented forreview, did not contain any statement of jurisdiction, and contained no statementfacts with record citations. In addition, Respondent's Certificate of Complianceincorrectly stated that the brief was 31 pages long, when it was in fact only ninepages.

ANSWER: Denied that the filing was improper. The document complied with the Second

District Appellate Court's Local Rule 106, which modified the requirements of 111. Sup. Ct. R.

341. Respondent states that the memorandum substantially complied with the Second District's

Local Rule except that the memorandum was not double-spaced. Respondent further states that

the brief was not 31 pages in length and that the Certificate of Compliance, which was not

required by Local Rule 106, contained a typographical error. Any remaining allegations are

denied.

18. One day later, on December 22, 2015, Respondent filed a motion titled "Motionto Supplement Common Law Record with Report of Proceedings in this MatterInstanter" along with a separate motion titled "Motion to File Common LawRecord Instanter."

ANSWER: Admitted. The motions speaks for themself.

19. On December 24, 2015, the Appellate Court entered an order dismissing Colon'sappeal with prejudice, and stated in its order that the dismissal was due toRespondent's failure to comply with its November 18, 2015 order and for filing abrief which violated several sections of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341.

ANSWER: Admitted that an order was entered and that the order speaks for itself.

20. Shortly after December 24, 2015, Respondent informed Colon that her appeal hadbeen dismissed based on the merits of her case, and that her case would need toproceed in Wisconsin. Respondent further explained to Colon that the AppellateCourt made the correct decision in finding that the trial court had ruled on hermatter correctly.


21. At the time Respondent informed Colon of the reason for the Appellate Court'sdismissal of her appeal, his statement to her was false because the Appellate Courthad entered its order stating that Colon's appeal had been dismissed withprejudice based on Respondent's failure to comply with the November 18, 2015order and filing a brief that violated several sections of Illinois Supreme CourtRule 341.

ANSWER: Denied.

22. At the time Respondent informed Colon of the reason for the Appellate Court'sdismissal of her appeal, Respondent knew the information he provided to Colonwas false because Respondent had received each of the Appellate Court orders,dated October 26, 2015, November 18, 2015, December 14, 2015, and December24, 2015, and was aware of the findings made within those orders, none of whichstated the dismissal was based on the merits of Colon's appeal.

ANSWER: Denied.

23. At no point did Respondent inform Colon of the written order dismissing herappeal, or that the Appellate Court had dismissed her matter with prejudice basedon Respondent's failure to follow previously entered court orders and deadlines.

ANSWER: Denied.

24. At no point did Respondent inform Colon the reason for the Appellate Court'sdismissal of her appeal with prejudice, or that the dismissal was due to his failureto follow previously entered court orders.

ANSWER: Denied.

25. As a result of Respondent's failure to follow the Appellate Court's orders, Colonwas unable to proceed in any way with her appeal.

ANSWER: Denied.

26. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in thefollowing misconduct:

a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing aclient, by conduct including failure to take sufficient action in advancingColon's pending appeal in relation to her dissolution of marriage matter, inviolation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

ANSWER: Denied.

b.

ANSWER: Denied.

ANSWER: Denied.

failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the client'smatter, by conduct including failing to inform Colon of the reason for thecourt's dismissal of her appeal with prejudice in relation to her dissolutionof marriage matter, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(3) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010); and

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, byconduct including informing Colon that her appeal had been dismissedbased on the merits of her case and research he had performed, when infact the Appellate Court had dismissed Colon's appeal with prejudicespecifically because of Respondent's actions and failure to comply withcourt orders, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010).

COUNT II

{Alleged Neglect, and failure to communicate-.]ose Reyes)

27. On August 26, 2013, Jose Reyes ("Reyes") filed a petition to establish parentageof his minor child in relation to Eleanor Conway ("Conway"). The action wascaptioned In re Parentage of Jose Reyes and Eleanor Conway, case number2013D080389, filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Domestic RelationsDivision, and initially assigned to the Hon. Lionel Jean-Baptiste ("Judge Jean-Baptiste").

ANSWER: Admitted. Respondent further states that he did not represent Mr. Reyes during this

time period.

28. In his parentage petition, Reyes sought to establish parentage, joint custody, and aparenting schedule for the parties' minor child, K. R.


time period.

29. On October 7, 2013, Judge Jean-Baptiste entered an order finding Reyes to be thefather of K. R., setting a schedule for parenting time, and continued the matter toNovember 19, 2013 for a status on other outstanding matters. On November 19,2013, Conway filed a petition for child support, seeking, in part, the entry of achild support order for 20 percent of Reyes' earnings for the support of K. R.


time period.

30. Between November 19, 2013 and March 25, 2014, the court entered variousorders in relation to outstanding matters in case number 2013D080389, includingparenting time modifications, and an initial order for child support.


time period.

31. On March 25, 2014, following a hearing in relation to the modification of childsupport, Judge Jean-Baptiste entered an order requiring Reyes, in part, to pay$979 per month for child support, and $200 per month for arrears on an arrearsjudgment of $11,900, to Conway. The order further required that Reyes was tomake payments to the Illinois State Disbursement Unit ("SOU"), and that, absentany modifications, Reyes' child support obligation would end on June 19, 2030.


time period.

32. Between March 25, 2014 and February 2017, during the pendency of Reyes'parentage and child support action, the court heard matters and entered orders, inpart, relating to custody, visitation, modifications to child support, and namechanges regarding K. R.

ANSWER: Paragraph 32 is non-specific, vague and cannot be answered. Respondent states that

the court record speaks for itself. Respondent further states that he did not represent Mr. Reyes

during this time period.

33. On or around February 16, 2017, while Reyes' parentage and child support actionagainst Conway was still pending, Respondent and Reyes agreed that Respondentwould represent Reyes in relation to his parentage and child support action in casenumber 2013D080389. At that time, the parties agreed that Respondent's legal feefor his representation of Reyes in his parentage and child support action would bean initial flat fee of $400, and that Respondent would bill $275 on an hourly basisfor his work related to the matter thereafter.


34. On or about February 17, 2017, Reyes made a $400 payment to Respondent,based on their agreement, described in paragraph 33, above.

ANSWER: Admitted that a $400 payment was made; denied as alleged.

35. On March 15, 2017, at a status hearing in court before the Hon. Abbey FishmanRomanek ("Judge Romanek"), Respondent filed his appearance on Reyes' behalf,and the court entered an agreed order continuing the matter to April 26, 2018, fora status hearing on future petitions which Harris anticipated filing on Reyes'behalf.


36. On March 27, 2017, Conway, represented by the law firm of Avery CamerlingoKill, LLC, filed two pleadings. The first was a motion entitled "Motion to EnforceJudgment and Court Order Entered on September 8, 2016 and Compel thePayment of Funds" ("motion to enforce judgment"). Conway's motion to enforcejudgment requested that the court enforce a previous court order requiring Reyesto pay $17,500 towards Conway's interim attorneys' fees.

ANSWER: Admitted that documents were filed with the court and those documents speak for

themselves.

37. The second pleading Conway filed on March 27, 2017 was entitled "Petition for aRule to Show Cause and for a Finding of Indirect Civil Contempt of Court, andfor Other Relief for Non-Payment of Support" ("petition for rule to show cause").Conway's petition for rule to show cause requested that the court find Reyes inindirect civil contempt for his failure to make payments towards child support and

arrears due in owing for K. R., based on the Uniform Child Support Order enteredby Judge Jean-Baptiste on March 25, 2014, described in paragraph 31, above.


themselves.

38. Conway's motion to enforce judgment and petition for rule to show cause,described in paragraphs 36 and 37, above, were scheduled for presentment beforeJudge Romanek on April 5, 2017.


themselves.

39. On April 5, 2017, during a status hearing for presentment on Conway's motionand petition, described in paragraphs 36 and 37, above, Respondent did notappear in court on Reyes behalf, and Judge Romanek entered two orders, issuinga rule to show cause against Reyes for his failure to pay child support, andgranting Reyes 28 days to respond to Conway's motion to enforce judgment andpetition for rule to show cause. Judge Romanek also struck the April 26, 2017status date, and continued the matter to May 19, 2017 for a hearing on Conway'smotion to enforce judgment and petition for rule to show cause.

ANSWER: Admitted that Respondent did not appear in court on April 5, 2017 on behalfof Mr.

Reyes and that the orders entered on that date speak for themselves.

40. As of May 3, 2017, the date by which Respondent was required to respond toConway's motion to enforce judgment and petition for rule to show causepursuant to Judge Romanek's April 5, 2017 court order, described in paragraph39, above, Respondent had not filed any responses in relation to either pleading.

ANSWER: Admitted that no written response was filed.

41. On May 19, 2017, at a hearing on Conway's motion to enforce judgment andpetition for rule to show cause. Respondent and Reyes appeared in court, andRespondent filed another appearance on Reyes' behalf, as well as responses toConway's motion to enforce judgment and petition for rule to show cause.

ANSWER: Admitted.

42. On May 19, 2017, following the hearing, Judge Romanek entered an order findingReyes in indirect civil contempt of court for his failure to pay child support perthe court's March 25, 2014 order. Judge Romanek further found that, as of thatdate, Reyes owed Conway a total of $3,083.88 for unpaid child support, ordered

10

Respondent to pay $750 towards his contempt of court purge on or before June22, 2017, and continued the matter for status on Reyes' purge payments, andConway's pending motion to enforce judgment, to June 22, 2017.

ANSWER: Admitted.

43. On or about June 6, 2017, Reyes made an additional $1,000 payment toRespondent, based on their agreement, described in paragraph 33, above.

ANSWER: Admitted that Mr. Reyes paid $1,000. Denied that the agreement is accurately

described in paragraph 33.

44. On June 22, 2017, at the status hearing on Reyes' payments towards his contemptof court purge, and Conway's motion to enforce judgment, Respondent appearedin court on Reyes' behalf, and attorney Samantha Donne ("Donne") appeared incourt on Conway's behalf. Reyes did not appear in court.

ANSWER: Admitted.

45. On June 22, 2017, Judge Romanek entered an order, agreed to by the parties,finding that Reyes made one $750 payment in relation to his contempt of courtpurge, and that Reyes would pay an additional $750 to Conway for unpaid childsupport by July 26, 2017 at 11:00 a.m. Judge Romanek further ordered Reyes toremain current on his child support payments, per the court's March 25, 2014order, described in paragraph 31, above, and continued the matter for a status onpayments and Conway's petition for interim attorneys' fees to July 26, 2017.

ANSWER: Admitted.

46. At no time on or before June 22, 2017 did Respondent consult with Reyes aboutReyes' ability or agreement to make an additional $750 payment to Conway, inrelation to Reyes' contempt of court purge for unpaid child support.


47. At no time on or after June 22, 2017 did Respondent inform Reyes thatRespondent had agreed on Reyes' behalf to make an additional $750 payment toConway, that the court had ordered Reyes to make an additional $750 payment toConway in relation to Reyes' unpaid child support by July 26, 2017, that Reyes'case had been continued to July 26, 2017, or the reason for the court's continuanceof Reyes' case.

ANSWER: Denied.

11

48. On July 26, 2017, at the status hearing in relation to Reyes' additional $750payment to Conway, Donne and Conway appeared in court, but neitherRespondent nor Reyes appeared in court. Donne called Respondent by telephoneto inquire of Respondent's appearance in court that day. Respondent did notanswer or return Donne's telephone calls, nor did Respondent inform the court ofhis absence in court that day.

ANSWER: Admitted.

49. On July 26, 2017, following the status hearing in relation to Reyes' additional$750 payment to Conway, Judge Romanek entered two orders. In the first order,Judge Romanek issued a civil arrest warrant, known as a body attachment, againstReyes, finding that Reyes and Respondent had actual notice of the July 26, 2017court date, that neither appeared in court, that Reyes continued to owe a total of$9,018.09 in unpaid child support, and ordering the Cook County Sheriff, or anyother duly deputized law enforcement agent, to arrest Reyes and place Reyes intotheir custody.

ANSWER: Admitted that orders were entered and that those orders speak for themselves.

50. In the second order entered on July 26, 2017, Judge Romanek granted Conway'spetition for attorneys' fees and entered a judgment against Reyes for $1,896,found that Reyes had failed to make the additional $750 payment, previouslyagreed to by Respondent on June 22, 2017, and took the matter off the court'sdocket until the body attachment against Reyes was executed.

ANSWER: Admitted that an order was entered and that the order speaks for itself.

51. At no time on or before July 26, 2017 did Respondent inform Judge Romanek,Conway, Donne or Reyes that he would not be appearing in court on July 26,2018, or provide any reason for his failure to appear.


52. At no time on July 26, 2017 did Respondent inform Reyes that the court hadissued a body attachment against him.

ANSWER: Denied as alleged. On information and belief, Ms. Conway informed Reyes of the

entry of the order on the same day it was entered, July 26, 2017.

53. On July 26, 2017 following the court hearing, after communicating with Conwaydirectly, Reyes learned that Respondent did not appear in court on July 26, 2017on Reyes' behalf, and that the court had issued a body attachment against Reyes.

ANSWER: Admitted.

12

54. On July 27, 2017, Reyes called Respondent by telephone, and sent Respondent atext message asking that Respondent contact Reyes as soon as possible. On thatsame date, Respondent called Reyes by telephone that explained that Respondenthad written the incorrect court date down on his calendar as his reason for notappearing in court.

ANSWER: Admitted.

55. At no time between July 27, 2017 and May 14, 2018, did Respondent take anyaction in relation to Reyes' domestic relations matter, and the body attachmentagainst Reyes issued by Judge Romanek on July 26, 2017 remained outstanding.

ANSWER: Denied.

56. On May 14, 2018, Respondent filed a motion entitled "Motion to Reduce Purgeand to Quash the Body Attachment and for the Hearing to Set Current ChildSupport" ("motion to reduce the purge and quash the body attachment") inrelation to Reyes' domestic relations matter. Respondent's motion was scheduledfor presentment on May 22, 2018.

ANSWER: Admitted.

57. On May 22, 2018, following the presentment of Respondent's motion to reducethe purge and quash the body attachment, filed May 14, 2018, described inparagraph 56, above, Judge Romanek entered two orders, which modified theprior body attachment, issued on July 26, 2017, reducing the bond from $2,500 to$1,500, and continued the matter to July 9, 2018, for a status hearing in relation toa future motion to set child support.

ANSWER: Admitted.

58. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in thefollowing misconduct:

a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing aclient, by conduct including failure to take sufficient action in advancing hisclient, Jose Reyes' pending domestic relations matter, in violation of Rule 1.3of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010);

ANSWER: Denied.

failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the client'smatter, by conduct including failing to inform Reyes of court ordered childsupport payments, and failing to inform Reyes of the court's July 26, 2017issuance of a body attachment against Reyes in relation to his domestic

13

relations matter, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(3) of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct (2010).

ANSWER: Denied.

WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully requests that this cause be considered and that the

Hearing Board make a just recommendation.

Kathryne Hayes ([email protected])COLLINS BARGIONE & VUCKOVICH

One North LaSalle Street, Suite 300Chicago, Illinois 60602Telephone: (312)372-7813

14

2015 III. IndDht. Am)., R 106

2015 Illinois Court Rules Archive

ILLINOIS COURT RULES ANNOTATED > RULES OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT > ARTICLE I. GENERAL RULES

Rule 106. Certain cases accelerated

(a)In addition to the categories of cases listed in Supreme Court Rules 311(a) and 660A, the Court willalso accelerate appeals from orders granting or denying petitions for removal.

(b)In order to expedite appeals under Supreme Court Rules 311(a) and 660A and this Local Rule,parties may file memoranda in lieu of formal briefs. Such memoranda need not comply with all therequirements applicable to formal briefs but must comply with the requirements of Supreme CourtRules 341(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j), and Local Rule 102.

(c)All accelerated cases shall adhere to the following schedule:

(l)The record on appeal (or certificate in lieu of record), including the common-law record andthe transcript of proceedings, shall be filed no later than 35 days after the filing of the notice ofappeal. Any request for extension of the time for filing shall be accompanied by an affidavit ofthe court clerk or court reporter stating the reason for the delay, and shall be served on the trialjudge and the chief judge of the circuit. Lack of advance payment shall not be a reason fornoncompliance with filing deadlines.

(2)The appellant's brief or memorandum in lieu of a formal brief must be filed within 28 daysof the filing of the record or certificate with the Court.

(3)The appellee's brief or memorandum in lieu of a formal brief must be filed within 28 daysthereafter.

(4)Any reply brief or memorandum in lieu of a formal brief must be filed within 7 daysthereafter.

(5)In the case of a cross-appeal, the cross-replybrief or memorandum in lieu of a formal briefmust be filed within 7 days thereafter.

(d)Motions for extension of time are disfavoredand shall be granted only for compellingcircumstances.

(1)A motion for an extension must comply with Local Rule 103(a).

(2)When a motion for an extension is basedon a delay in the preparation of the record,themotion shall detail the proceedings at the status hearing required by Supreme Court Rule311(a)(3) or 660A(b), including the trial court's determination of the status of thecase, the trialjudge's actions to expedite the preparation of the record, and whether the trial judge hasrequested the chief judge's assistance inresolving any filing delays. The motion shall alsoattach a file-stamped copy of any order entered at the status hearing andan affidavit of theclerk or court reporter stating the reason for the delay.

EXHIBIT

1

Page 2 of 22015111. 2nd Dist.App.,R 106

(3)A motion for an extension must be filed at least 10 days prior to the date to be extended ifserved by mail orby third-party commercial carrier orat least 5 days prior to the date to beextended if servedpersonally, by facsimile, or by e-mail.

(4)The Court may require a personal appearance by the attorney orparty requesting theextension.

(e)Motions should be served personally, by facsimile, orby e-mail whenever possible.

(f)Before filing any motion, a party shall confer with opposing counsel and inquire as to whetheropposing counsel intends to file an objection. The results of that inquiry shall be stated inthe motion.

History

Amended effective January 8,2008; amended effective April 6,2010; amended effective April 7,2011;amended effective March 4, 2014

ILLINOIS COURT RULES ANNOTATED

Copyright ©2018 by Matthew Bender &Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.

i'.nd of Document

KATHRYNE HAYES

Documents

{Alleged Neglect, failure to communicate, and conduct ...briefwhich violated several sections ofIllinois Supreme Court Rule 341. ANSWER: Admitted that an order was entered and that