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CASE STUDY: 1 AMSTERDAM AIR CRASH
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Separation of an engine from a 747-200 cargo aircraft resulted in a catastrophic
aircraft accident near Amsterdam. The engine separated, together with its pylon owing to
fatigue and fracture of components connecting the pylon to the wing. These components werehigh strength steel lugs and two "fuse pins". One fuse pin was not recovered, but the other
one and the lugs were investigated to find the most probable cause and sequence of damage
leading to separation. The #3 engine and pylon separated from the right wing in an outboard
and rearward direction. The #3 engine hit the #4 engine, causing this engine and its pylon
also to separate from the wing. During engine separation the right wing leading edge was
extensively damaged. This damage, together with loss of the engines, made control of the
aircraft extremely difficult and aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed into an apartment
block in a suburb 13 km east of Schiphol.
1.2 INVESTIATION
Fig 1.1 is a schematic of the engine pylon-to-wing connections. The design
incorporates six "fuse pins" which are less strong than other parts of the connections. If
extreme loads occur on an engine and pylon, the fuse pins made from 4330M, a high strength
low alloy steel, are supposed to shear off and allow a clean separation from the wing, thereby
precluding damage to the wing and possible rupture of the wing fuel tank.
Fig: 1.1 Pylon-to-wing connections
However, as found in the present case, and at least one other, engine and pylon
separation was accompanied by severe damage to the wing leading edge. Macroscopic
inspection of the components indicated that the upper link and diagonal brace had broken
away owing to overload as the # 3 engine and pylon separated in an outboard direction.
Fig: 1.2 shows the mid-spar pylon fittings. Each has two lugs that had been connected
via fuse pins to two male lugs on each mid-spar wing fitting. The lugs on the outboard pylon
fitting were unbroken but had witness marks indicative of scraping, as did the base of the
throat between the lugs. However, the outer lug of the inboard pylon fitting was broken.
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Detailed examination by the NLR showed that this lug had failed by a combination of tensile
and bending overload. From these results two main conclusions were drawn:
The missing inboard mid-spar fuse pin must have failed such that the outer lug of theinboard mid-spar pylon fitting took the entire load at this connection. Only thus is it
possible to explain overload failure of the lug by tension and bending
During failure of the inboard mid-spar connection the male lugs of the wing fittingmoved outward from the throat of the lugs on the pylon fitting. On the other hand,
failure of the outboard mid-spar connection resulted in the male lugs of the wing
fitting moving into the throat of the lugs on the pylon fitting, thereby producing
witness marks.
(a): Inboard (b): outboard (c): failed fuse pin
Fig 1.2: The lugs of the mid-spar pylon fittings.
Fig: 1.2(c) gives two macroscopic views of the outboard fracture surface of the fusepin. The partially separated sliver in figure contains a fatigue crack originally parallel to the
coarse machining grooves on the inside wall of the fuse pin. Fig: 1.2(c) is a detail of the
fatigue crack, which initiated at multiple origins along one or more machining grooves and
progressed to at least half the wall thickness before overload. The stresses causing fatigue
crack initiation were due to fuse pin bending. Fig: 1.3shows the most probable sequence ofevents
Fig: 1.3 Sequence of failure
1.3. REMEDIAL ACTIONS
Boeing instituted several remedial actions for the pylon-to-wing connections, some ofwhich are shown in figure 8. These actions were:
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A new design fuse pin made from corrosion resistant stainless steel and without thin-walled locations, compare Fig 1.4(a) and (b). This type of pin has a much improved
resistance to fatigue.
(a): Old design (b): New design
Fig 1.4: Fuse pin
Two extra connections between the mid-spar pylon fittings. Larger mid-spar pylon fittings and stronger diagonal brace and upper link. These
remedial actions are to prevent an engine and pylon separating from the wing under
extreme loads in flight, i.e. the concept of clean separation during flight has been
abandoned.
CASE STUDY: 2 CRASH LANDING AT SIUONX CITY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Date: July 19, 1989 Type: Uncontained engine failure, complete loss of flight controls Site:Sioux City. United StatesPassengers 285 Crew: 11. Injuries: 174. Fatalities: 112. Survivors: 184 Aircraft typeMcDonnell Douglas DC-10-10. Flight origin: Stapleton International Destination: Philadelphia International Airport
2.2 INVESTIGATION
2.2.1 ACCIDENT SEQUENCE
The Safety Board determined that the accident sequence was initiated by a
catastrophic separation of the stage 1 fan disk from the No. 2 engine during cruise flight. The
separation, fragmentation, and forceful discharge of uncontained stage 1 fan rotor assembly
parts from the No. 2 engine led to the loss of the three hydraulic systems shown in fig 2.1 (a)
and (b) that powered the airplane's flight controls. The flight crew experienced severe
difficulties controlling the airplane and used differential power from the remaining two
engines for partial control. The airplane subsequently crashed during an attempted emergency
landing at Sioux Gateway Airport. Upon ground contact, the airplane broke apart and
portions of it were consumed by fire.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sioux_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sioux_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sioux_Cityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sioux_City8/2/2019 All Case Study
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(a) Three hydraulic system of aircraft (b) Damage caused by fractured disc
Fig 2.1
2.2.2 ANALYSIS OF FAN DISK FRACTURE
Examination of the fracture surfaces of the fan disk disclosed that the near-radial,
bore-to-rim fracture was the primary fracture. The fracture initiated from a fatigue region onthe inside diameter of the bore. The remaining portions of the disk fractures were typical of
overstress separations resulting from the fatigue failure. Because of the geometry of the fan
disk and the load paths within the disk, the near-radial fracture created a bending moment in
the disk arm and web that overstressed the disk, leading to rupture and release of a segment
2.3 RECOMMENDATION
Intensify research in the nondestructive inspection field. Use of fuse to stop excess amount of hydraulic fluid from ruptured parts
CASE STUDY: 3 CUTTING EDGE:
3.1 INTRODUCTIION
Date: January 31, 2000. Type: Mechanical failure, maintenance error Site: Pacific Ocean near Anacapa Island, California Passengers: 83 Crew: 5 Fatalities: 88 (all) Aircraft type: McDonnell Douglas MD-83 Flight origin: Lic. Gustavo Daz Ordaz International Airport Destination: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
3.2INVESTIGATION
A McDonnell Douglas MD-83, which crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles
north of Anacapa Island, California Safety issues discussed in this report include lubrication
and inspection of the jackscrew assembly, extension of lubrication and end play check
intervals, jackscrew assembly overhaul procedures, the design and certification of the MD-80
horizontal stabilizer trim control system.
As the jackscrew rotates it moves up or down through the (fixed) acme nut. This upand down motion moves the horizontal stabilizer for the trim system. The jackscrew was
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found with metallic filaments wrapped around it; these were later determined to be remnants
of the threads from the acme nut.
(a) Lead screw (b) Acme nut
Fig : 3.1
(a) Schematic diagram of screw jack (b) Mechanism of screw jack for
for horizontal stabilizer horizontal stabilizer
Fig no 3.2
Later analysis estimated that 90% of the threads in the acme nut had been previously
worn away, and that they were then completely sheared off during the accident flight. Once
the threads failed, the horizontal stabilizer assembly was then subject to aerodynamic forces
that it could not withstand, and ultimately failed. Based on the time since the last inspection
of the jackscrew assembly, the NTSB determined that the wear had occurred at a much faster
than average rate (0.012 inch per 1,000 flight hours, when the expected wear was 0.001 inch
per 1,000 flight hours). The NTSB considered a number of potential reasons for this
excessive wear, including the substitution by Alaska Airlines of Aeroshell 33 grease instead
of the previously approved lubricant, Mobilgrease 28. The use of Aeroshell 33 was found not
to be a factor in this accident. Insufficient lubrication of the components was also consideredas a reason for the wear. Examination of the jackscrew and acme nut revealed that no
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effective lubrication was present on these components at the time of the accident. Ultimately
the lack of lubrication, and resulting excessive wear of the threads, was determined to be the
direct causes of the accident.
3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
In the event of an inoperative or malfunctioning flight control system, if the airplaneis controllable they should complete only the applicable checklist procedures and
should not attempt any corrective actions beyond those specified.
Identify means to eliminate the catastrophic effects of that single-point failure modeand, if practicable, require that such fail-safe mechanisms be incorporated in the
design of all existing and future airplanes that are equipped with such horizontal
stabilizer trim systems
Proper lubrication system should be design for screw jack
CASE STUDY: 4 HANGING BY THREAD
4.1 INTRODUTION
Date: April 28, 1988. Type: Explosive decompression caused by fatigue failure. Site: Kahului, Hawaii. Passengers: 90. Crew: 5. Injuries: 65. Survivors: 94. Aircraft type: Boeing 737-297. Operator: Aloha Airlines. Flight origin: Hilo International Airport. Destination: Honolulu International Airport.
4.2 INVESTIGATIONAround 13:48, as the aircraft reached its normal flight altitude of 24,000 feet (7,300
m) about 23 nautical miles (43 km) south-southeast of Kahului, a small section on the left
side of the roof ruptured. The resulting explosive decompression tore off a large section of
the roof shown in fig 4.1 (a) and (b), consisting of the entire top half of the aircraft skin
extending from just behind the cockpit to the fore-wing area.
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Fig 4.1 (a) Fig 4.1 (b)
As part of the design of the 737, stress may be alleviated by controlled area
breakaway zones. The intent was to provide controlled depressurization that would maintain
the integrity of the fuselage structure. The age of the plane and the condition of the fuselage
(that had corroded and was stressing the rivets beyond their designed capacity) appear to haveconspired to render the design a part of the problem; when that first controlled area broke
away, according to the small rupture theory as shown in fig 4.2 (a) and (b), the rapid
sequence of events resulted in the failure sequence. This has been referred to as a zipper
effect.
(a) Basic construction of roof (b) Small rupture theory (c) Fatigue crack near rivet
Fig 4.2
Investigation by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion
causing fatigue cracks around riveted area as shown in fig 4.2(c) (the plane operated in a
coastal environment, with exposure to salt and humidity).The root cause of the problem was
failure of an epoxy adhesive used to bond the aluminum sheets of the fuselage together when
the B737 was manufactured. Water was able enter the gap where the epoxy failed to bond the
two surfaces together properly, and started the corrosion process. The age of the aircraft
became a key issue (it was 19 years old at the time of the accident and had sustained a
remarkable number of takeoff-landing cycles of 89,090, the second most cycles for a plane in
the world at the time of well beyond the 75,000 trips it was designed to sustain)
4.3 RECOMMENDATION
Discontinue classification of fuselage skin as "malfunction evident" or "damageobvious" on supplemental structural inspection documents. In addition, review all the
remaining structurally significant items in the damage obvious category for possible
inclusion in the Supplementary Inspection Program. Initiate a corrosion prevention and control program designed to afford maximum
protection from the effects of harsh operating environments
CASE STUDY: 5 OUT OF CONTROL
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Date: 12 August 1985 Type: Explosive decompression due to Maintenance Error Site: Mount Osutaka. Passengers: 509 Crew: 15
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Fatalities 520 Aircraft type: Boeing 747-SR46 Flight origin Tokyo International Airport Destination Osaka International Airport
5.2 INVESTIGATIONThe official cause of the crash according to the report published by Japan's then
Aircraft Accidents Investigation Commission is as follows:
The aircraft was involved in a tail strike incident at Osaka International Airport on 2June 1978, which damaged the aircraft's rear pressure bulkhead shown in fig 5.1
The subsequent repair of the bulkhead did not conform to Boeing's approved repairmethods. The Boeing technicians fixing the aircraft used two separate doubler plates,
one with two rows of rivets and one with only one row as shown in fig 5.1 (a) and (b),while their procedure calls for one continuous doubler plate with three rows of rivets
to reinforce the damaged bulkhead. This reduced the part's resistance to metal fatigue
by 70%. According to the FAA, the one "doubler plate" which was specified for the
job (the FAA calls it a "splice plate" - essentially a patch) was cut into two pieces
parallel to the stress crack it was intended to reinforce, "to make it fit".[14]
This
negated the effectiveness of two of the rows of rivets. During the investigation Boeing
calculated that this incorrect installation would fail after approximately 10,000
pressurizations; the aircraft accomplished 12,318 take-offs between the installation of
the new plate and the final accident.
(a) Two row riveting (b) One row riveting (c) failure due to single row
riveting
Fig 5.2
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When the bulkhead gave way, the resulting explosive decompression ruptured thelines of all four hydraulic systems. With the aircraft's flight controls disabled, the
aircraft became uncontrollable.
CASE STUDY 6: CHINA AIRLINES FLIGHT 611
6.1 INRODCTION
Date: 25 May 2002 Type: Flight structural failure (Metal fatigue), Explosive decompression, Maintenance
error.
Site: Taiwan Strait (37 km northeast of Makung, Penghu Islands). Passengers: 207 Crew: 18. Fatalities 225 (all) Aircraft type: Boeing 747-209B Operator China Airlines Flight origin: Chiang Kai-shek International Airport. Destination: Hong Kong International Airport
6.2 INVESTIGATION
Searchers recovered 15% of the wreckage, including part of the cockpit, and found no
signs of burns, explosives or gunshots.
There was no distress signal or communication sent out prior to the crash. Radar data
suggests that the aircraft broke into four pieces while at FL350. This theory is supported by
the fact that articles that would have been found inside the aircraft were found up to 80 miles
(130 km) from the crash site in villages in central Taiwan. The flight data recorder from
Flight 611 shows that the plane began gaining altitude at a significantly faster rate in the27 seconds before the plane broke apart, although the extra gain in altitude was well within
the plane's design limits.
6.2.1 Metal Fatigue
The final investigation report found that the accident was the result of metal fatigue as
shown in fig 6.1(a) caused by inadequate maintenance after a previous incident. The report findsthat on 7 February 1980, the accident aircraft suffered damage from a tail strike accident while
landing in Hong Kong. The aircraft was then ferried back to Taiwan on the same day de-pressurized,
and a temporary repair done the day after. A permanent repair was conducted by a team from China
Airlines from 23 May through 26 May 1980. However, the permanent repair of the tail strike was not
carried out in accordance with the Boeing SRM (Structural Repair Manual). The area of damaged
skin was not removed (trimmed) and the repair doubler which was supposed to cover in excess of
30% of the damaged area did not extend beyond the entire damaged area enough to restore the
overall structural strength. Consequently, after repeated cycles of depressurization and
pressurization during flight, the weakened hull gradually started to crack and finally broke open in
mid-flight on 25 May 2002, exactly 22 years to the day after the faulty repair was made upon the
damaged tail. An explosive decompression of the aircraft occurred once the crack opened up,
causing the complete disintegration of the aircraft in mid-air as shown in fig 6.1(b).
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Fig 6.1(a) Fig 6.1(b)
One piece of evidence of the metal fatigue is contained in pictures that were takenduring an inspection of the plane years before the disaster. In the pictures, there are visible
brown stains of nicotine around the doubler plate. This nicotine was deposited by smoke from
the cigarettes of people who were smoking about seven years before the disaster (smoking
was allowed in a pressurized plane at that time). The doubler plate had a brown nicotine stain
all the way around it that could have been detected visually by any of the engineers when
they inspected the plane. The stain would have suggested that there might be a crack caused
by metal fatigue behind the doubler plate, as the nicotine slowly seeped out due to pressure
that built up when the plane reached its cruising altitude. The stains were apparently not
noticed and no correction was made to the doubler plate, which eventually caused the plane
to disintegrate in mid air.
6.3 RECOMMENDATION
Aviation industries around the world immediately inspect the scratch on aircraft
pressure vessel, especially if covered under doubler plate as it could have hidden damage that
might develop into fatigue crack.
CASE STUDY 7: DERAILMENT AT ESCHEDA
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Date: 3 June 1998.
Time: 10:59. Location: Eschede, Germany. Operator: Deutsche Bahn AG. Type of incident: Derailment. Passengers: 287. Deaths: 101. Injuries: 88.
7.2 INVESTIGATION
7.2.1 Chronology of Events
Wheel fracture
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Six kilometres south of central Eschede, near Celle, the steel tire on a wheel
on the third axle of the first car broke, peeled away from the wheel, and punctured the
floor of the car, where it remained embedded as shown in fig 7.1 (a)
DerailmentAs the train passed over the first of two track switches, the embedded tire
slammed against the guide rail of the switch, pulling it from the railway ties. Thissteering rail also penetrated the floor of the car, becoming embedded in the vehicle
and lifting the axle carriage off the rails. At 10:59 local time, one of the now-derailed
wheels struck the points lever of the second switch, changing its setting. The rear
axles of car number 3 were switched onto a parallel track, and the entire car was
thereby thrown away from track. Car number 4, likewise derailed by the violent
deviation of car number 3.
Bridge collapseCoaches one and two cleared the bridge. Coach three hit the bridge, which
began to collapse. Coach four cleared the bridge, moved away from the track, and hit
a group of trees. Fig 7.1 (b)
Fig 7.1 (a) Fig 7.2(b)
7.2.2 CAUSES
7.2.2.1 WHEEL DESIGN
The ICE 1 trains were equipped with single-cast wheels, known as monoblock
wheels. Once in service it soon became apparent that this design could, as a result of metal
fatigue and out-of-round conditions, lead to resonance and vibration at cruising speed
In response, engineers decided that to solve the problem: the suspension of ICE carscould be improved with the use of a rubber damping ring between the tire and the wheel body
as shown in fig7.1 (a) and (b) This new wheel, dubbed a "wheel-tire" design, consisted of a
wheel body surrounded by a 20 mm thick rubber damper and then a relatively thin metal tire.
The following factors, overlooked during design, were noted:
1. The tires were flattened into an ellipse as the wheel turned through each revolution(approximately 500,000 times during a typical day in service on an ICE train), with
corresponding fatigue effects.
2. In contrast to the monoblock wheel design, cracks could also form on the inside of thetire.
3. As the tire became thinner due to wear, the dynamic forces were exaggerated,resulting in crack growth.
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4. Flat spots and ridges or swells in the tire dramatically increased the dynamic forces onthe assembly and greatly accelerated wear
.
Fig 7.2 (a) Fig 7.2 (b)
7.2.2.2 MAINTENANCEInvestigators discovered via a maintenance report generated by the train's on-board
computer that, two months prior to the Eschede disaster, conductors and other train staff filed
eight separate complaints about the noises and vibrations generated from the bogie with the
defective wheel; the company did not replace the wheel. Deutsche Bahn said that its
inspections were proper at the time and that the engineers could not have predicted the wheel
fracture.
7.3 REMEDIES
Within weeks, all wheels of similar design were replaced with monoblock wheels.The entire German railway network was checked for similar arrangements of switches
close to possible obstacles.
Rescue workers at the crash site experienced considerable difficulties in cutting theirway through the train to gain access to the victims. Both the aluminum framework
and the pressure-proof windows offered unexpected resistance to heavy rescue
equipment. As a result, all trains were refitted with windows that have predetermined
breaking points.
REFERENCES
http://www.ntsb.gov/ http://www.nationalgeographic.com/ http://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http://verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplei
n/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdf
http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cutting_Edge http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR89-03.pdf
http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-air_report/JA8119.pdf
http://www.ntsb.gov/http://www.ntsb.gov/http://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cutting_Edgehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cutting_Edgehttp://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR89-03.pdfhttp://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR89-03.pdfhttp://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-air_report/JA8119.pdfhttp://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-air_report/JA8119.pdfhttp://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/eng-air_report/JA8119.pdfhttp://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR89-03.pdfhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Cutting_Edgehttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR90-06.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20080626181929/http:/verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/kennisplein/uploaded/MIN/2005-07/39448/ElAl_flight_1862.pdfhttp://www.ntsb.gov/